

Nationalism, Intervention and Redistribution

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BRIAN BARRY

**NATIONALISM, INTERVENTION
AND REDISTRIBUTION**

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'-- Persecution, says he, all the history of the world is full of it. Perpetrating national hatred among nations.

-- But do you know what a nation means? says John Wyse.

-- Yes, says Bloom.

-- What is it? says John Wyse.

-- A nation? says Bloom. A nation is the same people living in the same place.

-- By God, then, says Ned, laughing, if that's so I'm a nation for I'm living in the same place for the past five years.

So of course everyone had the laugh at Bloom and says he, trying to muck out of it:

- Or also living in different places.

-- That covers my case, says Joe.

-- What is your nation if I may ask? says the citizen.

-- Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland.

The citizen said nothing only cleared the spit out of his gullet and, gob, he spat a Red Bank oyster out of him right in the corner.' (Joyce 1986: 271-2)

1. Introduction: Statism, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism

We live in a world of states. We also live in a world of nations. These are both important facts, though of different orders. States are legal entities. Even if the government is incapable of the most elementary state function - maintaining public order within its territory - a state exists so long as it is recognized by other states (see Jackson 1990). Nations are institutionally embodied only contingently. Ultimately, the existence of a nation turns on what goes on inside people's heads. This remark is not intended to be disparaging to the potency of the national idea. It is capable of tearing apart states, as in Bosnia; and it is capable of eliciting enormous sacrifices in the pursuit of national autonomy, as in East Timor or among the Kurds in Turkey at the present time. Three points seem to me most interesting about the state system and the idea of nationality: that each is associated with a supporting ideology; that these two ideologies are in a curious way parallel to one another; yet that they are necessarily in competition with one another because they occupy the same conceptual space, in a way that I shall explain.

In what follows, I shall lay out the leading ideas of statism (section 2) and nationalism (section 3), including (in accordance with my title) their implications for intervention and redistribution. I shall then discuss the relations between them (section 4). Following that (section 5), I introduce a third doctrine, compolitanism, which (as I define it) is a combination of moral individualism and moral universalism. Cosmopolitanism, I argue, is likely to lead to conclusions substantially more sympathetic to intervention and international redistribution than either statism or cosmopolitanism. The next two sections (6 and 7) take up the difficult and complicated question of the relation between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Section

8 concludes by arguing that there are no good arguments against cosmopolitanism, and in particular that properly understood it is compatible with civic nationalism. This implies that civic nationalism can be combined with cosmopolitan conclusions about intervention and redistribution.

2. Statism

The statist ideology is believed in by all governments and a large number of international relations theorists. The legal basis of statism is the equality of states and the absence of any higher authority to which states are legally subservient. This means that the binding force of international treaties depends on consent. A strong norm of the society of states in its current incarnation (though not in earlier centuries) is the absolute inviolability of borders. No matter how corrupt or incompetent a state may be, the 'international community' (which for this purpose means the other states) is committed to condemning any attempt by another state to annex some or all of its territory, and is supposed to come to the aid of the state attacked. The idea of state sovereignty is also invoked to rule out coercive intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another. Thus, 'Article 2-7 of the United Nations Charter... precludes UN intervention in "matters that are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state"'. A fortiori unilateral intervention is excluded (Brown 1992: 112).

A stark illustration of the statist ideology at work is the conventional definition of 'terrorism' according to which terrorists are non-state agents and all states are supposed to co-operate in condemning and suppressing it. (The American-invented category of a 'terrorist state' is intended to refer to states such as Libya and Iran that, in the opinion of the State Department, train and support terrorists on the conventional definition.) The most fervent propagators of the anti-terrorist crusade are Israel and its protector, the United States. Yet on a less ideologically loaded definition (e.g. terrorism as the use of indiscriminate violence against a civil population in pursuit of political objectives), it is apparent that Israel would count as a minor victim of terrorism and one of the major perpetrators of it. And the United States would have to be regarded as by far the world's largest 'terrorist state' in virtue of its financial, military and diplomatic support for Israel and a whole series of right-wing regimes in Latin America (such as those of Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Brazil and Argentina) and elsewhere (e.g. Greece under the Colonels).¹ (The USA has also supported anti-government terrorists in post-Somoza Nicaragua and Allende's Chile, making it a 'terrorist state' even on its own definition).

The basic morality of the state system is that set out by Hobbes in the Leviathan. Individuals in a 'state of nature' have a right to do whatever is necessary for their own self-preservation, and each person is to be the final judge of what is necessary. Thus, each has a 'right to all

¹ For an excellent discussion of state terrorism, understood as "cases [in which] those who use violence for political purposes are those in power or their agents", see Jonathan Glover, 1991, quotation from p. 257. Glover concludes, surely correctly, that "even a casual study of state terrorism shows that it totally dwarfs unofficial terrorism in its contribution to human misery" (p.273).

things', since there is nothing that somebody might not regard as necessary for self-preservation. Hobbes himself pointed out that anyone who wants to see a real life example of a state of nature has only to contemplate the actual relations between sovereigns. The modern theorists of statism - realists and neo-realists in international relations theory - follow Hobbes in seeing the international sphere as one in which states pursue power as a means to security.² They add to the legal equality and sovereignty of states a parallel moral doctrine. According to this, there is no moral standpoint superior to that of the interest of states, so they are not morally answerable for their conduct.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the hardest norm concerning international distribution promulgated by the United Nations goes with the grain of statism and is explicitly anti-redistributive. This declares that states are entitled to be sole beneficiaries of the natural resources within their territory and those in the sea and in the seabed around their shores, now extended to a 200-mile limit. Although the norm is obviously most advantageous to resource-rich countries with long coastlines, such as Canada and the USA among the rich countries, and among the middling ones Brazil and Chile, it was supported by third world countries³. It is an index of the hegemony of statist ideology in international gatherings that even resource-poor and landlocked countries did not propose the cosmopolitan alternative of treating natural resources as a common possession of mankind.

It is true that third world countries would like transfers to them from rich countries, but they are most enthusiastic about forms of transfer that do not disturb the statist paradigm. Thus, the New International Economic Order promoted by the "Group of 77" in the late 1970s had as its centrepiece an increase in the price of primary commodities, to be brought about by some combination of restricting production and stockpiling (see Schachter, pp. 87-105). This would have required cooperation from the western countries, which was not forthcoming. In any case, it would have been a highly inefficient way of bringing about a relatively small transfer (the peculiarity of oil was not adequately appreciated) and would have made the worst-off (i.e. resource-poor) countries worse off. Despite this, it became the prime third world policy in virtue of its turning what was in effect aid into import income - thus putting it (on conventional statist principles) beyond reach of any external body's discretion. The mode of transfer currently in vogue is similarly statist in the same sense: the cancellation of debt. It is worth observing that this also does nothing for the poorest countries: even the collective insanity that gripped the world's bankers as they desperately sought homes for petrodollars after 1975 did not mean that they were prepared to lend money to, say, Burkina Faso.

To complete the picture it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of aid provided either directly by countries or through bodies such as the World Bank. Much bilateral aid fits perfectly within the statist paradigm, since it is motivated by the perceived security or commercial interests of the donor country. As far as the rest is concerned, the two most

² For realism, see Hans Morgenthau, 1948; for neo-realism Kenneth Waltz, 1959.

³ "In recent years no normative principle has been more vigorously asserted by the less-developed countries than that of 'permanent sovereignty over natural resources,' a concept generally defined by its proponents as the 'inalienable' right of each state to full exercise of authority over its natural wealth and the correlative right to dispose of its resources fully and freely." (Oscar Schachter 1977: 124)

salient features are the lack of a hard norm (comparable to that stipulating national sovereignty over natural resources) mandating contributions, and the small amount of aid in relation to the national incomes of the rich countries. Thus, the United Nations norm that official aid should amount to 0.7% of GNP is a mere aspiration, with no mechanism to ensure compliance, and actual performance falls far short, with the USA and Britain running at a mere 0.2% or thereabouts.

Nor is aid unequivocally welcomed by the potential beneficiaries. The statist ideology has no more vociferous adherents than the governments of third world countries - the more so, on the whole, the less their regime can bear international scrutiny. It is true that the practice of attaching conditions to aid (conditions either about the nature of the regime or the way in which the funds are used) does not violate the norm of non-intervention, because withholding aid is technically a non-benefit rather than a sanction.⁴ Nevertheless, it constitutes a challenge to the ideology of statism, in that it subjects states to outside judgement.

3. Nationalism

Nationalism is supported by a majority of the relatively small number of Anglophone political philosophers who have addressed the issue and a minority of international relations theorists (the majority being statist). It is tempting to say that nationalism is also the creed of many politicians and of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of millions of people all over the world. But the vast majority of those who create and endorse nationalist slogans are concerned with only one nationality: their own. This immediately introduces a contrast between practicing nationalists and practicing statist. Governments tend to pursue the interests of their state, in accordance with the statist ideology, but they accept the legitimacy of other governments doing likewise. To put it formally, they are willing to universalize the maxim of their actions.

Statism is a collective analogue of universal egoism, understood as the claim that each person should pursue his own interests. It is thus a genuine, if pretty stunted, morality: 'the mutual interest of all governments in their own survival sustains a whole set of conventions that could be summed up as "dog does not eat dog"'.⁵ In contrast, practical nationalism does not qualify as a morality at all. It is a collective analogue of selfishness elevated to the status of a moral imperative: I should pursue my own interests and others should serve my interests too. Thus, few Israelis seem prepared to see that, if their claim to a Jewish state has any validity, it must generate a claim to a Palestinian state that is at the very least equally valid. Similarly, Irish nationalists have always been reluctant to accept the existence

⁴ The international norm prohibits intervention but permits influence. This clearly leaves open a large area of uncertainty: when does influence turn into intervention? (See Brown 1992: p. 112). Withholding aid may seem non-coercive, but what about withdrawing it if a country has adapted its economy so as to rely on it?

⁵ Susan Strange, 1995, pp. 154-174, quotation from p. 170. For expositions of this 'morality of states', see Hedley Bull, 1977 and Terry Nardin, 1983.

of a community with a distinct identity in Ulster. Currently, Slovak nationalists are busy preparing for the legal suppression the rights of the Hungarian minority to organize politically and make its voice heard. The dirty little secret of nationalism is that the fulfilment of most nationalist aspirations entails stamping on the interests and aspirations of some other nationality. The point is 'that very few nation-states have ever existed. What for the most part existed have been multi-national states, dominated by a hegemonial nation' ⁶.

So prevalent is the phenomenon of nationalism as an oppressive force within a state rather than one serving to integrate all the inhabitants of the state's territory that it is a pretty safe bet anywhere in the world that a party describing itself as 'nationalist' will be dedicated to advancing the interests of a national group at the expense of other communities. These might be other nationalities or stigmatized minorities (such as gypsies, Jews or immigrants). In fact, virtually any descent group capable of being distinguished in some way can form a focus of antagonistic political mobilization. Nationalism in practice, then, is for the most part a way in which one group of people organizes itself to repress and exploit others. It is easy to see why it is so popular, uniting people across class divisions: for those with skills it removes a source of competition, and for those who have no objective basis for self-esteem a feeling of ethnic or racial superiority offers a spurious one.

Some writers have taken the view that such communal conflicts rest on "primordial attachments", and conclude that there is no point in making ethical judgements about them. But this kind of crude determinism has been challenged by the whole weight of historical and social scientific research in recent decades.⁷ There are a potentially unlimited number of ways of making invidious distinctions among human beings. Playing up one particular one as a basis of dividing the inhabitants of a territory into different groups is a decision, and one normally taken with a view to some economic or political advantage. I am going to assume, then, that practical nationalism - the pursuit of group advantage at the expense of some other group - is simply indefensible morally. I shall therefore focus on nationalism as a universalistic doctrine.

I take nationalism in this form to be the idea that every nation should have a state and every state should be the institutional embodiment of a nation. Stating it in this way makes it clear that nationalism is in a sense parasitic upon statism, in that it presupposes a world that is a society of states. We might even call it a statist heresy. 'It is of the essence of nationalism ... to be a revolutionary doctrine calling for the destruction of existing states and the construction of new ones with different boundaries, and thereby upsetting existing legal frameworks' (Canovan 1996: 11). It is scarcely surprising that the United Nations, as a trade union of states, does not recognize the national principle as a necessary or sufficient condition of a state's acceptability within the society of states.

There is one, strictly limited, exception to this hostility to the idea of national self-determination. This is enshrined in the doctrine that colonies have a right to detach

⁶ Booth 1995, quotation from p. 335.

⁷ A sampler of this research that I have found useful is John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 1994: *Nationalism*.

themselves from the colonial power and become independent states. (To be covered by this, the colony had to be separated by salt water from the colonial power: this avoided any threat to the legitimacy of the last remaining land empire, the Soviet Union.) However, this is a once-for-all exercise of self-determination, as far as the United Nations is concerned. Once the ex-colony has taken its place in the society of states, it is protected by the tenets of statism. Similarly, the surrealistically-named Organization of African Unity (whose members have scarcely a uninational state among them and have mostly been the scene of civil war) has as a central plank the inviolability of the largely arbitrary boundaries bequeathed by the colonial powers.

In the absence of salt water the United Nations does not demand division of existing states in any instance. It does recognize it where it happens but even here it is instructive to observe that statism is still respected as far as possible in the assumption that division should follow the lines of existing political subdivisions. Thus, the only kind of self-determination encouraged by the international community in the former Yugoslavia was 'the right of the citizens of the individual Yugoslav republics to decide democratically within the framework of existing frontiers ... whether and to what degree their republics should be part of a Yugoslav state.'⁸

The best known and most influential Anglophone academic nationalist is Michael Walzer, who has in a number of works developed a defence of a certain kind of nationalism.⁹ (I could also discuss Charles Taylor, but he is too busy fighting in Liberia at present to have much time left over for political philosophy.) The essence of this kind of nationalism is that, out of all the markers that might be (and have been) chosen by practical nationalists to differentiate national groups, it assumes without even discussing the issue that what defines a nationality is the existence of a distinctive national culture, which defines an entire moral universe for those who partake in it. A nation, according to this line of thought, has a national character, and a flourishing life can be lived only by absorbing this national character in the course of growing up, and then spending the rest of one's life living it .

This universe of thought is (even though its exponents do not say so) a contemporary version, with some of the excrescences knocked off, of the kind of German romantic nationalism typified by Herder. What I find curious is that its exponents do not apparently regard themselves as under any obligation to take account of the bloody consequences that this idea has had in the past two centuries, or to respond to criticisms of its realism. Thus it assumes that the culture comes first and the nation state comes into being to protect it. But as often as not the state creates the culture.

A language, it has been said, is a dialect with an army and a navy. If we update the quip to include an airforce and a nuclear arsenal, we can add the example of modern Hebrew, an invented language imposed by the Israeli state as a self-conscious means of welding disparate cultural groups into a single national identity. Moreover, especially in the first

⁸ Robert M. Hayden, 1995, p. 64 quoting 'Recognition of the Yugoslav Successor States', position paper of the German Foreign Ministry, Bonn, March 10, 1993.

⁹ Especially Michael Walzer, 1983; 1980; 1994: pp. 187-200 and 1995: pp. 281-297.

quarter century of its existence, the Israeli state placed a very high priority on 'the "cultural absorption" of new immigrants'. Language and culture were merged in this process. As an Israeli scholar has noted: 'One of the most important tools to achieve this cultural integration was the ulpan, the Hebrew-language school which was used to impart the main values and prevailing culture of Israeli society to new arrivals.'¹⁰ The whole idea was to break up pre-existing linguistic-cultural identities, and forge a new identity.

What implications has this theory of nationalism for my twin themes of intervention and redistribution? Not surprisingly, it is hostile to both. Cultural nationalism entails cultural relativism: Walzer insists that if the members of a nation are living in accordance with their 'shared understandings', they are in a condition of justice for them, and any external interference is unjust. Indeed, there is not even any legitimate basis for external criticism. As far as international redistribution is concerned, Walzer denies that there can be any such thing as international distributive justice, since there is no international community united by shared understandings of the meanings of goods.

4. Nationalism and Statism

The obvious limitation on the scope of these prescriptions is that they are derived from the idea of a state as the home of a nation. It would appear that all it has to offer to states (the vast majority in the world) that are not nation states is that it would be better if they were broken up and reconstituted so as to form states of the approved kind. Despite this, academic nationalists tend to write as if their doctrine could provide an underpinning for statism, taking existing state boundaries as given. For an example, here is the well-known political philosopher, Jean Bethke Elshtain: 'The nation-state model may have emerged historically as a Western invention of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 but this form has been embraced worldwide. Aggrieved people want, not an end to the nation-state, or to sovereignty, or national autonomy, but an end to Western colonial or Soviet or other external dominance of their particular histories, languages, cultures and wounded sense of collective identity.'¹¹ What has to be observed is that the Treaty of Westphalia created (or more precisely ratified) a system of states, not nation states, and that scarcely any of those states emerging from Western colonial or Soviet domination are nation states. In many cases, minorities have been treated worse following independence than anybody in the territory was before independence. The most striking illustration is Sub-Saharan Africa, which since decolonialization has suffered such a lethal combination of misrule and anarchy that most of the population are worse off economically and enjoy less physical security than under colonial rule.

¹⁰ Tamar Horowitz 1995, quotation from p.4.

¹¹ Jean Bethke Elshtain 1995, quotation from p. 270.

What has been said of the Yugoslav successor states may be generalized to many ex-colonial and ex-Soviet states. 'While these republics were indeed premised on a vision of "government of the people, by the people, for the people," they did not imagine the "new birth of freedom" envisaged by Lincoln. Instead they manifested a different ideology, of government of one kind of people, by that kind of people, for that kind of people, at the expense of all others in the state who are not so fortunately situated. Hardly a vision of undominated equality, what these constitutions defined and were meant to implement was and is a system of permanent discrimination and inequality, of, by, and for the majority, the ethnically defined "nation" or narod.' (Hayden 1995: 64)

We can see at work in David Miller's recent book On Nationality the curious process by which nationalist premises are deployed as a basis for deriving statist conclusions (Miller 1995). Miller's version of nationalism does not make it turn on ethnocultural identity. Rather he defines nationality in extremely idealistic terms, and it is this that enables him to arrive at his anti-interventionist and anti-redistributive conclusions. Thus, suppose we pack into the idea of a nation the requirement that everyone regards fellow nationals as equally valuable, so that there are no groups that are stigmatized or discriminated against. And suppose we also stipulate that there must on all important matters of public policy (peace and war, income distribution, and so on) be a consensus among the members of a nation - a General Will in which all participate. Then, if this nation inhabits a state, there is surely some plausibility in saying that (at any rate within certain broad limits) its collective autonomy is valuable, because it can be seen as a contribution to the flourishing of its individual members. Similarly, under these very stringent conditions, the normally problematic concept of collective responsibility may quite plausibly be regarded as having some application.

I do not know if there are any nation states in the world, if we understand the existence of a nation as requiring these conditions. (Perhaps Iceland is a candidate?) What is at any rate clear to me is that very few states are nations in the relevant sense, and the theory has less application the further they depart from its presuppositions. In the light of this, it seems to me quite bizarre that Miller should deploy it to explain why wealthy western countries should not intervene in the internal affairs of states in Sub-Saharan Africa (on the ground that this would be a violation of national autonomy or 'self-determination') and why they have no obligation to provide economic aid (on the ground that this would be a violation of collective responsibility) (Miller 1995: 65-79). Many of these countries do not make contact at any point with the requirements necessary to trigger the values of national autonomy and national responsibility. These include Angola and Rwanda, which Miller cites specifically as suitable applications of the principle of national autonomy, and Somalia, which is cited as an illustration of the way in which this principle of national responsibility relieves rich countries of an obligation to aid poor ones.¹²

Manifestly, the nationalist idea has here been transformed into the doctrine of state autonomy and state responsibility, which is assumed still to apply even if the state is riven by internecine conflict between opposing groups and the government is in essence a gang of looters intent on squeezing what it can out of the population at whatever cost to the future of

¹² For Angola and Rwanda see Miller 1995: 78 n.31, for Somalia see *ibid.* 63-4.

the country. Contrary to what Miller so confidently claims, only practical considerations (which may sometimes be powerful) weigh against intervention and economic aid where states are so radically defective in providing their citizens with the minimum of physical and economic security. Miller regards it as a decisive objection to cosmopolitanism that it results in this conclusion: I would rather urge it as a decisive objection to his own theory that it results in its denial.

The essential point here is that any defence of state autonomy that depends upon states having certain specific characteristics can justify state autonomy only in cases in which these characteristics are present. Miller's move from an idealistic version of nationalism as a premise to statist conclusions illustrates what goes wrong when this point is ignored. But he is by no means alone. Thus, in his book Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations, Mervyn Frost argues that there is no contradiction between statism and individual rights because rights can flourish only in states.' (Frost 1986). But the conditions for this to hold are extremely demanding. 'An autonomous state is one in which the citizens experience the well-being of the state as fundamental to their own well-being.' (Frost 1986: 179). As Chris Brown notes in a critical discussion, 'few, if any, actual states fit the bill, but states which do not meet the requirement for autonomy cannot properly claim to be sovereign in their dealings with other states.' (Brown 1992: 120). Carried through consistently, Frost's 'defence' of the state system would radically subvert it. For 'from the UN viewpoint, a state is a state is a state - and any attempt to distinguish between states that have earned the right to autonomy and those that have not is totally unacceptable' (Brown 1992: 121).

The ideal of nationalism in its standard form is that to each nation there should correspond one state and to each state there should correspond one nation. However, there is a variant of it which makes room for more than one nationality within a single state. This accepts all the presuppositions of cultural nationalism - the importance of preserving national cultures and the priority of culture to political forms - and differs only in denying that national aspirations must be embodied in an independent state. I shall look at this extension of nationalism to multinationalism as it occurs in Will Kymlicka's recent book Multicultural Citizenship (Kymlicka 1995).

There is a certain parallelism between the analyses of Frost and Kymlicka. While Frost makes membership of a state (of the appropriate kind) a necessary condition for the enjoyment of individual rights, Kymlicka presents immersion in the national culture as an essential context for development of a capacity for individual autonomy. It is in virtue of this that he feels entitled to give his book the subtitle A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. But Kymlicka runs into the same problem as Frost. Just as most states are not very good at guaranteeing human rights, so most of the cultures that have ever existed or that exist today are not at all conducive to the development of autonomy.

If we were to carry through consistently the notion that group autonomy is validated by its contribution to individual autonomy, we would surely have to say that only national minorities with liberal cultures can make a valid claim to autonomy. Instead, Kymlicka says that 'both foreign states and national minorities form distinct political communities, with their own claims to self-government' and that this rules out intervention even when the political

community violates elementary liberal prescriptions (Kymlicka 1995: 167). But where does this unconditional claim to national independence come from? It can arise only if we refuse to take the fundamental human right to be to live in a liberal society and instead say that it is to live in an integral national culture, whether liberal or illiberal. This is, of course, a total capitulation to the doctrine of romantic nationalism, and an abandonment of liberalism.

Kymlicka pursues a curious mode of argument to get to the conclusion that national minorities in liberal states should be permitted to pursue illiberal courses. He starts from the fact that western countries would not invade Saudi Arabia with a mission to clean things up, and uses this as a basis for arguing that national minorities should similarly be able to oppress women, deny religious freedom and generally behave in a barbarous fashion, so long as that is what their culture tells them to do (Kymlicka 1995: 165). (Kymlicka follows Michael Walzer in exempting genocide and slavery. It is worth noting that these are the subjects of separate United Nations conventions. The view that international intervention to stop these is justified is scarcely a distinctively liberal one.)

There are, manifestly, many reasons for not invading Saudi Arabia, including a sensible reluctance to take on the formidable military hardware that the West have been busy selling to the Saudi government for the last twenty years, and the same unwillingness to take over the administration of a country (for an indefinite period) that led to the abrupt termination of Desert Storm. (It could plausibly be argued that the international community had an obligation to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of Iraq under the terms of the genocide convention.) None of the reasons for unwillingness to take over Iraq (or a fortiori Saudi Arabia) provides any basis for saying that a country committed to liberal values should permit national minorities to behave illiberally. If we want to clear our minds about the validity of some principle, we should surely focus on a case in which its application is as straightforward as possible. It seems to me absurd to argue, as Kymlicka does, from what one might say about a case involving coercive international intervention to what one should say in one in which a court can prevent sex discrimination or religious persecution by making an enforceable judgement.

Contrary to what Kymlicka claims, I do not believe that there is any liberal principle that supports community autonomy when it takes illiberal forms.¹³ The only reasons for not intervening that a liberal can recognize are pragmatic - which is not to deny that they are frequently decisive. At the level of principle, romantic nationalism and liberalism are potential antagonists. There is no way in which liberal premises can underwrite autonomy for all nationalities.

Kymlicka seeks to cover the nakedness of his commitment to liberalism by saying that 'liberal reformers inside the culture should seek to promote their liberal principles, through reason and example, and liberals outside should lend their support to any effort the group makes to liberalize their culture' (Kymlicka 1995: 168). But the experience of those who have sought to air liberal principles even quite cautiously in Saudi Arabia shows just how empty a concession to liberalism this is. Presumably we would no more invade Saudi Arabia to

¹³ The claim is made by Kymlicka at *ibid.*, pp. 167-8.

enforce freedom of speech than we would to enforce any other liberal measures, and by Kymlicka's cockeyed reasoning this suggests that national minorities should similarly be allowed to prohibit liberal propaganda, thus nullifying Kymlicka's gesture towards liberalism. It is very unusual for a society that contravenes other fundamental liberal precepts not to place severe restrictions on freedom of speech. And it could no doubt be said truthfully of most cultures in the world that suppression of dissent is an integral element in them.

Kymlicka would allow liberal states to withhold economically advantageous deals (such as membership in NAFTA or the European Union) from illiberal states, as a way of putting pressure on them to reform. And he says that 'obviously' there are analogies with national minorities. However, since national minorities do not normally have tariff barriers with the rest of the country, this seems a good deal less than obvious. Such economic pressure should not, Kymlicka says, extend to 'a total embargo or blockade'. It is not at all clear to me why only 'total' embargo or blockade is ruled out, since the underlying distinction is apparently intended to be between 'incentives and coercion'.¹⁴ Why, on his principles, should any sort of embargo or blockade be permissible?

Many people are prepared to support economic sanctions but not forcible intervention in certain cases. This makes sense if one accepts the legitimacy in principle of forceful intervention but is convinced of the pragmatic case against. Conversely, if there really is a principle such as Kymlicka enunciates to rule out military intervention, I cannot see why it legitimates pressure (as distinct from proselytizing - where the government does not prohibit it) in any form. Kymlicka's proposal to allow pressure in some forms but not others seems to me pure fiat.

In practice, western governments are clearly inclined to follow through the logic of Kymlicka's non-interventionism all the way and sign trade deals with countries whose human rights records are notoriously poor, such as China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Kymlicka's chosen example of a country that should be left to its own devices, Saudi Arabia, provides an ironic footnote. So far from the British government threatening not to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia unless the government behaves better, the Saudis threatened not to buy weapons from Britain unless it deported Mohammed Al-Masari, a dissident (not, incidentally, a liberal one), who had been deploying the fax machine as a way of getting round the censorship. And the British government, explicitly acknowledging that it was responding to economic pressure, agreed. Only a court decision to the effect that the British government had not found a safe place for him to go to prevented it from summarily deporting him. Respect for 'cultural diversity' could scarcely be carried forward more slavishly.

5. Cosmopolitanism

¹⁴ All quotations in this paragraph are from Kymlicka 1995: 168.

Cosmopolitanism is supported by a few moral and political philosophers such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer¹⁵. It is also probably the working creed of officials in some United Nations agencies as UNICEF and the WHO, and NGOs such as Amnesty International, Oxfam and Greenpeace. How great its resonance is with the publics of, say, western countries is not easy to tell. However, I believe that citizens are less blinkered by the statist vision than are their governments. The widespread support for NGOs such as those I mentioned (and many others dedicated to similar causes) is one sign. During the unfolding tragedy of Bosnia moreover, western public opinion was constantly ahead of governments in favouring more forceful intervention to stop bloodshed and halt or reverse 'ethnic cleansing'.

In Britain the whole of the scandal created by the government's lying to parliament about its policies on arms sales to Iraq (exposed at mind-numbing length by the Scott report) arose because ministers feared that the actual policy of authorizing large-scale sales to such a brutal regime would be unpopular with public opinion. There were close links (in which money passed hands) between Conservative politicians, civil servants in the Ministry of Defence, and the major arms firms, so the whole business was corrupt. But I am prepared to believe that in addition the ministers responsible genuinely believed that they were pursuing the national interest by authorizing contracts for the arms industry and that this justified them in misleading the public, who would object on the basis of 'sentimental' (i.e. principled) humanitarian convictions about the obligations of the UK externally. Another encouraging sign of cosmopolitanism thinking in western countries was the refusal of a large part of the French population to fall in behind Chirac's attempt to invoke nationalist sentiment in support of the resumption of nuclear testing.

A cosmopolitan is, by definition, a citizen of the world. This might be taken to mean that cosmopolitans are committed to the creation of a world state, but this is itself an assumption that rests on statist ideology. The first people to call themselves cosmopolitans were the Stoics, who already belonged to a state that encompassed the whole of the civilized world (and some bits that weren't, such as Britain). The point for them was to indicate that they were in the first instance human beings living in a world of human beings and only incidentally members of polities. It is this spirit that animates contemporary cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism is, then, a moral stance constituted out of three elements, individualism, equality, and universality. Its unit of value is individual human beings; it does not recognize any categories of people as having less or more moral weight; and it includes all human beings. I believe that the logic of cosmopolitanism entails that the interests of future people have as much significance as those of contemporaries, but I shall not make much of that here.

Utilitarianism is the simplest form of cosmopolitanism, since it says that we weigh the interests of everybody on the same scales ('everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one') and recommend whatever actions, policies, laws or political institutions have the prospect of satisfying interests most in the aggregate. In practice, utilitarians have been

¹⁵ Beitz 1979 and 1992, Pogge 1989 and Singer 1972 and 1979.

remarkably unforthcoming about the international implications of the doctrine, with the exception of Peter Singer. However, my reason for starting from utilitarianism is to insist that it is not the only or indeed the most common form of cosmopolitanism. Both Beitz and Pogge, the other philosophers I mentioned, take John Rawls as their starting point and support (in broad terms) a global version of Rawls's theory of justice. This means that they are committed to universal civil and political rights and the redistribution of material resources for the benefit of those with the least, wherever on earth they may be living. This seems to me the most plausible version of cosmopolitanism, and it is the one whose implications I shall investigate here.

Since cosmopolitanism is defined in terms of a moral stance rather than (as with statism and nationalism) an institutional nostrum, there is a good deal of room for dispute about the institutions that would be best adapted to bringing about its vision of a just world. 'What is crucial to the cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to regard existing political structures as the source of ultimate value' (Brown 1992: 24). I would extend that to all political structures: the value of any political structure is entirely derivative from whatever value it contributes to (in the first instance anyway) human life. Thus, it is extremely plausible that cosmopolitan objectives require at the very least a strengthening of international institutions at every point (see, for example, Held 1995). But a cosmopolitan might well fear the repressive potential of a world state with sufficient coercive force at its disposal to bring to heel any lower-level entity (e.g. what are currently states).

As far as my themes of intervention and redistribution are concerned, cosmopolitanism obviously does not raise any principled objection to either: ultimately, rules of international engagement are to be assessed by the effects on individual human beings. Thus, cosmopolitanism necessarily rejects the idea of a 'society as states' if that is regarded as a self-contained morality. But with appropriate empirical beliefs a cosmopolitan could nevertheless support the statist norm of non-intervention. Thus 'international peace may be best served in a system in which there is a convention of respect for the autonomous domestic jurisdiction of states' (Beitz 1992: 129).

As Beitz observes, one may doubt this, or reject the assumption that peace is worth having at any price (Beitz 1992: 129). A cosmopolitan will then conclude that military intervention can be justifiable, while recognizing that such action is always fraught with risks, as the misadventures of the United Nations in Somalia illustrate all too clearly. It is also necessary to acknowledge that action by individual states is seldom if ever going to be disinterested and that humanitarianism may be a cloak for commercial or strategic interests. Economic sanctions avoid some of the objections, especially if organized internationally, but carry with them the inevitable drawback that a regime that is indifferent to the suffering of its subjects will not be deterred by economic sanctions so long as it can deflect their ill-effects on to them. Refusal to sell weapons might well hit home harder.

Less dramatic but more promising in the long run is a spread of international legal action. The establishment of a UN War Crimes Tribunal is an encouraging move. More broadly, Jonathan Glover has argued that respect for human rights might become a condition for being a member in good standing of the 'society of states': 'There should be international

courts to which human rights complaints could be brought against states (by, or on behalf of individuals as well as governments). The European Court of Human Rights is a possible model. Acceptance of the jurisdiction of such courts, and the provision of access to their investigators, could be regarded as a test of a country's fitness to participate in the international community. It could perhaps be a condition of membership of various international bodies (in the way that Spain, Portugal, and Greece would not have been able to join the European Community while under dictatorships). It might also be made a condition for such things as eligibility for loans from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.' (Glover 1991: 272)

As far as redistribution is concerned, the logic of cosmopolitan morality again suggests that individuals rather than states should be the units. The utopian ideal is of a global income tax levied on individuals according to a uniform progressive tariff regardless of their country of residence, the proceeds to be distributed to poor individuals wherever they live. Concessions to the reality of the existing system of states inevitably mean that cosmopolitans finish up by recommending redistribution from rich countries to poor ones. But they cannot regard that as the whole story, even within the state system, because they cannot be indifferent to the way in which the benefits of the transfer are distributed within the recipient country. Thus, cosmopolitan support for international redistribution (with states as the units) must always be conditional. If whatever resources are supplied to a country will find themselves in Swiss bank accounts belonging to members of the government, the case for aid disappears. But by the same token a strong prima facie case for international intervention then exists.

6. Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism

In discussing the policy implications of cosmopolitanism, I have already implicitly dealt with the relations between it and statism. The connection between cosmopolitanism and nationalism will be the topic of the remaining three sections of this paper. What makes this relation so difficult to pin down is the protean nature of nationalism. Thus, one variant of nationalism that could be regarded as quintessentially cosmopolitan - so long as one accepted its underlying assumptions - was the form popular in the nineteenth century according to which nationalism is a progressive force destined to pull 'backward' peoples such as the Welsh or the Basques out of their cultural stagnation. Certain nations - and only those - were charged by history with this leading role. As Margaret Canovan has observed, there was a 'strong element of historicism' in this theory. 'Given historicist assumptions, there is no more problem about discerning the gradually-emerging boundaries of historic nations than there is in identifying the boundaries of Marxist classes Confidence in the march of history made it possible for Mazzini to envisage a fully nationalist Europe made up of only eleven genuine nations, and to dismiss the claims of the Irish (among others) to constitute a nation on the grounds that they possessed no national language and no special historic mission.' (Canovan 1996: 8) Liah Greenfield has picked up this similarity and argued that that Marxism is historicist nationalism adapted so that classes instead of nations

become the bearers of historical change. German nationalists contrasted the backward political and economic condition of Germany with its cultural superiority; and for Marx 'the view of the proletariat as the universal class, in distinction from all other classes, reflected the idea of Germany as the pan-human nation in distinction from all other nations'.¹⁶

The obvious problem with this historicist nationalism is that it has gone the same way as the Marxism that is (according to Greenfeld) its offshoot: scarcely anybody believes it any more, especially those nationalities condemned to be swept away by the historical bandwagon. Hence, as Zygmunt Bauman has said, contemporary nationalists 'drift towards entities whose radical destruction was seen, at the beginning of modernity, as the sine qua non of "meaningful choice." It is now the much-maligned "natural communities of origin," necessarily lesser than the nation-state, and once described by modernizing propaganda as parochial, backwater, prejudice-ridden, oppressive and stultifying, which are looked to as the trusting executors of streamlining, de-randomizing, and meaning-saturated human choices.'¹⁷

The rub lies in Bauman's passing remark that these 'natural communities of origin' are 'necessarily lesser than the nation-state'. As I observed in section III almost every ethnocultural group with territorial ambitions lays claim to some 'home' territory that is also inhabited by at least one other community, which must (if the first group is to achieve its ends) be assimilated, subjugated, 'ethnically cleansed' or killed. Kymlicka's modification of classic romantic nationalism to allow for different ethnocultural groups to enjoy autonomy within a single state tends merely to reproduce the problem at a lower level. Kymlicka's own treatment of Quebec illustrates this. According to Kymlicka, any long-established community with its own institutions can claim the rights of a national minority. On this criterion, the Anglophone community in Quebec is a national minority within the province. Yet Kymlicka treats Quebec as if it were the home of only one community, the national minority and local majority of ethnic Francophones. He thus passes over in silence the discriminating legislation to which Anglophones have been subjected, and which is leading an increasing number to believe that they have no alternative but to emigrate, either to another province in Canada or another country.

Must a cosmopolitan nevertheless concede the inevitability of ethnoculturalist sentiment, and simply argue for more and more subdivisions until (with a certain amount of population transfer as well) only ethnoculturally 'pure' political units (whether states or subdivisions of states) are left? This question raises a large issue, to which I cannot begin to do justice here. This is how far we should take existing beliefs and attitudes as givens when operating in a prescriptive mode. If we take everything as given, there is nothing to be said except 'Que sera, sera.' But if we simply assume some overnight transformation of human nature so that everybody becomes a born-again cosmopolitan, it is hard to see why anybody should pay us attention. All I can say here is that if we are pessimists we will have to settle for mono-ethnic political units, but we should be clear about the costs.

¹⁶ Liah Greenfeld 1995, quotation from p. 562. Marx and Engels continued to believe that 'the right of historical evolution' belonged to nations as well as classes.

¹⁷ Zygmunt Baumann 1995, quotation from p. 546.

I am referring here not to the costs of achieving such 'pure' units, which may be very high, but to their fundamentally unsatisfactory nature once achieved. 'Philosophical well-wishers on both sides of the liberal/communitarian divide all too often courteously close their eyes on the realities of those "minorities" whose cause they are prompted to advocate by their laudable sympathy for the left-behind and deprived. Frequently the reality, when contemplated at close quarters, and particularly from inside, does not look exactly prepossessing. More often than not the "survivance" postulate turns into an awesome weapon of subjugation and tyranny, exercised by the acclaimed or self-proclaimed guardians of the "community" (ethnic, racial, religious) and its traditional values in order to exact obeisance from their hapless wards and to stamp out every inkling of autonomous choice' (Baumann 1995: 551). Ernest Renan saw the way things were going as early as 1882 and did not like it. In 'Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?' he argued that 'the doctrines that give priority to culture, race or language over the political ideal of the republic are . . . to be regarded as an intellectual and moral degeneration: "When we thus exaggerate it [the importance of language and race], we imprison ourselves in a limited culture, held as being national. . . . Nothing can be worse for the mind, nothing more hurtful to civilization."'¹⁸

If the dead are allowed to vote, those who claim the authority to cast their votes can defeat a majority of the living. 'Identification with and loyalty to the nation does not involve the "voluntarism" of a "daily plebiscite", rather it entails acceptance of the obligations of belonging and the mission of the nation as articulated by its guardians Such glorification [of the "authentic" nation] is translated into a rejection of "western" values, institutions and practices, which conveniently allows ethnocrats to ignore internationally recognised human and civil rights and reject charges of violations of international law.'¹⁹ A Bosnian Serb summed up the contradiction between ethnocultural nationality and cosmopolitan values when he lamented 'They want to make Serbs into citizens' (Mostov 1995: 72). Nothing could more clearly bear out Renan's 5 foreboding that 'what seemed to matter most was not to be an Italian, or an English, or a French citizen, but to be Italian, English or French . . .' (Viroli 1995: 160).

It is possible for a society to emerge from the worst excesses of ethnocultural nationalism, but the evidence suggests that it takes a long time. 'History', said Stephen Dedalus, 'is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake' (Joyce 1986: 28). Leopold Bloom too denounced history at the climax of the Jew-baiting in Barney Kiernan's pub from which the epigraph for this paper is drawn. 'But it's no use, says he. Force, hatred, history, all that. That's not life for men and women, insult and hatred.' (Joyce 1986: 273) Their creator, James Joyce, was an equally vehement opponent of 'educating the people of Ireland in the old pap of racial hatred.'²⁰ Joyce himself never set foot in Ireland again after 1912, and he was followed into exile in subsequent decades by thousands of men and women who found themselves stultified by the burden of history, in the form of the attempt to revive Gaelic, the

¹⁸ Maurizio Viroli 1995: 160, quoting Ernest Renan 1970: pp. 69-70.

¹⁹ Julie Mostov 1995, quotation from p. 71. The expression 'daily plebiscite' refers to Ernest Renan.'

²⁰ 'What I object most in [Griffith's] paper [*Sinn Fein*] is that it is educating the people of Ireland on the old pap of racial hatred whereas anyone can see that if the Irish question exists it exists for the proletariat chiefly.' Letter to Stanislaus Joyce, 25 September 1906, p. 111 of Ellman 1975.

subservience of state to church, and the official denigration of any culture except that of the peasantry. Only a half century after Irish independence in 1921 did the country begin to shake off the dead hand of Kathleen ni Houlihan.

I have so far in this paper been very kind to nationalism in one respect. I have refrained from mentioning one of the worst of all the offences of nationalism, from a cosmopolitan point of view. This is its close connection with war. By this I do not only mean that it tends to cause war, as a result of the irredentist claims it creates: it could equally well be said that statism has a tendency to cause war, as a result of the competition for power that it sets up. What I mean is that an extremely important strand of nationalism actually glorifies war. To be fair, I should add that there is a strand running from Herder through Mazzini (of whom more in the next section) whose ideal was a world of nations living in perfect harmony within their distinct moral universes. But opposed to this pleasant fantasy is another, darker, vision, in which warfare is welcomed as the sphere in which the supremacy of the nation reaches its apogee. It is not an accident that nationalists are belligerent or that national history consists largely in tales of battles lost and won.

It is sometimes suggested that the idea of warfare as a source of collective purification and individual redemption died on the Western Front, and perhaps it has lost its appeal in western Europe and some other places too. But it is still alive and well in many others, notoriously above all in the Middle East. A few days before he fell from office in 1992, Yitzhak Shamir made a speech in which he said: 'We still need this truth today, the truth of the power of war, or at least we need to accept that war is inescapable, because without this the life of the individual has no purpose and the nation has no chance of survival.'²¹ It would be only too easy to find similar sentiments in the mouths of other political leaders in the region. Defenders of nationalism cannot, I believe, shrug off as an unfortunate idiosyncrasy this connection between nationalism and the idea that 'without [war] the life of the individual has no purpose'. For once the value of the collectivity is exalted above the value of the individuals making it up, some sort of fanaticism can scarcely fail to follow.

This is not to deny that the creation of ethnoculturally homogeneous states (or sub-state political entities) may in some circumstances be the best option out of those open. But it is to say that it would have been better in the first place to avoid getting into a situation in which that is the best option. There is (as has often been pointed out) an analogy between secession and divorce. The aspect of the analogy I want to press is this. Studies are taken to show that divorce has bad effects on children, but all they actually show is that children of divorced parents do less well on various criteria than children of intact marriages. But this does nothing to establish that those children do worse if their parents divorce than if they don't. Whatever characteristics of a marriage results in its breaking up are presumably bad for children whether it breaks up or not - and may well be worse if it does not. The only way of finding out that would be to undertake a randomized controlled trial (RCT): take two matched sets of equally dysfunctional families and arrange for one lot of parents to divorce while the other lot stay married. This would obviously run into problems with the guidelines for experimentation with human subjects.

²¹ Avi Shlaim 1996, quotation from p. 17.

7. Nationalism Redux?

I am assuming that on cosmopolitan premises a minimally decent state is one that respects human rights (which means that only a minority of states are minimally decent) and that a good state is a liberal democracy (which means that there are scarcely any good states except in western Europe and countries of European settlement). Manifestly, the conditions for a functioning liberal democracy are stringent. 'The state must be strong and effective without being excessively coercive: it must, therefore, be able to mobilize support from at least some large sections of the population. However, if it is also to administer equal justice to its citizens it cannot support itself . . . by helping one group to keep another in subjection. It must in general be trusted by all sections of its subjects' (Canovan 1996: 39).

Thus, liberal democracy can be sustained (with policy outputs acceptable to a cosmopolitan) only if two conditions are met: 'the existence on the one hand of autonomous individuals who feel themselves to be free of ascriptive identities, and on the other of generalized trust among the members of the society, whatever their group membership. These are not conditions that can be taken for granted. In many parts of the world identity and solidarity are overwhelmingly ascriptive and communal.'²²

Michael Walzer has said: 'bring "the people" into political life and they will arrive, marching in tribal ranks and orders, carrying with them their own languages, historical memories, customs, beliefs, and commitments' (Walzer 1994: 188). If so, it has to be said that they are still at a pre-political stage. They are not fit to rule themselves and should be told to come back when they have got rid of their particularistic commitments - under pressure from a state that is not (and cannot be) a liberal democracy. What I take from Liah Greenfeld's stimulating study Nationalism (Greenfeld 1992) is a sense of the sheer amount of hammering that particularistic ethnic, religious and cultural activities had to be subjected to in order to constitute a common English and French citizenship, a sense of allegiance to England and France overriding communal loyalties. The historical contingency of this kind of state is scarcely surprising in the light of this.

But what are we to call this kind of state? Maurizio Viroli, in his book For Love of Country, proposes 'patriotism', which he distinguishes from nationalism. Of course, the most common contemporary usage of 'patriotism' equates it with xenophobia: we may recall Samuel Johnson's dismissal of it as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel'. But as intended by Viroli, it denotes a focus of loyalty to a state that must as part of the definition be committed to freedom and civic equality. Jürgen Habermas 'proposes a "patriotism of the Constitution" (Verfassungspatriotismus), that is, a patriotism [for Germans] based on loyalty to the universalistic political principles of liberty and democracy embodied in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany' (Viroli 1995: 169-79). But there is, obviously, another

²² Canovan 1996: 40, paraphrasing A. B. Seligman 1992. I have set out what seem to me the preconditions of a satisfactory liberal democratic regime in chapter 4 of Barry 1995.

candidate for the job of describing this phenomenon: 'nationalism', perhaps distinguished from ethnocultural nationalism by the modifier 'civic'.

Thus, nationalism (of a sort) comes back in - and this is the final twist in the argument of the paper - as a fitting object of commendation by a cosmopolitan. It has more in common with the 'progressive' nationalism of a Mazzini than with the ethnocultural reaction. Indeed, it is interesting that, whereas Margaret Canovan (as we have seen) takes Mazzini as the primary example of 'romantic-collectivist nationalism', Maurizio Viroli recruits him to the ranks of the constitutional patriots (Canovan 1996: 6-9; Viroli 1995: 144-56). And, by picking on different aspects of Mazzini's thought, he too can make out a good case. Thus, where Canovan assimilates Mazzini to Herder, Viroli distinguishes them: 'For Mazzini patria is not an organism composed of different parts hierarchially ordained, as the nation was for Herder, but a democratic association of free and equal individuals He develops the concept of patria as a democratic republic which encompasses not only civil and political equality, but also the right to education and labour' (Viroli 1995: 148). Thus, 'love of country has to be enlarged and ennobled by allegiance to universal principles' (Viroli 1995: 152). So, 'the same word "nationalism" that Herder used to indicate a salutary antidote against cosmopolitanism and cultural hybridness signifies for Mazzini the degeneration of the principle of nationality' (Viroli 1995: 152).

No doubt, this illustrates the way in which all good publicists are opportunists, who mix together ideas that are in the air regardless of their having different provenances. But it can be taken for the present purpose as suggesting that it should be possible to strip away the historicism of Mazzini's kind of nationalism and finish up with the nation as a locus of equal citizenship and non-exclusion. This necessarily entails the repudiation of ethnocultural nationalism, which is a virtual guarantee of unequal citizenship. For even in those rare cases where everybody within the territory belongs to the ethnocultural nation, we have seen that those who claim to speak in its name will define what constitute 'true' national values and exclude those who differ.

David Miller's On Nationality contains a useful analysis of civic nationalism, with which a cosmopolitan can be quite comfortable. This is on the face of it curious, when Miller was presented in section IV as an arch anti-cosmopolitan. The answer is, simply, that I was discussing there chapter 3 of the book, whereas what I am now talking about is chapters 5 and 6 of it. In my view all the arguments in chapter 3 are fallacious, and do not follow from anything in the later chapters. I shall try to show this in the next section.

In chapters five and six of the book, what Miller is discussing are the social and intellectual conditions under which a liberal democratic polity can maintain itself without having to resort to coercion of minorities. In contrast to the (official) argument in chapter three, these chapters are entirely state-orientated. That is to say, they take as given a state whose boundaries include members of different ethnic, religious or cultural groups and ask how matters might be arranged so as to maximize the prospects of rational and civilized public discourse leading to policy outcomes that are equitable and directed at the pursuit of the public interest.

Summarizing Miller's analysis, we might say that this requires - as a precondition of a common society-wide self-understanding and a common arena of political discussion - that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants must speak the same language, though not necessarily as their first language. Beyond that it requires widespread adherence to certain rules of the game and to the principles underlying them. It also requires a general willingness to transform the 'We want this' of naked group self-interest into demands of the form 'We believe that we have a legitimate claim to this, on the basis of broadly shared societal values'. As I understand him, Miller also believes that the citizens' ability to appeal a shared conception of the public interest requires as an underpinning some sort of common view of a distinctive collective enterprise.

Of all these conditions, it seems to me that only the last can with any historical legitimacy be assimilated to anything like a sense of distinctive national identity. For, as Miller himself admits (with unnecessary concern, in my view) none of the rest has any essential reference to characteristics that differentiate one country from others (e.g. the United Kingdom from most other members of the European Union). Indeed, since he believes that Britons cannot satisfactorily unite around their constitution unless it is codified and modernized, it may be said that he is himself advocating a step that would remove one of the most important differences between the United Kingdom and its neighbours. After this reform had been carried through, it is hard to see how the content of the 'civic education' that Miller advocates for the schools of Britain would be very different from that to be found in other European liberal democracies.

In the last chapter ('Conclusion') Miller writes: 'I have defended a civic education that presents to students the principles on which their society operates, and traces the historical process whereby those principles have come into play' (Miller 1995: 194). He goes on to say immediately: 'Liberals and nationalists will find themselves somewhat at odds over issues such as these.' But if this kind of thing is to count as 'nationalism', I simply cannot see why it should be regarded as being in principled conflict with liberalism. Liberals are presumably, first and foremost, people who want to see liberal institutions thrive. If, as seems plausible enough, Miller has correctly identified the conditions for their thriving it would have to be a perverse liberal who would object to measures necessary for the fostering of those conditions. Indeed, it is notable that the avowedly liberal American political theorist Amy Gutmann, in her work on what she calls 'democratic education', advocates a form of civic education that incorporates everything proposed by Miller and if anything goes beyond it (Gutman 1987: 1995). This no doubt reflects the American belief (which goes back well over a century) that the primary mission of the public school system is to turn a country of immigrants from a diversity of political cultures into a body of citizens capable of making liberal democratic institutions work.

The only ingredient in Millerian 'nationalism' that a liberal might be inclined to gag at is, as I have earlier suggested, the idea that the virtues necessary to the maintenance of a liberal democratic polity have to be supported by some common view of a shared collective purpose or perhaps even destiny. There is no question that this can (and usually does) take forms that are profoundly incompatible with liberal principles. Liberal democratic institutions cannot work well, if at all, in a divided society such as Northern Ireland which is proclaimed

by its first Prime Minister to be 'a Protestant state for a Protestant people' or in a Croatia whose government makes it clear from the start that those who are not ethnic Croats can never hope for anything but (at best) second class citizenship. But Miller would clearly repudiate this kind of exclusivity just as vehemently as any liberal who claimed to reject nationalism in any form.

We get the best idea of what Miller has in mind in his extended discussion in chapter six of the contested concept of British nationality. What is most important here are the alternatives that Miller rejects. He is explicit that a country containing English, Welsh and Scots (he ducks Northern Ireland), with a sizeable minority of immigrants or their descendants from the Caribbean and Indian subcontinent, cannot be defined in any terms that include nationality (in the sense that the English, Welsh and Scots are nationalities), race or ethnicity religion, or culture. The British Empire might be thought to have provided a world-historical project between 1880 and (at the outside) 1960, but it has had no successor. Margaret Thatcher's vision of Britain, in which liberty of association and democratic accountability were to be sacrificed to the Moloch of economic growth, clearly failed to inspire anyone outside the small group who grew rich quick from her efforts to implement it. Is some more promising alternative waiting in the wings?

Miller is, I am bound to say, not a great deal of help here. Apart from hoping that we might rally round the (yet-to-be-written) constitution, he seems to suggest that the common project at the moment is to search for a common project. My own view is that there are a number of things that British people can legitimately take pride in, first among which is the country's remarkable contribution to the arts, the physical and biological sciences, and the social sciences - out of all proportion to its size and obscure location. If it is asked why somebody whose parents hail from Trinidad should feel any connection with these achievements, I would reply that they have as much reason as I have. As far as I can tell my ancestors were agricultural labourers in Devon and artisans in east London. I very much doubt if any of them had any personal connection with great events (except, according to one speculation, being on the receiving end of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes). Other candidates are our role (in which the Commonwealth shared) in the defeat of Hitler, our record of preserving the countryside, and the qualities of decency and diffuse kindness celebrated by Orwell and still, perhaps surprisingly, surviving. (For example, I do not believe that there is any country in which passers by will come as quickly to the aid of somebody who falls down in the street or is involved in a car accident.)

Although such things might form the basis of a national identity unique to Britain, I would be the first to concede they are scarcely the stuff out of which an allembacing National Purpose is going to be forged. But do we need one? Do we want one? For my own part, I regard the lack of one as among the most attractive features of contemporary Britain.

8. Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism Restated

I have discussed the puzzle that Miller thinks his version of nationalism is inconsistent with liberalism, but there remains the further puzzle of his thinking it inconsistent with cosmopolitanism. The answer he would give is that even civic nationalism will entail that fellow nationals have obligations to one another that they do not have to people in the rest of the world. But this in no way contradicts the universalistic tenets of cosmopolitanism. Morality is, indeed, universal in its nature - Miller's fundamental error lies in denying this cosmopolitan claim. But that universal morality consists largely in general prescriptions that, in the actual circumstances of everyday life, generate specific obligations: to keep promises, to reciprocate benefits, and to play our part in the social practices of our society, such as those that prescribe the obligations of adults to care for children. (Any notion that there is something 'natural' and pre-social about the norm that devolves almost exclusive responsibility on the biological parents could not survive even the most casual survey of the wide variety of ways in which childcare responsibilities are distributed in non-western societies.)

My contention is that that there is nothing about common nationality as such that can make contact with any morally compelling basis for ascribing special obligations. It is simply the wrong sort of thing. This is not to say that we may not very well have obligations to co-nationals that we do not have to others. But we shall, I believe, always discover on further investigation that this obligation arises from some morally relevant relationship which is (more or less well) correlated with shared nationality.

One very important source of special obligations is common membership in a state. If I ask why I am obliged to contribute to the old age pension of somebody I have never met and have no particular interest in who lives in Rotherham, but not to the pension of somebody equally distant to me who lives in Rennes, the answer is that I belong to the same scheme of social insurance as the first but not the second. Now it is also true that I (probably) share a nationality with the first and not the second. Moreover, there is an obvious connection between this fact and the fact that I belong to the same system of social security as the first and not the second. But we should be careful not to elide these two separate facts and conclude that my special obligation to the pensioner in Rotherham derives from our common nationality.

Although I do not have the space at my disposal to demonstrate it here, I maintain that none of the apparently persuasive examples that Miller gives of special obligations arising from shared national identification supports his case. In every instance, I believe that we shall find that it is some other relationship that is carrying the moral strain. Most often it is common membership in a state that is doing the work, but the special obligations arising from this are treated as if the morally relevant feature underlying them were common nationality.

To conclude, let me return to the anti-interventionist and redistributive conclusions argued for by Miller, and referred to earlier in this paper (section IV). Do these follow from the kind of civic nationalism that Miller advocates and I endorse? Not in the least. Let us accept the (dangerous) analogue of a nation-state (in the non-ethnocultural sense of 'nationality') and a family. Cosmopolitans can accept (as I have pointed out) that family members have special obligations to one another that they do not have to others. But what if those obligations are

not met? Following Miller's prescriptions at the level of the nation-state, we would have to say that nothing can legitimately be done about it. But what we actually think is that the state (at some level, probably local) should step in to protect children from neglect and abuse, to protect spouses (usually in the nature of the case women) from battery, and so on. This is the right analogy, a cosmopolitan will say, for violations of human rights by states.

A parallel line of analysis applies to redistribution. Suppose we agree that families should in the first instance have autonomy to dispose of their income according to some internal decision-making process. This does not entail that this internal distribution is closed to outside scrutiny: indeed in Britain (and no doubt elsewhere) a man can be jailed for wilfully failing to support his family financially. Nor - as Miller would be among the first to insist - does it entail that families must be left to survive (or not) on whatever income the market provides them with. On the contrary, his nationalism is largely driven by the feeling that only national solidarity can underpin redistribution. But if the case for (qualified) autonomy for families does not rule out redistribution among families nor does (qualified) autonomy for nation states rule out redistribution among states.

I believe that cosmopolitan morality is the only one worthy of a human being. I do not know how to prove this. But I do think it is possible to support it indirectly by disproving arguments against it. Thus, I maintain that all the arguments directed by Miller against cosmopolitanism are fallacious. I have dealt with all of them except one. This is that cosmopolitanism cannot be right because its implications - e.g. about the need for international redistribution - conflict with widely held convictions. The same would no doubt have been true two centuries ago if it had been suggested that slavery should be abolished worldwide. And a proto-Millerian only a century ago would have laughed to scorn the idea that women should have the same political and civil rights as men. Perhaps in another century it will be a matter for amazement that transfers from rich countries to poor ones of 0.2% of GNP were once thought adequate to meet the moral obligations of people in rich countries. Whether they do or not, to adduce as argument against there being such an obligation that a lot of people currently do not believe that there is seems to me unutterably feeble. If we have convictions, let us have the courage of those convictions.

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