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State Security out of Control?
The Influence of Yugoslavia’s Political Leadership on Targeted Killings abroad (1967-84)

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Introduction:
Hitherto, it was assumed that the Communists in Yugoslavia with Josip Broz “Tito” on top gave their state security service straight orders to liquidate certain political opponents abroad. However, in light of the primary sources presented here, this assumption needs to be reassessed. This essay deals with targeted killings organized by Yugoslav state security services and the influence of the political leadership on these measures. Largely based on contemporary sources, it also highlights the logic behind the violent acts. Especially documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. State Department, which were released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in late 2016 and early 2017, help us to shed new light on this topic. Since targeted killings abroad are an issue also relating to other countries (for instance the United States of America), the peculiarities of the Yugoslav case are brought to the open. This can provide the basis for a comparative approach. The study starts with a brief outline of the Yugoslav state security.

The origin of the Yugoslav state security is usually dated back to the 13th May 1944, the day the Department for the Protection of the People was set up. It was transformed into the Administration of State Security (Uprava državne bezbednosti, UDB or colloquial “UDBA”) in 1946. After several adjustments, from 1963-67 the UDB was finally decentralized. This process paralleled the general trend in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), where the autonomous decision-making of the six component republics was considerably increased after 1963. The UDB was part of the state secretariat of the interior, since 1945 headed by Tito’s close comrade Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb who had the reputation of having a tough hand against all kinds of “enemies of the people”. In the late 1950s Ranković changed from the head of the interior to other government posts.

In the 1960s Yugoslavia entered a phase of liberalization, which was especially underpinned by the strengthening of self-administration. Ranković was regarded as an impediment to decentralization. Through his personal network from the time when he had been on top of the Interior Ministry, it was assumed, he still exerted a strong influence over the UDB, thus hindering the development of self-administration in all areas of public life. He was accused of being responsible for spying on high party members and even wiretapping Tito’s private rooms. In July 1966, at the fourth plenum of the Central Committee, he was ousted from his political posts. Whatever the real reasons were, Ranković’s loss of power gave a strong signal. He was seen as representing Serbian national interests and pulling the strings against his comrades. Top officials of the federal and Serbian UDB were dismissed. Ranković also impersonated the episode when the UDB had suppressed the Yugoslav Stalinists (even though many of them on false suspicions) with Stalinist methods. According to the Stalinist scheme, at some point the cleanser himself had to be purged. Ivan Mišković, head of the military security service, played a key role in safeguarding the dismissal of Ranković and his followers. In the early 1970s, however, when Mišković apparently started to mingle in the sensitive area of foreign affairs, he also lost his post.

At the end of the Second World War and thereafter, many anti-Communists from Croatia, Serbia and other parts of Yugoslavia fled their homeland or stayed abroad as Displaced Persons. As adherents of military groups and oppositional organizations, they posed a threat to the Partisan government. With the consolidation of the Socialist state this problem became less virulent. In the
In the late 1940s the attention of the politicians in Belgrade shifted to the emigration of pro-Moscow Yugoslavs in Eastern Europe (the so-called informbirovci). While Tito sided with the West, the prospects of anti-Communist Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian and Macedonian exiles benefiting from the Cold War situation diminished. In the late 1950s especially the Croatian anti-Yugoslav emigration was reinforced by younger refugees. Some of them had been active in militant nationalist groups, others left Yugoslavia for economic reasons. Often both motives intermingled. At the same time Ante Pavelić, ex-dictator of the Axis-allied wartime regime in Croatia, founded the Croatian Liberation Movement (Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret, HOP) a more or less implicit reference to the People’s Liberation Movement (Narodno-oslobodilački pokret: NOP), as the Communist-led anti-Fascist resistance during the Second World War was called. HOP served as an umbrella for Ustaša-inclined organizations like the United Croatians in West Germany. They recruited new members among the refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), where many of them went to get a job on the prospering labour market. The FRG was also attractive for political reasons. Since Tito re-established friendly relations with the Soviet sphere in the late 1950s, the government in Belgrade recognized the East German state. As a reaction, the FRG broke off its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. This development, in addition to the anti-Communist climate in the FRG, created favourable conditions for the exiles, because it brought along a weakening of Yugoslavia’s position.

On these grounds the FRG started to grant asylum to political refugees from Yugoslavia. Some hotheads among the newcomers were tired of the internal fractions and of limiting themselves to rituals like the annual celebration of the 10th April, when the collaborationist Ustaša state had been proclaimed in 1941. They demanded action instead. Croatian and to a lesser extent Serbian ultranationalists founded militant secret organizations in western countries like Australia or the FRG. In late 1962, a group of neo-Ustaše attacked the Yugoslav state representation near Bonn, setting the offices on fire. The house-keeper was shot on duty. In the summer of the following year three troikas of armed Croatian emigrants re-entered their homeland in order to conduct sabotage acts against Yugoslavia. The intruders, who belonged to the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB), were arrested before carrying out any of their planned assaults. Yugoslav representatives abroad were another target of frequent émigré aggression. While on visit in western states, politicians from Yugoslavia felt threatened by the open and sometimes frightening appearance of their opponent compatriots. Yugoslav propaganda pictured the adversaries abroad as bloodthirsty perverted Fascist thugs, an image that can perhaps best be seen in Miodrag Bulatović’s novel “The Four-Fingered People” (Ljudi sa četiri prsta).

Already in 1962, the Yugoslav government tended to de-escalate by offering an amnesty for people who had illegally left the country but not committed any grave crime. However, this gesture failed to turn up significant results. Especially the adherents of extremist émigré organizations responded with cynical rejection. On the other hand, in face of rising unemployment the number of Yugoslav citizens who at least temporarily left their country in search for jobs remained high. Those who emigrated illegally constituted an easy prey for the older exiles who offered job opportunities and social integration. In response, the Yugoslav leadership eased the travel restrictions and opened the state borders for a controlled emigration to countries with a lasting demand of fresh labour force. In addition to the political measures, the Yugoslav state security focussed on the dangerous parts of the emigration.
2. Reforms and Structure after 1966: State Security Periphery as “Centre”

The UDB, belonging to the ministry of the interior, was organized along the federal structure of the SFRY. Beyond its symbolic content, the fall of Ranković in 1966 brought fundamental changes to the state security.13 The reforms can be summarized as follows:

- The state security was renamed from “administration” to “service”, thus emphasizing that it should not stand above the law.14
- A governmental control commission was established.15
- In order to avoid a concentration of power in Belgrade, the autonomy of the state security services of the republics was considerably strengthened.16 From now on it was accurate to speak of Yugoslavian security services in plural.17

Each of the six component republics of the Yugoslav federation had its own state security organization. Below this level there existed state security “Centres” in the bigger towns. Bosnia-Herzegovina had nine, Croatia around the mid-1970s seven of them, and in Slovenia at the beginning of the 1970s there were eight.18 Most of the field work was conducted by the “Centres”. Another relevant factor in Yugoslavia’s struggle against the hostile emigration was the secret service of the Foreign Ministry.19 Though this study deals with the Yugoslav state security service (Služba državne bezbednosti, SDB) in the first line, on occasions when it is unclear which part of the Yugoslav intelligence system was involved, collective terms will be used.

On the one hand, the reform deprived the state security organs of any “executive functions”.20 The basic task was to conduct preliminary investigations. On the other hand, they were entrusted with averting criminal acts aimed at undermining the official order of the SFRY.21 This principle was laid down in the updated rules of the state security, issued in early 1967, which defined the Yugoslav state security as an “autonomous professional service” for the collection of data with the aim of “discovering and preventing[]” hostile activities.22 Towards officials of foreign states, Yugoslav representatives repeatedly asked for “preventative action against the extremist groups”.23 Following this demand, the security services started their own interventions.

Of the few documents available on this issue, an operational plan of the State Security Centre in Split allows us to reconstruct the considerations of an employee who was concerned with curbing the anti-Yugoslav efforts of Tomislav Krolo. He was identified as a militant Croatian in West Germany, where he apparently took part in “diversionist training”. To the state security officer at the desk in Split it seemed unlikely that Krolo would cease his hostile activities by intrinsic motivation or change sides and work for the state security. Thus, the state security informed the public prosecutor in Split to take legal steps against Krolo. The chances, however, that this procedure would have an impact on a person outside the Yugoslav jurisdiction were tiny. But the security service still held one trump up the sleeve: “In the utmost case someone would, in relation to the opportunities, move towards the physical liquidation. For this plan we started operational combinations during the recent year.”24

Though the plan to eliminate Krolo was not carried out, the Centre in Split arranged the killing of another Croatian militant in the FRG. Marijan Šimundić had been involved in organizing the failed attack of HRB combatants on Yugoslavia in summer 1963 and late that year he received a minor sentence for illegal firearms possession.25 To no surprise the Yugoslav security apparatus regarded
him as a potential danger. Šimundić was shot dead in an ambush-like setup near Stuttgart in September 1967. As indicated by SDB files, this operation was carried out by the State Security Centre in Split without the exact knowledge of the federal state security service in Belgrade (the SDB of the Savezni sekretarijat za unutrašnjih poslova, SSUP).

For the late 1960s, the CIA noted a high degree of confusion between the Yugoslav federation and its Republics over the “State Security Services’ command and control”. The significant reduction of personnel led to a marginalization of the SDB SSUP. The staff of the SDB was cut by half. Most affected was the federal SDB in Belgrade. As the SDB had lost its supervision, it was time to rebuild the position of the federal security service. Due to the far-reaching decentralization, the periphery decided over the future role of the former organizational centre. In the early 1970s, representatives of the Republic services conferred over the question of the hierarchy between Republics and the federation. The functions of the SDB SSUP were redefined.

3. Preventive Actions, Reactions and Taboo

It is questionable if the control commission of the late 1960s was really able to supervise the work of the security services. At some point its competences consisted of receiving reports on the organized opposition against the socialist system. Beyond the missing grip on the state security, the intelligence services even seemed to turn against domestic politicians. In a “closed door session” of the Executive Bureau in March 1971, the inner circle of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) investigated suspicions against “Yugoslav intelligence services […] that they were involved in a ‘conspiracy’ aimed at slandering the present Croatian Republic leadership by linking it to radical foreign émigrés who advocate an independent Croatia”. The discussion quickly revealed dissatisfaction with the complicated situation for politicians who were confronted with the opaque intelligence system. Prime Minister Matija Ribičić was disappointed that the intelligence services denied the control commission access to important documents. He spoke of “frequent irregularities”. Under these circumstances, he concluded, an effective government control was impossible.

Before entering the LCY Executive Bureau in 1969, Stane Dolanc had been a member of the Slovenian control commission for state security matters. The CIA considered him particularly “sensitive to recent Western press coverage of Yugoslavia”. Against this background, he addressed the issue in the frankest way. First he pointed to the confusing multitude of autonomous security services plus the military intelligence and the exterior secret service. Of major concern to him, however, were the lethal foreign activities of the state security. This is his statement from the strictly confidential records of the Executive Bureau:

„For me there is one situation beyond comprehension, totally unclear. The issue is liquidations. I think this here is the place where we can talk about this, that this will be investigated and checked who did this, how and why. All of you remember that we, the members of the [Executive] Bureau, at a session, I think a year ago, when I returned from [West] Germany and when I reported on the events and warnings I had received there […], because at that time an attempt was made on some Vukić, who they had tried to liquidate with a gas bomb, and when the Bureau, I think in unison, decided that nobody should get involved into such affairs, that this is a totally mistaken policy. However, thereafter these things still went on. “
Among his closest comrades, Dolanc referred to the assassination attempt on Ante Vukić, president of the United Croats of Germany, an organization that the authorities of the FRG described as supportive of anti-Yugoslav violence. On 22 October 1969, Vukić and his family members discovered that the interior of their car was sprayed with a toxic substance. This incident was only one of many in the late 1960s. After the SDB had attributed the installation of six simultaneous time bombs at Yugoslav missions in the U.S. and Canada to an anti-Communist organization of Serbs, Andrija Lončarić, a prominent figure in Serbian exile circles, was murdered in Paris on 6 March 1969. The investigators came across an “UBDA”-officer who had already returned to Belgrade. Ratko Obradović, editor of the Serbian “Iskra” émigré paper, was killed in Munich on 17 April 1969. Next was Sava Ćubrilović, a member of the Serbian National Defense in Sweden. The major suspect quickly boarded a plane to Belgrade.

According to SDB sources, Hrvoje Ursa was attached to a group of HRB activists in Frankfurt. In late September 1968, he was found dead in a West German river. Milan Rukavina, the predecessor of Vukić on top of the United Croats, was shot together with two compatriots in his Munich office on 26 October 1968. Yugoslav officials linked Rukavina to bomb attacks on public places in Belgrade. Another casualty among Croatian exiles was Nahid Kulenović, founder of a militant anti-Yugoslav underground organization and sentenced by a West German court for violating the official restrictions on weapons. Traces that emerged after his death led the investigators of the Munich police to the Bosnian state security. On 9 April 1969, Mirko Čurić was also killed in Munich. Along with Rukavina and Kulenović, he had been registered on a “list of terrorists” compiled by the Yugoslav state security.

That the killings corresponded to the task of the security services to spare Yugoslavia from violent attacks, was confirmed by a statement of Đuro Matošić, who had been a UDB officer in the latter half of the 1940s. As a member of the Croatian parliamentary committee for foreign relations he told a Yugoslav paper that the state security was “able to come to terms with the hostile activities of the emigration wherever it is necessary”. Obviously this referred to the foreign operations of the SDB (among others the assassination of the former concentration camp commander and militant neo-Ustaša leader Vjekoslav Luburić in Spain). Quoted in the international press, the message that had slipped Matošić’s tongue spread around the globe. This was one reason why, according to an internal CIA bulletin, the LCY leadership stressed “the need for more efficient control” over the work of the state security.

Despite Dolanc’s objections against the sensational foreign operations, further assassination attempts were made on exiles like the prominent Branimir Jelić, who was regarded by the Yugoslav Foreign administration “as one of the organizers and inspirers of diversionist-terrorist actions in Europe”. Recent aggressions of Croatian militants (e.g. the killing of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden in April 1971) gave drastic measures a justification. In a conversation with Soviet leader Leonid Brežnev, however, Tito advocated for the lawful treatment of political enemies: “After the war we didn’t cut anybody’s head anymore. We’ve finished what happened during the war. But after the war we didn’t do that, instead everything went before court.”
Hence, it is doubtful if the state leader was in favour of killing opponents abroad. In any case, Dolanc who clearly criticized the lethal operations was elevated to the influential post of the Executive Bureau’s Secretary. After the inner circle of the Communist leadership had come to the conclusion that the political control over the secret services (including military and foreign intelligence) was insufficient, a second control body came into being: the Council for State Security Affairs. It was attached to the Presidency of the SFRY. One shortcoming of this body was, however, that a direct representation of the intelligence services was missing. At the first session, Dolanc recommended to tighten the leadership of the multiple services in the SFRY. Again, he complained about the reluctance of the republics’ services to report to the SDB SSUP or the tendency to withhold important information. He also spoke of an inefficient competition between the civil and military services.

Whereas Dolanc addressed the actual problems, Secretary of the Interior Luka Banović warned of upcoming terror acts. Croatian militant émigrés, he reported, had large sums of money and explosives at their disposal. It seemed certain that an assault was imminent, but it was unclear exactly where and when. However, the security services took actions into their own hands. Banović presented a successful prevention of an attempt on the consul in Stuttgart. While using the official formula of bloody revenges among the exiles, he referred to the killing of Josip Senić in the night from 9th to 10th March 1972. Senić was officially known as an instructor and chief organizer of the HRB. A German court had sentenced him to three weeks in prison for the illegal possession of firearms. Actually, he was banned from re-entering the FRG when the police found him shot in the head while having been asleep. That the Yugoslav state security stood behind the murder, derives from a log entry of an operational consultation in Osijek of late May 1969, mentioning “the liquidation as the only appropriate measure” against Senić. Another strong indicator of Yugoslav state security involvement was the “detailed map” of Senić’s hideout delivered by an agent prior to the elimination.

4. “Special War”: The Geopolitical Context

Though not totally unexpected, the attack came as a surprise: On 20 June 1972, 19 heavily armed anti-Yugoslav Croats crossed from Austria into Yugoslavia. Their plan was to stir up a rebellion in Croatia where a nationalist reform movement had been suppressed early that year. Guerrilla warfare was meant to spark the flame. The intruders reached central Bosnia, killing 13 members of Yugoslav forces before being stopped. Most of the combat took place in the Raduša region, giving the counterinsurgency operation its name. Though the efforts of the security apparatus had been enormous, it took the defenders more than four weeks to corner all the enemies. Confronted with this weak performance, the SDB declared the targeted killings abroad the spearhead of counterterrorism. An internal SDB paper, issued during the operation “Raduša”, implicitly admitted the violent acts in foreign countries and clearly corresponded to the disapproval from high ranking politicians like Dolanc:

„The increase of aggressive methods against the emigration and the special missions of the SDB have been sharply criticized and subjected to investigation demands on grounds that they were ‘illegal’ work, that they could lead to ‘complications in international relations’ and that they would animate
Obviously aware of the delicate nature, the SDB stated that “some offensive actions of our service abroad” lowered the risk of further assaults. With the promise of handling the anti-terror measures “in a way that respects the political interests of the country and its international status”, the SDB tried to dispel the objections raised by Dolanc and his likeminded comrades. Alarmed by the fact that the guerrilla-style troublemakers had succeeded in penetrating deeply into the state territory, the political leadership provided a backup for the violent course of the SDB. The politicians with Tito on top interpreted the recent raid as part and proof of a “special war”. In their minds, Yugoslavia and the other non-aligned countries suffered from a subtle war waged by the superpowers, since both of them avoided a direct clash leading to mutual destruction by nuclear weapons. Triggered by the armed incursion, the identification with the Third World became the essence of the Yugoslav defence doctrine. Against this background, the militant exiles fought a proxy war that justified physical countermeasures.

A military style vocabulary euphemized the application of physical violence outside the state borders: “Through operations and other measures”, for instance, “the SDB managed to paralyze, smash, [and] temporarily or definitely stop the advancement” of Stipe Ševo, Gojić Bošnjak and Stipe Crnogorac. Crnogorac, a Croatian émigré in Austria, was certainly “paralyzed” while he was abducted and killed during the operation “Raduša”. In August 1972, the HRB-member Ševo was “definitely stopped” when he, his girlfriend and her nine-year-old daughter were shot on a road trip in northern Italy. Most likely the hit man was an agent of the Yugoslav state security. On 27 July 1972, a bomb exploded in front of Bošnjak’s restaurant, obviously intended to “smash” the anti-Yugoslav exile. Since this attempt failed and the SDB still regarded him as a terrorist, a second operation was mounted, this time trying to shoot him. However, the gunman from Bosnia was caught in the nick of time and ended up in a West German jail. Twenty years later, his contact person of the SDB Centre in Mostar testified on this incident. An official registry of the Bosnian SDB, listing Bošnjak as an operational case of the Mostar Centre, confirms this connection.

Among Yugoslav top politicians insecurity about a recurrence of armed incursions prevailed. On nationwide TV in April 1973, Tito stated “that any – and even the most insignificant – group of infiltrated enemies would be sought out and destroyed”. The scenario of a “special war” had a lasting impact on the state security. In the perception of security officials, their work consisted of resistance against a permanent global threat. Holding “an impassioned speech […] on the strength of the Yugoslav resistance to all interference from external sources ‘be they C.I.A. or Russian directed or misguided Yugoslavs’”, during a conference with Australian liaison officers Assistant Federal Secretary for Interior Josip Bukovac underlined the integral character of the “special war”.

While presiding over a session of the Executive Bureau in June 1973, Dolanc warned against an overreaction as he was of the opinion that “15, even 150 or 300 diversionists cannot wreck our socialist self-management progress in the country”. Only the existence of an inner enemy, he pointed out, allowed the attacks of foreign forces to gain strength. Thus, he advised to pay more
attention to the opponents inside the SFRY and even to deviations from the party line. For the situation abroad he recommended to focus on the hostile influences from the East. Corresponding to this proposal, Tito’s security advisor Ivan Mišković, according to CIA-sources “one of those who called loudest for vigilance against Western influences threatening Yugoslav security”, was ousted from his post. His dismissal paved the way for Franjo Herljević, another high ranking military man. Herljević, an active army general with an impressive wartime record, “was chosen as the new Federal Minister of Internal Affairs in May 1974 to effect closer coordination between military and civilian security services, and to supervise the organizational changes this would require”. After a revelation that the surveillance of pro-Soviet plotters had apparently been neglected, the SDB came under pressure. With the inauguration of Herljević, Tito demanded a closer cooperation of the intelligence system. Once the SDB SSUP had been marginalized, the state security was hard to get a grip on. Herljević, a Partisan veteran of strictly conservative leanings, was designated to introduce the required changes.

5. The Era of Franjo Herljević as Federal Secretary of the Interior
The answer to the insufficient governance of the intelligence system emerged as another administrative patch. Out came the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. Rather than interfering in specific operations of Yugoslav security services, it adopted programmatic guidelines and provided surveys of the general security situation. The idea behind this body, established in February 1975, was to ensure a regular exchange between top politicians and the highest governmental representatives concerned with security matters. Already in March 1975, Herljević informed the state leadership that the “deviations” of the SDB were brought to an end. He presented the SDB as being “completely in line with the politics of the League of Communists and comrade Tito”. From an inner-Yugoslav perspective, the problem of a potential abuse of the secret police was mitigated by insisting on loyalty of the security services to the LCY. Demanding a confession to the party line was actually a result of the new constitution of 1974, reinforcing the power position of the LCY. Thus, ideological loyalty was placed above operational discipline. The question of political loyalty of the SDB remained high on the agenda as Vice-President Vladimir Bakarić, also the president of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, “warned a party plenum [in mid-1975] that the internal security organs might be growing too strong and independent”.

In 1974, the same year Herljević became chief of the SSUP, new training instructions with a strong accent on counterterrorism were released. If a judicial persecution was out of reach and a clear warning of a suspected person in vain, the instructions envisaged “the physical annihilation” as an appropriate ultimate step against “outlaws, terrorists, diversionists and alike”. Herljević gave the SDB a broad definition of terrorists as “all persons who in Yugoslavia or abroad are involved in the preparation [!], attempt or execution of diversionist-terrorist acts”. Furthermore, in view of an upcoming strike against Yugoslavia, the self-initiative of state security agents on the spot was explicitly welcomed. Such procedures, the instructions read, could apply tactics “of military nature”. “Exceptional situations” – as they had occurred “immediately after the war or at the time of the IB resolution [i.e. when Yugoslavia was ousted from the international Communist organization in 1948]” – justified “liquidations”.
For numerous dispersed groups of anti-Communist fighters the war was not over in May 1945. In the latter half of the 1940s, hundreds of armed bands resisted the country’s takeover by the Partisans. After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, the neighbouring Socialist countries started a low scale war against Yugoslavia. Skirmishes at the borders occurred frequently. The incursion of summer 1972 reminded the political leaders, especially Herljević who had been in command of the operation Raduša, of these experiences. With two Croatian intruders eliminated in the Velebit mountains, five Croats arrested in the FRG for illegal combat weapon deals, Franjo Turk of the HRB administering a Swiss bank account and Nikola Štedul forwarding money from overseas to nationalist extremists in Europe, anti-Yugoslav militancy still seemed on the rise in late 1974. 

Immediately after Herljević had reminded the state security chiefs of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a session in June 1975 to avoid “international problems” as a result of “special actions”, he encouraged his audience to step up initiatives against the extremist emigration: “We cannot constantly cede the territory to the enemy, enabling him to maneuver, enabling him to act. For example there have been already some months, when we moved more aggressively against several groups of the enemy.”

At the same time Tito increased the fear of an approaching crisis with an update of the defence doctrine. By stating that “our country is permanently exposed to pressure and attacks of the external and internal enemy”, he declared a state of emergency towards Yugoslav government circles. So, first on Tito’s schedule after his holidays in summer 1975 was a meeting with all Yugoslav Secretaries for Internal Affairs. Herljević assessed the number of dangerous émigrés at 5,000 and remarked that “the [state security] service carried out a series of actions which caused provocations resulting in conflicts, quarrels and mutual settleings of accounts in some extremely dangerous organizations and groups as well as among terrorists. Twelve infamous criminals from the ranks of the Ustasha and Chetnik extremists lost their lives, two have been severely injured – [Dane] Šarac in a desperate condition: paralyzed.”

The CIA described Šarac, an exile seriously harmed in an assassination attempt on 17 July 1975, as “one of the most active and influential representatives of extremist émigré circles in West Europe”, belonging to the “HRB members who were sentenced [...] for bombings of Yugoslav installations in Germany between 1965 and 1968”. Being an infamous Ustaša convicted for war crimes, he was probably known to Herljević. At the departmental meeting in Belgrade, Herljević told the audience that specific actions for the stimulation of „further mutual settleings of accounts in the ranks of the extreme emigration” by the SDB were in the run. Internally Herljević (like his predecessor Banović) used the same coding as for the international public but noted the lethal incidents with satisfaction. It was also made clear that the violence was caused by the initiatives of the state security. However, in order to avoid legal disputes, the direct perpetration of the killings was attributed to the opposite side. After the update of the SDB manual in 1974, the killings of militant compatriots in foreign countries became programmatic.

Jakov Ljotić, a Serbian nationalist of extreme persuasion, was slain in his Munich apartment on 8 July 1974. An active involvement of the Yugoslav state security, as in the other cases listed here, was likely. On 17 February 1975, the Croatian right-wing nationalist Nikica Martinović was shot in Klagenfurt. State security documents had expressed a particular interest in “paralyzing” Martinović. Mate Jozak, according to the internal documents of the SDB an emissary of “terror
organizers” in Australia with the task of arms procurement for a raid on Yugoslavia, was killed and his body dumped into the river Rhine in late 1974.\textsuperscript{105} After a designated hit man had surrendered to the Belgian police, presenting a silencer-equipped gun allegedly received from the SDB for killing Bora Blagojević, this exiled Chetnik leader was shot in Brussels on 8 March 1975.\textsuperscript{106} On 17 May 1975, “Petar Valić, editor of a Chetnik newspaper in Belgium, was shot in Brussels. Evidence suggests [that the] Yugoslav security service was responsible.”\textsuperscript{107} Ilija Vučić, once sentenced by a West German court for violating restrictions on explosives, died after being hit by five bullets in Stuttgart on 6 June 1975.\textsuperscript{108} “Police suspected a terrorist team was dispatched from Yugoslavia for the purpose of killing him, but they had no proof”, concluded the CIA.\textsuperscript{109} SDB organs held the prominent Croatian exile leader Stipe Mikulić responsible for the explosion on board of a Yugoslav plane crashed over Czechoslovakia on 26 January 1972.\textsuperscript{110} Mikulić was killed in Sweden on 17 December 1975. The main suspect in police custody refused to give details on the origin of large monetary means in his possession – apparently the reward for the assassination – and eventually escaped to Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{111}

Ongoing anti-Yugoslav violence triggered media campaigns against the host countries of the fanatical nationalists, stating that the latter received support from western intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{112} The Yugoslav government expected “urgent, energetic and persistent measures to stop terrorist activities by Fascist groups”.\textsuperscript{113} Due to the central position in south-eastern Europe, with the easement of travel restrictions Yugoslavia became an international transit country. Throughout 1976, for instance, there were 106 million officially registered border crossings.\textsuperscript{114} During a consultation with Australian liaison officers, the Yugoslav representatives (actually SDB employees) pointed to the vulnerability of their state borders:

> „The Yugoslavs seemed confident that with the co-operation of Western European police forces (and Australia to a lesser extent at this stage) intelligence was keeping them up with the movements of hostile groups. They acknowledged however that they were dealing with clever people and that it was difficult for the Yugoslav police forces to adequately cope with the immense flow of traffic across their borders. It was always likely that small groups, or individuals, could ‘legally’ enter Yugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{115}

That the secretary-general of the HOP in France, Ivan Tuksor, was killed by a car bomb can be interpreted as a sign of growing nervousness inside the Yugoslav security apparatus.\textsuperscript{116} He had participated in the preparation of letter bombs addressed to the Yugoslav Consulate in Munich.\textsuperscript{117} On 6 August 1976, Miodrag Bošković and his friend Uroš Miličević, both anti-Communist Serbs, were assassinated in Brussels.\textsuperscript{118} In September 1976, the CIA summarized the recent wave of targeted killings as follows:

> „In the past two years there have been at least 11 unsolved murders of emigres abroad. Many, if not all, were probably ordered by the Yugoslav secret police. Yugoslav officials tend to react intemperately to emigre acts of violence, often in ways that undermine Yugoslavia’s case as the victim of terrorism.”\textsuperscript{119}

Meanwhile, the bad press continued. For example a front page article in The New York Times, published on 12 September 1976, mentioned “about 10 political murders of Yugoslavs living abroad so far this year”.\textsuperscript{120} Dolanc was obviously still worried about these developments, as he had a particular interest in cultivating friendly relations with the Western powers by reassuring them that
Yugoslavia refrained from entering the Soviet bloc. Confronted with a suffering international reputation of the SFry, Dolanc developed into an adversary of Herljević. A memo issued on 10 December 1976 by CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence reported on the frictions between Tito’s number one party secretary and the minister of the interior:

„In June, Dolanc reportedly took the unusual step of criticizing General Franjo Herljivic, the interior minister, at a meeting of the collective state presidency. Herljivic received the interior portfolio in 1974, when Tito ordered an upgrading of the internal security mechanism. Dolanc complained that excessive zeal by the police under Herljivic was causing problems at home and hurting Yugoslavia’s image abroad [1]. Dolanc’s complaints apparently fell on deaf ears because subsequent reports indicate that the ministry continues to go its own way.“

While the conflict between Dolanc and Herljivic lasted, the security services produced further problematic incidents. West German police officers arrested an employee of the Croatian state security who was on a mission to arrange the assassination of two Croatian militant émigrés (most prominently Stjepan Bilandžić – in the words of the FRG ambassador in Belgrade a target of Yugoslav “security service efforts to silence him”). When confronted by his West German colleagues with the murderous measures of the security services, Jovo Miloš of the SDB SSUP pointed to the autonomy of the “federalized organs” as an explanation. Unimpressed by the international complications, Herljivic still advocated a relentless counterterrorism. Towards the Federal Assembly, he boasted himself that between 1975 and 1978 some eighty “diversionist attempts” had been averted by Yugoslav security agencies. Thus, the continuation of drastic measures seemed well-justified. Without any hesitation Herljivic spoke in favour of an energetic struggle against any kind of opposition. He informed his comrades about an alleged alliance of domestic dissidents with the “hostile emigration”, “reactionary circles in the FR Germany and the USA” and “terrorists” (namely Gojko Bošnjak and Franjo Goreta).

The targeted killings abroad persisted. Bruno Bušić, a prominent member of the Croatian National Council, was shot dead in Paris on 16 September 1978. Standing trial in Zagreb six years before, he had been accused of collaborating with an unspecified foreign intelligence service. After leaving Yugoslavia, Bušić became a focal point of the nationalist network and was officially linked to the September 1976 hijacking of a TWA-airliner by Croatian separatists. After his death the police noted “the third recorded killing of a Croatian militant in France in the past six years“. A few years later an informant of the Yugoslav secret service underpinned the assumptions that Bušić’s assassination originated from Yugoslav state organs – he confessed having rejected an order to assassinate the exiled Croat.

Around early 1980, the Croatian state security blackmailed a Yugoslav citizen in the FRG to murder Goreta. In late 1979 a Croat told the authorities that he had been induced to kill certain compatriots in the FRG, among them Bošnjak. Several cases of attempts to recruit hit men for the SDB became public. In August 1979 the FBI reported to the U.S. Senate that the Yugoslav secret service played a key role in “harassment, intimidation and, perhaps, assassination”. Nikola Miličević had been repeatedly sentenced by West German courts for the illegal possession of firearms and other offences. He was a founding member of the splinter organization United Croats of Europe. Although Yugoslav officials held him responsible for terrorist attacks, the
Frankfurt Supreme Court rejected the extradition requests.\textsuperscript{138} In January 1980, he was shot near his home in Frankfurt. Investigators of the Federal Criminal Office expressed their doubts “that a killer squad on order from above” had been at work. To them it seemed more probable “that lower ranking ‘UDBA’-people from the camp of the hawks had operated independently”.\textsuperscript{139} Yugoslav officials considered Dušan Sedlar’s royalist organization Serbian National Defence, having some 270 members in the FRG, as dangerous.\textsuperscript{140} Stanko Čolak, chief of the SDB’s anti-emigration department in Belgrade, told his West German liaison about a militant “Sedlar group” which allegedly used British army bases for “operations against Yugoslavia”.\textsuperscript{141} Sedlar was shot in Düsseldorf on 16 April 1980.\textsuperscript{142} A CIA memo summarized the situation as follows: „Belgrade pursues an intense anti-terrorist program at home and abroad that has included diplomatic pressure, propaganda to discredit emigre organizations [... end of sentence censored]. [...] Should emigre organizations initiate terrorist activities it is likely they will be met with equally harsh countermeasures.“\textsuperscript{143}

That the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order served as a smokescreen to calm the consciences of the official Belgrade became apparent by a reaction of Veselin Đuranović, the Yugoslav PM, when his West German colleague in a confidential talk addressed the activities of Yugoslav secret services in the FRG. From Đuranović’s point of view, the problem of insufficient control (which he dated back to the time before 1966) was solved with the establishment of the governmental control body.\textsuperscript{144} The Yugoslav leadership, he claimed, “was aware of the dangers an uncontrolled activity of the services abroad” would involve. He alleged that Bakarić, the infirm partisan veteran who presided over the Council, would never agree to illegal actions of the secret services.\textsuperscript{145} This was probably true, but Bakarić aggravated the fight against militant exiles while frightening the Central Committee with the scenario of some 2,000 “terrorists” abroad.\textsuperscript{146} Only a few weeks after both heads of government had held their talk, Herljević visited Bonn and continued to demand a zero tolerance policy against anti-Yugoslav “terrorist elements”.\textsuperscript{147}

After Tito’s death (in the words of extremist émigrés “Day X”) the targeted killings intensified.\textsuperscript{148} In a public speech on 18 May 1980, two weeks after Tito had died, Jure Bilić, president of the Croatian parliament, warned of “terrorism and crime” from extremist emigrants.\textsuperscript{149} On 19 June 1981, the militant Serbian émigré writer Dragiša Kasiković and the 9-year-old witness Ivanka Milošević were killed in Chicago.\textsuperscript{150} Already in late 1976, Yugoslav representatives had linked Ante Kostić to a group of terrorists apprehended in Zagreb.\textsuperscript{151} He was sentenced for violations of firearms restrictions, but after being released, Čolak informed the West German embassy in Belgrade that Kostić was about to carry out “a spectacular action”.\textsuperscript{152} On the early morning of 9 October 1981, Kostić was killed in front of his home in Munich.\textsuperscript{153} The SDB linked the killing of another Croat, Stanko Nižić, in Zurich to trafficking of explosives for the „Croatian Revolutionary Movement“\textsuperscript{154}

6. Turning the Tide: Stane Dolanc as New Secretary of Internal Affairs

In 1981, riots broke out in the Albanian-inhabited Kosovo province of Serbia, shifting the focus of the SDB to exiles from that region.\textsuperscript{155} Heavily injured, Rasim Zenelaj survived an assassination attempt. On trial in Frankfurt, the perpetrator confessed having acted on behalf of the Yugoslav secret service.\textsuperscript{156} Zenelaj was an Albanian activist for Kosovo’s national independence from Serbia – as was Ibrahim Vehbi, killed in Brussels (also in 1981).\textsuperscript{157} In early 1982, three oppositional Kosovo-Albanian activists were shot at once in the FRG. One of the victims gave a clue by whispering
The new series of killings provoked critical reports in the West German media which the politicians could hardly ignore. In an address to the Bonn parliament, the conservative opposition confronted the public with the issue.

This was particularly inconvenient as Yugoslavia relied on the sympathy of the West. The socialist state was heavily indebted and needed the assistance of countries like the FRG for a prolongation of foreign credits. Dolanc as the darling of the West had some reason to worry that the adventures of the security services might taint the goodwill of the international partners. When he took over the Secretariat of the Interior in May 1982, he intended to weed out the “wild disorder” which apparently had occurred under his predecessor Herljević. An assessment of the CIA described the hopes raised with the replacement of Herljević as follows:

"The Yugoslav Government officially denies that it employs killer squads or hired assassins to keep its emigres cowed, and the West German Government rarely obtains conclusive proof of Yugoslav Government complicity in any particular attack on an emigre. Nevertheless, the pattern of events and the thrust of available evidence have convinced the Germans that the Yugoslav security service has been behind many of the killings. [...]"

In the spring of 1981, FRG Interior Minister [Gerhart] Baum met with his Yugoslav counterpart [Herljević] to complain about the activities of the Yugoslav service in West Germany. The latter indicated that Belgrade was unwilling to cease these activities unless Bonn would take further action to restrict the political activities of Yugoslav emigre groups. Baum could only reply that German security officials were already taking all measures available to them under the law.

Stane Dolanc, Yugoslavia's new Interior Minister, will probably be more responsive to Bonn's concerns. He has long had close ties to West German Social Democrats and generally seeks improved relations with the West. To be effective, however, Dolanc must succeed in imposing his will over the security service, which has had a reputation for independent initiative.

Dolanc frequently visited “Free West Germany” (as he used to call it), where he cultivated close contacts to leading Social Democrats. During the complications between Yugoslavia and the FRG over the exchange of West German left-wing and Croatian separatist militants in 1978, he tried to mediate. After the negotiations had failed, Dolanc “argued successfully for a moderate Yugoslav reaction to the FRG decision to refuse extradition". In his capacity as number one secretary of the LCY (until 1979), he played a key role in Yugoslavia’s friendly relations to the West – almost as an informal foreign minister. He developed into a guarantor of suppressing pro-Soviet elements in Yugoslavia. The CIA considered him “most wary of the USSR". Moreover, for the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, Dolanc was “a political animal of the first order” who “keeps a careful eye on the east".

The course of events indicates that Dolanc had a hard time bringing the state security services in line with foreign policy goals. While being only a few months in charge of the Internal Affairs, the SDB created another embarrassing situation. After the anti-Yugoslav militant Luka Kraljević had been attacked by strangers in his Bavarian home on 20 August 1982, two guns which originated from the SSUP were found on the escape route. Obviously they had been dropped by the agents who had panicked when Kraljević and his wife resisted the intruders. Another trace leading to Yugoslavia was the car rented by the agents and returned to Belgrade. An involvement of the Bosnian SDB seems likely since in the advance of the assault, the chief of the Centre in Mostar sent photographs of
Kraljević to his colleagues in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{172} Prior to the attempt, Kraljević had repeatedly received phone calls from a state security officer in Mostar trying to recruit him as an informer.\textsuperscript{172}

The periodical „security estimates“, compiled by the SDB SSUP, spotted the so-called „Augsburg group“ around Kraljević and Đuro Zagajski as “making intense preparations for the execution of terror acts during the spring and summer of 1983“.\textsuperscript{173} Zagajski, a member of the „Croatian Revolutionary Movement“ for the procurement of explosives, was found beaten to death near Munich on 26 March 1983.\textsuperscript{174} Another victim was Stjepan Đureković, a manager of Croatia’s biggest oil company, who for reasons of political dissent and fears of being discovered as a spy of the West German secret service moved to Munich.\textsuperscript{175} In late September 1982, the Croatian Secretary of the Interior announced that Đureković was “involved in subversive activities by an anti-Yugoslav terrorist organization of World-War-Two Ustashi émigrés”.\textsuperscript{176} This allegation seemed verified when the Yugoslav security organs noticed Đureković’s article in a paper with Ustaša leanings, recommending an uprising for the establishment of a Greater Croatian state.\textsuperscript{177} Hence, the SDB classified him as „motivator of the emigration for the execution of specific actions“.\textsuperscript{178}

Almost ten years after Đureković’s murder in July 1983, Čolak’s successor as chief of the anti-emigration department of the SDB SSUP remembered how Dolanc commented on the event: “After this the Germans will send us to hell. We have to stop it. In the past we have done some stupid things. That’s what I told Franjo [Herljević] right to his face.”\textsuperscript{179} Dolanc was obviously not the only politician worried about a deterioration of the relations with the West. When a delegate of the Yugoslav parliament asked about the reactions from abroad, the Deputy Secretary of the Interior took the opportunity for a public denial. Following the routine, he explained the incident with the fabrication of bloody feuds among the extreme nationalists.\textsuperscript{180} After a second assassination attempt was made on Kraljević in late 1983, leaving him blinded, Dolanc said on TV that “we are absolutely not interested in this kind of actions”.\textsuperscript{181} For more than a decade already, Dolanc pleaded for the strengthening of a supervising body on federal level.\textsuperscript{182} An analysis by the CIA described how Dolanc worked towards a closer coordination of the Yugoslav security services by the SDB SSUP:

“The leadership’s efforts to enhance federal control so far have had only marginal success, and the conflict between federal and regional security interests continues unresolved. […] The federal government in March 1984 passed legislation that returns to it some of the authority in regional security matters that it lost over the last 18 years. […] Advocates of the legislation, primarily former Interior Minister Dolanc, argue that sole reliance on information from local security organs would be disastrous, as apparently was the case before the Kosovo riots in 1981.”\textsuperscript{183}

Priority was given to domestic requirements, but also the foreign operations were affected by the modified regulations on the relations between the Yugoslav state security services. In mid-May 1984, Dolanc changed from top of the SSUP to the state presidency. In the parallel position as head of the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, which was given more power over the SDB, he hoped to be able to provide enough backup to the reform policy of his successor Dobroslav Čulafić (the new Secretary of the SSUP).\textsuperscript{184} The specialists of the CIA, however, assumed that the “federal Interior Ministry, aside from the small gain made under the 1984 Law on State Security, does not appear likely to recover much control or leverage over its regional counterparts”.\textsuperscript{185} An internal SSUP report of October 1984, which stated that the regional services
still withheld relevant information from the federal SDB, adds credibility to the assumption of the
CIA. The SSUP report attached great importance to forwarding data about terrorist threats, enabling
the security services to take operational steps. A considerable share of the operational
communication was conducted orally. The SDB SSUP concluded that it did not get the whole picture
on “all measures taken against […] enemies” (like “sending agents to call on extremists with the aim
of making them passive”).\(^{186}\)

Apart from the continuing deficit of centralized control, Dolanc at least had some influence on
the methods of the SDB. Whereas the hardliner Herljević had pleaded for offensive measures,
Dolanc requested the security services to refrain from the excessive use of force.\(^{187}\) Instead of
advocating actions modelled after military examples, he initiated an intensified information
exchange with foreign security agencies.\(^{188}\) As can be seen by the annual report of the Bosnian SDB
for 1986, where an emphasis was laid on the non-violent disruption of the hostile emigration (e.g.
by campaigns of defamation), the new softened course was followed.\(^{189}\) On the other hand, Dolanc
was no exception in taking the émigré threat seriously.\(^{190}\) Like most of his comrades, he believed in
the dangerous constellation of a “special war”, according to which Yugoslavia was under attack by a
crossover combination of enemies.\(^{191}\)

**Closing Remarks: Top-Down Command or Autonomous Decision-Making?**

The relations of Yugoslavia’s political leadership with the state security were somewhat ambivalent.
On the one hand, the politicians expected from the intelligence services to keep the émigré
challenge in check. It came, however, as no surprise that the number of targeted killings increased
significantly in the late 1960s. These years stood for a climax of liberalization in domestic politics.
While Yugoslavia experienced new openness, the mode of rule changed from totalitarian to
authoritarian.\(^{192}\) In this situation, the security services shifted the focus of their activities to the
militant opponents abroad, providing an outlet for repression.\(^{193}\) This distracted the attention of the
suppressive organs away from the domestic sphere, lowering the risk of persecuting members of the
LCY. As the history of recent purges demonstrated, the Yugoslav communists were not totally safe
from internal strife. Still in 1975, Tito raised with his comrades the scenario of reopening the Goli
otok camp.\(^{194}\) How much LCY members feared becoming targets of the SDB can be assessed by the
regulations of 1967 that defined the party personnel as a sensitive area for state security
surveillances.\(^{195}\)

Against this background, the interventions against militant opponents in foreign countries –
though sometimes controversial – became instrumental. Under the impression of constant violent
acts from right-wing émigrés, the Yugoslav leadership frequently encouraged its state security to
curb the hostile activities. The constellation of the “special war” potentiated the endangerment
represented by the anti-Yugoslav exiles. Eventually, the attack of June/July 1972 had a catalyst
effect on the targeted killings abroad.\(^{196}\)

At the centre of this complex stood the problem of insufficient political control over the
operations of the security services. The targeted killings rather appear as a symptom of insufficient
government control than as the result of orders from above. The top leaders, however, had differing
attitudes on preventive counterterrorism. This can be clearly seen by the antagonism of Dolanc and
Herljević. Whereas Dolanc explicitly rejected the lethal activities in Western countries, Herljević at
least supported these drastic measures. However, this examination is focused on the federal level of Yugoslavia. Because the autonomous decision-making of the Yugoslav republics was a decisive factor in state security matters, this dimension still deserves more scholarly attention.

2 Thanks to Christopher Molnar for useful advice on this paper.
13 Thanks to Christopher Molnar for useful advice on this paper.


25 WGFO B42/101: Statement of the Public Prosecutor at the County Court Stuttgart, 10 March 1964.


29 Dimitrijević, Odjek, 81.


34 SAS 1931/C-40-2, 876-878: „Predsedniku Republičke komisije za kontrolu rada Službe državne bezbednosti”, SIV (Komisija za kontrolu nad radom službi državne bezbednosti u saveznim organima uprave), Belgrade, 15 July 1969.


68 CIA-FOIA: “Eastern European Intelligencer #180. Dolanc and Miskovic Pick Up Where Tito Stopped”, CIA (OCI), 25. Sept. 1972: “In a 23 September address to the Croatian Socialist Alliance, [Tito’s special security advisor Ivan] Miskovic claimed that a ‘special war’ is being conducted against Yugoslavia by foreign intelligence organizations and the Croatian émigrés who have joined forces.”
72 (http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Svijet/tabid/67/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/226858/Default.aspx)
74 OEZB-JUG/6: Verdict of Case I KLS 2/74, Jury Court Karlsruhe, 10 May 1974.
77 Quoted after NAA (National Archives Australia) A6122/2270, 72: “Croat Extremists”, Australian Embassy to Department of Foreign Affairs (Canberra), Belgrade, 5 April 1973.
84 AY 803/1784: „Informacija o radu i iskustvima Saveznog saveta“, Presidency of the SFYR, (Savezni savjet za zaštitu ustavnog poretka), Belgrade, 14 June 1977.
86 Quoted in Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića, 132.
89 SAS 1931/2308: „Operativna obrada – Materijal – II deo“, SSUP (Centar za stručno obrazovanje), Belgrade 1974, p. 76/83.
SAS 1931/2233: “Direktiva za organizaciju i pripreme aktivnosti i mera na suzbijanju eventualne krize situacije u zemlji”, President of the Federation and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Tito), Belgrade, 27 June 1975.
SAS 1931/2308: „Operativna obrada – Materijal – II deo“, SSUP (Centar za stručno obrazovanje), Belgrade, 1974, p. 50.

176 OEZB-JUG/1: „Djurekovic Flees Yugoslavia“, Tanjug, Zagreb, 28 Sept. [1982].


188 BStU (Central Dept.): MsS Abt. X/246, 322: “Information der Sicherheitsorgane der CSSR. Über die Zusammenarbeit der Sicherheitskräfte der BRD und der SFRJ“, MfS, [late 1983].


196 FCO 28/2153: British Embassy to FO, Belgrade, 6 Oct. 1972; CIA-FOIA: “East European Intelligencer # 125. Emigres Strike in Yugoslavia“, CIA (OCI), 5 July 1972: “Yugoslav civilian and military intelligence services (YIS), nevertheless, take the émigrés seriously and are charged with neutralizing the threat. This latest escapade in Bosnia and threats of more violence may bring a round of reprisals by the Yugoslav services against émigré installations in Western Europe. In 1968 and 1969, the YIS played a part in some of the deaths of six émigré leaders in Munich.“ (https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79b00864a001200020111-4)