

Refugees in Canada and Germany: From Research to Policies and Practice

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Sammelwerk / collection

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:

GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Korntheuer, A., Pritchard, P., Maehler, D. B., & Wilkinson, L. (Eds.). (2020). *Refugees in Canada and Germany: From Research to Policies and Practice* (GESIS-Schriftenreihe, 25). Köln: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. <https://doi.org/10.21241/ssoar.66728>

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With the support of the
Erasmus+ Programme
of the European Union

Schriftenreihe

Band 25

*Annette Korntheuer, Paul Pritchard,
Débora B. Maehler & Lori Wilkinson (eds.)*

Refugees in Canada and Germany

From Research to Policies and Practice

Refugees in Canada and Germany: From Research to Policies and Practice

GESIS Series

published by GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences

Volume 25

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Bibliographical information of the German National Library (DNB)

The German National Library lists this publication in the German National Bibliography; detailed bibliographical data are available via <https://www.dnb.de>.

ISBN 978-3-86819-042-7 (print)

ISBN 978-3-86819-041-0 (eBook)

ISSN 1869-2869

Layout: Bettina Zacharias (GESIS)

Publisher, printing
and distribution:

GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences
Unter Sachsenhausen 6-8, 50667 Cologne, Tel.: 0221 / 476 94 - 0
publications@gesis.org
Printed in Germany

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Forewords

Michael Ungar

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Though Canada and Germany are both committed to the resettlement of refugees and migrants during this period of global instability, both countries face unique challenges resulting from social policies, geography and history. The Child and Youth Refugee Research Coalition (CYRRC) has been making efforts since 2015 to ensure dialogue between academics, policymakers and settlement organizations in both countries to improve the chances for migrants to resettle successfully. With a large number of these migrants under the age of 25, there is a need to ensure long-term solutions are put in place. This volume, drawing together research and insights into the experience of young refugees and migrants, is the kind of transnational, multidisciplinary work that can help us find innovative ways to resolve the challenges young migrants experience. As the work of the CYRRC shows, we will have to consider the many different systems that intersect in a young person's life if we are to be effective with our interventions and policies. Families (both in the host country and in the country of origin), schools, communities, religious organizations and resettlement services, both those supported by government and those in the not-for-profit sector, will need to work together to create the social and physical ecologies that can support refugees and migrants before, during and after their forced displacement. Good scholarship is going to be needed to find best and promising practices. This work has only just begun, though volumes like this, and the collaborations that they represent, are a big step forward. Juxtaposed, the chapters in this volume hold the promise of informing a path forward for a global crisis for children and youth that shows no signs of abating.

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In spring 2016, researchers from the Canadian research coalition CYRRC and the Leibniz Education Research Network LERN started to exchange information and initiate research collaborations on the integration of refugees. Researchers and policymakers in Canada and Germany felt the need to explore more deeply the conditions for successful integration regarding the newcomers and the host societies alike. Accordingly, the Integration CAN-D network has been established, supporting binational research co-operation and pooling research resources. It soon became apparent that thorough background information on how both countries deal with refugee issues every day would be a beneficial tool for researchers as well as other stakeholders, laying the groundwork for closer exchange and collaboration. Thus, the anthology “The Structural Context of Refugee Integration in Canada and Germany,” published in 2017, gave an overview of the societies’ features related to housing, education, economic integration, and health among refugees. Now, only two years later, it is being complemented by this volume, “Refugees in Canada and Germany: From research to policies and practices,” which focuses on some of the contributions that research can and does make to these issues, working together with different stakeholders. The challenge will remain for the years to come: Thousands of people are still forced to flee their homes every day; they are suffering from traumatic experiences and insecurities and are looking for a safe haven; and host societies and newcomers alike will face the task of their inclusion. This volume can provide inspiration for what research can contribute to successfully addressing this challenge.

Forced Migration, Integration and Resettlement in Canada and Germany: From Research to Policies and Practice

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Increasing International Migration Rates Since 2015

The year 2015 signified a momentous shift in contemporary global migration patterns, as record high numbers of people entered Europe in order to claim asylum. That year over 1 million people arrived in Europe by sea alone; many others did not survive the journey (UNHCR, 2015). The vast majority were primarily fleeing conflict and persecution in Syria, as well as conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, three countries that together made up nearly 75 percent of the total in 2015 (IOM, 2016). While the number of asylum seekers entering Europe decreased the following year, by the end of 2016 the number of new asylum claims worldwide exceeded 2 million. Contributing most significantly to these numbers were the crisis in South Sudan, which produced the fastest-growing refugee population that year, and the high number of Somalians also fleeing violence (UNHCR, 2016). For three consecutive years Turkey hosted the greatest number of refugees worldwide, however, in 2016, Germany was the world's largest recipient of new individual asylum applications (UNHCR, 2016). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), estimated that at the end of 2018, there were more than 70 million forcibly displaced peoples around the world – the highest amount in almost 70 years (UNHCR, 2019).

The contemporary phenomenon of increasingly high numbers of forcibly displaced populations crossing international borders in search of safe haven, in what we might call an “age of displacement” (McGrath & Young, 2019), is a global issue, and responses to it have varied drastically between and within national contexts. Local, regional and national governments have struggled with the increased costs of providing support and protections for those seeking temporary or permanent refuge. The so-called refugee and migrant “crises” have become both politicized and

sensationalized. In many contexts, the categories of “refugee”, “asylum seeker”, “migrant” have taken on pejorative connotations and have been used as a mechanism to divide, discriminate and to de/legitimize mobility and claims to international protection (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). Right-wing and populist governments and conservative media outlets across Europe and in North America have sewn the image of national spaces and borders under attack from “mass influxes” of refugees and migrants, fueling anti-refugee/migrant sentiment (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, & Wodak, 2018) and, in turn, justifying policies and practices of exclusion, security and containment. Our view is in line with journalist Daniel Trilling (2018) who maintains that it is not the movement of high numbers of refugees that is the “crisis”¹; rather, it is the border systems designed to deny and regulate mobility that poses a real threat to freedom.

Counter to the tangible and symbolic fences and walls that have been erected along national borders and the public attitudes that in some contexts have become less tolerant or increasingly hostile, there are numerous cases of governments, civil society actors, grassroots activists and everyday citizens across the globe that have taken more supportive steps in welcoming refugees into their respective societies. Germany and Canada have gained international notoriety and received accolades from the global community for their efforts and leadership in supporting and protecting refugees.

This edited collection offers an in-depth look at the reactions of Germany and Canada—two countries that have responded to the 21st century “age of displacement” in very different ways - and the creative solutions and often collaborative efforts these host societies have undertaken to support the sudden arrival of newcomers within their nation’s borders.

Refugees in Germany and Canada: Facts and Policy

Refugees in Germany

The summer of migration 2015 brought significant changes to stakeholders and institutions in the German context. Approximately 890,000 asylum seekers arrived in 2015. In addition, 280,000 arrived in 2016 and 186,000 in 2017 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019). With high numbers of people arriving in such a short period of time, Germany, its government and its people had to respond in creative and innovative ways.

Nevertheless, critical and negative responses to the arrival of asylum seekers have increased across German society. Since 2015, more restrictive asylum laws have been passed, and several legal changes have been introduced at the federal level. Some of

1 For this reason, when we refer to the global issue of refugee/migrant displacement as a crisis, we encapsulate “crisis” in quotations marks to signify that the issue is a social and political construction and to reiterate that it is the negative reaction to global displacement that is the crisis, and not the movement of people.

these changes have improved the situation for refugees, while others have created obstacles to their integration and participation in daily life (SVR, 2019a, 67f.)² Since November 2014, the German government has increased the number of countries deemed safe on the safe countries of origin list. All refugees from countries deemed safe who had their claim of asylum handed in after the 31st of August 2015, are prohibited from work. Moreover, refugees from “safe countries of origin” are obliged to live in a reception centre until the decision of their claim.

Since 2017, the federal states can continue to extend the residence obligation in new initial reception and return centres, so-called “AnkERzentren”³ up to 18 months, and up to 24 months for asylum seekers from countries defined as safe. With the Asylum Package II, introduced in March 2016, the family reunification to those granted subsidiary protection was suspended until August 2018. Among all refugees, those from Syria were the most affected by this policy change. The suspension was repealed in the Summer of 2018 and in its place a quota system was introduced that issues only 1,000 visas monthly. These restrictive policy reactions and measures are concerning, given the decreasing numbers of new refugee arrivals from 2015 onwards (see Figure 1). The categories of “registered asylum seekers” refers to new arrivals that received a proof of arrival document but have not yet filed their asylum claim; while asylum applicants refer to people that have formally filed their asylum application. By the end of 2017, the number of people seeking asylum in Germany had dropped drastically: less than 200,000 filed asylum applications that year compared to over 700,000 in 2016.


The statistical federal office also provides population counts of those with a refugee background. A “refugee background” refers to individuals who have been registered as a refugee or applied for asylum; in addition, this includes all accepted and denied asylum seekers and individuals that have been accepted through resettlement and humanitarian admission programs. The number of people with a refugee background has increased by more than 50% between 2015 (1,036,240) and 2016. Meanwhile the increase was moderate in the next year from 1,597,565 inhabitants with a refugee background by the end of 2016 to 1,781,750 by the end of 2017 (BAMF, 2019; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019).

Numbers of refugees arriving through a resettlement program in Germany have been low compared to those seeking asylum. However, the steady increase in resettlement numbers from 964 people in 2016 to 3,867 in 2017, in addition to the commitment to receive 10,200 resettled refugees in 2018 and 2019 point to the growing importance of resettlement programs (SVR, 2018a, p.34; BMI, 2019, p. 1). Germany decided only in November 2011 to engage permanently in a national resettlement program in cooperation with the UNHCR. In 2015, there was an expansion and the

2 The annual expert report of the expert council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR, 2019a) provides a detailed overview on policy developments in the field of migration and asylum from 2014 to end of 2018.

3 “Anker” stands for Ankunft, Entscheidung and Rückkehr: arrival, decision-making and return.

definition of a specific legal status (residence permit) for resettled refugees within the residence act (§23 AufenthG) (SVR, 2018, p.15f.). Another important step took place in April 2019 with the implementation of the pilot program “NesT” (restart in a team), which is designed to resettle 500 people through a collaboration of state and civil society partners in the years 2018/2019 (BMI, 2019). Similar “private” or “blended sponsorship” programs have been successful in Canada for a long time (Hynie et al., 2019; Korntheuer, Korn, & Masri, 2016).



Source: BAMF, 2019; Statistisches Bundesamt [Destatis], 2019


Figure 1 Registered asylum claimants and refugee population in Germany from 2015 to 2018

Refugees in Canada

The Canadian immigration system provides two pathways for protection and resettlement to refugees: 1) The Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program, for people seeking protection from outside of Canada (resettled refugees); 2) The In-Canada Asylum Program, for individuals making asylum claims from within Canada. Resettled Refugees include government-assisted refugees (GARs), people outside of Canada determined to be Convention Refugees and referred by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). Privately-sponsored refugees (PSRs) include both Convention Refugees as well as those in refugee-like situations who do not qualify as Convention Refugees. Blended visa office-referred refugees (BVORs),

a stream beginning in 2013, are Convention Refugees referred by the UNHCR and matched with private sponsors in a cost-sharing arrangement whereby both IRCC and private sponsors contribute financially to support the refugees. Refugees landed in Canada (RLSs, formerly LCRs), are accepted claimants that made an inland asylum claim, which are then determined by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB, 2016).

Between 2006 and 2015, 260,000 refugees resettled in Canada, constituting an average of 10 percent of its total annual immigrants (IRCC, 2017). Yet in the following three-year period, between 2015 and 2018, Canada resettled almost half the total number of refugees that were settled in the previous decade (IRCC, 2019) (see Figure 2). In this time, PSRs and BVORs made up a far greater share of the total resettled population than in the past. In addition, over 140,000 individuals filed claims for asylum from within Canada during that three-year span.



Sources: IRCC 2019; IRB 2015-2018

Figure 2 Resettled refugees and asylum claimants in Canada by entrance category, from 2015-2018

On the other side of the Atlantic from where hundreds of thousands of people were arriving in Germany during the summer of 2015, Canada had largely ignored the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis” that was unfolding far from its borders. This changed when a photograph emerged in November of the lifeless body of Aylan Kurdi, a

young Syrian boy who had washed up on the shores of a Turkish beach. The tragedy hit close to home for many Canadians when they learned that Aylan and his family were attempting to make their way to Canada. The subsequent outpouring of sympathy for the plight of Syrians marked a sharp turn in public opinion (Winters & Zyla, 2017). That the Canadian government *should* play an active role in resettling those fleeing violence in Syria emerged as a crucial election issue and later a point of nation-building as Canadians across sectors of society rallied to support the resettlement and integration of Syrian refugees (Ramos, 2016).

The newly elected Liberal Government of Canada responded to the humanitarian crisis in Syria by launching *Operation Syrian Refugees*, which facilitated the successful resettlement of over 25,000 Syrians in just 100 days (Government of Canada, 2019a). The Government's initiative included five phases: 1) identifying Syrian refugees to come to Canada; 2) processing Syrian refugees overseas; 3) offering transportation to Canada; 4) welcoming refugees in Canada; and 5) settlement and community integration. Under the fifth phase of the plan, Syrian refugees were transported to over 350 communities across Canada (excluding those resettled in Quebec), where they began to build new lives for themselves and their families (Government of Canada, 2017). Shortly after, the Government of Canada launched the *Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative* – a multi-pronged, domestic and global partnership between private sponsors, non-governmental organizations, provincial, territorial, municipal governments and international partners, including foreign governments, the United Nations Refugee Agency, and the International Organization for Migration. Together, these initiatives resulted in the successful resettlement of over 40,000 Syrians to Canada by the end of 2016 (Government of Canada, 2019b). This was in addition to resettling high numbers of refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Eritrea, and Colombia (RSTP, 2017). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) hailed this effort as “a model for the world” (Levitz, 2016).

In Canada the government had played an active role in the selection and resettlement of over 120,000 refugees between 2015 and 2018, about a third of which originated from Syria (Government of Canada, 2017b). As numbers of resettled refugees resumed to more normal proportions, 2017 marked a new challenge to Canadian society. Statistics from Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) show that about 50,000 people made in-land claims for asylum during 2017, more than double the claims of the previous year, and nearly three-times more than 2015. Another 55,000 new claims were made the following year in 2018. Although exact estimates are hard to produce due to the backlog of applications at the IRB, it is estimated that between two-thirds and three-quarters entered at unofficial border crossing areas (not at an official port of entry) (Government of Canada, 2019c). The majority of these so-called “irregular crossings” occurred in just two provinces (Saskatchewan and Quebec), which has meant that local communities and governments have had to devise new response strategies to address the unexpected spike in the volume of newcomers in areas not accustomed to receiving immigrants. Haitians and Nigerians constituted the greatest share of in-land claims in 2017 (IRB, 2017), which was the result of the sudden announcement by the Trump Administration that the US would

be cancelling their Temporary Resident Statuses. In 2018, Nigeria continued to be the main source country constituting the greatest share of in-land claims in Canada, with Mexico and India constituting the next most (IRB, 2018).

Refugees in Germany and Canada: Policy Answers and Scientific Knowledge Production

The arrival of significantly high numbers of asylum seekers and refugees in such a short period of time has presented numerous challenges to the governments of Germany and Canada, to refugees themselves and to the respective host societies as a whole. At the same time, this rare occurrence has also provided the opportunity to bring together different social actors and stakeholders across a range of sectors and institutions, locally, nationally and globally to work together under the common goal of building a more inclusive society. The initial response and ongoing efforts to deliver successful settlement and integration opportunities to this newly arrived cohort has required innovative strategies and practices from a range of actors and institutions, different levels of government, immigrant service-providing and other non-governmental organizations, educational workers, and everyday people that make up civic society.

Monitoring and evaluating the responses and documenting the successes and ongoing challenges that have transpired in the respective reception contexts in Germany and Canada is essential in order to maximize the full potential of their commitment to refugees. Insights derived from empirical research into the processes of integration as they unfold in their local and particular institutional contexts will enable government agencies, service providers and members of civic society to rapidly respond to factors that threaten the wellbeing of refugees. Not only is such research essential to inform practices and support current resettlement efforts but it will be instrumental to the successful integration of future cohorts.

In both German and Canadian national contexts, there has been a sharp increase in research projects in the field of forced migration since 2015. Forced migration and the integration of the incoming refugee population in Germany has been perceived as a central societal challenge and has resulted in intense public and scientific discourse and debate. Kleist (2019) notes a “boom” in forced migration and refugee studies and an increasing institutionalization of the field but asserts the field of academic research must develop a reflexive relationship with refugee policy practice. In addition to applied research, long-term projects are necessary to develop scientific concepts and theories. Kleist (2019) collected extensive information on over 600 research projects related to forced migration and refugee issues in Germany since 2011. The study found that 5 times as many projects were underway in 2016 than in 2013. Most of these projects were focused on applied integration research in the German context and 35 percent were carried out on a one-year term.

The Government of Canada has recognized the value of academic research to inform policies and best practices in supporting and resettling refugees. On Septem-

ber 8, 2016, Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) (the federal government’s main academic research funding agency) jointly announced that over \$600,000 would be invested in targeted research on “issues that affect the successful resettlement of refugees” (Government of Canada-SSHRC, 2016a). Funding of a maximum \$25,000 was distributed to 25 research projects, targeting issues related to the arrival, settlement and integration of Syrian refugees, with a particular focus on topics such as employment, social integration, youth, and the impact on local support systems (Government of Canada-SSHRC, 2016b). A scoping review of 429 peer-reviewed articles published in English and German between 1996 and 2015 revealed that only two studies focused on Syrian refugees, reflecting the timing of the Syrian conflict and that traditionally Syria was not a refugee producing country (Pritchard, Maehler, Pötzschke, & Ramos, 2019). In the near future, we can expect a large share of the academic research on refugee integration in Canada to be focused on the particular experiences of the recent Syrian cohort. However, this could also have the effect of ignoring the experiences of other refugee groups that make up a significant share of the refugee population in Canada.

Moving forward, it is essential that the knowledge produced through the latest research on key issues relating to the resettlement and integration of refugees in Germany and Canada is mobilized in a timely manner. Moreover, it is prudent that such knowledge is mobilized in a manner that is widely accessible to the broad range of audiences that share the commitment to understanding and improving the situation of those who seek refuge and safety in their respective community and broader society.

From Research to Policies and Practice

In the summer of 2017, Annette Korntheuer, Paul Pritchard, and Débora B. Maehler coedited what would eventually become a popular reference for students, academics, policy makers and settlement service providers wishing to learn more about refugee issues in Canada and Germany. Entitled *The Structural Context of Refugee Integration in Canada and Germany*, the work brought multi-sectoral stakeholders together to write about issues related to housing, education, labour market integration, and health among refugees destined to both countries (Korntheuer, Pritchard, & Maehler, 2017). Envisioned originally as a tool to help CYRCC-affiliated⁴ researchers learn more about Canadian and German contexts to refugee resettlement, the book has proved to be popular with many audiences outside the research group given that Germany and Canada have been the centre of much attention in this area.

This second volume – *From Research to Policies and Practice* – expands on our collaborative efforts. The objective of this edited book is to provide valuable information to

4 See foreword by Michael Unger

readers about the particular reception contexts and innovative ways the respective host societies of Germany and Canada responded to the sudden arrival of newcomers within their nation's borders. The book is organized along three central themes: i) How cities responded; ii) How activist organizations and media responded; and iii) How institutions responded. Section iii for instance includes empirical research contributions on various aspects of resettlement and integration as they relate to the education system, the healthcare system, the labour market, and Canada's resettlement initiative.

In section 1 "How Cities Responded", Korntheuer and Hergenröther detail in chapter 1 how the city of Munich developed a city-wide project called the "masterplan for refugee integration" to tackle the challenges linked to the arrival of thousands of refugees. Between 2014 and 2018, Munich received almost 15,000 refugee newcomers. The masterplan aims for responses in four fields of action: a) accommodation and access to community services, b) education, c) vocational education, counselling & language training, d) integration in the labour market and e) access to permanent housing.

In examining how Canadian cities responded to the sudden spike in asylum seekers entering Canada, Garcea (see chapter 2) furthermore provides a broad overview and in-depth analysis of the positions, policies, and roles of the municipal governments in the three largest urban centers of Canada – Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver – which received the highest number of asylum seekers in the country.

In section 2 "How Activist Organizations and Media Responded", Dünwald demonstrates through a case study of the Bavarian Refugee Council, how tensions arise in resettlement and integration efforts when different actors and institutions with competing interests are involved. In this case, he highlights the challenges this Human Rights NGO experienced in their welcoming efforts working within a context in which government measures have become increasingly exclusionary and punitive. Furthermore Laura Giesen (see chapter 4) takes readers beyond the Canadian-German context to show how Act.Now, a small, activist organization that emerged in response to the mass movement of Syrians fleeing war, become institutionalized into a formal NGO. This organization brought together mayors of major cities along the main flight route in the MENAT region (Middle East, North Africa, Turkey) and Europe with civil society, NGO's and scientists through repeated meetings and larger conferences to discuss strategies and responses tailored to localized and changing needs. The last contributions in section 2 comprise an original study by Winter, Patzelt and Schmid (see chapter 5). They map public responses to the so-called refugee crisis in the Rhein-Neckar Metropolitan Region in Germany and the (French and English bilingual) National Capital Region in Canada. In analyzing local newspapers to learn who claims what for or against (which kind of) migrants/refugees, their study shows that politicians and members of diverse civil society organizations are most successful in making their voice heard, while migrants/refugees are seldom allowed to speak for themselves. They also find that public discourse in both local contexts is overwhelmingly supportive of refugees with the specific claims made by civil society

actors in both regions being reflective of the highly divergent refugee integration schemes at the national/federal level.

Section 3 looks at “How Institutions Responded”. Firstly Homuth, Will and von Maurice (see chapter 6) report preliminary findings on one cohort of a two-cohort panel study –ReGeS (Refugees in the German Educational System). They examine the educational trajectories of the adolescent cohort with a focus on the impact of flight, origin country education, and future aspirations on their current educational situation in Germany. In addition Paradis, Soto-Corominas, Chen and Gottardo (see chapter 7) discuss the English second language acquisition as it is related to migrant children’s educational outcomes. Their study reports findings on the home language environment and English L2 vocabulary and grammatical development of Syrian refugee children from an on-going, multi-site study. Situating these findings alongside those from a previous study of Canadian ELLs from predominantly immigrant backgrounds (not refugee), they find that, overall, the Syrian refugee children had, on average, weaker home language environments than other groups of ELLs, and somewhat slower L2 acquisition. Importantly, their study points to the need for additional supports for Syrian children in L2 learning in school.

Furthermore chapters 8 and 9 examine issues related the health-care systems in Germany and Canada, respectively. Bozorgmehr and Razum (see chapter 8) provide an in-depth overview of the main barriers asylum seekers experience in trying to access health-care in Germany. They identify how restricting access to health care when asylum seekers first arrive constitutes an additional barrier to access (beyond language barriers), which leads to increased cost of care and the risk of exacerbating health problems in the future. Within Germany’s federal system, states respond differently to the challenges of providing care to asylum seekers, contributing to an ambiguous landscape and tensions within policy domains. Focusing on the Canadian context, Hynie, Tuck, Oda, and McKenzie (see chapter 9) examine the particular needs and access to healthcare access for Syrian newcomers in three studies. They find that in all three samples, self-rated physical and mental health were relatively positive. However, while there was good primary healthcare access, many reported unmet needs, which were higher for those with poorer health status, although this did not predict health status over time. Satisfaction and comfort with healthcare were high, especially among those with lower education, but lower for those with poorer mental health.

Related to the response of economic institutions, Jacobsen, Krieger and Legewie (see chapter 10) explore factors of labour market access for refugees in Germany. Their study provides an overview of how labour market access for refugees is conditioned by legal status. They analyze the German IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees to explore individual-level outcomes of labour market access. They for instance find that men, younger age, and higher education levels are associated with a higher chance of being employed. They also find that mental well-being is positively correlated with having gainful employment. Looking at labour market integration in the Canadian context, Yoshida and Amoyaw’s study (see chapter 11) in turn takes into account the presence of children in the household. Based on data from the 2015 Lon-

itudinal Immigration Database, they find significant diversity among newcomer parents in Canada not only in terms of their modes of entry to Canada but also their demographic characteristics and economic outcomes. In particular, they find that for recent cohorts of Government Assisted Refugee (GAR) and Privately Sponsored Refugee (PSR) parents tend to have lower educational attainment and official language proficiency at landing than refugees who sought asylum within Canada. These insights challenge perspectives on refugee settlement practices that perceive “refugees” as a monolithic group and highlight the uniqueness of their experiences compared to other immigrants.

Finally in Chapter 12, Silvius takes a critical look at the Canadian government’s Syrian Refugee Resettlement initiative. He argues that while it was an extraordinary undertaking by the government of Canada, its “whole of society approach” is part of a broader qualitative shift in the relationship between state and society in the context of refugee resettlement, whereby increasing numbers of private actors are charged with the responsibility of refugee resettlement. Ultimately, this constitutes a further step in the neo-liberalization of refugee wellbeing.

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How Cities Responded

1 How Cities Respond to Refugee Migration: Answers and Challenges in the City of Munich

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Abstract

As one of the main cross-points in Europe and Germany, the City of Munich caught international attention as a result of the increasing refugee migration in 2015. Images of refugee arrivals at Munich Central Station were broadcasted worldwide. Crisis squads were quickly established to organize emergency provisions such as short-term accommodations for transitioning refugees at the station. It soon became evident that in addition to these emergency provisions, the City needed a sustainable, long-term approach to support the integration of the refugees.

In January 2016, the mayor of Munich commissioned the administration to develop a city-wide project called the “masterplan for refugee integration” to tackle the challenges linked to the arrival of thousands of refugees. Between 2014 and 2018, the Capital City of Bavaria received almost 15,000 refugee newcomers. The masterplan aims at analyzing the status quo regarding the integration of refugees to develop appropriate responses to the needs of this population that should be implemented by the end of 2019. The following paper shows the City of Munich as a diverse urban centre with a significant share of its population made up of refugee newcomers and people with refugee backgrounds. National and federal policies are described as critical contextual factors for integration planning and management on a municipal level. The main focus of this chapter is a detailed description of the masterplan for refugee integration. It offers responses in four fields of action: a) accommodation and access to community services, b) education, c) vocational education, counselling & language training, d) integration in the labour market and e) access to permanent housing.

Keywords: Refugee Integration; Municipalities; Integration Planning

1.1 Introduction

The 5th and 6th of September 2015 will be remembered in Munich. On this weekend, approximately 17,500 refugees arrived in the capital city of Bavaria. From there on, day after day, thousands of refugees landed at the Munich Central Station. By the second weekend of September, an additional 20,000 arrivals were counted (Anlauf et al., 2015). Overall, Bavaria received more refugees in the first three weeks of September 2015 than in the entirety of 2014¹ (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2015).

The reason for the sudden and drastic influx can be traced, in part, to a tweet by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees notifying that Syrian refugees unregistered in Hungary would not be sent back to Hungary if they reached Germany; this sparked hope for many refugees, subsequently triggering a chain reaction (Blume et al., 2016).

As Munich is located at the crossroads of different traffic routes, Munich Central Station became one of the most significant locations for refugees arriving in Germany. With the sudden increasing influx the Youth Department of the City of Munich, one of the first stakeholders to emerge, set up a mini-office at the station to register and accommodate the unaccompanied minors among the arrivals. Autonomous, leftist groups arrived later at the station to counter a protest supposedly planned by the right-wing party AFD. The notice was a false alarm, no AFD member appeared. However, the leftist groups realized that during the evenings, no one was at the Central Station to receive the incoming refugees and decided to stay in order to help. As the G8 summit had taken place in Bavaria in June 2015, the autonomous groups were organized and ready to act. They were supported by a youth-focused NGO, which had been assigned by the City Youth Office for the coordination of volunteers².

In the first week, a crisis squad was established, lead by the regional district government. At the same time, a round table was organized, which brought together the City of Munich and representatives of civil society to discuss the situation. The City of Munich, the police and civil society stakeholders held joint press conferences. Most of the refugees arriving in Munich stayed only for a single night. They were lodged at “temporary pop up” shelters at different locations, such as the fair hall and the Olympic stadium, among others, before being transferred to other parts of Germany.

From the viewpoint of the municipality, the priority of tasks changed at the beginning of 2016. With the number of refugees slowly dwindling in February 2016, integration planning and long-term management became a central focus. In January 2016, the mayor of Munich commissioned the administration to develop a city-wide project called the “masterplan for refugee integration” to tackle the challenges linked to the arrival of thousands of refugees. The project was initiated under the auspices of the Office for Intercultural Affairs in July that year. The masterplan aims at ana-

1 In 2014 173,072 refugees applied for asylum, 25,667 of these were located in Bavaria (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015, p.16).

2 Information from an unpublished interview with Marina Lessig, contact person during the events in 2015 and vice chairwoman of the organization “Münchner Freiwillige – Wir helfen!”

lyzing the integration of refugees and to develop and implement measures and programs until the end of 2019 (Landeshauptstadt München. Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, 2018b).

The importance of municipalities as places in which the integration of the refugees ultimately occurs has been widely discussed (Bendel, Schammann, Heimann, & Stürner, 2019; Bogumil, Hafner, & Kastilan, August 2017; Degler & Liebig, 2017; Schammann & Kühn, 2016). Inclusion and social cohesion, or exclusion and discrimination are experienced in the local neighbourhoods (Schammann & Kühn, 2016). Since the nineties, when the number of refugees peaked for the first time, due to the Balkan wars, the policy of the City of Munich has been driven by a humanitarian approach toward refugees and asylum seekers, focusing on their integration needs (Crage, 2009; Korntheuer, 2016; Korntheuer, Gag, Anderson, & Schroeder, 2018). The city council maintains the stance that refugees have the right to integration supports upon arrival in Munich, regardless of their legal status. In contrast, national and federal policies are primarily designed to provide supports and assistance only to accepted refugees and asylum seekers with high prospects to stay in Germany³. Municipalities can act with considerable discretion while implementing national and federal policies (Degler & Liebig, 2017; Schammann & Kühn, 2016).

The following paper provides a detailed overview of Munich's refugee population (2). In a second step, it summarizes influences of national and federal policies on the municipal integration planning (3). The masterplan on refugee integration itself is presented in part four, followed by a conclusion comment and a summary of the remaining challenges (5).

1.2 Facts and Figures on the Refugee Population in Munich

Population data provide the basis for needs assessment and for designing tailor-made support systems. They can also capture the need for a change in integration planning and management. As part of the masterplan on refugee integration, an elaborate procedure has been developed to retrieve data on refugees from the Central Register for Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister, AZR). In the past, the database had been problematic, with dispersed data sources from different units in the government of Upper Bavaria (ROB), focusing on distinct status groups and time periods⁴. In order to have an evidence-based planning process for integration measures, a solid data-

3 Differentiation between asylum seekers into those with high and low prospects to stay became effective with the Asylum Acceleration Act on October 24, 2015. High prospects are set for asylum seekers from a country of origin with a total protection rate of over 50%. Eritrea, Iraq, Iran and Syria and Somalia are currently meeting this criterion. Countries with low prospects are those with low recognition rates, namely so-called safe countries of origin: Western Balkan states, Albania, Ghana and Senegal. Asylum seekers with open or unclear prospects to stay are those neither from the five states with high prospects nor from so-called safe countries of origin (Grote, 2018; SVR, 2019b).

4 The data sets referred selectively to those being allocated to Munich by ROB, those being accommodated in shelters or the number of refugees receiving benefits or taking part in

base of the refugee population in the City of Munich is necessary⁵. Furthermore, the new procedure makes it possible to gain a longitudinal perspective on population development. The data are limited, however, as they provide only demographic information, such as age, country of origin, gender and legal status and cannot be linked directly to data on functional integration indicators, such as labour market participation. Nonetheless, a permanent legal status acquisition may provide some indication of integration.

In December 2018, 42,520 people with a refugee background lived in the City of Munich. The identification of the refugee background population and refugee newcomers are determined through combining various factors, such as legal status category at landing and legal status while residing in Germany.

The database contains a total of more than 100 different legal status categories, including asylum seekers, accepted refugees, people with the so-called “tolerated status” (Duldung)⁶, as well as resettled refugees and refugees that landed through family reunification⁷. For those having been received in Germany through a humanitarian reception program, the current legal status was combined with the country of origin in order to identify migrants with refugee experience.⁸


In the following paragraphs, we refer mainly to two different datasets. Both are based on this identification process. D1 (see table 2.1) shows the share of the total population with a refugee background living in the City of Munich, at the end of December 2018. The second dataset (D2) is based on the same identification process and date, but only represents the newcomer refugee population that arrived in Munich between January 2014 and December 2018. In total, 14,701 people, more than a third of the total refugee background population (42,520), are refugee newcomers that arrived during this time period.

language courses. As the same person could, but did not have to be accommodated in a shelter and at the same time take part of a language course the data was inconclusive.

- 5 Categories and data sources were updated again by March 2019. For this chapter we decided to use the new database, since it is more accurate in terms of definition of legal status in combination with country of origin. Because the first report (Landeshauptstadt München. Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, 2018b) contains data from a preliminary basis, numbers may vary.
- 6 If the application for asylum is refused, but deportation restrictions exist, refugees are generally granted the so-called tolerated status. It is a suspension of deportation (Korntheuer, 2017, p. 39).
- 7 For an overview on Germany’s Refugee Protection System: Korntheuer, 2017, p. 37ff.
- 8 There are several humanitarian reception programs among them the resettlement program. As all person resettled are refugees, the respective legal status was taken into account without referencing it with the respective country of origin. Yet, there are other humanitarian reception programs which do not only address refugees. In these cases the country of origin had to be taken into account in order to tackle the target group.

1.1.1 Munich a Diverse City

Munich is a diverse and multicultural city with a population of 1.54 million. Almost half of the population (43.2%) is either a person with foreign nationality or has at least one parent born outside of Germany⁹. Just over half (56.8%) are German nationals without a so-called migration background (Landeshauptstadt München. Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, 2018b, p. 38). The following figure gives an overview of Munich's population.



Source. Data as of 31.12.2016 (Landeshauptstadt München. Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, 2018a, p. 37)

Figure 1.1 Munich Population

1.1.2 Gender, Age and Countries of Origin of the Refugee Population in Munich

The following chart (see table 1.1) gives an overview of the gender and age distributions of the refugee background population living in Munich as of December 2018. Public perception of incoming refugees has been very much focused on young men. The data on the population with a refugee background (D1) living in the City of Munich shows clearly that men are overrepresented among several age groups: for 16 to 24 year-olds (30% women/ 70% men), for adults age 25-50 years (35% women/ 65% men) and age 50 and older (38% women/ 62% men). Nevertheless, in total men aged 16 to 50 account for only 57% of the total population with a refugee background. As of December 2018, 12,759 girls and women (older than 15 years) with a refugee background were living in the city.

9 The so-called migration background within in the City's statistics is defined as being a foreign national, a German citizen that moved into Germany after 1955 or being German citizen with at least one migrant parent that moved into Germany after 1955 (Sozialreferat, interkulturelle Stelle, 2018, p. 35)

Table 1.1 Population with Refugee Background (D1) according to Age and Gender

Age group Gender	0-5 years		6-15 years		16-24 years		25-50 years		> 51 years	
	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M
Number gender/age group	1,154	1,254	1,549	1,702	2,270	5,264	6,815	12,837	3,674	6,000
Total age group	2,408		3,251		7,534		19,652		9,674	
Age group percentage of total refugee population	6 %		7%		18%		46%		23%	

Note. M = men, W = women.

Source. Own presentation according to City of Munich/AZR, 31.12.2018

Furthermore, gender distribution might change in future years because of family reunification processes. In 2017, more than 30,000 Syrian nationals landed in Germany via a family reunification process. The gender ratio of all migrants coming through this stream was 3.1 women to each man (SVR, 2019a, pp. 27–28).

The incoming population with refugee background is, overall, very young. Approximately 8,000 refugee infants, preschoolers, school - aged children, youth and young adults (age 0-24) that arrived in Munich from 2014 to 2018 (D2) are currently living in the city. Including this population in educational institutions, such as daycare/ kindergarten system, school system and vocational education system is a considerable challenge.

Iraq is the most common country of origin for both populations, those with a refugee background and newcomer refugees with over 3,000 newcomers arriving from 2014 to 2018 and almost 10,000 inhabitants in total. Countries of the Western Balkan region (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia) have been a primary origin of refugees into Germany and Munich since the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Since 2014, these states have been gradually declared “safe countries of origin” meaning refugees from them are subjected to residence obligations¹⁰ in shelters, restricted access to work permits and a fast-tracking of their asylum process. As a consequence, the numbers of refugees from these countries decreased considerably (SVR, 2019a, p. 69). For newcomer refugees from 2014-2018, only one Balkan state (Kosovo, see table 1.2) still figures in the list of the top 10 countries of origin in Munich. The organized distribution of asylum seekers in Germany takes place according to a fixed quota system (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2019; SVR, 2019b)¹¹. The assignment of asylum seekers from specific countries of origin depends on the jurisdiction of the local office of the federal agency for Migration

10 The place of living for asylum seeker is initially limited to a specific district (residence obligation). Asylum seekers are usually required to live up to six months in the initial reception centers (§ 47 AsylG). Asylum seekers from so-called safe countries are usually required to live in these centers until the decision on their asylum application is made. (SVR, 2019b, p.3)

11 For further information on Germany’s Refugee Protection System please compare Korntheuer (2017).

and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2019). The country-specific focus for the Munich office partly accounts for the high percentage of the refugee population from Afghanistan and Nigeria in Munich.

Table 1.2 Countries of Origin for D1 and D2


Top 10 countries of origin 12/2018 D1: population with refugee background*		Top 10 countries of origin 12/2018 D2: refugee newcomers**	
Iraq	9,844	Iraq	3,056
Afghanistan	5,346	Syria	2,800
Syria	3,181	Afghanistan	2,697
Serbia	2,145	Nigeria	1,390
Nigeria	2,002	Somalia	1,063
Somalia	1,876	Eritrea	746
Vietnam	1,791	Pakistan	371
Türkei	1,118	Iran	282
Kosovo	1,097	Sierra Leone	232
Serbia/ Montenegro (former)	909	Kosovo	143
Other	13,211	Other	1,921
Total	42,520	Total	14,701

Source. Own presentation according to City of Munich/AZR, 31.12.2018; *refugee background is defined through legal status category at landing and country of origin; ** refugee newcomers is the defined as refugee background population that arrived in Munich between January 2014 and December 2018 (see this contribution: p. 29f.).

1.1.3 Legal Status

The legal status of refugees in Germany has a profound influence on access to essential resources such as housing, health services and integration initiatives and support programs such as the state-funded integration courses (Grote, 2018).

The City of Munich wants to provide integration support to migrants and refugees, regardless of their legal status, in case that other national or federal level services are not forthcoming (Landeshauptstadt München. Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, 2018b). Hence, for the planning of integration programs within the City, administrative data on legal status has important implications for the identification of the population depending on City-funded programs. A clear trend in the increase of acquisition of permanent legal status becomes visible when comparing the refugee background inhabitants of Munich by the end of 2016 and 2018. Asylum seekers decreased by 5 percent, while the share of the population holding a residence permit increased by the same percentage points. Because of the significant population flows in and out of Munich, this does not imply that all asylum seekers from 2016 were able to gain a residence permit by 2018. There was also an increase in total number of persons with a suspension of deportation (so-called tolerated status), growing from 659 persons in December of 2016 to 1,039 two years later.



Source. Own presentation according to the City of Munich/AZR, 31.12. 2016 and 31.12.2018

Figure 1.2 Population with Refugee Background (D1) by 12/2016 and 12/2018

1.2 Influence of National and Federal Policies on the Municipal Integration Process

The integration of refugees is shaped through a multi-layer system of governance. Policies on national and federal levels restrict and enable access to essential integration measures carried out on the local level (Bogumil et al., August 2017, p. 9).

Since 2015, several legal changes have been introduced on a federal level; some of these changes have improved the situation for refugees, while others have created obstacles to their integration and participation in daily life (SVR, 2019a, p. 67f.)¹². In this section, we provide some examples of important changes and their implications at the local level.

The countries of origin, became more and more important in determining the resettlement supports for refugees¹³. As a result of these changes, the criteria for access to integration services have changed several times in the last years. Currently, integration courses funded by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, or labour market qualifications by the State Employment Agency, are only accessible for accepted refugees or asylum seekers with high prospects to stay. These policy changes have important impacts on the City's integration planning. While trying to fill in gaps for certain groups without access to state-funded programs, other gaps might arise through the changing legislation. Because of its own bureaucratic and political processes, the City administration is not always able to react immediately to these changing support needs.

Since November 2014, the number of countries deemed safe on the safe countries of origin list has increased. Since 2015, this population is obliged to live in a reception centre until the decision of their claim. Furthermore, all refugees from coun-

12 The annual expert report of the expert council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR, 2019a) provides a detailed overview on policy developments in the field of migration and asylum from 2014 to end of 2018.

13 See footnote No. 3 for more information on differentiation according to prospects to stay.

tries deemed safe who had their claim of asylum handed in after the 31st of August 2015, are prohibited from work. Other refugees have had their access to services and support increased at the same time. For example, access to work permits for asylum seekers and those having a so-called tolerated status was facilitated in 2014 by reducing the waiting time for access from nine-months to only three-months after arrival in Germany (SVR, 2019a, p. 67). In October 2015, the so-called Asylum Package I (Asylum Acceleration Act) was introduced extending the period asylum seekers are obliged to stay in initial reception centers from three to six months. Since 2017, the federal states can continue to extend the residence obligation in new initial reception and return centres, so-called “AnkERzentren”¹⁴ up to 18 months and for asylum seekers from defined safe countries up to 24 months. Inhabitants of these new shelters are widely excluded from participating in society for example, in most cases, work permits are not accessible as long as they live in the centres. Some of these new reception and return centres are located in the city, operating as a potential risk to social cohesion and peace in the City of Munich.

With the Asylum Package II, introduced in March 2016, the family reunification to those granted subsidiary protection was suspended until August 2018. Refugees from Syria were the most affected among all refugees. In Summer 2018, the suspension was repealed, in its place, a quota system was introduced with just 1,000 visas issued monthly. While this measure might reduce migration pressure into the City, it can increase needs in other areas. Not being able to reunite with close family members bears important risks for mental health and wellbeing (Ghaderi & van Keuk, 2016). Denying access to family reunification processes on the national level might lead to increased needs for mental health support locally.

One improvement by the new integration law (introduced on 6th August 2016) is called tolerated status for apprentices (Ausbildungsduldung). Those completing a dual apprenticeship or vocational training are granted a suspension of deportation during their training, thus, formalizing their stay in Germany. If they find a job linked to their training upon graduating, they will receive a two-year residence permit (SVR, 2019a). Unfortunately, on the federal state level in Bavaria, this policy was insufficiently put into practice; meaning that in the City of Munich, asylum seekers are currently facing significant obstacles to legalize and stabilize their status through this policy. Shortage of skilled workers is continuously a topic of interest on national, federal and on the local level in the City of Munich (compare the field of action four, p. 30). The hope that asylum seekers and refugees with a so-called tolerated status would fill gaps in the local job market have not been fulfilled so far, in large part, due to national and federal restrictions on labour market access.

14 “Anker” stands for Ankunft, Entscheidung and Rückkehr: arrival, decision-making and return.

1.3 The Masterplan for Refugee Integration in the City of Munich

The masterplan for refugee integration was first commissioned by Munich's head-mayor¹⁵ in 2016. Since then, working groups, a coordination group and project management have been working on the analysis of existing measures and needs and on the development and implementation of new approaches to support integration trajectories. A significant milestone was the presentation of the first report on the masterplan for refugee integration at the City Council in March 2018 and its subsequent publication in April 2018. Currently, all actors involved are working on the final project report, which is scheduled to be presented to the City Council by November 2019.

The structure of the masterplan defines five fields of action (see figure 1.3). The central body for the organization of the project is the coordination group, in which the project manager, the heads of the fields of action and the representatives of the City offices for equal opportunities (for women, LGBTI* and population with disabilities) meet on a monthly basis. In order to connect the process with the political decision-makers, a steering committee was established to accompany the work of the fields of action. The three mayors (see footnote 15) are part of the steering committee as well as the heads of those departments involved in the masterplan. Working groups in the different fields of actions are consisting of city staff from various departments as well as other important stakeholders in the field of integration such as the chambers of crafts, the State Education Office, employment agencies and NGOs. The frequency of meetings depends on the specific working group but generally, takes place once a month.

For the following section, we describe the fields of action in a three-step process:

- i) the original analysis on existing resources and needs assessment as mentioned in the first report on the master plan of integration;
- ii) examples of planned measures and programs are listed; and
- iii) the current state of realization as of March 2019 of the exemplified measures and programs is shortly described.

15 Munich has three mayors, the head mayor, the second and the third mayor. They share responsibilities.



Figure 1.3 Organisational Structure of the Masterplan on Refugee Integration

1.3.1 Field of Action 1: Accommodation and Access to Community Services

Needs assessment/ What has already been done (first report 04/2018)

The housing of refugees is mostly defined through federal and national policies (Schmidt & Kück, 2017, p. 73). While the City is responsible for the implementation, the framework in which the shelters operate (e.g. size of the rooms, number of standard rooms, showers, toilets and the staff-client ratio) is set by the Federal State of Bavaria. Mass shelters that have served as the primary form of refugee accommodation have long been criticized as potentially leading to high risks to psycho-social wellbeing and exposure to threats of violence (Aumüller, Daphi, & Biesenkamp, 2015; Schroeder, 2003).

When the number of arrivals started to rise in 2014, the City of Munich decided to increase the worker-client ratio from one social worker for every 150 refugee clients to 1 to 100, to improve the psycho-social care within the shelters. Several additional services like educational workers providing assistance to families and children as well as providing medical services frequenting the shelters have been introduced by the City of Munich to improve the situation for the inhabitants.

In 2016, several special accommodations for vulnerable refugees were available: a) one house (30 spaces) and one accommodation (60 spaces) for vulnerable refugee women, b) ten spaces for LGBTI* in shared flats, c) four wheelchair – accessible apartments with four beds each, and d) one house (74 spaces) for the accommodation of young refugees between 18 and 25 years of age who were enrolled in a qualification or a vocational school.

Two main challenges arose in the first assessment. If refugees moved out of the first reception center or the municipal and state-run shelter into the homeless shelter system or their apartment, the counselling process was interrupted as the social workers within the accommodations were no longer responsible for them. In addition to housing and coverage of basic needs, the inhabitants needed more access to the local communities/ neighbourhoods and more access to health provisions.

Among the *measures and programs proposed in the first report (04/2018)* were the following: (1) development of more accommodations or shared flats for vulnerable refugee populations; (2) development of a security concept for the inhabitants and the staff in shelters; (3) improvement of the counselling process: bridging the information gap between the different forms of accommodation and counselling services; and (4) introduction of measures improving the medical care of refugees.

What has been achieved?

The number of spaces for the accommodation of the most vulnerable refugee population has gradually increased. A working group headed by the Office for Housing and Migration in collaboration with other city departments and NGOs is currently developing a security concept for the city shelters. It will be finalized by Fall 2019 and is going to be presented to the City Council.

Regarding the counselling process, during the work, the federal policy guideline for the counselling of refugees changed. Before the introduction of the new guideline social workers in the accommodations had only been responsible for asylum seekers and not for accepted refugees. The newly introduced policy abolishes this distinction. Interruptions of counselling processes between the different social services have diminished. The knowledge regarding asylum law and issues regarding family reunification has still to be transferred and shared between the various different stakeholders. The Office for Housing and Migration will continue to address this topic. To improve the medical care for asylum seekers, several measures have been introduced. Among them, the number of nurses visiting refugee accommodations have been increased, and currently, measures are taken to further address the support needs of women with female genital mutilation.

1.3.2 Field of Action 2: Children and Youth in the Education System (Age Group 0-15)

Needs assessment/ What had been done already (first report, 04/2018)

Education plays a vital role for the integration of children and youth with a refugee background (Dewitz, Terhart, and Massumi, 2018; Massumi et al., 2015; Vogel and Stock, 2017). The inclusion of large numbers of newcomer refugees into educational institutions and programs such as daycare and preschool, school and non-formal education presents an important challenge for City departments, NGOs and other stakeholders.

Hence, the first report states as priority areas: i) the increase of attendance rates for refugee children in daycare and kindergarten as well as in higher secondary education; ii) the implementation of assessment strategies, and iii) support measures for transition moments. For the first report, no reliable data overview on the number of children with a refugee background in the educational institutions in Munich was available. By the end of 2016, an evaluation of the City Youth Office in the shelter system showed that the majority of refugee infants and children (age 0-6) did not attend

regular daycare or preschool programs, although the City Department for Education and Sports had already implemented an outreach counselling for parents of preschoolers in 42 shelters. Nevertheless, a large number of these children were able to attend a non-formal program carried out in the shelters by the City Youth Office. Furthermore, the report stresses a high need for non-formal support from the youth welfare office and other stakeholders due to traumatic flight experiences and the difficult living conditions in mass shelters. *Planned measures and programs in the first report (04/2018)* included: (1) The development of a concept and the implementation of an educational assessment centre for school children and youth; (2) Implementation of training programs for educators, social workers, teachers and other professionals and volunteers in trauma-sensitive and intercultural pedagogy; (3) the introduction of a digital system for translation services with live video connection.

What has been achieved?

As of March 2019, some important steps have been taken for the implementation of the mentioned programs and measures. The City Department for Education and Sports is able to provide a broad and differentiated training program for teachers and educators in the field of intercultural pedagogy. Furthermore, major networks have been built for the implementation of the educational assessment center through meetings with City and federal state stakeholders. Other measures such as the translation service are only in the first planning phase and need to be seen as long-term goals.

1.3.3 Field of Action 3: Vocational Education, Counselling and Language Training (Age Group 16-24)

Needs assessment/ What had been done already (first report, 04/2018)

Since 2015, integration programs and measures on national, federal and local levels as well as offers from civic organizations and NGOs have expanded considerably.

Integration in Munich has grown into a broad, differentiated and complex field. However, this also led to a confusion of offers and access requirements as well as to parallel systems. Some refugees enrolled or were enrolled at several educational institutions. At the same time, less well-connected persons did not participate in any educational activity at all.

The following diagram shows the so-called “educational chain”. It was used as an analytical scheme for needs assessment in the different phases of education for youth and adults age 16 and above.




Figure 1.4 Educational Chain for Refugee Youth and Adults (Landeshauptstadt München. Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, 2018b)

The City of Munich is willing to provide programs and measures alongside this educational chain model, enabling refugee newcomers to take sequential steps on their educational pathway. For the initial educational counselling, the City developed an educational assessment at the City's Integration Counselling Centre. There, individual scholarly biographies, previous work experiences and language competencies of the refugees are assessed. Depending on the educational background, the timely assignment to a suitable German course will follow, possibly also in literacy courses. If appropriate German language skills are already available, the refugees can catch up on school qualifications and attend transition classes at Vocational education schools or continue their professional education. Because of the legislation at the federal state and national levels, not all refugee newcomers can access work permits (see 3. in this chapter). In 2016, the City provided free language training for 1,709 youth and adults complementary to the national programs of integration courses (Landeshauptstadt München. Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit, 2018b, p. 69). Two thousand spots for vocational transition classes were available.

Nevertheless, language training needs already started to change at this time. In particular, newcomer refugee apprentices showed a high need for support to successfully participate in the dual-apprenticeship programs. Furthermore, different stakeholders continued to argue for the implementation of a central newcomer center, providing counselling on a wide range of topics and for all different age and legal status groups, since services and programs remained complex and dispersed. Among the *measures/ programs proposed* (first report 04/2018) were: (1) the adaptation of German language course formats (for example part-time and evening formats for apprentices and qualification alongside with a workplace); (2) measures to increase the access to schooling certificates; (3) the implementation of programs and formats for groups with special needs; (4) the implementation of a central newcomer centre.

What has been achieved?

Constant policy changes, as well as changes in population influx, hinder informed integration management at the municipal level. An educational policy document (State Education Office Nr. 124/2018) further restricted the access to the external examination of the basic secondary school leaving certificate for students in vocational education transition classes. Discussions on the access to secondary school leaving certificate must now be re-established with the State Education Office and the corresponding city departments. Adaptions of language course formats and the implementation of additional support programs for apprentices are currently processed in the City's planning and decision-making processes. Language formats for parents, as well as a model project for a language support-worker outreach program for newcomers with disabilities, shall be established by the end of 2019. Information management measures such as the implementation of a newcomer app service and the distribution of an educational portfolio for newcomers have been established already or are about to be established. Nevertheless, sophisticated structural and organizational measures such as the implementation of a central newcomer centre will only be possible in the long-term.

1.3.4 Field of Action 4: Job training and access to the labour market (age group adults 25 and older)

Needs assessment/What had been done already (first report, 04/2018)

Integration into the labour market highly depends on the local demand for labour. The labour market in Munich has grown steadily in recent years and offers excellent employment opportunities. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have a more detailed look at employment opportunities in Munich and at the competencies of refugee background population to assess chances, risks and qualification needs.

Apparently there is a demand for highly qualified employees in the City of Munich and only few job opportunities for lower-skilled jobs. Ninety percent of the job vacancies reported at the State Employment Office is for skilled workers and experts. So far, there is no complete database available on the German language skills and the education and qualification background of the refugees living in Munich. Dispersed data sets from the educational assessment at the Integration Counselling Centre, the employment agency and the jobcentre, show a heterogeneous population. Different data sources highlight the high need for language and literacy courses. About two-thirds of the population is literate in the Latin alphabet, while 20-40 percent are without any knowledge of the German language altogether. The educational background of the refugee population is very heterogenous. While approximately 30% of the population across the different data sets had received no schooling or up to 4 years of education, an important subgroup (17-19%) obtained a university entrance qualification in countries of origin or first receiving countries.

Analysis of the opportunities and risks in the Munich labour market for refugee newcomers reveals a mismatch between the demand of employers and the exist-

ing qualifications of the refugee newcomers registered with the employment agency and the job center. Although the Munich labour market is receptive to integrating newcomers, there is an immense need for skilled qualifications for which many newcomers fall short of meeting. Another important issue to take into account is that many refugee newcomers will likely struggle to engage in lengthy training when they are providing financial support to relatives still residing in conflict zones. The employment agency, the job center and the City Department for Work and Economy and Social Affairs developed qualification programs for refugee newcomers. Furthermore, refugee newcomers with a residence permit can access qualification measures through the Munich Employment and Qualification Program (MBQ). *Measures and programs proposed in the first report (04/2018)* included: (1) implementing more literacy courses for adults, (2) developing tangible and accessible qualification measures for adults with low levels of education (combining workplace education and language learning); (3) offering more programs for highly qualified refugee newcomers; (4) developing programs and initiatives for population with unclear prospects to stay (see footnote 3) and with a so-called tolerated status (see footnote 6).

What has been achieved?

Due to progress in language acquisition, refugee newcomers increasingly meet requirements for attending labour market qualification programs and finding jobs, as confirmed by Federal Employment Agency data showing a clear positive trend in labour market participation in Munich. With the project “startAB”, in 2018, the City Department for Social Affairs implemented a new format which focuses mainly on basic vocational training and imparting professional German and mathematics skills. This project is for refugee populations over 25 years with unclear prospects to stay. Furthermore, since 2017, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been offering shorter and more flexible qualification programs combined with language support and counselling from social workers. There is an increasing awareness of specific barriers for accessing language courses, qualification programs and the labour market for mothers with a refugee background. Under the leadership of the City Department for Work and Economy, an explorative, qualitative study regarding the labour market integration of refugee women is being conducted. A summary of the evaluation and the development of recommendations for action is planned for early 2020.

1.3.5 Field of Action 5: Access to Permanent Housing

Needs assessment/ What has been done (first report 04/2018)

Munich is a fast-growing metropolitan area. Natural growth and the increasing numbers of people moving into the city from other places has resulted in rapid growth during recent years. In 2015 the town reached 1.55 million inhabitants. By the end of 2022 1.7 million inhabitants are expected to live in the city, a number which, accord-

ing to estimates, will climb to 1.8 million in 2030 (Landeshauptstadt München. Referat für Stadtplanung und Bauordnung, 2017).

While from 2010 until 2015 the population in Munich increased by 142,000 people, only 36,808 apartments were built. The housing shortage is becoming an increasingly pressing issue with land and rent prices continuously rising. For refugees, it is extremely difficult to find housing in Munich. In consequence, accepted refugees remain in the shelter system. The bigger the family, the lower the income, the more pressing is the need to find a subsidized apartment on the social housing market. In December 2016, 11,462 households applied for social housing at the Office for Housing and Migration, for 8,256, the highest priority level was assigned, of which 437 were refugee households.

In addition to finding housing, managing daily life can cause significant challenges. For refugee newcomers, it can be a challenge to finance the basic needs of regular everyday life and to properly fulfill the role of the lessee. Refugees have to be empowered to tackle these issues and retain their place of living. In the past years, the city reacted to the challenges on the housing market by developing the action program on housing, which passed the City Council in 2016.

In 2016, the City of Munich created a program called “Housing for Everyone” which complemented the existing action programs. In 2016, a target was set by the City to build around 3,000 new apartments. These apartments are accessible to refugees still living in the shelter system and for other households registered for social housing. However, at the beginning of 2017, only 300 apartments were built while another 900 were in the planning process. There is a long way to go before housing can be “for everyone” in Munich. The *main recommendation proposed in the first report (04/2018)* was the development of social and subsidized housing schemes.

What has been achieved?

Between 2012 and 2016, around 1,584 apartments have been developed in the sector of social housing and low rent schemes. This number increased considerably in 2017 with 1,641 apartments and 2,034 in 2018. Since the implementation of the “Housing for Everyone” program, the construction of 791 apartments have been completed as of end of 2018, and 51 more are planned to be completed by 2020. Some projects could not be developed due to the resistance from some neighbourhoods.

1.4 Conclusion and Remaining Challenges

The master plan for integration of refugees was the starting point for an extremely important first step: the intensive analysis of needs and existing supports for the refugee population in the City of Munich. After the arrival of more than 35,000 refugees at the Munich Central Station in the first two weeks of September 2015, the inhabitants of Munich, NGOs and the city departments tried their best to help and spontaneously develop processes, supports and programs. However, by 2016 the integration field had grown into a large and complex system that was very hard to navigate, not

only for refugees but also those assisting and supporting them on their pathways into the receiving society.

The masterplan for refugee integration developed a conclusive and high-quality database of refugee newcomers and population with a refugee background in the City of Munich. Forty pages annex on existing supports showed the broad field of programs and initiatives within the City of Munich. Based on the analysis of needs and the existing integration landscape, it was possible to identify gaps and propose the development of new structures and programs. Furthermore, initiatives for information management, such as the app “integreat,” have been introduced thanks to the masterplan.

In the frame of the project, new integration supports were developed, and the continuation of already existing programs was justified by the plan. For instance, the conception of a central newcomer centre for the City Department for Social Affairs and the Department for Education and Sport with the involvement of the State Education Office (field of action 2/3) was developed. Other initiatives included: the development of an educational portfolio (see the field of action 3) and of new qualification programs for the labour market (see the field of action 4).

An important focus was the development of supports for the target group of vulnerable refugees and groups with special needs (see the field of action 1 and 3). The intensive project work resulted in greater awareness of the needs of the refugee target group in general and for an intersectional awareness in particular. Women, children, unaccompanied adolescents, LGBTI* refugees and refugees with disabilities became one focus of the masterplan.

The masterplan for refugee integration only contained a small budget for the project implementation and coordination of the fields of action. The development and financing of integration supports by the units and departments involved took place in parallel to the development of the project structure. Following this logic, in recent years, there have been numerous city council resolutions introduced by the units to promote the integration of refugees.

Forced migration and, consequentially, the municipal integration planning and management for the refugee population is a fast-changing field, strongly influenced by global developments and national and local politics. Hence, there needs to be a steady adaption of the local integration landscape in Munich. The masterplan with its project structure provided excellent space to create and stabilize networks among the different stakeholders. These networks will keep existing beyond the project structure and will facilitate joint efforts to create opportunities for successful integration pathways.

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2 Canadian Cities and Asylum Claimants 2017-2019: Overview and Analysis of the Cities' Positions, Policies and Roles

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Abstract

The overarching purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview and analysis of the positions, policies, and roles of the governments of the three largest cities in Canada (i.e., Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver) in the reception and settlement of asylum claimants arriving from the United States between 2017 and 2019. Two central questions guide the overview and analysis. First, what were the positions, policies and roles of the three cities vis-à-vis asylum claimants, and what were the determinants of the same? Second, did the three cities make a substantial contribution to the reception and settlement of the asylum claimants, and what were the determinants of the same?

This chapter reveals that the three city governments adopted relatively progressive and proactive positions, policies and roles vis-à-vis the reception and settlement of asylum claimants.

The chapter also reveals that several factors determined the positions, policies, roles and contributions of these three cities in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. Major factors included moral and legal imperatives, the policy and political interests of elected city officials, and the organizational capacities of these large municipalities. Furthermore, it reveals that their organizational capacities were partly based on the policies and processes they had developed in contributing to the settlement of previous influxes of asylum seekers and refugees, and particularly the Syrian refugees a few years earlier.

The chapter also reveals that the three cities made significant constructive contributions to the reception and settlement of asylum claimants arriving from the United States. However, it is difficult to say with a high degree of confidence precisely how significant it was. Moreover, it reveals three major related determinants of the significance of contribution. First, a relatively strong political will to assist in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. Second, the magnitude of their respective organizational and financial capacity and their willingness to use some of that capacity in the reception and settlement of the asylum seekers, Third, their willingness to work

in partnership with various governmental and non-governmental organizations as a means to leverage their resources and increase their capacity in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers.

Keywords: Canadian Cities; Asylum Seekers and Refugees; Resettlement

2.1 Introduction

The central objective of this chapter is to provide an overview and analysis of the positions, policies and roles of the governments of three Canadian cities, namely Montreal in the province of Quebec, Toronto in the province of Ontario, and Vancouver in the province of British Columbia in relation to the reception and settlement of asylum seekers arriving from the United States between 2017 and 2019. The decision to focus on the positions, policies, and roles of those three city governments regarding this category of newcomers is that during that period they received many more asylum seekers than other Canadian cities. Moreover, they devoted extensive attention and organizational resources to meeting their initial reception and settlement needs at least until their claims for refugee status are either approved or rejected.

In providing an overview and analysis of the positions, policies and roles of those three cities in relation to asylum seekers, this chapter addresses two central questions. What were the positions, policies and roles of the three cities vis-à-vis asylum seekers, and what were the determinants of the same? Did those cities make a substantial contribution to the reception and settlement of the asylum seekers, and what were the determinants of the same? In addressing those questions, this chapter builds on comparable issues addressed in a journal article about the positions, policies and roles of a sample of large Canadian cities in the resettlement of Syrian refugees in 2015 and 2016 (Garcea, 2016).

The remainder of this chapter consists of four sections. The first provides background information on the division of constitutional powers among the various orders of government in the field of immigration, and some data regarding the influx of asylum seekers needed for understanding the positions, policies and roles of the three city governments and the determinants of the same. The second provides an overview of their positions and policies related to asylum seekers. The third provides an overview of four major categories of roles they performed in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. The fourth provides a summary of the significant findings regarding their positions, policies and roles, and also lessons that may be drawn

Acknowledgments:

The author would like to extend sincere appreciation to all officials from the cities of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver who were very generous in assisting with the compilation and interpretation of relevant information for this chapter. Such appreciation is also extended to his principal research assistant, Adrian Aquino, whose remarkable dedication and skills made the production of this chapter possible.

from this particular case study of relevance for city governments and other orders of government within and beyond the Canadian federation.

Canada is a federation wherein jurisdictional authority for immigration is shared between the federal and provincial governments, but federal laws and policies have paramountcy vis-à-vis provincial immigration laws and policies. However, “control of aliens” (i.e., admission, deportation and citizenship) is an area of exclusive federal government jurisdiction that is not shared with provincial governments. Particularly important in this respect is that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction in relation to refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. For their part, city governments do not have any jurisdictional authority in either for immigration or control of aliens (Béchar and Elgersma, 2013). Nevertheless, in recent decades many city governments performed some important supplementary roles in the reception and settlement of various categories of newcomers, including asylum seekers. Moreover, in recent decades they performed such roles vis-a-vis asylum seekers, refugees, and other newcomers much more extensively, directly, purposefully, and willingly than they did in earlier decades. This change in orientation to such involvement has occurred as a result of a combination of two key factors. One key factor is the emergence of imperatives stemming from the influx of many more asylum seekers and refugees to those cities during the most recent decade compared to previous decades. The other key factor is the emergence of public philosophies regarding governance and justice in cities. Notable public philosophies have included “global cities” (Sassian, 2001), “progressive, inclusive and just cities” (Douglass, Garbaye, and Ho, 2019), and “powerful and proactive city-states” (Levi and Valverde, 2006).

2.2 Data on Asylum Seekers Entering Canada

During most of the past two decades the number of asylum seekers arriving to Canada from various parts of the world and entering through various official and unofficial ports of entry has increased steadily and substantially (Government of Canada [GOC], 2017). This is particularly true of the most recent decade. As Table 2.1 reveals, between 2011 and 2019 the range of asylum seeker claims processed by the Canadian Border Agency (CBSA) official and the Immigration and Refugee, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) officials has fluctuated between 10,000 and 64,000 annually. Moreover from 2017 to 2019 the number of asylum seekers arriving in Canada from various countries and through various official and unofficial points of entry was approximately 50,390 for 2017, 55,035 for 2018, and 63,830 for the first ten months of 2019 (GOC, 2019a).

Other data reveals that in the three years since the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada began tracking irregular border crossers (i.e., irregular migrants who crossed between official ports of entry along the Canada-US border) most have entered Canada from the United States. In 2017, for example, approximately 40% of the asylum claims were submitted by asylum seekers who entered Canada from the United States. Furthermore, most of these asylum seekers entered Canada across the Quebec and Ontario portions of the Canada-US border (Canada, 2018d). Evidently

90% of these entered through unofficial points of entry in Quebec, and the remaining 10% entered through other unofficial points of entry in Ontario, Manitoba and British Columbia (Banerjee, 2018).

Although the vast majority entered Canada through Quebec, a large percentage of them then settled in Toronto and some other neighbouring large municipalities in southern Ontario. They did so after filing their claims and while waiting for those claims to be processed by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Shertzer and Paquet, 2019). Many did this within the scope of a triage pilot project program established by the federal government to redirect asylum seekers away from the crowded shelters in Montreal and Toronto, which it quietly ended in July 2019 because some municipalities were not cooperating sufficiently to make it work more effectively (Canadian Press, 2019).

Table 2.1 Total Asylum Claims Processed by CBSA & IRCC Offices, 2011-2019

Province/Territory	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Newfoundland and Labrador	10	15	--	10	15	60	85	75	45
Prince Edward Island	--	0	10	0	0	0	--	0	0
Nova Scotia	40	45	20	30	40	65	85	80	100
New Brunswick	20	20	10	15	5	20	30	45	40
Quebec	4,485	4,475	2,405	2,635	2,955	4,660	24,710	27,910	30,410
Ontario	18,485	14,015	6,785	9,230	11,090	16,200	20,230	22,160	26,885
Manitoba	150	150	80	165	175	240	1,080	615	425
Saskatchewan	65	55	40	40	45	80	100	75	105
Alberta	875	780	495	625	955	1,200	1,735	1,765	2,035
British Columbia	1	920	510	695	780	1,340	2,335	2,310	3,775
Yukon	0	0	--	0	0	--	0	--	0
Northwest Territories	0	0	0	0	0	0	--	0	--
Nunavut	--	--	--	--	0	0	0	0	--
Total	25,315	20,470	10,365	13,445	16,055	23,860	50,390	55,035	63,830

Source. Gouvernement of Canada 2019a

Of the 127,505 asylum seekers who entered Canada between January 2017 and October 2019, a total of 56,515 were intercepted by the RCMP for crossing at places other than the official ports of entry. For 2017 the number of RCMP intercepted asylum seekers was 20,593 or approximately 41%, for 2018 it was 19,419 or about 35%, and for the first 10 months of 2019 it was 16,503 or approximately 26%. The average of such interceptions for that period was approximately 34%. After that initial spike in 2017 the trend for RCMP interceptions was downward (GOC, 2019a). The interceptions occurred when asylum seekers did not comply with Canadian immigration law,

which requires them to enter Canada through the officially designated entry points and to make their claim either there or at what are referred to as “Inland Offices” operated by the federal government’s Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA) which is mandated to receive and file such claims before they are dealt with by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) (GOC, 2019c).

The data in Table 2.2, which focuses on the processing of claims by asylum seekers during the period from January 2016 to October 2019, reveals that only 45% to 63% of claims referred to the IRB were approved and that of the remainder are 25% to 32.5% were rejected, and the rest were abandoned, withdrawn and other. Moreover, of those that were referred to the IRB, only 45% to 77% were finalized. It also reveals that the number of cases pending that were referred to the IRB increased steadily and substantially over that four-year period.

Table 2.2 Processing of Claims submitted by Asylum Seekers – Jan 2016-June 2019

		2016	2017	2018	2019
		[Jan-Dec]	[Jan-Dec]	[Jan-Dec]	[Jan-Oct]
REFERRED	Number	23,350	47,425	55,338	42,708
Accepted	Number	9,972	13,553	14,790	19,423
	Percent	63.3%	62.9%	55.1%	45.5%
Rejected	Number	4,821	6,223	8,759	10,708
	Percent	30.6%	28.9%	32.6%	25.0%
Abandoned	Number	286	740	1,376	1,234
	Percent	1.8%	3.5%	5.1%	2.8%
Withdrawn & Other	Number	682	997	1,880	1,556
	Percent	4.3%	4.7%	7.2%	3.6%
Total Finalized	Number	15,761	21,513	26,805	32,931
	Percent	67.5%	45.4%	48.5%	77.0%
PENDING (to date)	Number	17,537	43,250	71,675	81,275

Source. Government of Canada 2019d

Three interrelated factors increased the number of asylum seekers over time during the past decade. One factor was the momentum of the massive migration phenomenon that swept primarily through the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, as well as other regions of the world during that decade. The massive migrations included refugees, asylum seekers and other categories of migrants (GOC, 2019d).

A second factor was the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. More specifically, it was his anti-immigration policy pronouncements during his election campaign, while waiting for his inauguration, and following his inauguration which triggered a mass exodus of refugee seekers from the USA. Particularly significant in the period after he won the election were his musings and pronounce-

ments that asylum seekers and so-called “undocumented migrants” and asylum seekers, would face more intense scrutiny and possibly not be allowed to apply for refugee status or any other of immigrant status. Particularly important in this regard was his executive order issued in January 2017 banning immigration from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen for 120 days for what he described as the need to “keep radical Islamic terrorists out” (Merica, 2017). Equally important were his pronouncements regarding plans to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (Shear and Davis, 2017) and to deport large numbers of migrants from Latin American and Caribbean countries such as Haiti and El Salvador (Oppenheimer, 2018; Ford, 2018).

A third factor was Prime Minister Trudeau’s response to President Trump’s policy pronouncements regarding the possible deportation of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the proposed ban of immigration and refugee applications from some Muslim majority countries. In what amounted to a pronouncement echoing the noble sentiments emblazoned at the base of the Statue of Liberty, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that his government would welcome bona-fide asylum seekers and refugees wishing to resettle in Canada (Austen, 2017).

That pronouncement contributed immensely to a dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers from the United States crossing overland into Canada through uncontrolled parts of the border. What initially seemed like a laudable humanitarian proclamation, eventually became a controversial one as a result of some challenges that emerged in dealing with the unexpectedly high and indeterminate number of asylum seekers from the USA who entered into Canada at places other than officially designated and guarded ports of entry. The reason most asylum seekers chose to by-pass the official ports of entry is that crucial provisions in the bilateral Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) did not apply to those who did not use them when entering Canada (GOC, 2016). What may have been an oversight by the two countries when they negotiated the STCA, proved to be a legal loophole that made it possible for asylum seekers to enter Canada at uncontrolled points of entry without fear of being forced to return to the United States by Canadian officials under the terms and conditions of the STCA (Zilio, 2017).

The influx of asylum seekers from the United States, which commenced in December 2016, increased steadily for most of the next three years. Not even highly-publicized tragic incidents involving some asylum seekers such as, for example, losing fingers due to frost-bite or death resulting from cold weather did not dissuade many prospective asylum seekers from crossing the border into Canada. Many were willing to face the risks in the hope that they would be supported by governmental and community-based organizations or individuals when they crossed the border, and that their claim for refugee status and subsequently for permanent residency would be approved.

2.3 Positions and Policies of Cities

The governments of the three cities were generally favourably predisposed to assisting asylum seekers from the United States. This was particularly true when the influx began and the challenges of contributing to their reception and settlement was easier to manage. That predisposition changed only slightly when the numbers of asylum seekers from the United States increased dramatically largely due to the substantial increase in the number who were coming into Canada through places other than the official ports of entry. The numbers created challenges for the three cities because they did not know precisely how many would arrive during any particular period or how expeditiously their reception, settlement, and claims review would be processed. Such uncertainty augmented the challenges for the cities in being prepared to meet the reception and settlement needs of the refugee claimants.

The favourable predisposition of the three cities to assisting asylum seekers from the United States is evident in three key facts. First, as members of the Big City Mayors Caucus (BCMC) which exists within the Canadian Federation of Municipalities (FCM), all three city governments subscribed to progressive settlement policies toward various categories of newcomers, including those seeking asylum, as evident in some of the policy, advocacy and communication documents of that organization during the influx of Syrian refugees (Garcea, 2016). Second, all three cities were members of the Coalition of Inclusive Municipalities (formerly the Canadian Coalition of Municipalities against Racism and Discrimination – CCMARD), which was established as part of the International Coalition of Inclusive and Sustainable Cities – ICCAR, an initiative launched by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2004 (Canadian Commission for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, n.d.) and have also produced some advocacy documents and toolkits for municipalities (Holly and Jedwab, 2019). Moreover, the City of Toronto signed the Integrating Cities Charter produced by Eurocities and was the only municipality outside Europe to do so. The common purpose of these two protocols was for municipalities to oppose racism and discrimination and to foster inclusivity, equality and a welcoming and supportive spirit toward immigrants and refugees (Eurocities, 2018; City of Toronto [Toronto], 2014).

Third, between 2013 and 2018, the three cities adopted several significant policies that originally impinged directly or indirectly both on undocumented (i.e., non-status) residents and asylum seekers. The most notable of these were what are commonly referred to either as “sanctuary cities policies” or “access to city services without fear policies.” Generally, such policies were adopted in response to pressure from grass-roots human rights advocates and migrant justice organizations, and not exclusively through self-directed, autonomous city government progressive policy-making.

In 2013 Toronto adopted the Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians policy, commonly known as the Access T.O. policy, which rendered it the first “sanctuary-city” in Canada (Toronto, 2013a, p. 16). In 2016 Vancouver adopted the Access to Services Without Fear Policy (ACSWF) (City of Vancouver [Vancouver],

2016a; Vancouver, 2018). In 2017 Montreal's governance regime adopted the Declaration to Designate Montreal a Sanctuary City (Shingler, 2017; Scott, 2018). However, in 2018 it was supplanted by the policy and corresponding three-year action plan, titled *Montréal Inclusive: Plan d'action 2018-2021*, adopted by the subsequent municipal governance regime ostensibly because it wanted the policy and the corresponding plan to embody and profile the city's public philosophy of being inclusive vis-à-vis newcomers, rather than merely a sanctuary. (Scott, 2018; City of Montreal 2018a). Then in 2019, the latter governance regime adopted the *Politique d'accès aux services municipaux sans peur*, and used it to create a mediation or conciliation and protection unit (City of Montreal [Montreal], 2019). Despite some differences among the policies of those three cities in their precise goals, objectives, and initiatives, they all embodied a favourable and progressive predisposition toward the reception and settlement of documented and undocumented newcomers, including asylum seekers, within their respective geographic areas and their spheres of jurisdictional authority.

In addition to those particular policies, the three cities also adopted other policies, plans or strategies that reflect their progressive and proactive positions related to various categories of newcomers, including asylum seekers. Invariably such policies, procedures or strategies focused on meeting the needs of various categories of newcomers. For example, Toronto adopted the *Refugee Capacity Plan* (Toronto, 2019), Montreal adopted the *Montréal Inclusive: Plan d'action 2018-2021* (Montreal, 2018), and Vancouver adopted the *New Start Strategy 2016-2025* within the scope of the *Vancouver Immigration Partnership* (Vancouver, 2016b).

None of the preceding is to suggest that the city governments were entirely happy with all they had to do for the asylum seekers and the challenges they faced in doing it. Even some of their officials had some critiques of the situation they found themselves in at various points in time during that period. Invariably their critiques were directed at the American and Canadian national governments for their inability to monitor and moderate the flow of asylum seekers and undocumented residents from the United States. Whereas some of their critiques were muted, others were pronounced. The muted critiques of the American government were levelled at President Donald Trump for imposing or at least threatening to impose stringent and even draconian measures against some residents in the United States that had created the unexpected massive influx of asylum seekers and undocumented residents from that country. The muted critiques of the Canadian government were levelled at the Prime Minister of Canada for not choosing his words more carefully when he indicated that Canada welcomed asylum seekers from the United States with open arms. Notable criticisms included: not giving adequate consideration to the challenges that it posed for cities and community-based organizations in having to deal with the unexpected and unpredictable large influx of asylum seekers; not consulting them sufficiently on various matters, including developing plans for border controls; the distribution of asylum seekers both before and after processing them in their respective cities; not consulting them more regularly and efficaciously in developing plans for providing the asylum seekers with various services and supports; not providing timely and substantial financial resources in compensating them for some of the significant

costs they incurred by participating in the reception and settlement of the asylum seekers.

The governments of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal maintained their progressive and proactive positions despite those critiques, divided public opinion, as well as reticence and even resistance from newly elected provincial governments on the extent to which asylum seekers crossing the border anywhere other than the official guarded ports of entry should be assisted, (Grant, 2018). Their rationale and justification for doing so was that there was a legal and moral imperative on Canada to do so within the scope of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as section 131 of Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Moreover, they maintained that the legitimacy of asylum claims fell within the jurisdictional authority of the federal government's Immigration and Refugee Board, rather than the jurisdictional authority of the cities.

2.4 Roles of Cities

The three cities have performed four major types of roles for the benefit of asylum seekers, namely advocacy roles, coordinative roles, provision of services roles, and contributory roles (i.e., financial contributions and in-kind contributions). The four categories of roles performed by these cities, along with some notable examples of such roles, are discussed in turn below.

2.4.1 Advocacy Roles

All three cities performed key advocacy roles related to the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. This included public advocacy and intergovernmental advocacy.

The goal of the public advocacy was to encourage individuals, groups, and community-based organizations to understand and appreciate the challenges asylum seekers faced both before and after arriving in Canada, and to encourage them collaborate with each other and with city, provincial and federal governments in assisting reception and settlement of asylum seekers. In pursuing those goals, they engaged proactively in public advocacy through various means such as publicizing their respective policies of access without fear, delivering public speeches at major public events, participating in media interviews, launching poster campaigns (e.g. Access T.O. Working Group) (Toronto, 2017a), and posting progressive statements on social media regarding the importance of assisting and supporting the asylum seekers because it would benefit not only the asylum seekers, but also the communities in which they resided (Shingler, 2017).

The public advocacy of city officials was critical in establishing and maintaining greater public support for asylum seekers than if they had not undertaken such advocacy. The reason for this is that many members of the public expected city officials to provide leadership and they relied on them to provide perspectives and assessments of the merits of assisting in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. The effect that a positive, progressive and proactive predisposition by elected city

officials in contributing to the reception and settlement of asylum seekers had on their residents should not be underestimated.

In the case of intergovernmental advocacy, the cities undertook various types of initiatives, ranging from formal and informal communications with the federal and provincial governments on their own, in partnership with other neighbouring municipalities, or in partnership with their respective provincial and national organizations. This is particularly true of their partnership with other city mayors who were members of the Big City Mayors Caucus (BCMC) established under the aegis of the Canadian Federation of Municipalities (FCM). Whereas some of the intergovernmental advocacy was undertaken by the mayors and other elected officials, some of it was undertaken by appointed officials in meetings and communications with their provincial and federal counterparts. Whereas most of the intergovernmental advocacy occurred at the municipal-provincial or municipal-federal levels, some of it also occurred at the inter-municipal level as the three city governments attempted to encourage their counterparts in other city governments to become more progressive and proactive in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers.

All such intergovernmental advocacy by cities generally focused on three key spheres. One sphere of advocacy was the importance of meeting the needs of asylum seekers. Toward that end, the cities recommended that the federal government increase efficiency and effectiveness in assessing their claims. They also advocated for more considerable efforts on the part of the federal and provincial governments in ensuring that the rights of asylum seekers were recognized and respected and that the requisite reception and settlement support services were provided for them as they were for other newcomers such as, for example, government - assisted refugees (Vancouver, 2016).

A second sphere of such advocacy by those cities was for the federal and provincial governments to do more in meeting the needs of community-based organizations. In particular, they encouraged the federal and provincial governments to provide adequate financial support for community-based organizations that were either officially or unofficially involved in providing services and supports to asylum seekers from the time of arrival until at least the time that their claims were processed.

A third sphere of such advocacy was meeting the needs of the cities in dealing with the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. More specifically, the advocacy in this sphere fell within six sub-spheres, namely policy clarity, policy coherence and congruence, management, consultations, financial resources and logistical support. In the policy clarity sub-sphere, city officials wanted federal government officials to explain not only the precise scope, management and duration of the influx of asylum seekers and also its policies and plans for providing them with the requisite reception and settlement services and supports. In the policy coherence and congruence sub-sphere, they wanted the federal government to develop and implement coherent policies, plans and programs, for asylum seekers and to ensure that they were congruent with the existing plans, policies and programs of cities in their efforts to support such newcomers. In the management sub-sphere, they wanted the federal government to engage in better management of the flows of asylum seekers into the

country and especially to their respective cities, as well as improvements in managing not only the reception and settlement of asylum seekers, but also the application and determination processes. In the consultation sub-sphere, they wanted the federal government to consult them individually and collectively more frequently and more efficaciously to determine the preferences and capacities of cities to receive and assist asylum seekers. In the financial resources and logistical support sub-sphere, they wanted the federal and provincial governments to provide them with the necessary resources and supports required to meet some of the reception and settlement needs of asylum seekers from the time of arrival until their claims were resolved. The preceding advocacy can be found in municipal documentation and media coverage of the three cities' positions (e.g., Vancouver, 2016; Scott, 2018; Toronto, 2018d).

2.4.2 Coordinative and Facilitative Roles

The three cities performed significant coordinative and facilitative roles involving various governmental and non-governmental agencies and volunteers within their respective communities who were committed to making positive contributions in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. The focus of all such coordination and facilitation by the three cities was on one or more of the following issues: advocacy for meeting the reception and settlement needs of asylum seekers; the development and implementation policies for reception and settlement services; planning, programming and funding for the provision of such services; and the actual provision of such services.

In performing the coordinative and facilitative roles related to such matters, the cities relied on a complex and robust panoply of organizations within and beyond city hall which involved, in various combinations, elected and appointed city officials, representatives of the provincial and federal governments, and representatives of various types of organizations in the not-for-profit and for-profit sectors within their respective communities. Such organizations, along with their composition, and core mandates are identified in turn below. Unfortunately, space constraints do not permit the inclusion of more detailed information regarding such coordinative and facilitative organizational mechanisms. However, such detailed information is accessible from various websites identified in the references section of this chapter.

Toronto's Coordination and Facilitative Mechanisms

Notable examples of organizational mechanisms within the city hall in the three cities included divisions and departments as well as special agencies. In Toronto, the lead organizational division was Social Development, Finance and Administration (SDFA). During the past decade, its work related to various categories of newcomers, including asylum seekers, was assisted by several specialized agencies, namely the Access T.O. Working Group created in 2012; the Toronto Newcomer Office (TNO) established in 2013; the Newcomer Leadership Table (NLT) established in 2013; the

Refugee Capacity Senior Executive Committee (RCSEC) created in 2018, and the Refugee Capacity Advisory Committee (RCAC) created in 2018.

The Access T.O. Working Group, which consisted of representatives of 21 city divisions, agencies and corporations, was mandated to meet the service needs of undocumented Torontonians, including any asylum seekers who had either not filed a claim or who had been denied a claim and were therefore undocumented.

The TNO was a central agency created in 2013 to deal with newcomer reception and settlement. More specifically, it is a specialized agency of the City of Toronto, led by an Executive Director and funded jointly with the federal government assuming 80% of the costs and city governments assuming 20% of the costs. The TNO was mandated to manage the Newcomer Services Kiosk program, and perform various coordinative and facilitative roles in matters involving either only city departments and agencies or multi-stakeholder community-based agencies in which one or more city of Toronto agencies were either full-fledged members or at least contributory partners (Toronto, 2013a).

The NLT was a multi-stakeholder coordinative and facilitative committee which included representatives of all three orders of government, local authorities such as school board and hospital boards, and community organizations to share information and jointly make recommendations and undertake initiatives on system-wide issues related to such issues as housing, childcare, health, language and job training, job placement that impinge on the reception and settlement of newcomers in Toronto. The NLT is co-chaired by the City of Toronto's Social Development, Finance & Administration Division, United Way Toronto and York Region, and the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) (Toronto, 2013a).

The RCSEC, which was created to develop and implement Toronto's Refugee Capacity Plan, consisted of the City of Toronto's senior division heads, including the Executive Director of Social Development, Finance and Administration (SDF) as chair, and the division heads for the following units: Shelter, Support and Housing Administration (SSHA); Toronto Employment and Social Services (TESS); Toronto Public Health (TPH); Children's Services (CS); Office of Emergency Management (OEM); Strategic and Corporate Policy; and Corporate Communications.

The RCAC was a multi-stakeholder advisory committee consisting of representatives from the City of Toronto, provincial and federal ministries and agencies, several community agencies and refugee shelters. Its purpose was to assist the RCSEC in facilitating in performing its intra-organizational and inter-organizational coordination functions. Shortly after it was established RCAC created two working groups from its membership to focus on (a) how to leverage public-private partnerships and (b) ways to collect data related to immigration status without contravening the City's Access T.O. policy (Toronto, 2019).

The City of Toronto also performed its coordinative and facilitative roles in conjunction or in partnership with the four Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) in Toronto, which collectively were referred to as the four Quadrant LIPs. Toronto's four Quadrant LIPs were established by local stakeholders in each city but funded by the federal department of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) (Path-

ways to Prosperity, 2018). Their core function was to foster coordination and collaboration between governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies located both in the non-profit and the for-profit sectors in developing plans and setting priorities for meeting the reception and settlement needs of newcomers and the needs of communities receiving them. It is important to note that the four Quadrant LIPs were planning agencies rather than service-provider agencies in the immigration, settlement and integration sector. As planning agencies, they were focused primarily on preparing related to the reception and settlement needs of newcomers and the strategies, programs and services needed to meet those needs.

Montreal's Coordinative and Facilitative Mechanisms

In Montreal, the lead administrative agency that dealt with the reception and settlement needs of asylum seekers and other newcomers was the division of Développement et Diversité. In performing its reception and settlement vis-à-vis various newcomers, including asylum seekers, it established the Bureau d'Intégration des Nouveaux Arrivants à Montréal (BINAM), which performed coordinative and facilitative roles within and beyond city hall (Montreal, 2019). In this respect, Montreal's BINAM was comparable to Toronto's TNO. Indeed, the former was modelled on the latter.

One of the most significant multi-stakeholder organizations beyond the city hall that BINAM worked with was the Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes (TCRI), which was created in 2017. The TCRI provided opportunities for consultation, coordination and cooperation between the various governmental and non-governmental organizations. Since its creation it supplemented, and in some cases even supplanted, the City of Montreal's efforts in performing coordinating roles. The City of Montreal and the TCRI played the coordinative role and facilitative roles pursuant to the city's partnership with the provincial government as specified in the latter's Plan d'intervention du Québec en matière de prise en charge des demandeurs d'asile (Montreal city official, personal communication, March 5, 2019).

Vancouver's Coordinative and Facilitative Mechanisms

In the City of Vancouver, the lead city agency involved in coordinating various initiatives within and beyond city hall was the Social Policy and Projects Unit of the Arts, Culture and Community Service Division. As in other cities, the role performed by its senior staff members was significant in establishing multi-stakeholder partnership agencies devoted to coordinating and facilitating their efforts to meet the reception and settlement needs of various categories of newcomers, including asylum seekers. One of these was the Mayor's Working Group on Immigration (MWGI), which included representatives from universities, health authorities, school boards, lawyer associations, and other community sectors. In addition to making policy and program recommendations, the MWGI performed an advocacy role vis-à-vis elected and appointed officials, managers and staff of various organizations, the media and the public. For several years this was a standalone agency. However, when Vancouver's

Immigration Partnership (VIP) was established, the MWGI essentially became the central governance, planning and priorities body for that agency (Vancouver, 2019a; Vancouver, 2019b).

Another civic agency in Vancouver that performed a critical coordinative and facilitative role was the Cultural Communities Advisory Committee (CCAC), which in 2019 was renamed the Racial and Ethno-Cultural Equity Advisory Committee (RESEAC). This committee was created by and was accountable to Vancouver's City Council. For operational purposes, it was supported by the city's administrative officials. Its principal goal was to provide advice on enhancing access and inclusion for members of Vancouver's cultural communities to be treated equitably in receiving municipal services and participating in civic affairs. Toward that end, its principal functions and roles were: to identify issues and options; to review and assess city policies and propose any additions or changes to positions, policies and roles, provide guidance and support for city staff in community consultations and various forms of communications, and consult and collaborate with organizational representatives and individuals to advance the goal of racial and ethnocultural equity in the city. Finally, as noted above, in performing its coordinative and facilitative roles the City of Vancouver relied on the Vancouver Immigration Partnership (VIP) created in March 2015 (Vancouver, 2019b).

In performing coordinative and facilitative roles in the intergovernmental sphere, the three cities did so through periodic consultations either on a bilateral or trilateral basis involving

elected and appointed provincial and federal government officials. Interestingly, in the field of immigration as in other policy fields, very little was done on a multilateral basis between the cities and their provincial or federal counterparts. In the case of inter-municipal relations, sustained coordination and collaboration between two or more cities from different provinces comparable to that undertaken in 2018 by Toronto and Montreal for developing their respective policies and programs related to asylum seekers are not very common.

Although the modes of intergovernmental relations involving the three city governments and provincial and federal governments were relatively similar, there was one notable difference. Unlike its counterparts in Montreal and Vancouver, Toronto's city government signed the unique tripartite Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Understanding on Immigration COTMUI, the latest iteration of which was signed in 2018 for a quinquennium. The stated purpose of the MOU was for the committee of those three orders of government to consult and collaborate with each other on matters related to newcomer flows, reception and settlement, and to create any other consultative, coordinative and collaborative mechanisms needed to enhance the success of the partnership between those three governments (GOC, 2018). The efficacy and value of this unique MOU have been open to question since the first version was signed. Whereas many believe that it has served more of a symbolic function than a substantive one, others believe that its substantive role should not be underestimated. Those who espouse the latter position, point to the trilateral working relations with the reception and settlement of asylum seekers from 2017 to 2019

and suggest that the spirit, if not the letter of the agreement, was evident in the close working relationship between those three orders of government, but particularly between the federal and Toronto governments, especially after the provincial government became less cooperative with both of them.

2.4.3 Service Provision Roles

The three cities also performed some crucial roles in the provision of services to asylum seekers that, for analytical purposes, can be grouped into two major overlapping categories.

The first category consisted of special targeted reception and settlement services. These were services they provided for asylum seekers either directly or indirectly, and with or without financial compensation from the federal or provincial governments. This included services such as orientation to, and guidance and support in, accessing available services, as well as services such as shelter, food, transportation, designed to meet their basic needs.

A second category consisted of city services accessible to all city residents who met the basic eligibility requirements, rather than services targeted exclusively for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Asylum seekers granted permanent resident status were entitled to access an extensive set of services provided by the city, provincial and federal governments, and various local and regional service provider agencies for other permanent residents and citizens who met the eligibility requirements.

Both categories of services were provided to facilitate the reception and settlement of asylum seekers, not only immediately upon arrival, but also in the days, weeks, and possibly even months after their arrival while waiting for the processing of their claims and any related appeals. Indeed, in some instances some of those services were even provided to asylum seekers whose claims were rejected by the IRB while they were waiting either for voluntary departure or involuntary deportation.

The cities' involvement in the provision of both categories of services was either direct, in that they provided the services, or indirect, in that they performed key roles in coordinating or facilitating the efforts of various governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in providing the services. Notable areas in which they performed that coordination or facilitative role was in the immigration, settlement, health, and justice sectors. Moreover, as discussed in another section of this chapter, the three city governments were involved indirectly in the provision of such services in that they participated in the development and implementation of service provision plans or initiatives of various governmental and non-governmental agencies.

2.4.4 Contributory Roles

Finally, each city also performed two significant categories of contributory roles related to asylum seekers. One category was financial contribution roles, and the other was in-kind contribution roles. The objective here is to provide some general

observations and some notable examples, rather than a full and detailed account of all the financial contributions, including those for which the federal or provincial governments may have compensated them.

Financial Contribution Roles

The financial contributions of each city constituted a relatively small, but not insignificant, percentage of the costs incurred by the various orders of government for the reception and settlement of the asylum seekers. The federal government incurred the bulk of the costs and their respective provincial governments incurred a limited portion of the costs. The costs incurred by the cities were concentrated primarily in temporary and short-term shelter, subsidized housing costs, and financial supports to some key agencies that performed important roles either in providing referral services or actual services for asylum seekers.

Notable examples of such funding involving the City of Toronto included \$74 million for housing asylum seekers. Of the \$74 million, the City paid \$45 million, the federal government paid \$26 million, and the Ontario provincial government paid \$3 million. The City used \$11M it received from the federal government to relocate asylum seekers housed in temporary shelters and hotels (Canadian Press, 2018; Toronto city official, personal communication, May 6, 2019).

Notable examples of such funding involving the City of Montreal included \$12 million toward a \$24 million three-year “Montreal Inclusive” plan, that was cost-shared equally with the Quebec Government, designed to help facilitate newcomer reception, settlement and integration into city life regardless of their immigration or citizenship status (Montreal, 2018a). Of the \$24 million, \$3.75M was allotted for services for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Montreal, 2018a, p. 21). Examples of funding for various agencies in Montreal include the following allocations in 2017-2018: \$60,000 to Medecins du Monde for health and social assistance; \$30,000 to the Legal Clinic (Montreal Mission) to offer legal support; and \$30,000 to Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes (TCRI) to train 200 professionals to work in resettlement efforts (Montreal city official, 2019). It also included some of the costs for housing asylum seekers in its social housing system. Part of the total cost for housing was covered by the federal and provincial governments. For example, the Quebec provincial government provided the City with \$300,000 through a bilateral agreement three-year agreement (i.e., 2018-2021) devoted specifically for housing asylum seekers in its social housing system (Montreal city official, 2019).

Notable examples of such funding by the City of Vancouver included approximately \$1,000,000 annually for assisting asylum seekers, of which approximately \$300,000 to \$400,000 was disbursed as grants to agencies assisting asylum seekers (Vancouver city official, personal communication, April 24, 2019). One grant was for \$500,000 to ISS of BC, a settlement services agency, to make some of the housing units generally used for government-sponsored refugees available to asylum seekers (Vancouver city official, 2019).

In-Kind Contribution Roles

The cities also made numerous significant in-kind contributions. Generally, such contributions tended to involve the use of civic facilities for providing shelters or other forms of housing for asylum seekers, as well as specialized services to meet some of their other important needs such as orientation, transportation and social needs.

In Toronto, for example, shelters for homeless people and college residences were used extensively for housing asylum seekers. The lead role in providing such temporary housing was performed by Toronto's Shelter, Support, and Housing Administration. Because the City did not require information about immigration status to access homeless shelters, there is no definitive number of how many of the shelter inhabitants were asylum seekers (Toronto city official, 2019).

At such shelters they were provided meals and, when necessary, they were also provided with guidance and support by City staff and volunteers in connecting with other services such as health care, settlement support, long-term housing, education, and income supports (Toronto, 2017b, p. 9). The income support services for asylum seekers were provided through the Toronto Employment and Social Services division. The City was also responsible for providing transportation and other forms of logistical support to the asylum seekers housed in hotels by the Federal government (IRCC, 2018a).

Similarly, the City of Montreal also made substantial contributions to meeting the initial housing needs of asylum seekers. It was constrained to do so in part because a very high proportion of asylum seekers from the United States entered Canada through an access point on the Quebec border (i.e., Roxham Road). The pressure on its ability to house such asylum seekers was so high that to reduce that pressure, the federal government was constrained to act upon the request of the Quebec government to transport many asylum seekers other cities in other provinces (e.g., Toronto) shortly after they filed their claim in Montreal (Perreux, 2018). In its efforts to deal with the housing needs of the asylum seekers, the City of Montreal's Housing Branch worked with eleven community-housing agencies (Montreal city official, 2019). It also worked with three other local agencies to use the following facilities as temporary shelters: a former convent that the City had acquired; and the use of some schools they were not being used for educational purposes; and the iconic Olympic Stadium which was managed by a para-governmental agency; (Canadian Press, 2017b). Furthermore, to ensure the health and safety of asylum seekers in such shelters, the City collaborated with the Quebec Ministry of Health to ensure that the shelters were compliant with provincial standards and that adequate supplies were available for their health and safety (Montreal city official, 2019). This was in addition to the other services that asylum seekers could receive within the scope of the letter and spirit of the sanctuary city and the inclusive city policies, both of which embodied the notion of access to all city services without fear (Scott, 2018).

The City of Vancouver also made substantial in-kind service contributions both directly and indirectly to meeting the initial transitional housing needs of asylum seekers. It did so through various means, including providing land and facilities to

organizations committed to providing services and supports to asylum seekers and refugees (Vancouver city official, 2019). The most notable of these contributions was the City granting land to Immigrant, Settlement Services (ISS) of BC for a new facility, charging them \$1 per year for 60 years (Vancouver city official, 2019). Another such contribution was providing MOSAIC permission to use a new city facility for free (Vancouver city official, 2019).

2.5 Conclusion

To reiterate, the overarching purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview and analysis of the positions, policies, and roles of the governments of the three largest cities in Canada (i.e., Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver) in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers between 2017 and 2019. To reiterate, the overview and analysis were guided by two central questions: What were the positions, policies and roles of the three cities vis-à-vis asylum seekers, and what were the determinants of the same? Did the three cities make a substantial contribution to the reception and settlement of the asylum seekers, and what were the determinants of the same? The objective in this concluding section is to provide a summary of the general findings related to those two questions and some observations regarding what lessons can be drawn from the positions, policies and roles of these three cities by other cities within and beyond Canada.

The significant finding related to the first question is that the three city governments adopted relatively progressive and proactive positions, policies and roles vis-à-vis the reception and settlement of asylum seekers arriving from various countries, including the USA, between 2017 and 2019. Collectively the cities' positions, policies, and roles were designed to define the "municipal citizenship" of asylum seekers. More specifically, they were designed to protect their civil rights, provide them with access to reception and settlement services as well as various other municipal and community services without either encumbrances or fear. In this respect, the three cities opted to become what might be termed relatively generous, progressive and proactive sanctuary cities. Their decisions to do so were driven by a combination of factors. The most significant factors were the following: the moral and legal imperatives regarding the humane treatment of asylum seekers by all orders of government, including city governments; the imperatives created by the federal and to a lesser extent their respective provincial governments to contribute in the receptions and settlement of asylum seekers; their policy interests and imperatives to ensure that asylum seekers became positive and productive, rather than problematical members of their respective communities and economies; and their political interests in being responsive to the demands and pressures from many, though by no means all, members of their communities to be generous in receiving and assisting asylum seekers. None of the preceding is to suggest that city governments were readily or completely and unconditionally progressive and proactive. As this chapter has demonstrated, one of the significant conditions attached to their contributions to the reception and

settlement of asylum seekers was that the federal and provincial governments provided a substantial portion of the financial resources required for that purpose.

Two significant findings are related to the second question regarding the importance of the positions, policies and roles of the three cities in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers from the United States between 2017 and 2019. The first finding is that the three cities made a significant constructive contribution to the reception and settlement of those asylum seekers. However, it is difficult to say with a high degree of accuracy or confidence how significant their contribution was. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that without their direct and indirect contributions, the capacity of other orders of government and their respective communities in meeting the reception and settlement needs of asylum seekers would have been compromised substantially. This is not to suggest that each of them could not have made an even more significant constructive contribution, but that value of their contribution should not be minimized or dismissed.

The other significant finding related to the second question is that the ability of the three cities to make a significant contribution resulted from their political will and their substantial organizational capacity to do so. In the case of political will, the majority of their elected city officials were favourably predisposed to contribute to the reception and settlement of asylum seekers despite any criticism or opposition they faced from other elected officials or their residents who opposed the influx of large numbers of any categories of newcomers, but particularly asylum seekers and refugees, into their communities. In the case of organizational capacity, all three cities were relatively well equipped. Their respective organizational capacity was based on three interrelated elements: a complex set of progressive and proactive policy frameworks, an extensive and robust set of organizational networks and partnerships both within and beyond their respective city halls, and a substantial amount of human and financial organizational resources. Whereas the policy frameworks and organizational networks components of their capacity had been developed over time in response to successive waves of various categories of newcomers, including refugees and asylum seekers, the human and financial resources were available because of their relatively robust tax base and the transfer of some financial resources from the federal government and, to a lesser extent, from their respective provincial governments.

At least three important related lessons can be drawn from the positions, policies, and roles of these three Canadian cities regarding the reception and settlement of asylum seekers by other cities within and beyond Canada. First, the positions, policies and roles of cities can be significant for efficiency and effectiveness in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers. Second, cities can develop important policies, and perform very important roles related to the reception and settlement of asylum seekers either on their own or in partnership with other governmental and non-governmental actors. Third, within the Canadian federal system, the positions, policies and roles of cities in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers emerge in a complex vertical and horizontal multi-level context. Consequently, a major challenge for cities is to navigate that complexity in dealing with the multiplicity of gov-

ernmental and non-governmental stakeholders and the multiplicity of interests and values in dealing with the reception and settlement of asylum seekers and other categories of migrants.

For those interested in lesson-drawing from the positions, policies and roles of Canada's three largest cities, two important interrelated caveats are in order. First, not all cities are the same. Invariably, they differ geographically, socially, economically, financially, and politically. This is true not only of cities in different countries, or in different provinces or states within any country, but also within each province or state. Second, not all cities receive precisely the same number and types of asylum seekers. Invariably they differ in terms of, among other things, the total number that arrive, the volume and pace of their arrival, their places of origin. They also differ in terms of their racial and ethnic profiles, culture, religion, language, education and skills, and physical and mental health. Consequently, as cities become involved in the reception and settlement of asylum seekers, they must adopt policies, plans, strategies and initiatives that are appropriate in facilitating the reception and settlement of asylum seekers and other categories of migrants in light the political-economies of their respective communities, and the volume, composition, and demographic profiles of the migrant flows into their communities.

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How Activist Organizations and Media Responded

3 The Case of the Bavarian Refugee Council: Supporting Volunteers, Criticizing Politics

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Abstract

In summer 2015, the arrival of thousands of refugees via the Balkan Route led to an exceptional situation in Germany. Subsequently, duties such as registration, reception, decentral accommodation and asylum procedures presented significant challenges for the authorities on all levels. The chapter describes this process from the perspective of one NGO, the Bavarian Refugee Council. The efforts of government to contain the situation led to different, partly contradicting practices. Addressing topics such as refugee integration, refugees as security threat, and the discourse and practice of deportation, the contribution shows that the heated debates did not always lead to rationale policies, but rather to a policy development process the appropriateness and sustainability of which can be questioned.

Keywords: Bavarian Refugee Council; Volunteers; NGO

3.1 Introduction

Since 2015, the treatment of asylum seekers in Germany has changed radically. When in summer 2015, thousands of refugees arrived in Bavaria, there was an overwhelming desire to support these newly arrived. Today, this positive sentiment has declined, and authorities and bureaucracies that govern the fate of refugees are driven less by welcoming sentiments and integration efforts. Instead, excess of bureaucratic demands, exclusion in special “anchor”-centres and an orientation towards deportation mark the situation of many refugees in Bavaria, and in Germany more broadly. What follows is a short description of this turn in asylum policy and in the treatment of refugees, written from the perspective of the Bavarian Refugee Council, an umbrella organization consisting of many human rights advocates, refugee support groups and volunteers in Bavaria.

3.2 The Situation in 2015: First Reactions and Crisis Management

3.2.1 Refugees Welcome!

The arrival of thousands of refugees at the Bavarian border crossings (on some weekends in August 2015 totaling more than 10,000) at Munich central station presented a serious challenge for all authorities involved. The administration at all levels of government was not well prepared to deal with the many tasks involved in supporting refugees – such as guiding them to newly established arrival centres, relocating them to other distribution centres in Germany, examining their health situation, identifying especially vulnerable persons among them, and the responsibility for feeding thousands of persons – and they quickly reached the limits of its capacity.

Driven by a feeling of concern and curiosity, many people went to the places and routes where refugees were arriving, and an overwhelming attitude and proclivity to help emerged. These volunteers organized themselves, mostly via Facebook and other social media platforms, established links with the authorities and media, facilitated the provision of basic needs and services – doctors, translators, food, clothes – and provided assistance to accompany newly arrived refugees to ad hoc established camps, and offering information and support. They organized 24 hours shifts to canalize and organize the supporters. In all, more than 6,000 persons in Munich alone contributed to supporting refugees in the first couple of weeks. Many sacrificed their holidays and free time. In some cases, companies offered free days and flexible work shifts for employees to make sure they could attend their shifts. The municipality of Munich parked two buses in front of the Central Station which served as a command and organization point for volunteers. Doctors and medical staff set up a volunteer medical screening and first aid system, which, after some months, was financed by the government and transformed into a regular service. It was only with this volunteer support system, which emerged in the main places of arrival of refugees, that the government, administration and police could handle the situation with respect and a minimum of dignity to the newly arrived persons, children and

families. The sentiment of this welcoming attitude was closely linked to Chancellor Angela Merkel, who refused to close the borders and was paramount in assisting the other EU member states from which many of the refugees were transiting. More than 1.1 million refugees arrived in Germany in 2015, while about 300,000 just passed through Germany on their way to other EU states to the west and the north. (BAMF, 2016, p. 10; Die WELT, 2016)

3.2.2 The EASY Gap in the Registration of Refugees

The main focus of the authorities was on registration. A first registration usually took place when refugees were apprehended after crossing the border. This registration was carried out by the Federal Police, which is responsible for border controls. The standard procedure of registration included fingerprinting, taking digital photographs, searching the clothes and belongings (cell phones) and questioning. After being transferred to refugee reception centres, refugees were then registered once more by the regional government. This registration is based on a computer system called EASY (Erstaufnahme Asyl/First Reception Asylum) and is the basis for distribution to different Länder. In summer 2015, EASY was accessible only Monday to Friday, from 9 am to 5 pm. In order to prevent bottlenecks in registration over the weekend, hours of operation were extended first to Saturday and later Sunday. Eventually, the system was made accessible on a 24-hour basis. Delays, or double and triple registrations, and other problems sometimes blocked the administration of registering refugees.

When refugees first encounter the first authority, their passports and ID cards are confiscated. These are sent to the BAMF (Federal office for Migration and Refugees) branch responsible for the asylum claim, or the foreigner's office in the district where the refugee is accommodated. In 2015 and 2016, this process did not work effectively, and thousands of passports were stored at different offices while awaiting pickup by the foreigner's office that was responsible for locating their owners. Being registered in the EASY system does not mean that an asylum claim is officially filed. The BAMF invites every refugee to be registered in one of the offices. The gap between 1.1 million registered refugees (EASY database) and 476,000 registered asylum claims at the end of 2015 indicates that the BAMF, which is also responsible for the hearings and adjudicating asylum claims, was heavily under pressure (Bundesamt, 2016). Asylum seekers had to wait for months to file their asylum requests, and they often waited many more months or even years to be invited for the interview and for a decision to be made (Thränhard & Weiss, 2017).

The administrative shortcomings in the registration process and the challenge of establishing the identity of refugees led to ongoing public debate. Stepwise, it became clear that bureaucratic orders and a growing proclivity in attitudes toward shirking responsibility contributed to the authorities lacking the capacity to adequately deal with the situation. Clarifying one's identity today is one of the most crucial duties of a refugee, as it can determine the conditions of their deportability and also provide access to labour and integration pathways.

3.2.3 Acceleration and Prioritisation

The huge delay in asylum determination procedures was the object of many debates. Subsequently, several law-packages were prepared to “accelerate” procedures. Refugees were divided into different groups. Members of Group one, consisting of people from the so-called “Top 5” countries of origin (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea and Somalia), were prioritized and received an early hearing date. Some, mostly those from Syria, were offered an accelerated written procedure without a personal hearing. Persons from so-called “safe countries of origin,” which consists mostly of non-EU Balkan states, along with Senegal and Ghana, also received an accelerated hearing and procedure. Asylum claims from other countries, for example, Afghanistan, which had fairly good recognition rates, had to wait longer to be processed. The differentiation of refugee groups was driven even further. “Top 5” refugees received access to integration classes (mostly German language classes) and assistance to integrate into the labour market. While refugees from “safe third countries” were banned from working or participating in vocational training and, in Bavaria, were segregated to specific camps. They faced an accelerated procedure and pressure to leave the country, or finally deportation.

This differentiation was meant to serve different goals: the logic was that persons with good chances for recognition should be offered integration pathways as soon as possible, as long, passive waiting periods can impede motivation and contribute to disintegration rather than integration. Different programs to assess qualifications and work experiences should assist a fast integration into language classes, vocational training and the labour market. The claims of individuals from “safe countries of origin”, however, are subjected to quite different reasoning. Integration is not in the state’s interest. For refugees from the Balkans, specific measures were taken to discourage the formation of friendships with the local population; restrictions on work blocked opportunities to integrate; and, instead of applying the Dublin procedure, the determination procedure for refugees from the Balkans are fast-tracked to direct deportation to their home countries. Rejected refugees from countries where readmission does not work (for example some African countries, Iran and Pakistan) are allowed to stay in Germany but are blocked from any integration possibilities. This is true for instance for about 3,000 Senegalese refugees in Bavaria alone.

3.2.4 Distribution

The mass arrival of refugees in Germany during the summer and autumn of 2015 required accelerated measures. Arrival centres, often barracks but also tent-cities, were set up for registration and the short time accommodation for refugees. From these centres, refugees were distributed to other central distribution centres further north in Germany and then transferred to initial reception centres. Here, refugees would normally be registered by the BAMF, and then after three months (although this period was quickly extended to six months), further distributed to districts and cities across Germany. The distribution between the Laender follows a fixed criterion called “Königsteiner Schlüssel” (Korntheuer, 2017; Wendel, 2014). The distribution

within the Laender also follows a fixed scheme, which obliges all counties and cities to prepare for the reception of a specified number of refugees. The accommodation of high numbers of refugees was a problem for many towns and districts. Furthermore, not all municipalities were eager and willing to accommodate refugees. Many shortcomings and problems resulted in bad reception conditions. Minimum standards for reception conditions, weak and incomplete as they were, were neglected or abolished. The concerted efforts to distribute and accommodate newly arrived refugees posed practical challenges, and also figured as a major force in the heated political arena in debates on whether to welcome refugees or close the borders.

A specific challenge for the reception and accommodation of refugees was the high number of unaccompanied minors (UM). When UM were first detected, they had to be taken in by the local youth welfare offices in these municipalities. This quickly led to a lack of reception capacities in some of the towns close to the border or major train stops, such as Munich, Rosenheim, or Passau, among others. Only after two months was a new regulation passed to allow the distribution of UM across Germany. Nonetheless, UM have to undergo a clearing procedure that establishes specific needs, finds possible relatives elsewhere in Europe, and requires age verification before transfer. As the reception and care for UM require much better conditions, and notably much better assistance, the arrival of some tens of thousands of UM posed a specific challenge.

Different debates arose around the question of the distribution of refugees across Germany. In German regulations and laws, refugees do not get to decide where to go, unless they are members of a core family who have the right to stay together. The distribution process thus not only neglects people's wishes and interests regarding a possible destination country in Europe but also hinders contact with other family members, friends or ethnic communities. Furthermore, this distribution along a fixed, established number for each municipality neglects that some municipalities were better prepared than others to take refugees in (e.g. in regions with stronger outmigration). Finally, the rigid distribution system may hinder integration, which is well known to be made easier in the presence of ethnic networks.

Refugees in the status determination procedure or after their case is rejected are not allowed to change their place of living without permission of the authorities. A new law on integration issued in 2016 prescribes that even recognized refugees have to stay at the place where they were distributed to, and permission to change this place is only granted when they have a concrete job offer or a place for studying at a university elsewhere.

3.3 Who pays? Managing the Cost of Refugee Arrivals

3.3.1 Models to Cover the Costs for Refugee Reception, Accommodation, and Integration

In Germany, complex systems of financing and refinancing the costs for refugee reception exist side by side. Generally speaking, the Laender are responsible for

reception. They cover the costs for first reception centres and refinance the accommodation costs of counties (Wendel, 2014). Here, different figures and calculations coexist. Some Laender offer total reimbursement (Hamburg, Berlin, Bavaria), others have different “flat” rates for reimbursement, mostly between 500 and 900 Euros per month per person. Repeatedly, the Laender asked the federal government for financial assistance and received it in the monthly amount of 670 Euro per refugee (Hummel & Thöne, 2016, p. 49).

Social allowances for asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers (paid by local municipalities) are reimbursed directly by the federal government. Furthermore, the federal government finances most language classes via the BAMF or the federal Labour Agency. Once asylum seekers are recognized as refugees, the total accommodation costs have to be covered by the municipalities, while social assistance is still paid for by the federal government. This puts pressure on municipalities as well as the federal government to enroll refugees as fast as possible into language classes and jobs.

This can also be seen as a model for reimbursement during the asylum procedure. Municipalities are more eager to assist asylum seekers to get into training and jobs when this means a reduction of the financial burden. In Laender where the state is reimbursing all costs, there is no incentive for local authorities to integrate asylum seekers into the labour market (in general, asylum seekers have access to the labour market after three months in Germany).

3.3.2 Social Assistance

The administration of social assistance also varies widely between the Laender. In general, social assistance and counselling services for asylum seekers are provided by charities and welfare organizations. Sometimes, associations, refugee councils or municipalities offer counselling and assistance. This is especially true for bigger cities, who usually have developed strong networks of counselling agencies and a plurality of actors in this field. The Laender governments often reimburse the costs for minimal social assistance (at least partly: in Bavaria the reimbursement rate is at 80 percent of the staff costs). Increasingly, private commercial organisations enter the field of organizing accommodation and offering counselling and services.

Staff-client ratios are officially set to be around 1:150 or 1:200, that is, one social worker for 150 refugees, but in reality, the key is often at 1:400, or 1:800. Even with a key of 1:150, in-depth counselling and case management is difficult. With higher rates of refugees per social worker, it is challenging to provide counselling at all. This is the reason why local volunteers and neighbourhood groups are crucial when it comes to counselling and providing assistance to refugees (Borkowski, 2016).

3.3.2 To the Limits: Decentral Accommodation

Volunteers played a key role in the municipalities, quarters, and villages to which refugees were distributed after their arrival. Here, both small and larger groups of

volunteers gathered and organized support. In Bavaria, in principle, the Bavarian state is responsible for receiving and accommodating refugees in larger collective centres. In 2015, due to the high numbers of newly arriving refugees, these centres were lacked the capacity to fulfill this task. Therefore, the state delegated the duty to accommodate newly arrived refugees to the municipalities.

The reaction to this redistribution of responsibilities at local levels varied considerably, as the contexts in municipalities were very different. Local populations, economic conditions, and the availability of housing or accommodations for refugees, for example, varied from one municipality to the other. Moreover, the willingness and capability of local authorities and the local sentiment towards refugee reception played a significant role. On one hand, the district of Lindau, with a local economy orientated around tourism and medium-sized industries, managed to provide private housing to the vast majority of newly arriving refugees; while on the other, the district chief of Landshut used the question of accommodation to oppose Chancellor Merkel's decision to keep the borders open, and relocated refugees by bus to Berlin (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 2016). The district of Landshut is among the wealthiest in Bavaria, profiting greatly from tax revenue generated by large companies, such as a BMW plant, among other related local industries. The success achieved in Lindau, by contrast, was closely associated with the district administration, which already had by 2014 called mayors and municipalities to engage in suitable refugee accommodation, arguing that proper housing and integration minimizes the risks and problems afterwards. The administration set up a task force assisting municipalities and solving problems emerging from renting rooms and houses for refugees. Though situations differ widely, a general conclusion can be drawn in the sense that willingness and competence of local administrations played a crucial role in how districts managed to accommodate refugees.

Here again, volunteers proved to be crucial, assisting and working side by side with churches and welfare organizations. They assisted refugees in all realms of daily life and for coping with everyday problems, explaining to them the local rules, bringing them to language classes (in many cases literally providing transportation through the many driving services), setting up courses by themselves if nothing was offered by other organizations, enrolling children into school and nurseries, contacting employers for training and jobs, interpreting between refugees and administration, and being available for all the manifold questions and problems that arose. This plethora of challenges was overburdening many of the small groups of volunteers, however. At many places, especially where the groups were too small, volunteers felt exhausted, and, one by one, stopped or reduced their engagement, leaving an even heavier workload to carry for those remaining. Churches, welfare organizations and many district administrations tried to work against this trend, installing guides and assistants to support volunteers. Seminars were held to improve the knowledge of volunteers and to strengthen resilience. Just as important were the effects of self-organisation. Volunteers realized that they had to create networks with others, so they organized regional meetings and started to build up their structures. This was not only an effort to improve their individual capacities to assist refugees but also

a reaction against an increasingly hostile administration. Volunteers continued to struggle to provide effective and efficient integration supports to all refugees accommodated locally.

The decentralized accommodation system was strengthened through a law that prescribes that refugees have to stay in the place to which they were sent, even after the recognition of their asylum claim. The restrictions on mobility which accompany this obligation were criticized by the Refugee Council, together with many other organizations. Nonetheless, we have to concede that this decentral accommodation in many cases had several positive effects. A high number of German locals got involved in integration efforts, made friends with refugees, and, when this was not the case, at least learned to tolerate them. The refugees, on the other hand, had to deal with these locals, needed German to communicate with them and did not have the chance to easily connect to communities in larger centres. Both sides underwent a process of learning to accept each other. Against these rather positive outcomes, many examples showed the negative sides of decentral accommodation of refugees. Often, refugees were relocated to areas far from the town or village, in semi-industrial areas without neighbours or to remote places without public transport. Taking language classes or connecting to locals under these circumstances is almost impossible.

3.3.3 Integration: Not a Sprint, But a Marathon

One of the most debated questions, especially during the winter of 2015 and early 2016, addressed how to integrate the high numbers of arriving refugees successfully into society. Developing German language skills and integration into the labour market was seen as crucial. Opinions differed broadly in estimating the skills refugees already acquired in their home countries or during stays in transit countries; regardless, it was clear that many refugees would have to undergo years of training until they could successfully take part in economic life. This was also due to the conviction of most political and economic leaders that it makes no use to insert unskilled persons into the labour market, but rather to offer training and thus close the widening gap of skilled labour force in Germany. A broad array of tools was developed to measure and improve skills, and smartphone apps designed for almost all aspects of social and professional integration flooded the market.

Due to the lower education levels of many refugees, experts calculated that it should take about five years for an average refugee to be fit for entering skilled labour jobs (Thränhardt, 2015). Social integration, however, should be achieved faster. Here again, volunteers play a crucial role in informing refugees about the rules, formal and informal, and customs in German society. From the point of view of the authorities, it is the utmost importance that behaviour and conduct should follow social rules norms, and this thus resulted in the creation of a variety of list and guidelines published by small municipalities or introduced by the federal government, for integration classes, and for how refugees should behave.

3.4 From Refugees Welcome to the Security Threat. The Changing Opinion and Political Reaction Towards Refugees

3.4.1 Constructing Refugees as a Security Threat

The demonstrated need for integration is also due to the changing attitude towards asylum seekers. The New Year's eve celebrations of 2015 marked a turn in public opinion towards refugees. In Cologne, some groups of young migrants, most of them from Maghreb countries, sexually harassed women during the festivities between Cologne central station and the dome. Police and federal border police were not able to stop it. The incidents and the passive role of the police forces forced a debate on the issue that Germany is overwhelmed by the problems created by refugees – that the government is not able to keep order. Additionally, terrorist attacks in France and Germany stoked the fear that among the vast number of refugees were terrorists of AL Qaida and the Islamic State, who could have entered unrecognized, thus posing a threat to national security. Although the government had adopted a very restrictive position towards refugees and had issued a number of laws in this sense, the emergence of this issue in public debate created enormous pressure on the politicians responsible, lead by Angela Merkel. The chancellor was blamed for her decision to keep the borders open in summer 2015, and was therefore responsible for all the refugees in Germany. Popular newspapers, in first instance the BILD and WELT, both owned by the Springer Group, demanded hard measures, and blamed the government for having lost control over the “refugee problem.” This debate had a strong influence not only on the public's attitudes towards refugees but on the whole political landscape in general. The Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD), a party initially based on an EU-critical position, shifted to the right, stoking anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant opinions, which were further exacerbated by the PEGIDA movement (Patriotic movement against the Islamisation of the Occident). Both the AfD and PEGIDA extensively used Facebook and Youtube to spread their messages, often pushing the limits of what is considered/recognized as hate speech and racism. During a number of elections, the AfD increased their strength and posed a threat to the so-called “established” parties. Thus, the political landscape experienced a turn to the right marked by nationalist and anti-Muslim positions similar to the Scandinavian countries, though still not comparable to the situation in Central European countries (e.g. Poland or Hungary). It is mostly this debate that led to a shift from the problem of integrating refugees to the quest for “deporting” them (Meier-Braun, 2018).

3.4.2 Centralised Camps and the Quest for Deportation

Bavaria has been the federal state most eager to accelerate deportation, evidenced by the announcement that only people with protection have the right to stay and all others have to leave. In the past, these popular announcements already have been misleading. Many of those without a protection status stay years and many obtain a legal residence status. In years before 2015, statutory regulations were introduced

to assist the legalization of thousands of refugees. It was only in 2014 that the labour ban for asylum seekers during procedure and rejected asylum seekers has been lowered to three months after arrival. Vocational training and work were then declared legitimate ways to obtain legal status, even and especially when the asylum claim was rejected. This has changed fundamentally since. In Bavaria, asylum seekers coming from the Balkans (figures were sharply rising already in 2014), were sent to two specific Arrival and Removal Centres (Ankunfts- und Rückführungseinrichtungen) set up at Manching and Bamberg in September 2015, each of which had about 1,500 places. There, inmates faced an accelerated procedure by the BAMF and, after an adverse decision, faced immediate deportation or were asked to leave “voluntarily”. To assist voluntary return, the federal law was changed in January 2016 so that a legal option to return as a labour migrant was introduced (Flüchtlingsrat Niedersachsen, 2016). Those who secure a contract from a German employer before they leave, can apply for a labour visa to return to Germany again. Both measures, deportation and incentives to return, proved to be effective and increased the total number of returnees. This is at the core of the difficulties arising from a public discourse focusing on deportation in the coming years. Most of the Balkan refugees returned as early as 2015 and 2016. Deportation to the Balkan countries proved to be quite easy, as all these states are eager to establish close relations to the EU. Accepting returned migrants from Germany thus was a way to get Germany’s support regarding a future way into the European Union.

Returns to other countries of origin proved to be much more difficult, if not impossible. Most countries of origin demand a passport to prove that the person in question is a national while simultaneously creating barriers to obtain such documentation. During the past decades, many governments of the origin countries of asylum seekers realized that migrants abroad assist the national economy, through remittances and direct investments. Thus, the motivation to take back these emigrants is mostly low. This made it difficult for Germany continue to increase its deportation numbers, once most Balkan refugees had left the country. On the contrary, the figures stagnated or even fell. While chancellor Merkel appealed for a “national exertion for deportation”, the BILD could criticize the government for stagnating deportation rates even two years later (Bild, 2019).

Based on the “good” experiences with the arrival and return facilities, Bavaria extended the model of big camps. In a first step, additional camps were opened and the name changed from arrival and return facilities to Transit-Camps. The idea was that accelerated procedures should facilitate more efficient adjudication processes leading to the quick deportation of those whose claims were rejected. However, acceleration was severe. All persons whose asylum claim was rejected by the BAMF could file a case at the administrative court. It was not long until the courts were heavily overstrained leading to court decisions that lasted for a year or even longer. When the 2017 federal elections resulted again in a “big” coalition between the Union parties and the Social Democrats, they created a coalition treaty that contains a paragraph about the so-called AnKER Centres, based mainly on the Bavarian model of transit camps. Designed for a reduction of bureaucracy and accelerated proce-

dure, the promoted ideal was that only recognized asylum seekers should leave the centres, while others should face deportation (or “voluntary repatriation”) directly from the centres. (Hess et al., 2018).

This proved to be unfeasible. Many inhabitants of the AnKER Centres stay for a year or longer in these camps, suffering broadly from hostile conditions, a severe lack of information and counselling, exclusion from social life outside the camps, and the constant threat of deportation. Because repatriation to countries of origin proved to be a difficult task for the authorities, the aim shifted to deport persons according to the Dublin III regulation to other EU member states who are responsible for the asylum procedure. In many cases, responsibility was to remain with Italy, from where a majority of refugees came to Germany, driven by adverse (or non-existent) reception conditions and an increasingly hostile atmosphere created by Matteo Salvini's LEGA party. Salvini, however, was not willing to take back many refugees. Therefore, attempts to deport persons often failed, and created fear and stress among refugees, who developed strategies to avoid arrest. In response, massive raids were conducted by the police forces, further degrading the situation inside the camps.

3.4.3 Most Welcomed Craftsmen Deported? Contradicting Aims in Refugee Policy

As early as 2011, the Bavarian State started specific language training classes at professional schools. These were designed on the one hand for EU nationals who wanted to work in Germany but lacked language skills, and on the other. For younger refugees who could be introduced into professions at an early stage. At the time Bavaria was facing a lack of skilled workers, and this program was designed to prepare refugees to start vocational training as a first step towards beginning a professional career. The program was perceived to be very beneficial by economic institutions and was also the driving force behind the “3-plus-2 rule”, a new regulation introduced into law in 2016. Under this rule, refugees entering vocational training should be safe from deportation for the entire period of training (usually three years). After having finished the training successfully, they would be eligible for a residence permit for an additional two years, which was also renewable. Thus, this law facilitates a pathway to a stable legal stay for those who would otherwise face deportation (Sachverständigenrat, 2019).

The implementation of this rule contradicted the interest of authorities to deport all rejected asylum seekers. The Bavarian chambers for industries and commerce and the chambers for crafts protested against authorities in Bavaria, who made a concerted efforts to avoid applying it. A struggle persisted through countless single cases about the effectiveness of deportation versus employment or vocational training, and what the strategy should be. Finally, the CSU-led ministry of interior decided that those persons who were able to start vocational training or had already started a job should get a chance to stay. Both, employment and vocational training requires the permission of the local or district foreigners authority, and so many cases were

documented and sent to the ministry of interior, to the commission for hardship cases or to the committee for petitions of the Bavarian Parliament. A gap between the goals of fast deportation and the integration into the labour market opened, which reflected the ongoing struggle between more liberal forces and conservative and right-wing interests. Both sides of the political spectrum justify their own perspective: the liberals hold the view that despite many efforts, most refugees cannot be deported smoothly, and stay in Germany for many years anyway. Therefore, letting refugees stay while banning them from working in the formal labour market and integrating makes little sense. Conservative politicians, on the other hand usually hold the view that the integration of rejected asylum seekers increases pull effects of migration. They defend the argument that only those granted asylum should also get the right to stay. This conclusion is convincing on a formal level but does not hold in practice, as deportation often is a lengthy procedure and often unsuccessful.

3.5 Conclusion: The Refugee “Crisis” According to the Bavarian Refugee Council

The perspective of a human rights organization such as that of the Refugee Council is special. Freedom and liberty (of movement, residence, access to work etc.) are crucial and often stand against public opinion or the more or less successful attempts of governments to steer immigration through measures which include force, and sometimes violence. Furthermore, the Refugee Council is asked for help by many volunteers as well as professionals when things go wrong. This implies a rather critical and problem-oriented view on the situation, which does not always underline the overall success in integration of an unprecedented high number of refugees.

Thus, the reception and integration of an estimated million refugees during the last several years has to be viewed as a great success. Nonetheless, the past years showed to us that what was called the “refugee crisis” was in fact a crisis of bureaucracy: its root causes were tied to a failure of plausible estimations and, often enough, the lack of willingness to handle the arising problems in a pragmatic manner. Similar to many other European countries, Germany faced a rise in anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant opinions, not only represented by the growing AfD and right-wing extremism but also mirrored by positions of the German “Volksparteien”, the Social Democrats and the Union parties CDU and CSU. The double challenge to manage the reception, asylum procedure and integration and to fulfill what potential voters expect from the government led to a high number (more than 25, not including a new wave of more than ten laws currently in discussion) of sometimes more than questionable laws. As described above, the attempts to match the interests of different actors resulted in a disputed political practice. On the one hand the government favours exclusion in specific big camps and deportation; on the other hand, it assists successful integration.

The Bavarian CSU is a good example of the many turns and contradictions in politics. Known as a traditional hardliner party, it always pursued a strict law and order

position towards refugees. Capitalizing on growing anti-immigrant tendencies, the CSU took a hardline stance in its campaign in the 2018 election, drawing on harsh discursive framings of the refugee situation (e.g. the now Prime minister Markus Söder spread the term “Asylum-Tourism”). Many volunteers, who are by no means necessarily associated with the liberal or leftist side, but rather are often voters or members of the CSU, came out to criticize the party and its leaders. Some left the CSU while some churches and charities also established a critical distance to their policy direction. Polls showed that the CSU’s policies did not increase the pool of potential voters. Some months before the election, the party changed its position taking a more liberal and modest attitude but in doing so lost some credibility with its base. Shortly before the election, a protest against hate speech (with a banner showcasing three CSU politicians) inspired 40,000 demonstrators to take to the streets of Munich. The CSU lost more than ten percent of its voters and was forced into a coalition with the traditional, but also in some points more liberal leaning Freie Wähler. While the Social Democrats lost many votes the Green Party, which also stands for a liberal refugee and immigration policy, gained remarkably.

Thus, the refugee crisis influenced the German political landscape, shifting priorities, bringing deficits to the fore (such as the lack of housing in larger cities), and polarizing the population between a more open (global, multicultural) future versus a more nationalist and closed society. Although the situation regarding the reception of refugees is no longer considered a “crisis”, the perception of “crisis” persists.

In many ways this development is mirroring the early nineties when refugees from the Balkans arrived to Germany. Then, there was also a strong sense of the need to help in the early moments, which was followed by a hard debate on how to address the issue and the subsequent passing of very restrictive laws. One remarkable difference, however, is that the political debates stopped after the introduction of several strict laws (in particular after changes were made in the asylum paragraph in the German constitution). Today, this is not the case. The debate is no longer confined to or controlled by traditional political actors; the growing significance of social media has contributed to a political situation in which there is growing strength at both margins, the AfD and the Greens. The excessive lawmaking, which is at least partly a way to demonstrate that the government has (or regains) control over the situation, has not brought considerable effect to calm the political debate.

Similar in effect to the nineties is the growing illegalization of many refugees. Facing increased pressure, segregation in unwelcoming camps and exclusion through labour bans, many refugees attempt to escape this dire situation by joining the more prominent communities in the cities or by leaving for other EU member states. Here, one of the severe shortcomings of the past years becomes visible: the general lack of cooperation and common policies among EU member states. The “refugee crisis” did not strengthen a common search for solutions, rather, it increased nationalist thinking. Therefore, the challenges for the Refugee Council lie not only in strengthening integration and encouraging a refugee-friendly attitude in Bavaria and in the rest of Germany, but also increasingly in finding solutions for refugees in other EU countries.

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4 Looking Beyond the Canadian-German Context. Building European – MENAT Networks through the Act. Now Organization

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Act.Now

Abstract

Act.Now is an organization that was founded as a spontaneous response to the flight movements from war-torn civil Syria towards Europe in 2015/16 and the lack of coordination between the affected regions. The initiators shared the conviction that municipalities and other local stakeholders along the flight routes needed to connect, exchange experiences and find standard solutions to the challenges resulting from the flight movements. For that purpose they organized the first International Mayors' Conference NOW in Vienna in January 2016. Since then, five more Mayors' Conferences have taken place, and other formats, such as working groups, round tables and field exposures to cities across Europe and the MENAT region (Middle East, North Africa, Turkey) have brought together diverse groups of experts and stakeholders. Repeated meetings, as well as shared experiences and goals, have created a sense of community among the participants. Over that time, Act.Now and has consolidated into a more formalized NGO and the thematic focus shifted to increasing social cohesion on the municipal level with a particular emphasis on empowering children and youth.

Keywords: Networks; Social Cohesion; Conferences

4.1 Introduction

Act.Now is an organization that developed from a private ad-hoc initiative in response to the large flight movements from civil war-torn Syria towards Europe in 2015/16. Its inception was a spontaneous response to the challenges related to the sudden increase in refugees fleeing from Syria to the neighbouring countries or trying to make their way to Europe in summer of 2015 and the lack of an appropriately coordinated political response. Since then, Act.Now has gradually formalized into an NGO with more traditional structures, characterized by long-term goals and a shift in the thematic focus of its work. In the earlier stage of development, the key activities of Act.Now were organizing international conferences with a diverse group of participants from Europe and the MENAT region (Middle East, North Africa, Turkey), with a particular focus on giving a voice to mayors and other decision-makers on the municipal level. Over time, the organization developed additional activities, including the set-up of the thematic NOW Working Groups on the topics of Education and Diversity, Exploitation and Human Trafficking, Gender Equality, Trauma Surviving and Children's Rights; as well as the NOW Mayors' Network and a diverse range of other projects. "Connecting the Dots" is the motto of Act.Now's activities, which capture its central aims of connecting people, creating networks and bringing together the knowledge and experiences from a diverse set of actors and locations to foster better decision-making and innovative solutions.

Since 2015, the thematic focus of Act.Now's activities have developed from being primarily determined by the most manifest and immediate challenges along the flight route to a more localized focus on social cohesion at the municipal level with particular attention given to the participation and empowerment of children and youth.

This chapter summarises the development of the Act.Now's activities and emerging thematic focus and presents reflections on what the organization has learned by working with the diverse groups and networks it has brought together. These are primarily drawn from intensive reflections by the team and the founders of Act.Now, as well as feedback by members of its network on the shared experiences. These learnings might be of interest to other networks and organizations with a diverse membership.

4.2 Ad-hoc Initiative: Bringing Together Key Stakeholders on a Common Challenge

4.2.1 Conferences

In January 2016, the first International Mayors Conference NOW was organized in Vienna.

The idea to hold the event emerged from numerous informal conversations among a group of friends in Vienna, who – as concerned citizens – viewed the flight of millions of refugees to Europe and the political developments surrounding it as a

historical moment with a moral responsibility to take action. Patricia Kahane, André Heller and Elke Zuckermann, together with other like-minded allies and cooperation partners, founded Act.Now. The group saw an urgent need for a conversation between the different stakeholders along the flight route, and so organized the first NOW Conference. From the beginning, the initiators of the conference placed high importance on involving and giving a voice to all the relevant stakeholders. Experts from non-government organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs) and academia made up around two-thirds of the participants at the first NOW Conferences, while the rest of the participants were policymakers, in particular, mayors of small and medium-sized municipalities along the flight routes (around 20%) and refugees. Act.Now covered all costs for the participants, including travel and accommodation and assisted with visa applications to enable the participation of this wide range of stakeholders.

The motto of this first conference was "Listen – Ask – Learn – Answer" and the aim was to "create collective knowledge on the situation in all problem areas" (Act. Now, 2016, p. 3), to have a solution-focused exchange between the mayors, to hear first-hand accounts of everybody's situation and to support the participants in finding new strategies and solutions.

To achieve these aims, the conference was designed with a focus on co-creativity and striving to create equal footing between all conference participants. Efforts were made to ensure everybody felt supported and encouraged to contribute their experience, knowledge and especially promising practices (ibid., p. 4). The main formats were panel sessions, followed by World Café discussions, to avoid "classic presentations of prepared statements and short Q&As." (ibid., p. 4).

The hope was that people would connect and form friendships, acquaintances, partnerships and networks which could then enable people to react to new situations collectively and find common solutions to the challenges they faced (Act.Now, 2017a). Outside this conference, there was a perceived lack of platforms for such an exchange on equal terms, especially with this broad geographic scope and focus. Since 2015, six International NOW Conferences have taken place: Four in Vienna, one in Athens and one in Kampala, each with its thematic focus.

4.2.2 Geographic Scope

An essential element that sets Act.Now apart from other initiatives is the geographic scope that includes Europe and the MENAT (Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey) region, primarily those countries which are situated along the main flight routes, especially refugees fleeing from the civil war in Syria. Whether they are neighbouring countries, transit- or host-communities they face very different but inter-related situations. Bringing the relevant local actors from those regions together was a decision based on the conviction that sustainable solutions to the arising challenges can only be found if people work on them together. Table 4.1 shows the place of living of the participants (in total around 570) of the six NOW Conferences between 2016 and

2019. Among the high share of participants living in Austria were many with migration or refugee backgrounds.

Table 4.1 Place of living of the 570 Participants of the NOW Conferences (between 2016-2019)

Region	Share of participants
Austria	46%
Middle East	17%
Southern Europe	13%
Central Europe (without Austria)	6%
Africa	6%
Western Europa	5%
Southeastern Europe	4%
Northern Europe	2%
Other	1%

At the first conference in 2016, it became apparent that there were pronounced differences in the types of challenges that municipalities in different countries were facing. In neighbouring countries of Lebanon and Jordan, for example, the population numbers of some municipalities more than doubled with the arrival of Syrian refugees. The provision of the most basic infrastructures, such as water supply and waste management, were the most pressing challenges in these regions. The mayors from those regions demanded more support from the international community and at the same time stressed their own willingness to support the refugees (Act. Now, 2016, p. 5-9). Whereas the struggles reported from the municipalities in transit countries, such as Turkey, Greece and Italy, where most refugees did not initially intend to stay, were primarily related to the provision of basic needs for the high numbers of refugees and demanded the EU take up its responsibility. In destination countries, such as Austria and Germany, in which there was a much smaller number of refugees, the primary concerns of the municipalities were to support integration into their societies, and addressing the spread of right-wing populism and its strong anti-immigrant sentiments.

Despite significant differences in the context of migration and the particular situations and challenges corresponding to them, many participants stressed the need to collaborate across international borders, recognizing their interdependencies. A collective willingness to help and sincere concern for improving the fate of the refugees was evident.

4.3 Structural Development: Building Lasting Networks

4.3.1 Set-Up of the NOW Working Groups

From the beginning of Act.Now, there was a wish to create longer-lasting connections that extended beyond the organization of conferences. The idea to create thematic groups with the aim of enabling concrete collaboration between the experts participating at the conferences emerged out of the 3rd NOW Conference in 2017, which was “slightly more low-key, less of a demonstrative act than a working and networking convention” (Act.Now, 2017b, p. 5). Subsequently, several NOW Working Groups were formed to work on the topics of Education and Diversity, Exploitation and Human Trafficking, Trauma Surviving and Gender Equality (an additional NOW Working Group on Children’s Rights was set up in 2018). Each NOW Working Group was made up of a maximum 12 members, among which were committed participants of the NOW Conferences as well as additional experts, such as practitioners and professionals from the field and academics. The constitution of each group followed an interdisciplinary, intercultural and inclusive approach, ensuring the composition of its members represented the diverse set of stakeholders and practitioners from all levels and sectors within Act.Now’s geographical scope. Just as they prioritized at the conferences, the founders placed a strong emphasis on creating an atmosphere of mutual appreciation and empathy that would foster a fair exchange as a condition for fruitful collaboration.

The overall aim of the NOW Working Groups was to each pursue a simple project which benefits their respective target groups, as defined by each group. Within the general framework set by Act.Now, each NOW Working Group was given the freedom to define the specific goals of their projects, their substantive focus and the methods to achieve them. The only specified criteria were that they should be “effective, of high quality and empowering” (Act.Now, 2017c). Again, the organization and the cost of travel and accommodation were covered by Act.Now to enable a diverse composition of the groups.

Since their foundation, the NOW Working Groups have been meeting bi-annually, independent of the conference. Just over half of the meetings have been held in Vienna, with the others held in different cities, including Beirut, Amman, Athens, Belgrade and Zagreb. Most of the sessions had two main purposes: to develop the projects of the group and to get to know local initiatives and institutions in the respective field. The groups visited formal and informal educational institutions, community centres, NGOs, refugee camps, counselling centres as well as public institutions.

The projects developed by the working groups took a variety of different forms and are at different stages of realization. The NOW Working Group Trauma Surviving, directed at empowering young people with traumatic experiences to deal with their trauma, developed a booklet series helping them to understand the post-traumatic symptoms and motivate them to seek psycho-therapeutic help. The NOW Working Group Education and Diversity set its focus on “researching and/or implementing projects addressing the inclusion of “newly arrived students” (NAS) in countries of transit and refuge, with a focus on the special needs of refugee children and all other

deprived children” (Act.Now, 2017d). They work primarily through a video series introducing promising practices in this field from various geographical contexts.

The NOW Working Group Exploitation and Human Trafficking has organized a successful round table at the Austrian embassy in Belgrade between city representatives, local NGOs and other stakeholders to improve the collaboration and implementation of protective measures for victims of exploitation and human trafficking.

4.3.2 Mayors’ Network

In addition to the thematic working groups, the mayors, who had been an important group of returning participants since the first conference, formed a more stable group in 2017. Mayors and municipality representatives from more than 10 different countries of the EU, the Balkans as well as the MENAT region now form the NOW Mayors’ Network.

The aim is to be a platform for knowledge exchange and dialogue supporting the members to strengthen social cohesion in their communities, with the thematic frame being: “Changing the Narrative – The Power of Social Cohesion, Diversity, and Participation in our Cities” (Act.Now. 2018, p. 1). Act.Now organizes field trips to member municipalities for the Mayors’ Network, enabling the mayors to gain first-hand insights into the various contexts represented in the network. So far, the field trips have taken place in Chios (Greece), Hameln (Germany) and Vienna. Similar to the NOW Working Groups, the mayors visit institutions and projects that might serve as promising practices and provide new ideas for their work. In addition to these visits, Act.Now organizes workshops during the field trips. They cover topics related to social cohesion, participation or diversity and other topics important to the network members, such as good governance or funding of municipality projects (ibid. p. 3). Where needed, members of the NOW Working Groups, the broader network of Act.Now or external experts are brought in to share their expertise with the mayors.

The mayors come from very diverse geographical contexts (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey) and accordingly face different challenges. What connects them is the common aim to oppose rising populist narratives that deepen societal divisions. They all seek to advocate positive narratives and innovative ideas to strengthen social cohesion in diverse societies.

4.4 Thematic Development

The thematic focus of Act.Now developed in response to changing societal challenges. For the first years and during the first NOW Conferences, the focus was on the large flight movement and finding solutions to the challenges related to it. This focus has shifted as the sense of a state of emergency gradually vanished.

4.4.1 Refugee and Flight Focus

Several key challenges and related questions were addressed throughout the first conferences, some of which also became the focus areas of the working groups. They included (but were not limited to) the following topics and questions:

- *Integration.* Refugees and members of the host community share a common space. How can the integration and active participation of refugees in the host societies be facilitated?
- *Trauma Surviving.* Having experienced forms of violence and war, many refugees suffer from a range of post-traumatic symptoms. How can refugees receive the psychosocial support they need?
- *Education.* Refugee children needed to be integrated into the school systems of the host communities. How can schools address language barriers, build on the existing knowledge of refugee children and create inclusive environments?
- *Gender roles.* The gender roles of refugees and host communities tend to differ. Which gender-sensitive policies are needed in this context, and how can gender-specific vulnerabilities be addressed?
- *Empowerment and participation.* For successful integration, the individuality of refugees needs to be recognized. How can host societies take into account their different needs and potentials?
- *Exploitation and Human Trafficking.* Refugees are particularly vulnerable to being exploited mainly due to a lack of safe flight routes. How can stakeholders cooperate better to protect vulnerable groups from being trafficked or otherwise exploited?

The thematic focus of several of the NOW Conferences were direct responses to specific contemporary developments and events. For example, the focus of the 2nd International Mayor's Conference NOW in Athens addressed the EU-Turkey-Agreement and the effects and consequences of its implementation for local communities—in particular in Turkey and on the Greek Islands. The thematic topic of the third conference focused on “Children under the Radar,” the idea for which emerged during the conference in Athens after Europol published reports that 10.000 refugee children and youth in Europe were unaccounted for (Townsend, 2016).

4.4.2 Social Cohesion

As the sense of an immediate emergency subsided, the thematic focus of Act.Now gradually shifted to a more deliberative and long-term approach. On one hand, the approach was broadened to address social cohesion more generally. On the other, it narrowed to a concerted focus primarily on children and youth.

The broadened focus on social cohesion responds to increasing societal divisions which were particularly visible in the political reactions to the flight movements, but that also exist between a variety of fault-lines in today's heterogeneous societies. The Bertelsmann Stiftung defines socially cohesive societies as being “characterized by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness of its members with the community and a pronounced orientation towards the common good” (Arant

et al., 2016, p. 20). Act.Now aims to strengthen social cohesion on the local level by finding and supporting strategies to overcome societal divisions and to approach diversity in a positive and productive manner. Improving social cohesion includes, but is not limited to integrating refugees into the host societies. The acceptance of diversity, for all members of the community, as well as attitudes and practices of solidarity towards others are essential to achieving social cohesion. Initiatives fostering social cohesion tend to also have a positive impact on a welcoming culture towards refugees (Arant et al., 2016, p. 10).

Furthermore, refugees are far from the only group that tends to face exclusion and others can benefit from similar measures and approaches. Already the 3rd NOW Conference, which focused primarily on the struggles of refugee children, addressed the need for support of other “disadvantaged children and youth in the receiving countries” (Act.Now, 2017b, p. 3). This thematic shift mirrored changes taking place in the main activities of some of Act.Now’s network partners. Very few of the mayors in the NOW Mayors network still see the integration of refugees in particular as their most significant challenge. It remains an important topic but, for most of them, other challenges have become more pressing.

Act.Now focuses on children and youth as they are seen as a key to sustainable improvements of social cohesion. This is in line with empirical studies which identify a high share of young people and low rates of youth unemployment as factors which have a positive impact on social cohesion (Arant et al., 2017, p.17) and education as one of the critical approaches in supporting it (Arant et al., 2016, p. 11).

Social cohesion is primarily created at the local level, and education, as well as interpersonal communication between different members of societies and lively neighbourhoods with opportunities for exchange, are key to achieving it (Arant et al., 2016, p. 11). Therefore, the cooperation with stakeholders on the local level, in particular mayors and other representatives from municipalities, is essential. The NOW Mayors’ Network is Act.Now’s main platform for this purpose.

The NOW Working Groups formed at a time where the organization still focused primarily on refugees, which is manifested both in their thematic focus and in the composition of their membership, with a large share of people whose work is also focused on refugee issues. Nonetheless, most of their goals are directly or indirectly connected to improving social cohesion and ensuring that their projects are beneficial to both refugees and host communities, which was a concern for most of them from the beginning.

In January 2019, the 6th NOW Conference focused on youth participation as an essential means for social cohesion. Ensuring young people from all backgrounds have a role in shaping society is essential for sustainable social cohesion, as it allows them to practice and experience decision-making in diverse contexts and take part in shaping their future (Act.Now, 2019). Following this idea, almost one-third of the participants of this conference were young people below the age of 25 of diverse social and geographical backgrounds.

4.5 Observations and Learnings

Several observations and lessons can be drawn from the experiences during the activities of Act.Now. These are primarily related to building networks and working in diverse groups.

Generally, it can be observed that consistency, that is, having regular meetings with the same people, revolving around similar topics as well as sharing the experiences of the conferences and the field exposures, has – as reported by many of the participants – created a sense of community. In particular, the working groups have grown together in varying degrees. This is supported by a strong sense of a common purpose and the implementation of common projects. Apart from the activities organized by Act.Now, many interpersonal connections and collaborations were established as a result of working collaboratively and getting to know each other in this context. For instance, several members of the NOW Working Group on Education and Diversity have collaborated on publications, invited each other for conferences or as guest lecturers at their institutions. Also, numerous conference participants have reported having stayed in contact and collaborated with other participants after meeting them at the conferences. Information will be collected more systematically in the future to evaluate the outcomes related to this type of networking stemming from the conferences.

The diversity of the conference participants, the members of the NOW Mayors' Network and the NOW Working Groups is both an asset and a challenge for Act.Now's work.

Common feedback in this regard is that NOW Conferences enable an exchange that is more inclusive for diverse participants. This is mainly due to the fact that the organizational design of the conferences do not follow common diplomatic conventions, which tend to determine for instance in which order people speak and people of what professional levels sit on a panel together. According to this line of feedback, disregarding these conventions creates a less formal atmosphere and better chances to have diverse perspectives engage with each other.

In the NOW Mayors' Network, it has taken time and several meetings and shared experiences to raise mutual understanding and trust. While self-representative contributions took up a relatively high share during the first meetings, the discussions now have a significantly more collaborative quality. Starting with an input about a concrete solution to a challenge that all or most mayors have in common has shown to be an effective approach to starting a constructive discussion. That way, the presented solution serves as a common reference point, and the discussion that follows tends to be more focused.

In some situations, it has been helpful to temporarily reduce the complexity of a discussion by splitting up heterogeneous groups into more homogenous ones, such as by geographic origin, language or profession.

Developing projects in the very diverse groups, such as the working groups, has proven to be a challenge, especially within the very open frame provided by Act.Now. It is a common feedback from the working group members that the discussions

at the meetings have taken too long to arrive at a conclusion. The aim has been that all members of a working group agree on a common project. However, the differences in thematic interests and individual goals of members within the groups are so significant that this was difficult to reach. Also, the continuation of the work on a common project between the meetings has been difficult to reconcile with individual schedules and other professional obligations. In some cases, creating core groups where fewer members take the main responsibility for a project has been an effective solution.

The differences in terms of resources, culture, demographics, political and economic situations and many other local conditions are too vast to allow for one-size-fits-all solutions. Act.Now addresses this by showcasing a variety of promising practices from which certain elements can be transferred to other contexts. The diversity of the participants also means that different people often take away different key learnings from the same experiences.

Both members of the NOW Working Groups and of the NOW Mayors' Network give the feedback that the field exposures are among the most valuable experiences with Act.Now. By getting to know new projects and initiatives as well as the different contexts they have gained knowledge and insights beneficial to their work. Another benefit of these visits is related to political communication. Mayors from northern Europe can more credibly argue for the need to host and support arriving refugees if they can give a firsthand account of a camp on the Greek Islands.

4.6 Conclusion and Outlook

Act.Now has developed from an ad-hoc initiative in a crisis situation to an institutionalised organization maintaining strong networks of stakeholders such as mayors and a diverse range of experts from science and practice. In working with these various groups and networks, repeated meetings, common experiences and goals have helped to create a sense of community. When it came to developing and implementing common projects, diverse groups of more than 10 people mostly had difficulties in reaching a common goal and understanding of a project within a very loose set of framework conditions. Smaller sub-groups and clear expectations and responsibilities have helped to address this problem. In the future, this approach will be strengthened further by moving away from the fixed working group structure towards more flexible participation in individual projects. This should allow people who share a common goal and interest in a project to work together in a more focused manner. Recognizing that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions, instead of aiming at developing projects which are transferable to many different contexts, project collaborations with individual municipalities will take an important role. These may then be used as adaptable prototypes for projects in other contexts.

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5 Mapping Public Responses to the “Refugee Crisis”: Who Claims what in Heidelberg and Ottawa/Gatineau?

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Abstract

Despite their very different histories, ideologies of nationhood, and experiences with immigrant and refugee integration in 2015-2016, Germany and Canada both struggled with the sudden arrival of newcomers. This chapter maps public responses to the so-called refugee crisis in the Rhein-Neckar Metropolitan Region in Germany and the (French and English bilingual) National Capital Region in Canada. Taking local newspapers as an approximation of public space, we ask: who claims what for or against (which kind of) migrants/refugees? Our research shows that politicians and members of diverse civil society organizations are most successful in making their voice heard, while migrants/refugees are seldom allowed to speak for themselves. We also find that public discourse in both local contexts is overwhelmingly supportive of refugees with the specific claims made by civil society actors in both regions being reflective of the highly divergent refugee integration schemes at the national/federal level.

Keywords: Civil Society in Germany and Canada; Public Claims-making; Mid-size Cities

5.1 Introduction

While the Syrian civil war had been raging for years, it was only in 2015 that it generated massive flows of people seeking refuge outside the region, challenging intake and integration capacities not only in countries with a history of rejecting the idea of being “an immigration country” – such as Germany – but even in countries having made a name for themselves as multicultural nations built by immigrants – such as Canada (Winter & Zyla, 2016).

Indeed, in 2015, close to 1 million refugees/asylum seekers¹ arrived in Germany, creating new challenges regarding asylum decisions and refugee integration. In 2015, 441,899 initial applications for asylum were submitted. In 2016, another 722,370 applications for asylum were made with the most significant numbers of refugees coming from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2017). Most of these refugees arrived in Germany via the so-called Balkan route and had to be registered, distributed and accommodated upon their arrival (Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien, 2015). Facing this challenge, the German chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed her well-known sentence “Wir schaffen das” (“We can do this”).

Despite its remote location, Canada has, under the Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, resettled over 44,560 Syrian refugees since November 2015 (Government of Canada, 2019b). This figure is the largest undertaking since Canada resettled 60,000 Indochinese refugees in 1979/80 (Molloy & Simeon, 2016). The Governor-General at the time, David Johnston, called the arrival of Syrian refugees a “defining moment” for the country. He highlighted Canada’s “long tradition” of helping refugees in need and emphasized the importance of getting civil society engaged in the undertaking of resettling Syrian refugees to guarantee its success (CBC NEWS, 2015).

In both countries, the initial reception of refugees was very sympathetic and, civil society actors have played an important role in helping to manage the arrival of the newcomers and in contributing to their integration. However, at the same time, concerns about the cultural, social, linguistic and economic difficulties of the refugees’ integration have also come to the forefront. In Germany, these concerns facilitated the rise of right-wing movements such as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) and contributed to the success of the populist right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD) that became the strongest opposition party in the German Bundestag (Second Chamber) in 2017. In Canada, similar concerns came to light over the past years with explicitly anti-immigrant and specifically anti-refugee and islamophobic protests on the rise (Beer, 2019; Tunney, 2019).

1 In this paper, we use a broad definition of the term “refugee,” which designates individuals who (re)migrate due to devastating political, military, economic or social conditions in their countries of permanent residence. This definition is approximated by the German term *Geflüchtete*, which acknowledges the fact that some migrants may feel “forced” to escape harmful economic situations, and some asylum seekers may never obtain official refugee status.

In short, in both countries the integration of refugees has become an issue of contention in the public space, with multiple and diverse actors – such as politicians, NGOs, volunteers, social movements for and against refugees, as well as (former) migrants and refugees – being heavily engaged in defining (their version of) shared citizenship and its relation to perceived outsiders.

In this chapter, we aim to shed light on these debates by analyzing the public claims made in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”. We ask the following questions:

1. Who are the actors who manage to get their voices heard in public space?
2. What claims do they put forward and are these claims made on behalf of, against or by refugees? Put differently, which issues gain political salience?

In order to answer these questions, we put together a transatlantic research team also involving undergraduate research assistants in Heidelberg and Ottawa who helped with the collection and coding of newspaper articles (locally and transnationally), and who formed trilingual transatlantic teams to write short synopses of themes that are of particular importance to this research project (see textboxes below). We also took inspiration from scholarship pioneered by authors such as Koopmans and colleagues (2005), Isin and Nielsen (2008), as well as Bloemraad (2018). Following these authors, we interpret claims-making as expressions of citizenship. Citizenship is here viewed as a permanently negotiated cultural compromise between established groups and newcomers. Emphasizing participation and political mobilization, the act of making claims in the public space itself becomes the “essence” of citizenship, which may then reshape citizenship’s other dimensions: legal status, rights/duties, and (collective) identity.

Recognizing that immigration is first and foremost a local issue, we investigate claims-making in relation to the “refugee crisis” comparatively, in two very different local contexts: the region of Heidelberg with Sinsheim, Mosbach and Buchen (which is part of the Rhein-Neckar Metropolitan Region) in Germany, and the (French and English bilingual) National Capital Region in Canada with its twin-cities Ottawa and Gatineau. Taking local media as one possible approximation of dominant public discourses in both regions, we analyze articles published in the *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung*, as well as *The Ottawa Citizen* and *Le Droit*. Thus, by concentrating on public actors and their redefinitions of the “global refugee crisis” and its repercussions in local contexts, we also aim to make a contribution to the growing comparative research on migration and citizenship in both countries (Bauder, 2011; Schmidtke, 2014; Triadafilopoulos, 2012; Winter, 2014). The following sections of this chapter contain (2, 3) a discussion of the two regional contexts, (4) the methodology, (5) the analysis, and (6) the conclusion highlighting the differences and similarities of both countries. Our results show that politicians and political issues at the national level often prevail in local news coverage. Furthermore, local civil society, while being supportive of refugees, does rarely involve refugee voices into heterophony of humanist claims.

Textbox 1: National Identity in Canada and Germany: (still) Multiculturalism versus Ethnic Nationhood?

Sanford Jones and Daniella Ingabire

Canadian national identity is prominently associated with multiculturalism, as this configuration allows the appeasement of diverse ethnocultural and national communities. In the 1970s, multiculturalism emerged in response to diverse internal claims of nationhood, declaring that no distinct Canadian culture exists and that the participation of all ethnic, religious, linguistic cultures equally shape society. It has maintained national unity by employing what some call “cultural relativism” which is used to reject claims of nationhood by subnational cultures (Turgeon, 2015, para. 6). Despite the official adoption of multiculturalism as national ethos and law, social conservative rhetoric still defines Canada as a white settler society, considering the white population “real Canadians” (Paragg, 2015). However, even social conservative politics must employ a public discourse in which nationhood is determined based on civic loyalty, rather than on blood-based or mono-cultural “ethnic” definitions of citizenship, as this would alienate significant portions of non-white voters (Winter, 2014). Similarly, German political parties have begun to realize the normative and politically strategic necessity of appealing to multiethnic constituencies. While traditionally defined in terms of *Kulturnation* (a nation based on shared culture) with an ancestry-based citizenship law (*jus sanguinis*), in 2000 Germany adopted *jus soli* (territory-based citizenship), allowing “civic” citizenship. While it remains a contentious issue in public discourse whether Germany *wants* to be an “immigration country,” most have come to accept that this is *de facto* the case. In both countries, the recent “refugee crisis” brought contestations of national identity. Overall, and comparatively speaking, German discourse primarily focused on the construction of refugees as “others,” while Canadian discourse emphasised that their integration was a crucial aspect of multiculturalism (Winter, Patzelt, & Beauregard, 2018). In both countries, these conceptions were also hotly contested. While these national identities continue to be in fluctuation in public discourse, both countries face similar challenges; at the beginning of the 21st century, both countries strive to be active players in the global race for talented, skilled immigrants (*Fachkräfte*), and human capital more generally. At the same time, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic struggle to re-define citizenship in ways that highlight loyalty and attachment to the country.

5.2 The Heidelberg Region (with Sinsheim, Mosbach and Buchen) in Germany

Beginning with the opening of the borders to Hungary (which annulled the Dublin regulation) and the arrival of thousands of refugees who entered Germany via Austria on September 5th, 2015, the “refugee crisis” had arrived in Germany. The central station in Munich, where most refugees arrived that day (and in the subsequent

days), became the symbol for the “German welcome culture”, as local citizens tried to help the newly arrived refugees by distributing food and water, donating money, clothing and toys, as well as helping to build temporary shelters (see textbox 2).

Textbox 2: What is *Willkommenskultur* (“Welcome Culture”)?

Patrik Dahl & Alexandra Karabatos

The term *Willkommenskultur* was first used in German debates around immigration policy in the early 2000s with the intent of attracting skilled labour. By 2015, it was adapted to refer to the reception of a wider range of migrants including refugees. While *Willkommenskultur* generally describes an open and accepting attitude towards those wanting to settle in Germany, its usage in socio-political discourse has aligned with two related definitions. On the one hand, it refers to a paradigm shift in German immigration policy whereby Germany, previously considering itself not to be a country of immigration, promoted policies that opened up the country to immigration. The opening of Germany’s borders in 2015 despite the Dublin Regulation, which states that refugees must remain in the first safe EU country in which they arrive, can be seen as a symbol for this shift. Germany moved away from considering migrants to be a nuisance that must integrate to viewing integration as a two-sided process where the host country is responsible for establishing a structure that facilitates integration (Kösemen, 2017). The large number of refugees arriving in Germany in 2015 provided the context for the second meaning of *Willkommenskultur*: a surge in civil society willingness to get involved in refugee aid. This volunteer work – so extensive that Hamann and Karakayali (2016) classified it as a social movement – compensated for the state’s failure to prepare for the reception of so many refugees at once. However, public enthusiasm for welcoming strangers waned after some refugees were accused of sexual assault in Cologne early 2016 (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016). This marked a shift in German discourse away from *Willkommenskultur*. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a right-wing anti-immigration party in Germany has grown in support. German immigration policy has shifted towards advocating a European solution, i.e. the distribution of refugees among member states, in order to better protect one’s own borders. However, *Willkommenskultur* remains a contested issue, with many civil society actors still advocating the reception of refugees.

The work of volunteers at the local level was indispensable as the state and municipal authorities were not prepared to register or provide accommodation and medical care to a large number of refugees arriving in Germany (Speth et al., 2016). This is also reflected in a survey by Gesemann and Roth (2017) which shows that 90% of municipalities identified volunteering/civic engagement as the primary resource for coping with the “refugee crisis”; furthermore, local cooperation networks, a positive attitude and the openness of the population were also highlighted.

Overall, most refugees arriving in Germany and filing an asylum application in 2015 were from Syria (158,657 or 36%), Albania (53,805 or 12%), Kosovo (33,427 or 7.5%), Afghanistan (31,382 or 7%), and Iraq (29,748 or 6.5%) (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). Like elsewhere in Germany, the administrative district of Heidelberg received asylum seekers from all these regions. In total, Heidelberg accommodated approximately 5,000 refugees in 2015 and an additional 2,500 in 2016.

In the Heidelberg Region, like elsewhere in Germany, most of the work of settling and integrating refugees took place at the local level, as the state allocated a certain number of refugees to each municipality. This work, primarily facilitated through the civic engagement of volunteers, can be divided into several phases. The first stage of refugee integration took place in the summer and fall of 2015; this is the time frame under investigation here. This phase was characterized by a broad and spontaneous engagement at train stations and clothing stores along with the temporary housing of refugees. Volunteers also started to offer language courses, legal support, and translating services. Often people from bigger organizations acted independently as they wanted to start helping straight away, rather than waiting for programs to be put in place (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015). Several small, and more flexible, organizations which were able to integrate the interests, abilities and wishes of new volunteers resulted from this spontaneous engagement (Mutz et al., 2015). Later, in 2016, spontaneously founded initiatives went through a process of professionalization (phase 2a); vocational training, access to jobs and social integration became more dominant and resulted in the organization of welcome and integration cafés as well as workshops on intercultural practices (Hamann, Karakayali, Wallis, & Höfler, 2016). At the time of writing, a new phase of politicized volunteering is emerging as refugees, volunteers and established service providers are learning how local, regional and national structures are interrelated (Schmid, Evers, & Mildenerger, 2019).

5.3 The National Capital Region (of Ottawa and Gatineau) in Canada

In Canada, the so-called refugee crisis came onto the radar of politicians and civil society actors when the pictures of Alan Kurdi, a young Syrian boy found dead, washed ashore on a beach in Turkey, were published on September 3rd, 2015. These images did not only impact Canadians because they revealed the vulnerability of people fleeing from the civil war in Syria, but also because they created a “real” link between Canada and Syrian refugees as Alan’s aunt, Tima Kurdi, is a Canadian citizen and had been aiming to “sponsor” Alan’s family in order to bring them to safety (Winter et al., 2018). Given that the pictures were published amidst the federal election campaign, the question of the “refugee crisis” became a “central issue during the elections” (Ramos, 2016, p. 5). Having won the elections with the promise of resettling 25,000 Syrian refugees by the end of the year, the Liberal Party under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau “undertook a widely publicized initiative to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees under the slogan “Welcome Refugees” (Hynie, 2018, p. 1). However, it only achieved this goal by February 27, 2016. By the end of March 2019, a total of

44,560 Syrian refugees have been resettled in Canada under this initiative (Government of Canada, 2019b).

As in Germany, civil society actors played an important role in this undertaking and showed their compassion by becoming engaged in the resettlement process. Canadians did not only donate clothing, furniture and money but also sponsored about 42% of all Syrians who came to Canada through the so-called Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) Program (see textbox 3), one of three programs for the resettlement of refugees in Canada (Government of Canada, 2019b).

From November 2015 to March 2019, in the National Capital Region, the City of Ottawa (Ontario) admitted 2,300 Syrian refugees (285 through the blended sponsorship resettlement program, 1,485 as government-assisted refugees and 530 as privately sponsored refugees). Its twin-city Gatineau (Québec) accepted a total of 375 Syrian refugees (5 through the blended sponsorship resettlement program, 270 as government-assisted refugees and 100 as privately-sponsored refugees) (Government of Canada, 2019b).

In contrast to Germany, Canada has a well-developed immigration and settlement sector by and for immigrants and refugees (Bauder, 2014; Flynn & Bauder, 2015; Knowles, 2007) and refugees were mainly settled in communities that have “an existing Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) service provider organization” (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2015). Consequently, structures able to help the newly arrived Syrians with housing, language training, employment support, and health services already existed in Ottawa. However, new organizations, such as Refugee 613, were also established by civil society actors who wanted to help with the resettlement and integration of Syrian refugees (Refugee 613, n.d.). Moreover, the Syrians who arrived in Canada through the country’s resettlement program automatically obtained the status of permanent residents in Canada, allowing them to stay in the country indefinitely and having access to social and health services as well as the possibility to work.

Textbox 3: Canada’s Private Sponsorship Programme

Alanna Cunningham Rogers & Stanislava Schwalme

Eligibility for resettlement in Canada is established through the assignment of UNHCR Convention refugee status, or classification as “persons in refugee-like situations”. There are three refugee resettlement programs in Canada: 1) the 1978 Government-Assisted Refugees Program supports Convention refugees with public money; 2) the 2013 Blended Visa Office-Referred program allows Convention refugees to receive a mix of private and public funds; and 3) the 1978 Private Sponsorship program allows organizations and individuals to apply to sponsor Convention refugees and persons in refugee-like situations. Sponsors can be a “Group of Five” (five or more citizens or permanent residents), a Sponsorship Agreement Holder (an incorporated organization that has a signed agreement with the Government to help support refugees; most are religious, community, ethnic or humanitarian organizations), or a Community Sponsor (an organization, association, or corporation which does not have a signed agreement, but can apply to sponsor refugees nonetheless). Through this program, the sponsored refugee(s) receive(s) financial support from their sponsors for one year, or until they become financially independent. The sponsor(s) are also responsible to help with “housing, clothing and food, as well as social and emotional support,” and thus, play an important role in facilitating integration into Canadian society (Government of Canada, 2018). Since its inception, the Private Sponsorship program has helped resettled 225,000 refugees and persons in refugee-like situations. While the support for the program has generally been high since its initiation, the use of negative rhetoric around refugees – especially under the former Conservative government from 2006 to 2015 – resulted in “a deterioration in attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees” (Hyndman, Payne, & Jimenez, 2017, p. 57). Despite this, the annual numbers of privately sponsored refugees remain higher than those in the two other groups and, in fact, the majority of refugees who were resettled between January 2015 and April 2019 entered Canada through the private sponsorship program (Government of Canada, 2019a). Therefore, the government intends to continue the facilitation of more privately sponsored refugees than government assisted and other refugee groups. Proponents of the system highlight benefits for both refugees and sponsors: the total number of refugees accepted increases, the personal assistance of the sponsor(s) improves integration, and Canadians can channel their desire to help into direct assistance (Treviranus and Casasola, 2003). However, anecdotal evidence collected by the task force set up to manage the 60,000 Indochinese refugees resettled in the initial phase of the Private Sponsorship program indicated that some privately-sponsored refugees envied the independence and privacy allowed by the monthly allowance provided in the Government-Assisted Refugee Program (Molloy and Simeon, 2016) (for more information see Garcia, 2017).

5.4 Methodology

Research has shown that local newspapers report on immigration issues differently than supra-regional/national newspapers (Cooper, Olejniczak, Lenette, & Smedley, 2017; Wallace, 2018). These differences between national and regional and local newspapers are explained by “the differences in the types of issues that” these newspapers focus on (Wallace, 2018, p. 5). While national newspapers are required to “focus on the national government and international community,” regional or local newspapers “may have greater opportunities to explore the more personal, human-interest accounts of refugees’ experiences” (Wallace, 2018, p. 16). In this study, we sample claims made by refugees, against refugees and on behalf of refugees in three regional newspapers, the German *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung* (RNZ), as well as in *The Ottawa Citizen* (OC) and *Le Droit* (LD), both distributed in the Canadian National Capital Region.

We focus on the period between September 2015 and January 2016, a time during which the context of refugee perception changed from massive compassion toward the despair of refugees (immediately after the drowning of Alan Kurdi on September 2nd, 2015, which occurred almost at the same time as the opening of Germany’s border to refugees travelling along the Balkan route) to reservations and suspicion toward refugees (emerging after the Paris attacks on November 13th, 2015, as well as after the sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015/2016). Specifically, we analyze newspaper articles that were published in the two weeks following the aforementioned events. To collect articles, we used the following keywords: “Flüchtling*” for the RNZ, “refugee*” for the OC, and “réfugié*” for LD. For the collection of the articles on the Canadian side, the databases *Factiva* and *Eureka.cc* were chosen. From the Canadian newspapers a total of 173 articles were retrieved for the two-week period after the death of Alan Kurdi, 180 articles for the two-week period after the Paris attacks and 49 articles for the two-week period after the sexual assaults in Cologne, resulting in 402 articles all together. Out of these articles, 271 articles contained claims and, thus, were selected for the analysis and coding. On the German side, the articles were retrieved through the internal archive of the RNZ. 226 articles were downloaded for the two-week period after the death of Alan Kurdi, 225 articles for the after the Paris attacks and 157 articles for the two-week period after the sexual assaults in Cologne, resulting in a total of 609 articles. Out of these articles, 227 articles contained claims and were coded. For the coding, we developed a coding grid inspired by Koopmans et al. (2005, pp. 254–255). In this chapter, our analysis is based on the following codes:

1. Claimant: the actor making a claim (who makes a claim?)
2. The substantive issue of the claim (what is the claim about?)
3. Object actor: Who is, or would be, affected by the claim (for/against whom?)

In addition, we coded for standard properties (i.e. newspaper, publication date, headline, name of the author, genre), as well as two further categories, namely a) the category of claim, which identifies the overall topic of the claim, e.g. refugee/asylum

policies, resettlement or integration and b) the category of actor, which identifies the overall group an actor belongs to, e.g. politicians, civil society actors or specialists. These additional categories allowed us to group the individual claims and actors identified during the coding process into different groups.

In the first round of coding, the scheme was used to code the first 25 articles containing claims for all three events in the *OC* and the *RNZ*. Based on this initial round, the coding scheme was refined and applied to the articles of all three newspapers. Each of the first twenty-five articles was initially coded by four individuals and results were compared and discussed. By the time a good inter-coder reliability was achieved, each article was coded by two individuals and results were discussed and harmonized at weekly meetings.

In the local Canadian newspapers, *OC* and *LD*, a total of 1,486 claims were identified. Most of these claims (67%) were made on behalf of refugees, 14% were identified as being against refugees, only 4% of all claims were made by refugees and 15% were classified as none of the above (“other”). In the *RNZ*, the newspaper in the German context, a total of 500 claims were identified. Similar to the Canadian newspapers, most claims (58%) were made on behalf of refugees, claims against refugees came second with 21%, 3% of the claims were made by refugees and, 18% were classified as “other.” In the analysis below, we concentrate on the five most important categories of the two main actors and the claims they made. Our analysis compares the Canadian and German cases. For reasons of space, in this chapter, we do not differentiate between the anglophone (*OC*) and francophone (*LD*) media in Canada’s capital.

5.5 Analysis

5.5.1 Who Claims What in the National Capital Region?

Overall, many claims that we identified addressed political issues. Thus, it is not surprising that politicians are one of the most important categories of actors in our newspaper sample.

In fact, in Ottawa/Gatineau, the categories of (individual) politicians (54%) and of (general) federal government(s) (22%) – which refers mostly, but not uniquely to Canada’s federal government – stand for 2/3 of the claims made by the five most important actors. The remaining 1/3 of the claims were made by civil society actors, employees of NGOs and specialists (i.e. lawyers, academics, doctors). Irrespective of the category of actor, most of the claims made by the top five actors were made on behalf of refugees. One interesting discovery is that claims made by NGO employees were rarely ever made against refugees, while civil society actors did (in roughly 30% of the cases) speak out against refugees, highlighting the diversity of views and opinions that can be present among different groups in civil society (see Figure 5.1).

If all actors representing civil society, even those who oppose refugees, are combined for Ottawa/Gatineau, they stand for 240 claims in total (16% of claims, including those made by civil society actors, NGO employees, community organizations, by

former refugees now actively involved in civil society and right-wing activist groups). Based on these groupings, both politicians and civil society actors represent those with the most impact on local discourses on refugees in the National Capital Region. Both categories of actors, however, address different topics and issues in their claims.




Figure 5.1 Top 5 kind of actors in the National Capital Region

Politicians, who represent the biggest group of political actors, were mostly concerned with the topics shown in Figure 5.2.

The topic of resettlement was most prominent among politicians. Claims based on resettlement (124 in total) focused on issues related to the relocation and reception of refugees in Canada in general, and Ottawa or other regions of the country in particular. Claims grouped under the category of resettlement (election) related to the question of how many Syrian refugees should be resettled by the Canadian government, a debate which dominated the federal election campaign in Canada in the fall of 2015. Also, many claims addressed the topic of privately sponsored refugees and the commitment to help with the reception of refugees at the local level. They also emphasized issues about the reception and distribution of refugees arriving in Europe and, thus, topics which do not concern Canada directly. An international orientation is also found among claims listed under the category of refugee/asylum policies, many of which referred to Merkel’s refugee policy in Germany and other refugee regulations in Europe.




Figure 5.2 Politicians and categories of claims in the National Capital Region

Claims classified under security often referred to the screening process for the resettlement of refugees, which was frequently discussed by politicians. On the one hand, Canadian politicians claimed that screening processes should be put in place to prevent terrorists and those presenting a danger to the country from entering the country. On the other hand, it was also politicians who claimed that a balance be struck so that screening processes would not slow down the rate at which Syrians can be resettled. Overall, claims in support of stricter controls and screenings became more prominent after the Paris attacks in November 2015. Nevertheless, claims demanding help and support for Syrians fleeing war, terror, and persecution remained high on the agenda for politicians. This is demonstrated by the fact that these claims, classified under the category of refugee aid/humanitarian aid, form the fourth - largest category of claims for this category of actors (see Figure 5.2).




Figure 5.3 Civil society and categories of claim in the National Capital Region

The focus of the claims made by civil society actors differs slightly. Most of the claims (42) demanded solidarity, support and civic engagement for refugees. Specifically, they focused on private initiatives providing support to arriving refugees. Calls for more support and solidarity were particularly dominant in the period after the drowning of Alan Kurdi. The second - largest category of claim – refugee/asylum policies – captures demands to remove barriers to the private sponsorship of refugees, which had previously been put in place by Stephen Harper’s Conservative government (2006-2015). Civil society actors also lobbied for more governmental support for resettling and integrating Syrian refugees. Refugee aid/humanitarian aid represented the third - largest category of claims. It was demanded that the Canadian government increased its efforts to help Syrian refugees and provide more financial resources to refugee aid programs and organizations. These claims highlighted the existing commitment of civil society actors and underscored their willingness to help even more. Claims made under the category of resettlement discussed in detail how civil society can even better support the settlement (and integration) of refugees, mostly by means of private sponsorship. Finally, right-wing activist groups, mainly located outside the country incited hatred and violent acts against refugees (classified under the category of racism/discrimination/xenophobia) (see Figure 5.3).




Figure 5.4 Kind of actors in the Heidelberg region

5.5.2 Who Claims What in the Heidelberg Region?

Similar to the articles in the *OC* and *LD*, political actors represent the most important group of claims-maker in the *RNZ*. Politicians were responsible for 67% of all claims, while government agencies represented 11%, and political parties 8% of claims. Thus, taken together, political actors were responsible for over 2/3 of all claims coded in the *RNZ*. Specialists were also among the five most important categories of actors, with 4% of all claims made by this group. Civil society actors represented only 10% (40 claims) of the claims made in the Heidelberg region. However, if this number is combined with the claims made by NGO employees, they total 53 claims. Civil society members become, thus the second most important group of actors (see Figure 5.4). As such, similar to the National Capital Region in Canada, political and civil society actor groups dominated the newspaper discourse in the Heidelberg region. Likewise, most claims in the *RNZ* were made on behalf of refugees. Only in the case of political party/ies, more claims were made against refugees than on behalf of refugees. This is because the Christian Social Union (CSU) demanded the introduction of an upper limit for the number of asylum seekers accepted into the country.

The focus will now be turned to the categories of claims, including the topics, themes and discourses highlighted by politicians and civil society actors in Germany.

The claims made by politicians in the *RNZ* fall roughly within the same categories than those made by other actors in the Heidelberg region. As such, refugee/asylum policies (107 claims) were the most important categories of claim. It was claimed that Germany opened its border to refugees, that Chancellor Merkel’s approach to refugee policy was upheld, and that the distribution of refugees in Europe be speeded up.

Classified under politics with 27 coding instances, were claims calling to take into consideration the financial burden posed by asylum seekers to the German state. In contrast to the overall ranking of claims, the topic of integration was not very important to politicians who were more concerned about security (23 claims), especially after the Paris attacks and the sexual assaults in Cologne. After these events, German politicians claimed the establishment of a new anti-terrorism law (*Anti-Terror-Paket*) and better protection of the population from security threats. The related topic of increased border controls (classified as “mobility/border control (restricted/controlled)”) occurred in 21 claims. Mostly, politicians in different European countries demanded closing borders to refugees, while politicians in Germany requested an upper limit on the number of refugees admitted to Germany. Finally, the accommodation of refugees was addressed in 20 claims made by politicians and dealt with the rather contentious issue of how to provide housing and accommodations for newcomers (see Figure 5.5).




Figure 5.5 Politicians and categories of claim in the Heidelberg region

While integration was not amongst the most important categories of claims made by politicians, the topic was the most important one for civil society actors (18 claims in total). These claims mainly demanded better support for the economic and cultural integration of refugees. Second was the category of refugee aid/humanitarian aid (7 claims) which captures demands for (financial) support for various organizations providing aid to refugees. Claims addressing “other issues” and claims regarding solidarity/support/civic engagement (6 claims each) came on a shared third place. The former included claims that could not be allocated to any of the other categories.

The latter highlighted activities in support of refugees, such as donations, events promoting the strength of diversity, and anti-discrimination measures. It is interesting to note that claims about solidarity/support/civic engagement which, seemed to be important in the Ottawa/Gatineau context received relatively little attention in the Heidelberg region. Finally, claims on refugee/asylum policies came fifth with four claims in total addressing different political topics both at the local and international level (see Figure 5.6).




Figure 5.6 Civil society and categories of claim in the Heidelberg region

5.6 Conclusion

While Canada and Germany have different approaches to understandings of immigration and the arrival of newcomers, the categories of actors getting a voice in the local newspapers, as well as the concerns expressed are relatively similar. This becomes particularly apparent when examining claims made by politicians in relation to security issues. Actors in both countries seem to be afraid that criminals or terrorists could be among the refugees. In the fall of 2015, this concern provoked claims for stricter security and border controls. Demands for better security measures intensified after the Paris attacks in November, 2015 and, in Germany, also after the sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015/16. Our results provide a snapshot of the voices heard and the issues that gain political salience in two local contexts within each country.

However, the claims made by politicians at the local level also reflected the national debates in both countries. On the Canadian side, the election campaign occupied a

central role resulting in many claims about resettlement, specifically on the number of Syrians who should be resettled in Canada. On the German side, the party leaders of the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Horst Seehofer and Angela Merkel respectively, were intensively debating the introduction of an upper limit for the number of asylum seekers admitted to the country. This debate was echoed in several claims made under the category of mobility/border control (restricted/controlled).

Differences in the claims made by politicians also underscore the geographical variations of both countries. In Germany, refugees could literally walk across the borders of the country, resulting in a less structured approach to the reception and accommodation of refugees. In Canada, by contrast, the arrival of refugees was organized through an active resettlement process. These contextual differences of the reception of refugees are also reflected in the claims made by civil society actors in both regions. In Ottawa/Gatineau, private sponsorship of refugees was particularly important; this indicates a unique feature of Canada's resettlement program. It also reflects the country's self-conception as being a welcoming and caring nation for those in need. The prominence of this topic, rather than questions about integration, can be explained by the fact that for most of the period under investigation, the resettlement process of Syrian refugees to Canada was still in the planning phase. In the Heidelberg region, by contrast, refugees had already arrived and questions of providing accommodation, and facilitating integration were prominent. These issues represented the challenges faced by municipalities during the fall and winter of 2015/16, considering that several thousand refugees arrived in Germany every month during that period. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the majority of claims made by civil society actors in the Heidelberg region were made on behalf of refugees and, thus, demonstrate a positive attitude towards refugees and a willingness to integrate them into German society (in the long term). This supports the argument that Germany is moving away from its traditional self-understanding as an ethnic nation (Winter et al., 2018).

The critical role that civil society actors played at the local level is reflected through this research's focus on the Heidelberg region and the Ottawa/Gatineau National Capital Region. In both regions, actors belonging to civil society represented the second largest category of actors (after politicians) who made their voices heard in public space, here represented by the local newspapers. Given their commitment to the cause and their willingness to help – which is well documented in the literature (Aumüller, 2016; Hamann et al., 2016; Macklin et al., 2018; Schmidtke, 2018) – it should not come as a surprise that the majority of claims in the local newspapers were supportive of refugees, while only a minority of claims explicitly opposed or even condemned the accommodation of (Syrian) refugees. However, contrary to scholarship indicating that local newspapers are likely “to explore the more personal, human-interest accounts of refugees' experiences” (Wallace, 2018, p. 16), there were very few accounts on the personal experiences of refugees in our sample and very few claims made by refugees themselves (4% of coded claims in the *OC/LD* and 3% in the *RNZ*). If the act of making claims in the public space is indeed a crucial dimen-

sion of citizenship (Bloemraad, 2018; Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Koopmans et al., 2005), capable of reshaping one’s legal status, rights/duties, and collective identity, we can conclude that by the fall of 2015 and the early months of 2016, refugees were not yet able to fully participate “as citizens” in the communities they moved to. Rather, their legal status, rights/duties, and identity were negotiated for them by members of the established groups.

It would be too easy to blame the absence of refugee voices from the local media solely on the period covered here, which admittedly only focussed on the early stages of the arrival of refugees in Canada and Germany during the 2015-2016 “crisis”. Rather, actors – like refugees – who do not hold power in society tend to be on the margins of political discourse. At the local level, one way out of this could be related to the politicization of individuals, locally relevant questions related to humanitarian aid and pragmatic solutions to “real” problems of refugee integration, such as shelter, housing, food, schooling, and language acquisition at both the individual and the collective level. The politicization of these issues involves local civil society actors advocating for or against certain regulations or proposed solutions. While usually busy with other aspects of life, they spontaneously engage in political discourses to change them. Politicization thereby opens up the opportunity for civil society and, in a second step, for refugees to be given a voice in the local media. It is a way for civil society associations and refugees – together or, more likely, in dissent and exchange – to shape the public discourse sustainably and to render the perspective of refugees more central to “mainstream” political debates. Furthermore, in order to better capture the voices from refugees, newspapers would have to rely more on translators, social media and reporting (including diary, photo, and video materials) produced by refugees, and on – ideally permanently engaged – staff members who can legitimately give a voice to refugees because they reflect a diversity of backgrounds, experiences, and political opinions. Better capturing the perspectives of refugees and migrants in local media is particularly important during times of heightened polarization, such as elections in order to counter-act one-sided representations of migration issues for the sake of (presumed) political gains.

Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible without generous support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Partnership Grant, PI: Michael Ungar), the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, and the Center for Social Investment as part of the Realword-Lab Asylum funded by the Ministry of Science, Research and the Arts of the State of Baden-Württemberg. One of the authors also acknowledges support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Centre of Excellence “Cultural Foundations of Integration”, University of Konstanz, Germany. The authors are particularly grateful to Alanna Cunningham Rogers, Daniella Ingabire, Sanford Jones, Alexandra Karabatos (in Canada), as well as Patrik Dahl, Stanislava Schwalm and Jonas Gottschalk (in Germany) who provided transatlantic research assistance.

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How Institutions Responded

6 Broken School Biographies of Adolescent Refugees in Germany

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Abstract

The recent movement of refugees to Germany also included nearly 600,000 children and adolescents. The two-cohort panel study “ReGES – Refugees in the German Educational System”¹ was launched to analyze the integration of these minors in the educational system. This chapter introduces our study, its design, and the sample. It then focuses on the adolescent cohort and provides a first description of its members’ educational trajectories: *What were their educational biographies in their home countries?, how did their flight impact their educational careers?, what is their current educational situation in Germany?, and what are their future educational aspirations?* The chapter closes by describing some aspects of well-being as important determinants of future educational success.

Keywords: Refugees; Educational Careers; Emotional State

1 The project on which this article is based is being funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research under the grant number FLUCHT03. The content of the publication is solely the responsibility of the authors.

6.1 Introduction

In the aftermath of the so-called “refugee crisis,” it became evident that it is essential to have a reliable data source if we want to gain a better understanding of the situation of refugees in Germany and engage in structured political management. Although the issue of successfully integrating immigrants and their descendants into society is not new and researchers can look back on a long scientific tradition, the available empirical evidence on the situation of refugees (with particular reference to educational processes) is significantly insufficient (Olczyk, Seuring, Will, & Zinn, 2016). Especially studies on the educational situation of young refugees² do not have a long tradition in Germany (Behrensen & Westphal, 2009), and therefore, there are few studies focusing on these groups (Johansson, 2014; Johansson, Schiefer, & Andres, 2016). Moreover, research on the integration of refugees into the educational system is just getting started. Some researchers have tried to infer insights from register data (see El-Mafaalani & Kemper, 2017; Kemper, 2016), whereas others have used qualitative study designs (see Korntheuer, Gag, Anderson, & Schroeder, 2018; Korntheuer, Korn, Hynie, Shimwe, & Homa, 2018).

In the timeframe from 2013 to 2017, more than 4.3 million persons sought asylum in the European Union (EU) with a peak in asylum applications in 2015 and 2016. According to the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF), more than 40% (nearly 1.8 million), of asylum seekers who chose to seek refuge in Europe came to Germany (BAMF, 2018). Despite receiving the highest number of refugees, Germany is only number four in Europe after Sweden, Hungary, & Austria when comparing the number of asylum seekers per capita. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017), Germany was in the top eight of refugee-hosting countries in 2016 worldwide. Many of those who fled from their home countries are minors. Around one third, that is, nearly 600,000, of all asylum applicants, are under the age of 18 (BAMF, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). The rate of minors among the applicants rose from circa 31.7% in 2014 to circa 45.0% in 2017.

These large number of under-age refugees has shifted the focus to educational institutions because their integration can be expected to take place primarily within the educational system. At the moment, however, reliable data is not available that would allow analyses of the educational situation of refugees, their pathways, and individual educational trajectories in Germany. The only exception is the IAB-BAMF-SOEP study that incorporated a refugee sample into the German Socio-Economic Panel (Brücker, Rother, & Schupp, 2016; Spieß, Westermaier, & Marcus, 2016). However, this study focuses mainly on households, and there is a lack of (quantitative) studies focusing on the educational situation of young refugees that also take the institutional learning environments of minors into account. Therefore, the longitudinal study “ReGES - Refugees in the German Educational System” was launched to fill this gap.

2 In this contribution, the term “refugee” is not used in the strict sense of the Geneva Convention, but instead includes all asylum seekers seeking protection (in Germany).

6.2 Refugees in the German Educational System (ReGES): A German Panel Study

6.2.1 Study Aims

The ReGES study has two main objectives.

1. To describe the newcomer groups, their current situation in the educational system, and their educational trajectories:

ReGES aims to provide answers to three questions that are particularly important for policymaking: First, which refugee group came to Germany and what are their chances of success in Germany based on their previous life courses and family resources? Second, what is the educational situation of refugees in Germany, which schools do they attend, and in which specific contexts are they found? Do they use voluntary educational services such as kindergarten or language courses? The type of facilities, the resources at the educational institution, and the local and regional level are essential determinants of educational outcomes. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the educational situations of young immigrants and the impacts of these contexts on their educational success. Third, how can the educational pathways and trajectories of refugees be described, and what are the central determining factors? The main goal when answering these questions is to determine which factors facilitate integration and which factors hinder it.

2. To examine the influence of migrant-specific factors on educational outcomes:

ReGES aims to answer questions that are especially relevant from a more theoretical perspective: In which pertinent aspects for a successful educational career (e.g., language competencies) do refugees differ systematically from other migrant groups that have been living in Germany for some time; and how do refugee-specific factors (e.g., residence status, return orientation) affect educational success?

6.2.2 Study Design

ReGES has a dual-cohort and multi-informant panel design. It focuses on two cohorts that are each about to make a significant educational transition in the German educational system, and it includes not only the individual target population(s) but familial, institutional, and regional context persons.³

The first cohort (Refugee Cohort 1, RC1) targets children of pre-school age who are about to enter elementary school. With a minimum age of 4 years, children who have not yet attended school and their parents are being followed through the first years of elementary school. Although the children are being tested in basic cognitive abilities and German-language competencies, due to their age, the primary informants


3 The ReGES study design and instruments in both cohorts had to pass a strict data protection check ensuring that they are in line with European data protection regulations.

in this cohort are the parents who are being interviewed every six months (a total of seven times throughout the study).

The second cohort (Refugee Cohort 2, RC2) targets adolescents who are at least 14 years old and still in the lower secondary tier of the German educational system. This group is about to make the transition to either upper secondary education or vocational training. In contrast to the preschool cohort RC1 in which parents are the primary informants, the adolescents themselves are the key informants in RC2, and they are being interviewed twice a year. Unlike in RC1, the parents in RC2 were interviewed only once at the beginning of the study to gain direct access to the adolescent's family background along with other background and (family) history information. Like the children in RC1, the adolescents' basic cognitive abilities and their German language skills are also being tested.

In both cohorts, the educational staff and the heads of the institutions attended by the children and adolescents are being interviewed once per year to gather information about the respective institutional contexts. Also, municipal employees and staff at refugee accommodation centers who facilitate the integration of refugees in their everyday work were interviewed during the first panel wave to gain information on the local and regional living contexts of the study participants. Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the survey design (for more detailed information on the two cohorts and an overview of the survey contents, refer to Will, Gentile, Heinritz, & von Maurice, 2018).

In both cohorts, a broad initial measurement is being performed that makes no restrictions regarding specific groups of origin. Nonetheless, from a practical point of view, there were some specific participation criteria: Only refugees who came to Germany from January 1, 2014 onward at the earliest, who live with at least one parent (or legal guardian) in Germany and have been living in Germany for at least three months were interviewed. Likewise, only people who were able to answer the questionnaires in German, Arabic, English, Farsi, French, Kurmanji, Pashtu, or Tigrinya were interviewed. After the initial measurement, the focus was placed on specific groups of origin in order to pursue these particular groups over their educational careers and to question and test them in more detail while reducing the selection of survey languages to Arabic, English, German, and Kurmanji (for more information, see Will et al., 2018).



Note. Each arrow represents a point of data collection from one of the four informant groups. Larger arrows = instruments in eight languages, smaller arrows = four languages. Adapted from Will et al. (2016).

Figure 6.1 ReGES design

6.2.3 Sampling Strategy

The survey is being conducted in the five federal states of Bavaria, Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony. The federal states were selected using various macro-indicators such as the number of refugees in the respective states, unemployment rate, or population density. Another important selection criterion was the strategy for schooling young refugees (for details on the selection of federal states, see Will et al., 2018).

One central challenge was the lack of a sampling frame within the federal states. Therefore, a complex multistage sampling strategy was adopted (for more details on the sampling, see Steinhauer, Zinn, & Will, in press; Will et al., 2018).

The Central Register of Foreigners (*Ausländerzentralregister*, AZR), which contains information on all registered foreigners in Germany, was used to select rural and urban districts within the selected federal states housing refugee families with offspring in the age groups of interest – children between the ages of 4 and 5, and adolescents between the ages of 14 and 15 – and came from the three countries of origin with the largest groups at that time (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria).

Residents' registration offices – based on a sample of 80 municipalities and 40 urban districts – were asked to randomly draw children and adolescents in the relevant age groups who joined the community after January 1, 2014 and who have the nationality of one of the leading countries of origin of asylum seekers in recent

years that has a high protection rate.⁴ The residents' registration offices provided the addresses of these persons.

Because the data from the residents' registration offices contain no information about either resident status or the educational situation of the young immigrants, in the last step, drawn persons were asked for a screening interview. The interviewers then had to determine whether the targeted child lived in the contacted household and fell into the defined target population of one of the two ReGES cohorts. During the screening, information about all children within the household was gathered, and all eligible children or adolescents were selected.⁵ Suitable for ReGES were persons:

- for whom an asylum application had been made or was planned;
- who were in one of the cohort-specific age groups: RC1: 4 to 9 years; RC2: 14 to 16 years;
- who had not yet attended elementary school (RC1) and who were attending a general education secondary school at the time of the interview (RC2);
- who came to Germany after January 1, 2014, and had lived here for at least three months;
- who lived with a parent or legal guardian in the same household.⁶

The survey took place between January 2018 and June 2018. A total of 4,323 families with 5,475 children targeted for either RC1 or RC2 were interviewed, with a net sample of 2,405 children in RC1 and a net sample of 2,415 adolescent in RC2 (for more information on response rates and further experiences from the field, see Will et al., 2018).

6.2.4 Adolescent Sample

Because this chapter focuses on the school biographies of adolescents, we report only the sample composition of RC2 (for further information on the RC1 sample, see Will et al., 2019).

Table 6.1 reports basic sociodemographic information on the RC2 sample. Age was one of the sampling criteria and had to be between 14 and 16 years (in October

4 People with Russian or Turkish nationality were not considered, despite the considerable number of asylum seekers from these countries and a fairly high protection rate. We did this because a large number of immigrants from Russia and Turkey came to live in Germany for other reasons. Therefore, the sampling strategy applied here, which assumes that most persons of the considered nationalities are refugees, would not be applicable for people with these nationalities.

5 This resulted in a higher chance of selection for persons in families with many children.

6 Although unaccompanied minors are an important and sizeable group, they were not part of the ReGES target population. This decision was made due not only to ethical considerations but also to the fact that unaccompanied minor refugees have very different integration chances in Germany due to a whole set of regulations.

2017). The sample is slightly skewed toward the lower bound. The average age is 14.9 years ($SD = .81$ years).

At 55.1%, there are slightly more males than females in the ReGES sample.

Three major groups of origin can be identified and analyzed in the data. At 69.2%, Syrians form the vast majority of the sample. The other two sizeable groups are Iraqis (13.5%) and Afghans (9.2%). This distribution is also in line with the number of asylum applicants reported by the BAMF (2019) for the years 2013 to 2017 in which these three countries were also the largest groups. All other identifiable groups in the ReGES-Data are below 2% of the sample and are grouped (see note in Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Sample composition of ReGES adolescents

	<i>n</i>	%
Age (in October 2017)		
14	932	38.6
15	812	33.6
16	671	27.8
Sex		
Female	1,085	44.9
Male	1,330	55.1
Nationality		
Afghan	222	9.2
Iraqi	326	13.5
Syrian	1,670	69.2
<i>Other*</i>	136	5.3
<i>Unclear**</i>	61	2.5

Note. * This group consists of persons from Eritrea, Gambia, Iran, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia; each subgroup below the threshold of 2.5% of the total sample. Data from ReGES parents and adolescent interviews ** Information about the nationality of the adolescents was gathered in the parent interview. If parents would not participate, some family background information was gathered in a more extended version of the adolescent interview. Because some parents consented at the contact phase of the interview but were ultimately not interviewed, there are cases in which there is no information on nationality.


6.3 Broken School Careers of Adolescent Refugees

The school biographies of adolescent refugees can be divided basically into three parts: first, their educational careers in their home countries before the flight; second, education (or the lack thereof) during the flight including time spent in refugee camps; and third, their educational situation in Germany. Moreover, educational aspirations can give a hint regarding their future perspectives in Germany.

6.3.1 Schooling in the Home Country

Some of the refugees come from countries in which longer compulsory school attendance (i.e., beyond elementary education) is not as frequent as in Western societies or in which regular school attendance is no longer easily possible due to the political situation. Therefore, it is not surprising that an average of 6.3% of the ReGES adolescent sample reported no schooling at all in their home countries (see Figure 6.2). Whereas 95.0% of male adolescents reported schooling experiences in their home countries, only 92.1% of female adolescents had gone to school.

There were, however, decisive differences by nationality, with adolescent refugees from Syria and Iraq having higher rates of school attendance in the country of origin than adolescents from Afghanistan.



Source. Data from ReGES adolescent interviews.

Figure 6.2 School attendance in the country of origin by sex and nationality (percentages)

ReGES data permit a differentiated examination of the type of school the adolescents attended in their countries of origin along with the duration of their attendance. On average, the adolescents had attended school for 6.4 years (see Table 6.2). There were, however, significant differences between the groups, as shown by the standard deviation of 1.9 years. Nearly all adolescents who went to school had attended either an elementary or a middle school before having to flee.

Table 6.2 Schooling duration in the home country by school type

Last school type attended in the home country	N	School years	
		M	SD
No school attended	134	-	-
Elementary school	947	5.1	1.5
Middle school	978	7.5	1.4
Vocationally oriented high school	19	9.0	2.4
Academically oriented high school	29	8.8	2.1
Another school	16	7.9	2.1
Total	2,123	6.4	1.9

Note. *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation. Data from ReGES adolescent interviews.

6.3.2 Schooling During the Flight

All young refugees had to abandon their education at some point to flee from their homes to another country. Depending on their origin, their resources, as well as other factors and circumstances concerning their reasons for fleeing (civil war, genocide, ecological catastrophes, etc.), their flight took more or less time. In the ReGES sample, several groups can be separated based on their flight duration. However, there is neither a normal nor an apparent distribution pattern. About one-half of the sample needed two months or less for migrating into Germany, whereas, there was also about one-quarter who needed even more than two years. The overall mean flight duration was 8.2 months (*SD* = 15.4 months).

Table 6.3 shows the flight duration in months; that is, the time from leaving their home countries to arrival in Germany. Not included is additional time in which they might have had to drop out of school and the time they might have had to leave their homes within their countries of origin due to internal displacement. This means that these forced educational breaks might have been even longer than indicated here.

Especially for those adolescents whose flight took a very long time, there may have been the chance for longer stays in another transit location where attending some types of school might have been possible or even mandatory. However, only 13.1% of adolescents reported that they had attended some form of school during their flight. Of those whose flight took more than six months, 15.5% reported a school visit during that time. For the vast majority of adolescents, the time of their flight is lost educational time.

Table 6.3 Flight duration and schooling during the flight

Flight duration	N	% _{col}	Schooling during flight		
			N	% _{row}	
Less than 1 month	563	23.3	<i>n.i.</i>	<i>n.i.</i>	
1–2 months	693	28.7	<i>n.i.</i>	<i>n.i.</i>	
3–6 months	232	9.6	8	3.4	
7–12 months	112	4.6	18	16.1	
13–24 months	183	7.6	33	18.0	
More than 24 months	632	26.2	93	14.7	
Total	2,415	100.0	152	13.1	*

Note. *n.i.* = no information; the question was asked only if flight duration took at least 3 months.
 * Based on $n = 1,159$ who were asked this question. Data from ReGES parent and adolescent interview combined.

6.3.3 Schooling in Germany

Due to the sampling strategy, all adolescents in the ReGES sample were attending a general education school at the time of the first interview. Like all children in Germany from the age of 6 to 16 (in some states until 18), refugees are also principally required to attend school independent of their legal resident status. However, the legal regulations in the individual federal states in which the ReGES target persons are living differ in terms of when compulsory education takes effect. In most states, compulsory education begins after the assignment to municipalities. The state of Bavaria is an exception here, with compulsory education beginning three months after moving to Bavaria.


Table 6.4 Residence duration and duration until school enrollment in Germany

	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Min	<i>Mdn</i>	max
Residence duration in Germany (at the date of interview, in months)	2,267	29.6	9.1	3	30	53
Duration until school enrollment (in months)	2,219	7.1	6.7	0	5	51

Note. *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation, min = minimum, *Mdn* = median, max = maximum. Data from ReGES adolescent interviews.

The ReGES data reveals that adolescents first must wait for some time in Germany before they can attend school (which is called “enrollment” below). In the ReGES sample, it took an average of 7.1 months from the time of immigration until the adolescents first visited a school in Germany (see Table 6.4); however, there is a significant variance (standard deviation of 6.7 months). Some refugees attended school

within the first month, whereas others reported that it took several years before they could attend school for the first time. With a median of 5 months, one-half of the adolescents in the sample lost up to 5 months in their educational careers before attending a school in Germany, whereas it took the other one-half at least 5 months to enter the schooling system. Adding this to the duration of their flight, young people have lost an average of about one school year. It will be essential to consider what effect the length of these disruptions will have when analyzing their future educational careers.



Note. Data from ReGES parent and adolescent interviews, $n = 2,367$. By Will et al. (2019).

Figure 6.3 Arrival and enrollment date of adolescents (percentages)

The duration from immigration to first school attendance in Germany also depends on the date when these young people came to Germany. Figure 6.3 shows the immigration date and school enrollment times for the entire sample. Most adolescents came in the second half of 2015 and early 2016. The course of admission showed some delay, especially in the second half of the school year of 2015/2016, presumably due to limitations in the provision of school capacities. But also, in subsequent years, admissions were more staggered and took place at the beginning of a new school year around August or September.

In most federal states, children and adolescents have to attend special classes for new immigrants before admission to regular classes.⁷ These tend to have different names in different states, so we shall call them “newcomer classes.” In these classes, migrants acquire the basic knowledge of German required for a regular education and are informed about the country’s educational system. These classes are not intended solely for refugees but for all school-age migrants who come to Germany. This also includes EU migrants who face comparatively low hurdles when migrating

7 See Vogel & Stock (2017) for an overview of the legal frameworks in the federal states in Germany.


to Germany. However, depending on their previous school experiences and German skills, it is also possible to attend a regular class right from the beginning or to switch early. In the ReGES sample, 36.7% of adolescents reported currently attending a newcomer class, with a total of 55.9% reporting that they had attended such a class at some point.

The German school system can be described as highly stratified and standardized (Allmendinger, 1989). Traditionally, after four years of elementary school, students are sorted by prior achievement into a lower secondary school track (*Hauptschule*) leading to vocational training, a middle secondary school track (*Realschule*) opening up more advanced vocational training options, and a higher secondary track (*Gymnasium*) with a strong academic focus and an orientation toward tertiary education. In most states,⁸ the lower and middle secondary tracks are combined into one school type (*Verbundene Haupt- & Realschule*) that either replaces both school types or exists as a complement to the traditional school types (von Maurice and Roßbach, 2017). In many states, there is also a fourth type of comprehensive school that integrates all tracks (*Gesamtschule*).

The students in the ReGES sample are distributed quite evenly across almost all school types at the lower secondary level. The most frequented school forms are the *Gymnasium* and *Realschule*, both with 22.0% attendance. However, it is important to note that – if students visit newcomer classes – they are assigned to a school, but do not necessarily attend that school's track. To meet spatial needs, newcomer classes were established at nearly all schools with enough free space. Almost one-half of the ReGES students who attend a *Gymnasium* are allocated to a newcomer class instead of a regular class. Over the course of the study, it will be important to monitor whether a transition to a regular class at the academic track can be realized. When considering only the part of the ReGES sample that is already attending a regular class, *Realschule* is the most frequented school form followed by *Hauptschule* (see Figure 6.4).

Regardless of the class type (regular vs. newcomer) attended, there were clear differences in the distribution of ReGES adolescents across the various school types in Germany compared to the total population (see Figure 6.5). ReGES adolescents attended lower secondary schools (*Hauptschule* and *Verbundene Haupt- & Realschule*) more frequently than 14- to 16-year-old students in the national average. This was also true for the average in the federal states participating in ReGES. Also, the share of students at a *Realschule* was lower within the ReGES sample than the national average or the share within the whole student population of the ReGES states.


8 In Germany, education lies within the jurisdiction of the federal states.



Note: Data from ReGES parent and adolescent interviews ($n = 2,412$), and school register data, school year 2016/2017 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018); own calculations. Adaptation of Will et al. (2019).

Figure 6.4 School distribution of adolescents by the school and class type in comparison (percentages)

As with the distribution of the types of school, there were also grade level differences in comparison to the national average. According to the representative *Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2015* data, 15-year-old students in Germany are mainly in grades 9 and 10 (92.0%) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016), whereas the ReGES students were distributed across several grade levels and were more likely to be in lower grades than the average for 15-year-olds in Germany (see Figure 6.6). The distribution of ReGES adolescents across several grades was partially due to the age range. Slightly more than one-half of the adolescents were attending the 9th or 10th grade (52.7%) at the first measurement point and were thus close to the transition to upper secondary education or vocational education and training. There was no significant difference between refugee students attending a regular class and those still in a newcomer class. The age of ReGES adolescents, who were, on average, 15.4 years old and therefore younger than the PISA sample (mean age = 15.8 years), did not explain this difference. Looking only at the 15-year-olds in the sample (33.6% of the total ReGES sample, mean age: 15.5 years), they were still much more frequently in lower grades compared to adolescents in Germany as a whole.




Note. Data from ReGES parent and adolescent interview ($n = 2,412$), and PISA 2015 student questionnaire. Adaptation of Will et al. (2019).

Figure 6.5 Grade distributions of ReGES- and PISA-2015 samples (percentages)

6.3.4 Plans for the Future: Educational Aspirations

For medium and long-term integration – whether in Germany or in the country of origin – it is not just the current situation in the educational system that is central, but especially future educational processes. Aspirations are important determinants of educational trajectories (Beal & Crockett, 2010; Fergusson, Horwood, & Boden, 2008). A well-known phenomenon in migration and educational research is findings indicating particularly high educational aspirations among migrants (for Germany, see Becker & Gresch, 2016; for other European countries, see Jonsson & Rudolphi, 2011; Teney, Devleeshouwer, & Hanquinet, 2013; for the USA, see Bates & Anderson, 2014; Hao & Bonstead-Bruns, 1998; Hill & Torres, 2010; Mickelson, 1990; Zhou & Bankston, 1994). Refugees were no exception here (see Figure 6.6). When asked about their idealistic educational aspirations in terms of leaving school certificate, 71.9% of the adolescents said they were aiming for a qualification entitling them to study at university.



Note. Data from ReGES adolescent interview ($n = 2,373$).

Figure 6.6 Idealistic and realistic educational aspirations of adolescents (percentages)

Whereas idealistic educational aspirations are the educational goals young people desire, regardless of actual circumstances, realistic educational aspirations – also called expectations – take the actual contextual conditions and personal abilities and resources into account. We asked about their realistic aspirations: “Considering everything you know now: With which qualification will you probably leave school in Germany?” Still, 66.0% of adolescents said that they expected to achieve a university entrance qualification (see Figure 6.8).

From a theoretical point of view, it is assumed that high educational aspirations have a positive influence on educational decisions and achievements. Empirical results in particular are already available on how aspirations and ambitious educational decisions relate to transitions in different national contexts (Teney et al., 2013; Tjaden & Scharenberg, 2017; Wohlkinger, Ditton, von Maurice, Haugwitz, & Blossfeld, 2011). In the US context, there are also a few studies on the relationship between educational aspirations and the development of competencies (e.g., Goldenberg, Gallimore, Reese, & Garnier, 2001; Goldsmith, 2004; Kim, 2002). However, whether the young refugees will also succeed in transforming their high ambitions into educational success is still an open question.

6.4 Well-being and Satisfaction of Adolescent Refugees

Subjective life satisfaction, as an expression of quality of life, cannot just be seen as a first indicator of emotional integration into German society. Life satisfaction is also an important factor for adolescents’ development (Lewis, Huebner, Malone, & Valois, 2011). Therefore, the adolescents in ReGES were asked about their overall life satisfaction, whether they enjoyed school, and whether they had specific problems at school.

In response to the question, “How satisfied are you, all in all, with your life?”, all respondents rated themselves on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (*completely dissatisfied*) to 10 (*completely satisfied*). For the ReGES parents, the average life satisfaction rating was 7.2, which is the same as the average in the German majority (Schupp, Goebel, Kroh, & Wagner, 2013). For ReGES adolescents, the average was marginally higher at about 7.4 (see Table 6.5).


For adolescents in general, education is not just important for their life chances but also structures the major part of their lives. It can be argued that a refugee may view attending a regular class as an accomplishment, as a signal of officially having acquired the necessary skills to participate equally in the educational system. There was, however, no difference in satisfaction between adolescents who attended regular classes and those still attending newcomer classes. And the two groups also did not differ in their well-being at school. All students reported a high level of well-being at school (“I enjoy being at school”) with a mean rating of 4.0 on a 5-point scale.

Table 6.5 Life satisfaction and well-being at school by attended class type

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	min	<i>Mdn</i>	max
Life satisfaction					
Complete sample	7.4	2.1	0	8	10
In newcomer classes	7.4	2.1	0	8	10
In regular classes	7.3	2.1	0	8	10
Well-being at school					
Complete sample	4.0	1.2	1	4	5
In newcomer classes	4.0	1.2	1	4	5
In regular classes	4.0	1.1	1	4	5

Note: *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation, min = minimum, *Mdn* = median, max = maximum. Data from ReGES adolescent interview (n = 2,392).

In addition to their life satisfaction and well-being at school, adolescents were asked about specific problems they might encounter in their everyday school lives that could hinder their educational development. They rated six different problem areas (social exclusion, fear of threats and violence at school, fear of threats and violence on the way to school, and food-related, language-related, and culture- or religion-related problems) on a 5-point scale. Their answers indicated that the majority of refugee students did not have these problems (see Figure 6.7). Fear of threats and violence in particular were not a problem for the majority of students. Nonetheless, these problems did occur for a small, but still substantial subgroups (9.0% for violence at school and 7.2% for violence on the way to school, when the middle category “partially true” was also included). Problems related to language or cultural or religious differences were reported more often. Furthermore, about one-quarter of the adolescents perceived at least some social exclusion.



Note. Item text: “Have you had any of the following problems at school?”. Data from ReGES adolescent interview (n = 2,382).

Figure 6.7 Problems at school (percentages)

6.5 Summary

This chapter had two objectives: (1) to give an introduction to the ReGES study, a new two-cohort panel study on the integration of refugee children and adolescents who came to Germany in the recent immigration movement; and (2) to provide first insights into schooling biographies of refugee adolescents.

In summary, the school biographies of all ReGES adolescents have been interrupted through their forced migration. The period between leaving their country and enrolling in a German educational institution lasted an average of more than one year. Although the young refugees currently seem to be quite well integrated into the German school system, there are various reasons why it is necessary to look at their school careers in a more long-term perspective. One question is, for example, in which type of schools do adolescents find themselves after leaving the newcomer classes? It is also unclear whether the relatively frequent placement of adolescents in lower grades relative to their age will lead (only) to delayed school graduation or whether there is a risk that these adolescents will drop out of school. It is possible – if not even likely – that they will lose even more time in their educational careers because they might not enter vocational training directly after school but first attend the so-called transition system that is available in Germany between school and vocational training. However, it is also conceivable that some of the young immigrants will realize their high aspirations and achieve a university entrance qualification and continue with an academic education.

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7 The Home Language Environment and English Second Language Learning of Syrian Refugee Children: Comparisons with other Newcomer Children in Canadian Schools

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Abstract

Identifying factors that positively promote – or pose challenges for – English second language (L2) acquisition has relevance for predicting migrant children’s educational outcomes. This is because oral language skills underpin literacy skills, and both are associated with academic success. Most research in the Canadian context on English second language learners (ELLs) has been conducted with children from pre-dominantly immigrant backgrounds whose families vary in length of residency. There is limited information on the process and factors predicting English L2 acquisition in recently arrived children from refugee backgrounds, who can have distinct characteristics and needs. This chapter first reports findings on the home language environment and English L2 vocabulary and grammatical development of Syrian refugee children from an on-going, multi-site study. Second, these findings are compared to those from a previous study of Canadian ELLs from predominantly immigrant backgrounds with same length of schooling in Canada and who were administered similar measures. Overall, the Syrian refugee children had, on average, weaker home language environments than other group of ELLs, and showed somewhat slower L2 acquisition. These findings from the first wave of our multi-site study suggest that Syrian children might need additional support for their L2 learning to promote their success in school.

Keywords: English Second Language Acquisition; Input Factors in Bilingualism; Migrant Children

7.1 Introduction

Existing research with children from migrant families has shown that multiple home language and literacy factors determine children's acquisition of their second language (L2) as well as maintenance of their first language (L1) (Albirini, 2014; Chondrogianni and Marinis, 2011; Hammer et al., 2012; Hoff, Welsh, Place, & Ribot, 2014; Jia, & Aaronson, 2003; Jia & Fuse, 2007; R. Jia & Paradis, 2015; Paradis, 2011; Paradis, Rusk, Sorenson Duncan, & Govindarajan, 2017; Prevoo et al., 2013; Sorenson Duncan & Paradis, 2018, in press). For L2 acquisition in school-age children, the home language environment predicts variance in outcomes beyond the amount of exposure to the L2 in school. Proximal factors influencing school-aged children's L2 acquisition include use of the L2 among family members, and how frequently children engage in language-rich activities like reading or using other media in the L2 (Jia & Aaronson, 2003; Jia & Fuse, 2007; Kaltsa, Prentza, & Tsimpli, 2019; Paradis, 2011; Paradis et al., 2017; Prevoo et al., 2014; Sorenson Duncan & Paradis, in press). More distal home environment factors like maternal education and parental fluency in the L2 also impact the rate of L2 acquisition (Chondrogianni & Marinis, 2011; Paradis, 2011; Prevoo et al., 2014; Sorenson Duncan & Paradis, 2018). Identifying factors that positively promote – or pose challenges for – L2 acquisition has relevance for predicting migrant children's educational outcomes. This is because oral language skills underpin literacy skills and both are associated with academic success in monolinguals and bilinguals (Clarke, Snowling, Truelove, & Hulme, 2010; Whiteside, Gooch, & Norbury, 2017).

Children from migrant backgrounds who are in the process of learning English as a L2 in elementary schools are typically referred to as English language learners or ELLs. Most research in the Canadian context on L2 acquisition and the role of language input factors includes groups of ELLs with diverse family migration backgrounds and lengths of residency (e.g., Chen, Ramirez, Luo, Geva, & Ku, 2012; Goldberg, Paradis, & Crago, 2008; Paradis, 2011; Rezzonico et al., 2015; Sorenson Duncan & Paradis, 2018). In migrant families, home language environments and children's dominant language changes with the length of residency (Jia & Fuse, 2007; Jia & Aaronson, 2003; Paradis & Kirova, 2014). Therefore, we can anticipate that the home language environment and language abilities of children from recent newcomer families, like Syrian refugee families, might be different from what has been reported in studies with diverse ELL samples. Furthermore, there is a lack of Canadian studies that have examined the impact of adverse pre-migration factors, such as interrupted education and refugee camp experience, on bilingual development post-migration. Studies have drawn links between adverse pre-migration factors and the challenges refugee children and youth face in the education system and societal integration more generally (Hadfield, Ostrowski, & Ungar, 2017; Kanu, 2008; McNevin, 2012), but links with language learning have not been explored. In sum, existing research is insufficient for informing our expectations of the home language environment and bilingual development of the Syrian children who have recently arrived in Canada. Between 2015 and 2019, an initiative from the Canadian government has resulted in

Syrian families being the largest group of refugees resettled (Government of Canada - Immigration, Citizenship and Refugees, 2019).

The first objective of this chapter is to examine the home language environment and English L2 vocabulary and grammatical development of Syrian refugee children from an on-going, multi-site study. The second objective is to compare these language environment factors and English outcomes to a previous study of Canadian ELLs with the same length of schooling using similar measures. This comparison will reveal the similarities and differences between the Syrian refugee group and a more diverse group of ELLs, which in turn, will show if the Syrian group needs additional support for their English L2 learning.

7.2 Multi-site Study of Syrian Refugee Children's Language Development

As part of the Children and Youth Refugee Research Coalition (CYRRC - <http://cyrrc.org>), we are conducting a longitudinal study of the language and literacy development in English and Arabic of Syrian children from refugee families who are in elementary schools in Edmonton, Waterloo and Toronto. For this chapter, data on home language factors and oral English language abilities are reported from the first wave of data collection.

7.2.1 Method

Participants

One hundred and thirty-three children in 73 families from Edmonton, Toronto and Waterloo participated in this study. Children ranged in age from 6 to 13 years, and 83.5% of children in the study had siblings who also participated. The average number of children per family was 4.33 (ranging from 2 to 8). All families migrated to Canada as refugees in 2015 or later and had a mean length of residency in Canada of 23.05 months. All families were Arabic-speaking, i.e., no Kurdish-speaking families. Their children had an average of 17.63 months of English schooling at the time of testing, in junior kindergarten to grade 7, with most children in grades 3 and 4. Because of the civil war in Syria and the migration experience, many of the older children had their schooling in Arabic interrupted. The average length of Arabic schooling is 14.52 months, and the average age is 9.36 years old. This indicates that, most children were admitted into Canadian schools with limited educational experience; however, at the time of testing, they had higher English schooling on average than schooling in Arabic. Only 68% of children had any schooling before arriving in Canada, and 35% had spent time in a refugee camp before arriving in Canada. Summary information is in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Characteristics of the child participants

	Mean	SD	Range
Ages in years	9.36	1.96	6-13
Length of residency in months	23.02	7.63	2-37
Length of English schooling in months	17.63	6.53	2-30
Length of Arabic schooling in months	14.52	15.08	0-72

Note. $N = 133$. Length of residence for a child differs from that of the family since some children had siblings who participated

Procedures

Children and their parents were either visited in their homes or at the children's schools by two research assistants, one of whom spoke Arabic fluently. Parents were administered a questionnaire in Arabic, as an interview, to gather information on family demographics and the home language environment. Children's English vocabulary and grammatical abilities were assessed through standardized measures administered by an assistant who spoke English fluently.

- 1) *Alberta Language Environment Questionnaire-4* (ALEQ-4, adapted from Paradis, 2011). Parents were asked questions about their family's pre-migration experiences, their education background (including English training) and their self-rated fluency in English (5-point scale with descriptors – see Appendix). Parents were also asked to indicate how much Arabic versus English they used with their children and which languages the children used with older and younger siblings (5-point scale with descriptors – see Appendix). Language input to the child and language output from the child were assessed separately. Individual relative language use scales for parents and siblings were analysed, and, a proportion score for English use at home was also calculated by adding the rating scale numbers and dividing by the total number of scales answered. Finally, parents were asked about the frequency with which their children engaged in language-rich activities in English and Arabic in a given week (5-point scale with descriptors– see Appendix). Activities included listening/speaking activities (television, YouTube, What's App, music), reading/writing activities (books, websites, messaging), playing with friends, and extra-curricular activities (homework clubs, sports, religious activities). A composite score estimating the richness of the English environment was calculated by adding the rating scale numbers and dividing by the total number of scales answered to generate a proportion score.
- 2) *Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test- IV* (Dunn & Dunn, 2007). Children were shown an array of 4 pictures and asked to point to the picture best matching the word given by the experimenter. Raw scores can be converted to standard scores for comparison with monolinguals.

- 3) *Test of Early Grammatical Impairment* (Rice & Wexler, 2001). Initially designed for use in a clinical setting, this test includes a sub-test for accuracy with verbal suffixes in English, an aspect of grammar that poses difficulty for English L2 learners (Chondrogianni & Marinis, 2011; Jia & Fuse, 2007; Paradis, Tulpar, & Arppe, 2016). Children were asked to produce sentences describing pictures to elicit the use of verbal suffixes. For third person singular [-s], children were asked questions like “what does a dentist do?” with expected answers like “A dentist cleans teeth” or “A dentist looks in your mouth” when viewing a picture of a dentist in an office. For past tense [-ed], children were shown pictures of an activity that was on-going, followed by a picture with the activity completed. They were asked the following, “The boy is raking and now he is done. Tell me what he did.”, with the expected answer, “The boy raked.” Scores can be criterion-referenced to monolingual performance.

7.2.2 Results

Language Use at Home

Mean scores for children’s relative input and output in Arabic versus English with mothers, fathers, older and younger siblings are in Table 7.2. Recall that lower numbers on the 5-point scales mean more Arabic and higher numbers mean more English. Overall, family members mainly used Arabic at home since mean input-output across all scales was 1.28, and the proportion of English spoken in the home among family members was .07 ($SD = .12$) with 1.0 indicating only English and .00 indicating only Arabic. Nevertheless, the use of English and Arabic was not distributed evenly among family members. A series of non-parametric paired-samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed that parents used less English with the children than their older siblings (father-older siblings: $V = 17, p < .001$;¹ mother-older siblings: $V = 0, p < .001$) and their younger siblings (father-younger siblings: $V = 22, p < .001$; mother-younger siblings: $V = 0, p < .001$). Similarly, the children used more English with their older siblings than with their parents (father-older siblings: $V = 40, p < .001$; mother-older siblings: $V = 21, p < .001$) and with their younger siblings than with their parents (father-younger siblings: $V = 46, p < .001$; mother-younger siblings: $V = 24, p < .001$). No difference emerged in input and output language choice between children, their older versus younger siblings.

1 We used paired-samples non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests, which are appropriate when the assumption of normality is not met. When discussing these analyses, we report the p-value of the test together with its V statistic (i.e., the sum of positive ranks).

Table 7.2 Children's input and output of Arabic versus English with parents and siblings

Interlocutor	Input to children from	Output from children to
Fathers	1.02 (.13)	1.12 (.35)
Mothers	1.0 (.00)	1.16 (.51)
Older siblings	1.46 (.94)	1.51 (.95)
Younger siblings	1.62 (1.09)	1.51 (.95)

Note. Mean (SD). Scales are 1-5, where 1 = Mainly or only Arabic; 2 = Arabic usually/English sometimes; 3 = Arabic and English equally; 4 = English usually/Arabic sometimes; 5 = Mainly or only English

The Richness of the English Environment Outside School

Table 7.3 shows the mean rating scale scores for the frequency of language rich activities in English and Arabic in an average week, along with the results of a paired Wilcoxon test. Overall, children did not frequently engage in language-rich activities in either language since the means range from 1-3 on a 5-point scale. For the individual scales, children engaged in reading/writing more frequently in English than in Arabic. They engaged in listening/speaking activities, extra-curricular activities, and playing with friends more frequently in Arabic. Overall, the richness scores for English and Arabic were similar (.42 vs. .42; $V = 4472$, $p = .73$).

Table 7.3 Frequency of language rich activities in English and Arabic per week

Activity type	English	Arabic	Paired Wilcoxon tests
Speaking/listening	2.77 (1.23)	3.14 (1.16)	$V = 1985$, $p = .020$ *
Reading/writing	2.05 (.88)	1.47 (.78)	$V = 2483.5$, $p < .001$ ***
Extra-curriculars	1.65 (.94)	1.87 (.92)	$V = 1122$, $p = .018$ *
Playing with friends	1.97 (.94)	2.32 (1.07)	$V = 985$, $p = .003$ **

Note. Mean (SD). Scales are 1-5, where 1 = 0-1 hours (never/almost never); 2 = 1-5 hours (a little); 3 = 5-10 hours (regularly); 4 = 10-20 hours (often); 5 = 20+ (very often). *** = $p < .001$; ** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; ns = $p > .05$.

Parent Education and English L2 Fluency

There was a range in parent education levels, but the largest percentage of fathers was those who had attended only elementary school (41.43%), followed by secondary school (32.86%), college/university (21.43%) and other professional training (4.29%). Similarly, for mothers, the largest percentage had attended only elementary school (39.73%), followed by secondary school (31.51%), college/university (23.29%) and other professional training (4.11%). Also, one mother had not completed any formal education. Fathers had, on average 10.11 ($SD = 3.91$) years of education compared to mothers who had 9.89 ($SD = 3.99$) years. Regarding English language training in

Canada, fathers and mothers reported similar amounts, 12.07 months ($SD = 9.50$) versus 12.20 months ($SD = 9.32$), respectively. Fathers and mothers also reported similar self-rated English proficiency scores, 2.9 ($SD = 1.05$) and 2.69 ($SD = 1.01$) respectively, which fell between “limited English fluency” and “somewhat fluent in English” on our 5-point scale. Some parents had no English language training since arriving in Canada (8.70% of fathers and 10.96% of mothers). As a group, parents in our sample do not have high levels of education and were not fluent English speakers.

Children’s English L2 Vocabulary and Grammar

Children had a mean raw score of 73.30 ($SD = 26.02$) and a mean standard score of 58.31 ($SD = 17.66$) on the English receptive vocabulary test, the PPVT. The monolingual normal range for standard scores is 85-115 ($-1SD$ to $+1SD$) with a mean of 100. Thus, the standard score mean of 58.31 achieved by the group of Syrian children is $-2SD$ s below the population mean for their monolingual age peers. A total of 8 children out of 133 had PPVT scores at or above 85. On our grammatical measure, the TEGI, children had a mean score of 43.39% ($SD = 33.29$). The criterion scores to meet age-based expectations for ages 6 and up are 85%-97%, and thus, the mean score is well below criterion. A total of 11 out of 133 children scored at or above the relevant criterion score.

The standard deviations in vocabulary and grammatical test scores indicate there is much variation in performance and so we conducted correlational analyses to understand what home environment, schooling and pre-migration factors were associated with performance on these English tests. Spearman’s rho nonparametric correlations were used because variables were on different scales/distribution patterns. For the PPVT, raw scores were used in the correlations. Results in Table 7.4 show significant small-to-moderate correlations between most of these factors and English L2 outcomes.

Table 7.4 Correlations between home environment, schooling, pre-migration factors and English L2 outcomes

	Vocabulary	Grammar
Arabic vs. English use at home (mean of all scales)	.318***	.282**
Richness of English environment	.520***	.351**
Mother’s years of education	.196*	.188*
Father’s years of education	.303***	.219*
Mother’s English L2 fluency	.321***	.349***
Father’s English L2 fluency	.276**	.197*
Length of English schooling	.503***	.267**
Length of Arabic schooling	.084 ns	.235**
Length of time in refugee camp	-.001 ns	-.013 ns

Note. *** = $p < .001$; ** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$; ns = $p > .05$.

7.3 Comparison Between the Syrian Group and a Diverse Group of Canadian ELLs

Results from this study with Syrian refugee children are compared to those from research with a more diverse group of 169 ELLs using the same or very similar measures reported in Paradis (2011). The children in Paradis (2011) were residing in Edmonton or Toronto, had primarily immigrant rather than refugee backgrounds and had the following L1 backgrounds: Arabic, Cantonese, Hindi, Mandarin, Punjabi, Spanish and Urdu. These children had nearly 2 years of English schooling like the Syrian children, but they were younger as a group (4 ½ to 7 years old) and about half were Canadian-born, indicating that their families had longer residency in Canada than the Syrian sample. Exposure time to the L2 is a more important comparison factor than age for gauging abilities in the L2; however, results from the entire sample of Syrian children as well as a subsample of only those who were 6 and 7 years old are included in Table 7.5 to mitigate the effects of age differences.

Table 7.5 Comparison between the Syrian group and the ELL group from Paradis (2011)

	Paradis (2011) (N=169)	Syrian-all (N=133)	Syrian – younger (N=39)
Length of English schooling	19.6 (11.7)	17.63 (6.53)	15.46 (6.57)
Proportion English use at home	.36(.23)	.07 (.12)	.07 (.13)
Richness of English environment	.62(.15) ^a	.42 (.13)	.39 (.11)
Mother's education in years	14.0(4)	9.89 (3.99)	9.54 (3.90)
Mother's English L2 fluency	3.31 (2.1) ^b	2.69 (1.01)	2.42 (.91)
Vocabulary – PPVT raw scores	62.88 (20.29)	73.30 (26.02)	61.49 (19.97)
Vocabulary – PPVT standard scores	87.78 (16.27)	58.31 (17.66)	68.18 (12.82)
Grammar – TEGI	55% (34) ^c	43% (33)	32% (29)

Note. Mean (SD).

^aFewer scales are included in the richness measure used in Paradis (2011) than in the present study since some activities would not be expected for younger children

^bMother's L2 fluency was on a 0-4 scale in Paradis (2011), but they have been converted to 1-5

^cFor TEGI, scores are from Paradis et al. (2013) because the scores from Paradis (2011) included an additional sub-test. These two studies were based on the same ELL sample.

The comparison indicates that the home language environment supporting L2 acquisition is weaker for the Syrian children than for the more diverse group of ELLs since there is less English spoken, less frequent language rich activities and mothers have lower levels of education and more limited L2 fluency in the Syrian group. The raw scores on the vocabulary measure, PPVT, are higher for the Syrian group, but the

standard score is about 30 points lower, meaning the raw vocabulary size for older children is less likely to meet age norms than that of the younger children in Paradis (2011). Put differently, the older children in the Syrian sample are pulling up the raw scores (age x raw score, $r = .250$, $p = .004$) but pulling down the standard scores (age x standard score, $r = -.500$, $p < .001$). Finally, the Syrian group's score on our grammar measure, TEGI, is 12 points lower than that of the diverse ELL group. There is very little difference in the home language factors for the entire Syrian group and the younger sub-sample, but there are differences in the English L2 outcomes. The mean raw score on the PPVT for the younger Syrian children is nearly identical to the Paradis (2011) sample. The mean standard score for the Paradis (2011) sample is still higher than that of the Syrian subsample, likely due to the lower age bound in the former. In contrast, the TEGI scores are even lower for the subsample than for the total Syrian group.

7.4 General Discussion

The motivation for this study comes from the absence of research in the Canadian context on the L2 acquisition of recently arrived refugee children. Our goals were twofold: 1) Examine Syrian children's home language environment and L2 vocabulary and grammatical outcomes in their early stages of L2 learning, and 2) Compare these findings to existing research with a more diverse group of ELLs in Canada. Since oral language forms the foundation for literacy and academic progress, this study has implications for educators and parents.

Not surprisingly, we found that these newly arrived Syrian children are living in Arabic-dominant households with a small shift towards the use of English among siblings only. Even though English is not used frequently at home, greater use of English at home (among siblings) was related to larger English vocabularies and more accurate English grammar. Beyond conversational language, the Syrian children do not engage in language enriching activities frequently in either language, especially when compared to the other ELL children from Paradis (2011). Nevertheless, increased richness of the L2 environment was associated with stronger vocabulary and grammatical skills, in line with previous research (Jia & Aaronson, 2003; Jia & Fuse, 2007; Kaltsa et al., 2019; Paradis, 2011; Paradis et al., 2017; Prevoo et al., 2014). Finally, the parents of the Syrian children have lower levels of education and English fluency compared to the parents of the ELLs participating in Paradis (2011). These distal parent factors also contributed to the children's L2 development, as in other studies (Chondrogianni & Marinis, 2011; Paradis, 2011; Prevoo et al., 2014; Sorenson Duncan & Paradis, 2018). Previous research on ELLs and parent factors has typically reported an association between maternal factors and children's outcomes, but not paternal factors (Sorenson Duncan & Paradis, 2018). It is possible that fathers are more present in the home and more involved with the children in these Syrian families for reasons of culture, pre-migration experiences or lack of employment. Our

results signal that further research into the role of fathers in Syrian children's language development could be worthwhile.

In addition to home language environment, we found that more Arabic schooling predicted stronger English grammar. This positive correlation could explain, in part, the lower grammar scores for the younger Syrian subsample (Table 7.5), since these children had, on average, just 5.26 months (SD = 7.66) of Arabic schooling prior to arrival in Canada. It is worth noting that these correlations were small, and our measures are broad, so these results are suggestive only. Future research on the effects of pre-migration adversity on L2 acquisition in refugee children should include more fine-grained measures.

Among the home factors we examined, language use at home and richness of the L2 environment outside school are the most malleable, and as such, have implications for advice to parents. Regarding research on English use at home in migrant families, there are conflicting findings. Some studies have found no relationship with L2 outcomes, and limited parent fluency in the L2 is likely responsible for this (Hoff et al., 2014; Paradis, 2011; Paradis & Kirova, 2014; Sorenson Duncan & Paradis, in press). Importantly, maintenance of the heritage L1 crucially depends on the use of the L1 at home (Albirini, 2014; Hoff et al., 2014) and maintaining the L1 has socio-emotional and cognitive benefits for migrant children (Bialystok, 2007; Tseng & Fulgini, 2000), as well as providing support for their L2 acquisition (Pasquarella, Chen, Gottardo, & Geva, 2015). Therefore, even if greater use of the L2 among siblings is giving a boost to these Syrian children at these early stages of L2 acquisition, our results should not be taken as a recommendation for a complete switch to the use of English at home among siblings or among all family members.

In contrast, since our results showed that richness of the L2 environment outside school contributes positively to the rate of L2 acquisition, and is measured separately from Arabic richness in the home, parents should be encouraged to facilitate greater richness in the home language environment in both languages to promote success in bilingual development. That being said, we need to consider that family resources can be very limited in recent-arrival families who have many children and might be living on government assistance. In addition, parents with primary school education might not be able to increase literacy-based language - rich activities at home as easily as parents with higher levels of education. For these reasons, it would be helpful for community organizations, libraries and schools to provide out-of-school rich language and literacy experiences for vulnerable ELL children who are recent arrivals, like many of these Syrian children.

After just 2 years of schooling in the L2, neither the Syrian group nor the diverse ELL group from Paradis (2011) showed performance like monolinguals in English, as would be expected since it can take up to 7 years for ELLs to converge with monolinguals for oral language abilities (see Murphy, 2014, for review). However, the Syrian children's achievement in English grammar was lower than that of the ELLs in Paradis (2011) who had the same amount of English schooling. The Syrian children's English vocabulary was lower in terms of age-corrected standard scores compared with the ELL sample from Paradis (2011). The raw vocabulary scores were slightly

higher for the total Syrian group and the same as those from Paradis (2011) for the younger Syrian subsample. It seems that the Syrian children are generally keeping pace with other ELLs when it comes to accumulating English vocabulary, but the older Syrian children are accumulating L2 vocabulary faster than the younger Syrian children. Previous research has also found older children to show a faster rate of L2 acquisition (Chondrogianni & Marinis, 2011; Golberg et al., 2008; Paradis, 2011). However, the older Syrian children have to navigate advanced curriculum content at school with substantially smaller vocabularies and weaker grammatical abilities than their monolingual age peers and with gaps in their schooling. Therefore, even if they are learning their L2 vocabulary a bit faster, their academic progress could be at greater risk than that of the younger Syrian children (cf. Kanu, 2008; Pasquarella, Gottardo, & Gant, 2012). Our comparisons between the Syrian children and the ELL group from Paradis (2011) have several limitations due to differences in ages, L1 backgrounds and length of residency between the samples. A comparison between a better-matched group of ELLs from immigrant backgrounds and these Syrian children would be more informative.

In conclusion, since schools in the Canadian context have likely set their expectations of ELL students' L2 learning and academic performance on a more diverse sample of ELLs, it is important for them to be informed of where Syrian refugee children might differ. These findings from the first wave of our multi-site study suggest that Syrian children might need additional support for their L2 learning.

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Appendix

Table A1

Excerpts from the Alberta Language Environment Questionnaire – 4

1 Parental fluency in English

How well does the mother/father speak/understand English? (self-rating)

1	2	3	4	5
Not Fluent in English	Limited Fluency in English	Somewhat Fluent in English	Quite Fluent in English	Very Fluent in English
No understanding or speaking ability	Some understanding and can say short, simple sentences or phrases	Good understanding and can express myself on topics about myself, my family and my home	Very good understanding and can use English adequately for work and new situations. Can talk about complex ideas	Understand almost everything, even humour. Very comfortable expressing myself in English in all situations
	<i>e.g.</i> Can answer the phone in English; can buy groceries at a store Words are strung together even if incorrectly	<i>e.g.</i> Can go to the doctor and describe what is wrong Mostly comprehensible even with grammatical errors	<i>e.g.</i> Can communicate effectively with teachers at parent teacher interviews; could work in the service-industry; can follow movies or television shows May still have some grammatical errors.	Can speak confidently in new situations. Use English to talk about intangibles

Note: Top row has descriptors of categories. Bottom row has examples of language use in each category

2 Language use among family members at home

1. What language does the mother speak to the child?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English some-times ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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2. What language does the child speak to the mother?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English some-times ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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3. What language does the father speak to the child?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English some-times ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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4. What language does the child speak to the father?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English some-times ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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5. What language do the younger siblings speak to the child?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English some-times ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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6. What language does the child speak to the younger siblings?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English sometimes ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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7. What language do the older siblings speak to the child?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English sometimes ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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8. What language does the child speak to the older siblings?

1 Mainly or Only Arabic ENG: 0-20% ARAB: 80-100%	2 Usually Arabic / English sometimes ENG: 30% ARAB: 70%	3 Arabic and English equally ENG: 50% ARAB: 50%	4 Usually English/ Arabic sometimes ENG: 70% ARAB: 30%	5 Mainly or only English ENG: 80-100% ARAB: 0-20%
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3 Richness of the language and literacy environment

1. How much time does your child spend doing speaking/listening activities in English in a week?

Examples: *watching TV shows, movies, YouTube, Netflix, music, phone, Skype, What's App (oral), singing, poetry, story-telling*

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

2. How much time does your child spend doing speaking/listening activities in Arabic in a week?

Examples: *watching TV shows, movies, YouTube, music, ?, phone, Skype, What's App (oral), singing, poetry, story-telling*

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

3. How much time does your child spend doing reading/writing activities in English in a week?

Examples: *Reading books (for school or pleasure), websites, messaging (texts, email, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat), homework*

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

4. How much time does your child spend doing reading/writing activities in Arabic in a week?

Examples: *Reading books (for school or pleasure), websites, messaging (texts, email, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat), homework, Koran*

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

5. How much time does your child spend attending religious services, prayers, or community events in Arabic in a week?

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

6. How much time does your child spend doing extra-curricular activities in English in a week?

Examples: sport, dance, music, after school programs (Boys & Girls Club, homework club)

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

7. How much time does your child spend in heritage language classes in Arabic in a week? (Outside school)

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

8. How much time does your child spend playing with friends in English in a week?

Example: *before/after school or at recess, family friends, neighbourhood friends*

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

9. How much time does your child spend playing with friends in Arabic in a week?

Example: *before/after school or at recess, family friends, neighbourhood friends*

1	2	3	4	5
0-1 hours	1-5 hours	5-10 hours	10-20	20+
Never/almost never	A little	Regularly	Often	Very often

8 Lost in Ambiguity: Facilitating Access or Upholding Barriers to Health Care for Asylum Seekers in Germany?

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Abstract

Germany has been receiving asylum seekers for many years, with numbers increasing in particular during 2014-16. Recent spikes in numbers have not led to the development of reception policies that ensure equitable health care access for refugees, constituting a missed opportunity. Since the 1990s, health care entitlements for people seeking asylum in Germany have been restricted during the first months of their stay, covering mainly acute conditions, immunizations, and care during pregnancy and child birth. There is mounting evidence that these restrictions constitute an additional barrier to access (beyond, e.g. language barriers), leading to increased cost of care and the risk of exacerbating health problems. In Germany's federal system, states respond differently to the challenges of providing care to asylum seekers. This is partly due to different political attitudes of decision-makers towards refugees; and partly due to varying interpretations of the available (and not always sufficient) evidence provided by different actors. Underlying this ambiguous landscape is an unresolved tension within the policy domains, and a lack of political leadership, combined with a decentralized health and migration policy system.

Keywords: Asylum Seekers; Health Care Access; Health and Migration Governance

8.1 Introduction

Germany has a long history of immigration concerning both labour and forced migration. It has been a major destination country for asylum seekers since the 1990s, with peaking numbers in the most recent large-scale migration movements. Germany was the largest single recipient of new asylum claims among industrialized countries between 2013 and 2016 (UNHCR, 2014, 2016) and, in 2017, it was the second-largest after the United States (UNHCR, 2018).

The health of asylum seekers is determined by a wide range of pre-migration factors (individual risks and life-styles in country of origin, living conditions and health care system in country of origin, reasons for migration), but also by the route of migration and the conditions in the host countries in the post-migration phase (Zimmerman, Kiss, & Hossain, 2011). As such, health patterns and needs differ among the very heterogeneous group of asylum seekers. In addition to general primary health care needs, frequent conditions include mental issues (depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder), physical consequences of war and trauma, infectious diseases, but also chronic conditions such as hypertension and diabetes (Abubakar et al., 2018; Goosen, 2014; Bozorgmehr et al., 2016). While general migrants show a mortality advantage compared to the host population, asylum seekers and refugees show higher mortality rates compared to their respective host populations (Aldridge et al., 2018). In Germany, a wide range of policies for health assessment among asylum seekers exists in the 16 federal states. However, these assessments only focus on infectious disease and not on other health needs (Bozorgmehr, Wahedi, Noest, Szecsenyi, & Razum, 2017; Wahedi, Noest, & Bozorgmehr, 2017).

Since the 1990s, a parallel system for the health, humanitarian and welfare needs of asylum seekers was created through the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. This national law, in fact, reduced health and welfare services to a level below that of the majority population and replaced monetary benefits by services in kind. Since then, access to health care is limited by national law after initial entry to the country. Currently, this initial phase comprises 15 months in which entitlements to health care are restricted: asylum seekers are entitled to treatment for acute and painful conditions, vaccinations, preventive care and check-ups for children, as well as services during pregnancy and childbirth. Further so-called "essential services" may be offered on request and on a case-by-case basis, depending on individual assessments carried out by welfare agencies and public health authorities (Bozorgmehr, Wenner, & Razum, 2017; Razum & Bozorgmehr, 2016). As there is no explicit national list defining what these essential health care services include, it is left up to the relevant local authorities to determine the precise package of services available to asylum seekers.

In addition to these entitlement restrictions, asylum seekers face further barriers in accessing health care: a health care voucher is required to visit a doctor (except in emergencies), and they must personally apply for the voucher at the local welfare agency or state-level authority. Usually, the voucher is valid for a specific visit to a doctor or for three months. After 15 months, all asylum seekers are entitled to an electronic health card – with exceptions for asylum seekers from so-called "safe

countries of origin” (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ghana, Kosovo, Macedonia – former Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegro, Senegal, and Serbia) and/or the presumed success of the asylum claim (Bozorgmehr, Dieterich, & Offe, 2019; Offe, Dieterich, Bozorgmehr, & Trabert, 2018). The e-health card allows for direct access to health care providers (without the need for a voucher) and entails coverage by the same service package provided to residents who are insured under the statutory health insurance system.

As a response to the large-scale immigration in 2015, several federal states and local authorities have been introducing e-health cards for asylum seekers shortly after their arrival (i.e. before the 15 month period) to replace the bureaucratic voucher system. This policy change has been accompanied by extensive discussions and negotiations between multiple actors at the national, state and district/commune level. More specifically, the policy change is an illustrative case which highlights how two policy domains – health and immigration– may collide and, in combination with a fragmented, decentralized governance system (for both health and immigration), translate into a heterogeneous and ambiguous policy landscape for health care access of asylum seekers. This chapter aims to provide insights into the negotiation processes around the policy change. It highlights the institutional responses which led to synergistic or conflicting dynamics and concludes with lessons learnt from the perspective of health in all policies.

8.2 The Evolution of E-health Cards for Asylum Seekers

Civil society organizations working in health and human rights have been criticizing the use of health care vouchers since the 1990s for potentially delaying access to health care and creating an unnecessary administrative barrier for asylum seekers (Pross, 1998). The federal state of Bremen, one of the smallest German states, was the first to introduce e-health cards for asylum seekers in 2005. The rationale of the then coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the respective senator of the state, was to overcome the cumbersome voucher system. Based on national legislation of the social security code V (Sozialgesetzbuch V), the state welfare agency registered asylum seekers with a local sickness fund (Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse, AOK Bremen/Bremerhaven) and paid a lump sum per person to cover administrative costs – a procedure that has been practiced since then with considerable success. The state continues to act as cost bearer, but payments are channelled through the efficient sickness fund system and not through a cumbersome voucher system. As with welfare payments for unemployed residents, the sickness fund reimburses health care providers for services provided to asylum seekers and charges the authorities at regular intervals as is the case with the reimbursement scheme of the overall health care system. Entitlement restrictions are thus reduced to a minimum, and the service package offered to asylum seekers differs only slightly from that offered to residents. More importantly, no systematic differences in physical access are being made between asylum seekers and residents, and individuals showing up in hospitals or clinical practices are not

automatically identified as asylum seekers by the health personnel, which facilitates equality and non-discrimination in access to health care in line with the regulations of the right to health (Hunt, 2006).

In 2012, seven years after the introduction of e-health cards in Bremen, and with the beginning, rising numbers of asylum seekers, the federal state of Hamburg adopted the so-called Bremen Model and also introduced e-health cards for asylum seekers. The contract, however, was set up with the AOK Bremen/Bremerhaven, as the sickness funds in Hamburg declined to register asylum seekers and administer the scheme. Following the introduction of the electronic health card, the state authority in Hamburg carried out an internal evaluation and concluded that administrative costs had been substantially reduced. The cost savings were over €1 million a year, yet per capita, health care expenditure for asylum seekers remained largely unchanged (Burmester, 2015, 2016), showing that improved physical access to health care did not translate into rising per capita expenditures or “over-utilization” of health care.

8.3 The Changing Policy Climate and Opportunities for more Equitable Health Policy

At the same time, debates on the need to reform the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act intensified. This was triggered by a Constitutional Court judgment stating that differences in the level of cash benefits paid to residents and to asylum seekers to cover living costs were unconstitutional unless the difference in benefits payments was based on an objective measure of need (The Federal Constitutional Court, 2012a, 2012b). In other words: general and systematic differences in welfare payments based on crude categories such as residence status were judged as illegitimate and illegal with respect to the constitution. Since the underlying rationale for differentiated access to welfare services was based on deterrence, rather than an objective measure of need, the act was reformed, and cash benefits were equalized between residents and asylum seekers. Over the course of the debate, inequalities associated with the health care entitlement restrictions and physical access to health care under the voucher system became increasingly a matter of public concern, and civil society organizations, as well as political parties – such as the Greens and the leftist party Die Linke – called for the abolishment of those sections in the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Acts which restricted access to health care.

Instead of complete abolishment, however, the then government (a coalition between the CDU and SPD) passed a reform (which came into force in March 2015) to reduce the period of entitlement restrictions from 36 months to 15 months (Bozorgmehr & Razum, 2015). While this facilitated improved access by reducing the waiting time to receive the e-health card compared to the period before March 2015, this period was still longer than the waiting time, which existed in the 1990s. Hence, the extent to which access was improved was relative, i.e. some progress was achieved

compared to the immediate period before 2015, but no progress existed compared to the 1990s (Bozorgmehr & Razum, 2015; Bozorgmehr et al., 2017).

However, the public debate about whether to issue e-health cards to asylum seekers immediately after their arrival in Germany gained traction in 2014 when refugee arrivals spiked, and during 2015 when 890 000 asylum seekers were registered (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2016), with thousands arriving on a daily basis (Nicolai, Fuchs, & von Mutius, 2015). Last but not least, new and timely data analysis proved that restricting asylum seekers' entitlement to health care compared to granting full access to services resulted in higher health care expenditure over the previous two decades (Bauhoff & Gopffarth, 2018; Bozorgmehr & Razum, 2015). This scientific evidence was in contradiction to the widespread argument that granting full access would necessarily, and inevitably, increase health care costs. However, the evidence is completely plausible from a public health and health systems research perspective, which is united in the sense that good access to high-quality primary health care services reduces health care costs, while delayed care and emergency care is known to be more costly.

8.4 Institutional Responses at National Level

The evidence that restrictions are associated with higher per capita health care expenditure among asylum seekers resonated in the German media, from newspapers to TV reports, spurring national political debate, and prompting an expert hearing in the German federal parliament's health subcommittee in June 2016. However, discussions about the potential advantages and disadvantages of the e-health card were heated. Proponents brought forward the existing scientific evidence and experiences from Hamburg and Bremen, arguing that e-health cards reduced bureaucracy and related administrative costs and ensured both improved and non-discriminatory access to health care for asylum seekers. Opponents brought forward a wide range of practical, technical, and political arguments. Large federal states questioned the transferability of the policy measure introduced in the smallest federal states (Bremen, Hamburg) to their contexts. They argued that they were not in a position to introduce e-health cards due to the different levels of administrative responsibility for health care immediately after an asylum seeker's arrival (responsibility at state level) compared with responsibility in the course of their stay in Germany (responsibility at district and municipal level). Further arguments advanced against the e-health card included, (i) the (assumed) technical problems of issuing cards to a population which is often dispersed and relocated between and within states, (ii) increasing pull factors that would encourage further migration to Germany, and (iii) exacerbating health care costs due to the (assumed but already disproven) increased use of health care by asylum seekers. In a nutshell, while the health policy domain came up with an efficient and effective measure to improve health care access, its widespread adoption and implementation was questioned and delegitimized by concerns and objections from the migration policy domain.

As of 2019, the public debate and political negotiations in parliament has not resulted in legal reform to ensure a nationwide implementation of the e-health card for asylum seekers. Instead of national legislation and country-wide implementation of the e-health card, the ruling coalition government settled on a compromise. It initiated a reform in the social security code that allowed interested federal states to issue e-health cards to asylum seekers at the state or district level before the first 15 months had elapsed, while obliging sickness funds in the states to enter into a contract with those authorities planning to introduce health cards. The core of the national level institutional response was, therefore, to decentralize the decision to introduce e-health cards. This was a missed opportunity to dissolve the political tensions between health and migration policy domains that led to contradicting positions at national level. The missed opportunity to introduce the e-health cards on national level had a significant impact on efforts to facilitate access to health care for asylum seekers at the sub-national level.

8.5 Institutional Responses at Federal State Level

As the Federal Government passed the decision of introducing e-health cards to the 16 federal states, discussions about the advantages and disadvantages and negotiations relating to potential implementation models continued at the sub-national level. Due to different local contexts and dynamics of proponents and opponents, the relative dominance of one line of argument over the other was very heterogeneous in the different federal states. While in some contexts the health policy perspective was given more weight, in others the concerns and objections against the e-health card stemming from the immigration policy domain dominated. This translated into a very diverse policy landscape with respect to the way asylum seekers access health care across Germany.

To date (2019), just four federal states (Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, Brandenburg and Thuringia) have opted to introduce e-health cards. These early adopters also initiated reforms in the form of state-level regulatory frameworks to cover all health care costs at state level. Three more states (the most populous federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia, as well as Rhineland-Palatinate and Lower Saxony) decided to leave the decision on whether or not to introduce the card to individual communities/municipalities. In other words, they passed down the responsibility of decision making on the lowest administrative level. They did not implement state-level structures for financing, except for single lump-sum payments and regulations to cover extraordinarily high costs for individuals on a case-by-case basis (Wächter-Raquet, 2016). As a result, 22 out of 396 communities/municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia have introduced the e-health card. Research on the reasons for, and consequences of, (non-)adoption is ongoing (Wenner et al., 2019). The reform was also only partly adopted in the other states which further devolved the decision: in Rhineland-Palatinate, just 1 out of 2305 communities/municipalities has adopted the e-health card, while in Lower Saxony, the figure is 1 out of 944. In the state of Hessen, negotia-

tions are ongoing (2019), and implementation at the state, district or municipal level remains to be decided.

Six states (Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saarland, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt) decided not to introduce e-health cards for asylum seekers and ended negotiations in 2016. The arguments put forward in these states were often politically motivated, rather than supported by evidence. These were presumed acceleration of the asylum processes making the introduction of e-health cards dispensable before a decision on asylum claims is made (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania), cost (Saarland), concerns that the e-health card encourages immigration (Saxony), and claims that a high level of access was already ensured by the current voucher system (Bavaria). Opposition to the electronic health card in Baden-Württemberg – the third-largest federal state, which receives about 13% of all asylum seekers in Germany – was particularly surprising. The then governing Greens strongly advocated in favor of introducing the e-health card before elections to the state parliament in 2016. However, after the election, the Greens formed a coalition with the conservative CDU, and the new coalition government opposed the cards (Hyde, 2016; Bozorgmehr & Razum, 2016). In the six federal states that do not use the e-health card, asylum seekers must still apply in person at the local welfare agency for a health care voucher before accessing a health care service.

8.6 Lessons Learnt from the Perspective of Health in All Policies

From the perspective of Health in All Policies (HiAP), some important lessons can be learnt from the policy response of Germany as one of the largest recipients of asylum seekers in Europe. HiAP refers to policy coherence between domains outside the health sector (trade, economics, education, etc.) and the health sector itself. The concept roots back to the Ottawa Charter of Health Promotion (WHO Europe, 1986), and argues first, that good health at the population level can only be achieved when different societal sectors shape their policies synergistically with respect to potential health effects; and second, that the health sector alone cannot compensate for major shortcomings or potential health hazards stemming from other sectors. More recently, evidence from a systematic review and meta-analysis showed the potential harmful effects on health of non-health related migration policies (Juárez et al., 2019), highlighting the need for stronger coherence between the different policy domains (Bozorgmehr & Jahn, 2019). As for Germany, the case of introduction of e-health cards shows what happens when health policies are influenced, discussed, or mandated from the realm of migration policy which has completely different normative, ethical and political underpinnings and thus often collides with the aims of health policy (Bozorgmehr & Jahn, 2019). This tension, which could not be resolved at the national level due to a lack of political leadership, led to a situation in which 16 federal states and more than 410 districts implemented an array of policies that either facilitated access or upheld barriers to it, contributing to the formation of an incoherent policy landscape. When asylum seekers are transferred between federal states, or between districts within federal states, access to health care changes

due to different policies. Given the major differences in implementation, their actual entitlements and access to health care are ultimately determined by chance, depending on the community/municipality they are assigned to (Razum, Wenner, & Bozorgmehr, 2016). This is partly due to different political attitudes of decision-makers towards refugees; and partly due to varying interpretations of the available (and not always sufficient) evidence from different actors. Underlying this ambiguous landscape is an unresolved tension within the different domains of policy, and a lack of political leadership, combined with decentralized health and migration policy system. The opportunity to reform the system and implement an efficient, effective and equitable policy towards refugees was missed in the early 1990s when the number of asylum seekers peaked after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The current landscape shows Germany as a country whose institutions are “lost” between attempts to uphold access barriers to health care to deter migrants and attempts to facilitate access to health services by making the system more efficient and equitable. This divide may be regarded as reflection of the overall polarization among societies on how to deal with forced migration. In this case, an initially well-intended reform increased health inequalities within the group of asylum seekers by making their health care access even more dependent on the context to which they are assigned.

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9 Health Care and the Canadian Syrian Resettlement Initiative: Understanding Syrian Newcomers' Needs and Health Care Access in Context

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Abstract

Three studies looked at the health, health needs and healthcare access of Syrian refugees in their first months of arrival in Toronto. Study 1 surveyed 400 Syrian refugees for healthcare access and needs within the first few months of arrival. Approximately six months later, in study 2, we followed-up with 200 of the original Study 1 sample further exploring self-rated health status and the impact of social determinants of health, and unmet health needs. Study 3 looked at social determinants of healthcare access, satisfaction and comfort in 541 Syrian refugees in the first 18 months of arrival. In all three samples, self-rated physical and mental health were relatively positive. While there was good primary healthcare access, many reported unmet needs. Few accessed mental health services. Unmet needs were higher for those with poorer health status, but this did not predict health status over time. Satisfaction and comfort with healthcare were high, especially among those with lower education, but lower for those with poorer mental health, perhaps suggesting poorer mental health care services. Finally, although no respondents reported discrimination in healthcare settings, the findings are consistent with previously observed challenges around language interpretation, dental care, and the national Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) insurance.

Keywords: Healthcare Access; Social Determinants of Health; Resettled Refugees

Between November 2015 and January 2017, Canada resettled over 40,000 refugees from Syria (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017a). The Syrian resettlement initiative is not the first time Canada has welcomed displaced people from a single conflict in relatively large numbers. Most famously, Canada accepted about 60,000 refugees fleeing conflict in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1979-1980. Although the numbers in the Syrian response seem relatively small compared to the numbers of asylum seekers in other countries, like Turkey or Lebanon, Syrian newcomers arrived in a very short period of time and with little advance notice to the agencies and sponsors receiving them. This chapter focuses on health care responses in the largest city in Canada (Toronto), the region that received the most significant number of Syrian refugees in this initiative, and situates that response in Canada's immigration and health care context, and in the context of our broader knowledge about Syrian refugees' health.

9.1 Introduction

Canada receives refugees through two different routes, as in-land refugee claimants or as resettled refugees. Asylum seekers who claim refugee status once they arrive in Canada are in-land refugee claimants. In 2018, there were 55,030 claims, an unusually high number (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019). These arrivals are unplanned and can, therefore, be challenging to respond to in terms of service provision but are relatively small in terms of absolute numbers.

The second route through which refugees come to Canada is through resettlement. Resettled refugees are selected and screened overseas while they are residing in an asylum country. On arrival to Canada, resettled refugees receive landed immigrant status plus one year of settlement and financial support. Although Canada is currently resettling the largest number of refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2019), the absolute numbers also tend to be small. In 2014, the year before the Syrian resettlement initiative began, 23,286 resettled refugees entered Canada. Within the category of resettled refugees, there are several streams, but two dominate. Historically, about half of resettled refugees came through government sponsorship (Government Assisted Refugees, or GARs), and half through private sponsorship (Privately Sponsored Refugees, or PSRs). During the Syrian resettlement initiative, 21,876 resettled as GARs, 14,274 as PSRs, and 3,931 were Blended Visa Office Referred refugees (BVORs) (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017a).

GARs and PSRs have some essential differences from the perspective of health and health services. One key element of Private Sponsorship is the principle of naming; sponsors can identify or name a particular eligible person for sponsorship, and so private sponsorship is often a form of family reunification (Labman, 2016). PSRs typically have a pre-existing social or family network in Canada, better English or French language skills than GARs, and a higher socioeconomic status. In contrast, GARs are selected based on their vulnerability, which includes the presence of severe or chronic illnesses in the family, and thus GARs are more likely to have complex health concerns. Nonetheless, the federal government collects and forwards health-

related information about resettled refugees and can notify settlement agencies about particular health needs in advance of the refugees' arrival to aid in identifying needed services. PSRs may benefit from the highly personalized attention of their sponsoring group, but GARs may benefit from the experience and networks of the settlement agencies coordinating their settlement. We, therefore, were interested in exploring the health care access and outcomes for recently arrived Syrian GAR and PSR newcomers.

The differences between GARs and PSRs are even more significant among the Syrian cohort, particularly in education levels and language skills (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, Canada, 2016). These are variables that can have implications for the accessibility of health services. Language ability and lack of interpretation are among the major barriers that have been reported for access to health care for refugees (Hynie, 2014; McKeary & Newbold, 2010). The second focus of our research into health and health care for newly arrived Syrians was thus whether differences in health care access between GARs and PSRs were due to socio-demographic differences between the groups.

The impact of post-migration conditions on refugee mental health has been well-documented (Bogic, Njoku, & Priebe, 2015; Hynie, 2018; Li, Liddell, & Nickerson, 2016). Refugee mental health post settlement in a third country is better with better socio-economic status in the country of settlement, more employment and greater social inclusion. There is less evidence about parallel effects for physical health. However, research into the social determinants of health have noted that poverty and inequality have an impact on morbidity and mortality not just through exposure to more noxious and less healthful environments but also through psychological variables like stress, suggesting similar determinants for refugees' physical health post-migration (Braveman & Gottlieb, 2014; Miller, Chen, & Cole, 2009). The final aspect of our research was thus also to explore whether differences between GARs and PSRs may be due to some critical post-migration conditions, keeping in mind that as recent newcomers, most refugees would not be employed.

9.2 Canada's Health Care System

Health care in Canada is provided through Medicare, a single-payer universal insurance program (Government of Canada, 2016) that is provided at no charge at the point of service by provincial or territorial insurance programs to their residents. This care includes full coverage for medically necessary services provided by hospitals, physicians, and dentists providing hospital-based services. Other services including vision and dental care, prescription drugs, ambulance services and home care are not covered and must be paid for either out of pocket or through private insurance. However, supplemental coverage is offered by provincial governments to specific groups (seniors, children, those receiving social assistance) for many of these services. The third group of functions are primarily private. These include dental care (excluding hospital-based dental surgery), vision care for adults (when provided by

optometrists or other non-physicians), and outpatient physiotherapy (Government of Canada, 2016; Martin et al., 2018).

Although the health care insurance programs are provincial/territorial, there is also national coverage for some groups in Canada through the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) that supplements provincial insurance, or provides coverage for those who may not meet eligibility requirements for provincial/territorial coverage, including refugees and refugee claimants (Government of Canada, 2019). Resettled refugees are eligible for provincial health insurance because they arrive as permanent residents but also receive one year of IFHP for coverage to bridge them until their provincial coverage begins and for supplemental services, such as vision care, home care and prescription drugs, in a manner similar to how it is provided for those on social assistance (Government of Canada, 2019; Government of Ontario, 2019; WelcomeBC, 1999). IFHP is also available to refugee claimants until their claim is approved and they achieve permanent resident status.

Challenges with IFHP

In order to receive payment for seeing a patient with IFHP, the health care provider must be registered with IFHP (Medavie Blue Cross, 2016). Not only is this a separate process for making claims, but it is deemed to be complex, requiring time-consuming paperwork for claims and a slow time to reimbursement, which has been found to be a barrier to health care providers registering for IFHP (McKeary & Newbold, 2010; Miederna, Hamilton, & Easley, 2008). Health care providers may also not know about IFHP or do not see the need for it, especially if they rarely see refugees. The lack of exposure to refugees may be due not only to their small numbers, but also their limited distribution across Canada. GARs are resettled in only a small number of cities, 36 cities during the Syrian resettlement initiative (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2016). PSRs are much more widely distributed because they reside in the same communities as their sponsors but then typically in much smaller numbers per community (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2016). Moreover, resettled refugees transition quickly to the provincial plan, and thus most will be using provincial health insurance in the majority of their interactions with the primary health care system. A small survey recently conducted with family care physicians in the Greater Toronto Area found that approximately 60% of family practitioners were not registered with IFHP, and of those, almost 30% stated that they had not even heard of it (Reddit et al., 2019).

The use of the IFHP was further undermined by a series of policy changes that began in 2012 with the adoption of Bill C-31 by the Conservative federal government. This Bill was intended to deter refugee claimants and included a series of changes to health insurance coverage for different categories of refugees and claimants (Government of Canada, 2012). GARs saw no changes to their coverage. Every other group did, but in different ways. The changes were so complicated that some health care providers refused to accept IFHP for anyone, even those who had full coverage (Hynie, 2016; Stewart, De Souza, & Yudin, 2018). The changes were reversed by a

Supreme Court decision, and ultimately, in April 2016, coverage was reinstated to all categories of refugees and refugee claimants by the Liberal government. However, some have suggested that there were lingering effects of this period of confusion and that providers continued to be less likely to accept IFHP as a result (Antonipillai et al., 2018).

9.3 Health Needs of Syrian Refugees

Canada has a large newcomer population and thus culturally appropriate care and the provision of interpretation services are common issues. Nonetheless, although over 50% of Torontonians were born in another country, culturally and linguistically accessible health care remains a challenge (Kalich, Heinemann, & Ghahari, 2016). Barriers to care for refugees may be even more challenging. Refugees can arrive with complex health issues that are the result of hazardous pre-migration and migration experiences, and a lack of appropriate health care while in asylum, which can require specialized medical knowledge (Pottie et al., 2011).

Pre-migration exposure to violence, war, unsanitary or dangerous living conditions, or poor nutrition can have serious health consequences that require immediate treatment (Pottie et al., 2011). Syrian refugees risked direct exposure to violence, such as through assault by combatants or other community members, torture or bombing. During the conflict in Syria, they were also exposed to extreme poverty, malnutrition, and lack of safe drinking water. Moreover, more than half of hospitals and health centres were closed, leaving few options for treatment for acute conditions or management of chronic conditions (Syrian Centre for Policy Research, 2015; The Economist, 2016; World Health Organization, 2015). The migration route and asylum conditions also place people in situations of risk. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that approximately 4000 international migrants have died en route every year since 2014 (IOM, 2019). Common migration pathways carry a range of dangers, including extended exposure to harsh environmental conditions, lack of food and water, and other physical hardships, such as the risk of drowning in marine crossings. Moreover, as many as two-thirds of migrants on some pathways report physical violence, sexual violence, robbery, and kidnapping (Horwood, Forin, & Frouws, 2018).

On arrival in countries of asylum, refugees often spend extended periods of time in unhygienic conditions and poverty, with limited access to health care and then usually only primary care (i.e., initial essential treatment of health conditions, as opposed to specialized care) (Langlois, Haines, Tomson, & Ghaffar, 2016). The majority of Syrian refugees currently reside in Jordan (667,200), Lebanon (992,100) and Turkey (3.6 million) (UNHCR, 2019) as was the case for those who came to Canada during the Syrian resettlement initiative. Most Syrian refugees in these settings were living in poverty, with inadequate shelter and unsanitary conditions, and with limited access to adequate nutrition and clean water (IRCC, 2016; Karaspan, 2018; Lenner & Schmelter, 2016; UNHCR, 2015a; UNICEF, UNHCR, & World Food Program, 2016). Primary health care access for refugees was available in Jordan, Lebanon and

Turkey in 2015, the year of departure for most of the cohort in the Syrian resettlement initiative, but any specialized care required payment of fees (Ammar et al., 2016; Saleh, Aydin, & Koçak, 2018; UNHCR, 2015b). Consistent with these conditions, Syrian refugees have been found to suffer from untreated physical injuries and infectious diseases associated with their living conditions while living in asylum (Karasaşan, 2018). Syrian refugees have also been found to suffer from chronic illnesses related to their origin in a middle-income country, such as heart disease and diabetes, which went untreated or undertreated for an extended period of time (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017).

9.4 Study Results: Recently Arrived Syrian Refugees in Toronto and Access to Health Care

Our team conducted a series of multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary studies in the City of Toronto to examine health care needs and access among Syrian refugees within the first months of their arrival to Toronto. The first study was a survey conducted with 400 recent Syrian refugees: GAR refugees recruited in hotels, and PSR refugees recruited through a range of community agencies between April and September 2016 (Oda et al., 2017, 2019). The second study was conducted between January and July 2017 and followed up with half of the original sample about 6 months later (100 GARs and 100 PSRs) using a combination of focus groups and survey to explore unmet health needs and changes in health status over the first year (Tuck et al., 2019, in press). The third study is ongoing and is following a larger sample of Syrian refugees ($n = 1932$) in six cities in three provinces in Canada for over four years. These newcomers were settled in Okanagan and Vancouver (British Columbia); Kitchener, Toronto and Windsor (Ontario); and Montreal (Quebec) (see Hynie et al., 2019). This chapter will focus only on the 541 participants in the Greater Toronto Area.

9.4.1 Study 1: Health Needs of Recently Arrived Syrian Refugees in Toronto

The first study explored perceived health status, health care needs and health services use of Syrian refugees in Toronto upon arrival, while many GARs were still residing in hotels (for more details, see Oda et al., 2017, 2019). GARs arrived in large numbers and resided in hotels while they waited for settlement into their first homes; PSRs were settled by their sponsors, who had often arranged accommodation either before their arrival or shortly afterwards.

A total of 400 adult Syrian refugees were recruited, 177 (44.2%) GARs, of whom 69 (39%) were still residing in hotels, 209 (52.2%) PSRs, and 12 (3.0%) BVORs. Approximately half were women ($N = 221$; 55.2%). They were 18 to 86 years old ($M = 40.6$ years, $SD = 14.9$) and had been in Canada an average of 4.4 months (GARs: $M = 3.4$ months; PSRs: $M = 6.1$ months). All were interviewed in person using an Arabic survey by a bilingual Arabic-English speaking female researcher in hotels, community centres, faith organizations, or in their own homes.

Results

Surprisingly, given the selection criteria for GARs, there was no difference between GARs and PSRs regarding the proportion reporting a chronic illness or disability (GAR: $N = 47$, 26.6%, PSR: $N = 55$, 26.8%, $\chi^2 < 1$). GARs were less likely to have a family doctor (58.2% versus 97.6%, $\chi^2 (N = 400, 1) = 91.47$, $p < .001$) but more likely to have accessed a dentist (49.2% versus 32.5%, $\chi^2 (400, 1) = 11.01$, $p = .001$). There was no difference in having seen an eye specialist (48.5%), and relatively few of either group reported seeing a social worker (14.5%) or other potential mental health care providers.

Overall physical and mental health was measured using the RAND-36, a widely used self-report measure that has been validated in Arabic (Coons et al., 1998). Scores are converted to t-scores that are standardized on the US population; a score of 50 is equivalent to the average score in the US population, with higher scores indicating better health. Self-reported physical ($M = 58.2$, $SD = 10.49$) and mental health ($M = 57.4$, $SD = 12.0$) on the RAND-36 were above the US population average. Overall self-reported health on the RAND-36 was better for PSRs on both physical (PSR: $M = 60.6$, GAR: $M = 55.6$, $t (384) = 4.83$, $p < .001$) and mental health (PSR: $M = 59.8$, GAR: $M = 54.5$, $t (384) = 4.40$, $p < .001$) but both were above the US-standardized population mean of 50.

GARs reported more unmet health needs than PSRs (55.9% versus 41.6%, $\chi^2 (400, 1) = 7.86$, $p = .005$). A multinomial regression predicting unmet health care from settlement category, the sociodemographic variables of age, length of time in Canada, and education; having a family doctor; having a chronic disease/disability; and RAND-36 physical and mental health scores found only that those reporting poorer physical health scores ($\beta = -0.04$, $p = .02$) and poorer mental health scores ($\beta = -0.04$, $p < .001$) were more likely to have an unmet health need.

Summary

In the first few months after arrival in Toronto, Syrian refugees in our sample reported good physical and mental health and relatively good health care access. Very few had seen a health care provider who could address mental health issues, and about half reported unmet health care needs. GARs did not fare as well as PSRs in terms of health care access. Fewer had a family physician, and a greater proportion reported unmet health care needs although the latter differences disappeared after controlling for socio-demographic variables.

Dental care was frequently mentioned as an unmet need. Coverage for dental care under IFHP is only for tooth extraction and not for non-surgical care, and thus crowns and other expensive procedures are not covered. The primary reasons respondents gave for why they had unmet needs were similar to those of other Canadian residents: long wait times, the cost of services and a lack of time to seek health care services (Hwang et al., 2017). In their first year of residence in Canada, both GARs and PSRs should have had access to IFHP and thus should have had support for services not covered by their provincial insurance. This suggests gaps in the provi-

sion of supplemental health care to this population, either because additional services not adequately covered, and/or a lack of knowledge about IFHP by health care providers, refugees or their sponsors.

GARs reported a number of variables that could explain their lower access to health care; they had lower levels of education and had been in Canada for a shorter period, both of which may reduce access. Moreover, many were interviewed in the hotels so they have not been connected to family doctors at that time. Language barriers may have played a role, but this was not assessed. Study 2 examined the impact of English language ability on access, and the impact of unmet needs and social determinants of health on subsequent health status for a subsample of this group.

9.4.2 Study 2: Exploring the Impact of Unmet Health Needs in Over Time Among Syrian Refugees in Toronto

Half of the participants from Study 1 were followed up approximately 6 months later to explore changes in health over time, and whether health status trajectories differed between PSRs and GARs in the short term, especially in light of the differences in unmet healthcare needs (for more details, please see Tuck et al., 2019, in press). Of the original sample, 393 agreed to be contacted, and all of the 200 recruited agreed to participate. Half of the sample ($n = 100$) was GARs (50% women) and half ($n = 100$) was PSRs (56% women). The subsample differed from the original sample in terms of being somewhat less likely to have reported a chronic illness or disability, more likely to have a family doctor and had been in Canada slightly longer (13 days) than those not selected for follow up. Please see Tuck et al. (2019) for more information about measures and procedures. Surveys were conducted in Arabic. Respondents participated in the surveys in face-to-face interviews, primarily in their own homes, or in community or faith-based organizations.

Results

Social and participant variables: PSRs were older ($M = 44.7$ years, $SD = 16.40$) than GARs ($M = 33.8$ years, $SD = 10.81$), more likely to have completed at least 12 years of education (GARs: 35%; PSRs: 61%), had fewer children (GARs: $M = 3.7$, $SD = 2.04$; PSRs: $M = 1.8$, $SD = 1.20$), and were less likely to be single, widowed or divorced (GARs: 15%; PSRs: 26%). PSRs had been in Canada longer (GARs: $M = 443.8$ days or 14.8 months, $SD = 63.05$ days; PSRs: $M = 468.7$ days or 15.6 months, $SD = 82.87$ days) and were less likely to always need an interpreter (GAR: 40%; PSR: 17%). PSRs were more likely to have paid employment (GARs: 11%; PSRs: 47%). The cost of housing was a challenge for most respondents, with only a third of participants agreeing that their housing was affordable (GARs: 36.7%; PSRs: 37.4%).

Health variables: At follow up, all 200 participants reported having a family doctor, and 84 (42.6%) reported an unmet health need. Interestingly, 40 (20.3%) participants no longer had an unmet health need, relative to baseline, whereas 29 (14.7%) now had an unmet health care need but did not at baseline. Physical health, as measured by the RAND-36, remained relatively positive when compared to the US average of

50, and was not significantly different from baseline ($M = 58.3$, $SD = 10.52$ versus $M = 58.1$, $SD = 10.35$, $t < 1$) whereas mental health showed a slight but significant improvement ($M = 58.7$, $SD = 11.44$ versus $M = 56.8$, $SD = 12.12$, $t(199) = 2.29$, $p = .02$).

A linear regression on GARs and PSRs' physical and mental health status, controlling for socioeconomic variables and unmet needs at baseline, found PSRs reported better physical health than GARs, ($\beta = 4.48$, $p = .02$). The only other predictor of physical health at follow up was physical health at baseline, $\beta = 0.48$, $p < .001$. The final model explained 39% of the variance in follow up physical health scores, $R^2_{adj} = .39$, $F(11, 185) = 12.58$, $p < .001$. For mental health at follow up, mental health at baseline was the only predictor ($\beta = 0.47$, $p < .001$). The final model explained 30% of the variance in follow up mental health scores, $R^2_{adj} = .30$, $F(11, 185) = 8.90$, $p < .001$.

Summary

Both GARs and PSRs continued to report unmet health needs, but this status changed for several participants. Unmet health needs at baseline also did not predict health status at follow up, suggesting that unmet needs may not have been reflective of systematic issues in accessing health care. Our subsample of GARs continued to report poorer subjective physical health, relative to PSRs, even when controlling for possible socio-demographic variables that might explain these differences, and self-rated health did not improve between baseline and follow up. All of these participants reported having a family doctor. Factors predicting physical health and well-being for this sample may, therefore, lie in the broader social environment and selection factors that differ between those who entered Canada through these different pathways rather than accessibility of health care.

Self-rated mental health, on the other hand, did not differ between the groups. There was very low usage of possible mental health care services at baseline, and yet mental health improved somewhat from baseline to follow-up and was generally relatively positive. This is not to minimize the challenges that have been reported in other samples (Georgiadou, Zbidat, Schmitt, & Erim, 2018), but is consistent with findings that emphasize the resilience of those refugees who are able to resettle and find permanent residency in a third country (Hynie, 2018; Li et al., 2016). It is also possible that those experiencing more difficult mental health issues may not have wanted to, or been able to, participate.

Study 3 goes into further depth in perceptions of health care services and mainly whether Syrian newcomers felt comfortable and satisfied using the services that were available to them, and barriers that they have experienced in accessing them.

9.4.3 Study 3: Exploring Perceptions of Healthcare among Syrian Refugees: Data from SyRIA.lth.

In 2017, we initiated a 4-year longitudinal survey called Syrian Refugee Integration and Long-Term Health (SyRIA.lth) to look at the relationship between migration pathway, service use, integration pathways and long-term health and mental health outcomes for Syrian refugees who came during the Syrian resettlement initiative. For

more details on the overall study and measures, please see Hynie et al. (2019). For the current chapter, we focus on health care with respondents in Toronto in Year 1 to look at more subjective perceptions of health care received, and particularly the predictors of health care satisfaction and comfort.

In Year 1, there were 541 respondents 18 years of age or older, representing 248 households. Half ($N = 276$, 50.7%) were female. Of these, 314 were GARs, 187 PSRs, and 40 were BVORs (3 did not respond. GARs ($M = 35.2$, $SD = 12.03$) and BVORs ($M = 35.3$, $SD = 13.37$) were somewhat younger than PSRs ($M = 40.0$, $SD = 18.83$). The majority were married (77.3%). A subset of the respondents in Study 1 also participated in Study 3 but was not actively recruited and was not tracked from one study to the next.

Participants were asked about their use of physical and mental health services and women's health services in the first 3 months, and first year, whether they had a family doctor, satisfaction with and comfort using health services, whether they had experienced barriers or discrimination in health care settings, and whether they would like more information about health services. We utilized the RAND-36 to assess overall physical and mental health status. As noted above, RAND-36 scores are standardized against the US population, such that a score of 50 is equal to the US average health score. Participants completed the survey in Arabic, in face-to-face interviews with bilingual research assistants.

Results

Almost all the GARs (98.7%) and BVORs (100.0%) described their religion as Muslim, whereas only a third of PSRs did so (34.6%). GARs and BVORs had a lower level of education than PSRs (see Table 9.1). Almost all had a family doctor (98.2%) and had utilized health services in the first three months after arriving (89.8%). Few used women's health services in the first three months: 16.3% of GAR women, 9.4% of PSRs, and 17.6% of BVORs. By the end of the first year, however, 36.9% of the GAR women, 19.8% of the PSRs, and 35.3% of the BVORs had done so. Almost none used any mental health services in the first three months (2.8%). By the end of the first year, 8.9% of GARs had accessed mental health services, 4.8% of PSRs, and 2.5% of BVORs.

When asked who helped them find a physician, 78 (43.1%) of the PSRs and 31 (79.5%) of the BVORs said their sponsors, whereas 137 (46.9%) of GARs were helped by their settlement counsellor. A family member helped 7.2% of GARs ($N = 21$) 7.7% of BVORs ($N = 3$) but 26% of PSRs ($N = 47$), over three-quarters of whom had family members in Canada (77.7%). Co-ethnic friends also helped GARs ($N = 64$, 21.9%) and PSRs ($N = 32$, 17.7%) but fewer BVORs ($N = 1$, 2.6%). No other response was given by more than 13% of any sponsorship group.

GARs were somewhat more likely to want more information about health services (8.9%) than PSRs (4.8%) or BVORs, (0.0%). No respondents reported experiencing discrimination in any health care setting. However, a small number of participants ($N = 33$, 6.1%) reported having had their IFH documents refused. A further 196 (36.8%) reported not having an interpreter provided at an appointment when one was needed, but it is not clear if this was during a health appointment.

Table 9.1 Socio-demographic characteristics by sponsorship pathway


	GAR n = 314	PSR n = 187	BVOR n = 40	<i>p</i> value
Female	51.3%	51.3%	42.5%	
Education below Grade 6	39.8%	12.3%	45.0%	
Always need interpreter	47.8%	17.6%	45.0%	
Mean Age	35.2 ^a	40.0 ^{ab}	35.3 ^b	<i>p</i> < .001
<i>SD</i>	12.03	13.83	13.37	
Mean number of children under 18	3.04 ^a	1.73 ^{ab}	2.4 ^b	<i>p</i> < .001
<i>SD</i>	1.80	1.40	1.19	
Mean months displaced	37.1	20.0	35.5	<i>p</i> < .001
<i>SD</i>	10.88	17.64	12.41	
Mean months in Canada	12.7	13.7 ^a	12.0 ^a	<i>p</i> = .04
<i>SD</i>	5.00	4.91	4.47	
Physical health (RAND-36)	54.1 ^a	58.1 ^{ab}	53.4 ^{ab}	<i>p</i> = .001
<i>SD</i>	12.74	10.45	10.77	
Mental health (RAND-36)	54.1 ^a	58.1 ^a	53.9	<i>p</i> = .006
<i>SD</i>	14.23	12.15	14.84	

Notes. GAR = Government Assisted Refugees; PSR = Privately Sponsored Refugees; BVOR = Blended Visa Office Referred refugees; SD = Standard Deviation; means with the same superscript differ at $p < .05$.

Only 36 participants (7.4%) accessed mental health services. A multinomial regression significantly predicted mental health care access $\chi^2(15) = 42.89, p < .001$. Participants reported greater mental health service use if younger (Wald = 5.59, $p = .02$), if they had poorer mental health on the RAND-36 (Wald = 15.42, $p < .001$) and, marginally, if they were Muslim (Wald = 3.00, $p = .08$) $\chi^2(15) = 42.89, p < .001$.


The majority of GARs (71.2%) and PSRs (77.0%) were satisfied with their family doctor. Among BVORs, only 56.4% said that they were satisfied. A multinomial regression significantly predicted participants' satisfaction with their family doctor, $\chi^2(30) = 59.94, p < .001$. Participants were more likely to be satisfied if they had better mental health (Wald = 3.98, $p = .05$), fewer than 4 children (Wald = 4.14, $p = .04$), and if they had been in Canada for less time (Wald = 5.68, $p = .02$).

In terms of their satisfaction with health services more generally, 78.8% of respondents were mostly or very satisfied (see Figure 8.1). Likewise, in terms of their comfort using health services, 77.9% reported being very or mostly comfortable (see Figure 9.2).



Notes. GAR = Government Assisted Refugees; PSR = Privately Sponsored Refugees; BVOR = Blended Visa Office Referred refugees.

Figure 9.1 Satisfaction with health services



Notes. GAR = Government Assisted Refugees; PSR = Privately Sponsored Refugees; BVOR = Blended Visa Office Referred refugees.

Figure 9.2 Comfort with health services

In terms of satisfaction with health services, a multinomial regression found that those more likely to be satisfied had better mental health (Wald = 4.12, $p = .04$) and a lower level of education (Wald = 7.64, $p = .006$), $\chi^2(15) = 35.60$, $p = .002$. Greater comfort using health services was predicted by longer length of displacement (Wald = 4.88, $p = .03$) and marginally by better mental health (Wald = 3.18, $p = .07$), and being a woman (Wald = 2.91, $p = .09$), $\chi^2(15) = 29.03$, $p = .02$.

Summary

We found few differences between GARs, PSRs and BVORs. PSRs reported somewhat better physical and mental health than did either GARs or BVORs, who were selected on the basis of vulnerability. Nonetheless, all three groups reported better physical and mental health scores than the average US resident. Almost all of the Syrian refugees in this sample reported having a family physician, and the majority accessed

health services within three months of arrival. They reported being satisfied with health services and their family physician and comfortable using health services. They did not report any experiences of discrimination, in terms of feeling that they had received worse services than others, but they did not always receive interpretation services when needed. GARs seemed somewhat more satisfied and comfortable with health services than PSRs, but sponsorship differences disappeared when other socio-demographic variables were taken into account. Dissatisfaction with health services, to the extent that there was any, was associated with higher levels of education, which may explain the sponsorship differences since PSRs had higher levels of education, on average. Perhaps those with higher socioeconomic status prior to arrival had higher expectations due to a history of having access to a good private medicine system in Syria.

There was relatively low use of mental health services, consistent with the findings in the other two studies, but this sample also reported relatively positive mental health, and so the low use may reflect low levels of need. Consistent with this interpretation, self-rated mental health was a strong predictor of the use of these services. Nonetheless, finding culturally appropriate mental health services has often been identified as a challenge for refugee populations (Hynie, 2014), and this requires further exploration. Satisfaction with health care services was greater for those with better mental health, suggesting that those with poorer mental health may have had difficulties accessing appropriate services. This possibility is being explored in more detail in later waves of data collection.

9.5 Discussion and Conclusions

Canada has a long history of refugee migration and resettlement, including relatively large resettlements from single countries. Resettlement allows for advance preparation, both in terms of the numbers arriving and anticipating their health needs, and this was the case in the Syrian initiative. Moreover, as a country with a high proportion of immigrants from multiple countries, health care systems and providers have experience in culturally competent health care provision. These aspects of Canada's immigration system should have left Canada well prepared for the Syrian initiative. Nonetheless, in the current context, reports suggest that little warning of arrivals was provided, and agencies often received as many as double their annual allocation of refugees over only a few days, and with only a day or two notice. Government assisted refugees were selected for vulnerabilities that included disabilities or chronic illness, and thus their number included families with members with complex health care needs. Past research suggests that complex care is challenging to coordinate for GARs even with adequate warning because of the complexity of navigating the health care system (Hynie, 2014). There were, therefore, reasons to be concerned about whether the preparation of the health care system was adequate to meet the needs of Syrian newcomers during this initiative and in particular if the needs of GARs would be adequately met.

For the Syrian newcomers to Toronto, however, the high levels of publicity about the newcomers' arrival seemed to have led to a strong response on the part of the health care system. Virtually all participants accessed health services early in their arrival to Canada and after about one year in Canada, almost all had a family physician. Participants reported high satisfaction and comfort with health services and none reported experiences of discrimination although some reported not having interpretation when they needed it, although it is not clear whether the latter was specific to health services. Although many reported unmet health needs, the barriers that they identified were similar to those identified by other Canadians. Unmet needs did not remain constant across time, suggesting that these needs were eventually met. Moreover, they did not predict health status over time. One issue that did emerge is some barriers around acceptance of IFH, or around being asked to pay for services that IFH should have covered. This is consistent with previous findings that IFH is generally not understood and even resisted by many health care providers and was possibly even more confusing due to the recent history of changes in coverage.

In sum, while a large proportion of the Syrian newcomers in our sample reported chronic diseases and disabilities and a number of unmet health needs, they also reported good health on average, positive experiences with the health care system and general satisfaction with the care that they received. While health outcomes were slightly poorer for GARs, the differences were not as significant as might be expected, given that complex health problems was a factor on which they were selected. It is also possible, however, that those who were the sickest did not participate in this research, and that Toronto had more success responding than other cities or smaller centres. Toronto also has health centres that focus on refugee health and thus perhaps more capacity to respond appropriately. However, it also may be the case that the salience of the Syrian initiative in the media and public discourse (e.g., Winter, Patzel, & Beauregard, 2018) may have motivated greater coordination of health care efforts and strengthened the response to Syrian newcomers in Toronto, relative to services available for refugees under other circumstances. The success of the response is heartening and suggests that we have the capacity and knowledge to provide good health care to vulnerable communities and can use what was learned in coordinating this response to serve other communities that may have complex needs.

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10 Labour Market Participation of Refugees in Germany: Legal Context and Individual-level Factors

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Abstract

Labour market access is a crucial aspect of integration. Among other things, it provides migrants with economic resources to participate in societal life in the host country. This chapter explores the factors of labour market access for refugees in Germany. First, we provide a brief overview of how labour market access is determined by legal status. Second, we explore individual aspects of labour market access using the German IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees. Results show that male, young, and highly educated refugees have a higher chance of being employed. Furthermore, the data indicate that mental well-being is positively correlated with having gainful employment.

Keywords: Refugees; Labour Market; Asylum Law

10.1 Introduction

In 2015 alone, around 890,000 asylum seekers arrived in Germany (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2016). Over the years, this influx has occupied the political sphere, public administration, civil society, and academia (Brücker et al., 2019b). A key issue was and still is the integration of refugees into the labour market. What opportunities exist for refugees in the German labour market, and which factors are associated with labour market integration?

To answer these questions, we use data from the first and second wave of the German IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey of Refugees (Kühne, Jacobsen, & Kroh, 2019). The IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey of Refugees is a random sample of refugees drawn from the official central registry of foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister, AZR) of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF; von Gostomski & Pupeter, 2008). The target population comprises asylum claimants that entered Germany between 2013 and 2016 as well as their household members. Most people of the current refugee cohort come from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Eritrea. Disproportional sampling design was employed in order to ensure sufficient sub-sample sizes; for example, refugee families were oversampled to facilitate analyses on such families with sufficient observations.

The first, 2016 wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey of Refugees consists of 4,527 adult individuals in 3,320 households. Data on additional 5,380 minors are available through the household context. Given the ongoing inflow of asylum seekers to Germany, in 2017 an additional sample was included. The second, 2017, wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey of Refugees consists of 5,721 adults and 7,688 minors in 3,884 households. Overall, the study gathers extensive information on topics such as refugees' economic integration, language acquisition, education, well-being, and personality. It, thus, is an excellent source to study the impact of changing migration legislation and institutional frameworks on refugees' integration in Germany. Furthermore, mother-child questionnaires¹ are used to gather information about refugee children and their integration trajectories. More detailed information on sampling, target population and fieldwork results are provided in Kroh et al. (2017) and Jacobsen et al. (2019). The data is available through the research data centers of the Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP)² and the Institute for Employment Research (IAB)³.

In this chapter, we focus on refugees and asylum seekers who are of working age (i.e., between 18 and 65 years), migrated between January 2013 and January 2016, and still lived in Germany in 2017. First, we provide a brief outline of the legal context for refugees' labour market participation in Germany and show how this context changed since the rise in forced migration in 2013. Second, we present empirical findings that suggest two main conclusions: refugees have overall high aspirations

1 In specific questionnaires, mother answer questions about their children.

2 DOI: 10.5684/soep.v34

3 DOI: 10.5684/soep.iab-bamf-soep-mig.2017

to enter the German labour market, but actual employment rates vary; male, young, and mentally healthy refugees are most successful in finding gainful employment.

10.2 Legal Context of Refugees’ Labour Market Participation

Refugees’ right to access the German labour market, i.e. possession of a work permit, is crucially linked to their residence status. In principle, there are three residence statuses for refugees. Upon arrival in Germany and after having applied for asylum, asylum seekers first receive permission to reside (“Aufenthaltsgestattung”) until a final decision on their asylum application is made. The asylum decision has four possible outcomes: asylum/refugee protection, subsidiary protection, suspension from deportation (“Duldung”), or deportation (BAMF, 2019b; Korntheuer et al., 2017).⁴

If the request for asylum is granted, asylum seekers receive either official refugee status or subsidiary protection and obtain a temporary residence permit (“Aufenthaltserlaubnis”) with the prospect of staying for at least one to three years in Germany. If the application for asylum is rejected, but deportation is not an option (e.g., due to health concerns or danger to life and limb), asylum seekers are suspended from deportation (“Duldung”). Figure 10.1 shows how these residence statuses currently determine refugees’ access to the German labour market.




Figure 10.1 Legal status and labour market access

The structure of residency status has undergone some changes with regard to access to the labour market since 2013 (Table 10.1).

4 Refugees can receive a residence permit based on German asylum law or the Geneva Convention for refugees. Moreover, even if not deemed eligible for asylum under these two legislative texts, refugees may receive a subsidiary protection status if it is judged impossible for them to return to their home country (for instance, because of civil war). The subsidiary protection status is a special provision in the Germany asylum law.

Table 10.1 Changes in labour market access of refugees in Germany

Residence Status	2013	2014	2015
Residence permit	<p>\$31 of the Order amending the Foreigners' Work Permit Regulation (Verordnung zur Änderung des Ausländerbeschäftigungsrechts): Recognized asylum applicants who have received a work permit from the Federal Office may hold a job without requiring confirmation by the Federal Employment Agency.</p>		
Permission to reside pending asylum decision	<p>Foreigners shall not be allowed to take up paid employment as long as they are required to stay in a reception centre. (Asylum Act, §61(1)). Foreigners needed to file their asylum application with a branch office of the Federal Office shall be required to live for a period of up to six weeks, but no longer than three months, in the reception centre responsible for receiving them (§47 Asylum Act).</p> <p>An asylum applicant who has stayed in the federal territory for nine months on the basis of permission to remain pending the asylum decision may [...] be permitted to take up employment if the Federal Employment Agency has granted its approval or a statutory instrument stipulates that taking up such</p>	<p>Priority review (Vorrangprüfung) by the Employment lapse once a person has lived in Germany for 15 months. Review of comparability of working conditions remains in place (§32 Order of Regulation for Employment of Foreigners [Verordnung über die Beschäftigung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern])</p>	<p>Priority review is suspended in 133 of 156 regions of the Federal Employment Agency (§32 Order of Regulation for Employment of Foreigners [Verordnung über die Beschäftigung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern])</p> <p>Safe Country of Origin List of safe countries: Asylum Procedure Act, Annex II</p> <p>A foreigner from a safe country of origin as defined in Section 29a who has applied for asylum after 31 August 2015 may not be permitted to work during the asylum procedure. (Asylum Act §61 (2))</p> <p>In derogation from subsection 1, foreigners from a safe country of origin (Section 29a) shall be required to live</p>

Residence Status	2013	2014	2015
	<p>employment is permissible without the consent of the Federal Employment Agency. (Asylum Act §61(2))</p> <p>No permission required for education, internship, employed by family members OR after a four-year stay in Germany (§32 Order of Regulation for Employment of Foreigners [Verordnung über die Beschäftigung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern])</p>		<p>in the reception centre responsible for receiving them until the Federal Office has decided on their asylum application or, should the claim be rejected as manifestly unfounded under Section 29a or as inadmissible under Section 29 (1) no. 1, until they have left the federal territory or until the deportation warning or deportation order is enforced. Sections 48 to 50 shall remain unaffected. (Asylum Act §47 (1a))</p>
Suspension of deportation	<p>Foreigners with the temporary suspension of deportation who have been in Germany for a year can be authorized to take up employment.</p> <p>No permission required for education, internship, employed by family members OR after a four-year stay in the federal territory (§32 Order of Regulation for Employment of Foreigners [Verordnung über die Beschäftigung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern])</p>	<p>Foreigners whose temporary suspension of deportation who have been in Germany for three months can be authorized to take up employment.</p> <p>Priority review (Vorrangprüfung) by the Employment lapse once a person has lived in Germany for 15 months. Review of comparability of working conditions remains in place (§32 Order of Regulation for Employment of Foreigners [Verordnung über die Beschäftigung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern])</p>	

Note. The grey background colour indicates translations from German by the authors because no official translation was available; all other text is taken from official interpretations of German law.

While refugees with a residence permit were always allowed to immediately access the German labour market after approval (either official refugee status or subsidiary protection), the restrictions for the two other groups were successively relaxed between 2013 and 2016. Most importantly, waiting periods to fully access the labour market were reduced to three months in 2014; from nine months for asylum seekers and twelve months for individuals suspended from deportation. During these waiting periods, refugees are neither allowed to access the German labour market nor to take up vocational training or pursue self-employment. Additionally, since 2015, in most parts of Germany, asylum seekers and individuals suspended from deportation no longer need consent of the Federal Employment Agency to take up employment. Employment is still strictly prohibited for refugees obliged to live in a first reception center. Such obligations are in place in several German federal states and specifically apply to individuals from so-called “safe third countries” since 2015.

A special regulation applies to refugees who started an apprenticeship in Germany: if, after signing the training contract, it is determined that the refugee should return to his or her country of origin, he or she may finish the apprenticeship and then work for two additional years in Germany. This special arrangement was implemented in 2016 and is meant to secure some return on investment both for refugees and companies that train refugees.

10.3 Results of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey of Refugees

10.3.1 Labour Market Prerequisites and Access

In this section, we provide an overview of refugees’ educational level and further individual-level determinants of labour market success in Germany. We draw findings on the educational level from previous work with the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees. Findings on the employment probability are based on our analysis.

Recently arrived refugees in Germany show a great deal of variation in their level of school degrees. On the one hand, 33 percent have an intermediate school degree, and 40 percent have a secondary school degree. On the other hand, eleven percent have a primary school degree, and yet another eleven percent have no formal education at all (Brenzel & Kosyakova, 2016). Thus, refugees in Germany have significantly less intermediate school degrees and more significantly low degrees or no education, compared to the German population (Brücker et al., 2016).

Regarding integration into the labour market, two observations stand out from these descriptive findings. First, intermediate school degrees are often cited as an important certificate in the context of skill shortages in the German labour market (Bremser, Höver, & Schandock, 2012); for refugees, they could offer a route to vocational training and, eventually, well-paying jobs in the German economy. Second, refugees with low or no educational degrees will most likely have to invest in additional educational degrees before being able to achieve stable employment in the German labour market. This, in turn, may help alleviate skill shortages German companies have faced in recent years. For instance, the Bertelsmann foundation

estimates that Germany will need a net migration of at least 260,000 people per year to counteract shortages in the labour force (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019).

10.3.2 Gainful Employment and Labour Market Entry

A considerable share of refugees who came to Germany between 2013 and 2016 was already gainfully employed at the time of the survey in mid to late 2017.⁵ This is remarkable given that earlier studies of refugees who entered Germany between 1990 and 2010 saw a relatively slow integration into the labour market; their employment rates took years to catch up to other migrant groups. For example, it took earlier cohorts around five years to reach the employment rates which other migrants showed in their first year of residence (Salikutluk, Giesecke, & Kroh, 2016). Among refugees who came to Germany between 2013 and 2016, 30 percent are gainfully employed, are in a vocational training program, or do an internship (see table 10.1).⁶ There is a clear gender gap in the rate of participation, with women showing a significantly lower rate (8 percent compared to their male counterparts' 37 percent, respectively).

Table 10.2 Employment rates over gender in percent, weighted

Employment Status	Overall	Men	Women
Employed	19.4	24.5	3.8
Vocational training/internship	6.3	7.7	2.2
Marginally employed	3.9	4.4	2.4
<i>Sub-total</i>	29.5	36.6	8.4
Not employed	70.4	63.5	91.7
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(3,167)	(2,387)	(780)

Note: In some cases, the numbers do not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Source. IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, weighted, author's calculations

However, looking at current employment only tells part of the story. Some refugees arrived so recently in Germany that they had little time to adjust to their new life, let alone seek employment. A look at the intention to participate in the labour market for those who do not have a job yet shows that refugees are overall highly motivated to find employment in Germany: around nine out of ten unemployed refugees plan to seek jobs in the future (around 94 percent, see table 10.2). This gap between actual

5 Gainful employment refers to full-time or part-time employment, marginal employment and internships.

6 Refugees who found employment in Germany are mainly employed in clerical positions or as labourers (75 percent; table available upon request) or as trainees in vocational training programs or internships (22 percent).

unemployment rates and aspirations suggests there may be obstacles to refugees' employment, such as legal and institutional barriers (cf. above), lack of German language proficiency or mental health.

Table 10.3 Employment aspiration over gender in percent, weighted

Employment Aspiration	Overall	Men	Women
No plan to seek employment	6.5	4.0	11.8
Plan to seek employment	93.5	96.0	88.2
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2,493)	(1,695)	(798)

Source. IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, weighted, author's calculations

10.3.3 What Individual-level Factors Impact Chances of Having a Gainful Employment?

A key question is which individual characteristics increase or decrease refugees' chances of being gainfully employed. Table 10.4 shows the association between the likelihood of having gainful employment and refugees' socio-demographic characteristics, such as their level of education, language skills, legal status, and mental health. We use logistic regression and show average marginal effects, which indicate changes in the average probability to be gainfully employed, given a change in one characteristic while all other factors remain constant. For instance, Table 10.4 shows that all other factors being equal, men have a 23 percent higher probability of being gainfully employed compared to women. While these associations do not allow inferring causal links, the analysis does identify driving forces for having gainful employment (for a discussion of the difference between association and causal relations, see Holland (1986), among many others).⁷

⁷ Causal analyses require that statistical methods differentiate between cause and effect, e.g. by ruling out any potential confounding factors questions of direction of causality through an experimental design. Since the present data does not allow such causal analyses, we can only provide statistical correlations. For example, mental ill-being is negatively correlated with labour market access. However, we cannot tell whether mental ill-being is the cause for unemployment or its effect.

Table 10.4 Logistic regression analysis on employment, weighted

	Average Marginal Effect	SE
Gender (ref = female)	0.23***	(0.03)
Age (ref = 18-30)		
31-40	0.04	(0.04)
41-50	-0.15***	(0.04)
51-65	-0.21***	(0.05)
German Proficiency (ref = good)		
Medium	-0.05	(0.04)
Bad	-0.12**	(0.04)
Post-Traumatic-Stress Disorder (ref = no)	-0.12***	(0.03)
ISCED (ref = primary)		
Secondary	0.16***	(0.04)
Tertiary	0.11**	(0.04)
Year Moved to Germany (ref = 2013)		
2014	0.02	(0.07)
2015	-0.10	(0.06)
2016	-0.14	(0.10)
Country of Origin (ref = Afghanistan)		
Albania, Serbia, Kosovo	0.08	(0.14)
Iraq	-0.08	(0.07)
Eritrea, Somalia	-0.02	(0.07)
Iran, Pakistan	0.12	(0.09)
Syria	-0.03	(0.06)
Other	-0.02	(0.07)
Form of Protection (ref = Asylum Seeker)		
Refugee	0.02	(0.05)
Suspension of Deportation	0.03	(0.07)
Other	0.14	(0.10)
Participation in BAMF integration class (ref = no)	-0.06	(0.14)
N (unweighted)	1,931	

Notes. Significance Levels ***0.001 **0.01 *0.05. German proficiency is measured by means of a grouped mean index for self-reported reading, speaking, and writing abilities (see Jacobsen et al., 2017, p. 26 for details). The risk to suffer from PTSD is measured by a set of proxy variables (for coding see (Hollifield et al., 2013) one being the absence of a valid screening instrument for multiple refugee populations. The Refugee Health Screener-15 (RHS-15 and (Brücker et al., 2019, p.52)). The ISCED relies on the self-reported educational level. Originally, the ISCED categorization comprises 9 levels reaching from 0 “in school” to 8 “Doctoral or equivalent.” We condensed these categories into 1 “in school and primary education,” 2 “secondary education,” and 3 “tertiary education” (for more details see (SOEP Group, 2018, p.35)). The measurement of attendance in BAMF integration classes relies on self-reports and comprises the most common class such as the BAMF integration class (BAMF, 2019a) and the BAMF-ESF integration class (BAMF, 2015), which is particularly designed for job seekers.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, weighted, author’s calculations

As would be expected, demographic characteristics are associated with the likelihood of employment. Survey participants between 41 and 65 years of age show a significantly lower probability of being employed compared to the reference group (survey participants aged 18 to 30 years). This may be related to the fact that younger cohorts find it easier to adapt to the new environment, and vocational training and internships are likely to be much more accessible to younger refugees. Additionally, many integrational measures implemented by the German government mainly aim at young people. Furthermore, employment rates for males are higher than for females. We assume that this is due to the male breadwinner model that prefers men as the economic provider, mirroring the pattern in the German society. Although progress has been achieved in recent years, many institutions in Germany, such as language and integration courses, do not meet the needs of migrant mothers because they do not provide care for refugee children or acknowledge issues of gender sensitivity. To tackle this imbalance in employment rates, one option could be to organize classes in a way that accommodates the needs of refugees with children.

The level of education plays a crucial role in labour market success, both for the migrant and native-born population (Kalter, 2008). A common way to compare different educational/vocational levels across countries is the ISCED classification, which standardizes educational degree considering different country contexts. Using the classification our analysis shows that refugees with either secondary or tertiary education have a significantly higher probability of finding employment compared to those who have only primary education or no educational degree.

German language skills and length of stay, too, are often found to increase the chances of having employment (Kalter, 2008). These findings are partially mirrored in our data: respondents who migrated to Germany before 2016 are more likely to be in employment by 2017, compared to those who had been staying in Germany for one year or less. Furthermore, the data indicates that respondents with low German language abilities have a lower probability of being gainfully employed. However, we find no significant association between participating in a language training course or “integration course”⁸ and the likelihood of being employed. This may be because we include German language proficiency in the model as a separate factor, which is correlated with attending language and integration classes.

Besides having the right credentials, such as high education, a further aspect that has been shown to be crucial for refugees’ employment is mental health (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010). Whereas we assume that mental health is an important pre-condition for finding employment for any population, refugees are especially affected by traumatic experiences during their flight to Germany (Brücker et al., 2019a). Therefore, the mental state should receive special attention. Our analysis shows that respondents who are identified to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Hollifield et al., 2013), have a significantly lower probability of being

8 “Integration courses” are government-run courses that contain 600 hours of language and 100 hour of orientation classes and aim to facilitate orientation in the new environment.

employed. Thus, psychological support seems a crucial tool for fostering economic integration trajectories.

10.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we analyzed the labour market integration of refugees in Germany. We provided a brief outline of the legal context for refugees' labour market participation in Germany, we discussed the level of qualification of the German refugee population, we presented descriptive findings on refugees' labour market entry, and we analyzed what individual-level factors impact the chances for refugees gaining employment.

Our analyses show that mainly male and young refugees and refugees who are mentally stable and with high education have significantly better chances of being integrated quickly into the labour market. Further, a more extended residency in Germany increases the chances of having employment.

Research on earlier refugee cohorts shows that past refugees were integrated much more slowly into the labour market than other migrant groups (Salikutluk et al., 2016). Changes in the legal context, especially conditions for access to the labour market that have been changed during reform of the "integration bill" ("Integrationsgesetz") 2016 and the "bill for expediting asylum procedures" 2015 ("Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz"), aim to facilitate refugee integration into the labour market. There seems to be cause for mild optimism, given that recent refugees seem to find it somewhat easier to enter the German labour market, compared to earlier refugees (Brücker, Hauptmann, & Sirries, 2017). Moreover, the exceptionally high motivation among both female and male refugees to take up employment suggests that we may well see an increase in rates of employment of refugees in Germany over the coming years.

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11 Looking Beyond Labour Market Integration: Household Conditions Surrounding Refugee Children in Canada

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the economic integration of refugees and immigrants while taking into account the presence of children in the household. Based on data from the 2015 Longitudinal Immigration Database, our findings illuminate significant diversity among newcomer parents in Canada not only in terms of their modes of entry to Canada but also their demographic characteristics and economic outcomes. Recent cohorts of Government Assisted Refugee (GAR) and Privately Sponsored Refugee (PSR) parents tend to have lower educational attainment and official language proficiency at landing than refugees who sought asylum within Canada. Nevertheless, a sizable proportion of refugee parents start working at the onset of their resettlement, although their household income levels are lower than that of skilled worker or family immigrant parents. These insights challenge perspectives on refugee settlement practices that perceive “refugees” as a monolithic group and highlight the uniqueness of their experiences compared to other immigrants.

Keywords: Refugee; Integration; Canada

11.1 Introduction

In a matter of four months, from November 2015 to February 2016, Canada welcomed over 26,000 Syrian refugees. According to a report by IRCC, priority was given to families and children in the selection process, and as such a higher proportion of *households arrived with a child(ren)* compared to refugees from other countries (Houle, 2019). Because these children will be spending a greater part of their lives in Canada, and their well-being is something that their parents also desire, it is important to ask how well they will adapt to life in Canada. Literature on social stratification indicates that the economic conditions of their households are one of the main factors that influence their life chances. Important life decisions, such as pursuing post-secondary education or vocational training, which strongly influence life chances, are shaped by the class origin characteristics of their parents, particularly their human capital endowments, socioeconomic backgrounds (financial capacities) and cultural values/orientation toward children's education.

Much of the existing research on the economic integration of refugees and immigrants tend to focus on individual outcomes without taking into account important family characteristics, such as the presence of children. Although the employment outcomes and earning levels of refugees and immigrants are good indicators of the household conditions that surround their children, the presence of children itself affects a parent's planning and arrangement for work or training opportunities. As a result, estimates of economic outcomes, which do not take into account the presence of children in a family, do not offer an accurate picture of refugee and immigrants' household conditions. Thus inspired, we examine the demographic characteristics and short-term economic outcomes of refugees who arrived as parents using data from the 2015 Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), which contains the records of refugees and immigrants who arrived from 1980 to 2015. The results are compared across the three main refugee groups (i.e. government-assisted, privately sponsored, and refugees who sought asylum in Canada) as well as other immigrant parents, such as those who were selected under the economic and family streams.

Although this study does not directly include the outcomes of the recent Syrian refugee cohort, our analyses are based on longitudinal data that span over 30 years, which provide the historical contexts to situate their experiences. In the end, we will discuss the prospects for this current cohort by contrasting their characteristics reported by external sources. Our findings, which illuminate significant diversity among refugees in terms of their modes of entry to Canada, capacity for production, and their economic outcomes, challenge our perspectives on refugees and their settlement processes that tend to see "refugees" as a monolithic group. Further, the massive flow of refugees is recurrently portrayed as something new, which often leads to social anxiety; yet a historical overview offers structural contexts to highlight the uniqueness or similarity of the current experience. Such insights are highly valuable for effective responses.

11.2 Economic Outcomes of Refugees and Immigrants in Canada – The Need to Focus on Households with Children

Much of the literature on the economic outcomes of refugees and immigrants focus on adult migrants (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012; DeSilva, 1997; DeVoretz, Pivnenko, & Besier, 2004; Beiser & Hou, 2000; IRCC, 2012; Picot, Zhang, & Hou, 2019; Samuel, 1984; Wilkinson & Garcea, 2017; Yu, Ouellet, & Warmington, 2007). Their main concern is how well refugees adapt to the Canadian labour market and how long if at all, it takes for them to converge with other immigrants or the national average. Generally, their findings show that refugees tend to do well after some struggles during the initial resettlement period and, although they trail behind economic immigrants (Yu, Ouellet, & Warmington, 2007), they catch up to the level of family class immigrants over time (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012; DeSilva, 1997; DeVoretz, Pivnenko, & Besier, 2004). However, there are significant variations across source countries (Picot, Zhang, & Hou, 2019) and types of refugee status (Yu et al., 2007).

Examining the economic outcomes of refugees and immigrants while taking into account their household structure is crucial because not all permanent residents to Canada arrive with family members or children. Houle (2019) reports that 85% of the Syrian refugee families who arrived during the 2015-16 period came with children, which is much higher when compared with refugee families from other countries (63%). Generally, the presence of children in a family is known to reduce labour market participation, particularly for women, because of parenting duties (Uppal, 2015). Although the proportion of families with two working parents have increased in Canada (69%), almost half of the couples with a young child(ren) have one spouse who is either unemployed, out of the labour force, or working part-time (ibid, p.4).

The existing literature suggests that the presence of children has unique impacts on the economic activities of refugee families. It is reported that lack of access to childcare presents barriers for refugee parents to take language training; even when childcare services are available, many refugees do not utilize these services due to fear and cultural unfamiliarity (Fazel et al., 2012; Salehi, 2010, cited in Pritchard & Ramos, 2018). For refugees, who had to flee from violence and oppression and stay in refugee camps for a prolonged period, leaving their children in the hands of people who are yet to gain their trust may not be a natural course of action. The context is, however, different for economic immigrants who tend to have high human and financial capital. They arrive with knowledge of Canada's official languages; even if not, they can afford to hire private services. Family-sponsored¹ immigrants tend to have strong social networks (family or friends) who may offer childcare support or provide information about credible childcare services. Thus, compared to other immigrants, the presence of children in refugee households may have greater impact on the capacity of refugee parents to engage in economic activities, and this could,

1 In Canada, there are three main streams of permanent residency admission categories: family, economic and refugees. For the brief definitions of immigrant and refugee, see the section on Data and Measures.

in turn, have dire consequences for their children's outcomes as they transition into adulthood.

11.3 Data and Measures

We used data from the 2015 Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB) in order to examine the human capital levels of refugee and other immigrant parents at landing and their economic outcomes after arriving in Canada. The IMDB contains information from two administrative data sources: the Immigration Landing File (ILF) and T1FF tax records. The IMDB holds a wide range of information related to economic outcomes at the individual and household level, and sociodemographic characteristics of immigrants and refugees who became permanent residents (PR) of Canada since 1980 and filed a tax at least once since landing. The extensive coverage of individual characteristics in the IMDB is ideal for examining the integration patterns of refugees and other immigrants over time. In our analysis, we focus on adult newcomers, 25 years of age or older at arrival, who reported having children in their T1FF tax records in the year of landing or the following year. In this manner, those who filed their first tax in subsequent years are excluded. We also exclude those who landed in 2015 because they will most likely be underrepresented. Further, T1FF tax files are not available until the 1982 tax year; hence, information on the presence of children is not available for those who landed in 1980. For them, we assessed the parenthood based on the information from the 1982 tax return.

Our analysis focuses on three main refugee groups (Government Assisted Refugees – GARs; Privately Sponsored Refugees – PSRs; Refugees Landed in Canada – RLC), two groups of economic immigrants (Skilled Workers – SWs; Business immigrants), and one family class category (sponsored spouses and partners). The term “immigrant” generally refers to an individual who migrates into a country with the intention of long-term settlement. Therefore, an individual who comes to Canada as a refugee or non-refugee can be considered as an immigrant. In the Canadian context, however, refugees and immigrants are defined as separate groups. Immigration, Refugees, Citizenship Canada (IRCC) defines an immigrant as “a person who chooses to settle permanently in another country (Government of Canada, 2017)”, while refugees are people who “are forced to flee (Ibid)”. Within refugee groups, GARs and PSRs are overseas resettled refugees; while the former is screened and funded by the Canadian government, the latter is sponsored by non-governmental organizations, individuals or group of individuals. On the other hand, RLCs are refugee claimants who have been granted refugee status after a successful refugee determination process (see also Garcea, 2017). Thus, refugees in Canada, by definition, possess permanent residency, while asylum seekers, whose refugee status are yet to be determined, are officially classified as temporary residents.

Among immigrants, there are two main groups: family and economic class immigrants. Family class immigrants are admitted on the bases of their kinship affinity (e.g. Spouse/Partner or a dependent child) with a Canadian citizen or permanent resident. In contrast, economic immigrants are selected for their potential to make

substantial contributions to the Canadian economy. There are sub-categories under the economic class. Skilled immigrants are particularly screened and selected for their favourable human capital characteristics (i.e. education, work experience, language proficiency) while business class immigrants are chosen for their financial capacity to invest and establish businesses in Canada (see Hou & Bonikowska, 2017 for a detailed description of these landing categories). For the economic groups, only principal applicants are selected for the analysis because it is their socioeconomic characteristics that are subjected to the screening process. These six groups account for over 90% of adult newcomers (25 years and older) who arrived with at least one child.

As measures of household conditions, we examined employment rates (including self-employment) and household income, which are direct measures of newcomers' economic conditions. To contextualize these outcomes, however, it is crucial to examine the relative importance of human capital factors, such as language and educational attainment. Proponents of the human capital theory maintain that these factors affect economic outcomes (Becker, 1964; Ferrer & Riddell, 2008; Warman, Sweetman, & Goldmann, 2015). Thus, observed differences in economic outcomes should be interpreted in light of differences in human capital endowments. At the same time, research on social stratification and social mobility suggests that parent's human capital endowments (i.e. education levels and language skills) have a significant impact on their children's aspirations for higher education and occupational career (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2012; Davis-Kean, 2005; Erola, Jalonen, & Lehti, 2016). For instance, refugee and immigrant parents with high language skills have a better capacity to communicate with teachers and other personnel in the school system, which leads to positive effects on their children's educational development. Parents with higher education also have high expectation for children's educational achievement (Davis-Kean, 2005). Against this backdrop, we examine variations in newcomer parents' knowledge of official language and highest degree obtained at landing as well as their economic outcomes (i.e. employment and household income) thereafter. We assessed their employment and household income at one, three, and five years after landing.

The analysis will be descriptive. Each of the human capital and economic outcome variables will be first compared across the six groups of refugee-immigrant admission categories. After that, we will report the breakdown for the three refugee groups based on seven landing cohorts: 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-2004, 2005-09, and 2010-14. As discussed by Picot, Zhang and Feng (2019), the source countries of refugees vary across different cohorts. During the 1980s, Canada admitted many refugees from Viet Nam, Poland, and El Salvador, while the top source countries shifted to Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the 2000s, refugees from Afghanistan, Colombia, China, and Pakistan increased; then Iraq in the late 2000s and Haiti in the 2010s (Ibid). These source countries, in a way, reflect different causes of the refugee crisis (i.e. war, political oppression, natural disaster), which, in turn, underscores the sociodemographic characteristics and vulnerability of refugees. Given that many of those who landed from 2010-2014 had not spent three or five years by

2015, we only focused on their employment and household outcomes measured one year after they landed.

The number of refugee and immigrants included in the analysis by landing category and landing cohort is reported in the Appendix (Table A2). A more significant share of the newcomers in our sample was admitted through the economic class stream (37% Skilled workers and 4.5% Business class immigrants), followed by family class immigrants (27.4%). Together, refugees consisted of about 21%, and majority of them were resettled from overseas (7.5% GARs and 5.9% PSRs).

11.4 Highest Level of Educational Qualifications at Landing

Overall, newcomers to Canada are highly educated. Majority of adult refugees and immigrants who had children came with some post-secondary education. About 38% of them had a bachelor’s or post-graduate degree, and another 24% came with a post-secondary certificate (see Figure 11.1). This, however, varies across the landing categories.




Figure 11.1 Highest level of education at landing among refugee and immigrant parents by landing category (1980-2014)

The three refugee groups tend to have lower proportions of post-secondary degree holders; 14% of the GARs and PSRs came with a university or post-graduate degree, while over half of them had a high school diploma or less education. This contrasts to immigrants admitted under the economic stream. Skilled worker principal applicants have the highest educational attainment with about two-thirds of them arriving with a university or higher credential. For family class, more than half of the sponsored spouses and partner who were parents came with post-secondary education or higher (29% with University or post-graduate degrees, and 27% with some

post-secondary certificate). Thus, refugees who arrived with children tend to be less educated than immigrant parents admitted through the economic or family streams.

When we examined the educational level of the three refugee groups over time (Figure 11.2), some different patterns appeared. While the RLC have relatively constant educational level, the proportions of the GARs and PSRs who had a high school diploma or lower fluctuates.




Figure 11.2 Highest level of education at landing among refugee parents by landing cohort

Those who landed before 2000 tend to have a larger share of post-secondary education, while those who came after 2000 are more concentrated in the lower education level. Particularly, the vast majority (84%) of GAR parents who arrived in the 2010s did not have post-secondary education. This makes a clear contrast to the other refugee categories. RLCs who had children, in particular, are quite well educated; almost half of them claimed they had post-secondary education (20% had university degrees, and 29% had a post-secondary certificate).

On the whole, refugee parents' education level is lower than other immigrant parents. Variations in educational attainment between refugees, family and business immigrants are not substantial as skilled worker immigrants. Among the refugee groups, recent cohorts of GAR parents are disadvantaged relative to the older cohorts, as well to their PSR and RLC counterparts.

11.5 Knowledge of Official Languages at Landing

Majority of refugee and immigrant parents arrived with knowledge of at least one official language (Figure 11.3). About 70% of them declared that they knew English and/or French; over half (55%) came with knowledge in English, 6% percent knew French, and 8% knew both English and French. However, this also varies across landing category.




Figure 11.3 Knowledge of official languages at landing among refugee and immigrant parents by landing category (1980-2014)

Among refugees, the two overseas resettled categories– i.e. GARs and PSRs—had lower levels of English and French knowledge. About 76% of GAR parents and 65% of PSR parents arrived with no knowledge of the official languages. On the other hand, majority (83%) of the RLC group had knowledge of at least one of the official languages at landing. This is partly because RLCs spend time in Canada as asylum claimants before they are granted permanent residency. In fact, their level of official language skills is comparable to that of Skilled Workers. Interestingly, half of the business immigrants who arrived as parents had no knowledge of English and/or French. The majority (70%) of family class immigrant parents were knowledgeable in at least one of the official languages.

When we examine the trends for the refugee groups over time, the proportions are somewhat consistent for GARs and RLCs across cohorts (Figure 11.4), while the proportions of those who have knowledge of official languages vary quite substantially for PSR parents.




Figure 11.4 Knowledge of official languages at landing among refugee parents by landing cohort

For the PSR parents, 47% of the 1990-94 cohort claimed knowledge in English and/or French, which is double of the previous cohorts. During this period, the number of PSRs increased drastically (see Table A2). In subsequent cohorts (1995-99 and 2000-04), the proportion of those with knowledge of the official languages reduced substantially, although it increased again in 2005-09 and the 2010s.

Generally, refugee parents recruited from outside of Canada tend to arrive with very limited official language skills, which may require a longer training process before securing their employment. They may also have greater barriers to communicate with teachers or other service workers for their children. The proportion of GAR parents with English/French skills are consistent over time, but are lower than the proportions for PSR parents in some cohorts. The language barrier is, however, less pronounced for RLCs compared with the other refugee groups.

11.6 Employment

Unlike economic immigrants who are screened and selected based on their prospects to adapt to the labour market and contribute to the Canadian economy, refugees are selected on the basis of humanitarian principles. Yet once they arrive, they need to establish economic roots for their wellbeing and that of their family. Given that their migration is not “voluntary”, at least relative to other migrants, some may expect that it takes longer for refugees to secure employment due to their limited language skills as well as psychological and social adjustment to new life. Figure 11.5 portrays such general patterns for refugees and other immigrants who arrived with children during the 1980-2009 period.




Figure 11.5 Employment in 1, 3, 5 years since landing among refugee and immigrant parents by landing category (1980-2009 cohort)

The overall level of employment, which also includes self-employment, is higher among skilled worker (SW) immigrant parents relative to other landing categories. After the first year of landing, almost 80% of SW parents were employed and this was somewhat constant throughout their first five years in Canada. Relative to this group, refugee groups' rates are lower. Yet the employment rate for PSR parents in year one is quite high (72%), exceeding that of family class immigrant parents (66%). The GARs and RLC groups, in contrast, struggle in the first year. Even then, more than half of them (51% of the GARs and 57% of the RLCs) found a job to earn wages and their rate of employment increased over time. By the third and fifth year, the employment rates of GAR and RLC parents almost converged to that of family class immigrant parents and their PSR counterparts. On the other hand, the employment rates of business class immigrant parents are relatively low probably because they tend to have different sources of income.

These general patterns fluctuate across cohorts. Figure 11.6 shows different patterns for each of the refugee groups.




Figure 11.6 Employment in 1, 3, 5 years since landing among refugee parents by landing cohort

For GAR parents, recent cohorts struggle more in the first year. Those who arrived since the 2000s, for instance, had employment rates below 40% after one year of landing. The rates improved over time, yet they are still lower than that of the previous cohorts. This could be partially explained by the lower levels of educational attainment among recent cohorts, but more research is warranted to identify the sources of vulnerability among recent GAR cohorts. Likewise, the employment rates for PSR parents declined among recent cohorts, albeit not as acute as their GAR counterparts. The levels of employment are around 60% for those who landed since 2000. RLC parents, on the other hand, experienced increasing rates of working in the initial years of settlement. The better employment outcomes of RLC parents reflects the fact that many of them lived in Canada and had the opportunity to acquire study and/or work permits to enable them to upgrade their education and be engaged in the labour market, while their refugee claims were being assessed and processed.

In sum, refugee parents start establishing economic roots in the early settlement period and majority of them are successful in getting jobs. However, more recent refugee cohorts who arrived from abroad, particularly GARs, have lower employment rates in the first year compared to their counterparts who lived in Canada as refugee claimants prior to their admission as permanent residents (RLCs). Although some refugee parents struggle more than others in the first year or so, their employment rates generally improve over the first 5 years.

11.7 Household Income

Although many refugee parents start working at the initial settlement period, and their employment rates catch up with some of other immigrant groups, their household income tend to be lower than that of other immigrants. Figure 11.7 shows the average household income during the first five years after landing by landing category. The values from previous years are adjusted for inflation at the 2015 constant dollar value.




Figure 11.7 Average Household Income in 1, 3, 5 Years since Landing among Refugee and Immigrant Parents by Landing Category (1980-2009 cohort)

Similar to the patterns of employment, skilled worker immigrant parents generate higher household income compared to refugees and other category immigrants. Their average household income in the first year was \$35,000, which is slightly lower than that of family class parents (\$38,000); yet by the third year, the average income for the SW group was the highest among all the landing categories. Among refugees, RLC parents tend to have higher household income than their GAR and PSR counterparts during the first five-year settlement period. After the first year, the average household income for RLC parents was \$29,000, and it increased to \$40,000, while that of GAR and PSR parents was \$22,000 and \$27,000 at year 1, and \$36,000 and \$35,000 by year 5, respectively.

This finding is not surprising, although it is in contrast to the pattern of employment, where PSRs have higher rates of working than RLCs. To the extent that RLCs have pre-landing Canadian experience, they may have established valuable social networks that could support them take care of their children, which would allow them to work for longer hours. Also, employment prior to landing might have led to higher wages by the time of landing.

Yet again, there are substantial variations across the cohorts. Unlike the rates of employment, the average household income among refugees increased over time across cohorts (Figure 11.8). Refugees are entitled to various income transfers and support from the government and private sponsors within the first 12 months of arrival, but the amount they receive varies over time. The amount also varies based on the household structure. For example, the amount of child benefit varies based on the age and number of children in a household. The number of income earners also affect household revenue as well.




Figure 11.8 Average household income in 1, 3, 5 years since landing among refugee parents by landing cohort

The fact that their first year household income increased across cohorts while their rates of employment declined could potentially mean that recent cohorts received higher income transfer than previous cohorts or more members in a household are working. Even after the initial income support period, refugees consistently generated higher household earnings in years 3 and 5. This potentially suggests that more refugee parents work and generate substantial income, besides the social transfers they receive. Although further analysis that takes into account the effect of household structure (a number of family members) and other living conditions such as housing and other market prices is warranted, our findings suggest that refugee parents start engaging in the labour markets soon after arrival; and their household income increased over time, which may have positive implications on their children’s well-being.

In summary, the analysis shows that refugee parents arrive with a limited level of human capital than economic and family immigrant parents. Among the refugee

groups, recent cohorts of GARs and PSRs tend to have lower educational attainment at landing than their RLC counterparts. GAR and PSR parents also tend to arrive with very limited knowledge of the Canadian official languages, while majority of RLC parents have knowledge of at least one of the official languages. Although the rates fluctuate across landing cohorts, it is more pronounced for PSR parents than GAR and RLC parents.

Nevertheless, a sizable proportion of refugee parents start working at the onset of their resettlement. In general, GAR and RLC parents have lower employment rates after one year of landing, but they catch up to their PSR counterparts over time. However, the rates of employment across cohorts show that recent GAR and PSR arrivals may experience greater barriers to secure employment at the initial stages compared to previous cohorts. As expected, the household income levels of refugees are lower than that of skilled workers or family immigrants during the initial settlement period. But in contrast to the pattern of employment, more recent cohorts of refugees tend to generate higher levels of household income relative to their counterparts in previous cohorts.

11.8 Conditions of Refugee Families and Children's Outcomes: From the Past to the Future

These trends indicate that refugee children's household conditions, captured by their parents' human capital endowments, employment rates, and household income, are not as favourable as that of the children of skilled workers or family immigrants. Refugee parents' educational level and language skills at landing (except RLC) are lower than family class and skilled worker immigrant parents. They also have greater barriers to employment and attainment of higher household income at the early stage of their arrival. If a prospect based on the social stratification withstands, these trends lead to lower levels of educational aspiration, and lower educational achievement since children's outcomes are often associated with indicators of household conditions. However, existing research shows different patterns when it comes to the educational outcomes of newcomer children.

Hou and Bonikowska (2017) examined the rates of university completion among children with immigrant or refugee parents. According to their estimates, which is based on the National Household Survey 2011 linked with the Immigrant Landing File, almost one-third (33.5%) of PSR children, 29.7% of GAR children, and 31.7% of the children of RLC completed university². Given the different sources of data, it is difficult to draw a direct comparison; yet it is apparent that the children of immigrants have higher rates of educational attainment compared to their parents. Estimates from Hou and Bonikowska's (2017) study and our data show that refugee children, in particular, achieve much higher educational outcomes relative to their

2 Their analysis includes immigrant/refugee children who arrived in Canada at the age of 15 years or younger between the 1980-2000 period and fall in the age range of 25-44 years old in 2011.

parents, despite their parents' limited educational levels and language skills at landing. Also, the university completion rates of refugee children in Canada is higher than that of family children (Hou & Bonikowska, 2017). While the rates are around 30% among refugee children, the rate for family class children was estimated at 22.7% (ibid, p.1442). In fact, refugee children's university completion rates are higher than that of native-born children with two native-born parents, and they only trail behind the children of economic class immigrants. More than half of the children of economic class immigrants (50.3% for the skilled worker and 59.3% of the business class) obtained a university degree in Canada. Much of the gaps between refugee children and the children of economic and family class immigrants may be attributed to variations in their parents' education, language skills, employment rates, and household income as reflected in our findings.

These findings are in line with the "success orientation model" (Boyd & Grieco, 1998, Boyd, 2009), which explains why immigrant children outperform their parents or the third-plus generation. This framework posits that the achievement of immigrant children is attributed to the high aspirations and expectations typically possessed by their parents. Often, refugee children's experiences are considered unique relative to non-refugee migrant children, given their traumatic pre-migration experiences, separation from family or friends, and the challenges they experience in refugee camps. Yet in terms of educational achievements, evidence from past cohorts underscores the resilience of refugee children as long as they are structurally integrated and provided with the necessary support (i.e. proper grade placement and good parental health) (Wilkinson, 2002). The evidence so far suggests that, although refugee parents may not fare as well as their counterparts admitted through the economic and family streams, their children tend to be resilient and they do quite well at least in terms of educational achievements. But, how could this be translated to the Syrian cohorts?

To a large extent, the socio-political climate that surrounded the admission of the 2015-16 Syrian refugee cohort was positive. Such public support fosters welcoming communities, which promote smoother integration among newcomers (Esses, Hamilton, Bennett-AbuAyyash, & Burstein, 2010; Portes & Borocz, 1989; Ravanera, Esses, & Fernando, 2013). Yet supportive public opinion can change over time due to ebbs and flows of social condition. Social issues, such as irregular border crossing since 2017 or the rise of populist ideologue can change the socio-political climates, which may not only affect various social policies towards refugees but also lead to a hostile environment for refugee children. Although the literature tends to offer evidence towards the "resilience" of refugee children, Canada is not free from racially or ethnically motivated discrimination, and continuous awareness of this social context is important.

According to recent estimates, the 2015-16 cohort of Syrian refugees to Canada are in conditions that are more vulnerable than refugees from other countries. Houle (2019), based on the Census 2016, reports that government-assisted Syrian refugees are much more vulnerable socioeconomically than their PSR counterparts since over 70% of them did not have secondary education and almost 80% had no

knowledge of Canada's official languages at arrival. Further, Syrian GARs and PSRs struggle to find employment during the initial settlement period relative to refugees who were admitted in the same years from other countries. Given that many of the Syrian refugees consisted of couples with children (about 85%) and arrived without much formal education or literacy even in their mother tongue (Houle, 2019), their precarious conditions are expected. These realities, no doubt, provide greater levels of challenges for their children to overcome if they are to follow the positive trends of previous refugee cohorts.

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Appendix

Table A2 Number of refugees and immigrants who were 25 years or older at landing and arrived with a child(ren) by landing category and cohort

Landing Category	Cohort										Total		
	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-09	2010-14	N	%				
Refugee													
Government Assisted Refugees (GARs)	21,370	20,945	13,745	13,535	12,420	10,175	9,045	101,235	7.5%				
Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs)	12,055	14,610	33,675	4,175	3,955	4,665	6,865	80,000	5.9%				
Refugees Landed in Canada (RLC)		25	15,785	23,205	26,510	25,115	18,470	109,110	8.1%				
Economic													
Skilled Worker (SW)	46,220	46,085	62,795	72,180	108,265	87,410	76,405	499,360	37.0%				
Business Immigrants (Busi)	5,805	9,440	15,875	9,495	7,785	7,130	5,375	60,905	4.5%				
Family													
Spouses and Partners (FAM)	36,170	33,370	61,345	47,155	57,190	65,840	68,545	369,615	27.4%				
Other													
Other	35,235	12,520	22,925	15,590	11,985	14,960	17,780	130,995	9.7%				
Total	156,855	136,995	226,145	185,335	228,110	215,295	202,485	1,351,220					

12 Government as Resettlement Facilitator in the “Whole of Society” Approach: Canadian Refugee Resettlement in a Neoliberal Era

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Abstract

A critical eye can be used to interrogate the Government of Canada’s “whole of society” approach to newcomer settlement and integration. Such an approach considers the tasks associated with refugee resettlement to exceed both the fiscal and functional capacity of the federal government and require active contributions of provinces and territories, municipalities, service providers, and additional stakeholders. With the federal government playing the role of facilitator and coordinator, such an undertaking constitutes more than augmenting federal government contributions with those of other levels of government and private actors. Rather, it can be seen as part of a broader qualitative shift in the relationship between state and society in the context of refugee resettlement, whereby increasing numbers of private actors are charged with the responsibility of refugee resettlement. To this end, this chapter considers how the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative, while an extraordinary undertaking by the federal Canadian government that is not without increased economic resources and good will, constitutes a further step in the “neo-liberalization of refugee well-being”.

Keywords: Refugee Resettlement; Neoliberalism; Private Sponsorship

12.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the new practices and functions undertaken by the Canadian federal government under what eventually became the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative (SRRI). Under the initiative, the number of Syrian refugees who resettled – which entails relocating refugees from a country of asylum to a third country such as Canada (see <https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement.html>) – in a relatively short period of time (the most intense period being from the end of 2015 to the early months of 2017) was disproportionately large when compared to recent refugee resettlement trends in terms of the Canadian context. The initiative mobilized new institutions and reinvented existing ones as a response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

In many respects, the resettlement of Syrian refugees was a national initiative for which the only parallel in Canadian history was the resettlement of refugees from Indo-China in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Private sponsorship was a key mechanism by which each national resettlement imperative was accomplished. While over 200,000 privately sponsored refugees have arrived in Canada since 1978, 60,000 Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian privately sponsored refugees arrived in Canada in the late 1970s and early 1980s, including 29,269 in 1979 (Hyndman, Payne and Jimenez, 1979). According to the Government of Canada’s figures, 44,550 Syrian refugees were resettled in Canada between November 4, 2015 and February 28, 2017, of which 21,730 were Government Assisted Refugees (GARs); 18,860 of which were Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs); and 3,960 were Blended Visa Office Referred Refugees (3,960) (Government of Canada, 2019a).

The SRRI should be appreciated as an accomplishment in an era in which the presence of refugees is becoming increasingly stigmatized and scapegoated. What room exists for a critical assessment of the SRRI, then, when the recent historical alternatives appear to be worse? In this chapter, I argue that the resettlement of Syrian refugees in Canada bears the imprint of longer-term 21st-century trends of “neo-liberalization” of refugee resettlement, whereby wider swaths of society, refugee serving organizations, as well as refugees themselves, bear increasing amounts of responsibility for resettlement and integration along neoliberal lines. From a social policy standpoint, this tendency bears the imprint of “new public management” thinking, a trend that became particularly prevalent in Canada vis-à-vis Immigrant Serving

Acknowledgments

I thank Emily Halldorson for providing research assistance for this chapter. I also extend my appreciation to the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Manitoba Office, who have allowed reproduction of sections of a previous article here. I thank Hani Ataan Al-ubeady, Carlos Colorado, Dylan Chyz-Lund and Emily Halldorson for their contributions to this previous article. My sincere appreciation goes to personnel at Welcome Place for helping to facilitate the original research from which this chapter is derived. Finally, I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding aspects of this research via the Manitoba Research Alliance through the latter’s ‘Partnering for Change: Community-based Solutions for Aboriginal and Inner-city Poverty.’

Agencies (ISAs) following the 2008 financial crisis (Lowe, Richmond, & Shields, 2017) but has roots that extend deeper.

A critical eye can be used to interrogate the Government of Canada's "whole of society" approach to newcomer integration in the context of refugee resettlement. Such an approach considers the tasks associated with refugee resettlement to exceed both the fiscal and functional capacity of the federal government and to require active contributions of provinces and territories, municipalities, service providers, and additional "settlement and integration stakeholders" (Prince-St. Amand, 2016). With the government playing the role of facilitator and coordinator, such an undertaking constitutes more than augmenting federal government contributions with those of other levels of government and private actors. Instead, it can be seen as part of a broader qualitative shift in the relationship between state and society in the context of refugee resettlement, whereby increasing numbers of private actors and non-governmental organizations are charged with the responsibility of refugee resettlement.

To this end, I demonstrate how the SRRI, while an extraordinary undertaking by the Canadian federal government that is not without increased economic resources and goodwill, constitutes a further step in the "neo-liberalization of refugee well-being" (Silvius, 2016). This neo-liberalization has three major components: 1) Immigrant Serving Agencies (ISAs), whose service delivery capacity and relationship to the Canadian state have been affected by the long-term incorporation of principles of New Public Management; 2) Refugees themselves, who are expected to meet short term "settlement and integration" targets, compete within labour and housing markets, and provide social reproductive care work similar to the "settled" population despite bearing legacies of displacement (Silvius, 2019); 3) and most importantly for this paper, the increased government role in the augmentation and coordination of voluntarism and private contributions for (Syrian) refugee resettlement.

In this new stage, the Government of Canada plays a very particular role in the mobilization, coordinating, and supporting volunteer resources and private contributions for refugee resettlement. The involvement of numerous strata of Canadian society in refugee resettlement has positive effects in terms of de-stigmatization of refugees, cultural acceptance, and inclusivity. However, this involvement comes by way of the further recalibration of the (federal) state's responsibilities vis-à-vis refugee resettlement and, ultimately, well-being. The Federal Government retains "conventional" roles of sponsoring, screening, accepting for resettlement, conducting security checks, providing services for settlement and integration, and providing material supports (i.e., a decommodified source of income) for a finite period (via the Resettlement Assistance Program). However, as I demonstrate in this chapter, it is taking on new functions of encouraging voluntary contributions and leveraging its contributions through partnering with, if not delegating responsibility to, private sector actors and non-governmental organizations to aid in the social side of resettlement efforts, which are processes of "settlement", or becoming settled and integrated in a new society.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I demonstrate the different categories of refugees under the Canadian immigration system and posit that the difference in refugee type has a bearing on the kinds of settlement support that refugees receive. In Section 3, I consider how efforts towards settlement have been conditioned by the more significant changes in state-society relations under neoliberalism, new public management (NPM), and austerity. In Section 4, I demonstrate how the Canadian federal government is moving to a new model of refugee (re)settlement under the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative (SRRRI), whereby they became the facilitator, manager, and coordinator of private and voluntary contributions. Section 5 serves as a conclusion.

12.2 Categories Matter: Private Sponsorship, Government Assistance, and the Responsibility to Resettle¹

All recently arrived refugees who resettle in Canada, whether initially upon arrival or soon after that, are seeing their well-being determined by their ability to compete in labour and housing markets in the context of diminishing social provisions and at disadvantages vis-à-vis local populations, significant categorical differences among them. The two largest categories of refugee admission classes in Canada are Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) and Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) (for a review, see Garcea, 2017). Changes in their relative significance in favour of the latter over time demonstrate the increased role that private actors and non-governmental organizations are expected to play in refugee resettlement. Through Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)’s Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP), GARs are entitled to a maximum of one year’s worth of income support, which corresponds to provincial social assistance rates (Alboim & Cohl, 2012, pp. 36-37). RAP-eligible GARs may receive additional financial supports including a shelter allowance – a monthly amount for rent and utilities corresponding to provincial rates – and a basic allowance – which, determined by family size and age, corresponds with provincial Employment and Income Assistance (EIA) rates, and includes a monthly food and incidentals allowance.

12.2.1 Government Assisted Refugees (GARs)

As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Silvius et al., 2015; Silvius, 2016), however, RAP supports received by GARs have dwindled in relation to the price of housing on private housing markets in Canada, meaning that over time, GARs are seeing the social provisions for which they are eligible upon resettlement become inadequate given the exigencies of local rental markets. Indeed, in its 2016 evaluation of Canada’s resettlement programs, IRCC called for increasing the provisions within the RAP:

Since GARs and BVOR [a category described below] refugees are selected based on resettlement need and supported by the Government of Canada, it

1 This section is derived in part from Silvius, 2016.

is expected that the level of support provided should allow GARs to meet their essential needs and enable them to meet the UNHCR stated goal of allowing refugees to rebuild their lives in dignity. Several lines of evidence showed that RAP income support levels are inadequate to meet these expectations.

RAP income support is insufficient to meet the basic necessities and housing needs of GARs. Most notably, the cost of housing is significantly higher than what RAP income support allocates for housing. Furthermore, RAP income support is substantially lower than the Low-Income Cut Off rate for all major cities in Canada. Also, while RAP income support is designed to mirror provincial social assistance rates, some lags occur in matching RAP income support to social assistance rates (IRCC, 2016a).

12.2.2 Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs)

Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs) have their initial well-being determined largely by private financial contributions, albeit as mandated by the Canadian government as a condition for sponsorship. The main advantages of the privately sponsored stream are in private sponsors being able to forward the name of the refugee(s) they wish to sponsor and the possibilities that PSRs will obtain a direct support network through their sponsors. Sponsorship agreement holders (SAHs), their affiliates, Groups of Five (5+ Canadian citizens or permanent residents), and community sponsors, some of which are community organizations, can privately sponsor refugees, and are mandated to provide basic needs for the PSR during his/her first year in Canada (Alboim & Cohl, 2012, pp. 37-38). Due to the sponsors' ability to identify the refugee(s) to be resettled, the PSRP has enabled *de facto* family reunification – which has been lauded by refugee advocates but criticized by various Canadian governments as contrary to the intentions of the program (Hyndman, Payne, & Jimenez, 2017; Labman & Pearlman, 2018).

Since 1979, Canada's PSRP has been guided by the principles of additionality (the program is to serve in addition to the government's commitments to GARs) and naming (private sponsors may choose whom to sponsor).² In certain jurisdictions, PSR mechanisms are not adhering to the additionality principle; instead, they are replacing GARs, or at least coming at the same time as reductions or stagnation in the annual levels of GARs, and their more "generous" social entitlements. As a result, the government offloads the responsibility for providing material supports required for refugee resettlement onto citizens. Elsewhere, I have demonstrated that in Manitoba, for example, annual PSR arrivals have generally increased since the late 1990s, whereas GARs have decreased (Silvius, 2016). Labman (2016) demonstrates the general trend of growth in the PSRP from 2001-2014, with the number of PSRs being resettled in Canada eclipsing those of GARs in 2013, before dipping below again

2 See The Canadian Council for Refugees (2013). Important changes in Canada's Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program (PSRP). <http://ccrweb.ca/en/changes-private-sponsorship-refugees>

in 2014. Nonetheless, over time, the sustained allocation of resettlement spaces to PSRs constitutes “an intentional and significant reallocation of resettlement numbers from the government to private citizens” (Labman, 2016, p. 71). Moreover, as is demonstrated later, while private sponsorship certainly provides a mechanism for the active contributions of Canadian civil society in refugee resettlement, it is not immune from influence by political imperatives – namely, the Canadian federal government’s expressed desire to admit and resettle Syrian refugees in a relatively short period.

12.2.3 Blended Visa Office Referred (BVOR) Refugees

The Blended Visa Office Referred (BVOR) program was created in 2013 after approximately two decades of pilot projects that targeted specific refugee populations for both government and private support (see Labman, 2016; Labman & Pearlman, 2018). In it, UNHCR-referred refugees are selected by the government and matched with private sponsors– hence, sponsors cannot name their “preferred” candidate, but the costs of resettlement are shared by the government and private sponsors. It is unclear whether the BVOR program fully respects the additionality principle, as the government retains the power to influence which refugee is eligible for selection. Private sponsorship contributions are therefore enabling the government to meet its international obligations (Agrawal, 2018). As Labman and Pearlman (2018) demonstrate, the BVOR program was implemented through the re-designation of 1000 GAR spots as BVOR spots, and since its inception, actual arrivals have fallen below targeted numbers. As it denies sponsors the ability to identify the refugee(s) they wish to sponsor, BVOR sponsorship enables government-selected refugees to be financially supported by Canadian society directly.

The BVOR program is considered a three-way partnership between the Government of Canada, the UNHCR, and private sponsors. The UNHCR identifies the refugees, the Government of Canada provides up to six months of income support through the RAP, and private sponsors provide an additional six months of financial support and up to a year of “social and emotional support”. For the duration of the sponsorship (one year), BVOR class refugees are covered under the Interim Federal Health Program and receive provincial health coverage (IRCC, 2018).

12.2.4 Private Refugee Sponsorship as “Exportable Model”?

One of the lasting legacies of Canada’s efforts towards Syrian refugee resettlement has been additional international exposure of Canada’s private refugee resettlement mechanisms, which have been lauded by some as an “exportable” model. The Canadian government, the UNHCR and the Open Society Foundations, George Soros’ initiative, commended the “Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative” in December 2016 as a means of promoting the use of private sponsorship in other national jurisdictions. Such a celebration warrants some scrutiny. The Canadian government’s decision to accept Syrians as *prima facie* refugees, rather than undertaking individual refugee

status determination, expedited the selection, arrival, and re-settlement of Syrians. However, during the “Syrian refugee crisis”, backlogs of applications of non-Syrian refugees, including those who had completed their applications before the arrival of Syrians, increased (Hyndman, Payne, & Jimenez, 2017).

There are benefits of “community” and “social capital” as sources for emotional and financial support, information, and knowledge of new social and cultural systems for resettled refugees by sponsors is well developed (D’Addario et al., 2007). The Privately Sponsored Refugee Program on the surface would appear to facilitate such connections by way of the sponsor-sponsored relationship. However, there are limits to the “social capital” that resettled refugees receive under these circumstances. Possessing social capital alone may not enable refugees to overcome, for example, downward economic mobility in the context of racialized economic structures and other impediments (Lamba, 2003) or the challenges in finding adequate, affordable, and dignified housing in overheating housing markets (Silvius, Halldorson & Ataan Al-ubeady, 2019; Tanasescu & Smart, 2010).

Similarly, Agrawal (2018) suggests that much of the relevant literature lauds private sponsorship for its ability to serve a complementary function to government-determined refugee selection and resettlement and by mobilizing the contributions of broad sections of Canadian society. In an “inter-sponsorship comparison study”, which examines the settlement experiences of Syrian PSRs, BVORs, and GARs, Agrawal instead concludes that PSRs experience comparable resettlement challenges. In a study of the settlement experience of Syrians in the Canadian province of Alberta, Drolet and Moorthi (2018) conclude that while private sponsors play a significant role in refugee (re)settlement, the level of support they offer is variable. Despite high levels of community commitment in private sponsorship, without coordinated government support, private sponsorship risks becoming privatized sponsorship, in which the imperative of government is being carried out by civil society (Hyndman, Payne, & Jimenez, 2017; Labman & Pearlman, 2018). In other words, encouraging private regimes of refugee resettlement runs the risk of overreliance on private contributions for refugee resettlement to the determinant of guaranteed social supports and well-funded and solid bodies tasked with fulfilling settlement needs of resettled refugees. The SRRI is worth examining with such considerations in mind.

12.3 Syrian Resettlement, Settlement, and New Public Management

12.3.1 Refugee Integration: A “Two-Way Process”?

Termed initially “Operation Syrian Refugees” (OSR), the Canadian federal government’s undertaking to resettle large number of Syrian refugees constituted ambitious targets and necessitated complex ministerial coordination and cooperation. In November 2015 the Government of Canada indicated its commitment to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees, a goal they declared having met by February 29, 2016. Resettlement of the first 25,000 Syrian refugees would occur in five phases: 1) Identifying Syrian refugees to come to Canada; 2) Processing Syrian refugees overseas; 3) Trans-

portation to Canada; 4) Welcoming in Canada, and 5) Settlement and community integration (IRCC, 2017). This chapter focuses on the last two stages, as this is the terrain upon which social policy and the parameters of settlement take place.

Settlement itself is not a straightforward notion; however, it is essential to note that the Government of Canada defines it in a particular manner following its Settlement Program and the settlement supports offered therein, with an emphasis on the short term nature of settlement:

Settlement refers to *a short period of mutual adaptation* (emphasis added) between the newcomers and the host society, during which the government provides support and services to newcomers. Integration is a two-way process that involves a commitment on the part of immigrants to adapt to life in Canada and on the part of Canada to welcome and adapt to new people and their different cultures (Government of Canada, 2019b).

Through the Settlement Program, IRCC (formerly CIC) funds support services, including childcare, translation and interpretation services, crisis counselling, transportation assistance, and provisions for disabilities, which enable re-settled refugees to access other services. In terms of direct services, they support: needs assessments and referrals; information and orientation; language training; and employment-related services, namely “services that directly equip clients with employment-related skills and support in accessing the labour market”, including those which assist resettled refugees to prepare for the credential assessment process (“employment bridging initiatives, employment-related mentoring and networking, employment and credential assessment counselling, skills development and training”). They also support “services that help to connect clients with the broader community, public institutions, and community organizations” (“community activities, services connecting clients to public institutions and their communities, cross-cultural activities, and mentoring and networking”). Moreover, the Settlement Program also contains smaller amounts of funds to support auxiliary services, which “seek to enhance capacity in the [IRCC]-funded settlement community to optimize client outcomes”³ (Government of Canada, 2019b).

3 IRCC lists the following as eligible indirect services: Conferences, development and sharing of materials, tools and best practices; Development of pilot/demonstration projects for service delivery innovation; Development, management and dissemination of service provider training content, standards and curricula to ensure comparable newcomer outcomes; Community engagement and partnerships for local planning and coordination; Promotion of francophone settlement services and francophone minority communities; Awareness, attraction and retention activities to support the vitality of francophone minority communities; Employer Engagement; Francophone Immigration Network (RIFs); Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs); Professional Development; Support to local communities and employers to assist them in accessing foreign-trained newcomers; Support to facilitate the credential assessment process for internationally trained individuals through projects with regulatory bodies, apprenticeship authorities and/or related partners, organizations or partnerships; Applied research on unmet needs and best practices regarding settlement services.

During the SRRI, Immigrant Serving Agencies (ISAs) played an indispensable role in facilitating resettlement. However, their position in an increasingly complex service delivery landscape can be understood in terms of welfare state restructuring. Lowe, Richmond and Shields (2017) consider the position of ISAs in facilitating the settlement and integration of newcomers (refugees and immigrants), suggesting that such organizations are indispensable for fostering a welcoming environment for newcomers while demonstrating that their work is being compromised under conditions of austerity and neoliberal restructuring. Such conditions contribute to decreased funding and competitive funding processes, a loss of organizational autonomy, and the disciplining of organizations into adopting bureaucratic evaluation and assessment procedures, all of which culminate in the destabilization of the system within which ISAs operate.

12.3.2 Refugee (Re)Settlement and New Public Management

According to Lowe, Richmond and Shields (2017), as part of the non-profit sector in Canada, ISAs have been subjected to restructuring according to the principles of New Public Management (NPM), which serves as a “transmission belt used to impose neoliberal governance and practice models onto the nonprofit sector” (p.19). Such a philosophy is comprised of 1) the downloading of services and care from the federal state to local governments, non-profit organizations, individuals and families; 2) a diminishing of the scope and scale of social programs despite their nominally remaining; 3) the increased prevalence of Alternate Service Delivery (ASD) – which involves reduced services, restricted access to services, and services being provided by third-party actors (including “cheaper” providers from the non-profit sector); 4) the adoption of business models and the criterion of efficiency; 5) a shift from more extended term, less contingent funding to “short-term, competitively-based program financing tied to narrow and strict audit-oriented accountability mechanism” (p. 20); 6) marketized “thinned out” and “leaned out” services the parameters which are dictated by the funder; 7) constricted space for advocacy by non-profit agencies, which further alienates marginalized groups (pp. 19-21). The authors concede that “the delivery of settlement services through non-profit bodies... pre-dates NPM... [However], what changed with NPM for ISAs is reduced autonomy for providers, the tight control of programming by the state, a narrowed role in society, and funding instability” (p.21).

ISAs were hit particularly hard with austerity measures following the 2008 financial crisis, whereby the “State-ISA Funding regime” was recalibrated to become increasingly limited and unstable, with diminished long term, stable financing (see also Bushell and Shields, 2018). Moreover, the economical components of neoliberalism have been joined by right-wing anti-immigrant populism (Moreno, Shields, & Drolet, 2018). Together, these tendencies make for an environment within which refugees may access social programs aimed at their welfare and well-being only with greater difficulty.

Hence, the environment within which a large number of Syrian refugees were resettled differed substantially from Canada’s other significant undertaking of refugee resettlement as a response to conflict in IndoChina. As Alboim (2016), demonstrates, federal-state structures of resettlement underpinning both initiatives differed considerably, with the SRRI being characterized by an offloading of responsibility onto other actors. The following is worth quoting at length:

The organization and mandate of Employment and Immigration Canada in 1979-81 allowed for a continuum of action and consistent direction. Visa officers overseas; officers at the reception and matching centres; officers in local immigration centres; settlement, training and employment counsellors in local employment centres; as well as Employment Development Branch (EDB) community developers/refugee liaison officers were all in one department and reported to the same deputy minister/minister. This enabled quick coordination and collaboration to ensure the best use of resources and services. An internal task force led by the deputy minister allowed obstacles to be removed and resources to be allocated quickly to where they were needed.

By the time the Syrian crisis took place, there were no networks of immigration centres and employment centres across the country, the EDB no longer existed, responsibility for training and employment programs had been devolved to the provinces, and responsibility for reception, resettlement, and integration services had been devolved to a network of NGO service providers funded by the federal government through contribution agreements. While there are distinct advantages to the current system of NGO service providers, key elements (like sponsor support and monitoring, and community development) have fallen through the cracks or are not consistent across the country. Coordination is also more difficult; in many communities, there are no immigration department representatives at the table because the department is no longer present in those communities (Alboim, 2016).

The Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative constituted an exceptional event in terms of Canadian state and society’s capability to resettle larger than historically normal (for Canada) amounts of refugees in a short period. Indeed, an extraordinary mobilization of resources facilitated Syrian refugee resettlement. However, this occurred within a climate long affected by the neo-liberalization of the newcomer serving sector in Canada and bore the characteristics of this longer-term change. Moreover, as demonstrated in this chapter, it occurred through the unprecedented mobilization of volunteer and contingent resources.

12.4 Scope and Scale of Syrian Resettlement: An Exceptional and Privatized Undertaking?⁴

12.4.1 A National Political Imperative

The issue of resettling refugees in Canada from the Syrian conflict became politicized before the 2015 federal election. Then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his Conservative Government had received pressure, including from within his cabinet, to increase the number of Syrian refugees being resettled in Canada. In January 2015, the Conservatives pledged to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees over the next three years, an increase over the quota of 1,300 that the government had already allotted. However, Harper's condition was that the focus is on particular religious minorities from within the country (Levitz, 2016b). In January 2015, "areas of focus" were made part of a refugee triage system, effectively circumventing United Nations' legislation prohibiting discrimination in the selection of GARs, by allowing certain cases to be expedited while others were not. "Areas of focus" included ethnic and religious minorities (i.e. Christians, Yazidis, etc.), people identifying as LGBT, people who speak English or French, people who have families in Canada, and people who have run a business (see Levitz, 2016c; Petrou, 2015).

The admittance and resettling of Syrian refugees in Canada became a significant issue during the 2015 federal election, particularly after a picture of the body of a Syrian child named Alan Kurdi washed up on a Turkish beach exploded on social media. The three major national parties – the Conservatives, New Democrats, and Liberals – all campaigned on policies committing to increasing the intake of Syrian refugees. The Liberals promised a minimum of 25,000. However, this number would only be reached with significant collaboration with the private sector, through private sponsorship, and by way of the BVOR Program (see Levitz, 2016a). Arguably, such a commitment to Syrian refugees during the federal election created a political imperative for the eventually victorious Liberals to act upon. Once in office, the federal Liberals made a series of moves to facilitate the resettlement of Syrian refugees.

4 This section is a revised version of material initially published in Silvius et al. 2017.

On November 9, 2015, a new Cabinet Ad Hoc Committee was created to help facilitate the resettlement of Syrian refugees (Office of the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, 2015).

On November 24, 2015, the government announced a five-phase plan to resettle 25,000 refugees (identification, selection/processing, transportation, welcoming, and settlement/integration). Furthermore, they committed up to \$678 million over six years toward the resettlement of Syrians, of which \$325-377 million was allocated for settlement and integration. The government promoted the hashtag #welcomerefugees with the intention of increasing public dialogue and involvement in the matter of Syrian refugee resettlement (Government of Canada, 2015).

On January 26, 2016, the federal government announced the Syrian Family Links Initiative in partnership with Catholic Crosscultural Services to help connect Syrian refugees abroad with private sponsors through the help of a refugee’s family in Canada (Government of Canada, 2016a).

On February 5, 2016, the government encouraged municipalities outside traditional GAR resettlement locations to develop a Community Partnership Settlement Plan and apply to join the RAP. Communities outside of major cities have traditionally not administered RAP and been locations for the resettlement of GARs. During the Syrian response, these communities were encouraged to develop a plan for the resettlement of GARs in partnership with social service agencies and other community partners. IRCC facilitated an application process in which a community had to demonstrate how they would meet the educational, employment, housing, social, and other needs of refugees. If accepted, that community could then begin welcoming GARs (Government of Canada, 2016b).

The Canadian Forces spent \$6.4 million to renovate and upgrade housing units on five military bases to accommodate refugees (as a last resort option). The money was absorbed by the Department of National Defense’s regular budget, and as of February 29, 2016, none of the housing had been used (Zimonjic, 2016).

On May 9, 2016, more than 40 additional staff in the Middle East were reallocated to assist in the processing of Syrian PSR applications until March 31, 2016. (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2016).

As a highly visible political issue to which the federal Liberals devoted significant political capital, the Syrian refugee crisis prompted mechanisms, tools, supports, and methods for public engagement for which there is no recent parallel in Canada’s recent history of refugee resettlement. In retrospect, the attention given to Alan Kurdi’s tragic death provided a stimulus to the private sponsorship of Syrian refugees in Canada and thrust the specific case of Syrian refugees into the national spotlight (CBC News, 2016a). Arguably, Syrian refugees specifically became a matter of greater national attention than had been the matter of refugees *as such* and contributed to a spike in material, financial, and political support for Syrian refugees in particular.

The disproportionate attention granted to resettling Syrian refugees relative to resettling those of other countries of origin is evidenced in the discrepancies devoted to each at the level of public awareness and engagement. Indeed, the hashtag #welcomerefugees, which was actively promoted by the Government of Canada, denotes the welcoming and resettling of Syrian refugees alone in government campaigns. Such is evidenced in a prominent webpage of the Government of Canada (<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/index.asp>), wherein one could see updates on the government's efforts to resettle Syrian refugees, including the number that have arrived in Canada since November 4, 2015 (which total 40,081 as of the last update on the website – January 29, 2017). The Government of Canada developed a comprehensive map to detail the destination communities for incoming Syrian refugees (<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/map.asp>). From the best of this author's discernment, there is no comparable website, index or tool available to the public for refugees resettling in Canada *in general*.

12.4.2 GARs, PSRs, and the Resettlement of Syrian Refugees

The distinction in refugee classification is crucial when understanding the changing role of government in matters pertaining to refugee resettlement, as demonstrated above. Thirty-six Canadian communities had a Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) service provider organization to facilitate the resettlement of GARs (Government of Canada, 2017b). Moreover, 350 Canadian communities (excluding Quebec) welcomed Syrian refugees (as of December 18, 2016). (Government of Canada, 2017a).

There is a considerable difference in the criteria in place for community selection for GARs versus those which are in place for PSRs. This difference is indicative of the differing settlement environment in which GARs and PSRs may find themselves once in Canada. The Government of Canada's assessment of the SRR (Government of Canada, 2019c) states that GARs “go to communities in Canada where there is already settlement supports in place, with consideration given to whether they have family members in Canada, as well as the availability of schools, housing and language training. Our goal is to find a community with existing resettlement and settlement services that meet the needs of refugees and allows them to connect with a support network that can help them adjust to life in Canada”. Conversely, “privately sponsored refugees go to the community where their sponsor lives”. In such instances, there is no consideration of the settlement environment in which resettled refugees find themselves. Therefore, while the site emphasizes that all resettled refugees have access to the “full suite of federally-funded settlement services that help them integrate successfully into their new communities and Canadian society”, the extent to which a resettled PSR will have access to such services, particularly in smaller communities, remains uncertain.

At a national level, significant federal resources were devoted to mechanisms to promote civic engagement on the matter of Syrian refugee resettlement. Such public participation, and the corresponding private and voluntary tools through which settlement is facilitated, may be thought of as part of trends towards the “privatiza-

tion” of refugee resettlement, wherein the government’s role becomes less of a direct funder of core supports as it concentrates its efforts on facilitating and mobilizing private initiatives and resources for refugee resettlement. In Manitoba, the recent tendency has been to increase the number of PSRs relative to the number of GARs. This reflects a long legacy of community-based advocacy: private sponsors and community groups have long sought greater autonomy vis-à-vis government structures to select and sponsor refugees. Nonetheless, the success of private sponsorship is predicated on the willingness and ability of voluntary associations to support the social and financial needs of refugees during resettlement (Silvius 2016).

The Syrian case in Manitoba challenged such privatization insofar as: 1) Syrian refugees arriving in Manitoba have been predominantly GARs to date, and 2) Considerable government funding and support were mobilized at both the provincial and federal levels. In such a scenario, successful settlement is predicated on the availability of adequate, affordable housing, and the corresponding financial support to facilitate initial housing and settlement. As is demonstrated below, mechanisms established during the first group of Syrian arrivals led to a broader range of options than those experienced by other GARs in recent years.

12.4.3 Government as Facilitator of Refugee Settlement: Privatization in the Making?

The Government of Canada retains “conventional” government roles in refugee administration and resettlement. The former is beyond the scope of this chapter. We can consider direct funding to refugee serving organizations or the use of rent subsidies and public housing as evidence of the latter. An emerging governing function as it pertains to Syrian refugee resettlement can be found in the organization of informational resources that may assist Canadian citizens, community-serving organizations, and private entities to participate in the Syrian refugee settlement effort (see Province of Manitoba, 2016a). For example, the Refugee Sponsorship Training Program is funded by IRCC and administered by Catholic Crosscultural Services. In its own words,

The Refugee Sponsorship Training Program (RSTP) is a program designed to support the Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAHs) of Canada, their Constituent Groups, Groups of Five and Community Sponsors on a national level (excl. Quebec). The objective of the RSTP is to address their information and on-going training needs as well as the initial information needs of sponsored refugees (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, 2016).

Similarly, the government has played a partnering and coordinating role at the level of housing practices. On January 20, 2016, Canadian Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship John McCallum announced that the Government would be partnering with Lifeline Syria, a sponsoring agency in Toronto, to temporarily house GARs with sponsors waiting for their PSRs to arrive, taking pressure off settlement agencies and avoiding hotel use (CBC News, 2016b). McCallum later cancelled this

plan citing the government's "duty of care" and a desire not to move refugees to one home only to have to move them again later (The Canadian Press, 2016).

However, the focus here is on how the private/community side of Syrian resettlement exceeds that which is contained within existing private sponsorship mechanisms. One such initiative is the Welcome Fund – a large private and charitable initiative established for the purposes of resettling Syrian refugees. Through the Welcome Fund, an entity called Community Foundations Canada (CFC) disbursed funds to community organizations across Canada, mostly through the local community foundations. For example, the Winnipeg Foundation disbursed Welcome Fund grants to Winnipeg-based organizations. The CFC represented a network of 191 such foundations. The Welcome Fund was established on December 10, 2015 with a \$500,000 donation from Manulife Financial. This donation was matched by Community Foundations of Canada (Venn, 2015). On December 16, 2015, Canadian National Railway donated \$5 million to the fund. Donald Arthur Guloien, President and Chief Executive Officer at Manulife, stated at the time that "CN has shown tremendous leadership and generosity with its support of the Government's plan to settle 25,000 Syrian refugees in Canada" (Bervoets, 2015). John McCallum indicated in March 2016 that the goal of the fund was to raise \$50 million for the purposes of supporting Syrian refugee settlement efforts. At that point, the fund had attracted \$30 million, with donations coming from banks, insurance companies, and the automotive industry (CBC News, 2016c).

In addition to lauding contributions from the private sector, the Welcome Fund's architects envision the fund as being capable of responding to settlement needs identified by local settlement agencies. The five stated principles of the fund are as follows:

- "Do what's best and align our resources with refugees arriving in our communities;"
- "Use funding for the highest priorities, recognizing that there's not enough to fulfill all needs;"
- "Stay true to the purpose of the Welcome Fund, but be nimble enough to respect and respond to local needs shared by communities;"
- "Look for opportunities to build a legacy of lasting relationships and best practices;"
- "Respond to the urgent nature of the situation, while keeping an eye on sustainability and a focus on the long-term" (Lyons, 2016).

On the fund's webpage, a promotional article written in June 2016 describes the fund's impact in the following manner:

Now, 150 days since the Welcome Fund's creation we have activated our community foundation network to support Canadian organizations helping government-sponsored refugees settle in 28 communities in every province through rent subsidies, emergency loan funds, urgent mental health care, start-up kits of household goods, language and employment training, and much more (in Lyons, 2016).

Indeed, numerous ISAs across Canada received CFC funds to enable various aspects of Syrian refugee housing and resettlement. A timeline of organizations receiving CFC funds looks as follows. On February 11, 2016, the Calgary Catholic Immigration Society received \$600,000 for the purpose of providing “housing supports” (Bervoets, 2016a). On March 11, 2016, the London United for Refugees received \$250,000 for loans for renters and housing subsidies (Bervoets, 2016b). On March 15, 2016, the Immigrant Services Association of Nova Scotia (ISANS) and the Community Foundation of Nova Scotia received \$200,000 for housing support for people with disabilities or needed for larger units (Bervoets, 2016c). On March 16, 2016, the Foundation of Greater Montreal received \$750,000 (Bervoets, 2016d). On March 17, 2016, the Winnipeg Foundation received \$500,000 to disburse to local agencies. The first disbursements included \$150,000 to Welcome Place and \$75,000 to the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization of Manitoba (IRCOM). With these funds, Welcome Place established the Bed in a Bag Program, which provided families with linens and utensils. IRCOM used the funds to support families in their transitional housing complex (Bervoets, 2016e). On March 18, 2016, the Immigrant Social Services of BC received \$500,000 (Bervoets, 2016f). On April 11, 2016, \$250,000 went to Hamilton’s Wesley Urban Ministries for housing allowances and emergency funding to support housing stability and prevent evictions (Bervoets, 2016g). On May 4, 2016, the Community Foundation of Ottawa received \$450,000 to distribute to the Catholic Centre for Immigrants, Ottawa Community Immigrant Services Organization and World Skills (Venn, 2016a). On May 10, 2016, \$175,000 went to the Waterloo Region Immigration Partnership through the Kitchener and Waterloo Community Foundation (Venn, 2016b). On May 24, 2016, \$750,000 was granted to a new “cross-sectoral leadership group” (business, City, landlords, settlement agencies) led by the Toronto Foundation addressing the housing affordability gap (Barton, 2016).

A brief analysis of the CFC, its funding sources and its methods of disbursement demonstrate a prevailing trend within refugee resettlement: the increased significance of private funding in the entire fiscal and budgetary outlook of refugee serving the organization, including funds and programs which are intended to serve GARs. The argument in favour of such funding mechanisms is that they provide a way to diversify an organization’s funding base in a context in which baseline public funding is insufficient to tend to myriad organizational and client needs.

However, the state of insufficient public funding and the itemized nature of private funding, whereby it is attached to specific, individual components of an ISA’s overall resettlement services, warrant greater scrutiny, as the services which are provided by way of such mechanisms remain contingent on ongoing private donations. Moreover, should the public attention and enthusiasm devoted to the welcoming, resettling, housing, and supporting of Syrian refugees not carry into the future and be applied to *all* refugees that resettle in Canada, a vacuum of material, social, and emotional supports will be left. Such a gap can only be prevented by persistent and durable government funding.

The CFC is one of several non-profit organizations that initially accepted and administered donations for Syrian refugee resettlement (see Philanthropic Founda-

tions Canada, 2016). Since that time, individual initiatives proliferated to a staggering degree, and this warrants a deeper analysis than is possible here. However, what follows is one illustrative example. IKEA Canada established a program to transfer funds to enable settlement organizations to purchase IKEA home furnishings for Syrian families (IKEA Corporate News, 2015). IKEA's Refugee Settlement Support Program committed \$180,000 to support refugee resettlement in Canada. Registered charities could apply online for up to \$5000 worth of IKEA products. In order to be eligible, the charity must be supporting at least one household living within 100 km from an IKEA store. The campaign closed on March 31, 2016 (see Chan, 2015 and Lum, 2015) meaning that other refugees in need would not be able to take part in this initiative.

12.5 Conclusion- Lessons Learned from the Lessons Learned? Government as Resettlement Facilitator in the Whole of Society Approach

In its overview of some of the actions they undertook through the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative (SRRI) and the scope of the initiative, the Canadian government, indicated some lessons learned from the undertaking. The key lessons learned are indicative of the government's "whole of society" approach to refugee resettlement and reflect its role as the mobilizer, facilitator and coordinator of volunteer contributions and providing information so that resettled refugees may make appropriate decisions regarding their settlement trajectories. These lessons include: 1) "information-sharing with stakeholders", whereby IRCC "is continuing to look at ways to provide more timely information to stakeholders regarding refugees, from all populations, who are being resettled to Canada"; 2) "partnerships and teamwork"; 3) "public support" - whereby [IRCC] is harnessing this goodwill by providing additional support to immigrant-serving organizations to help support volunteer coordination', one aspect of which was to develop, in partnership with Volunteer Canada, a Volunteer Management Handbook "with tools and tips to support immigrant-serving organizations as they draw on the skills of volunteers to assist newcomers to Canada"; 4) "operational flexibility and innovative approaches to processing", which highlights the creation of temporary operations centres in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey; 5) "prima facie refugee designation", whereby those claiming refugee status from Syria were exempt from having to prove their refugee status; and 6) the "importance of giving refugees time to say goodbye and pre-arrival orientation". (Government of Canada, 2019).

This constitutes a phenomenon that is beyond the longer-term effects on ISAs by neoliberalism and austerity governance (Lowe, Richmond, & Shields, 2017) to a more active role for government in the soliciting, supporting, augmenting, and coordinating of private contributions for refugee resettlement, including the developing of government policy and programming to this end. While the state retains "conventional" resettlement functions (assessing the "validity" of refugee claims, granting permanent residency, funding direct and indirect settlement services, and, in the

case of GARs, providing a guaranteed, decommodified source of income in the form of the Resettlement Assistance Program there are four lessons we can learn: 1) we can think of it taking on new and/or intensified resettlement functions, including the growth of Privately Sponsored Refugee program; 2) general boosterism; 3) providing informational resources to enable widespread volunteer efforts; 4) soliciting private contributions in funding and governance of refugee resettlement. In an era of widespread populist and xenophobic backlash against racialized and stigmatized refugees and newcomers, criticism of a national government’s positive orientation to the *idea* of resettling refugees may be somewhat misguided. Nonetheless, we should continue to investigate ways such undertakings are constructed on the same shifting sands of neoliberal society, where their success or failure are ultimately predicated on individuals’ willingness to demonstrate enthusiasm and shoulder the material, social, and emotional costs associated with refugee resettlement.

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This edited collection offers an in-depth look at the reactions of Germany and Canada – two countries that have responded to the 21st century ‘age of displacement’ in very different ways - and the creative solutions and often collaborative efforts these host societies have undertaken to support the sudden arrival of newcomers within their nation’s borders.

The migration of significantly high numbers of asylum seekers and refugees between 2015 and 2018 presented destination and resettlement societies both a sizable challenge and an opportunity to respond effectively to the imminent needs of this cohort. Germany and Canada emerged as leaders on the global stage for how they responded and the innovative ways they were able to bring together different social actors and stakeholders locally, nationally and globally. This volume is the result of an ongoing international, collaborative effort to monitor and evaluate these responses – *from research to policies and practice*. The objective is to mobilize knowledge produced through the latest research on key issues relating to the resettlement and integration of refugees in Germany and Canada in a timely and accessible manner.

The works presented here not only show evidence based results on resettlement and integration in Canada and Germany, they also provide valuable insights that can support government agencies, service providers and members of civic society to rapidly respond to factors that threaten the wellbeing of refugees and will be instrumental to the successful integration of future cohorts.

Dieses Sammelwerk beschreibt die Reaktionen Deutschlands und Kanadas auf das ‘age of displacement’ des 21. Jahrhunderts. Es zeigt Lösungsansätze und gemeinsame Anstrengungen auf, die unternommen wurden, um die seit 2015 Neuzugewanderten zu unterstützen. Zudem werden kritische, gesellschaftliche und politische Antworten auf Fluchtzuwanderung analysiert.

Die Zuwanderung einer hohen Anzahl von Asylsuchenden und Geflüchteten zwischen 2015 und 2018 stellte Deutschland und Kanada zwar vor große Herausforderungen, eröffnete jedoch auch die Chance, effektiv mit den Erwartungen unterschiedlicher Interessengruppen umzugehen. Beide Länder zeigen sich als wichtige Akteure, die sich bemühen, diese auf lokaler, nationaler und globaler Ebene zu vernetzen, um geeignete und innovative Antworten auf drängende gesellschaftliche Fragen zu finden. Dieser Band ist das Ergebnis einer internationalen Zusammenarbeit, um diese Antworten und Reaktionen – *from research to policies and practice* – zu analysieren und zu evaluieren. Ziel ist es, neue Forschungsergebnisse zu Schlüsselthemen im Zusammenhang mit Flucht-migration und Integration in Deutschland und Kanada zugänglich und nutzbar zu machen.

Die hier vorgestellten Beiträge diskutieren nicht nur evidenzbasierte Ergebnisse zur Integration von Asylsuchenden und Geflüchteten in Kanada und Deutschland, sondern sie liefern auch wertvolle Ansätze, um öffentliche Akteure, soziale Institutionen und Mitglieder der Zivilgesellschaft dabei zu unterstützen, das Wohlbefinden und die Integration von Neuzugewanderten zu sichern.