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DISCUSSION

Political culture and its types in the post-Yugoslav Area

Ladislav Cabada

Abstract: The aim of the article is to apply the concept of traditional, modern, and obmodern society on the development of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area. The post-Yugoslav – and generally post-Communist – societies might be analysed as interesting example of limited modernisation after the 1945, when some spheres were developed similarly in the comparison with the Westerns societies, but in other the development was stopped, retarded or deformed. Next to the traditional dichotomy traditional vs. modern society we apply the interesting model of obmodern society presented by the Slovenian sociologist Ivan Bernik. Based on the analysis we generally construct the “geocultural” dividing line between two groups of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area.

Keywords: post-Yugoslav area; political culture; traditional society; modern society; obmodern society; geocultural division

Introduction

The question of the Balkans as a specific geographical, political and cultural formation reappeared in social science after 1990 in connection with the outbreak of several war conflicts on the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. During the Cold War period, the term “Balkan” had again become a mere geographical term; however, after 1990 the Western world returned to a “well-tried” cultural and political definition of the Balkans as a “homogeneous” complex. This complex had existed practically since the 16th century, when the majority of Balkans territory was ruled over by the Ottoman Empire, understood as a European periphery, an “anarchistic and barbarian periphery, from which the West dissociates” (Hösch 1998: 603). As Maria Todorova successfully showed, in this case we have to deal with “indolent assumption”, based especially on stereotypes and preconceptions (Todorova 1999). Be that as it may, we cannot ignore

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1 This article is a research outcome of institutional support of specific research (instuchonální podpora specifikého výzkumu) project at Dept. of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Philosophy, University of West Bohemia in Plzen.

2 In the period of bipolar separation of the world and also because of the specific position of Tito’s Yugoslavia the southeastern European peninsula was divided into three parts: Soviet, Yugoslav and “Western” (Waisová 2002: 57).
the fact that the Balkans as a region has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate many specific characteristics, which make it a *sui generis* case.

In this article I shall try to (re)define the basic definitions of so-called Balkan political culture. I will focus especially on the evolution in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula – that is, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This is a specific area, which was for long periods a part of mutual state units (Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia). But we may clearly observe that even this long common evolution does not induce similar evolution of the political cultures of individual national-cultural-religious entities. My interpretation will be based above all on some theoretical works which focus on the differences between traditional and modern society, and I shall apply these theories to our concrete knowledge about the evolution in the former Yugoslavia.

**Historical development of the Balkans – traditional or modern society**

The concept of dividing human societies into traditional and modern arose in the modern social sciences in the latter half of the 19th century. In this sense, Emile Durkheim’s *About the societal division of work*, which appeared in 1893, may be considered the seminal work. The author distinguished two types of societies with a different type of solidarity – organic and mechanic. “The organic solidarity of modern society is conditioned with the division of work among specialised subgroups; mechanic solidarity of the traditional non-stratified society is maintained by all members of partial relational mutually homogenous segments” (Budil 2001: 404). We have to deal with a classification in which the main criterion is the functional specialisation of an individual that makes him an independently acting individuality. If this criterion is not fulfilled, we can talk about the observed society as a traditional one.

Examples of modern European societies are undoubtedly the so-called western societies, which underwent a specific historical development from the beginning of the 19th century. The result of this development is a modern, secularised society with a high level of individual independence. On the principle of dichotomy and mutual struggle certain cultural and intellectual phenomena (for example renaissance/reformation, classicism/enlightenment, realism/positivism etc) dynamic energy was created and released. The final consequence of this process was openness and plurality. The eastern part of the European continent practically did not participate in this process of development (Hösch 1998: 605).

In a Europe with such development, an imaginary dividing line was created between West and East, in other words between modern and traditional society.

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3 As the break point we can regard the year 1492 (Cabada 2000).
4 The German thinker Walter Schamschula states that eastward from this lane there are living Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins.
It is worth noting that all the societies behind this line display a dominance of orthodox religious denomination, while for example Slovenian and Croatian society with a dominance of popery is affiliated to the West. In my opinion, this – purely bipolar – segmentation is too simplistic and imprecise. Undoubtedly, under Ottoman dominance the Balkan region developed differently in comparison with other European regions. This difference led to the establishment of specific societal and political preconditions, which influenced the development of the political culture of individual ethnical and national communities. This specificity was based especially on the crossbreeding of different impacts – “one quarter Attic, one quarter Turkish, one quarter New Greek, and one quarter Bavarian”, said Duke Hermann von Pichler about Athens in the 17th century (Hösch 1998: 616). Indeed, we cannot identify with the ethnocentric view of the Balkans as a territory where “Turkish dominance caused permanent retardation” (Hösch 1998: 611).

Wars in the Balkans – primarily the Austrian-Ottoman rivalry – contributed above all to the ethnical immaturity of the entire Balkans region. This immaturity led to extensive cultural contacts, but it did not induce sharp mixing of cultures. The primary reason was to be found in the geographical preconditions of the internal Balkans where hilly areas dominated, thus limiting operational possibilities. This precondition, together with the influence of component religious denominations, led to the creation of localised society. As Igor Lukšič mentioned, the borders of the community lie at the border of the village. “Moral, political and cultural borders were delineated by the village community. The awareness of authentic, real people with authentic interests and obligations to the community was exercised. Without a state and market system and with totalitarian power of the church it was not possible to develop the space of abstraction of modern (liberal) politics with an abstract citizen – that is, with legal equality and freedom of the individual” (Lukšič 2001: 64).

We may observe that the main difference between the West and the Balkans in the field of political culture is based on the status and rights of the individual as a member of the political community and/or in the largeness and internal structure of this community. While in the West the rights of the individual as a member of society and the political system are continuously being purveyed and deepened, Balkan political culture is based on localism, characterised by membership of the individual in the local (rural) community – this being the primary membership which determines the majority of the political attitudes of the individual. In this sense, the role of the most important authority is played by the local political leader, who is

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5 Naturally, if we accept the idea that this comparison is acceptable for our study.
mostly identified with the local religious exponent. K. Zernack speaks in this context about the affinity of Byzantine and Turkish competence (Zernack 1977: 46).

The individual community develops very independently, distinctly isolated from other local communities. This is one of the reasons why for long centuries we can observe in the traditional communities in the Balkans a lack of institutions. Miscellaneous communities with different cultural patterns were living often on very small territory; their political culture based on a reluctance to communicate with neighbouring communities and on sharp self-sufficiency. When we introduce to these “rural communities” (Dorfgemeinschaft) the power approach, we might anticipate tragedy (Hösch 1998: 620).

Another important attribute, which is connected with the detachedness of local communities in the central regions of the Balkans, is the inability to view political matters in an abstract sense. The individual is not able to refer to central institutions, his life is enacted within the clearly defined borders of the community. All relations are based on strictly patrilinear grounds; here the basis is mostly – in the opinion of the Austrian historian Karl Kaser – the time-honoured concept of the whole family (zadruga) (Höschl 1998: 621).

Considering all the presented arguments we may note that on the Balkan peninsula, above all in its hilly area (Dinar mountainous regions), in the period of 16th-19th century, specific communities were created with a specific political culture. These communities could be defined as traditional in the sense of the dichotomy modern vs. traditional society. Specific political culture, based on the local communities and unclear identification with the political centre, is not in itself a source of conflict. This dimension was brought into the political cultures of the central Balkan regions from outside, above all with the wave of nationalism in the 19th century, which is closely connected also with the role of the religious denominations. Particularly important here is the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its crystallised Messianism, though other denominations also were creating a strong misalliance with nationalism. For example the role of the Catholic Church in Slovenian and Croat society was, up to the Second World War, markedly higher and “specific” in comparison with the West European countries.

A further important factor is that destabilisation and conflict were reintroduced into Balkan political culture with the process of modernisation. The modernisation supporters – national intelligence in the process of creation – were without doubt supporters of nationalistic ideas, which, similarly as in the western part of Europe, were based on the idea of exclusivity. The national political elite strove for institutionalisation of Balkan communities on national and religious grounds, but the new ideas were not understandable for the local communities. Local communities were not able to participate in the modernisation process, especially because of
their inability of political abstraction. The consequence of this discrepancy was a deepening of the gap between the political elite and the “rest” of society. Local communities became only passive observers who understood the changes only on a symbolic level (a similar model can also be seen in some post-Yugoslav societies in the 1990s).

Political modernisation in the Balkans is connected with the intellectual elite (but not with the development of market and industrialisation), which were established beyond the reach of the local communities. A strong dichotomy between the city and the country\textsuperscript{6} was established where the city was understood as something dirty, depraved, and strange, as something which was disturbing the traditional processes. As early as 1902 this discrepancy between the old, traditional world and the new, “modern” epoch was described in *At the hill* (Na klancu) by the famous Slovenian writer Ivan Cankar. Symptomatically, the author lived in a relatively developed and “modernised” part of the Balkans (Cankar 1995).

When we observe the historical development in the Balkans in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, we can see that the modernisation supporters (intellectuals) strove for modernisation above all in political life – an effort to create a national state – while they downgraded and/or prevented modernisation in the economic, social and cultural spheres. An important and symptomatic attribute is the unwillingness to transfer modern political rights to the national communities thus created. There is no emancipation of the individual as a political subject, having the possibility to participate in the political process. On the contrary, those who could take part in this process were above all the traditional representatives of local communities.

Developments in the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) also correspond to this interpretation of political modernisation. The political order of this state may be described as very conservative, let us say traditional. Evidence of this may be seen for example in the development of an electoral law which did not correspond to developments in Western Europe, nor even in Central Europe. The active election right was restricted only to men older than 21 years (passive right was a minimum of 30 years); also the educational census was applied – knowledge of the “national” language (Cabada 2000b: 117). If in the 1920s the new state tried to incorporate at least formal liberalisation – and modernisation – of political life, after the proclamation of dictatorship in 1929 the Belgrade leadership gave up on this mission. Moreover, in the unsatisfied traditional communities, which did not possess any influence on the political scene, the traditional representatives – especially churches – started to play the role of warriors against the “centre”. The result was authoritarian,

\textsuperscript{6} The rural population in the Balkans was substantially more numerous than the urban population. In 1841, 83\% of the population in the Balkans worked in agriculture, while in the United Kingdom this figure was only 22\%. 
fascist political regimes in Slovenia and Croatia in the first half of the 1940s with a strong influence of the Catholic Church, but also the monarchist (četnik) movement in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. When we look closely at the internal segmentation of these political elements, we can see that they gained their support above all in the traditional political structure. For example, the Slovenian Territorial Army, which collaborated with the Italians and later Germans, was based on the principle of the so-called countrified guard. Their main opponents were partisans, mainly communists, bringing political, social and economic modernisation. They offered a programme of participation of the individual in political and economic life, although it was shown that many arrangements were only temporary and many promises were not realised.

**Tito’s Yugoslavia and its demise**

In my opinion, there is no reason to doubt the modernity of the political programme of the Yugoslav partisan movement only because of the predominance of communists. Comparing the measures introduced by the partisans led by Tito with the situation before 1941, we can see important changes in the functioning of society. Introduction of a broadminded election law, an effort for quick economic modernisation (above all industrialisation), involvement of a modern concept of multiethnic coexistence and development towards a consensual model of state functioning were basic characteristics of the political system, especially after the quarrel with the Soviet Union. Of course, the above-mentioned principles were only theoretical, even if they became part of the constitution. On a practical level, up to 1953 the Yugoslav model functioned similarly to the models in the Soviet camp; at the beginning Yugoslavia was even Stalin’s most painstaking scholar. Later, after redefining the basic principles of “democratic centralism”, important changes were brought into the system, but they mostly remained only formal.

A specific role was played by the constitutional changes conducted by Tito’s top ideologist Edvard Kardelj. After the quarrel with the Soviet Union, Kardelj started to combine Marxist theory with radical anarchism. The cornerstone of his theory was communes, independent municipal units, which in the future were to take up the role of the “dying” state. The communes were in fact small territorial units, which alongside municipal functions also took up a part of state functions. Undoubtedly, we may observe here certain continuity with the local communities from the “pre-communist” epoch. In the communes almost the whole economic, social and political life of the individual was realised – the rate of individual emancipation.

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7 Active and passive election rights for every institution were from the age of 18. In the event that the individual started to fight (in time of war) or work before he was 18, he gained the election rights for at least some institutions.
was only as high as the internal conditions in the “traditional” communes were changed. Political modernisation then in many cases only seemed to be modernisation and in the communes (especially the rural) there still ruled the traditional models of linkages, responsibility and decision mechanisms. The modernisation supporter became the city, where a section of the rural population was moving. In a strange environment their main guideline was the ruling ideology and its institutional grounds – the communist organisation with the Union of Communists on the top. Although this organisation was centralised, it still allowed for a more clearly defined political emancipation of the individual in comparison with the traditional rural communities. Yugoslav literature contains descriptions of precisely this “modernisation metamorphosis of the individual” in the process of transition from the rural to the urban environment.8

In contrast to western countries, the modernisation jump in Yugoslavia – similarly as in other socialist states – was realised during the 1950s and 1960s. Firstly this jump is shown in the political sphere (emancipation of the individual), later in the economic sphere (industrialisation) and in the 1960s we can then observe the first changes also in the cultural sphere. And precisely at this moment there are also emerging initial doubts about the success of modernisation. It was shown that after the first modernisation jump, the system began with the construction of rigid institutional structures, which limited and deformed subsequent modernisation processes (Adam 1989: 22). The consequence of this deformation was a stopping of the modernisation process, to which some sectors responded with an effort for more independent politics. In fact, active sectors were those with a significant share of the urban population, where new, “modernised” societal formations were being created. These formations strove for another form of modernisation and to bring Yugoslavia closer to the western societal and political model. The immediate reaction of the political system was suppression of the new formations (Balut, Cabada 2000: 752).

The pressure by some sections of society for the continuation of political and cultural modernisation was averted by the system with the constitutional reform in 1974. Edvard Kardelj again inspired the changes. The new constitution was to be another step on the road to abolishing the state. Elections were cancelled and substituted by a complicated system of delegations; the role of republic, national segments also increased. This led to a provisional reduction of the pressure that was coming above all from Slovenia and Croatia.

The next crisis for the system came sooner than expected – in the 1980s. One reason was the death of the charismatic leader Tito and the ensuing battle for supremacy

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8 As an example we could name the – in many ways very controversial – book Knife (Nož) by Vuk Drašković (Drašković 1995).
among the communist leaders; another reason was the economic situation. The crisis showed that deformation of the modernisation process in the political sphere could strongly influence the personal economic satisfaction of the individual. The masses, who were still depoliticised and whose interest in the functioning of the system was above all economic, ceased to identify with the system. The reaction in the national communities was dual: one part wished to continue with modernisation and bringing Yugoslavia to the western model of society; the second group reverted to traditional values. These persistent values had lain hidden for decades, only to be reactivated in the 1980s (Adam 1989: 20).

The disintegration of Yugoslavia may also be interpreted as a conflict of two sharply differing political cultures, which were formed above all during the 1980s. On one side there was the “heading towards modernity” political culture of national segments, which accepted the majority of modernisation processes (Slovenia, Croatia). On the other side there was a political culture rooted in traditional models of political and societal behaviour with a strong role of the local community and local political elite. These two streams aspired to gain dominance in the common state and to unify political culture as the basis of post-Tito Yugoslavia.

Since the mid-1980s the trend of establishing basic starting-points for aspects of both mentioned political cultures has sharply accelerated. The north-western part of Yugoslavia is rapidly coming to form the basic structures of a civic society. In the dichotomy traditional vs. modern society this means the creation of specialised political and societal structures and functional differentiation. Relatively structured party systems are created, as also are many non-formal associations which have arisen from the strengthening civic society – feministic, pacifistic, ecological etc. (Cabada 2001: 202). All these events are a sign of the next wave of emancipation of the individual as a political subject who is struggling for his share in the decision-making process.

On the other hand, in the southern parts of Yugoslavia in the latter half of the 1980s there was a gradual interconnection of the political culture of traditional societies with the leadership principles. Here the starting point is the mythisation of Serbian history and reference to the old, practically tribal, form of state existence. The political rhetoric misguidedly employs terms associated with the nationalism of the 19th century. The traditional way of thinking is shown above all in the effort of the new political elite to win the support of the rural communities, while the urban units are mostly in opposition. This opposition may be seen especially in internal matters of society and changes in the political system; it is less manifest in foreign policy. Another important traditional characteristic is the role of the Serb Orthodox Church as the holder of traditional models of political culture (messianism, self-sacrifice).
Naturally we cannot claim that the dichotomy indicated here is pure. The Yugoslav modernisation process led to deformations (though less than in the Soviet satellites or even Soviet Union itself) and we may observe here two types of distinctly old-fashioned, non-modern structures: on the one hand those which were generated by the system (the majority of communist structures); then, on the other hand, latent traditional structures which were activated in the 1980s. It was impossible to nullify the post-war modernisation process which had become one of the bases for the future development of Yugoslav societies. The only difference was the rate of acceptance of this process as the basis for future development. Societies in the northern part of Yugoslavia understood modernisation as being unfulfilled and wished to correct this problem (the question of decentralisation of economic and political structures and higher emancipation of individual national sectors). Societies in the southern part of Yugoslavia considered modernisation as sufficient or even too extensive and disturbing the concept of a unified and centralised Yugoslav state formation. If there was some concordance between both approaches, it was without doubt the nationalistic approach. Nationalism provided a basis on which to build the Serbian projection of a centralised Yugoslavia as a “Great Serbian” area. It was also a basis for Slovenian and Croat politics, which understood Slovenes and Croats as exclusive entities with completely different qualities – political culture – as the other Yugoslav nations.

It is evident that in Yugoslavia in the 1980s at the latest, there again loomed latent existing autonomous political cultures, which for the most part could identify with national segments. Especially in the northern parts of Yugoslavia there was hectic activity, whose aim was to demonstrate absolute dissimilarity of local political cultures in comparison with Balkan (Serbian) political culture. The idea of Central Europe has also been reactivated, including Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina (Cabada 2001: 204). Likewise religiously determined positions are revitalised, with some authors contrasting the “cultural” popery and “lesser cultural” Orthodox Church (Jambrek 1988: 154). Cultural stereotypes are resuscitated; again the “picture of the other” is important as a specific part of individual self-identification. Again we can come across expressions which were rejected in the period of the first modernisation jump – “perfidious Jesuits” (Croats), “Byzantine intriguers” (Serbs), “tricky Orientals” (Muslims) (Djilas 1994: 20) or “Southerns” (non-Slovenes) (Cabada 2000a: 249). It is clear that the modernisation effort of Tito’s leadership to create a unified political Yugoslav nation has not succeeded.

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9 It is difficult to talk about a unified Croat national culture when comparing for example Dalmatia and Slavonia.

10 The “picture of the other” in Balkans political culture is described in Mariana Lenkova’s book “Hate Speech” in the Balkans.
In my opinion, different political cultures are one of the basic preconditions and reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Some “post-Yugoslav” authors suppose that behind the disintegration we have to look above all to the ambitions of political leaders. For the communist leaders, nationalism and war were the only chance to save their positions. I agree with this opinion, but in every successive state the (old)-new political elite was formed on the basis of concrete political culture, which was the basis for their political activities.

### Obmodern societies – relativisation of the dichotomy modern vs. traditional society

Hand in hand with the disintegration of the socialist block in the social sciences, research into the internal structure of individual societies has also changed significantly. It has been demonstrated that rejection of the socialist societal model and the formation of different types of post-communist societal models can be accommodated on a modern vs. traditional line only with great difficulty. This linear configuration is too simplistic and unable to perceive the characteristics of post-socialist societies. These societies have undergone a specific modernisation process that does not correspond absolutely to the models familiar in Western Europe where modernisation was realised primarily on the basis of economic and market development. Together with this, there was the pressure of society for extending political rights and greater functional differentiation of the political process. The main specific feature of the modernisation process in the socialist camp was the effort to initiate modernisation from the top, with the dictate of the modernistic intellectually political elite. This combination of modernisation and socialism created a specific type of societies, which we – in the opinion of important Slovenian social scientist Ivan Bernik – could class as obmodern societies, which are for him a historically unique entity (Bernik 1997).

In these obmodern societies the modernisation process was deformed in comparison with the development in Western Europe. As a result, these societies are modernised only partly in some domains, while in others they have remained monodimensional, traditional (Bernik 1997: 25). The main domain where modernisation is lagging behind, is – not only for Bernik – the political sphere. In socialist societies the political system plays an over-dimensioned role, it is trying to interfere in all other spheres. If the political system is not able to hold the same tempo of modernisation as in the economic or social sphere, the result is deformation of the modernisation process and the establishment of a modernity deficit. This deficit is viewed by the modernisation – above all intellectual – elite as a shortcoming, which must be eliminated as soon as possible. The result is conflict between this elite and the political system; if the system feels strong enough, it
reacts with repression. If such repression could disrupt the stability of the political system, there will be some partial modification – reform – which means an extension of the modernisation jump.

Such development leads to a situation in which individual socialist societies need not necessarily be internally similar. Thus it is impossible to set these societies on the continuum modern vs. traditional society. In other words, Bernik is claiming that, just as there is not only one type of modern society, we cannot speak only about one type of obmodern (post-socialist) society. Therefore he suggests setting the individual models into a spacial framework rather than on a line. This could stress the multidimensionality of the societies under examination (Bernik 1997: 24).

Similar ideas to those expressed by Bernik may also be observed in the work of the Polish social scientist Jadwiga Staniszkis. She too defines the modernisation of socialist societies as modernisation from the top. In her opinion, in the process of modernisation the rationality of the political elite and the “rest” of society was deepened. While the elite thinks in terms of lodging institutions, the masses as passive observers (some authors speak directly about the depolitisation of masses – Vajdová 1996: 345) see the development primarily in the prism of the standard of living and symbols (Staniszkis 2001: 62-63).

In obmodern societies modernisation is coming from the top, it is not continuous and consistent and it is oriented to the deformations, but above all to the separation of the societies into distinctly different sectors, which could only communicate with difficulty.11

The different power of individual sectors could be one of the points for orientation in the classification of the post-socialist systems. If the traditional sector ruled over the society (in possible combination with the communist sector), a new political system developed in the magic circle of deformed political modernisation. From the point of view of establishing a democratic form of governance, such systems offer few prospects. On the other hand, if the liberal sector prevailed in the society (again in possible combination with the sector established in the communist period), after the fall of socialism the next modernisation jump was started, which could mean the stabilisation of a democratic model of organisation.

11 For example Zdenka Vajdová in her analysis of the theoretical concepts and research of political culture shows Schöpflins’ model of three communities inside post-communist societies: 1. Traditional (rural) society, whose values survived the communist modernisation. The society is open to populist demagogy, with a low degree of political literacy, non-understandable state and inferiority to etatism; 2. Society established even in the communist period, whose main characteristic is a positive attitude to dependence on the state. A modernistic communist elite accepted the deformed view of modernisation as advantageous. The higher class changed its political power into economic power or converted towards nationalism as a means for preserving political power; 3. Civic segment, liberal society strive for real modernisation and elimination of deformation in the modernisation process (Vajdová 1996: 345-346).
Also in the field of modernisation and change of political culture, the obmodern societies show certain specificity. The main characteristic of innovations in the sphere of political culture is their limitation to small groups of the population, above all to the urban political-economic-educational elite. Precisely this new elite created new values of political orientation and infringed the cultural hegemony of the socialist system (Bernik 2000: 12) and became a bearer of change at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. The political culture of the new elite in comparison with the political culture of the traditional sector – in spite of all modern deformations – came into conflict with the dominant political culture, whose supporters were mainly politicians and intellectuals relying on the traditional (rural) segment. One who repeatedly proved himself to be such a politician was S. Milošević – a member of the “modern” communist segment – searching for his political recourse in myth and tradition, based then in the rural regions in southern Yugoslavia. Milošević could also use the modernisation deformations, which strongly influenced the specific character of the Yugoslav political system, the structure of Yugoslav society and above all the political culture. This specific character was designated especially with the fusion of egalitarian and authoritarian values and expectations. Political culture in Yugoslavia “namely had its roots in the tradition, but functionally it was implanted into the socialist society. The socialist system acquired the mass support (incomparable with the support in other socialist countries – L.C.) with fulfilling the egalitarian expectations of the majority of population. Although the fusion of egalitarianism and authoritarianism functioned from the point of view of stability of the political system, it was at the same time quite non-functional in terms of the modernisation of Yugoslav society” (Bernik 1997: 86).

In this sense, it is possible to understand Milošević’s behaviour after 1987. He was trying to satisfy the needs of the majority of the population, which for him was represented by Serbs. He was winning support above all in the “peripheral”, rural part of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo. For the satisfaction of “egalitarian claims” there also served the redistribution of financial sources via the so-called “tax on non-developed territories”, which was collected especially in Slovenia and Croatia. In this model naturally modernisation was not realised, above all in the sense of economic and political responsibility of individual in the spheres, who were the money-recipients.

In the 1980s the Yugoslav political model fell into deep crisis, which is connected with Tito’s death and the absence of a proper successor, economic crisis, emancipation of northern national units (Slovenia, Croatia) and increase of national spitefulness in Yugoslavia. In the sense of political culture studies we cannot ignore the differences between the political cultures of individual societal sectors, which was markedly shown during the time of crisis. It has been shown that some sectors were
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not satisfied with the depth of the modernisation of political culture and were striving for future modernisation steps, while others wished to return Yugoslavia to the former, “premodern” or “protomodern” development level. Some authors consider that, for the stability of the political system, above all the long-term correspondence of societal values, norms, models and organisational structure of political system are necessary (Bernik 2000: 9). In other words, the institutional form of the political system must correspond with the political culture. As we have shown, we cannot speak of any dominant political culture in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. After the attempt to create a unified Yugoslav nation in the 1980s, (new) independent national political cultures appeared, often very different. Satisfying the claims of these cultures would be possible only in a very decentralised state; the southern republics and also the Belgrade leadership ruled by Milošević do not agree with such decentralisation. This civilisation incompetence (Sztompka 1994: 89) is the main cultural political starting point for the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Post-Yugoslav political cultures

The dissimilarity of political culture in the different parts of the former Yugoslavia was one of the main reasons for disintegration of this state creation. Nowadays we could find on the territory of the former Yugoslavia five independent states, two protectorates, nine more or less independently developing political systems with their own political cultures and a specific position in the space of European modern, obmodern and traditional societies. It has been shown that the idea of a unified Yugoslav society was unreal and, after the escalation of the conflict among exponents of individual political cultures at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, each of the national societies embarked upon an individual, specific development, which was strongly influenced by the political culture of every society.

Searching for stability of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area, we must necessarily begin from the premise that this has changed in the last twelve years in every post-Yugoslav society. There existed many possibilities of development – from the effort to finish the modernisation process through limited interventions, producing a deformed socialist model of modernisation, to the efforts to return to traditional organisation of the society; all these variations are nowadays represented in the post-Yugoslavia area. Slovenia is classified as a modern consolidated democracy and Croatia is shown as system with prospects in the sense of modernisation and consolidation; while for example Kosovo has changed into a distinctly obmodern society with the superiority of traditional structures on the clan background.

12 In spite of political declarations of Western statesmen it is necessary to think about at least two political systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the same situation is also in the case of Montenegro and Kosovo – both are independent societies with own political culture.
Under the international protectorate, attempts are developing to change the political culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and partly in Kosovo. The success of these attempts depends substantially on the capability of the societies in question to modernise, especially in the political sphere. As the first studies on political culture in the former Yugoslavia showed, the success of these efforts is very unclear (Dimitrijević 2000). Undoubtedly the process will be quite lengthy, stemming – as the examples showed – primarily from the most low-ranking levels and not from the top (Daskalovski 2000).

After the fall of socialism no one system was oriented directly towards democratic plural model, but to the different modifications of socialism or combinations of the socialist and democratic model. Also nowadays paternalism remains the characteristic sign of post-Yugoslav societies (Bernik 1997: 85). Paternalism is shown above all in the political and partially also economic dependence of a large part of societies on state help and support. The civic sector is developing slowly and the main positions still have external actors. An exception is Slovenia, which practically eschewed wars and embarked upon modernisation changes relatively early.

After the fall of the Milošević regime we may say that the developed western countries became an example for all the political systems in the post-Yugoslav area. Hopefully, the xenophobic hysteria against western, “materialistic” civilisation has disappeared (Draškić 1995): this was something used in political propaganda especially by Milošević. All systems embarked upon the road of political modernisation – economical, political and cultural. To prognosticate the success of this process – or its duration – is almost impossible. Tentatively we could perhaps speculate on the greater or lesser chances of individual societies.

At the moment, it seems that the former Yugoslavia is crossed by an invisible border, which divides two groups of countries (societies) as the basis of a different political culture. The first group is characterised by significant progress in the sphere of economic modernisation, modernisation of the political system, orientation towards political democracy, rule of law and a relatively strong civic society. The second group is characterised by non-adherence to the principles of constitutionalism, a tendency to centralise the governance and to oligarchisation of politics (Szomolányi 1999: 25; Cabada 2001a). The first group, including Slovenia and with reservations also Croatia and Macedonia, is built on an obmodern and modern political culture, although even here we could find some traditional components which could, in the event of a crisis, lead to the deformation of modernisation. The second group includes all other post-Yugoslav systems, where the traditional political culture still predominates (in possible combination with the post-communist

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13 The protectoral countries are prepared to start economic modernisation with massive financial support only after modernisation of political structure and political culture too.
one, which is seeking out the pre-communist, mainly nationalistic roots), characterised with an unclear position for the individual in political life, little specialisation of political institutions, superiority of traditional linkages over the modern political linkages etc. In some cases the traditional institutions have pushed back the “modern” political institutions established in the communist period (Kosovo).

**Conclusion**

In the last half-century, political cultures in the post-Yugoslav area were appreciably destabilised in the sense of sharp efforts for change. This destabilisation in the form of a modernisation jump retarded modernisation, and reaction to modernisation manifested itself differently in individual political cultures in Yugoslavia. Destabilisation continued also after the disintegration of the unified state and the establishment of new states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In Slovenia and also after Tudjman’s death in Croatia we could identify this destabilisation with modernisation and an endeavour for transition to a democratic model with a clearly modern character. In the other post-Yugoslav countries destabilisation went mostly in the way of a traditional society with the acceptance of some elements of the communist system, which could be characterised as modernisation deformations. Further destabilisation in the sense of political modernisation remains a distinct possibility, but important changes are still not being realised.

**References**


Political culture and its types in the post-Yugoslav Area

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