Post-Soviet 'Uncivil Society' and the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin: A Case Study of the Extraparliamentary Radical Right in Contemporary Russia

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Post-Soviet “Uncivil Society” and the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin
A Case Study of the Extraparliamentary Radical Right in Contemporary Russia

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Cambridge for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. No parts of the text have been submitted for another qualification.

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Kyiv, 23 January 2007
Summary

This dissertation argues that, in Russia, the extreme right, in spite of its relative failure to become a notable force in parliament throughout the 1990s, remains a significant social and political factor in the new century.

The thesis uses the generic concepts of uncivil society, groupuscule, and right-wing Gramscianism developed in comparative fascist studies to substantiate the claim that the political potential of ultra-nationalism in a given country might be assessed incompletely by sole measurement of the electoral performance of right-radical parties. It refers to the transformation of anti-Semitism in late Imperial Germany from a party ideology into a component of national political culture as an example illustrating that stagnating or downfalling ultra-nationalist parties, sometimes, indicate not a decline of the popularity of their aims, but an infiltration of their ideas into society. The thesis reviews recent comparative research on the role of third sector actors in regime change and post-War politics in Western Europe to illustrate that a consideration of the organizational capacities, ties with the elite, and social rootedness of extremely right-wing extraparliamentary groupings might constitute an important addition for an adequate assessment of the prospects of the ultra-nationalist movement of a given country.

In its second, empirical part (Chapter III), the study develops a case study in the emergence of post-Soviet uncivil society detailing the context and course of the rise, in 1988-2006, of Aleksandr Dugin’s circle of “neo-Eurasianists” from a lunatic fringe group into an influential think-tank with a notable presence in the Russian book market, intellectual discourse and mass media. Apart from showing Dugin’s increasing reach into Moscow high politics, the study, in particular, focuses on his purposeful attempts to enter Russia’s academic life and mainstream political publicism, and some successes he had in doing so.

The conclusions relate the findings from the case study to recent trends within Russian extremely right-wing party politics, and make some tentative suggestions on how the Russian extreme right, as a whole, as well as its scholarly study, as a collective enterprise, might develop in the future.
“One of the most important and dangerous spiritual events of the post-communist period is the ‘sudden’ resurgence of conservative-nationalistic fundamentalism and its messianic pretensions.”


“The prospects of the extreme Right in the former Soviet Union and Soviet bloc seem better than in most other parts of the world.”


“In post-totalitarian Russia, the ideological climate has been gravitating more and more towards right-wing conservative values colored by Russian nationalism.”


“I would like to stress again that the widespread rise in xenophobia is most alarming. Excessive nationalism and the ideologies transmitted by parties and organizations attached to the extreme right are the main causes of this state of affairs.”


“Xenophobia exists in many countries, but in Russia it has become a norm, a commonplace for the majority of the country.”

Aleksandra Radkovskaya, a psychologist at Moscow State University, quoted in Financial Times, 30th December 2005.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>APO</strong></td>
<td>Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (extra-parliamentary opposition)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CDI</strong></td>
<td>Center for Défense Information</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPSU</strong></td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<td><strong>ENR</strong></td>
<td>European New Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETTs</strong></td>
<td>Eksperimental'nyi tvorcheskii tsentr (Experimental Creative Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EWE</strong></td>
<td>Erwägen Wissen Ethik (Deliberation Knowledge Ethics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDR</strong></td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOP</strong></td>
<td>Grand Old Party (the US Republican party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRU</strong></td>
<td>Glavnoe razvedovatel'noe upravlenie (Main Intelligence Directorate, the secret service of the USSR General Chief of Staff)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JRL</strong></td>
<td>Johnson's Russia List</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KGB</strong></td>
<td>Komitet gosudarstvenoi bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KPRF</strong></td>
<td>Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Communist Party of the Russian Foundation)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LDPR</strong></td>
<td>Liberal'no-demokraticeskaya partiya Rossii (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MGU</strong></td>
<td>Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet (Moscow State University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NBP</strong></td>
<td>Natsional-bol'shevistskaya partiya (National-Bolshevik Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>natsboly</strong></td>
<td>natsional-bol'sheviki (National Bolsheviks)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NTV</strong></td>
<td>Nezavisimoe televidenie (Independent Television)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NSDAP</strong></td>
<td>National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National-Socialist German Workers Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OPOD</strong></td>
<td>Obshcherossiiskoe politcheskoe obshchestvennoe dvizhenie (All-Russian Political Social Movement)</td>
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</table>
ORT  Obshchestvennoe rossiiskoe televidenie (Public Russian Television)

PIR  Perspektivnye issledovaniya i razrabotki (Future-oriented Research and Projects)

RAN  Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk (Russian Academy of Sciences)

RAU  Rossiisko-amerikanskii universitet (Russian-American University)

RF  Russian Federation

RFE  Radio Free Europe

RL  Radio Liberty

RNE  Russkoe Natsional'noe Edinstvo (Russian National Unity)

RTR  Rossiiskoe teleradiokompaniya (Russian TV and Radio Company)

RSFSR  Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

SS  Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad)

SVR  Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service)

US  United States [of America]

USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VAK  Vysshaya atestatsionnaya komissiya (Highest Attestation Commission)
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A further scholar I wish to express my special gratitude to is Professor Roger D. Griffin who has given me useful feedback on the various subject matters of the below survey. I use Professor Griffin’s taxonomic and conceptual framework concerning the ideological and organizational permutations of contemporary ultra-nationalism in this study. A closer look on the development of post-war comparative studies of the extreme right, in general, and of international fascism, in particular, should lead one, I would think, to recognize in Griffin the most important taxonomist and interpreter of contemporary Western ultra-nationalism. It is less the neatness of his constructs or playfulness of his language, than, simply, the usefulness of his terminology and definitions for my particular concerns that has led me to embrace most of Griffin’s conceptual framework.

Concerning the practical side of this study, I am especially grateful to Dr. Michael Hagemeister and Aleksandr Verkhovskii whom I would call “professional friends” and who—though being busy with their own research—have spared considerable time to give me extensive feedback on earlier versions of this study. I am also grateful to Dr. Cas Mudde and Dr. Robert L. Paarlberg for reading through, and making valuable remarks on, the working paper out of which this study developed, as well as to Prof. Dr. Michael Minkenberg for some useful feedback. Prof. John B. Dunlop and Dr. Robert Otto helped me in many ways to collect the material for this study.

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organized by the Robert Bosch Lecturer Program at the Yaroslavl’ State Pedagogical University, 25th March 2003, (http://www.boschlektoren.de/a-sites/projektterasse/fertigeprojekte/csteck/andreas.doc). In connection with these presentations, I thank these venues’ organizers’ Dr. Lucan Way, Dr. Maria Popova, Dr. Vera Haney and Christiane Steck for giving me the opportunity to get some useful critical remarks and suggestions on my argument.

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Of course, none of the above-mentioned individuals or institutions bears any responsibility for the mistakes, omissions and misjudgements this study may contain.

Among the friends I would like to thank for their warmth and kindness towards me during the last years are Eugene, Ingmar, Desiree, Gergana, Markus, Kriszta, Thomas, Michael, Uschi, and, of course especially, Lena.

But it is to my parents to whom I dedicate this study.

A.U., Kyiv, January 2007
Preface

“Liberalism is a disgusting, human-hating, mean doctrine. It is loathsome in theory and practice.”

Aleksandr Dugin1

The bodies of literature on both Soviet Russian nationalism and the post-Soviet Russian extreme right have, as documented in the footnotes below, grown during the last years.2 Why would an extensive treatment of one particular aspect of the Russian extreme right dealt with in one way or another in other studies by various scholars be

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worth adding?

First, while the post-Soviet Russian political system—whether one regards it as democratic or not—has been consolidating and the socio-economic situation stabilizing since the turn of the century, the relevance of extremely right-wing ideas in Russia has, as I shall illustrate below, not diminished. The, if compared to the State Duma elections of 1999, resurgence of nationalist parties other than the Communist Party in the parliamentary poll of December 2003 and the widely reported numerous xenophobic incidents in various Russian cities over the last years are only the most obvious manifestation of this tendency. A number of other developments pointing in the same direction will be mentioned or analyzed below.

Second, while Russian and foreign public attention to some permutations of Russia’s “uncivil society” (a concept extensively introduced below), such as for instance the skinhead movement, has risen during the last years, similar developments in the realm of Russia’s intellectual life, academia and mass media have received less attention. They constitute topics located at the margins of Western investigations into Russian politics. This is in spite of them being politically more relevant than the widely reported tendencies in youth culture.

Parts of post-Sovietology have returned to “Kremlinology” and become a kind of “Putinology” that, sometimes, tends to downplay the significance of developments outside the inner circle of the Russian president’s entourage. Other tendencies in Western post-Soviet studies remain focused on such organs as the State Duma, Federation Council or regional governments—instiutions that have lost significance since Vladimir Putin’s rise. A third direction has developed an economistic focus, expressing itself, above all, through the high interest for the so-called “oligarchs,” and their machinations. While all of these fields of study are important, they seem to receive an altogether disproportionate share of consideration within political science. Other, equally important actors, institutions and developments in the realms of civil society and culture, in contrast, suffer from relative inattention by political researchers. Russian uncivil society is one of them.

Third, Russia’s uncivil society’s main protagonist in my first article on this subject in 2002 was a man called Aleksandr Dugin.3 Back then, he may have not yet been a

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figure known to every Western observer of Russian politics. But he is now probably somebody whom many informed Western and most Russian analysts would recognize as a political commentator with a certain profile. Although failing to enter the State Duma, as he apparently desired in December 2003, Dugin has, since the publication of my 2002 paper, advanced further in gaining influence on the political thinking of mainstream elites, especially in politics and academia—a development that will be outlined in detail. Having been earlier the subject of only few Western major newspapers reports, including an account in the Financial Times (London), he has by now been introduced in various major newspapers like, for instance, the Wall Street Journal (New York) or Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich). Recently, Dugin managed to place an article in Russia in Global Affairs, the Moscow partner journal of the influential US monthly Foreign Affairs. He has become an irregular contributor to the foremost Western source of daily political information on Russia, the Washington, DC


mailing group Johnson’s Russia List.6

Already in 1993, Victor Yasmann claimed that “[i]n today’s ‘Weimar Russia’ there is no political concept, nor political force, which can intellectually challenge the new Russian-Eurasian fundamentalism [principally represented by Dugin—A.U.].”7 Anastasia Mitrofanova confirmed eleven years later: “Without any doubt, among the existing ideologies of political Orthodoxy [i.e. of Russian radical nationalism—A.U.], Eurasianism [principally developed by Dugin—A.U.] is the one with the brightest prospects.”8 In fact, one could argue, as I try to substantiate below, that Dugin now belongs to the political mainstream. Analyzing Dugin more thoroughly, contextualizing his rise, as well as listing recent activities by, and introducing the latest scholarly and other literature on, him should thus be no waste of paper.

A fourth, different motivation for extending here in detail my 2002 paper’s argument on Dugin’s position in Russian uncivil society is that its subject matter may serve as an illustration for the continuing relevance of studying the extreme right not only in Russia, but in general. Why would such a demonstration be of interest?

There seems to be, in Western political analysis today, a tendency to regard the intensive study of contemporary ultra-nationalist ideologies as a not entirely salient endeavour, and, in some cases, as not even quite a serious political science matter—but, perhaps, rather a subject for cultural studies, psychology, or sociology.9 This is in contrast to the approach to the current extreme right within the discipline of contemporary history where the general interest to the causes of World War II and the Holo-

9 One of the few exceptions, i.e. a contemporary influential political scientist taking up the subject of the extreme right, has been Herbert Kitschelt in collaboration with A.J. McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995). However, Kitschelt’s study can be also seen as illustrating the point made here: While he deals extensively with the issue of locating various radically right wing parties within their countries’ peculiar political spectra, he has less interest in in-depth research into, and adequate classification of, the mythic cores of the ideologies of these organizations. Among noteworthy monographs on the post-war extreme right by political scientists interested, in contrast, as much in ideology as in party politics are Michael Minkenberg, Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich: USA, Frankreich, Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998) and Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). Especially important for the argument below is the collected volume Cas Mudde and Petr Kopecký, eds., Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 2003).
caust is easily extended to the post-war period—as illustrated in the writings of such eminent historians as Walter Laqueur,10 Aleksandr Galkin,11 Wolfgang Wippermann12 and Roger Griffin,13 or macrohistorically oriented political analysts like Roger Eatwell14 or A. James Gregor.15 To be sure, there exists, in contrast to US political sci-


ence, a sizeable community of researchers of the contemporary extreme right in Western Europe—with its largest section, appropriately, located in Germany. However, apart from the elevated position of “extremism studies” in Germany (stemming from the role of the related theory of totalitarianism as a founding myth for the Federal Republic),\textsuperscript{16} comparative ultra-nationalism is not among the “big” subjects in West European political studies, as one can easily see from the obligatory political science curricula at universities, list of contents of the leading journals in the field, or primary foci of the major national and European funding schemes.

If one were to evaluate the position of the Western study of the post-war extreme right only within the context of Western Europe, its relative marginalization would be, at least partly, understandable: Even a hypothetical rise of a more or less radical nationalist into the office of head of state and/or government in a West European state—for instance, in a country like France, Italy or Austria—would, probably, not any longer lead to ethnic cleansing, totalitarianism, or war. The strictures of the various pan-national institutions—e.g. those of the EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe etc.—covering Western Europe in general are such that a coherent implementation of radically nationalist policies would be difficult to accomplish even if such a politician could rely on the support of the majority of his (less probable: her) people. Moreover, the post-war economic boom in Western Europe as well as its “nuclear umbrella” supplied by the United States have been major factors in providing long-term affluence, international security and political stability. Even a major economic crisis in Western Europe is, therefore, unlikely to immediately (or ever) lead to a domination of governmental offices of a West European state by extremely right-wing politicians as had been the case in large parts of the current EU territory in the early 1930s. Why—one may in view of such circumstances with considerable justification ask—should one spend time and money on the study of an altogether relatively in-consequential factor in EU high politics?

Things are different in Russia. For instance, one could argue that the rise of Vladimir Zhirinovskii in December 1993 was a necessary—though, by no means, sufficient—condition for Moscow’s intervention in Chechnya a year later. Arguably, without the

particular composition of the State Duma at that time and the gradual shift in mainstream political discourse facilitated by Zhirinovskii’s ascent a year before, the “party of war” within the Kremlin (Aleksandr Korzhakov, Oleg Soskovets, Nikolai Egorov, Pavel Grachev, Vladimir Polevanov, Oleg Lobov, Mikhail Barsukov, and others)\(^{17}\) may not have managed to make El’tsin agree using force “to pacify” the Chechens in December 1994.\(^{18}\) As is all too well-known, this adventure has led to two devastating wars which have by now cost the lives of tens of thousands of innocent people—with no end in sight. This major event in current Russian history with far-reaching repercussions in Russian domestic politics and foreign affairs would, probably, not have happened without Zhirinovskii’s rise in 1993.

The aim of this study is to underline further that, in Russia, the dividing line between extremely right-wing and mainstream politics is less clear than in the West.\(^{19}\) Moreover, what we are now observing and what will be partly demonstrated below is the continuous infiltration of cryptic and not so cryptic ultra-nationalist ideas into Russian elite discourse. For example, there are a number of former high government officials who, after leaving the government, have, to one degree or another, affiliated themselves with, and thus added to the reputation of, the extreme right. The most prominent examples are the reputed economist and former Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Sergei Glaz’ev, Army General and former Minister of Défense Igor’ Rodionov, or former Press Minister Boris Mironov. While these examples of an interpenetration between the moderate and extreme right are relatively familiar, the considerable osmosis that has recently also been happening between Russian civil and uncivil society is a lesser known phenomenon. Chapter III of this study is an attempt to illustrate this phenomenon with particular attention to Russia’s think-tanks.

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\(^{17}\) On the “party of war” within the Kremlin, see *Die Zeit* 50, no. 2 (1995), and John B. Dunlop, “The ‘Party of War’ and Russian Imperial Nationalism,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 43, no. 2 (1996): 29-34. Dunlop counts Viktor Erin and Sergei Stepashin also among the full members of this informal network. To me, they seem to have been more ambivalent figures.

\(^{18}\) Such an opinion was voiced by, among others, Grigorii Yavlinskii during an *NTV* weekly television show issue of *Itogi* on 18th December 1995. See also Elena Klepikova and Vladimir Solovyov, *Zhirinovskii: The Paradoxes of Russian Fascism.* Transl. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (Harmonsworth, Middlesex. Viking/Penguin Group, 1995). VII. A leading Russian specialist on contemporary Russian nationalism, Nikolai Mitrokhin, too has stated that the 1993 elections (i.e. Zhirinovskii’s victory) exerted a principal impact on the “ideology of Russian stateness,” and that the resulting processes led to, among other things, the intervention into Chechnya. See his “Ot ‘Pamyati’ k skinkhedam Luzhkova: Ideologiya russkogo natsionalizma v 1987-2003 godakh,” *Neprikosnovennyi zapas*, no. 5(31) (2003): 37-46, here 40.

In the context of Western research into the international extreme right, it is not only of interest that, in the case of Russia, the study of ultra-nationalism cannot be regarded as being fixated on a subject matter only peripheral to the major concerns of political science. What also becomes both fascinating and disturbing in this context is that the political ideas, strategies and tactics of certain sectors of the Western extreme right gain, in this context, an additional dimension. That is because of the well-known phenomena of cross-country diffusion of ideas, and influence of international epistemic communities on domestic politics. In our case, Western extreme rightists are linked in various ways to their Russian counterparts and exert considerable impact on them—as I shall try to show below.20

One could observe this peculiar phenomenon already in December 1993 when the relatively close relations between Zhirinovskii’s so-called Liberal-Democratic Party and Dr. Gerhard Frey’s dubious Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union), at that point, led to the odd situation that a bizarre minor German nationalist organization—smiled upon by many West German political commentators—had, unexpectedly, acquired a partner with some influence on Russian high politics. The money that Frey—infamous in Germany for his expensive elections campaigns—has, probably, spent on supporting Zhirinovskii during the State Duma campaign of 1993 may have been the most effectual political action he has and will have ever undertaken.21

Something comparable has happened to some West European extremely right-wing intellectuals. By way of being absorbed, adapted and used—as will be discussed in some detail below—within structures like Dugin’s Eurasia Movement, the ideas of such relatively obscure figures in post-war European political thought as Julius Evola, Alain de Benoist or Claudio Mutti, all of a sudden, are entering the thinking of the political, cultural and academic elites of a nuclear superpower.22 Whatever one may think about the usefulness of studying in-depth the ideology of the post-war West European extreme right by itself: In view of the—as I shall show below—continuing relevance of Russian ultranationalism and its considerable debt to certain West Euro-

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22 Parland, The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia.
pean models, attention to the margins of the political spectrum in many countries—and not only in Russia—has gained legitimacy as a subject of topical, problem-driven political research. The various ultra-nationalist subcultures in the West may, as such, be, perhaps, left to be investigated by students of societal, historical or cultural affairs. Yet, when these otherwise inconsequential subcultures, via their Russian counterparts, inform the discourse of Russia’s political, administrative and intellectual elites, they start to fall in the realm of “proper” political science—understood as a discipline concerned with recent and current issues in the authoritative allocation of values, and as an enterprise that may (or even should) have some impact on real politics. The below survey is too brief and sweeping to demonstrate exhaustively these new tendencies in the comparative study of the contemporary international extreme right. Yet, it might suggest some directions where future political research into contemporary Russian affairs and the international extreme right could go.

A final reason to attempt here a more extensive introduction to, and contextualization of, the Dugin phenomenon in particular is a discussion I recently had on the ideology and relevance of Dugin with the eminent specialist on comparative fascism A. James Gregor, a professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley. Our controversy was a spin-off from an international debate of Roger Griffin’s approach to historical and neo-fascism in the German journal Erwägen Wissen Ethik (EWE; Deliberation Knowledge Ethics). Gregor’s reply to my critique of his classifica-

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23 Well-known examples of the latter aspect, i.e. of social scientists reaching beyond the Ivory Tower of academia, are the US political researchers Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama whose writings have, arguably, exerted some influence on the thinking of the elites of many countries, including Russia. See Andrei P. Tsygankov, Whose World Order? Russia’s Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).


tion of Dugin as definitely not fascist touched not only upon the nature of Dugin’s ideology, but, somehow, also upon my intentions. Gregor suspected me of aiming to censor Dugin. One of the three of my replies to Gregor was in German, and the second and third, in English language, appeared only in a subsequent EWE issue, i.e. separated from the main debate of Griffin’s concepts. This may have left Anglophone readers of this exchange wondering what exactly my argument and motivations, a topic brought up by Prof. Gregor, were. The below study addresses some of the issues raised in this exchange.26

26 At this point, I should also take the opportunity to mention that a German Evolian journal published by the extremely right-wing Regin publishing house has, without my knowledge, reprinted an edited section of a German-language paper of mine on Dugin as: Andreas Umland, “Der Aufstieg Alexander Dugins,” Junges Forum, no. 1 (2004): 43-44, URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.regin-versand.de/bestellung/pd-1158835944.htm?categoryId=5. Oddly, the list of contents of this issue of Junges Forum has been reposted at one of Dugin’s WWW-sites (URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1863). These publications may give the impression that I am sympathetic to the causes of Junges Forum or Evraziya. As will become clear below, this is not the case.
I Introduction

I.1 The Purpose and Structure of this Study

This study does not attempt to falsify a hypothesis in the narrow sense of the word, i.e. to disprove an argument about causes and effects. Rather, its purpose is to question a particular interpretation of current Russian affairs that was indicated in the foreword, and might be summarized in the following way:

*Russian ultra-nationalism—as not only a popular mass media theme, but a socially rooted and politically relevant movement—has been getting nowhere in post-Soviet Russia. It might be currently prominent because it has become an object of manipulation by Kremlin technologists, and of concern for Russian and Western human rights groups. However, as one can see from the lack of seriousness of such parties or blocs as Zhirinovskii’s “Liberal Democrats” or Rogozin’s “Rodina” (as well as dozens of other contenders that never made it into the Russian parliament), the Russian extreme right is pathetic. Though, as recent skinhead activities suggest, not a negligible societal phenomenon, it remains outside the Russian mainstream, and is as inconsequential a macro-political factor as a sober analyst would expect.*

Variations of this view are widespread among especially Russian,27 but also some non-Russian observers of current Russian affairs. To be sure, few Western commentators might venture to formulate or support as outspoken an evaluation as the above one. However, the impression of continuing disinterest among Western political scientists for extremely nationalistic ideas and groups in Russia, as reflected by the subject’s relative under-representation in major REES journals and book series, emerges from a cursory comparison of Russian ultra-nationalism’s prominence in relation to

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both, other themes in current Russian politics (leadership, federalism, political economy, etc.) and other international varieties of right-wing extremism (Front national, Vlaams Bloc, Alleanza Nazionale, Nouvelle Droite, Islamic fundamentalism, etc.). It suggests that an implicit opinion similar to the one stated here informs Western perceptions of post-Soviet affairs. Below, I attempt to develop a case study designed to indicate the inadequateness of such an assessment.

In doing so, my survey uses findings of research into non-Russian civil societies and ultra-nationalisms as well as examples of non-party Russian right-wing extremism. They are meant to illustrate that the relative decline in radically nationalist Russian party politics in the late 1990s and the largely abortive attempts to form a stable unified ultra-nationalist bloc in the State Duma can, by themselves, not be seen as an unequivocal indication that “anti-liberal statism” has lost its appeal in Russia. In particular, they suggest that the considerable growth of the non-governmental, not-for-profit sector of Russian society since the mid-1980s cannot be regarded as exclusively beneficial in terms of Russia’s transition to a polyarchy, and further democratization. Not only is a Russian “civic public” or “civic community” developing only

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28 This is the (arguably improvable) concept used in the pioneering article by Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, “The Weimar/Russia Comparison,” Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (1997): 252-283.

29 For the early period, see Anne White, Democratization in Russia Under Gorbachev, 1985-91: The Birth of a Voluntary Sector (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). In the words of Uhlin, “[m]any foreign researchers have probably underestimated the size of civil society in Russia because they focus on NGOs with Western contacts, which are probably a small minority of Russian groups.” See Anders Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society: Democratization in Russia and the Baltic States. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 25 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 58. Fein stated in late 2001: “Today the number of public organizations registered with the Russian Justice Ministry is approximately 300,000 of which, according to estimations by experts, circa 75,000 are active.” Elke Fein, “Zivilgesellschaftlicher Paradigmenwechsel oder PR-Aktion? Zum ersten allrussischen ‘Bürgerforum’ im Kreml,” Osteuropa 52, no. 2 (2002): 158-179, here 160.

30 My taxonomy draws on the conceptualization, proposed by Robert A. Dahl, of democracy as constituting not only an ideal-typical notion, but an ultimately utopian project. Dahl, in my understanding, applies the term “polyarchy” to those regimes that, even if by necessity representing only incomplete implementations of the democratic ideal, are fundamentally inspired by it. Democratization is, within this terminological scheme, seen as a continuous, potentially infinite process. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). A democratization break-through that marks a qualitative change from a non-polyarchic to a polyarchic regime might then have to be labeled “polyarchization.” Whether or not Russia has already passed this stage or not is a matter of dispute.

31 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 221.

slowly, and seems, in connection with various measures by the Putin administration, to have come recently to a halt. Some of the more significant pre- and post-Soviet groups, movements, and trends within the Russian voluntary sector are unsupportive, or even explicitly critical of liberal democracy. A number of major non-state institutions and networks in Russian society contain ultra-nationalist, fundamentalist, and, partly, fascist\textsuperscript{33} sub-sectors that question the adequacy of the construct “civil society” to designate them. These organizations’ or groupings’ primary function is less—or not at all—to enhance peoples’ inclination and ability to participate effectively in political activities that could promote further democratization. Instead, they provide, sometimes expressly so, a medium for the spread of radically particularistic world views, ascriptive notions about human nature, and antiliberal or and bellicose political ideas, as well as an organizational training ground for potential political activists holding such views.\textsuperscript{34} As in the case of civil society organizations proper, such uncivil society groups may “serve as a breeding ground for new political parties, by providing the basis for future party organizations, or by supplying personnel for future political parties.”\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} For lucid definitions of fascism, and its proper and diminished sub-types, such as proto-fascism, see Roger D. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (London: Routledge, 1993). As I have dealt with the issue of adequately classifying post-Soviet Russian extremely right-wing ideologies with generic labels, and, in particular, which groups should be labeled fascist and which not in my previous publications extensively, these questions will be touched upon only rarely in the below study. See Andreas Umland, “Neue ideologische Fusionen im postsowjetischen russischen Antidemokratismus: Westliche Konzepte, antiwestliche Doktrinen und das postsowjetische politische Spektrum,” in: Eckhard Jesse and Uwe Backes, eds., Gefährdungen der Freiheit: Extremistische Ideologien im Vergleich. Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts 29 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006): 371-406; Andreas Umland, “Tri raznovidnosti postsovetskogo fashizma: Kontseptual’nye i kontekstual’nye problemy interpretatsii sovremennogo russkogo ul’tranatsionalizma,” in: Aleksandr Verkhovskii, ed., Russkii natsionalizm: ideologiya i nastroeniye (Moskva: Sova, 2006), 223-262.

\textsuperscript{34} The construct “uncivil society” (a term that can, probably, be improved upon) was introduced to the study of Russian ultra-nationalist tendencies seemingly by Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Stephen E. Hanson, “Paths to Uncivil Societies and Anti-Liberal States: A Reply to Shenfield,” Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 4 (1998): 369-375. There is also a newsletter called (Un)Civil Societies available via Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.rferl.org/ucs/). The connotation of the term “uncivil” here is, obviously, different from the meaning it has, for instance, for Richard Rose, “Uses of Social Capital in Russia: Modern, Pre-modern, and Anti-modern,” Post-Soviet Affairs 16, no. 1 (2000): 33-57, here 37.

Table 1: The major extremely right-wing parties in the RF in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Short Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>Liberal'nodemokraticheskaya partiya Rossii (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia)</td>
<td>1990-</td>
<td>Vladimir Zhirinovskii A misnamed ultra-nationalist, populist parliamentary party, perhaps, created by the KGB and constantly present in the State Duma since December 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRF</td>
<td>Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiskoi Federatsii (Communist Party of the Russian Foundation)</td>
<td>1993-</td>
<td>Gennadii Zyuganov The major successor party of the CPSU, and an important player in the State Duma since December 1993. While not being ultra-nationalist as a whole, many of its leaders clearly are (Makashov, Ilyukhin, Kondratenko, etc.).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 By classifying all four of these parties as “extremely right-wing,” I, by no means, imply that there are no important differences between them with regard to their organizational structures as well as their agendas. The concept “extreme right,” as I use it here, comprises carriers of as divergent ideologies as fundamentalism, ultra-conservatism, and fascism. In addition, the KPRF is not only a larger, but also a less homogeneous political organization than the other three parties (which, to be sure, have different factions too). Notwithstanding, “extremely right-wing”—though being too strong, or even wrong for certain trends within the KPRF-leadership—would still seem to be one of the less inappropriate generic concepts that have been suggested to capture Zyuganov’s political ideas to which I briefly return below. On the various ideological camps in the Russian “communist” movement, see Joan Barth Urban and Valerii Solovei, Russia’s Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). I have dealt with the ideologies of Barkashov, Zhirinovskii, Dugin and Zyuganov in: Umland, “Neue ideologische Fusionen im postsowjetischen russischen Antidemokratismus.”
The study is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapter II) starts with arguing the necessity of continuing attention to Russian right-wing extremist tendencies in general, and to such trends in civil society, in particular—in spite of an apparent recent decline of extremely right-wing parties. It does so by referring to both, certain particulars of Russian politics today, and some analogies from contemporary West European history. It specifically addresses the issue of an adequate interpretation of the altogether paltry performance of the four major ultra-nationalist parties of the 1990s, the LDPR, RNE, KPRF, and NBP (Table 1) and their frequent failures to achieve high offices during elections in the 1990s.37

It, in a first step, argues that their leaders’ party-building efforts have, from their inception, been hindered by fundamental inconsistencies in these parties’ public image. In assessing the temporary decline of extremely right-wing party politics in Russia in the late 1990s and first years of the new century, it refers, in a second step, to the experience of late Imperial Germany that faced the disappearance of most of its antisemitic parties, but not of antisemitism around 1900. It, in a third step, notes that specific attention to non-party activities on the extreme right has been called for by scholars of inter- and post-war Western ultra-nationalism. Finally, it introduces two distinct permutations of uncivil society, the “New Right” and groupuscules, both of which have become prominent in post-war international right-wing extremism, including Russia’s.

The second part or Chapter III of the study contains a description and interpretation of one particular sphere of Russia’s emerging uncivil society as an illustration for the above issues—intellectual centres.38 It focuses on a realm that Anders Uhlin has

37 I refrain, at this point, for two reasons from further elaboration on the Blok Rodina (Motherland Bloc) that entered the State Duma in December 2003 with a surprisingly good result (9.02%). First, the origins and future of Rodina are unclear. The alliance brought together an array of more or less prolific politicians who have split, in the meantime. If the bloc had indeed been merely a creation of the Kremlin, as many observers alleged, it might have been from the outset destined to be an ephemeral political organization. A the moment of finishing this study, it seems that the bloc may disappear altogether as happened to other nationalist unions such as the Russkii Natsional’ny Sbornor (Russian National Assembly), Front Natsional’nogo Spaseniya (National Salvation Front), or Blok “Vlast’ narodu!” (“Power to the People” Bloc). Second, an unequivocal classification of the whole bloc as ultra-nationalist could be misleading. While many prominent members would fall under this category, others would not. In addition, none of Rodina’s leaders has so far produced as large a body of literature as the main objects of this investigation: Zyuganov, Zhirinovskii, Limonov and Dugin. Whether Rodina will, after its various splits, produce a nationalist successor organization, and how sustainable such an organization may be, is, in late 2006, still unclear.

38 For a recent study of a different subject, but with a somewhat similar intention, see Tobias
called “civil society elites,”\textsuperscript{39} and briefly introduces various think tanks paying special attention to the publishing, propagandistic, networking and similar activities by Aleksandr Dugin. This overview will focus less on the substance of the ideas of these groupings than on their organizational capacity, spread, political connections, and increasing presence in Russian society in the late 1990s and early 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Some of Dugin’s ideas will, to be sure, be analyzed in detail. Yet, this is done less so in order to explain their nature, than to show how his self-promotion is designed to facilitate his acceptance by society, in general, and his entry into mainstream elite discourse, in particular. My treatment of Dugin’s ideas is thus less motivated by an attempt to classify his world view,\textsuperscript{40} than to illustrate how he adapts his official image in a way that furthers his influence in Russian public and intellectual life. The conclusions draw some inferences concerning the future of the Russian extreme right and its scholarly study.

\textsuperscript{39} Uhlin, \textit{Post-Soviet Civil Society}, 176.

\textsuperscript{40} I have attempted to do that in Umland, “Tri raznovidnosti postsovetskogo fashizma,” 252-261.
I.2 The Arguments, Foci and Limits of this Study

The first argument proposed in Chapter II of this study can be seen as ideographic-hermeneutic as it will interpret some peculiar features of the Russian extreme right, namely the failures of the major ultra-nationalist parties, throughout the 1990s in relation to certain fundamentals of Russia’s specific nationalist discourse. The second argument of Chapter II reports first the relative decline of right-wing extremist electoral support in the late 1990s. It then argues that the relative failure of Russian radically nationalist parties so far is insufficient to indicate that the post-Soviet extreme right has lastingly lost its political relevance. It is historical-analogical in that it points out some peculiarities in the development of German ultra-nationalism of the late 19th century as being suggestive for an adequate assessment of current Russian trends.

The third section of Chapter II too tries to contribute to a better conceptualization of the Russian extreme right in the light of non-Russian experiences. In particular, it refers to some recent trends in the study of Western right-wing extremism, and suggests that, for an adequate measurement of the strength and spread of ultra-nationalist ideas in, especially post-war, modern societies, close attention has to be paid to groupings and tendencies outside the narrowly electoral realm. For this reason, the concept of the extreme right should be broadened so as to include not only parties, but also various non-party social actors, i.e. to incorporate also—what has come to be known as—“uncivil society.”

While the latter would strike students of Western ultra-nationalism as a common place, the study of Russian politics, as indicated above, suffers from an excessive focus on the Kremlin, governmental institutions and economic actors. Only rarely have forces outside the major political institutions and narrow circle of so-called “oligarchs” received the attention they deserve by political scientists. Rather, this realm remains, as mentioned in the Preface, a prerogative of contemporary historians, geographers, sociologists, and students of Russian cultural and sub-cultural life. As far as I can see, the main protagonist of Chapter III, Aleksandr Dugin, for instance, has, outside the community of students of the Russian extreme right by now become known. However, Dugin is almost entirely ignored by post-Sovietology understood as a political science sub-discipline. Instead, Dugin’s activities have been studied by philologists (Hielscher, Parland, Laruelle, Höllwerth, etc.), geographers (Bassin, In-
gram), or historians (Luks, D. Shlapentokh, Wiederkehr, Hagemeister, Dunlop), but been largely ignored within the community of political scientists interested in post-Soviet Russia. As a leading specialist on post-Soviet civil society recently noted, with implicit reference to political science, “[t]here is not much research on ethnic or national identities. Neither organizations focusing on the culture and/or political and civil rights of ethnic minorities nor the more extreme nationalist and xenophobic organizations have received much scholarly attention [by political scientists—A.U.].”

A Note on the State of Russian Right-Wing Extremism Studies

Though the small circle of students of Russian ultra-nationalism seems to agree on the growing importance of its subject, in general, and of Dugin, in particular, there is, so far little sustained collaboration between the various scholars spread across the Northern hemisphere—a state of affairs I lamented already in 1997 (and the following years), but which has changed little since. The exception to the rule so far has been Stephen Shenfield’s path-breaking Russian Fascism (2001) which—unusually for the discipline—used extensively English- and Russian-language, primary and secondary sources, and is thus, by far, more informative than any other non-Russian book on the subject. However, even Shenfield’s well-researched study does not include all the relevant secondary sources. It, in particular, entirely ignores the considerable recent German-language literature which—like for instance Markus Mathyl’s articles cited frequently below—is, sometimes, superior to similar Anglophone publications. Therefore, the footnotes of the below study have been filled with more rather than less literature, and, especially secondary, sources on the subject in Russian, English and German in an attempt to draw the attention of the various scholars in our small field to the work of their colleagues of which they seem to be, sometimes, unaware. The study is as much an investigation into, as a report on international research on, the Russian extreme right.

While Shenfield’s book would be the first I would recommend on the subject, it has been justifiedly criticized for its weak conceptual basis. This concerns especially its confusing usage of “fascism” for which four, partly conflicting definitions are presented in his book. Though Shenfield seems to have consulted only a limited amount of literature on comparative fascism, he chose to formulate his own definition of not only

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41 Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society, 65.
42 Umland, “The Post-Soviet Russian Extreme Right.”
Russian, but also generic fascism—an undertaking that was neither necessary nor successful. He also does not make an explicit distinction between anti-democratic political society, and uncivil society. In connection with this, Shenfield’s extensive treatment of the above mentioned and below introduced neo-Nazi organization RNE seems not in all respects helpful. His extensive survey of the RNE analysis draws too much attention to a phenomenon the nature of which may have been more sub-cultural, than political.\textsuperscript{43} Last but not least, Shenfield’s book is now somewhat out-of-date.

\textit{Dugin’s Competitors}

The following survey represents neither an intellectual biography of Dugin, nor an extensive exegesis of his writings, both of which are sorely needed.\textsuperscript{44} I deal in some detail with both of these aspects—the particulars of Dugin’s life and the peculiarities of this ideology. Yet, I am interested in his CV only in as far as such information is conducive to a better understanding of his continuing rise and peculiar position in Russian politics as an actor who is not affiliated to any party, but, nevertheless, of growing importance, and thus a good example for Russia’s rising uncivil society.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} I have extensively argued the para-political nature of contemporary Russian neo-Nazism in general, and of the RNE, in particular, in Andreas Umland, “Tri raznovidnosti postsovetskogo fashizma.”

\textsuperscript{44} In as far as the study focuses on various repercussions, in intellectual and political life, of Dugin’s ideas and rise as much as on the Dugin phenomenon itself, I rely here often on secondary, rather than primary sources. This is meant to increase the inter-subjectivity of my presentation, and to illustrate, by itself, the growing attention to Dugin among Russian and Western journalists as well as scholars of as different disciplines as philology, history and geography. A meaningfull analysis of the texts of the various intellectuals and publicists I introduce below would be a life-time project as their books and articles sum up to tens of thousands of pages. In addition, Dugin—as will be discussed later—uses tactics of obfuscation and political mimicry making an adequate interpretation of the contradictory ideas in his dozens of books and articles a formidable challenge that could be adequately met only in a separate, different long-term research project. In view of these circumstances and of the fact that this is not a study of Dugin per se, but of his rise in the context of Russia’s emerging uncivil society, it was often more interesting to note what historians of Dugin’s intellectual evolution had to say on him, instead of reproducing Dugin’s own, often inconsistent sentences. As I am not claiming to present here a history of ideas, I feel justified to rely on those scholars who would, in contrast, be vindicated to call themselves historians of classical and/or “neo-Eurasianism” and to use their conclusions on these subjects, rather than my own references to, and impressions from, primary sources which—the reader can be assured—I did read, to a large extent.

\textsuperscript{45} Thus, this study will hardly represent the “last word” on Dugin’s biography. That is not only because this is not the purpose of the below text, but also because Dugin (like his teacher Evgenii Golovin, see below) likes to surround himself with various myths making it, sometimes, hard to distinguish between truth and fiction in his autobiographical reports. See Nikita Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego
elaborations on Dugin’s ideas go only as far as is necessary to illustrate what his political strategy is about, and, in particular, what specific significance the term “neo-Eurasianism” has for Dugin’s tactics of political mimicry.

The reason that, along with brief overviews of the activities of Aleksandr Prokhanov, Sergei Kurginyan and Lev Gumilëv (see below), Dugin’s “neo-Eurasianism” was chosen here for a lengthier illustration of the rise of Russian uncivil society has less to do with Dugin’s particular ideas. As will become clear below, his writings—while making, perhaps, interesting reading, if one likes fantasy literature—contain little more than mixture of bizarre conspiracy theories, voluntaristic historical interpretations, and more or less adequate reviews of numerous Western and Russian texts on such subjects as occultism, international relations and religion. To be sure, for instance, Dugin’s “ethnopluralist” ideas about on inter-ethnic relations—analyzed briefly below and in the literature quoted—are still, in a number of ways, more sophisticated than those of Lev Gumilëv (1912-1992)—another, somewhat similar publicist introduced in a special “Excursus” below, and seen by many Russians as a serious scholar, if not a contemporary “Russian Darwin.”

Yet, even though his ideas may be less crude than Gumilëv’s, many Western readers, when encountering Dugin’s alternative interpretation of world history, have been unwilling to believe that his abstruse claims enjoy acceptance among important sections of Russia’s intellectual, academic and political elite.

Dugin was also not chosen here because his views are especially radical, as one may think when reading his many articles and books published during the 1990s. One might have also taken for illustration of the point to be made here the dubious writings and public perception of other prolific publicists, such as renowned mathematician Igor’ Shafarevich, chemistry professor Sergei G. Kara-Murza, or journal-
ist Vladimir Kucherenko. The latter, for instance, is a graduate of Moscow State University’s Faculty of History, former editor for the popular Russian online magazine Stringer and correspondent for, among other periodicals, the Russian government’s official daily Rossiiskaya gazeta. Kucherenko now writes books under the pseudonym of “Maksim Kalashnikov.” He is, like Dugin (on whom he occasionally relies), not afraid of admitting an interest in elements of Nazism. Kucherenko-Kalashnikov is also fond of comprehensively re-interpreting Russian as well as world history and of advising the Russian people, especially, the elites, on how to act in the future—again reminding Dugin’s intentions. Going beyond Dugin, Kucherenko-Kalashnikov has proposed to make the infamous antiseemitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion a part of the school curriculum. He dreams, in one of his recent books, Forward to the USSR-2, of a “Neuroworld” which would be a “structure” combining the characteristics of a “church, huge media holding, as well as of a financial ‘empire’ added with a secret service.” He would like to see in Russia a “secret [parallel] state,” “new empire,” “new species [poroda] of human beings,” a “team of programmers and computer geniuses” who would, “on the other side of the ocean [i.e. in the US—A.U.],” cause “chaos and catastrophes.” Kucherenko-Kalashnikov has proposed a “[s]ystem of development and application of neuro- and psychotechnology” for mili-

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Kara-Murza is affiliated with Shershnev’s below-mentioned Fond natsional’noi i mezhdu-
narodnoi bezopastnosti. For a short introduction to Kara-Murza, see Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 150-151, 161. Among his many books are Sergei G. Kara-Murza, Sovetskaia tsivilizatsiya (Moskva: Algoritm, 2001); idem, Evrei, dissidenty i evrokkommunizm (Moskva: Algoritm, 2002); idem, Antisovetskii proekt (Moskva: Algoritm, 2001); idem, idem, Manipulyatsiya soznaniem (Moskva: Eksmo-Press, 2004); idem, Potertyannyi razum (Moskva: Eksmo-Press, 2005); idem, Oppozitsiya kak tenevaya vlast’ (Moskva: Algoritm, 2006).
49 E.g. Maksim Kalashnikov, Vpered, v SSSR-2 (Moskva: Yauza, Eksmo-Press, 2003); idem, Slomannyi mech’ imperii (Moskva: Krymskii Most, 9d—Paleia, 1998); idem, Bitva za nebesa (Moskva: AST, Astrel’, 2002); idem and Yuriy Krupnov, Gnev orka (Moskva: AST, Astrel’, 2003); Maksim Kalashnikov, Amerikanskoe igo: Zhem diade Semu russkie raby (Moskva: Yauza, Presskom, 2005); idem, Genotsid russkogo naroda: Chto mozhet nas spasti? (Moskva: Yauza, Presskom, 2005). My list of authors is by no means complete, does, perhaps, not even include the, apart from Dugin, most important publicists, and could be extended with many more names like Yuriy Petukhov, Aleksandr Se-
vust’yanov, Yuriy Mukhin, Oleg Platonov, Mikhail Nazarov, etc.
52 Moroz, “Podnyavshii svastiku.”
Not only seem Kucherenko-Kalashnikov’s views thus hardly less radical than Dugin’s outlined below. The 2003 book just quoted from is also noteworthy because it has a circulation number of 10,000. Yasmann wrote in August 2004 that the book “has gone through several editions over the last 18 months and its popularity has become widespread.”

Dugin is thus neither the most radical, nor the only widely read representative of ultranationalist publicism in Russia today. However, in distinction to Shafarevich’s, Kara-Murza’s and Kucherenko-Kalashnikov’s recent efforts, Dugin’s enterprise seems, as I will try to illustrate below, to be a more sustained, better thought-through and organized, as well as more original and encompassing operation in terms of both, its contents, sophistication and infrastructure. An aim of this study is to illustrate why Dugin appears as an especially noteworthy actor within contemporary Russian uncivil society, in general, and extremely right-wing intellectualism, in particular.

This said, the present study neither claims to be a definitive account of Dugin, nor ventures to provide a comprehensive survey of the whole Russian extreme right. It is focused less on the extreme right per se, than on its extra-parliamentary political organizations, networks, potential and influence. Dugin’s reinterpretation of classical Eurasianism is dealt with here at considerable length. However, it is elaborated upon in the context of Dugin’s strategies to achieve influence, rather than in terms of his eventual aims for Russia, or location in the history of Russian thought. “Neo-Eurasianism” is extensively treated here less to explain Dugin’s world view, than to show how the concept serves him in his Gramscian strategy of achieving hegemony in Russia’s cultural complexes—concepts that will be explained below. The study does also not yet amount to a comprehensive estimation of the current strength and reach of Russia’s uncivil society as a whole, and touches only en passant upon the question of the spread of extremely right-wing attitudes among the population at large. These issues either have been dealt with in other studies referred to in the footnotes, or constitute large, separate themes that would demand a different and/or lengthier investigation. A final reason for focusing here on intellectual centres which try to influence mainstream political discourse is that one can easily paraphrase for the study uncivil society Anders Uhlin’s remark concerning the study of civil society proper, namely that “the important task of researchers interested in democratization is not primarily to identify actors within civil society, but to identify politically relevant

54 Yasmann, “Analysis: The Clandestine Soviet Union.”
The Major Concepts of this Study

Some of the less familiar concepts of this study, like “uncivil society,” “groupuscule” and “Gramscianism” will be extensively introduced below. Some other, more general concepts frequently appearing in the text will, however, only briefly or not at all be elaborated upon. The latter concerns such terms as “Russian civil society,” “Russian nationalism,” “Russian fascism,” or “the Russian extreme right.” These are concepts that have been extensively dealt with in the literature quoted, including my own publications.

To be sure, concerning, for example, “Russian civil society” and “Russian nationalism,” one could argue that an extensive discussion is needed because of their specificity. While being aware of some striking peculiarities of civil society and nationalism in Russia as compared to other countries, I regard these idiosyncrasies, however, as neither salient enough to make them subjects of separate sections, nor as sufficiently under-researched to justify their separate treatment. Therefore, I refer here simply to the literature on civil society and nationalism, in general, and the study of their Russian permutations, in particular. My own position within the conceptual struggles within these fields, as far as this needs to be clarified for the purposes of my argu-

55 Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society, 27-28, emphasis added.
ment, will become clear in the chapters. Further deliberation would serve little more than to document my reading of the literature in these fields. As I have published a number of book reviews on both, historic and current Russian nationalism\(^{57}\) as well as Soviet and post-Soviet state-society relations,\(^{58}\) I would hope that this is not imperative.

Certainly, to repeat here what previously has been written on nationalism and civil society in Russia would be a good introduction to those not yet familiar with this liter-


Moreover, reflecting upon, for instance, the Slavophile claim that the Russians are destined to lead the world because of their alleged openness to other nations—an idea expressed by many later Russian nationalist thinkers, among them Fedor Dostoevskii—or elaborating on the structural similarities between Russian Orthodox chiliasm and Bolshevik teleology would be fascinating endeavours.\textsuperscript{59} Equally, discussing, for example, the effects of the Russian tradition of synoptic thinking about the world, or of the peculiar pathologies of post-totalitarianism on the formation of civil society in post-Soviet Russia would be captivating enterprises.\textsuperscript{60} But, in as far as other authors have done so with more competence than I could hope to achieve, adding my elaborations on these issues would be superfluous for the purposes of this study—i.e. for drawing attention to some aspects of Russian civil society and nationalism that, in contrast to the above issues, have been largely overlooked in publicistic writing on Russian affairs so far, and be only rarely treated in-depth within scholarly political research.

A general interpretative issue to be still worth mentioning here is that my outline of the rise of Russian uncivil society below can be read as supporting arguments about the peculiarity of Russian civil society, as proposed by authors like Oleg Kharkhordin who, at one point, mentions the construct "uncivil society" without explaining what the term, in his understanding, means.\textsuperscript{61} As will become clear in my brief review of uncivil society in pre-Nazi Germany, a particularly strong uncivil society is, however, not something unique to Russia. Thus, I would stick to the above-indicated position that, though Russian affairs are indeed peculiar in a number of ways, similarly high concentrations or specific combinations of seemingly unique social and cultural features can be found at other places, within other civilizations, and in other time periods too. Whatever thus makes civil society and nationalism in Russia different from other


permutations of these phenomena is insufficient to see them as phenomena *sui generis* demanding an elaborate introduction within a study such as mine.

**Conceptual Borders of Generic Civil Society and Nationalism**

What might, notwithstanding, be worth clarifying here are a couple of definitional issues in my conceptualization of generic civil society and nationalism. While my usage of “civil society” is, perhaps, more narrow than in other studies, my usage of “nationalism” is broader than usual.

“Civil society” is here understood not only as an ideal type to denote a social realm distinct from political society and private life, but also a concept to be separated from all forms of businesses, profit making activity or “economic society” (though not from those associations of businesses that are created to exert influence on the government or society, rather than to directly increase profits). This is, for my particular study, of importance as far as it would—in contrast to a classification made recently by Louise Shelley—exclude from the category of *uncivil society* the phenomenon of organized crime. Within my particular conceptualization of civil society, crime groups would constitute a perverted form of *economic* society, in as far as its purpose too is making profit. Basically, the same reasons that are applied when making an argument for not including businesses into the concept of civil society could be made for not seeing organized crime as a permutation of uncivil society. To be sure, Petr Kopecký, among others, has pointed out that

the sharp theoretical boundaries that are drawn [...] between civil society, political society [...] and economic society are in empirical reality difficult to sustain. Organizations that operate between the state, the family (individual, household) and the economic production (market, firms)—that is, civil society—will often significantly overlap with one or more of these

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63 Henry and McIntosh Sundstrom seem to make the same argument in the introduction to the paper collection in which Shelley’s article appeared when they exclude organized crime groups from their notion of civil society not because of the bandits’ illegal status or readiness to use violence, but explicitly because they “are profit-oriented.” Henry and McIntosh Sundstrom, “Introduction,” in: Evans, Henry and Sundstrom, *Russian Civil Society*, 3-8, here 5. See also their concluding article “Russian Civil Society: Tensions and Trajectories,” in: *ibid.*, 305-325, here 315.
subsystems.\textsuperscript{64}

However, for analytical reasons, civil society will be understood here as an ideal-typical concept that is distinct from political and economic society as well as from private life.

While my conceptualization of “civil society” might thus be narrower than those of others, my notion of nationalism is broader. I would argue that the structural traits and elements of the ideology of nationalism, narrowly defined, might be also found to refer to communities not commonly recognized as proper nations. When right-wing extremists speak affirmatively of the “Aryan nation,” “Eurasia,” or “nation of Europe” (\textit{Nation Europa}, as the title of a German right-wing journal goes), it seems legitimate to admit an application of the concept of nationalism, more loosely defined, to these ideologies too. While the “Aryans,” “Eurasians” or “Europeans” are not treated as nations in the scholarly literature, extremist political actors using such terms define these communities with the help of traits—culture, blood, religion, traditions, ancestry, etc.—that are also applied in delineating nations from each other. In as far as nations can be seen as “imagined” or even “invented” communities, the question arises why one should make a principal conceptual differentiation between, for instance, the familiar notion of Russian ethnic nationalism, on the one side, and the less familiar idea of a “Eurasian nationalism,” on the other—apart from the fact that the former notion might be more easily understood and popular.

While one might justifiably argue that, for, among others, lexicological reasons, “nationalism” should not be applied to ideologies that refer to such larger (pseudo-) communities, it is still possible to locate their radical expressions within the realm of the more general concept of the radical or extreme right. In the light of this, the answer to the question of whether, for instance, radical “Eurasianism” should be seen as a form of nationalism (“supra-nationalism”?) or not is, ultimately, inconsequential for my purposes. It falls within the borders of the concept of the extreme right, in any way. The same goes for other differences represented in various sections of the Russian ultra-nationalist movement where there are numerous disagreements about who can be called a \textit{russkii}, \textit{rusak}, \textit{velikoros}, \textit{rossiianin}, \textit{slavianin}, etc. or how legitimate each of these terms by itself is.

\textsuperscript{64} He adds: “[T]his also means that uncivil movements, and therefore uncivil society, are a part of civil society […]” Petr Kopecký, “Civil Society, Uncivil Society, and Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe,” in: Mudde and Kopecký, eds., \textit{Uncivil Society}? 1-18, here 14-15.
A Methodological Rationale of this Investigation's Approach

If a particular methodology needs to be identified as guiding the below study, it would be, as the study's sub-title indicates, the case study method—with all the limitations and benefits linked to it. Moreover, one of the purposes of the below survey is to demonstrate that the rise of Dugin’s “neo-Eurasian” movement constitutes an important, if not critical case for an adequate interpretation of the political potential of the post-Soviet Russian extreme right. This means that Dugin’s emergence not only illustrates, but, to some extent, exemplifies the growing relevance of ultra-nationalism in Russian mainstream political, academic and intellectual discourse.

The case study is an approach that, as listed by Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg, has a number of advantages in comparison to other methods of investigation:

1. It permits the grounding of observations and concepts about social action and social structures in natural settings studied at close hand.

2. It provides information from a number of sources and over a period of time thus permitting a more holistic study of complex social networks and of complexes of social action and social meanings.

3. It can furnish the dimensions of time and history of social life, thereby enabling investigators to examine continuity and change in lifeworld patterns.

4. It encourages and facilitates, in practice, theoretical innovation and generalization.65

While these are important advantages of the case study method that will benefit the argumentation below, my approach here does also not proceed from an assumption voiced by Schwartz and Ogilvy66 and applied to social sciences by Lincoln and Guba67 that an in-depth analysis of one case only is comparable to a piece of a hologram, and that a single case is thus already sufficient for revealing all relevant char-


acteristics of the entire phenomenon that the case represents—i.e., here, of the Russian extreme right as a whole. Lincoln and Guba seem to believe that singular cases are comparable to elements making up holograms and that they each exhibit all the features of the complete phenomenon under scrutiny. They use the metaphor of the hologram, in which every particle contains the whole picture, as an instrument to confer to the case study an unusually high status.

In contrast, I do not think that this metaphor is apt, in general, and that my study has the potential to comprehensively illustrate for the reader all the various characteristics and implications that the rise of Russian ultra-nationalism may have, in particular. What I report below about the ideology, strategy and tactics of Dugin can thus not be seen as being fully representative of, or the last word on, the entire spectrum of Russian radically anti-Western actors. My text is merely what it claims to be—a study of one and only one case in the rise of post-Soviet uncivil society.

On the other hand, Dugin’s movement is by now so important an element within this spectrum that this investigation might still have the potential to count as an, in Eckstein’s sense, “crucial case study” and that its findings have thus implications going beyond a mere illustration of the point to be made. What I claim is not that my investigation is sufficient for understanding the Russian extreme right in its entirety, but that it is, nevertheless, suitable for debunking interpretations of current Russian politics such as the one stated above where the extreme right is dismissed as a marginal phenomenon. I believe that my study, in and of itself, should be already enough to show that the growing prominence of ultra-nationalism in daily media reports from Russia cannot be as easily relegated to journalistic hyperbole, or as quickly ignored as a result of manipulations by political technologists as holders of the above-formulated opinion may think.

A Final Introductory Note

A last note to be made before starting the argument concerns Eduard Limonov’s National-Bolshevik Party that would, in as far as Dugin was the NBP’s second in command in 1994-1998, be worth investigating in the context of this study in some depth. However, as far as others have already written on the subject, and, in particular, as

69 Markus Mathyl, “The National-Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia: Two Neo-fascist Group-
Andrei Rogatchevski of the University of Glasgow is currently writing a book on the NBP,\textsuperscript{70} I have chosen to limit my descriptions of the NBP in this study to the necessary minimum. Dugin's important role in the NBP in the mid-1990s is for the sake of the argument of this study—his growing influence on the Russian establishment, and not only youth culture—of limited relevance, in any way. The NBP was and is a factor that, in contrast to the Dugin phenomenon, can be safely located at the margins of Russian political, intellectual and public discourse.

What the present investigation thus tries to demonstrate, by way of introducing in some detail one particularly relevant example of post-Soviet Russian uncivil society, is the increasing sophistication, considerable organizational capacity, and already deep infiltration into mainstream social institutions of certain groupings that are radically anti-Western and whose ideas amount to nothing less than a blueprint for a new Cold War (if not more). Such an indication should be sufficient to suggest that, for the foreseeable future, right-wing extremist ideas will continue to play a role in Russian politics independently of the individual fates of its recently prominent political party leaders such as Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Aleksandr Barkashov, or Eduard Limonov.

II Civil Society’s Relevance for Right-Wing Extremism Studies

There is a multitude of factors that have inhibited the emergence of a fully-fledged post-Soviet party system, in general,\(^\text{71}\) and the growth and rise of ultra-nationalist parties, in particular, in Russia.\(^\text{72}\) Among the reasons for the latter might be a factor often invoked by Russian observers that there is a peculiarly Russian antipathy against ultra-nationalist ideas. Whether this is an appropriate interpretation or not, the relatively poor performance of many extremely right-wing individuals and parties in Russia’s elections so far can, for the below reasons, not be seen as indicating that the prospects of ultra-nationalist politics in Russia are principally negligible.

II.1 Some Peculiar Dilemmas of Russian Ultra-Nationalist Politics in the 1990s

Concerning the limited electoral success of right-wing extremist parties or politicians during the last decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century in Russia, it is noteworthy that all four major political organizations that promoted ultra-nationalist ideas of various types and took, to various degrees, part in elections in this period, i.e. the LDPR, RNE, KPRF and NBP, suffered from certain basic impasses rooted in their particular history or leadership:


First, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the supreme, dictatorial leader of the LDPR, has a Jewish father, and is, at least to some Russians, recognizable as Jew. Though Zhirinovskii cannot be regarded as being Jewish in any meaningful sense, and though he sees himself as being fully Russian, his family background constituted a principal predicament for Zhirinovskii’s acceptance by many right-wing extremist politicians, intellectuals, activists, and voters—among the latter also those not holding ultra-nationalist views. In a survey presented by the Lev Gudkov in a volume of the Moscow Carnegie Center in 1999, 64% of the respondents reacted negatively to the question on whether a Jew could be President of the RF. In a survey by the Levada Center in June 2005, again, 65% of the respondents were “rather” or “definitely against” an RF President of non-Russian nationality. While not all of these re-


74 Yevgeniya Al'bats, Evreiskii vopros (Moskva: PIK, 1995). Though this had been common knowledge in the Russian public since the early 1990s, it is significant that, in 2001, Zhirinovskii himself admitted the fact in public. See Susan B. Glasser, “Russian Revises His Heritage: Anti-Semitic Politician Zhirinovskiy Admits Father Was Jewish,” The Washington Post, 17th July 2001, A13. I am grateful to Professor Marshall I. Goldman for bringing this article to my attention.

75 See the quote from Andrei Sinyavskii in Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 95.

76 A further worth-mentioning source of confusion has been the name of Zhirinovskii’s Party: “Liberal-Democratic.” See Andreas Umland, “Ein Gespräch mit Wladimir Shirinowskij,” Die Neue Gesellschaft: Frankfurter Hefte 41, no. 2 (1994): 114-117. This title, however, is less related to Zhirinovskii’s views at any time of his political rise, as has sometimes been implied, than to the party’s peculiar origins in 1990. See Julia Wishnevsky, “Multiparty System, Soviet Style,” Report on the USSR, 23 November 1990, 3-6; John B. Dunlop, “The Leadership of the Centrist Bloc,” Report on the USSR, 8 February 1991, 4-6; Galina Luchterhandt, “Der ‘zentristische’ Block,” Aktuelle Analysen des BIÖst, no. 46 (1991); and, especially, John B. Dunlop, “The Party and the KGB Dabble in Democracy,” in his important The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, 2nd edn. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 108-111. Later on, Zhirinovskii was at pains to interpret the meaning of his party’s name. One such attempt was to translate “democratic” into “national” or “popular,” and “liberal” into “liberationist.” See Vyacheslav Likhachev, Politicheskii antisemitizm v Rossii (Moskva: Academia, 2003), 28. Thus, his organization would be a party struggling for national liberation of Russia from negative outside influences (“Zionism,” “Southerners,” “American Jewish capital” etc.).

77 Lev Gudkov, “Antisemitizm v postsovetskoi Rossi,” in: Neterpimost’ v Rossi: Starye i novye tobi (Moskva: Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi, 1999), 74, as quoted in Likhachev, Politicheskii antisemitizm v Rossi, 8.

spondents might see Zhirinovskii as a half-Jew or not fully Russian, many of those with a nationalistic outlook, probably, would label him according to his “blood.”

In addition, Zhirinovskii has been involved in numerous televised scandals—such as physically attacking a woman and a fellow ultranationalist in the State Duma—since he came to prominence in December 1993. He has thus not only discredited himself and his party in the eyes of many, though—as recent election and polling results show—by no means all Russians. He has also lost credit he and his followers had in the nationalist mainstream. In an interview in late 1994 already, the leading Russian ultra-nationalist ideologist Aleksandr Prokhanov (introduced below) said: “Zhirinovskii is a very extravagant politician, with very extravagant and unusual political technologies. And his methods and his ideals distress, and in the end they will not pay.”

Some prominent figures in the extreme right, such as the former editor of the prestigious Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military-Historical Journal) Viktor Filatov, to be sure, did seemingly not regard Zhirinovsky’s ancestry or scandalous behaviour as being by itself, or at all a problem, and co-operated or still co-operate with him. However, it seems not too far-fetched a speculation that a majority of Russia’s ultranationalists would regard a Russian president with a Jewish father as undesirable (to say the least), in general, and the rise of Zhirinovskii to such a position as unwelcome, in particular.

Second, the party that came to occupy most of the lunatic fringe section, i.e. the explicitly anti-systemic, counter-cultural, violence-prone, outermost right niche, of the Russian party spectrum in the mid- and late 1990s was the RNE. This party used

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79 The negative PR effect of Zhirinovskii’s antics though has often been over-rated by Western and Russian observers according to whom he, accordingly, should have disappeared from politics long ago. Zhirinovskii has been consciously playing the role of the traditional Russian figure yurodiv (a clown expressing folk wisdom), and explicitly defended his theatrical style as necessary to keep people’s attention. See Martin A. Lee, The Beast Reawakens (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1997), 323-325.
80 Aleksandr Dugin, for instance, has called Zhirinovskii’s electorate “mindless and rootless Lumpen, oligophrenics [and] petty criminals.” As quoted in Oreshkin, “Spor Slavyan.”
prominently (though not exclusively) some barely modified German Nazi symbols, such as the swastika and Roman salute, as well as ideas, such as biological racism. It is true that—as Russian neo-Nazis have argued frequently—no single of the external trappings and ideological traits that make the RNE similar to the NSDAP was by itself unique to Nazism, and some of them can be found in historic Russian nationalism. However, their combination quite obviously was. I shall not go here into the details of the various problems that an as explicitly neo-Nazi profile as the RNE’s would encounter everywhere in the world (including Germany), and did encounter in Russia. It may suffice to say that this particular characteristic predestined the RNE, from its creation, to political isolation, and, arguably, eventual failure. Whereas, for


Thus, it should be noted that racism was already present in the ideology of the pre-revolutionary extreme right. For instance, the infamous Black Hundred—while proclaiming that its ideology was identical with Orthodox Christianity—refused to accept baptized Jews in their ranks. See Anastasiya V. Mitrofanova, Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira” (Moskva: Nauka, 2004), 110. In any way, the Black Hundred has played only a secondary role for the RNE as a role model.

Simonsen reports the following interesting discussion on the RNE with Aleksandr Prokhanov, a leading ideologist of the Russian extreme right (see below): “Late in 1994, in an interview with this writer, Prokhanov said that he ‘sympathized with’ Barkashov and did not in any way distance himself from the content of Barkashov’s ideology. ‘I see [in Barkashov] many political shortcomings, as in a politician who is quite odious and extravagant. I think Barkashov has to overcome some ideological formulas which became inherent in this organization [i.e. the RNE] and became a problem in this organization. If he can be capable of overcoming these problems, then Barkashov will be a quite outstanding politician.’ When asked about which ‘formulas’ Barkashov had to overcome, Prokhanov pointed out that the Russian National Unity leader had borrowed several elements of ideology from German radical nationalism. ‘He should be closer to Russian history,’ Prokhanov said.” Simonsen, “Aleksandr Prokhanov,” 103.

Andreas Umland, “The Pseudo-Threat of Russian Neo-Nazism: Symbolical and Ideological Handicaps of the RNE,” Paper presented at the 33rd Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Arlington, Virginia, 15-18 November 2001. Shenfield, for instance, quotes the Don Cossack Ataman Nikolai Kozistyn as saying that the Don Cossacks (like all Cossack groups—a more or less nationalistic grouping) “will never stand together with those who wear the black uniform of the chasisers.” Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 78. In more general terms, a major comparativist of fascism and specialist on the Russian extreme right aptly observed: “Small groups in various parts of the world continue trying to revive the old Nazism and Fascism, embracing their emblems and slogans and, of course, their ideas and programs. But even if these corpses could be resurrected, they would still be irrelevant to today’s world. Just as Communism in its Leninist-Stalinist incarnation cannot be resurrected, historical fascism cannot have a second coming, either.” Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4.

It is for these reasons that it seems that, in some surveys of the Russian extreme right,
instance, the prominent Russian nativist writer Valentin Rasputin had, in the late 1980s, publicly defended the then prominent, extremely anti-semitic Russian Pamyat group (where Barkashov began his political career), the same Rasputin, in 1993, publicly denounced Barkashov and Russian neo-Nazism—apparently less so because of the substance of its ideology, but because of the symbols it uses.88 When, in autumn 2000, the RNE finally fell apart, one of its major successor organizations, the All-Russian Socio-Political Movement “Russkoe Vozrozhdenie” (Russian Rebirth), demonstratively abandoned the swastika as its emblem.89

Third, the political profile of the KPRF—here seen as a party to fall within the category of ultra-nationalist organizations considered here90—remains fundamentally compromised by ideological inconsistencies stemming from its originally left-wing roots.91 This is in spite of the CPSU’s impregnation with crypto-nationalist ideas already under Stalin,92 and the sophistication of the KPRF’s gradual switch to an increasingly

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90 I have tried to show elsewhere in some detail that Zyuganov’s ideology should be classified as extremely right-wing (though ultra-conservative rather than fascist). See Umland, “Neue ideologische Fusionen im postsowjetischen russischen Antidemokratismus.” For an interpretation that somewhat departs from such labeling, see Robert C. Otto, “Gennadi Ziuganov: The Reluctant Candidate,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 46, no. 5 (1999): 37-47.
explicit right-wing discourse represented by the ever more elaborate russophile ideology developed in the numerous publications of its political leader and major ideologist, Gennadii A. Zyuganov.\textsuperscript{93} Zyuganov's bold, undisguised adoption of the ideas of prominent Russian and European right-wing thinkers, including, for instance, the émigré monarchist political theorist Ivan A. I'llin (1883-1954),\textsuperscript{94} has led him to move

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\textsuperscript{93} E.g. Ivan A. I’llin, \textit{O Rossii} (Moskva: TRITE—Rossiiskii Arkhiv, 1991); idem, \textit{Nashizm, ..., uncondi-}

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the KPRF in a more and more obviously non- and even, implicitly, anti-communist direction. One commentator observed concerning the post-Soviet Russian right's re-discovery of the inter-war Russian nationalist émigré movement of Eurasianism (to be dealt with in more detail below): “While [Aleksandr] Dugin and [Aleksandr] Prokhanov [introduced below—A.U.] have emerged as Eurasianism's main ideologues, the movement's greatest practitioner is Gennadi Zyuganov. Zyuganov has used Eurasianism to reinvent the Communist Party, and he has been fantastically successful in doing so.”

Another observer claimed that not Pravda 5 [Truth 5], the official KPRF organ, but Aleksandr Prokhanov's weekly Den'/Zavtra—also introduced below—"represents the ideology of the communist mainstream." This, notwithstanding, the party has not repudiated its role as the main successor organization of the CPSU. It is thus seen by leading right-wing spokesmen (few women are to be found in this spectrum), and, presumably, a considerable number of

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An important interpretation that, in contrast, emphasizes the clarity of Zyuganov’s agenda as important for his relative success in party-building is Stephen E. Hanson, Ideology, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Anti-System Parties in Postcommunist Russia. Studies in Public Policy Number 289 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1997). Brief summaries of Zyuganov's apocalyptic world view may be found in his articles "Rossija nad bezdnoi," Nash sovremennik, no. 11 (1993): 182-191, and “Rossiya v bor'be tsivilizatsii,” Nash sovremennik, no. 10 (1995): 102-110.


nationalist voters as being responsible for many of Russia’s misfortunes in the 20th century. With reference to Zyuganov’s and others’ merger of ideas derived from Orthodox Christianity with communism Anastasia Mitrofanova has observed:

Orthodox Communists face the [...] complex problem of trying to reconcile Sovietism and Orthodoxy. Having suggested that the Soviet Union inherited the geopolitical mission of Russia they need to reconcile the official Soviet atheistic doctrine with this mission to protect world Orthodoxy. In their attempts to resolve the dilemma, modern communists make the USSR a clandestine “Orthodox kingdom.”

As a result of such curiosities, the KPRF is, correctly or not, perceived by many Russian rightists as not representing a genuinely anti-universalistic party that, moreover, has an ideological heritage going back to the theories of a German half-Jew. At least, as long as the party keeps the attribute “Communist” in its name, it will remain vulnerable not only to liberal, but—what is more important—nationalist critique referring to its Marxist roots, and Soviet past.

A fourth, lesser known, but temporarily important ultra-nationalist group that seemed to be on the rise in the late 1990s, and will play some role below, is the National-Bolshevik Party NBP. In the words of one of its former members, this party had, “in late 1996 until early 1998, [its] period of intellectual and cultural apotheosis. The NBP started to add not only quantitative, but also qualitative strength.” In 2001, Stephen Shenfield argued that the NBP had “demonstrated a pattern of steady growth, with

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99 This vulnerability became relevant in the 1996 presidential campaign when Yel’tsin (though being himself a former CPSU apparatchik) was able to launch a sophisticated negative campaign against the KPRF-leader that referred to Russia’s Soviet past. See Michael McFaul, The 1996 Russian Presidential Elections: The End of Polarized Politics (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).


the result that it is now one of the largest political organizations of fascist orientation in Russia, with a membership estimated to be in the range 6,000 to 7,000.”

The NBP belongs, as the RNE, to the counter-cultural, expressly anti-systemic current in Russian ultra-nationalism, and has been labelled, by a leading Russian expert on Russia’s extreme right, “the party of general extremism.” Nevertheless, the NBP too is still bound to refrain from violating some basic strictures of the political niche it aims to occupy in order to achieve larger support. In other words, in spite of its distinctly novitistic profile, the NBP too has to remain within some basic ideological fixpoints of right-wing extremism in order to gain wider acceptance among nationalist voters.

The NBP faced, in this regard, not only the dilemma that its eccentric leader, the novelist Eduard Limonov, had spent a large part of his adult life, 1974-1991, in the West, been a French citizen, called himself a “European” or “international writer” as well as “of the West” or “non-Russian,” and reflected in his writings Western influences. Limonov has an ambivalent relationship to his own nation, a feeling that expressed itself, as Stephen Shenfield noted, in “diatribes against the weak and

102 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 190.
103 Ibid., 209, 292, and personal communicaton with Likhachev.
106 Ibid., 335.
useless sentimentality of the Russian psyche or ‘soul,’ and against Russians in general, whom he excoriates as masochistic arse-lickers.”108 In a 1998 article for Moscow’s dubious US-American expat weekly The eXile to which Limonov, for a while, regularly contributed, the NBP leader, for instance, wrote:

I feel deep shame to be a Russian, deep shame to drag my fucking Slavic face across the world. To be a Russian in 1998 it is like to admit that you are village idiot, having feeble brains. We Russians, when we decide to be peaceful, instead we demonstrate to the world our super-stupid masochism, because we always overdo things. […] That fucking Russian soul!109

Moreover, before becoming involved in politics, Limonov had described homosexual encounters in the United States in his, perhaps, most infamous autobiographical novel Eto ya - Edichka (It’s me, Eddie).110 One observers even argued that Limonov’s novel had contributed to making male homosexuality—a criminal offence in Russia until 1994—acceptable in society.111 The issue at hand here was, for instance, illustrated in 1992 when Limonov, in an interview for the leading ultra-nationalist weekly Den’ (Day), felt it necessary to defend his writings by way of speaking of himself in the third person:

The journalist Limonov is burdened with the “sins” of all the heroes and anti-heroes of Limonov, and he becomes, simultaneously, a drug-addict, alcoholic, homosexual, Trotskyite, fascist, etc. As I have already told the correspondent of Komsomol’skaya pravda [Truth of the Komsomol; a major Russian daily newspaper—A.U.] […] No, I am not homosexual,

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108 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 206.
and no, I am not addicted to drugs. Thus, please, calm down gentlemen...\textsuperscript{112}

A comment of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn illustrates the dominant view in mainstream Russian nationalist intellectual circles on Limonov: “a little insect who writes pornography.”\textsuperscript{113}

The above-listed characteristics constituted profound discrepancies in the profile of post-Soviet Russia’s ultra-nationalist parties during El’tsin’s presidency. One should, therefore, be cautious to infer from the relative electoral impotence of organized Russian political ultra-nationalism in the 1990s a general lack of prospects for extremely right-wing groupings in Russia’s elections in the new century.


\textsuperscript{113} As quoted in Lee, \textit{The Beast Reawakens}, 313. For an, in contrast, sympathetic assessment by a mainstream Russian nationalist publicist, see V.G. Bondarenko, \textit{Eduard Limonov} (Moskva: Paleya, 1992).
II.2 Some Recent Developments in Russian Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics

Not only was the Russian extreme right inhibited by the above intricacies from the outset. Its political fortunes seemed, after reaching a certain peak in 1993-1995, to be further dwindling in the late 1990s.

First, after the LDPR’s impressive results in the 1993 and 1995 State Duma elections (22.92% and 11.18%),\textsuperscript{114} Zhirinovsky’s electoral support decreased in the 1996 presidential (5.7%) and 1999 State Duma elections (6%). In the 2000 presidential elections, he received with 2.7% the lowest result in federal-level elections so far. In 2001, Shenfield saw the LDPR as “a force in rapid decline.”\textsuperscript{115} Of course, Zhirinovsky’s party made a surprising comeback in the proportional part of the voting for the current State Duma, and received, in the December 2003 parliamentary elections, with 11.45% its second best result in federal-level elections ever. Yet, at the same time, the LDPR also did not win any single-mandate districts in these elections, and remains an isolated faction in the State Duma. In the December 2005 Moscow City Council elections, the LDPR did not manage to pass the 10%-threshold for these elections and will thus not be represented in the most important Russian regional parliament.

Second, the nationalist Agrarian Party that was prominent in post-Soviet Russia’s first parliaments, constituted, for most of its history, \textit{de facto} a front-organization of the KPRF, and received considerable support in the first post-Soviet multi-party parliamentary elections of 1993 (7.9%) has since then become an, at best, second-rate political factor.\textsuperscript{116} It received 3.78% in the 1995 State Duma elections, did not participate in the 1999 elections, and reached only 3.64% in the 2003 State Duma elections.\textsuperscript{117} Moreover, it has recently loosened its ties to the KPRF, and associated itself with the pro-Putin party \textit{Edinaya Rossia} (Unified Russia).

\textsuperscript{115} Shenfield, \textit{Russian Fascism}, 86.
\textsuperscript{116} The Agrarian Party is included in these considerations not as a right-wing extremist force by itself, but as a non-, rather than extremely anti-democratic grouping that could have served as a coalition partner for an ultra-nationalist alliance in the 1990s and beginning of the new century.
Third, the large difference between unpopular Boris El’tsin’s and little-known Vladimir Putin’s outcomes, on the one side, and Zyuganov’s results in the 1996 (second round) and 2000 (first round) presidential elections, on the other, was already then interpreted to signal the fading of a serious anti-liberal alternative in Russia. Since, moreover, the KPRF has been relying heavily on elderly voters, a decline of the party was, by many observers, in spite of some surprising gains in opinion polls in 2001 and 2002, always seen as a matter of time. By 2005, finally, not only are the prospects of the Russian “communist” movement ever reaching federal-level executive power looking increasingly unreal. The survival of the KPRF as a significant political actor is under question. It received, in the December 2003 State Duma elections, 12.65%, i.e. only little more than half of its share of the 1999 elections when it had its best result ever in federal-level parliamentary elections: 24.29%. “The KPRF’s dismal performance in the 2003 election, in which it suffered sizable loss of votes and seats on both halves of the Russian ballot [i.e. its proportional and majoritarian parts], has led many Russia-watchers to [...] expect the communists to slide into a marginal tier on the domestic political scene.” In the opinion of William A. Clark, “the outcome of the 2003 election provides [indeed] some basis for handicapping the future prospects of the KPRF in Russian electoral politics.” While the KPRF remains a party that will, probably, pass the 7%-barrier newly introduced for the proportional voting system of the December 2007 (and all following) State Duma elections, it has, since the height of its popularity in 1996-1999, lost its cloud of being the dominant political organization of Russia.

Fourth, the RNE split in autumn 2000 into several minor organizations. When still unified, the RNE was perceived, at least, by some observers as a significant extra-parliamentary force. This cannot be said of current organized Russian political neo-Nazism, any more. Though the RNE’s split-offs continue to attract considerable atten-

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118 For instance, in a ROMIR poll reported on 30 June 2001, 35% of those asked said they would vote for the KPRF in elections. See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/07/1-rus/rus-030701.html.


121 Ibid., 16.

122 Likhachev, “Chto predstavlyaet soboi Russkoe Natsional’noe Edinstvo kak organizatsiya.”
tion from the press and human rights watch-dogs, they are not any longer recognized as a serious threat like the unified RNE of the 1990s.

Fifth, NBP-leader Limonov spent a considerable period of time in prison for illegal ownership of weapons in 2001-2003. As a result, the NBP was weakened organizationally and in terms of its public image. Since Limonov’s freeing from prison, the natsboly (an abbreviation for natsional-bol’sheviki), have, like the RNE’s remnants, been again attracting interest by the mass media. Yet, in spite or because of the NBP’s frequent presence in newspaper headlines, the party seems to have become further locked in the extra-parliamentary niche of the opposition, and continues to disqualify itself among patriots with its numerous scandalous actions as a serious political player. In contrast to most other Russian ultra-nationalists, Limonov and his party remain in unmitigated opposition to the Putin administration, and are not afraid of engaging in provocative actions against the government. While the natsboly have earned a certain public reputation with their principled stance, they will have, under Putin’s neo-authoritarian regime, difficulties to step outside their current identity as a rabble-rousing youth gang. It seems not unlikely that, sooner or later, the Russian authorities—having already attempted several times to shut down the organization—will take resolute action against Limonov. The natsboly’s recent prominence in the mass media even suggests that they may currently be left untouched as they are playing a certain useful role for the Kremlin by, for instance, discrediting, with their participation, protest actions of other political or civic actors.

Last but not least, one has to mention the new electoral bloc Rodina (Motherland) that was created in 2003, and entered, in December of that year, the State Duma with the surprisingly high result of 9.02%. It also managed to win eight further seats in single-member district elections, and to attract another directly elected independent deputy to its faction—the notorious defender of the Soviet unitary state Viktor Alksnis. While Rodina’s faction, when still unified, did include a number of prominent ultra-nationalists, it remains unclear, as in the case of the KPRF, whether the whole bloc should be categorized as a fully extremist right-wing force. One of its first
leaders, Sergei Glaz’ev, for instance, started his political career as a member of Egor Gaidar’s team of liberal pro-Western reformers in 1992.

Although Rodina’s nationalism was, nevertheless, manifest, and linked in several ways to the “lunatic fringe” of the Russian anti-Western spectrum, the bloc resembled the KPRF in occupying an ambivalent position in the Russian ideological spectrum: It supported the government in a number of ways; it opposed the Putin regime on certain issues; and it constituted an anti-systemic force in some other regards. Moreover, according to the perception of many observers, the Rodina bloc was merely a creature of the Kremlin (i.e. the Presidential Administration) that had been formed to draw votes away from both, the “communists” and the liberals, in the 2003 State Duma elections. It was also perceived as a force unlikely to survive a withdrawal of support from the Kremlin—all the more so as there will be a new 7%-threshold in future State Duma elections. The public conflicts between the three Rodina leaders Dmitrii Rogozin, Sergei Glaz’ev and Sergei Baburin, and their splitting of the bloc into two organizations also did not bode well for this branch of Russian nationalism. In any way, as I am finishing this study, it appears that the bloc might, as a result of new Kremlin machinations, disappear altogether. One of the successor organizations of the original Rodina has become part of a new moderately nationalist and economically leftist Kremlin-creature, the bloc Spravedlivaya Rossiya (Just Russia).

Does this, in conclusion, mean that right-wing extremism is and will remain a minor phenomenon in post-Soviet Russian politics, and that, as a competent Russian observer commented already in summer 2001, “the time of the national-radicals is over”? The glance on the history of ultra-nationalist movements elsewhere cautions against a quick answer.

125 Likhachev, “My i nash diagnoz.”
II.3 Evaluating Declining Ultra-Nationalist Parties:
Some Lessons from German History

For instance, modern German political antisemitism is marked by a fundamental discontinuity—one could say, paradox—in its history that might be suggestive for an evaluation of the recent relative decline of Russian radically nationalist parties. At the end of the 19th century and early 20th century, the young German party system experienced a significant change by the downfall of its most explicitly antisemitic components. Only a few years before, some seemingly vigorous ultra-nationalist parties, founded during the 1870s-1880s, had been on the rise, and, together with the increasingly antisemitic Conservative Party, won a majority in the 1893 Reichstag elections. Also, a multitude of antisemitic literature had been circulating in Germany for more than two decades at this point. Yet, “[t]he electoral fortunes of the antisemitic parties, other than the Conservative Party, declined in the first decade of the twentieth century.” Otto Kulka explains that

the diminishing importance of the antisemitic parties towards the end of the nineteenth century [however] does not indicate a parallel decline underlying their critique of Judaism. Rather it suggests the penetration of this criticism into the ideologies of most of the large political parties at the end of the imperial age and during the Weimar era.

What is even more relevant for the present analysis is that the latter development was, in the words of Daniel Goldhagen, “true not only of political institutions but also of the Tocquevillian substructures of society, the associations that provided the staging ground for people’s political education and activity.” Werner Jochmann writes

129 Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 76.
131 Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 72.
that “a wealth of examples shows how, in the [18]90s, antisemitism infiltrated in this way into every last citizens’ association, penetrating folk clubs and cultural societies.”

For these and some other reasons, Peter Pulzer warns that an emphasis on the overall meagre direct political influence of the German antisemitic parties and their leaders until 1918 would miss the point:

Thirty years of incessant propaganda had been more effective than men thought at the time; antisemitism was no longer disgraceful in wide social and academic circles [...]. Insofar as they had impregnated wide sections of the population with antisemitic ideas, the antisemitic parties had not only succeeded in their object but also worked themselves out of a job.

In the words of Shulamit Volkov, “[w]hat in the [18]70s was created in the heat of passion became in the [18]90s a common place. In the earlier period, antisemitism was preached with true hate; at the end of the century, it became part and parcel of a whole culture.”

Goldhagen, in his otherwise debatable, but on the present issue illuminating study of German popular anti-Semitism, concludes that

the decline of the antisemitic parties was therefore not symptomatic of a decline in antisemitism, for these particular parties had already performed their historic role of moving antisemitism from the street and the beer hall’s Stammtisch into the electoral booth and the seat of parliament, into, in Max Weber’s formulation, the house of power. The antisemitic parties had rendered themselves moot. They could quietly disappear, leaving the political terrain to more potent successors who were fit for the next upsurge in antisemitic expression and activity.

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135 Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 76. Similar phenomena could be observed in other countries and time periods. For instance, a century later, in the 1980s, “[t]he whole spectrum of German politics moved somewhat toward the right […] But this did not help the [right-radical] Republicans; on the contrary, it tended to make them redundant.” Laqueur, Fascism, 114.
It would be misleading to draw far-reaching parallels between the type, salience and radicalness of antisemitism in late Imperial German and post-Soviet Russian society. Nor would it be adequate to claim that exactly the same process of transfer of ultranationalist ideas from waning fringe parties to the political mainstream as well as to civil society sectors is taking place in Russia today. However, this example illustrates that a deterioration of the electoral and organizational performance of right-wing extremist parties cannot, in every case, be seen as an unequivocal indication of a diminishing appeal of their ideas. It also indicates that attention to developments within (un)civil—and not only political—society may assist in drawing a fuller picture of the spread, nature, and radicalism of anti-democratic ideas in a given country.
II.4 Civil Society's Role in Democratic Transition, Consolidation and Breakdown

Not only can declining nationalist parties, in a certain context, create misleading impressions about a population's propensity to support anti-democratic politics. In some recent research, there has also been questioning of the contribution of a strong civil society to the creation and fortification of polyarchies. Whereas a mainstream approach—sometimes called “neo-Tocquevillian” and principally inspired by Robert Putnam’s seminal book *Making Democracy Work*—assumes an important positive effect of civil society on democratization, some dissenting voices have argued that a strong third sector may have only limited relevance for certain attempts to establish polyarchies, or may, in particular circumstances, even contribute to the break-down of unconsolidated polyarchies. For instance, Omar G. Encarión showed in a recent paper that “Spain constructed a viable and very successful new democracy with a notable deficit in civil society development as reflected in the absence of the conditions most conducive to the production of social capital.”136 In as far as Spain constitutes “the paradigmatic case for the study of democratic transitions,”137 and as it has been said that, for Eastern Europe, “the optimistic scenario is to retrace the path of Spain,”138 this finding, if correct, should have significant consequences for our understanding of how polyarchies emerge.

II.4.1 German Vereinswesen in the Weimar Republic

What is even more relevant for the present context is that another paradigmatic case for the comparative study of regime change, namely the fall of the German Weimar Republic in 1930-1934, is marked by the presence and active involvement of a—by both historical and comparative standards—exceptionally varied and thriving voluntary sector.139 As Sheri Berman has noted,

139 Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals of Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar*
in contrast to what neo-Tocquevillian theories would predict, high levels of associationism, absent strong and responsive national government and political parties, served to fragment rather than unite German society. [...] Weimar’s rich associational life provided critical training ground for eventual Nazi cadres and a base from which the National Socialist Workers’ Party (NSDAP) could launch its Machtergreifung (seizure of power). Had German civil society been weaker, the Nazis would never have been able to capture so many citizens for their cause or eviscerate their opponents so swiftly. [...] [T]he NSDAP rose to power, not by attracting alienated, apolitical Germans, but rather by recruiting highly activist individuals and then exploiting their skills and associational affiliations to expand the party’s appeal and consolidate its position as the largest political force in Germany.  

The peculiarity of German civic associations of this time was that, instead of representing indicators for the depth of democratic inclinations within the German population, they grew during periods of strain. When national political institutions and structures proved either unwilling or unable to address their citizens’ needs, many Germans turned away from them and found succour and support in the institutions of civil society instead. [...] This growth of associations during these years did not signal a growth in liberal values or democratic political structures; instead, it reflected and furthered the fragmentation of German political life and the delegitimization of national political institutions.  

A somewhat similar argument has been made for the case of Northern Italy where the post-World War I Fascist movement too emerged from a relatively well-developed network of civil society institutions and only later shifted its main bases of support to the South—thus calling into question Putnam’s famous thesis.

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141 Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” 411, 413.
143 Putnam, Making Democracy Work. One should add though that, while “the fasci original-
These findings indicate that the role that civil society plays in a regime change is conditioned by other circumstances, such as the strength of political institutions, individual characteristics of the relevant non-governmental organizations, as well as the degree of legitimacy of the existing political regime. Berman concludes that, “[p]erhaps, therefore, associationism should be considered a politically neutral multiplier—neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context.”\textsuperscript{144} In a broad survey of civil society’s ambivalent role in democratic consolidation and development focusing on Weimar Germany, the United States and Argentina, Ariel Armony too concludes that “[c]ivil society may or may not lead to democracy because what matters is the context in which people associate, not because association is inherently and universally positive for democracy.”\textsuperscript{145} Bob Edwards and Michael Foley make the generalization that social initiatives depend crucially on a context set jointly by state, market and civil society; and the logic of organization in such initiatives often intermingles legal coercion, authoritative decision making and implementation, political manipulation, economic ends and the voluntary pursuit of group and individual goals. But if this is the case, then it will be very difficult to specify in the abstract just which characteristics of civil society per se [...] contribute to healthy democracy and which do not, because the specific roster of beneficial characteristics would vary cross nationally and over time along with the socioeconomic and political context.\textsuperscript{146}

\section*{II.4.2 Antiliberal Associationism}

A partial solution to the dilemma of the simultaneously democratization-furthering and -inhibiting role that civil society may play can be found in analyses that tried to distinguish between different types of non-state/not-for-profit institutions, i.e. between

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\textsuperscript{144} Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” 427. \\
\textsuperscript{145} Ariel C. Armony, \textit{The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization} (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 2. \\
\end{flushright}
those that have democratic and anti-democratic inclinations. For instance, the most prominent among the rapidly growing organizations within the voluntary sector of the Weimar Republic were the various nationalist associations that became popular after World War I. These nationalist associations are best viewed as “symptoms and agencies of change. They were formed as distinctive organizations within a space which the difficulties and obsolescence of an older mode of dominant-class politics had opened up.” Non-party institutions such as these nationalist associations were not only peculiar in that they came to substitute political parties—a pattern that, since World War II, has become again relevant in, among other countries, Germany. They should also be seen as not representing manifestations of civil society in its traditional meaning, but as constituting “uncivil groups,” or “uncivil organizations.” Thus, as Cas Mudde notes, “statements like ‘an active civil society is good for democracy’ are invalid, as it depends on which groups within civil society dominate.”

Against the background of such circumstances, it is important that, in the words of Neera Chandhoke, “our normative expectations about the sphere of civil society should not derange our analysis of actually existing civil societies.” A similar note of caution has been made by Thomas Carothers in 1999 with regard to the post-Soviet context:

Extrapolating from the courageous role of civil groups that fought communism in Eastern Europe, some civil society enthusiasts have propagated the misleading notion that civil society consists of noble causes,


150 Encarnión, “Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain,” 67-68.


152 Mudde, “Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe: Lessons from the ‘Dark Side,’” 169, italics in the original.

and earnest, well-intentioned actors. Yet civil society everywhere is a bewildering array of the good, the bad, and the outright bizarre.\footnote{Thomas Carothers, “Civil Society,” \textit{Foreign Policy} 117 (Winter 1999-2000): 20, also quoted in Mudde and Kopecký, \textit{Uncivil Society}? VI.}


Leigh Payne shows that “(un)civil movements […] employ the same mobilizational strategies used by social movements within civil society: like social movements they claim to identify and empower a new political constituency, conscious of its identity while struggling to overcome its marginal status in the political system.”\footnote{Payne, \textit{Uncivil Movements}, XIX.} Pedahzur and Weinberg observe that, since the early 1970s, non-party forms of linkages between state and society have become more prominent in general, and argue that not only civil society proper has thus gained importance.\footnote{Pedahzur and Weinberg, “Modern European Democracies and Its Enemies.”} Non-party challengers of democracy, i.e. various permutations of uncivil society, too—whether as substitutes for strong right-wing extremist parties\footnote{Uwe Backes and Cas Mudde, “Germany: Extremism without Successful Parties,” \textit{Parliamentary Affairs} 53, no. 3 (2000): 457-468.} or as complementary players of anti-democratic political actors—have become more relevant in established democracies.

Kopecký and Mudde, in their study on post-communist uncivil society, write that the “normative underpinnings [of the bulk of recent literature on civil society in Eastern Europe] obscure important aspects of the phenomenon and thereby understate the importance of civil society in post-communist politics.” They maintain that their collection’s papers “show that the dominant claim of the weakness of civil society in East-
ern Europe is, in part, a consequence of the narrow bias of most scholars, who disregard the ‘dark side’ of civil society.”

159 Mudde and Kopecký, “Editors’ Preface,” in: idem, Uncivil Society? XVI-XVII, here XVI. I will not go here into discussing the related important and more complicated, but fascinating issue mentioned in the same volume, namely that “‘civil’ movements are not by definition good for democracy/democratization, and ‘uncivil’ movements are not by definition bad for democracy/democratization.” Mudde, “Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe: Lessons from the ‘Dark Side,’” 169. While this might, in and of itself, be true and would seem to constitute a blow against Putnam’s thesis, even Mudde would, perhaps, agree that uncivil society has a (probably, far) larger potential to hinder, inhibit or reverse democracy/democratization, than civil society proper. In any way, the question is too complex to be elaborated here further.
II.5  Electoral vs. Non-Electoral Activities of the Western Extreme Right Today

Already before these theoretical arguments were made, attention to the non-party realm has been called for in empirical research on recent developments in German and other Western ultra-nationalisms.

II.5.1  The Relevance of Post-War Extraparliamentary Ultra-Nationalism

In distinction to Herbert Kitschelt who focused in his path-breaking book on—what he called—the “New Radical Right” in Western Europe of the 1970s-1990s mainly on political parties,\textsuperscript{160} Michael Minkenberg in his subsequent comparative study of right-wing radicalism in post-1968 Germany, France and the US, for instance, considers, apart from parties, a wide variety of groups within uncivil society.\textsuperscript{161} These include intellectual circles, sub-cultural milieus, religious organizations, youth gangs, publishing houses, and other formations. Minkenberg’s attention to these phenomena is not only useful in that it provides the basis for a more adequate assessment of the penetration of right-wing radical ideas into society—especially with regard to those countries that have not experienced as impressive surges of right-wing parties as, for instance, Austria (\textit{Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs}), Italy (\textit{Alleanza Nazionale}), or France (\textit{Front national}). Minkenberg also addresses, more adequately than Kitschelt, the fact that activists espousing such ideas have been using different strategies in promoting their views depending on the particular socio-political contexts, cultural traditions and legal-institutional settings within which they operate, and that party-building is only one of several tactics to gain influence on society.\textsuperscript{162} Minkenberg, for instance, notes that, in the US, certain xenophobic and fundamentalist groups have, instead of forming their own parties, used Republican front organizations to penetrate the state via the GOP.\textsuperscript{163} In Germany, a “New Right” intellectual discourse on nation-

\textsuperscript{160} Herbert Kitschelt in collaboration with Anthony J. McGann, \textit{The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

\textsuperscript{161} Michael Minkenberg, \textit{Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich: USA, Frankreich, Deutschland} (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998).


\textsuperscript{163} See also Michael Minkenberg, \textit{Neokonservatismus und Neue Rechte in den USA: Neuere konservative Gruppierungen und Strömungen im Kontext sozialen und kulturellen...
al history and identity has become influential in public debates. Instead of engaging in party-building, this section of the German radical right has had some success in affecting German political culture in general, and the agendas of the moderate right-wing parties, in particular. The “New Right” has done so, moreover, consciously by way of adopting Antonio Gramsci’s well-known notion of the necessity for an ideological group to achieve first “cultural hegemony” in a society in order to acquire subsequently political power (more on this below). On the territory of the former GDR too, to the surprise of many observers, right-wing radical parties have, with some notable exceptions, not fared well in elections so far. Yet, East German ultra-nationalism has become disturbingly strong on the grass-roots and sub-cultural levels, and, especially, in the youth scene. With regard to the whole transition area east of the former Iron Curtain, Cas Mudde, in his conclusions to a paper collection


167 Alex Demirovic, “Kulturelle Hegemonie von rechts: Antonio Gramsci—gesehen von der ‘nouvelle droite’,” Die neue Gesellschaft: Frankfurter Hefte 37, no. 4 (1990): 352-357; Armin Pfahl-Traughber, “Gramscismus von rechts”: Zur Gramsci Rezeption der Neuen Rechten in Frankreich und Deutschland,” Blick nach rechts, no. 21 (28 September 1992): 3-5. It might be this openly admitted strategy rather than any particular ideological prescription that constitutes the most important common denominator of the various subgroups within—what has become to be called—the “European New Right,” and delineates it from other forms of right-wing extremism.
on uncivil society, even maintains that “[i]n many ways, [...] ‘uncivil movements’ [...] are more authentic representatives of civil society in post-communist Europe. [U]nlike many prominent ‘civil’ organizations in Eastern Europe, which are elite-driven NGOs detached from society, many ‘uncivil’ organizations are true social movements, i.e. involved in grass-roots supported contentions politics.”

II.5.2 The Groupuscule

An important sub-sector of post-war uncivil society—namely the multitude of minuscule and relatively closed ultra-nationalist and often fascist groupings across the world—has, recently, been extensively conceptualized in a heuristically fruitful way by Roger Griffin as “groupuscules.” Distancing himself from approaches that have dismissed this spectrum of small extremist groups as hardly worth studying, Griffin argues that there is a certain sub-category of minor ultra-nationalist groupings that should, in spite of their unimpressive magnitude, be taken seriously as objects of study in their own right. This class would include such Western organizations as the Groupe Union Défense, White Aryan Resistance, or European Liberation Front. These groupings had been labelled as “groupuscules” before, but not been extensively conceptualized until Griffin did so. They have either, after an unsuccessful performance in electoral contests, left high politics, but continued to thrive as parochial associations. Or they were never conceived to become fully-fledged parties in the larger public realm, and constituted, from their inception, relatively clogged organizations serving mainly the small circle of its members and supporters. Although some of these groupuscules call themselves “parties,” they should be understood as belonging, at best, to a diminished sub-type of the generic political party.

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173 The NBP spoke highly, and later apparently became a member of the international network of the European Liberation Front. See Pribylovskii, Russkie natsionalisticheskie i pravoradikal’nye organizatsii, 186-187.
174 On the concept of “diminished sub-type,” David Collier and James Mahoney, “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87 (December 1993): 845-855; and David Collier and Steven Levit-
The term “groupuscule” is being used [...] to refer to a political organization which by the standards of national party politics has minute active membership, and may have an extremely low or non-existent public profile, yet is a fully ripened fruit within its own ideological vineyard. [...] Its diminutive size, marginality, and relative inconspicuousness bestow on it qualities which suit the purposes of its organizers.  

The form of the groupuscule has been chosen for their organization by many extremely right-wing activists in the West, as they had to adapt to an increasingly depoliticized and “de-nationalized” public in the post-World War II context. The groupuscules thus largely define themselves by their “renunciation of any aspirations to create a mass membership base, appeal to a wide political constituency in the general public, or to enter into alliances or compromises with other political actors in the pursuit of maximum influence.” Instead, groupuscules have taken the form of cadre organizations run by small elites of activists, which keep alive the prospect of having an impact on society by remaining open to linkages with kindred spirits on the extreme right and publicizing its existence through effective propaganda directed at the chosen few. [The Internet, moreover] allows the creation of a “virtual community” [...] cocooning its members against contacts with the outside world [...]. [E]ach groupuscule, no matter how small, [can] act as a nodal point in a vast, constantly evolving network of extremist organizations of far greater significance than the sum of its parts: the groupuscular right. [...] [P]erhaps the most important aspect of the groupuscular right for political science lies [thus] in the structure it has come to adopt in order to act not as a single corporate body, but as a network of ideological formation and activist coordination made up of self-contained grouplets. [...] Cumulatively these “groupuscules” can be conceived as constituting a new type of political subculture or actor, the “groupuscular right,” which has an aggregate substance, influ-

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175 Griffin, “From Slime Mould to Rhizome,” 3.
176 Griffin, “From Slime Mould to Rhizome,” 8.
ence, and longevity disproportionate to the size, impact, and stability of any of its components.\textsuperscript{177}

It is thus not useful to consider groupuscules solely as remnants of abortive attempts of party-building. Instead, they should be regarded either as a peculiar sub-sector of uncivil society, or as representing hybrid phenomena fluctuating between political and civil society—the latter, shifting pattern being typical of a number of voluntary sector organizations in modern societies, in general.\textsuperscript{178}

The importance of the individual groupuscule stems not only from being embedded in a larger network of similarly oriented entities, but also—resembling the function of many other civil society organizations—from its potential as a training ground and school for future political activists. The Groupuscule can have a formative impact on the careers of particular individuals in search of grand narratives and total truth by playing a crucial role in transforming ill-defined resentments into a personal sense of higher mission to “do something about it.” In extreme cases the groupuscule has made decisive contributions to turning a disaffected loner into a fanatical “lone wolf” ready to carry out ruthless acts of terrorism at symbols of society’s decadence whatever the cost in human life, as Timothy McVeigh and David Copeland dramatically illustrate.\textsuperscript{179}

For the case of Russia, this category of groupings within the ultra-nationalist spectrum is clearly relevant too (more on this below). It was gaining importance when, in July 2001, a new Law on Parties was adopted. The law required that political parties that wished to register as such with the Justice Ministry had to document, among others, significant organizational capacity across Russia such as an overall membership of at least 10,000, and 100 or more members in more than half of Russia’s 89 regions. As official registration was indispensable to take fully part in high politics, and especially in elections, the high threshold for registration created by the new Law on Parties pushed dozens of political organizations that had regarded themselves as power-seeking organizations into the non-electoral realm where most of those that continued to exist as organized groups have remained locked.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 2, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{178} Diamond, Developing Democracy, 224.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 9.
A second amendment to the law introduced in December 2004 has aggravated the situation for smaller parties further: The minimum membership number for a party to be registered is now 50,000, and, in more than half of the subjects of the Russian Federation, a registered party has to have at least 500 members. In addition, the electoral system has been changed into an exclusively proportional one with an increased threshold of 7%. These regulations add further problems, to say the least, to the political ambitions of leaders of minor parties, including the ultra-nationalist ones.\textsuperscript{180} Adopting a back-stage/groupuscular, rather than front-stage/electoral strategy may thus constitute a pragmatic option for many extremist organizations if they want to continue having, at least, a minor impact in today Russia. Above all, it might be a way to survive organizationally, and remain prepared for situations that would allow them to re-enter high politics.

Already before these reforms of the Russian electoral system were made, the Russian extreme right had experienced groupuscularization. Nikolai Mitrokhin—not yet knowing of Griffin’s conceptualization of the groupuscule—observed in 2003 that, after the defeat of the armed opposition in October 1993,

the marginal nationalists of a racist orientation left big politics for a long time. The disillusionment they had experienced forced them to leave their hope to “find truth” in the political realm. Taking over from the church fundamentalists the rule “save yourself and many will save themselves before you,” they found themselves in the frameworks of church structures—among them in the role of monks and popes. They also started forming rural and urban closed communities of those believing in the same ideas who tried to have as little as possible contacts with the outer world.\textsuperscript{181}

Also in 2003, Markus Mathyl made the first—not entirely successful—attempt to apply the concept of the groupuscule to Russian conditions in an article for \textit{Patterns of Prejudice}.\textsuperscript{182}

Griffin’s concluding remark in his first publication on this issue concerns the Western context, but is, at least, equally relevant for Russia. The groupuscular right

\textsuperscript{181} Mitrokhin, “Ot ‘Pamyati’ k skinkhedam Luzhkova,” 39.
\textsuperscript{182} Mathyl, “The National-Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia.”
is a political force which guarantees that if conditions of profound socio-economic crisis were ever to emerge again in the West’s democratic heartland to make mass support for revolutionary nationalism a realistic possibility, then many countries would have not only the dedicated cadres prepared to lead it, but a plentiful reserve of ideological resources to fuel it.\footnote{183}

II.5.3 The European “New Right”

Another peculiar strategy of extreme nationalists in the post-war period has been that of the above-mentioned so-called European New Right (ENR) which possesses some peculiarities that are both theoretically and empirically relevant within the context of the present study. Here the concept of uncivil society gains an additional dimension in as far as the European New Right, in distinction to other forms of uncivil society, pursues a strategy that, based on self-critical reflection, purposefully attempts to utilize the infrastructure of a polyarchy’s civil society in order to attack and eventually undermine a democratically oriented polity. Research on this specific approach has so far been mainly done concerning contemporary Western Europe. But, as in the case of the groupuscular right, the issue is, for reasons that will become clear below, at least as relevant for contemporary Russia.

The novel ultra-nationalist intellectual movement that, in Germany, became known as the “\textit{Neue Rechte}” (“New Right”) has not only—like the groupuscles—for reasons of tactical expediency refrained from direct involvement in party-building and everyday politics. It has followed this course consciously, on the grounds of a specific long-term strategy briefly mentioned in the above review of Minkenberg’s book. This strategy can be termed as “right-wing Gramscianism,” and is also a relevant phenomenon in contemporary Russia. It will, therefore, explained here in some detail.

The forerunner of the contemporary New Right discourse in Germany, and Europe in general, was a diffuse group of anti-democratic publicists, writers and scholars in inter-war Germany that has become known by its oxymoronic name “Conservative Revolution.”\footnote{184} This tendency included, among others, such prominent publicists and

\footnote{183} Griffin, “Net Gains and GUD Reactions,” 46.
\footnote{184} For a short critique of “New Right” and “Conservative Revolution” as political science concepts, see Andreas Umland, “Review of Pfahl-Traughber, \textit{Konservative Revolution und Neue Rechte},” \textit{Politische Vierteljahresschrift} 41, no. 2 (2000): 12-13, and idem, “‘Konservativnaya revolyutsiya’: imya sobstvennoe ili rodovoe ponyatie?” \textit{Voprosy filosofii},
academics Ernst Jünger, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Edgar Julius Jung, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler, Othmar Spann, and Ernst Niekisch (see Appendix).\textsuperscript{185} These influential intellectuals were in radical opposition to liberalism in general, and to the Weimar Republic, in particular, but remained largely outside everyday party politics (though some, like Jung, also took up political appointments, at one time or another). Their goal was an ideational subversion of the normative foundations of the Weimar Republic that would lead to its delegitimization, a democratic break-down, and the subsequent creation of a new post-liberal nationalistic order.\textsuperscript{186} According to some observers, that is exactly what the “conservative revolutionaries” achieved. In 1939, the Russian historian and publicist Georgii Fedotov, for instance, wrote that it was not the “rise of the masses,” as had been often assumed, but the rebellion of the intellectual elites that stroke the fatal blow to humanism in the inter-war period.\textsuperscript{187}

These ideas and tactics have been revitalized in Europe since the late 1960s, at first in France where a vigorous new intellectual movement describing itself as the \textit{Nouvelle Droite}, and led by the influential proto-fascist publicist Alain de Benoist (b. 1943) emerged. Many of the New Right’s spokesmen are graduates of prestigious \textit{grand écoles}.\textsuperscript{188} The \textit{Nouvelle Droite} is, perhaps, less novel in terms of its peculiar ideology as this body of ideas constitutes largely an adaptation of German “Conservative Revolutionary,” “National-Bolshevik,” “Third Way,” Euro-fascist as well as other older extremely right-wing theories to contemporary West European conditions.\textsuperscript{189} Instead, the French, and later other European sections of the, New Right


\textsuperscript{186} Stefan Breuer, \textit{Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution} (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993).


\textsuperscript{188} Laqueur, \textit{Fascism}, 99.

\textsuperscript{189} For a comprehensive presentation of the various permutations of fascist ideology, see Roger D. Griffin, ed., \textit{Fascism} (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995). Though one might see the “New Right’s” eager incorporation of some recent (pseudo-) scientific findings in their theories as representing another significant advance distinguishing it from the “Conservative Revolution.” See Iris Weber, “Wissenschaftliche Grundlagen:’ Soziobiologie, Verhaltensforschung und Psychologie,” in her \textit{Nation, Staat und Elite: Die Ideologie der Neuen Rechten}. PapyRossa Hochschulschriften, 15\textsuperscript{th} Vol. (Koeln: PapyRossa-Verlag
innovated intellectual right-wing extremism by, above all, explicitly introducing the idea that a gradual right-wing cultural change is a necessary preliminary stage for achieving political power. In a first step, “cultural hegemony” would have to be secured and civil society impregnated with right-wing ideas. Only then an attempt to attain actual power over the state would have a chance of success.

This strategy was by itself not original as the inter-war German “Conservative Revolutionaries” had, intuitively, been following a similar approach. What still was an innovation in the late 1960s was, firstly, that a “cultural struggle strategy” was overtly adopted as an official key prescription for action, and even as a marker of identity by, initially, the French, and later, most of the West European, including the German, New Right.\textsuperscript{190} Second, this was done with unashamed reference to the ideas of the Italian Communist Party’s co-founder, one-time General Secretary, and principal theoretician Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937).\textsuperscript{191} According to Gramsci, the power of the state in developed societies is based on not only its institutions, but also or even more so on its “società civile”—i.e. on the norms, attitudes, as well as thought and emotional patterns which are transmitted by the “cultural complex” (schools, universities, mass media, etc.), and which legitimize the current power relations. A movement that wants to take political power would, therefore, first have to acquire dominance over the ruling concepts of the cultural super-structure. As a result of adopting this approach, the \textit{Nouvelle Droite} has come to conceive of itself, quite literally, as a “school of thought” that aims to change the existing mentalities and norms in order to create the preconditions for political change.\textsuperscript{192}

This peculiar feature of the New Right highlights the importance of cultural complexes and civil society as constituent parts of research into contemporary European right-wing extremism. If this branch of ultra-nationalism explicitly announces that it regards not (yet) the state, but civil society—and, only in the second instance, political society—as its primary medium for inducing change, than it would, for an exhaustive evaluation of the strength of right-wing extremist tendencies, be of interest to see how sophisticated, industrious, and successful the New Right has been in doing so,

\textsuperscript{190} Pfahl-Traughber, \textit{Konservative Revolution und Neue Rechte}, 132-134.


\textsuperscript{192} Weber, \textit{Nation, Staat und Elite}, 32.
and not only to measure the extreme right’s electoral performance.

This is apt not only in terms of the New Right’s own perception of its role in a certain socio-political system. It is also relevant in view of Western social science findings concerning the role of non-party social institutions for sustaining certain political systems. There seems to be considerable overlap between Gramsci’s idea of the relevance of the support of “cultural complexes” for regimes, and the Tocquevillian emphasis on a thriving civil society as the foundation of stable democracy as proposed, for instance, in Robert Putnam’s work\textsuperscript{193}—or, at least, in culturalist interpretations of its findings.\textsuperscript{194} In other words: The strength of uncivil society—i.e. of social actors latently or manifestly opposed to democracy, but not operating in the party-political realm—might be as important for an evaluation of the chances for a successful consolidation of a young polyarchy as the strength of civil society proper.


III Ultra-Nationalist Intellectual Centres in Contemporary Russia

"Nothing is so popular in Russia today as disliking America."


III.1 Other Manifestations of Uncivil Society in Contemporary Russia

There are a number of further phenomena in Russian uncivil society that would be also worth considering in connection with the argument of this study. These include, among others:

(a) the infiltration of established civil society institutions, such as the trade union movement, with anti-democratic ideas of various kinds,\footnote{Vladimir Marakasov, “Cherepovetskii poligon,” in: Vladimir Ilyushenko, ed., Nuzhen li Gitler Rossii?: Po materialam Mezhdunarodnogo foruma “Fashizm v totalitarnom i posttotalitarnom obschestve: ideynye osnovy, sotsial’naya baza, politicheskaya aktivnost’,” Moskva, 20-22 yanvarya 1995 goda (Moskva: PIK, 1996), 60-62; Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 142-143. On the NBP’s influence on the “independent” students’ trade union Sashchita, see Mathyl, “Die offenkundige Nisse und der rassenmäßige Feind”,}
(b) the emergence of a number of new volunteer, grass-roots and self-help organizations, such as various ecological groups, anti-drug initiatives, or child-support organizations,\(^{198}\) that—in spite of owing their existence to liberal democracy—do not promote, or even explicitly reject its normative foundations,\(^{199}\)

(c) certain tendencies in the Russian Christian-Orthodox churches, especially within the Moscow Patriarchy,\(^{200}\)

(d) many of the new or revived Russian Orthodox brotherhoods,\(^{201}\)

(e) the ultra-nationalist sections of the neo-pagan movement,\(^{202}\)

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(f) a large part of the Cossack movement containing some primary examples of, in Payne’s terms, “uncivil movements,”

(g) the ultra-nationalist hard-rock and punk scene,

(h) the fast growing skinhead movement,


(i) various newspaper, magazines, and publishing houses with a distinctly anti-Western profile, like Paleya or Russkaya ideia, as well as their book series, like Yauza Publishers’ series Russkii revansh (Russian Revanch) or Put’ Rossii (Russia’s Path), in which, among others, the above mentioned Kucherenko-Kalashnikov and Dugin have published their books.

(j) a number of more or less nationalist TV shows, like Moskoviya Channel’s weekly program Russkii vzyglyad (Russian View) moderated by the popular anchorman Ivan Demidov.

(k) the multitude of ultra-nationalist World Wide Web sites.

(l) ultra-nationalist tendencies in visual arts;

(m) the, under both the Czarist and Soviet rule, important nationalist literary scene with its well-known “thick journals,” and

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206 E.g. Mikhail Nazarov, Zhit’ bez strakha iyudeiska! O prichinakh, tselyakh i pervykh rezul’tatakh “Pisma 500-5000-15000” (Moskva: Russaya ideya, 2005).

207 Kalashnikov, Vpered, v SSR-2; Dugin, Proekt “Evraziya.” Yauza Press has been cooperating with the large Russian publisher Eksmo-Press (www.eksmo.ru) which had to apologize for Yauza’s publications (see URL [last accessed October 2006]: http://resheto.ru/speaking/news/news696.php), but apparently continues to cooperate with Yauza.


a number of organizations calling themselves “parties” that should, however, be conceptualized as hybrids between proper political parties, on the one side, and groupuscules (as introduced above) on the other, including the RNE, and NBP and that thus fulfil both functions in this political spectrum (with the groupuscular one often being the more, or even only important aspect of their activities), as well as some further groupings constituting proper groupuscules (as defined above) that do not fall into any of the other categories listed here.

These certainly significant phenomena are largely ignored here not only in view of lack of space, but also because they have, partly, been subject to scholarly scrutiny before. In a number of cases, already considerable research has been done on these phenomena. That seems to be less the case with regard to the intellectual centres, in general, and their institution-building, networking and propaganda efforts, in particular. The overview of some activities in the latter realm below is meant to complement previous content analyses and interpretations of the publications of these centres, and to suggest stronger attention to the issue of how industrious, successful and influential organizations they actually constitute (and not only what their ideas are about), in future research.

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214 Perhaps, some of the well-researched various Pamyat’ groups, as well as their successor organizations would, apart from a number of other similar groupings such as the Right-Radical Party of Sergey Zharkov, fall in this category. Brief English-language surveys that list further putative groupuscules are Alexander Verkhovsky, “Ultra-Nationalists in Russia at the Onset of Putin’s Rule,” *Nationalities Papers* 28, no. 4 (2000): 707-726; Vyacheslav Likhachyov, “Nationalist Radicals in Contemporary Russia: Ideology, Activities, and Relationship to the Authorities,” in: T. Lokshina, ed., *Nationalism, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Contemporary Russia*. Transl. by MBS Intellect Services Inc. (Moskva: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2002), 259-281.

215 The prominent Russian ultra-nationalist publicist Aleksandr Sevast’yanov once correctly identified a reason for paying attention to intellectuals and think-tanks: “The practice has shown that our common adversaries are not so much afraid of nationalists in boots and black blouses […]. A nationalist with a bowtie—a scholar, a writer, a banker, a top-administrator, a lawyer—horrifies them.” See *NDPR—partiya russkogo naroda* (Moskva:
III.2 Post-Soviet Right-Wing Think Tanks

There have been several networks of nationalist intellectuals in post-war Soviet Russia within the dissident scene, and around the semi-official “thick-journals.” Some articles and books published in these frameworks gained relevance for the formulation of the programs of the newly emerging nationalist parties in Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, eventually many writings of the Soviet-era publicists and novelists became outdated when the Russian political system and society transmuted ever more deeply. Although most of the important Soviet “thick journals” kept and keep appearing, some new initiatives by often, until then, unknown intellectuals have since 1990 gained prominence. Among these more recent institutions are:

- Aleksandr Podberezkin’s Center for International and Strategic Research, publishing company RAU-korporatsiya (Russian-American University Corporation), and Foundation/Movement Dukhovnoe nasledie (Spiritual Heritage; perhaps, the most important set of institutions in this list),

- Yevgenii Troitsky’s Association for the Complex Study of the Russian Nation,

- Sergeii Shatokhin’s and Yevgenii Morozov’s International Institute of Geopolitics,

Natsional’naya gazeta, 2005), 63, as quoted in Mitrofanova, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy*, 119. It might be also worth adding that Anders Uhlin has found that not only “[t]he level of education among the interviewed civil society elites [in Russia and the Baltics] is impressively high,” but that it is highest (89% with higher education) among the leaders of those NGOs which have an ethnic or nationalist orientation. Uhlin, *Post-Soviet Civil Society*, 67. Another important finding in this context would be that local elites in Russia are “quite elitist in their orientation.” *Ibid.*, 159.

216 Brudny, *Reinventing Russia*.
the Moscow Historical-Political Center attached to the ultra-nationalist party *Russkii obshchenatsional'nyi soyuz* (Russian All-National Union).  

- General-Major Konstantin Petrov’s so-called Popular Movement “K bogoderzhaviyu” (Towards God’s Rule), or *Kontseptual’naya partiya “Edinenie”* (Conceptual Party “Unification”), and its Academy of Management,  

- General Leonid Ivashov’s *Akademiya geopoliticheskikh problem* (Academy of Geopolitical Problems) and its affiliated Center for Ethnopolitical and Islamic Studies led by Den’ga Khalidov,  

- Igor Dëmin’s Orthodox-Monarchic Analytical Center “Al’fa & Omega,”

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221 Mitrofanova, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy*, 162.  
- Gen.(ret.) Leonid Shershnev’s Fond natsional’noi i mezhdunarodnoi bezopastnosti (Foundation for National and International Security) and its bimonthly bulletin Bezopastnost’ (Security), 224
- the Analytical Center NAMAKON—Nezavisimoe agentstvo, marketing i konsalting (Independent Agency, Marketing and Consulting), 225
- Mikhail Leont’ev’s (see below) Serafimovskii klub (Serafim Club), 226 and
- Arkadii Maler’s Vizantiiskii-evraziiskii klub “Katekhon” (Byzantine-Eurasianist Club “Katekhon”) or simply Byzantine Club founded in 1999 at Moscow’s Institute of Philosophy, and the Philosophical and Political Center Severnyi Katekhon (Northern Katekhon). 227

These centres are not only peculiar for their relative novelty. They are also distinct for being under-researched so far—an omission that, especially with regard to Podberozkin’s influential Foundation/Movement Dukhovnoe nasledie and productive publishing house RAU-Korporatsiya, 228 constitutes an unfortunate state of affairs. 229

228 For some basic information, see Oksana Antonenko, New Russian Analytical Centers and their Role in Political Decisionmaking (Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996).
229 A leading specialist in the field has recently aptly noted that, in general, “English-language scholarly sources on fascist tendencies and movements in post-Soviet Russia are meager.” Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 299.
III.3 Sergei Kurginyan’s ETTs

Among the first of the new intellectual centres that did, in contrast, attract some attention by scholars was the International Foundation Eksperimental’nyi tvorcheskii tsentr ETTs (Experimental Creative Center) established, in February 1989, by the USSR Council of Ministers. The ETTs was headed by Sergei Ervandovich Kurginyan (b. 1949)—geophysicist, Candidate of Physical-Mathematical Sciences, former research fellow of the Moscow Oceanology Institute and Geological Institute, certified theatre director, one-time advisor to CPSU Moscow organization head Yuri Prokof’ev, and 1990 Patriotic Bloc candidate.230 In 1989-1991, the Center represented “the most serious attempt to revise official ideology into a nationalist creed.”231 Russian journalists described the ETTs as “the think tank of the [ultra-conservative] deputy group ‘Soyuz’ in the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies,232 and Kurginyan as the “mysterious advisor for the Kremlin leaders”233 as well as “the last mystical hope of the neo-Bolsheviks, saviour of the CPSU, [and] theoretician of communism as a new religion.”234 Ignatow called him “a kind of post-communist Cagliostro.”235 John Dunlop observed that

Kurginyan has been assailed by Russian “democrats” as “a political shaman,” “a charlatan,” and “the new Rasputin.” Yet despite such often-expressed contempt for Kurginyan, the “democrats” could scarcely deny the extraordinary influence that he exerted on Russian and Soviet politics during the period from 1989 through 1991. Among those he reportedly counselled were the Soviet president Gorbachev, two Soviet prime-ministers—Nikolai Ryzhkov and Valentin Pavlov—Ivan Polozkov, head

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231 Brudny, Reinventing Russia, 252.
233 As quoted in Alexander Yanov, Weimar Russia—And What We Can Do About It (New York: Slovo-Word, n.d.), 274.
234 As quoted in Kurginyan, Sed’moi stsenarii, 6.
of the Russian Communist party, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB.\textsuperscript{236}

In October 1990 and February 1991, the Ryzhkov and Pavlov governments respectively issued decrees granting ETTs international status as well as broad prerogatives at home, and directing the USSR Ministries of Défense and Internal Affairs. The KGB was ordered to assign to the Center high-ranking officers from their active reserve.\textsuperscript{237} The think-tank had, according to one source, in 1991, a yearly budget of approximately seventy million roubles, and about 2,000 employees among whom there were, apart from up to one hundred political analysts,\textsuperscript{238} “mainly programmers, physicists, biologists, and constructors.”\textsuperscript{239}

The Center apparently reached the peak of its political influence in the late summer and fall of 1990 in connection with the discussion, in the USSR’s leadership, of Grigory Yavlinsky’s and Stanislav Shatalin’s “500 days” plan of transition to a market economy. According to Dunlop, in August-September 1990, Kurginyan’s Center advised Prime Minister Ryzhkov in his resistance against the adoption and implementation of the “500 days” plan. The authors of this plan were described by Kurginyan, at a brainstorming session of the USSR Council of Ministers, as objectively acting as “agents of [Western] imperialism.”\textsuperscript{240}

In late 1990, ETTs presented its own vision for the Soviet Union’s post-communist future—and it was telling that the pamphlet of Kurginyan’s Center was titled \textit{Postperestroika}.\textsuperscript{241} Subsequently, ETTs developed geopolitical models, reform programs, and schemes for the fight against increasing crime. Among other things, it published a draft proposal for a new CPSU platform in July 1991, and contributed to the economics section of the program of the ultra-nationalist National-Republican Party of Russia of Nikolai Lysenko. Later, Kurginyan created special appendices for the spread of ETTs’s ideas: in 1992, the Inter-Regional Club “Postperestroika,” and, in 1994, the elite club “Soderzhatel’noe edinstvo” (Substantive Unity) that included

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{236} Dunlop, \textit{The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire}, 165.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 166.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Kurginyan, \textit{Sed’miy stsenarii}, 116.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Yanov, \textit{Weimar Russia}, 274.
\item \textsuperscript{240} As quoted in Dunlop, \textit{The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire}, 166.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
among its more than hundred members such prominent figures as Valerii Zorkin, Oleg Shenin, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Nikolai Ryzhkov, and Aleksandr Sokolov. Since 1993, Kurginyan’s ETTs has been publishing, apart from books and brochures, the high-brow journal Rossiya XXI (Russia in the 21st Century) with contributions from a variety of, mainly, nationalist authors including the prominent publicist Ksenya Mya-lo.

The basic idea of Kurginyan’s grouping, in the early 1990s, seemed to be that the world is divided into individualistic and collectivistic civilizations with Russia belonging to the latter type. The Communist Party would need to ally itself with the Orthodox Church, re-centralize the state, lead the country on a developmental path modelled on the Japanese or Chinese examples, create a “religion of science,” and reject the introduction of Western institutions enslaving the USSR to Western economies. Kurginyan wanted, as he announced in 1991, to make his contribution to this process by way of “creating an alternative national elite.” Some noteworthy peculiarities in Kurginyan’s approach have been his gloomy warnings about the possibility of a fascistization of Russia, his radical critique of Dugin (see below), and his negative attitude towards Germany—a country that, at least, in the 1990s, was seen as the preferred partner for Russia by most Russian nationalists, whether moderate or extreme.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Kurginyan’s Center constituted the most significant clearly nationalist think-tank, and publishing house (along with the older “thick journals”). However, while Kurginyan still occasionally appears in the media, ETTs has,

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243 E.g. Sergey Kurginyan, Rossiya: Vlast’ i oppositsiya (Moskva: ETTs, 1993).
244 Ivanov, Rußland nach Gorbatschow, 349-350.
245 Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, 167-169; Brudny, Reinventing Russia, 253-254.
246 As quoted in Yanov, Weimar Russia, 274.
247 One should not be misled by such a stance of Kurginyan as his ideas can be interpreted as being close to proto-fascism themselves. See A. James Gregor, “Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 1 (1998): 1-15.
249 Yanov, Weimar Russia, 273, 296.
since the early 1990s, lost its nimbus among Moscow’s elite and impact on Russian politics.
III.4 The Role of Aleksandr Prokhanov

A more steadily influential institution on the far right fringe among the new think-tanks, throughout the 1990s, was the Analytical Center of the most important post-Soviet ultra-nationalist weekly Den’ (The Day) which was founded in November 1990, and later re-named into Zavtra (Tomorrow). The weekly also called itself “Organ of the Spiritual Opposition” and “A Newspaper of the State of Russia.” It has since its creation been edited by the well-known journalist and novelist, and one-time rocketry engineer, forester, KGB agent, Asia-Africa correspondent of the high-brow weekly Literaturnaya gazeta (Literature newspaper), and secretary of the RSFSR Writer’s Union Aleksandr Andreevich Prokhanov (b. 1938). Prokhanov is a writer, editor and ideologist of the Russian extreme right who has attracted considerable Western attention, and does thus not need a detailed introduction here. For his previous glorification of the Soviet Afghanistan adventure, and general militarism Prokhanov was labelled the “nightingale of the [Army] General Staff,” and has been compared to Rudyard Kipling. In the mid-1980s, he “came under increasing fire from literary critics for the crude militarism and lacking literary qualities of his writings.” Igor’ Klyamkin noted already in mid-1988 the growing political influence of the writer.

Prokhanov’s core ideas are summarized in his programmatic essay “The Ideology of Survival” published in 1990. There Prokhanov claims that, in 1942 (when the Nazis stood at the gates of Moscow and the Comintern broke down), the Communist Party

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250 The recent issues of this most important weekly of the extreme Right may be found at URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.zavtra.ru/.
254 As quoted in Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, 169.
255 Allensworth, The Russian Question, 245; Pribylovskii, Vozhd, 84.
257 Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, 171. See also Allensworth, The Russian Question, 246.
became the party of the people.\textsuperscript{259} This essay illustrates a trend in parts of the Russian extreme right in showing the ambivalent relationship of many ultra-nationalists to Russia’s Soviet past. On the one hand, original Bolshevism (in some instances including Lenin) is rejected, and often equated with the post-Soviet democrats (who, in turn, are frequently portrayed as “criminals”). On the other hand, the “achievements” (sometimes including the purges) of Stalin who, though being Georgian, is seen as a Russian national hero, rather than an Old Bolshevik, are greatly appreciated.\textsuperscript{260} In Mitrofanova’s words, “Aleksandr Prokhanov simply equates ‘anti-liberal,’ ‘Soviet’ and ‘Orthodox.’ For him not only Kim Jong Il and [Slobodan] Milosevic are [Christian] Orthodox, but also Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat and even European nationalists Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jörg Haider.”\textsuperscript{261}

With the gradual break-up of the Soviet Union in 1990-91, Prokhanov’s major focus of activity switched from that of a writer, to that of an editor for, and organizer of, the extreme right. This process eventually led to the regular publication of his weekly *Den’* from January 1991 onwards, and the gathering of a distinguished circle of ultranationalist analysts as the newspaper’s regular contributors. Among the Analytical Centre’s aims were and are to introduce via *Den’/Zavtra* to nationalist intellectuals new trends in Russian and foreign right-wing thought, and to analyze the current power structures as well as to provide interpretations of their activities from a “patriotic” point of view.\textsuperscript{262} Mitrofanova writes that “[i]n many aspects, *Zavtra* is an ‘anti-newspaper.’ It publishes no fresh or exclusive information: only interpretations and explanations of current events.”\textsuperscript{263}

Prokhanov’s aim, in particular, was and is to use the newspaper *Den’/Zavtra* to bring together various brands of Russian ultra-nationalism, and induce their coordination and unification. Prokhanov has been a driving force behind various broad alliances of, and ideological innovations—including the spread of Eurasianism—in, the Russian extreme right.\textsuperscript{264} He became “the far Right’s unofficial minister of propaganda.”\textsuperscript{265} *Den’/Zavtra* included, at one point or another, most major Russian opposition figures of the 1990s (with the notable exceptions of Zhirinovsky, Barkashov and Li-

\textsuperscript{259} Simonsen, “Aleksandr Prokhanov,” 100.
\textsuperscript{260} For a succinct summary of Prokhanov’s article see Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, 172-174.
\textsuperscript{261} Mitrovanova, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy*, 63.
\textsuperscript{262} Ivanov, *Rußland nach Gorbatschow*, 350-351.
\textsuperscript{263} Mitrofanova, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy*, 109.
\textsuperscript{264} Verkhovskii, Papp and Pribylovskii, *Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii*, 284-286.
\textsuperscript{265} Laqueur, *Fascism*, 192.
monov) on its editorial board, including Dugin and Zyuganov. Victor Yasmann reported in 1993 that Prokhanov had secured contributions to Den’ by “the former rector of Moscow State University, the director of the thermo-nuclear centre in Protvino, academician Anatolii Logunov, and the director of the Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Gennadii Osipov.” In mid-1994, Prokhanov claimed that his newspaper was influencing Moscow’s elite groups and becoming a factor in the formation of post-Soviet ideology. According to Michael Specter, “[p]erhaps more than any man in Russia, [Prokhanov] helped for […] the powerful alliance of Communists and nationalist groups that [made] Gennady A. Zyuganov […] the main challenger for the Russian presidency [in 1996].” In Wayne Allensworth’s words,

Prokhanov has engineered the various concrete forms the [communist-nationalist] coalition has taken since the collapse of the Soviet Union (the National Salvation Front and the People’s Patriotic Union that backed Zyuganov’s 1996 presidential candidacy, for example). The founder of the most influential nationalist publication in Russia has worked diligently to promote opposition unity and is perhaps the only nationalist figure who has remained on good terms with his comrades across the political spectrum.

In 1994, Prokhanov had announced: “I limit my activities to the publication of a newspaper and the creation of ideological and propagandistic fields and energy.” However, having indeed devoted most of his energies to editorial and organizational work for the extreme right during the 1990s, Prokhanov, in 2001, made himself again widely known as a notable ultra-nationalist writer in his own right. He published, under the imprint of the respected Moscow press Ad Marginem, a best-selling political novel called Gospodin Geksogen (Mr. Hexogen) fictionalizing the 1999 apartment-block bombings in Moscow and other cities. In May 2002, the notorious book won him

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266 Pribylovskii, Vozhdi, 84-85.
270 Allensworth, The Russian Question, 261.
the prestigious 2001 National Bestseller Prize.\textsuperscript{273} Prokhanov promptly donated the $10,000 prize-money to the defence of \textit{NBP}-leader Eduard Limonov who was then awaiting his trial on charges of illegal arms ownership and attempting to overthrow the constitutional order.\textsuperscript{274}


III.5 The Dugin Phenomenon

“Time has come for Russia to find a clear-cut ideology, as well as a tough and understandable line in both, domestic and foreign affairs.”

Aleksandr Dugin

One of Den’/Zavtra’s Analytical Centre’s most prolific early contributors, erudite theorists, and industrious publicists has been the mysticist Aleksandr Gel’evich Dugin (b. 1962). Dugin became first known in Russian ultra-nationalist circles through his publications in Den’/Zavtra’s in 1991-1992. In Alexander Yanov’s words, “having nearly monopolized the central periodical of the opposition, Den’, Dugin was [in mid-1992] halfway to elbowing [Sergey] Kurginyan out of the opposition’s intellectual leadership.” Later on, he edited the weekly’s sections Vtorzhenie: national-bol’shevistskaya territoriya (Invasion: The National-Bolshevik Territory) and Evraziiskoje vtorzhenie (Eurasian Invasion).

He seems to have had considerable influence, not the least, on Prokhanov himself: The latter reproduced a core idea of Dugin’s early manifesto “The War of the Continents” (1991-1992) published first in Den’, namely the idea of a confrontation between a pro-Western KGB and Russian patriotic GRU, in the above-mentioned 2001 novel Gospodin Geksogen. Dugin, in turn, had been earlier influenced by older

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275 See also, Umland, “Formirovanie fashistskogo ‘neoevraziiskogo’ intellektual’nogo dvizheniya v Rossii.” The most important autobiographic text by Dugin on his intellectual formation and entry into Russian politics, which will be quoted below and has only recently become available, is: Aleksandr Dugin, “Pravye lyudi—sovremennye pravye: Dugin Aleksandr Gel’evich (r. 1962),” Pravya.ru, 22 February 2006, URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.pravaya.ru/ludi/451/6742. I am grateful to Prof. John Dunlop for bringing this revealing interview to my attention.

276 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 27th January 2005.


278 Yanov, Weimar Russia, 279.


280 Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 92-93.
writings of Prokhanov, as documented by the various references to Prokhanov in “The War of the Continents.”\textsuperscript{281}

In spite of Dugin’s, already in the early 1990s, notable publicistic successes within the far right, the study of the ideas, entourage and activities of this non-conformist writer has, until recently, been seen as the domain of an exclusive group of students of Russian sub-cultures, lunatic fringe politics, and occultism with a taste for the bizarre.\textsuperscript{282} However, the establishment, in 2001, of the Socio-Political Movement “Eurasia,” that will be described below, under Dugin’s leadership represents merely the latest peak in a chain of consequential initiatives by him throughout the 1990s. Perhaps, counter-intuitively to many observers of Russia, the content, spread and reception of Dugin’s quixotic ideas had, already in the 1990s, become relevant for an adequate assessment of mainstream Russian political, social and cultural trends too.\textsuperscript{283}

### III.5.1 Dugin’s World View

Dugin’s numerous writings have become the subject of several content analyses.\textsuperscript{284} Although Dugin has, especially recently, tried to present his agenda as a variety of, or, even, as mainstream, “Eurasianism” or “neo-Eurasianism” (a tendency to be scrutinized below),\textsuperscript{285} his ideas constitute not only and not so much permutations of these

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\textsuperscript{281} Dugin, \textit{Konspirologiya}, 115.

\textsuperscript{282} This is, to be sure, not a problem peculiar to contemporary Russian studies. As Roger Griffin mentions in his introduction to the groupuscules right: “Scholarship of this type [i.e. research into groupuscules] requires a passion for the recondite, the arabesque and the Byzantine which is not part of the staple qualities of the university-trained political scientist.” Griffin, “From Slime Mould to Rhizome,” 4.


schools of thought. Rather, as will be detailed below, Dugin’s views are comparable to the German inter-war “Conservative Revolution,” and owe much to various international schools of geopolitical, proto-fascist and conspiriological thought including, for instance, Julius Evola or Jean Parvulesco as well as to the post-1968 West European “New Right.”

In the words of one observer, Dugin’s theories are a “delirious combination of [Lev] Gumilëv [see below—A.U.], [Vladimir] Solovëv, [Friedrich] Nietzsche and theorists of fascism, contemporary and historical.” In addition, there is an influence of mystical and occultist theories and writings like those of Hermann Wirth, Gustav Meyrink and Aleister Crowley reflecting a generally high interest in esotericism in post-Soviet Russia. Walter Laqueur has observed that “[i]f the Ariosophists of Germany and Austria had a presence in the early days of Nazism (until Hitler purged them), the purveyors of occultism have assumed an even greater role in the genesis of Russian fascism and the extreme Right.”

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289 Laqueur, Fascism, 194.
Dugin thus writes not merely about certain contradictions between Western civilization and Russia as, for instance, above-mentioned Kucherenkov-Kalashnikov or Kurginyan do. Instead, he draws, in his otherwise contradictory writings, the recurring picture of an ancient conflict between

- free-market, capitalist, Atlanticist sea powers (“thallasocracies”) that go back to the sunken world of Atlantis, continue the behaviour of the ancient states of Phoenicia and Carthago, and are now headed by the “mondialist” United States, on the one side, and

- autarkic, etatistic, Eurasian continental land powers (“tellurocracies”), originating with the mythic country of “Hyperborea,” preserving the tradition of the ancient Roman Empire, and now having as its most important component Russia, on the other.

According to the above-mentioned series of articles writing by Dugin in February 1991 until January 1992, the secret orders or “occult conspiracies” of these two antagonistic civilizations—Eternal Rome and Eternal Carthago—have been in an age-old struggle, an occult Punic war, that has, often, remained hidden to its participants and even its key figures, but has, nevertheless, determined the course of world history. The confrontation is now entering its final stage, the “Great War of the Continents,” demanding Russia’s rebirth via a “conservative,” “Last” and “permanent revolution.” This will be “the greatest Revolution in history, continental and universal, [...] the return of the angels, the resurrection of the heroes, and the uprising of the heart against the dictatorship of reason.” The new order to be created would be informed by the ideology of “National Bolshevism” and an exclusively “geopolitical” approach to international relations. A victory in this Endkampf (final fight) against Atlanticism would create a “New Socialism,” and imply territorial expansion as well as the formation of a Eurasian bloc of fundamentalist land powers (including, perhaps,

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290 Moroz, “Podnyavshii svastiku.”
even a traditionalist Israel) against intrusive, individualist Anglo-Saxon imperialism.\textsuperscript{293}

Writes Dugin in the early 1990s,


\citepar{Dugin, Konspirologiya, 128. For an excellent summary of further aspects of Dugin’s worldview, see Allensworth, The Russian Question, 248-262.}

\citepar{Laqueur, Fascism, 130.}

[b]oth Orders [the Eurasianists and Atlanticists] have the deepest ontological and sacral roots; they possess metaphysical reasons that make them what they are. To regard one of these Orders a historical accident means rejecting the secret logic of human and cosmic cycles. The choice of the geopolitical path reflects the choice of a metaphysical path, an esoterical path, the path of the Spirit through the world’s building. Therefore, there is no guarantee; therefore, one can, strictly speaking, not claim that Eurasia is good, and Atlantica—bad, that Rome is virtue, and Carthago—evil, and vice versa. But everybody called upon by his [sic] Order has to make a decided step and serve indeed his [sic] Order. The laws of our times are such that the result of the Great Battle are not predetermined, the outcome of the drama “Eurasia against Atlantica” depends on the sum of planetarian solidarity of all called upon the service, of all soldiers of geopolitics, of all secret agents of the Land and secret agents of the Sea. The end result of the cosmological war of Apollo against the Snake Python depends on everybody among us—whether he [sic] realizes this or not.\textsuperscript{294}

As will be shown below, ideas such as these should not lead one to dismiss lightly Dugin as hardly constituting a relevant political phenomenon. Walter Laqueur has commented:

Sometimes one suspects a black sense of humour behind the grotesque fantasies. But the fanatics of the extreme Right lack a sense of humour. They know that the last judgment is at hand, that the Russian people are about to be exterminated. People in such a frame of mind are not likely to engage in frivolous jokes.\textsuperscript{295}

Mark Sedgwick has, in his study of the impact of Dugin’s Traditionalism in Russia, noted that “Dugin’s ideas seemed less eccentric to their Russian than to their West-
Igor Vinogradov, editor of the reputed Russian émigré magazine *Kontinent*, observed on Dugin and his followers, already in 1992:

They are undertaking a noisy galvanization of a reactionary utopia that failed long ago, an attempt to revive through the injection of a new vaccine—a combination of “Orthodoxy” and “Islam” in the name of combating insidious “Zionism,” putrid Western “Catholicism” and any kind of Jew-Masonry whatever [...]. For all their [intellectual] ineptitude, they are very dangerous. After all, the temptation of religious fundamentalism in our century of unbelief and general spiritual corruption is attractive to many desperate people who have lost their way in this chaos.  

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III.5.2 The Rise of Dugin

*Dugin’s Origins*

Most reports agree that Dugin grew up in a privileged family as the son of a GRU officer, either a general or a colonel, and that his grand-father and great-grandfather had also been army officers. One biography alleges that his father died when Dugin was still a child. According to another report, he entered, after finishing high school with mediocre results, the Moscow Aviation Institute, on the insistence of his father. He interrupted his education, however, either because of insufficient study results, on his own will, or because of an arrest connected to dissident activities. According to Mark Sedgwick who bases his report on an interview with Dugin,

[in 1983 the authorities learned of a party in a painter's studio where Dugin had played the guitar and sung what he called “mystical anti-Communist songs,” and Dugin was briefly detained. The KGB found

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297 Elena Yakovich, “Kontinent v Moskve [an interview with Igor Vinogradov],” *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 22 July 1992, 5, as quoted in Sedgwick, *Against the Modern World*, 230. It is telling that, recently, Dugin has, as will be detailed later, become a regular contributor to the same *Literaturnaya gazeta* [Literary Newspaper].
299 E.g. Polyannikov, “Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyshleniya o evrazistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’”
300 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mdladshego pereustroit’ mir.” According to the same source, Dugin’s father, allegedly, put his son for a while into a psychiatry.
301 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mdladshego pereustroit’ mir.”
forbidden literature in this room, principally books by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and [Yuri] Mamleev [...]. Dugin was expelled from the [Moscow] Institute of Aviation, where he was studying. He found employment as street sweeper and continued reading in the [Soviet Union’s largest] Lenin Library with a forged reader’s card. In contradiction to this report, another biography of Dugin says that, after his expulsion from the Aviation Institute, he started working in a KGB archive where he gained access to, and read large amounts of, forbidden literature on Masonry, fascism and paganism.

At about the same time, if not before, Dugin must have become involved in a secretive group of esoteric intellectuals interested in European and Oriental mysticism, black magic, occultism, and alchemy. At one point, this circle called itself “Black Order of the SS,” and its leader Evgenii Golovin (see Appendix) Reichsführer SS. Most sources agree that the circle had, originally, been founded in the 1960s at the flat of the writer Yurii Mamleev (see Appendix). The most important Russian reference work on late Soviet independent groupings called this circle in 1991 the “Movement of Intellectuals-Conservatives.” The hand-book states that the circle of approximately 10 people had been founded in 1966, and, apparently in the late 1980s, proclaimed, as its aim,

an attempt to found an ideology uniting all patriotic creative forces of the State [Derzhava], on the basis of uniform metaphysical traditions and values. [It is] an attempt to transform politics from a fight for power into an instrument of harmonizing the imperial ethnien.

In 1975, Mamleev was expelled from the USSR after his circle and its samizdat literature were discovered by the KGB. According to Berezovskii, Krotov and Chervyakov, it was then that Golovin became the circle’s leader until 1978. After

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302 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 223.
303 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego perestroit’ mir.”
305 Polyannikov, „Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyshlenniya o evrazistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’”
306 As quoted in V.N. Berezovskii, N.I. Krotov and V.V. Chervyakov, Rossiya: Partii, assotsiatsii, soyuzy, kluby. Tom 1. Chast’ 1. Spravochnik (Moskva: RAU-Press, 1991), 42. Two of the authors of this exceptionally informative handbook, Vladimir Berezovskii and Valerii Chervyakov, helped me collecting material for my research in the mid-1990s, and, tragically, died in a car-accident in the late 1990s.
307 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego perestroit’ mir.”
308 Berezovskii, Krotov and Chervyakov, Rossiya, 42.
Mamleev’s expulsion, the circle became also more secretive and took new members only after some initiation ritual. Allegedly, the circle’s members included, at several points, apart from Golovin, Dugin and Mamleev, the Islamist Geidar Dzhemal (see Appendix), the artists Anatolii Zverev and Vladimir Pyatnitskii, the poets Genrikh Zapgir, Yuriu Kublanovskii and Leonid Gubanov, the philosopher Vladimir Stepanov (see Appendix), and, according to one source, even the famous writer Venedikt Erofeev. According to another well-informed source, in 1978-1988, the group was led by Geidar Dzhemal, and, in 1983-1989, also by Dugin.

The Azeri Dzhemal (b. 1947) was, at that time, apparently a close friend of Dugin, and had a biography somewhat similar to Dugin’s. In 1967, Dzhemal too had been expelled from his higher education institution, the Institute for Oriental Languages (where, at the same time, Zhirinovskii studied) for political reasons, and subsequently become an autodidact interested in Traditionalism. In 1980, Dzhemal, Dugin and Golovin went for a month-long trip to the Zeravshan Mountains in the North-East Pamirs. Dugin’s first major contribution to the activities of the circle was, apparently, his translation of Julius Evola’s writing *Pagan Imperialism* into Russian language.

For Dugin, the influence of Golovin was especially important, and one report says that it was Golovin, a professional translator and polyglot, who motivated Dugin to learn foreign languages. The same source says that that “Golovin’s lectures on her-

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309 One sources alleges that this initiation ritual consisted of Golovin urinating into the mouth of the new apostle. See Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereustroit’ mir.” While this may not have been the case, the Mamleev-Golovin circle is, indeed, by most observers described as having been interested in bizarre experiments as a way of self-discovery.


311 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereustroit’ mir.” Interestingly, Eduard Limonov apparently knew Golovin and Mamleev before his emigration in the 1970s, but was not especially close to them. That was in spite of Limonov’s interest, at that time, for mysticism. Shenfield, *Russian Fascism*, 203.

312 Berezovskii, Krotov and Chervyakov, *Rossiya*, 42.


meneutics, Traditionalism and Eurasianism were received by Dugin as eye-opening.”

Dugin later spoke of the circle as “the true masters of the Moscow esoteric elite.”

In 1989, the Golovin circle started to publish a *samizdat* newspaper *Poslednii polyus* (The Last Pole) which was edited by I. Dudinskii, had a circulation of 3,000-5,000 copies, and appeared altogether three times. Dzhemal, Golovin and Mamleev have continued to collaborate with Dugin after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and are contributing today to his publications and other activities.

During a visit to Western Europe in 1989, Dugin met a number of well-known ultranationalist European publicists including the Frenchman Alain de Benoist, the Belgian Jean-François Thiriart, and Italian Claudio Mutti. According to one source, Dugin was able to establish contacts with some of them thanks to the help of Mamleev who, at that time, must have lived in Paris. Later, these men, together with other similarly oriented theorists, visited Dugin in Moscow, and participated to one degree or another in his various projects. In 1991, Dugin published a book called *Continente Russia* in Mutti’s Italian publishing house. According to a further source, the Golovin circle had also contacts to the French publishing house called *Vivrismus*, and to a Paris philosophical group around Tat’yana Goricheva.

During perestroika, Dugin took a brief interest in the radical wing of the democratic movement led by Valeriya Novodvorskaya. Together with Dzhemal, Dugin entered, on Golovin’s advice, in 1987, Dmitrii Vasil’ev’s National Patriotic Front *Pamyat’,* Moscow’s major independent ultra-nationalist organization, at this time. Having served

317 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereurost’ mir.”
319 Berezovskii, Krotov and Chervyakov, *Rossiya*, 42.
322 Polyannikov, „Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyslenniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’”
325 Berezhovskii, Krotov and Chervyakov, *Rossiya*, 42.
326 Polyannikov, „Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyslenniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’” Another author alleges that Dugin and Dzhemal wanted to emigrate to Libya in the mid-1980s. See Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereurost’ mir.” According to some sources, Dugin was once married to Evgeniya Debryanskaya, a leader of Russian feminism. See Polyannikov, „Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyslenniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’” His current wife, however, is his close colleague Natal’ya Melent’eva who is an active editor and writer for *Arktogaya* and *Evrasiya*.
327 Personal communication with Vyacheslav Likhachev, Spring 2005; Polyannikov, „Po tro-
at the Central Council of *Pamyat* in 1988-1989, Dugin, however, left the organization after a conflict with Vasil’ev who had called him a “kike-mason.”

**Dugin’s Emergence as a Publicist**

From 1988-1991, Dugin was editor-in-chief for a publisher called EON (perhaps, his own creation), and entered, in 1991, the editorial board of *Den’*. At the same time, he continued his activity in the publishing business with the foundation of what would gradually become a major post-Soviet Russian ultra-nationalist press: the Historical-Religious Society Arktogeya (Northern Country). In 1991, he published his first larger and widely noted books, *The Mysteries of Eurasia* and *The Paths of the Absolute*, as well as the first issues of the almanac *Milyy Angel* (Enchanting Angel), and abortive journal *Giperboreets* (The Hyperborean). These were followed by numerous books, and some other periodicals.

Most of the publications principally authored or edited by Dugin are listed in Table 2 below. Still, this list includes neither a number of further books published by Arktogeya (for which Dugin often provided forewords), nor some edited volumes published under the imprint of other presses to which Dugin contributed too. It also does not include a flood of articles by Dugin that have appeared in a variety of Russian (and some Western) periodicals, above all in the weeklies *Zavtra* and *Limonka* (The Little Lemon, a word also used for a hand-grenade), but also in such Soviet-era

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328 Pam Khimery, ili razmyshlenniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke;’” Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego perestroit’ mir.”

329 URL (last accessed October 2006): http://eurasia.com.ru/leaders/dugin.html. Not much is known about EON, a publishing house from which I have not been able to find any books.


333 In listing below the circulation numbers of the books and journals in question, I am following an approach of Viktor Shnirel’man. In his analysis of the spread of pseudo-theories of the alleged ancient roots of the Russians connected to the so-called *Book of Vles* (a forgery), Shnirel’man lists the circulation numbers of the journals that have propagated such theories as well as of the volumes containing the *Book of Vles* or parts of it. See Shnirel’man, *Intellektual’nye labirinty*, 272-273.

334 *Limonka* was founded in 1994. Official circulation numbers were 7,000 in 1995, 5,500 in 1996, and 10,000 in 1997. See *Limonka*, no. 77(1997): 1, no. 13 (1995): 4; Rogachev-
ultra-nationalist organs, as the monthly *Nash sovremennik* (Our Contemporary) since the early 1990s as well as in various centrist newspapers since the mid-1990s. Still, this table alone shows Dugin’s enormous output, and the variety of subjects he has been dealing with: esotericism, international relations, culture, history, politics, etc. There are, probably, only few publicists—whether pro- or anti-democratic—in Russia today how could report as continuous a flow of publications as Dugin’s over the last 15 years.

335 Many of these articles became subsequently chapters, or sections in Dugin’s books. See, for instance, the acknowledgements in Aleksandr Dugin, *Tampliery Proletariata: Natsional-bol’shevizm i initsiatsiya* (Moskva: Arktogeya 1997), 323-324. Thus, the below table probably does reflect the larger part of Duing’s publicistic work.
Table 2: The major books and journals published by Dugin, if not otherwise indicated, under the imprint of Arktogeya Press.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issue or edition nos.</th>
<th>Official circulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Puti Absolyuta</em> [The Paths of the Absolute]</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st edn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Continente Russia</em> [The Continent Russia]</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1st edn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Misterii Evrazii</em> [Mysteries of Eurasia]</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1st edn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Giperboreets</em> [The Hyperborean]</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>No. 1&lt;sup&gt;339&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Almanakh “Milyy Angel”</em></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1st Vol.</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Konspirologiya</em> [Conspirology]</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1st edn</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rusia: Misterio de Eurasia</em></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1st edn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Giperboreiskaya teoriya</em></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1st edn</td>
<td>50,000 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Elementy: evraziiskoe obozrenie</em></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>No. 1</td>
<td>50,000 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Puti Absolyuta</em></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2nd edn</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is an improved version of the table first presented in Umland, “Kulturhegemoniale Strategien der russischen extremen Rechten.” The question marks behind some circulation numbers below indicate that these are officially given circulation numbers that might be inflated. I shall be grateful for any corrections or additional information on the data in this table.

<sup>336</sup> This number is taken from an annotation in *Elementy*, no. 8 (1996/1997): 111.

<sup>337</sup> See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://eurasia.com.ru/leaders/dugin.html. Apparently, Dugin wrote this book in 1989. See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.arctogaia.com/public/putiabs/. I have not been able to establish the publisher and circulation number of this first edition. Perhaps, it was published in Moscow by EON.

<sup>338</sup> Published in Parma or/and Milano by Edizioni All’insegna del Veltri.

<sup>339</sup> Pribylovskii, *Vozhdi*, 44-45.

<sup>340</sup> Almanac “Enchanting Angel.”

<sup>341</sup> Sub-title: *Nauka o zagovorakh, taynykh obshchestvakh i okkul’tnoy voyne* [The Science of Conspiracies, Secret Societies and Occult War].

<sup>342</sup> Published in Madrid by Grupo Libro. Some sources give 1990 as the year of publication of this book which seems to me unlikely.

<sup>343</sup> Hyperborean Theory. Sub-title: *Opyt ariosofskogo issledovaniya* [An Aryosophical Inquiry].

<sup>344</sup> Published in Madrid by Grupo Libro. Some sources give 1990 as the year of publication of this book which seems to me unlikely.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issue or edition nos.</th>
<th>Official circulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;““-</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No. 3</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;““-</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No. 4</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;““-</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>No. 5</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td>&quot;““-</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>No. 6</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Vol.</td>
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345 Shenfield though gives the number 2,000; Russian Fascism, 291.
346 Conservative Revolution.
347 The Aims and Tasks of Our Revolution.
349 Templar Knights of the Proletariat. Sub-title: Natsional-bol’shevizm i initsiatsiya [National-Bolshevism and Initiation].
351 New sub-title: Myslit’ prostranstvom [Thinking in Terms of Space]. This third edition of the book was added with a second part. See Ingram, “Alexander Dugin,” 1032.
352 Sub-title: Eskhatologiya i traditsiya [Eschatology and Tradition]; identical with Milyy Angel, 2<sup>nd</sup>-3<sup>rd</sup> Vols.
353 Sub-title: Strategicheskie perspektivy razvitiy Rossi v XXI veke [Strategic Perspectives of Russia’s Development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century].
355 Published in London by the European Liberation Front or/and Eurasian Movement. See
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Includes the articles “National-Bolshevism or Nothingness,” “Just Bolshevism,” and “Five Theses on the Meaning of Life.”

Includes the articles “Der Arbeiter,” “The Post-Liberal Era in Russia,” “Ideology of World Government” and “When Everybody Has Gone.”


Some of the print versions of this newspaper do not have a number on them, but are instead subtitled spetsial'nyi vypusk (special edition). However, the electronic version of the irregular periodical are numbered consistently, and have been taken from the WWW-site: URL (last accessed October 2006): http://eurasia.com.ru.

Foundations of Eurasianism.

A Russian Thing. Sub-title: Ocherki natsional'noy filosofii [Outlines of a National Philosophy].
Contributing frequently to *Den’* and other ultra-nationalist organs, in July 1992, Dugin launched what would become the periodical establishing his reputation in Russia and abroad, the journal *Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie* (*Elements: Eurasian Review;* 9 issues published in 1992-8).\(^{370}\) It was partly modelled on Alain de Benoist’s pan-European network of journals of the same name, but went, in a number of ways, further than its West European counterparts leading de Benoist to later distance himself from Dugin. *Elementy* included, apart from Dugin’s and his followers’ articles, interviews with a number of prominent Russian ultra-nationalists politicians such as Sergei Baburin (then RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputy and later a State Duma deputy for *Rodina*),\(^{371}\) Eduard Limonov, Viktor Alksnis (former USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, ...
member of *Elementy’s* editorial board and current State Duma deputy), or the late Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev, 1927-1995). "*Elementy* was especially noticeable for its sophisticated use of illustrations with accompanying inscriptions." Every issue contained, at least, one contribution by a foreign author of either the inter-/post-war periods like Julius Evola, Mircea Eliade and Carl Schmitt, or contemporary West European New Right, e.g. de Benoist, Claudio Mutti, Jean Thiriat, Armin Mohler, or Robert Steukers. The contributors of *Elementy* also included representatives of some other of the above listed right-radical intellectual centres such as Evgenii Morozov of the International Institute of Geopolitics.

*In the Wilderness*

Already in the early 1990s, when Dugin only began to emerge as a nationalist theoretician, and followed still a largely groupuscular strategy, as introduced above, he seemingly started to think about how to break out from the lunatic fringe spectrum and to reach a status in society similar to that of the “New Right” in Western Europe. In March 1992, Alain de Benoist, together with Belgian right-wing extremist publicist Robert Steukers, visited Moscow, and held a round-table with Dugin, above-mentioned ultra-nationalist Supreme Soviet and today State Duma Deputy Speaker Sergei N. Baburin, the Head of the Chair of Strategic Studies of the General Staff Academy General Lieutenant Nikolai Klokotov and some other personalities. Apparently, as a result of this visit Dugin founded the *Elementy*, and initially included de Benoist in its editorial board. Among the various new right-wing extremist intellectual periodicals that appeared in the early-mid 1990s (some of them also co-edited by Dugin), *Elementy* quickly acquired a special position, and has since become the subject of content analyses by Russian and Western authors alike. Although de Benoist became later disappointed about Dugin and cut ties with him, it seems still the case that those institutions affiliated with Dugin should—as will be argued in more detail below—be regarded as part and parcel of the European “New Right”, and as principally inspired by the “*Nouvelle Droite*’s” Gramscian strategy. In spite of the split

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373 Mitrofanova, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy*, 56.


between Dugin and de Benoist, *Elementy* reported continuing ties to de Benoist research Center GRECE as well as to other West European “New Right” think-tanks in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany and Spain.\(^{375}\)

Interestingly, the ties between the Russian and Western New Right had been emerging even before Dugin went to Western Europe in 1989. According to Martin Lee, Eduard Limonov who co-founded with Dugin the above mentioned National-Bolshevik Front/Party in 1993-94 had “first encountered de Benoist in Paris” where Limonov, as a Soviet émigré writer, also “hobnobbed with various iconoclasts, including another proponent of National Bolshevism, [the above mentioned] Jean-François Thiriat [see Appendix].” In August, 1992, Thiriat visited Moscow where he was welcomed by Dugin, and met, together with Dugin, the former 2nd Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Egor Ligachëv and KPRF chairman Gennadii Zyuganov. On 23 November 1992, Thiriat died from a heart attack, and “was eulogized in several nationalist press outlets in Russia, including *Den’*, which published some of his writings.”\(^{376}\)

In 1993, Dugin met in Moscow Christian Boucher, the head of the French section of the Order of Oriental Templars (Ordo Templi Orientis), an international occult grouping principally influenced by the writings of the British Satanist Aleister Crowley (see Appendix).\(^{377}\) According to one report, Dugin was inspired more by Crowley’s biography than his writings as Crowley once tried to attract to his Order Stalin, Hitler, and other leaders.\(^{378}\)

In summer 1994, Dugin visited Italy.\(^{379}\)

In September 1993, a series of documentaries under the title *O tainakh veka* (On the Secrets of the Century) authored by Dugin and Yurii Vorob’evskii was shown on the First and Fourth Russian TV channels.\(^{380}\) The program took an apologetic approach to historic fascism, explained empathetically Nazi symbols and mysticism, and admitted the possibility of a non-compromised, benign, intellectual fascism.\(^{381}\) As a result it was shut down. In spite of Dugin’s co-founder and leadership of the *NBP* in the mid-1990s, he, in 1996, also became an irregular contributor to the major liberal high-

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378 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego perestroyit’ mir.”
brow daily *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Independent Newspaper). This newspaper later provided a regular forum for the presentation and discussion of Dugin’s ideology.\(^{382}\) Stephen Shenfield further noted that

> [i]n 1997 Dugin had a weekly hour-long radio program called *Finis Mundi* [End of the World] on the popular music station *FM 101*.\(^ {383}\) This series, which attracted a cult following of university students, was suspended after sixteen weeks. Dugin later established a second program on a less well-known station, *Free Russia*.\(^ {384}\)

There he led, in 1997-1999, a program called “Geopolitical Review.”\(^ {385}\) There have also been reports that Dugin has been giving lectures at the Russian Academy of the General Staff. One commentator mentions cooperation of Dugin with the Ministry of Défense journal *Orientiry* ( Orientations).\(^ {386}\) Shenfield noted in 2001 a relationship between Dugin and the head of the company *Russkoe zoloto* (Russian Gold), Aleksandr Tarantsev.\(^ {387}\)

For some time, to be sure, it seemed as if Dugin’s multifarious dealings were reaching a dead end. According to one observer, in the 1990s, Dugin was actively publishing, “[b]ut, in seriously influencing public opinion, he did not succeed then. He was read only by the enlightened underground keen on all kinds of mystic esoterics.”\(^ {388}\)

As noted, in 1993-1998, he, together with Limonov, set up the National-Bolshevik Front, and later the *NBP*.\(^ {389}\) The two avant-garde publicists seemed to cooperate for a while fruitfully in, above all, creating one of the most extravagant post-Soviet newspapers, *Limonka*.\(^ {390}\) Dugin and Limonov were engaged in an attempt to create a joint


\(^{383}\) These programs on various philosophers, intellectuals and writers are available on audio-cassettes and CD from *Arktogeya*.


\(^{386}\) Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessi’noi pered maniei Dugina-mldshego pereustroit’ mir.”

\(^{387}\) Shenfield, *Russian Fascism*, 199.

\(^{388}\) Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessi’noi pered maniei Dugina-mldshego pereustroit’ mir.”

\(^{389}\) Shenfield, *Russian Fascism*, 194.

radically nationalist opposition that would unite several new ultranationalist parties, including the RNE and NBP, some prominent counter-cultural figures, as well as, perhaps, nominally communist groups such as Viktor Anpilov’s Russian Communist Workers Party into a more potent political force.\(^{391}\) When a joint Declaration of some of representatives of these forces with the signatures of Dugin, Limonov, Letov, Bar-kashov, Bachtiyarov, and Morozov was published in June 1994, it seemed for a moment as if this endeavour might lead somewhere.\(^{392}\) However, eventually, this project—as well as another one, the Movement for a Conservative Revolution\(^{393}\)—did not materialize.

Dugin’s first attempt to become a party politician proved to be a failure too. In 1995, he, as an NBP candidate, took part in the State Duma elections in a suburban district of St. Petersburg. In spite of the public support of the popular rock-singer Sergei Kurëkhin (1954-1996) and his group Pop-mekhanika as well as Egor Letov’s punk group Grazhdanskaya oborona, Dugin received merely 0.87% of the vote, and occupied the 14th place among the 17 contenders of his electoral district. This was, even in comparison to other unsuccessful ultra-nationalist candidates, an embarrassing result.

In May 1998, it was, among other factors, the tension between Dugin’s intellectual ambition and esoteric style of writing, on the one side, and the conflicting needs of populist party politics of the National Bolsheviks that led him leave the NBP with a number of his followers in order to devote himself to other activities.\(^{394}\) Following the saga of Dugin’s and Limonov’s rapprochement and split in 1993-1998, to be extensively described in a forthcoming book Andrei Rogatchevski, as well as Dugin’s earlier and later forays, one feels reminded of certain inter-war European tendencies. Then,
[s]ome of fascism was not more than posturing and the effusions of minor philosophers hoping to gain a wider audience by making extreme statements, or of decadent writers who had turned into men of action—such as [Maurice] Barrè or [Gabrielle] D’Annunzio.395

However, in distinction to the eventually pathetic efforts of these inter-war fascist intellectuals, Dugin, after his departure from the NBP in 1998, started to make steps in gaining an indirect, but increasingly strong influence on mainstream political and intellectual trends. In fact, as Stephen Shenfield and others have noted there is evidence that, already before 1998, Dugin’s ideas had a certain impact not only on the lunatic fringe, but on selected parts of Russia’s political and academic establishment. In the early 1990s, he seems to have affected the evolution of, among others, Zyuganov’s russophile re-interpretation of the idea of socialism396—a central term in Dugin’s writings too. In 2001, Shenfield noted that

[...] various periodicals of the Ministry of Défense have for a number of years now been publishing advertisements for Dugin’s books and articles [...] [and] [t]here is considerable circumstantial evidence suggesting that General Igor Rodionov was particularly well-disposed toward Dugin during his tenure as head of the Academy of the General Staff and then (briefly) as defense minister in 1996-1997. 397

Theoretician of the Post-Soviet Russian Right

In many regards, in the late 1980s and early-mid 1990s, Dugin’s activities resembled those of the above listed and some other intellectuals: He was building up his own research and publication centre, and trying to propagate his ideas among ultranationalist political organizations, and further potential supporters in such spheres as youth groups, the military, secret services, and academia. He, like many other nationalist publicists, attempted to smuggle his ideas into nationalist politics. In the words of Mark Sedgwick, Dugin and Dzhemal in 1987-1989, for instance, had “hoped to influence [Pamyat’] toward Traditionalism, rather as [Mircea] Eliade had hoped to use the Legion of the Archangel Michael in Romania, and [Julius] Evola had hoped to

395 Laqueur, Fascism, 26.
396 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 192.
397 Ibid., 198-199.
use the Fascists, the Herrenclub, and the SS.” While this early attempt by Dugin of the late 1980s was largely unsuccessful, the record in the 1990s is a mixed one.

The two principal institutions that Dugin founded in 1990-1991, and that later became his main instruments for spreading his views were the Historical-Religious Association Arktogeya (Northern Country) which also functions as a publishing house, and the Center for Special Meta-Strategic Studies, a think-tank. Numerous institutions such as these sprang up in Russia in the early 1990s. Most of them have since remained marginal or vanished altogether. They thus came to represent mere footnotes in post-Soviet Russia’s early history.

In contrast, Dugin’s various publications, especially the mentioned journal Elementy as well as some other periodicals, were more original and widely read in nationalist circles, than the drier, if, partly, not less numerous works of other publicists such as Kurginyan. This was not the least, because of the frequent contributions by, or references to, inter- and post-war Western authors in Dugin’s journals and books. Dugin’s, for the taste of Western readers, bizarre obsession with esotericism might have also contributed to his growing popularity in some Russian sub-cultures. Already in 1996, it has been said that “[a] variety of esoteric cults have their fervent followers on the extreme Right, in Russia perhaps more than in any other country.”

Dugin was thus an intellectual who had been exercising more influence than other similar publicists on the formation of the agenda of the post-Soviet Russian extreme right, already by the mid-1990s. As one perceptive observer noted, although his ideology constitutes “garbage from concepts digested by Europe […], [b]ecause Dugin’s erudition is peculiar and fed by material from not very well-known among Russian readers works by Hitlerite occultist institutes, his texts make a dumbfounding impression on readers unprepared to digest such spiritual food.” Allensworth was among the first Anglophone observers to remark, in 1998, that Dugin’s “importance to the ‘patriotic’ movement has not yet been properly acknowledged.”

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398 Dugin later described Pamyat’s members as “hysteric[s], KGB collaborators, and schizophrrenics.” Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 224.
400 It has been later re-named into Center for Geopolitical Expertise. See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://cge.evrazia.org/.
401 Yanov, Weimar Russia, 275.
402 Laqueur, Fascism, 122.
Prokhanov has [...] subtly spread the ideas of Aleksandr Dugin among his brethren via Den'/Zavtra. Eurasianist or not, the term mondialism [a term popularized by Dugin in Russia] is heard from the lips of even the most vociferous critics of Dugin’s ideology. It is Dugin, who broadened the horizons of the [anti-Western] coalition: Mondialism, not simply the West or El’tsin or Zionism, is the enemy. Gennadii Zyuganov has wielded the language of Dugin’s cultural system quite effectively, eschewing the classic Jewish-Masonic formula for streamlined, modernized version of the grand conspiracy that transcends the conspiratology of the Old Right.404

According to Aleksandr Verkhovskii, “[t]hanks to Dugin’s talents the ‘conservative revolution’ has gained such a wide popularity that elements of this ideology can be detected in [the ideas of] almost all Russian nationalists [...].”405 For instance, it was Dugin who “with his national-bolsheivism and ‘left-wing fascism,’ [...] supplied [the prominent writer Eduard] Limonov with the conceptual formulas that enabled him to achieve the desired synthesis [of his various ideas].”406 A 2005 Zavtra reviewer of a book by former Dugin-disciple Vadim Shtepa did not even think it to be necessary to explain to his readers what such concepts as “traditional society,” “Guénonian critique” or “inversion” connote—meaning that Dugin had, by then, succeeded to make

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404 Allensworth, The Russian Question, 245, 261. However, Allensworth contradicts himself when also assuming that Zhirinovskii’s idea of a “drive to the south,” i.e. the plan of Russia’s occupation of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, “may have been inspired by Dugin’s geopolitics [...].” Ibid. As Allensworth—in my view, quite correctly—writes himself, at another point in his, in general, extremely well-researched book: “By the time [Zhirinovskii] emerged on the political scene in the late Gorbachev period, the drive to the south was already formulated as the core of Zhirinovskii’s ideology.” Ibid., 193. Not only is it unlikely that the later LDPR leader had become aware of Dugin’s views already before 1993 when Dugin, like Zhirinovskii, had still been a political nobody even within the nationalist fringe. Zhirinovskii’s extreme anti-Muslim propaganda and frequent use of the derogative term yuzhane (Southerners) in his major pamphlet Poslednii brosok na yug (The Last Dash to the South) document a form of ultranationalism that is fundamentally different from Dugin’s. I thus suspect that, even in the period 1991-1993, i.e. when Zhirinovskii formulated his plan gradually in his party’s newspaper Liberal, Dugin exerted little if any influence on Zhirinovskii. The LDPR leader is a Turkologist by training, did his military service in the Caucasus, and lived in Turkey during Soviet times. He thus needed little advice on the beauties of the Eastern tradition from Dugin or somebody else. Extensive treatments of Zhirinovskii’s ideology may be found in Koman, “The Last Surge to the South,” and Umland, “Vladimir Zhirnovskii in Russian Politics.”

405 Verkhovskii, Politichesko pravoslavie, 10.

406 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 204.
Western Traditionalist terminology self-explanatory within, and become part and parcel of, the Russian extreme right-wing discourse.407

Moreover, Dugin’s approach was, as Markus Mathyl has pointed out, also exceptional in that his circle quickly managed to establish ties with the counter-cultural youth scene, among them popular nationalist rock- and punk-musicians such as Egor Letov (b. 1964), Sergei “Pauk” Troitskii (b. 1966), Roman Neumoev, or the late Sergei Kurēkhin (1954-1996).408 In addition, the Dugin circle became known for its sophisticated, inter-connected set of World Wide Web sites that offer most of the circle’s publications, above all Dugin’s books, in electronic form.409 Dugin has explicitly praised the WWW’s qualities as being conducive to the activities of anti-systemic, marginalized groups.410 Since the late 1990s, the presence of Dugin’s organizations and writings on the WWW has thus evolved into a major tool of linking with each other his supporters across Russia and abroad, and of spreading his views. Early on, Dugin started to build up extensive web-archives of most of his texts and of the writings of his intellectual fathers and followers on his WWW-sites. Some of these sites are briefly described in Table 3 below. His Yahoo-Group-Mailinglist “Neo-Eurasia” was founded in January 2001, had accumulated 350 members by January 2007, and embraces today a vibrant community of Russian and non-Russian supporters of “neo-Eurasianism.”411

One of the most original electronic initiatives linked to the Dugin circle was, in 1999-2002, the WWW-journal :LENIN: Antikulturelogicheskii ezhenedel’nik [Lenin: An Anti-


408 Markus Mathyl, “Die Konstruktion eines Feindes: Antisemitismus und Antiamerikanismus in Aleksandr Dugins Neo-Nationalbolschewismus,” Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the German Society for East European Studies “Vorurteile als politische Barrieren,” Göttingen, 7-8 March 2002; idem, “Das Entstehen einer nationalistischen Gegenkultur im Postperestrojka-Rußland.” See also Anne Hahn, “Voll tolerant oder was dürfen uns sibirische Dorfdeppen singen? Über eine Auseinandersetzung um den Sänger Jegor Letow,” URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.satt.org/gesellschaft/02_10_letow_1.html. These and similar actions by the Dugin circle remind one of the strategy of “entryism” followed by certain extremist groups in, for instance, England and Germany in the 1980s that tried to infiltrate youth-cultures such as soccer-fans and discotecas. Laqueur, Fascism, 127.


410 See Schmidt, “Kein betrüblicher Systemfehler?”

411 URL (last accessed January 2007): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/neo-eurasia/. One may add though that some members of this group, like myself, can, probably, not be counted as full supporters of “neo-Eurasianism.”
Culturological Weekly] which regularly published contributions by Dugin under the rubric Atsefal, and was created and edited by the prolific, anti-systemic Russian WWW-publicist Mikhail Verbitskii (b. 1969). Dugin and Verbitskii have both received awards for their various writings on the WWW.412 Verbitskii started his various internet activities, above all his project End of the World News (EOWN), in the mid-1990s from the server of Harvard University where he was completing a Ph.D. in Mathematics in 1990-1997. Apart from his numerous presentations at various European mathematics seminars and conferences, Verbitskii gave, invited by the University of Oxford Russian Student Society, in 2004 a paper on the history of the Russian “nationalist opposition” at Balliol College Oxford, at which I was present. At this presentation, Verbitskii mentioned neither his own role in the rise of the Dugin circle in 1990s, nor his apparent sympathy for the ideas of the British Satanist Aleister Crowley—an inclination documented by Henrike Schmidt.413 He also did not speak about his more recent participation in activities of the Dugin circle.414 That may have been because, at the time of his presentation at Oxford, Verbitskii was officially affiliated with the Mathematics Department of the University of Glasgow.

412 Verbitskii’s project is shortly introduced and well-interpreted in a comparative perspective by Schmidt, “‘Kein betrüblicher Systemfehler’?” 223-228. A short biography of Verbitskii by Evgenii Gomyi and Aleksandr Sherman may be found at URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.guelman.ru/obzory/verbitsky.htm.

413 Schmidt, “‘Kein betrüblicher Systemfehler’?” 223-228.

### Table 3: Some WWW-sites within Dugin’s webring.

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<th>Name</th>
<th>WWW-Sites</th>
<th>Purpose, reach, structure, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Tradition—Revolution</td>
<td><a href="http://aweb.com/hub?ring=tradition">http://aweb.com/hub?ring=tradition</a></td>
<td>A site uniting several WWW sites related to Dugin’s ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical-Religious Society <em>Arktogeya</em></td>
<td><a href="http://www.arctogaiia.com/">http://www.arctogaiia.com/</a>, <a href="http://arcto.ru/">http://arcto.ru/</a>, <a href="http://www.my.arcto.ru/">http://www.my.arcto.ru/</a></td>
<td>The society is described as an “association of intellectuals who study religious traditions, cultures and history of world nations.” In effect, it seems to function mainly as a publishing house principally engaged in circulating Dugin’s manuscripts—often multiple copies under various headings. By 2001, <em>Arktogeya</em> had ten branches in nine Russian cities. Interestingly, Dugin presents himself, on these sites, in different ways. For instance, his outspoken article “Fascism—borderless and red” is absent in the WWW book <em>Tampliery Proletariata</em> at <a href="http://arcto.ru/">http://arcto.ru/</a>, but present in the same book’s WWW version at <a href="http://www.arctogaia.com">http://www.arctogaia.com</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2002: <em>Novoe soprotevlenie</em> (New Resistance).</td>
<td><a href="http://resist.gothic.ru/">http://resist.gothic.ru/</a></td>
<td>Apparently, a virtual organization the site of which is also available in English, and contains some texts, pictures, and links to the other sites listed here. A purpose of the site seems to be the introduction of Dugin’s network to English readers, and subscription for a mailing list is possible. Now it is called: <em>Salt u poslednego fonarya</em> (Site at the Last Lampoon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Novyi universitet</em> (New University). This project may not have materialized.</td>
<td><a href="http://universitet.virtualave.net/">http://universitet.virtualave.net/</a></td>
<td>Lectures, and seminars in theology, history, political science, sociology, psychology, religious studies, philology, and ethnology as well as on metaphysics, traditionalism, geopolitics, conspiriology, etc. given at the Mayakovskiy Museum. Staff lecturers: A. Dugin, E. Golovin, Yu. Mamleev, A. Ezerov, M. Verbitskiy, A. Nevskiy and others. Last lectures announced for December 1999. About fifty students currently [November 2000] consider themselves his followers.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>WWW-Sites</th>
<th>Purpose, reach, structure, etc.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konservativnaya revolyutsiya (Conservative Revolution)</td>
<td><a href="http://ww">http://ww</a> w.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6824/</td>
<td>A site with links to major anti-Western texts, and groups in Europe and Australia that call themselves “conservative revolutionary.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evrazya: Informatsionny-analiticheskii portal (Eurasia: Informational-Analytical Portal)</td>
<td><a href="http://evr">http://evr</a> azia.org/</td>
<td>Dugin’s current major site where he publishes his articles, TV shows, books, and other statements, and where his current organization, the International “Eurasian Movement,” is briefly presented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archivio Eurasia</td>
<td><a href="http://unteer.lycos.it/EurasianWeb-Site/">http://unteer.lycos.it/EurasianWeb-Site/</a></td>
<td>A site devoted to texts of Dugin in Western languages, and his links to West European marginal intellectuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disser tationsionne issledovaniya… (Disser tation research…)</td>
<td><a href="http://science.dugin.ru/">http://science.dugin.ru/</a></td>
<td>The texts of, and protocols of the academic council meetings concerning, Dugin’s dissertations for the Candidate of Science in Philosophy and Doctor of Science in Politology degrees (see below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web-Design Firm Kontinent.</td>
<td><a href="http://element2000.virtualalave.net/design.html">http://element2000.virtualalave.net/design.html</a> (now dead link)</td>
<td>The task of this enterprise was the creation of new sites for institutions and organizations with a “Eurasian geopolitical direction.” This project may not have materialized as the site is not any longer operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenin: an offering to Gods unknown. End of the World News</td>
<td><a href="http://im">http://im</a> perium.len in.ru/</td>
<td>A site of comments and texts on contemporary affairs and philosophical questions run by Dugin’s associate Mikhail Verbitskii.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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In the mid-1990s, Dugin seems to have followed a dual strategy of, on the one side, affiliating himself to, and trying to impregnate with his ideas, the most radical anti-systemic segments in Russia’s emerging uncivil society, and, on the other side, entering Moscow’s political establishment, and gaining a wider readership beyond the narrowly neo-fascist support. Thus, for instance, Dugin, somewhat paradoxically, was, in 1993-1998, as mentioned, co-founder, leader as well as major ideologist of Eduard Limonov’s expressly revolutionary, anti-systemic National-Bolshevik Party while, at the same time, appearing on national radio and TV, publishing in liberal newspapers, and reading lectures on philosophy, world history, and international relations at various occasions and institutions such as the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation.

From the Margins to the Mainstream

The contradiction in Dugin’s simultaneously groupuscular and Gramscian strategy was resolved in 1998 when Dugin and a group of his supporters left the NBP, and, instead, established themselves, at first, as an informal advisory group to, and, later, as an official analytical division at no lesser an institution than the office of, the Speaker of the lower house of the Russian parliament, Gennadii I. Seleznëv.

The official title of the institute attached to Seleznëv’s bureau, and headed by Dugin was: Section for Geopolitical Expertise of the Expert-Consultative Council on Problems of National Security at the Office of the Head of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Dugin’s affiliation was announced by Seleznëv in 1999.

Two years before, in 1997, Dugin had published the first edition of his, perhaps, most influential work Osnovy Geopolitiki (The Foundations of Geopolitics) that quickly sold

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418 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 193.
419 See Dugin, Tampliery proletariata, 324.
420 It is noteworthy that Dugin was then still a member of the NBP the slogans of which, at that time, included “Seleznev—na parashu!” (Seleznev, you belong to the latrine!). As quoted in Rogachevskii, “The National-Bolshevik Party (1993-2001),” 3. This slogan was pronounced at an NBP demonstration on 7 November 1997.
421 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 332.
422 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 193.
out, acquired the status of a seminal study, and became a text-book at various Russian higher education institutions, especially those of the military. It is a book that earned him wide attention in not only the nationalist section of Russia’s elite. Jacob Kipp reported concerning the publication of the first edition of Osnovy Geopolitiki in 1997:

When I was in Moscow in June, the Dugin book was a topic of hot discussion among military and civilian analysts at a wide range of institutes, including the Academy of State Management, and in the [presidential administration] offices at Staraya ploschad’ [Old Square].

Alan Ingram observed that “[e]ditions one and two [of Osnovy Geopolitiki] sold out, and the first printing of the third edition (5,000) copies was becoming difficult to obtain in September 1999.” Dugin himself claimed that the Georgian translation of this book sold 5,000 copies in little Georgia. In 1999, a chapter from the book was reprinted in a major scholarly anthology on Russian foreign policy and security. By 2000, Osnovy Geopolitiki had gone through its fourth edition, and become a major political pamphlet with a wide readership in academic and political circles.

Probably, in connection with these trends, Dugin’s presence in mainstream Russian media and conferences started to increase markedly from 1998 onwards. To be sure, there was, as Stephen Shenfied noted, in 2001 yet no evidence that Dugin’s ideas have had any palpable influence on the general public. Indeed, his language is too esoteric even to be understood by most ordinary people, nor is his work easy to popularize. However, it is Russia’s present and future intellectual elite that Dugin

424 As quoted in Shenfield Russian Fascism, 199.
429 See Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 199; and Ingram, “Alexander Dugin,” 1032.
Dugin’s most important project bringing him even broader attention in the press was the foundation of the Socio-Political Movement “Eurasia” in spring 2001.\textsuperscript{431} His earlier affiliations with the General Staff Academy or office of the Speaker of the State Duma could have been seen as, by itself, constituting merely temporary, if not accidental, phenomena. With the foundation of “Eurasia,”\textsuperscript{432} the Dugin phenomenon, however, has made a qualitative leap from the footnotes to the major plot of post-Soviet Russian history.

Already at its foundation in 2001, the new “Eurasia” movement was marked by a number of important peculiarities. For instance, its creation was evidently supported by the Presidential Administration; it was, seemingly, a project advanced by the Kremlin’s notorious “political technologist” Gleb Pavlovskii.\textsuperscript{433} According to one source, the organization was financed by the General Staff.\textsuperscript{434} Whether this was indeed the case or not, “Eurasia” claimed over fifty regional organizations and about 2,000 activists at its first congress in April 2001.\textsuperscript{435} Among the members of “Eurasia’s” first Central and Political Councils were Talgat Tadzhuddin, the Chief Mufti of the Russian Muslim Spiritual Directorate,\textsuperscript{436} as well as high representatives of Chris-

\textsuperscript{430} Shenfield, \textit{Russian Fascism}, 198.
\textsuperscript{433} I am grateful to Robert C. Otto for highlighting this link to me. See, for instance, Andrey Kolesnikov, “Posle podvodnoi lodki: Na katastrofakh otrabatyvaetsya informatsionnaya politika,” \textit{Izvestiya}, no. 161 (29 August 2000): 3. Another source, however, claims that “[t]he talk that ‘Eurasia’ is one more project of the well-known political technologist G. Pavlovskii realized with money from the Russian special services is merely a PR campaign for Pavlovskii himself.” See Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereuстроит’ mir.”
\textsuperscript{434} Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereuстроит’ mir.” The same source says that “the chekists [i.e. the former KGB—A.U.] do not directly finance Dugin.” \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{436} On Tadzhuddin, see Vyacheslav Likhachev, “Rossiiskie musul’mane I antisemitizm,” \textit{Evrej Evrazii}, no. 1(2) (2003): 4-12. Verkhovskii reports from the congress: “An even greater role in the creation of Eurasia was played by the Spiritual Department of Talgat Tadzhuddin. He personally sat in the presidium of the conference and one could see many mullahs in the audience. […] (Buddhists and Hebrews [sic, i.e. Jews] were represented only sparsely and insignificant figures at the founding congress.” Alexander Verkhovsky, “Religious Xenophobia: Within Religious Orders and Between Religious Or-
tian-Orthodox, Jewish, and Buddhist religious organizations. Verkhovskii notes that, in particular, the Catechism Department of the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchy was involved in this project. It is also noteworthy that the movement’s leading organs included the former SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) officer Petr Suslov and General-Lieutenat (ret.) Nikolai Klokotov who had held the Chair of Strategy of the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff from 1988 to 1996 and contributed to Dugin’s seminal work Osnovy geopolitiki. A further remarkable figure in Dugin’s entourage was, for a while, Khozh-Akmed Nukhaev (b. 1954) who had once been a Chechen separatist dissident, held high posts in the Chechen Republic government in the 1990s, published books as well as brochures on political issues, and spoke in favour of a union between Eurasianist Orthodox Russian and Islamic Ichkeriya (Chechnya). However, Nukhaev became also known as a suspect in the case of the murder of the former editor of the Russian edition of the weekly journal Forbes, Khlebnikov who had written an unfavourable book about Nukhaev.

While this list of supporters of Dugin looks impressive, it needs to be said that some of these figures may have been told by the Kremlin’s “political technologists” to enter Dugin’s organization to manipulate Russia’s political landscape, and, perhaps, others...
saw “Eurasia” as an instrument to further their social careers—rather than as an organization fully expressing their world views and political aspirations. What appears, in view of such caveats, as a more noteworthy feature of “Eurasia’s” founding congress on 21 April 2001 was the presence of a prominent Russian political theorist, the late Aleksandr Panarin (1940-2003), and a well-known TV journalist of Russia’s first and most far-reaching Channel ORT, Mikhail Leont’ev (b. 1958), at this occasion.\(^{445}\) Whereas the formerly listed figures may have had, partly, careerist motives for taking part in Dugin’s new initiative, such a motivation seems less likely with regard to the latter two Russian notables who, arguably, had more to loose than to win from an association with as dubious a figure as Dugin.

Leont’ev, by one source called “the president’s [i.e. Putin’s] favourite journalist,”\(^{446}\) is the infamous founder, editor-in-chief, and major anchorman of the rabidly anti-American daily political prime-time TV show Odnako (However). He was not only present at “Eurasia’s” founding congress,\(^{447}\) but also became a member of the movement’s Central Council.\(^{448}\) Later, however, Leont’ev seems to have left “Eurasia,” and founded instead his own Serafim Club which, in the meantime, seems to have also become defunct.\(^{449}\) In any way, the fanaticism of Leont’ev’s anti-Americanism has remained, and kept the substance and tone of his TV programs close to the direction and style of Dugin’s writings.

Professor Panarin was, in his own words, a representative of “late Eurasianism,”\(^{450}\) and, in the words of a detached observer, “a leading theoretician of modern Eurasianism.”\(^{451}\) His, perhaps, most important overtly ideological book *The Orthodox Civilization in the Global World*\(^{452}\) is a manifesto of anti-Westernism and Russian messianism\(^{453}\) that proclaims Russian Orthodoxy as a “universal project” and “world-wide

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\(^{447}\) A photograph of Dugin and Leont’ev together may be found in Valerii Stroev, “Analitiki o evrazistve,” *Evraziiskoe obozrenie*, no. 5 (11 February 2002): 2.


\(^{449}\) Verkhovskii, “Serafimovskii klub.”

\(^{450}\) As quoted in Mitrofanova, *Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira”*, 139.

\(^{451}\) Hofman, “No Love from Russia,” 33.


\(^{453}\) See the review of Sally Boss at: URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~sarmatia/405/254bossp.html.
historical alternative.” While ideas like these indicate well the reasons for Panarin’s support for Dugin, the Professor cannot be dismissed as a representative of a marginal tendency in Russian academia. Panarin held the Chair of Political Science at the Department of Philosophy of Moscow State University, and thus one of the most important posts in the Russian social science community until his early death in 2003. He was also Director of the Center for Social and Philosophical Studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a productive publicist and author or co-author of, among others, various monographs sold and recommended by the Russian Ministry of Education as philosophy and political science textbooks. In Soviet times, Panarin belonged to a social-democratic student dissident group, and was, for this reason, expelled from the Komsomol as well as Moscow State University. In 1989, Panarin, oddly, published a book critical of French neo-conservatism—an ideological trend that, in the very same year, was about to become a major source of inspiration for Dugin who was visiting Western Europe in 1989. At this time, Panarin was still an ardent proponent of democracy, liberalism, universalism, and, even, the Reformation (a position unusual for an Orthodox Chris-

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454 As quoted in Mitrofanova, Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira,” 140.
457 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Aleksandr Panarin kak zerkalo rossiiskoi revoyutsii,” unpublished paper (San Francisco 2005), 4. I am grateful to Professor Tsygankov for sending me, and letting me quote from, his important important intellectual biography of Panarin.
When in the mid-1990s, Panarin was turning towards Eurasianism, he was initially at pains to emphasize the difference between his “civilized” Eurasianism and its radical version promoted in such organs as Den’, Elementy and Nash sovremen- 
nik. Though Panarin was, in the mid-1990s, regarded as a representative of a version of Eurasianism more moderate than Dugin’s, he actually “rarely mentioned the founding-fathers of Eurasianism and, later, even attacked the ‘geographical determin-
ism’ that was conferred to them.” The “Eurasianist” Panarin seems thus to have had a strained relationship to the classics of Russian Eurasianism, reminding of the selectivity with which Gumilëv and Dugin have used them (a tendency to be analyzed below). Nevertheless, Panarin still “remained closer to the ideas of such founding-
fathers of Eurasianism as Petr Savitskii or Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi than the follow-
ers of the biologicist theories of Gumilëv or the supporters of extremely right-wing geopolitics pronounced by Dugin (in spite of the rapprochement of Dugin and Panarin during the last years of the latter).”

In 1999, a Russian social scientist called Panarin, in the reputed journal Europe-Asia Studies, “one of the most profound and original modern Russian scholars in the philosophy of politics.” Mitrofanova writes that “Panarin has always been one of the most respected political theorists in Russia.” In 2002, Panarin won the prestigious Solzhenitsyn Prize for two of his recent books, History’s Revenge: The Russian Strat-
egic Initiative in the 21st Century (a reply to Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History), and The Seduction by Globalism (on Russia’s distinctiveness from Western civil-
ization). By this time, Panarin had become an increasingly shrill voice of radical anti-Westernism, propagator of conspiracy theories, apologist of Stalinism, convert to anti-Semitism (warning against “Jewishization” of the world), and regular contributor to the well-known nationalist “thick journal” Moskva (Moscow). His ideas on an im-
peding conflict between the land- and sea-powers were becoming similar to Dugin’s. However, “Panarin’s reputation among the academics was by that time so

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460 Ibid., 9-11.
464 Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 151.
467 Tsygankov, “Aleksandr Panarin kak zerkalo rossiiskoi revoyutsii,” 15-22. One should add
firm that even the publication of evidently ‘ideological’ books was not able to shatter it.”468

At first, Panarin did, in contradiction to some press reports and scholarly analyses,469 not become a member of Dugin’s movement, but merely attended its founding congress in April 2001. What, nevertheless, indicates a certain closeness between Dugin and Panarin already in 2001 was that the scholar contributed articles to “Eurasia’s” first publications.470 Panarin also quoted Dugin’s above mentioned tome *Osnovy geopolitiki* affirmatively in some of his political science text books.471 In 2002, Panarin finally became a member of the Central Council of Dugin’s newly founded party “Eurasia.” According to Dugin, Panarin agreed to write a foreword to one of Dugin’s latest books *Filosofiya politiki* (Philosophy of Politics). Yet, Panarin’s illness and eventual passing away in September 2003 prevented him from doing so.472

Presumably, for neither of these two well-established figures in Russian society, Leont’ev and Panarin, an affiliation with an organization such as “Eurasia” was a necessity in terms of their respective careers in journalism and academia. Instead, it seems that Leont’ev and Panarin were genuinely attracted to Dugin and his ideas. With such prominent personalities and prolific commentators in their own right at his side, Dugin had, at the beginning of this decade, started making inroads into mainstream Russian politics, elite thinking, and society as a whole. It is especially surprising that a scholar like Panarin, by way of publicly supporting “Eurasia” and Dugin seemingly acknowledged the latter’s intellectual leadership although Dugin’s dubious intellectual and political biography is well-known, and though Dugin had only shortly

before been awarded a Candidate of Science degree from an obscure Rostov higher education institution (more on this below). Dugin was aware of the potential importance of Panarin’s support for his organization: At “Eurasia’s” founding congress, in his plenary speech, he immediately expressed his joy about Panarin’s presence in the auditorium. In a later speech reviewing the congress’s results, he again underscored Panarin’s presence (and that of another prominent publicist, Eduard Bagramov, editor of the journal Evraziya as a pleasant surprise. It is to be expected that Dugin’s approval by Panarin will further boost the status of Arktogeya’s numerous extremely anti-Western publications, and promote their usage by educational institutions, including universities.

Panarin’s turn to the extreme right reminds—to return briefly to the above comparison of late Imperial Germany with contemporary Russia—of the impact that the coming out of a German prominent academic, the historian Heinrich von Treitschke, as an antisemitite had on German society of the Wilhelmine period. Leonid Luks notes that

Treitschke who was among the most influential academic teachers of Berlin University contributed heavily to making antisemitic stereotypes respectable. In his lectures, on “politics” he described the alleged deficits of the “Jewish national character” with similar venom as he had done already in his publicistic work. […] Among Treitschke’s listeners who absorbed the message of the eloquent university lecturer were many students who would later be among the most active fighters against the so-called “Jewish threat.”

George Iggers points out that “[i]n Treitschke’s auditorium, there were the future leaders of the Pan-Germans […] as well as hundreds of later high officials, lecturers, army officers, etc. He succeeded in providing his ressentiment, his hate against so-

474 Laruelle’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 12.
cialists, Jews, the English and non-whites [...] with an aura of scholarly respectability.\textsuperscript{477} To be sure, the contents of Panarin's and Treitschke's writings and lectures are hardly comparable; yet, their respective roles within the academic establishments of their countries and times, to some degree, are.

Since the foundation of “Eurasia” in 2001, the development of the Dugin phenomenon has become difficult to follow. The number of Dugin’s appearances in the press, television, radio, World Wide Web, and various academic and political conferences has multiplied and can, therefore, be presented here only selectively.\textsuperscript{478} To fully document and adequately analyze the multitude of activities Dugin and his movement since “Eurasia’s” foundation in 2001 would constitute a separate research project. Already in 2002, one commentator reported that

\begin{quote}
[a]ccording to the data of the Effective Politics Foundation (headed by Gleb Pavlovskii) the frequency of mentioning [upominaemost’] of Dugin in the Russian mass media in the first half of 2002 was almost ten times [na porядок] higher than the [value of this] indicator for the respective period in 2000 had been.\textsuperscript{479}
\end{quote}

Below, I am mentioning thus only some of the various developments of the Dugin phenomenon in 2001-2006.

\textit{Dugin in Moscow High Politics}

For instance, in December 2001, Dugin and his followers apparently managed to hijack the VI World Russian Popular Assembly, an annual gathering of Orthodox and other religious believers held since 1993 under the aegis of the Russian Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{480} At this Assembly, high officials of the Russian government and churches were present, including President Vladimir Putin and the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russians Aleksii II. “Eurasia” apparently sponsored a number of presentations at this congress and managed to place two of its representatives, Dugin and Tadzhuddin, as speakers of the main Plenary Session of the congress. As a result, Dugin and Ta-

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[479]{Timur Polyannikov, “Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyshleniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’”}
\footnotetext[480]{Mitrofanova, \textit{The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy}, 221.}
\end{footnotes}
Dzhuddin had the opportunity to officially present themselves on a par with a number of influential Russian figures such as Putin and Aleksii II whom they explicitly addressed in their speeches. Dugin's publishing house Arktogeya-Tsentr produced, afterwards, a small collected volume which commemorated this occasion, with a print-run of 1,000. The book included apart from texts by Putin, Aleksii II, the Head of the Writers Union of Russia Valerii Ganichev, the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the Republic of Crimea Leonid Grach, pieces by various supporters of “neo-Eurasianism,” among them a number of academics sympathetic to Dugin, e.g. Aleksandr Panarin.  

Concerning Dugin’s growing presence in mass media, he has repeatedly appeared in, among others, Vladimir Pozner’s leading Russian weekly prime time analytical TV show on Channel 1 (ORT) Vremena (Times), Aleksandr Arkhangel’skii’s late-night high-brow talk-show on Channel 2 (RTR) Tem vremenem (At the Same Time), Vladimir Solovëv’s weekly NTV political show Voskresnyi vecher (Sunday Evening) as well as Andrei Malakhov’s popular Channel 1 (ORT) talk-show Pust’ govoryat (Let Them Talk). He has become a regular commentator in the Moskoviya TV Channel’s nationalistic analytical weekly program Russkii vzyvyad (The Russian View) led by the popular showman Ivan Demidov. Since 2005, he is the presenter of his own irregular TV talk-show Vekhi (Landmarks) at Russia’s new religious TV channel Spas (Saviour). 

Apart from Dugin’s frequent appearances in radio and television shows, it is worth-noting that he was, in 2003, a regular contributor for Literaturnaya gazeta (Literary Newspaper), one of Russia’s most reputed intellectual weekly newspapers, and led a column under the pseudonym Atsefal. In addition, Dugin is a somewhat less frequent contributor to the official Russian federal government newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta (Russian Newspaper). A Swiss journalist called Dugin in February 2006 an “influential political scientists” whose “permanent presence in the media has made him an authoritative speaker of the conservatives.”

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482 Personal observations in 2005-2006.  
484 A list of Dugin’s publications to Rossiiskaya gazeta may be found at URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.rg.ru/tema/avtor-Aleksandr-Dugin/.  
485 Ingold, “Patriotisches Krisenmanagement.”
In view of the above, Dugin's failure to transform his organization into a functional party in 2002-2003 cannot be taken as a measure for an adequate assessment of his current and future role in Russian society. As Dugin stated at the Founding Congress of his Movement on 21 April 2001: “Our aim is not to reach power and not to fight for power; our aim is to fight for influence on the power [holders]. These are different forms.” Dugin’s unsuccessful liaison with Rodina in summer 2003, his abortive attempt to participate in the State Duma elections of December 2003, and his eventual expulsion from the Party “Eurasia” by the party’s co-founder Petr Suslov in 2004 are thus of only limited relevance for an evaluation of his role in society.

What seems more important is that, during the last years, his indirect political influence has been rising further. In particular, the new shift of his organizational base from the Party “Eurasia” to the Mezdunarodnoe “Evraziiskoe dvizhenie” (International “Eurasian Movement”), founded in November 2003, became another breakthrough for Dugin in terms of his reach into the Russian political elite. The original “Eurasia” Movement of 2001 included prominent personalities, like Tadzhuddin, Panarin and Leont’ev, mainly from civil society. The only prominent exclusion to this rule was then Dmitrii Ryurikov who became a member of “Eurasia’s” Central Council. In the 1990s, Ryurikov had been a foreign policy advisor to Boris El’tsin. When “Eurasia” was founded in 2001, Ryurikov was the Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan.

While Ryurikov was a figure of exceptional status of the first “Eurasia” Movement founded in 2001, the leading body of Dugin’s new International “Eurasian Movement” of 2003 comprises—in addition to prominent civil society actors, academics from the C.I.S. and some minor Western intellectuals—also a number of representatives of the Russian government and parliament. In October 2006, the list of the members the Movement’s Highest Council included:

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from the Russian executive and legislative branches of power:

- Minister of Culture of the RF, Aleksandr Sokolov,
- Vice-Speaker of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the RF, Aleksandr Torshin,
- Chairman of the Committee on International Relations of the Federation Council, Mikhail Margelov,
- Advisor to the President of the RF, Aslambek Aslakhanov,
- former Deputy Foreign Minister and current Ambassador of the RF to Latvia, Viktor Kalyuzhnii,
- Ambassador of the RF to Denmark, Dmitrii Ryurikov,
- Head of the Department on Political Parties and Social Organizations of the Ministry of Justice of the RF, Aleksei Zhafyarov,
- Minister of Culture of the Republic of Yakutiya (Sakha) and Rector of the Arctic State Institute of Culture and Art, Andrei Borisov,
- Head of the State Committee for Property of the RF Territorial Directorate responsible for Moscow State University, Zeidula Yuzbekov,

from Russian civil society:

- Chief Mufti of the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Russia and European Countries of the C.I.S., Talgat Tadzhuddin,
- President of the National Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters and member of the Directorate of the Academy of Russian Television, Eduard Sagalaev,
- Head of the Council of Ambassadors of the RF and President of the Russian-Turkish Friendship Society “Rutam,” Al’bert Chernyshëv,
- Editor-in-Chief of the Russian army newspaper Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star), Nikolai Efimov,
- President of the Consulting Firm Neokon and founder of the WWW-Site Worldcrisis.ru, Mikhail Khazin,
- Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Vice-President of the Society of Georgians of Russia, Severian Zagarishvili,

- Head of the Congress of the Peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Secretary for National Issues of the Union of Writers of Russia, Brontoi Bedyurov,

(3) *from the C.I.S.:

- Rector of the Lev Gumilev Eurasian National University of Astana (Kazakhstan), Sarsyngali Abdymanapov,

- Ambassador of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to Russia and Head of the Council of Directors of Postnoft Ltd, Apas Dzhumagulov,

- Director of the Academy of Management attached to the Office of the President of Belarus and Director of the Research Institute on the Theory and Practice of Government of the Republic of Belarus, Evgenii Matusevich,

- Rector of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University of Bishkek, Vladimir Nufad’ev,

- Director of the Akhmad Donish Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences, Rakhim Masov,

- Rector of the Makhambet Utemisov Western Kazakhstan State University of Uralsk, Tuyakbai Ryzbekov,

- Leader of the *Bratstvo* (Brotherhood) Party, Ukraine, Dmitro Korchinskii,

- Leader of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, Nataliya Vitrenko,

(4) *from other countries:

- Head of the *İşçi Partisi* (Labour Party) of Turkey, Doğu Perinçek,

- French Air Force General (ret.) and leader of the Forum for France, Pierre-Marie Gallois,
- Director of the Center for Central Asian and Caucasian Studies at Luleå, Sweden, and Editor-in-Chief of the scholarly journal *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Murad Esenov,

- Lecturer of the Faculty of Policy Studies of Iwate Prefectural University, Japan, Yukiko Kuroiwa,489

- conspirologist and author of the book *Vladimir Poutine et l’Eurasie* (Charmes: Les Amis de la Culture Européenne, 2005), Jean Parvulesco,

- Editor-in-Chief of the Milano journal *Eurasia: Rivista di Studi Geopolitici* (of which Dugin is an editorial board member), Tiberio Graziani,

- Head of the Congress of Serbs of Eurasia (KSEA), Mila Alečković-Nikolić.490

In view of the above-listed members of the Russian executive and legislative branches of power in the International “Eurasian Movement,” Dugin’s claim, in September 2005, that the Kremlin supports what he is trying to do sounds plausible.491 To be sure, a mere presence of such persons as Culture Minister Sokolov, and Federation Council Deputy Speaker Torshin as well as International Affairs Committee Chairman Margelov in the register of the Highest Council of Dugin’s movement may not mean much in terms of these politicians’ ideological positions, and cannot be regarded as an endorsement of Dugin’s neo-fascist views. However, it does indicate that these highly placed figures are aware of Dugin, support, at least, partly his movement, and have become accessible to him. That Dugin has serious contacts within both, the Russian executive—including the presidential administration and government—and parliament is an indication of the breadth of his influence among Russia’s political elite.

Apart from the diversification of Dugin’s contacts into the higher echelons of power in Russia, he has recently become known as creator of a new youth organization called


491 Paul Goble, “Eurasians Organize ‘Anti-Orange’ Front in Russia, CIS,” *Johnson’s Russia List*, no. 9242 (2005), #27.
**Evraziiskii soyuz molodezhyi ESM** (Eurasian Youth Movement),\textsuperscript{492} and introduced as heir to Ivan the Terrible’s infamous personal guard and mystical order *oprichnina*. Founded on 26\textsuperscript{th} February 2005 and led by Pavel Zarifullin, the *ESM*’s explicitly stated aim is the prevention, through “direct action,” of events like the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in Russia. One of its first activities was its participation in a meeting in support of President Murtaza Rakhimov who has become known for the authoritarian methods of his rule and large-scale manipulation of elections, in Bashkortostan’s capital Ufa.\textsuperscript{493} Since its foundation, the *ESM* has established itself as such an active and prolific youth organization with branches in a number of former Soviet republics and a special section for children (*ESM*-*deti*) that an adequate coverage of the rise of this organization would demand a separate study.

In addition, Dugin has extended his international contacts since the foundation of his movement in 2001. They now range from Great Britain where he is in contact with Troy Southgate’s “New Right” to various intellectual and political figures in Turkey where he has become known as a leading Russian political commentator. Though it would be an overstatement to say, as Mitrofanova does, that the “Eurasia” section of the Serbian nationalist WWW-site “Komentar” is “basically stuffed with A. Dugin’s articles,”\textsuperscript{494} the “neo-Eurasianist” is present there and presumably has some following among the Serbian extreme right.\textsuperscript{495}

**Dugin’s “Academic Career”**

The above development mark important trends. Yet, what might be most relevant in terms of both, Dugin’s own idea of what his activities are about, and the depth and sustainability of his impact on Russian society, are his publicistic activities and their acceptance within Russia’s elites. Will his attempts to lastingly impregnate Russia’s and the C.I.S.’s intellectuals and politicians with his ideas—an enterprise that Dugin sees himself as more important than his various forays into the electoral arena—be successful? For an understanding of the Dugin phenomenon, Dugin’s eagerness to

\textsuperscript{492} Another (perhaps, virtual) organization initiated by Dugin are the so-called United Tatar-Mari-Hyperborean Forces. See Goble, “Eurasians Organize ‘Anti-Orange’ Front in Russia, CIS.”

\textsuperscript{493} Mitrofanova, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy*, 194. Interestingly, Dugin, at the same time, is opposed to Tatarstan’s President Mintimir Shaimiev. See Goble, “Eurasians Organize ‘Anti-Orange’ Front in Russia, CIS.”

\textsuperscript{494} Mitrofanova, *Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira,”* 246.

\textsuperscript{495} URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.komentar.co.yu/evroazija/index.php.
become a fully accepted member of academia is particularly revealing. It speaks
about both, how he understands himself as well as what the long-term prospects of
his role in Russian society might be.\textsuperscript{496} Whether Dugin will be in a position to enter
the Ivory Tower, make his pamphlets into text-books, and become accepted in scholar-
ly circles are major issues in assessing the chances of his project as he himself
understands it.

Indications that Dugin has, in spite of his pronounced anti-rationalism, aspired to be-
come integrated into Russia’s social sciences from the start of his publicistic activities
can be found in his early publications. In the blurb for his seminal and especially
phantasmorgic book \textit{Konspirologiya} of 1992,\textsuperscript{497} the

editorial collegium of the publisher [i.e. Dugin himself—A.U.] underlines that the present publication has a strictly scientific,

scholarly character though the specifics of the present theme

force one frequently to [turn to] non-traditional methods, to the

study of mythological paradigms and complicated sociological

laws.\textsuperscript{498}

In his seminal article “The War of the Continents” that was first published in the major
Russian extremely right-wing weekly \textit{Den’} and reprinted in \textit{Konspirologiya}, Dugin
praises Sir Halford Mackinder for having, in his science of geopolitics, established
“certain \textit{objective laws}.”\textsuperscript{499} While, in the second 2005 edition of \textit{Konspirologiya},
Dugin, interestingly, admits that the 1992 first edition contained “many now obvious
absurdities, inconsistencies, imprecisions and overstatements,” he still claims that
this was a “serious analysis of serious events,” and that the mistakes “were corrected
later in our serious and valid scholarly [\textit{nauchnye}] studies.”\textsuperscript{500} In another book, Dugin
admits too that his aim of a Conservative Revolution “does not constitute a ready-

\textsuperscript{496} Needless to say that such behavior is in stark contrast to, for instance, the self-
perception of Adolf Hitler who even “refused to accept honorary doctorates.” Laqueur,
\textit{Fascism}, 20.

\textsuperscript{497} There is contradictory information on the publication year of the copy that I have in my
archive: The title sheet gives 1993 as the publication year, while the copyright statement
contains the number 1992.

\textsuperscript{498} Dugin, \textit{Konspirologiya}, 2. A similar point is made in Mitrofanova, \textit{The Politicization of
Russian Orthodoxy}, 147.

\textsuperscript{499} Dugin, \textit{Konspirologiya}, 92, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{500} Aleksandr Dugin, “Konspirologiya—veselaya nauka postmoderna,” in his, \textit{Konspirologiya
(nauka o zagovorakh, sekretnyh obshchestvakh i tainoi voine)} (Moskva: ROF “Evrazi-
made model,” yet that it “can also not be reduced to a phantastic voluntaristic pro-
ject.”

Since his early publications, Dugin has tirelessly and with increasing professionalism
worked towards publicizing his ideas among educated citizens of the former Soviet
Union. In September 1998, he launched an attempt to establish his own “New Uni-
versity”—a series of high-brow lectures and seminars for his Moscow followers.

Mitrofanova noted in 2005 that “[o]rganizing exhibitions of books by Aleksandr Dugin
in various cities and countries seems to be the central preoccupation of the Interna-
tional ‘Eurasian Movement,’” and that Dugin has explicitly “formulated the task of
restructuring the elite’s consciousness, stating that the ‘xenomorphous’ (i.e. non-
Russian) elite should be impelled to give an oath of allegiance to the Russian na-
tion.”

Whether Dugin will manage to leave the ghetto of fringe publicism with which he is
still associated among Russian intellectuals depends on whether he will be accepted
in mainstream academic discourse. To be sure, there is, in principle, nothing to be
said against an entry of persons with unusual biographies into academia, and, in par-
ticular, against greater diversity in post-Soviet social sciences. However, a number
of Russian self-made “scholars” like Dugin have made it their aim not only to enter aca-
demia, but also to radically transform basic criteria of what constitutes science, what
scholarly research is about, and to permit bodies of thought such as occultism, mysti-
cism, esotericism, conspirology, etc. into higher education and scholarship that
would bring down the borders between science and fiction, and blur the distinction be-
tween scholarly and non-scholarly texts. While pluralism in academia may be as valuable as
in other spheres of life, “[t]he gatekeeping functions of the academy cannot be abol-
ished by a wistful appeal to diversity.”

Mitrofanova who is both an observer and participant of the elite stratum that Dugin
wishes to enter writes of him as still belonging to a circle of “new intellectuals” not
accepted among the academic establishment.

In terms of their style, the works of the “new intellectuals” remind
one of the scholarly tractates of the Middle Ages and Renaissance:

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501 Dugin, Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya, 3.
504 Ibid., 192.
505 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001), 5.
absence of footnotes, references to authorities as providing proof, [and] mixing of reliable with unreliable information. Instead of calling the “new sciences” false, one could regard them as a sign of an ar-
chaization of science, its return to former forms.\textsuperscript{506}

It remains to be seen whether Dugin will be able to enter mainstream scholarly discourse, become integrated into the academic establishment, and thus gain opportunities to influence, above all, the educated young. One might, in this connection, recall that, in the inter-war years, “[s]tudents were strong supporters of the fascist move-
ments in Spain and Romania, and so in these countries fascism was in the early years a phenomenon confined mainly to particular universities. Likewise, the Nazis emerged victorious in Germany’s university elections well before they became a major political factor nationwide.”\textsuperscript{507} While, at the point of finishing this study, it is still an open question whether extremely right-wing ideas will gain a lasting foothold in Russian academia comparable to the advance of racial studies into mainstream German academia during the Weimar Republic, Panarin’s above mentioned interest for Dugin’s activities indicate that the leader of the International “Eurasian Movement” has done already a first step into the Ivory Tower of Russian higher education and scholarship by 2001. Further aspects of his rise also illustrate Dugin’s gradual entry into intellectual elite circles, and the higher education system.

For instance, two scholars from a reputed Moscow higher education institution who seem to have endorsed Dugin by way of contributing to a collected volume of conference papers published by the “Eurasia” Movement\textsuperscript{508} are the Professors Viktor Zotov\textsuperscript{509} and Anatolii Ushkov\textsuperscript{510} who both hold the degree of a Doctor of Science (Dr.Sc.) in Philosophy, and teach at the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of the Russian University of People’s Friendship—once a major Soviet institution for educating foreign students.\textsuperscript{511} Though it is of some importance that Zotov and Ushkov did not hesitate to submit their papers for a volume published by “Eurasia,” it also needs to be mentioned that this volume was

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{506} Mitrofanova, \textit{Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira,”} 186.
\bibitem{507} Laqueur, \textit{Fascism}, 19.
\bibitem{509} URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/49663.
\bibitem{510} URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/49713.
\bibitem{511} URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.rudn.ru/.
\end{thebibliography}
the above-mentioned collection of presentations at the VI World Russian Popular Sobor hijacked by “Eurasia,” and that neither Zotov nor Ushkov recommend Dugin’s books in the study program of their university courses on the history of Western, Russian and Eastern political thought.\textsuperscript{512} Concerning Ushkov, one might add though that he affirmatively quotes Dugin in his cited contribution,\textsuperscript{513} and recommends numerous anti-Western texts, among them those by above-mentioned Ivan Il’in, Lev Gumilëv, and Aleksandr Panarin, in his university syllabus.\textsuperscript{514} At least Ushkov might thus be counted among Dugin’s open supporters.

Academics in the Urals who are—more obviously so than the mentioned Moscow professors—close to Dugin are, at Chelyabinsk State University, Galina Sachko, Candidate of Science in Philosophy, Associate Professor (dotsent) and Dean of the Faculty of Eurasia and the East,\textsuperscript{515} and, at the Urals State University of Technology, Professor Stanislav Nekrasov, Dr.Sc. in Philosophy, who also works at the Urals State Conservatory in Ekaterinburg.\textsuperscript{516} As shown below, Dugin’s connections to academics in the Southern Russian city of Rostov-on-the-Don seem to be particularly well-developed. Among Dugin’s followers in Rostov is, for instance, Professor Tama-ra Matyash, Dr.Sc. in Philosophy and holder of a chair at the Instituted for Further and Continued Education at Rostov State University.\textsuperscript{517}

Although Mitrofanova claimed in 2004 that “not a single traditional scholar will seriously consider […] a dissertation written on the basis of the ‘methodology of integral Traditionalism,’”\textsuperscript{518} she reports herself extensively on Dugin’s success in obtaining the degrees of a Candidate of Science in Philosophy, and Doctor of Political Science at Rostov. Like myself, Mitrofanova has been wrong in stating that Dugin defended

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{512} See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/31326; ;
  \item URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/31329.
  \item URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/31329. Mitrofanova mentions Professor V.Y. Pashchenko as a supporter of Eurasianism at Moscow State University’s Faculty of Philosophy. However, Pashchenko supports the Eurasianist G.V. Vernadskii’s idea of genetic link between the Slavs and Mongols, rather than Dugin’s occultist theories on Eurasia. Mitrofanova, \textit{Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira,”} 139.
  \item URL (last accessed October 2006): http://old.russ.ru//authors/stnek.html.
  \item Mitrofanova, \textit{Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira,”} 185.
\end{itemize}
his *kandidatskaya* at Rostov State University\(^\text{519}\) when, in fact, the defence took place under the chairmanship of Yu.A. Zhdanov (apparently, a relative of former Central Committee Secretary Andrei Zhdanov) on 20 December 2000 at an institution called the North-Caucasian Higher School Scientific Center.\(^\text{520}\) The title of Dugin's Candidate of Science dissertation was “The Evolution of the Paradigmatic Foundations of Science: A Philosophical-Methodological Analysis” which was later published as a book.

The only significant instance of protest against Dugin's entry into the academic establishment through the conferment of a Candidate of Science degree seems to have come from Professor Dr.Sc. Boris Georgievich Rezhabek, a biologist, ecologist and philosopher at Rostov-on-the-Don.\(^\text{521}\) who published two (seemingly identical) articles against Dugin after, in late 2000, the head of *Arktogeya* managed to defend his *kandidatskaya*.\(^\text{522}\) Rezhabek wrote that, contrary to Dugin's own claims, young Dugin was exmatriculated from the Moscow Institute of Aviation not for anti-Soviet activities, but insufficient performance. Whether this is the case or not, Dugin never finished a regular higher education degree program, and the question arises how he was admitted to a postgraduate degree examination. Rezhabek reports that “the ideologist of the 'Conservative Revolution' presented to the Academic Council [at Rostov] a.... diploma from the Extra-Mural Department of the Novocherkassk Institute of Melioration Engineering!”\(^\text{523}\) As Mitrofanova comments, Rezhabek implied that this diploma from Novocherkassk may have been obtained in an irregular way.\(^\text{524}\) At least, it is safe to note that melioration engineering is not a subject closely related to Dugin's dissertation subject of philosophy of science.

What was noteworthy in this defence is that the *vedushchaya organizatsiya* (leading organization)—a specific Soviet/post-Soviet institution within a postgraduate research


\(^{521}\) A short biography of Rezhabek might be found at URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.rel.org.ru/cgi-bin/script.cgi?action=show&file=10030.


\(^{524}\) Ibid.
degree procedure, designed to secure outside evaluation of research submitted for the acquisition of an academic degree—was the Department of Philosophy and Methodology of Science of the Faculty of Public Administration of Russia’s most prestigious institution of higher learning, Moscow State University (Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet—MGU). In addition, Prof. V.G. Kuznetsov as a representative of Moscow State University, namely of Panarin’s Faculty of Philosophy, though not having been present at the defence in person, played the role of Dugin’s official “opponent” in this procedure.525

This kandidatskaya defence is well-documented as Dugin has put the procedure’s stenogramm on the WWW,526 and as above-mentioned Rostov biology professor Boris Rezhabek has commented on the event. Rezhabek complains, for instance, that, among the five “scholarly works” listed by Dugin in order to fulfil the publishing requirement of the Highest Attestation Commission (Visshaya attestatsionnaya komissiya—VAK) of the Ministry of Education for obtaining a Candidate of Science degree, there were “four published in Dugin’s own publishing house Arktogeya, and only one, with little relation to the theme of the dissertation, in the journal Filosofiya khozyaistva (Philosophy of Economics).”527

In 2004, Dugin defended, contrary to an information by Mitrofanova who again mentions Rostov State University,528 his doktorskaya (a second doctoral degree comparable to the German Habilitation necessary to pass in order to acquire the right to a full professorship) at another, in connection to Dugin’s dissertation subject, unusual institution—the Rostov Juridical Institute of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation.529 In 2001, this Institute’s Deputy Director for Academic Affairs, Police Colonel and Professor Viktor Vereshchagin, Dr.Sc. in Philosophy, had been a contributor to a collected volume edited by Dugin’s Eurasia Movement, and performed as Dugin’s dissertation supervisor at the defence of the kandidatskaia.530 The subject of Dugin’s thesis presented to the Juridical Institute was “The Transformation of Political Structures and Institutes in the Process of Modernization of a Traditional Society.”

525 Rezhabek, “Merzlaya zemlya evraziitsa Dugina.”
527 Rezhabek, “Merzlaya zemlya evraziitsa Dugina.”
Once more, most noteworthy about this defence was that Moscow State University played, in this procedure too, the role of the “leading organization.”\textsuperscript{531}

It should be also noted that, in distinction to the ambivalent situation with Dugin’s formal fulfilment of the publishing requirement for obtaining the Candidate degree, Dugin duly fulfilled this formality in the case of the defence of doktorskaya. He seems to have, simply, submitted 32 of his previously published publicistic and political articles for a re-publication to a yearbook and some minor scholarly journals with titles like \textit{Ekonomicheskaya teoriya na poroge XXI veka} (Economic Theory on the Threshold to the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century), \textit{Filosofiya khozyaistva} (Economic Philosophy) and \textit{Filosofiya prava} (Legal Philosophy).\textsuperscript{532} The VAK that, formally, confers the doktor nauk title demands twenty publications in periodicals or collected volumes explicitly accepted as scholarly by the VAK for conferring the degree of a Doctor of Philosophy. Apparently, Dugin re-published his previous statements in the three minor periodicals solely for the sake of fulfilling this requirement. The leading “neo-Eurasianist” now, as

\textsuperscript{531} While this aspect of Dugin’s academic career provides his Candidate and Doctor degrees with some legitimacy, it should be also noted that it is, altogether, not that surprising that Moscow State University agreed to play such a role in Dugin’s dissertation defense. As mentioned above, on MGU's Philosophy Deparment’s most influential professor, Aleksandr Panarin, had, until his death in 2003, been emerging as a supporter of Dugin’s projects. Also, this most reputed of Russia’s universities did in the 1990s not hesitate to confer the degree of Doctor of Science in Philosophy to such “scholars” as above-mentioned Gennadii Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Not only were the texts submitted by Zyuganov (“Major Tendencies and Mechanisms of Socio-Political Changes in Contemporary Russia,” 1995) and Zhirinovskii (“The Past, Present and Future of the Russian Nation,” 1997) hardly proper dissertations, but rather extended political pamphlets with footnotes. Zyuganov and Zhirinovskii also did not fulfil some crucial formal requirements for the conferral of a doktor nauk. Neither of the politicians had a sufficient amount of papers published in recognized scholarly journals which is a requirement that needs to be fulfilled to be admitted to a defense of a doktorskaya, in the first place. Zhirinovskii, moreover, was admitted to the defense of a doktorskaya without ever having defended a kandidatskaya (something Zyuganov had been able to accomplish during his apparatchik career in Soviet times at Moscow’s so-called Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee). These and a number of similar examples illustrate both, the importance which Russian political actors attach to formal academic qualifications and the degree of corruption of the Russian higher education system. See Aleksandr Kats, “Doktor Zyuganov,” URL (last accessed October 2006): http://zhurnal.lib.ru/k/kac_a_s/zuganov.shtml; S.G. Egorov, “Gorbachev vchina,” \textit{Duel'}, no. 25(47) (1997), URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.duel.ru/199725/?25_3_1; Artem Verindub, “Slantsy Putina,” \textit{Russkii Newsweek}, 7 June 2004, URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.duel.ru/199725/?25_3_1; Dmitrii Simakin, “Doktora nevidimogo fronta,” \textit{Nezavisimaya gazeta}, 24 March 2006, URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.ng.ru/inquiry/2006-03-24/1_doctors.html; Nikolai Aruev, “Akh, uvazhaemye kolligyi, dotsenty s kandidatami,” \textit{Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti}, no. 21(2411) (2001), URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.mathsoc.spb.ru/formu/aruev.html.

\textsuperscript{532} See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://science.dugin.ru/.
Mitrofanova notes, prefers to be called “doktor Dugin”—in Russia, an unusual way of addressing a scientist who is not a physician.533

What was, perhaps, most noteworthy in Dugin’s 2004 doktorskaya defence was that the prominent Russian political sociologist and philosopher Professor Aleksandr Tsipko played the role of Dugin’s official “opponent” in the dissertation defence at Rostov, and thus, like his late colleague at Moscow State University Professor Aleksandr Panarin, contributed to giving a certain clout to Dugin’s academic career. Tsipko had, for years, been affiliated to the social-democratic Gorbachev Foundation and plays, in his TV and other mass media appearances, the role of a patriotic, yet moderate commentator. In the early 1990s, he did, though, also attract some attention with his idiosyncratic theory on the origins of Russian Bolshevism in which he claimed a pre-eminence of non-Russian factors in the emergence of Soviet totalitarianism.534 Concerning Moscow State University’s role in Dugin’s entry into the academic establishment, it, finally, needs to be mentioned that, since February 2006, Dugin has been teaching a course on “Post-Philosophy: The Problem of Philosophy under the Conditions of Post-Modernity” at MGU’s Philosophy Department—a fact that was not left unmentioned at Arktogeya’s WWW sites.535

III.5.3 The Role of “Neo-Eurasianism” in Dugin’s Political Mimicry536

How was Dugin able to gain such wide acceptance among Russia’s academic and political elite? A major tool in Dugin’s Gramscian strategy and attack on the still prominent position of more or less liberal political values and pro-Western (or, at least, not radically anti-Western) attitudes among intellectuals and leaders of post-Soviet Russia has been the above-mentioned term “Eurasianism”—or his new construct “neo-

536 This section is partly based on Umland, “Kulturhegemoniale Strategien der russischen extremen Rechten."
Eurasianism”—itself.  

Whereas Dugin has, during his groupuscular phase in the early 1990s, used frequently terms like “Traditionalism,” “New Socialism” and “Conservative Revolution” for describing his views, this changed towards the end of the decade in the course of his gradual inclusion into the political establishment, and embrace of “New Right” tactics. In the words of one of his former accomplices, in the late 1990s, “Aleksandr Dugin started active cooperation with the authorities replacing the, by definition, extremist ‘National Bolshevism’ [for self-description] to the more [politically] correct ‘Eurasianism’ [for labelling his own ideology].” In as far as “Eurasia” and “Eurasianism” are greatly inflated words in contemporary Russia, this would, by itself, hardly be a fact worth noting. For instance, the prominent Russian ethnologist Viktor Shtirel’man noted already in 1996:

The Eurasianist movement that blossomed in the Russian émigré scene in the 1920-1930s is experiencing, in our times, a kind of second birth. The ideas of Eurasianism have been adopted [podkhvacheny] to one degree or another by the intellectual elite of the establishment of Russia—and not only inside her. In particular, everybody will remember the April 1994 project of the President of Kazakhstan for the creation of a Eurasian Union. The ideas of Eurasianism are regarded with sympathy by such—in terms of their world views and aspirations—different actors as the former (until 1993) advisor to the Russian president S[ergei] Stankevich [on the one side] and the leader of the communists G[ennadii] Zyuganov [on the other], one of the inspirators [v dokhnovitele] of the “spiritual opposition” A[leksandr] Prokhanov in collaboration with a whole number of other patriotically oriented writers [on the one hand] and the film director N[ikita] Mikhalkov [on the other], the well-known linguist Viach[eslav] V. Ivanov and literary critic V[adim] Kozhinov. The Eurasianist ideology is propagated by the russocentric literary-artistic journal Nash sovremmenik [Our Con-

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537 The most profound study of classical Eurasianism published so far is: Marlène Laruelle, L’idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire. Preface by Patrick Sériot (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999). There is also an excellent Russian translation of the book to which I will refer below: Marlen Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva ili Mysli o velichii imperii (Moskva: Natalis, 2004).

538 Maler, “National-bol’shevizm: konets temy.”

539 For an overview of the various denotations of “Eurasianism” in post-Soviet Russia, see Fischer, Eurasismus.
temporary] as well as the organ of the Russian Academy of Sciences Oboşchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’ [Social Sciences and the Contemporary World]. All of the theories [postroeniya] of the nowadays so popular geographer and historian Lev N. Gumilëv [see below—A.U.]—whose collected works are, with big pomp, currently published by the librarian association Tanais—are, with very rare exceptions, elevated to [the status of] Eurasianist sources.540

Anastasiya Mitrofanova made a similar observation, eight years later:

While, in the early 1990s, they could be found only in marginal journals printed on bad paper paid for by the authors themselves, today, one encounters references to Eurasianism (both, direct and indirect) in presentations of the most moderate political actors and the articles of respected scholars. Eurasian ideas are spread over the whole political spectrum; they can be found even in addresses of the highest state officials.541


Thus, Dugin’s self-description as a “neo-Eurasianist” constitutes nothing particular in post-Soviet Russia. What makes this issue interesting here is that Dugin has, largely, succeeded in impressing on both Russian and Western observers the notion that he is indeed a new Eurasianist thinker, and thus writes within in the tradition of a well-respected school of thought within the modern Russian history of ideas. This became

his entry ticket into mainstream Russian political discourse. It is the success of Dugin’s purposeful political mimicry—the effective representation of his world-view and movement within a much broader, popular intellectual and political tendency in post-Soviet Russia—that seems to be the key to his recent advances. By way of stylizing himself as a major representative and innovator of classical Eurasianism, Dugin has succeeded in distracting public image from his earlier groupuscular strategy of an unashamed embrace of fascism during the 1990s, and in persuading Russia’s elite of the “centrism” of his political position and benignness of his aims today. “Eurasianism” has been Dugin’s device of entryism allowing him at once to both, sneak in, and manipulate, the intellectual and political mainstream.

Dugin’s re-interpretation of the highly respected world-view of Eurasianism reminds of the strategy of Germany’s inter-war “conservative revolutionaries” and their purposeful stretching of such, in the Weimar Republic, popular notions as “socialism” and “democracy” to fit their ultra-nationalist aims. Dugin’s introduction of the term “neo-Eurasianism,” in turn, is reminiscent of the post-1968 European New Right which introduced the construct “ethnopluralism” as a euphemistic term for covering its neo-racist ideology and attempted to utilize the today popular notion of pluralism for anti-democratic aims. Not only has Dugin succeeded in manipulating “Eurasianism” in a way that has allowed him to enter the Russian political and intellectual establishment. In many, if not most Russian and non-Russian scholarly analyses too, Dugin’s movement is acknowledged as representing a revival of the Russian émigré intellectual movement of the 1920s-1930s that called itself and became known as “Eurasianism.” It is for this reason—many academics’ acceptance of the Eurasianist credentials of Dugin and the scholarly clout this gives to Dugin’s claims—that this misleading contextualization of the Dugin phenomenon needs to be addressed in more detail.

As mentioned, Dugin’s intellectual biography indicates that his political thinking and world view have, initially, been formed by other schools of thought than classical

542 Pfahl-Traugber, Konservative Revolution und Neue Rechte.
543 E.g. Michael Kleineberg and Markus Kaiser, „Eurasien“—Phantom oder reales Entwicklungsmodell für Rußland? “ Universität Bielefeld. Fakultät für Soziologie. Forschungsschwerpunkt Entwicklungssozioologie—Working Paper, no. 338 (2001), as well as many other secondary sources on Dugin listed above and below. Interestingly, some sections of the West European extreme right have started to consciously use the concept too. See, for example, Carlo Terracciano, Revolte gegen die moderne Weltordnung: Die revolutionäre Aktualität des Werkes von Julius Evola im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Bliestorf: Regin-Verlag, 2005). The issue of the kind and degree of Dugin’s influence on the West European extreme right could be a fascinating subject for future research.
Eurasianism, not the least by Western authors. Such an interpretation departs from Kaledin’s who asserted a primary importance of Russian authors for Dugin, and sees Western sources—in particular Traditionalism—coming in only at a second stage. Kaledin writes:

Simply, Dugin earlier than others read the works of P[etr] P. Semenov-Tyan-Shanskii, I[van] I'ilin, N[ikolai] Danilevskii, N[ikolai] Alekseev, N[ikolai] Berdyaev and L[ev] Gumilev who wrote about the continental might of Russia and her messianic role in unifying around her all peoples. The merit of Dugin is, merely, that he synthesized their ideas with philosophical Traditionalism […].

On the contrary: Russian authors such as the ones mentioned by Kaledin were adopted by Dugin only later on in order to “nativize” his world view which remained fundamentally indebted to Western sources.

Dugin’s Intellectual Biography

The future “Neo-Eurasianist,” according to Mark Sedgwick, translated into Russian (apparently from German), as early as 1981, i.e. at the age of 19, Baron Julius Evola’s Pagan Imperialism which was, oddly, freely available in Russia’s largest, Lenin Library. In fact, Evola’s books had already been “discovered in the Lenin Library in Moscow by Jamal [i.e. Geidar Dzhemal, a close associate of Dugin in the 1980s; see below—A.U.] and a few other dissidents [also linked to Dugin] shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis [in 1962].” In 1991, at the age of 29, Dugin translated into Russian

544 See Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereustoit’ mir.”
545 Thomas Parland makes the following, more apt observation by way of juxtaposing Dugin’s and KPRF-leader Gennadii Zyuganov’s ideas: “Dugin is more influenced by [West] European antiliberal rightism in general and German national socialism in particular, whereas [Gennadii] Zyuganov’s ideas are coloured by Russian conservative thought (Nikolai Danilevskii, Ivan I’llin, Ivan Solonevich, [Lev] Gumilevi) combined with parts of [Joseph] Stalin’s legacy as well as with elements of Western thought (Arnold J. Toynbee, Samuel Huntington, i.a.). Dugin is obsessed by occultism, whereas Zyuganov is rather an eclectic thinker and pragmatic politician.” Parland, The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia, 138.
546 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 5, 221-222. According to another report, already in his youth, Dugin was to such a degree interested in Nazism that he, being member of a student rock-group, co-produced a so-called “Hans-Zivers-Songs’ collection which praised sadism, decadence and SS romantics.” Timur Polyannikov, “Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyshleniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’” Kontinent [Kazakhstan], nos. 21(83), 22(84) & 24(86), 2002, URL (last accessed October 2006): http://centrasia.org/newsA.php4?st=1039820400. However, this information is not cor-
and published *The Crisis of the Modern World*, the major work of René Guénon—founder of a Western intellectual movement that became known as Traditionalism. A commentator from Kazakhstan claimed that “it was exactly with this book with which in the 1960s [Evgenii] Golovin’s and [Geidar] Dzhemal’s [two of Dugin’s major teachers, see below—A.U.] fascination with Traditionalism started which is why [this book] can rightly be called the ‘true source and secret of Duginism’.”

Dugin himself specified in a 2006 interview that his intellectual formation happened in 1979-1980 when becoming acquainted with the traditionalists of the “third way,” those like [Eduard] Golovin and [Geidar] Dzhemal. Therefore, my formation as a personality, as an intellectual, as a thinker, as a politician, as an ideologue was exactly traditionalistic. [...] I was 17-18 years old and saw the world as absolutely empty and disgusting. This emptiness had to be filled with something. The alternatives which were offered to me—the intelligentsia with [Bulat] Okudzhava, half-dissidents reading [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn, the inert conformist Orthodox—did not fill this emptiness at all [...]. The only thing which could fill this gigantic inner emptiness which I had was the total rejection of everything modern within the framework of the ultra-revolutionary traditionalist non-conformist intellectualism of [René] Guénon and [Julius] Evola. [...] That is how I was formed. In 1981-82, I was already a full-fledged [zakonchenny] philosopher with an own intellectual agenda, with an own metaphysic and ideology. [...] I did not mature any more [Bol’she ya ne vzrosle].

One would have to add that, with regard to Guénon himself, it is—reminding somewhat the issue of “neo-Eurasianism”—not clear whether Dugin can be justifiedly called the former’s legitimate follower, and an authentic representative of perennial philosophy. That is because Dugin, for example, often seems to locate the beginnings of the primordial “Tradition” only in one particular—i.e. the Eurasian—civilization rather than in an ancient religious order embracing the whole of humanity. The latter universalistic aspects of Guénon’s world view—sometimes reminiscent of the *Ringparabel* in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s (1729-1781) famous drama-play *Na-
than, the Wise (1779)—are thus lost in Dugin’s historiosophy. Dugin’s Traditionalism—if one is prepared to accept such a designation—is more similar to that of Julius Evola. James Gregor even identified Evola as the principal source for Dugin. In connection with this circumstance, Shenfield’s argument that it is exactly Dugin’s Traditionalism that “identifies [him] unequivocally as a fascist” is not only conceptually unsound, and has more to do with Shenfield’s idiosyncratic definition of fascism than with Guénon’s original Traditionalism. Shenfield’s statement seems also empirically questionable in as far as the peculiar kind of Traditionalism that Dugin learnt from Evola and that he further manipulated into what was to become “neo-Eurasianism” has, arguably, not much to do with perennial philosophy as understood by the original Traditionalists any more.

A reason for this might be that other Western theorists—some of whom had no connection to Traditionalism whatsoever—also had considerable influence on Dugin. Wayne Allensworth wrote, in his informative analysis of contemporary Russian nationalism published in 1998, that “Dugin appropriated (almost wholesale) the ideas of the Belgian geopolitical theorist Jean Thiriart,” a Belgian former pro-Nazi activist, and co-founder of West European post-war neo-fascist, anti-Western “National Bolshevism” (more in the Appendix). The most important source of Dugin’s 1991-1992 seminal article “The War of the Continents” seems to have been the Romanian New Right conspiriologist Jean Parvulesco, and, in particular, Parvulesco’s 1989 report The GRU Galaxy: The Secret Mission of Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR, and the Future of the Eurasian Continent which, allegedly, Parvulesco had, personally, given to Dugin. There, Parvulesco, according to Dugin’s reference, spoke of the “Eurasian Order” as having been particularly active in the early 20th century.

Oddly, neither Parvulesco nor Dugin mention in this connection the circle of the classical Eurasianists, but rather an obscure “St. Petersburg doctor Bamaev” as well as, among others, Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg, Marshall Tukhachevskii, or

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549 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 268.
550 Gregor, “Andreas Umland and the ‘Fascism’ of Alexander Dugin.”
551 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 195.
552 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World.
553 Allensworth, The Russian Question, 251.
GRU founder Semën I. Aralov. Moreover, when speaking about the Russian “Eurasianist Order’s” white section in Europe—i.e. its representatives in the Russian anticommunist émigré scene—in his “The Great War of the Continents” (1991-1992), Dugin does also not mention the classical Eurasianists. Instead, he speaks about representatives of this Order in the Abwehr [Nazi Germany’s counter-intelligence unit—A.U.], and later also in the foreign sections of the SS and SD (especially of the SD, the chief of which [Reinhard Tristian] Heydrich [1904-1942; a mastermind of the Holocaust—A.U.] was himself a devoted Eurasianist which is why he became a victim of the intrigues of the Atlanticist [Wilhelm Franz] Canaris [1887-1945; one of the leaders of the German military Widerstand against Hitler—A.U.]).

As illustrated before, Dugin has, in some of his writings, acknowledged the influence of Western schools of thought, like Traditionalism, the Conservative Revolution or geopolitics, on “neo-Eurasianism.” Yet, in his Manifesto of the Eurasian Movement, he, in contradiction to the above autobiographical statement, put the various schools of thought reflected in “neo-Eurasianism” in a different order, and claimed that his ideology emerged by way of

[p]roceeding from the heritage of the Russian Eurasianists of the 1920s-1930s, incorporating the spiritual experience of the tradition of Russian Orthodoxy from ancient times to today, enriching itself with the social criticism of the Russian narodniki and European “New Left,” evaluating anew the achievements of the Soviet epoch of the fatherland’s history, and, in addition, mastering the philosophy of Traditionalism and Conservative Revolution, [and] a developed geopolitical methodology […]

This statement is similar to the one by Kaledin, and not only deliberately confuses the temporal order of the impact of various sources of “neo-Eurasianism” on Dugin (and, probably, lets the mentioned Russian and Western left-wingers turn in their graves). It also camouflages the pre-eminence of Western ideas for his intellectual development. Dugin changes here and in other statements the order of primacy for obvious

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555 Dugin, Konspirologiya, 100-101.
556 Ibid., 102.
reasons: He, being an ultranationalist, needs to make sure to not appear as an importer of Western ideas into Russia—a trait that could become an image problem similar to those mentioned with regard to Barkashov and Limonov. When still following a groupuscular strategy and openly posing as a radical (and not “centrist,” as today), he freely admitted the influence of the German “Conservative Revolution” and German National Bolshevik Ernst Niekisch (see Appendix). Yet, he felt it necessary to clarify that “National Bolshevism”—a construct he especially frequently used to describe his views in the 1990s—is, nevertheless, an “extremist Russian ideology.”

What Dugin’s activities are about is well-summarized in the following observation by Wayne Allensworth:

The [Russian] New Right, through its chief ideologist, Aleksandr Dugin, [...] borrows heavily from the ideological arsenal of the European Right in an effort to renew the Russian Idea, but it has not repudiated those Russian thinkers of the past who are considered the precursors of the new synthesis. Dugin’s ruminations on the nation forming aspects of geography may be Spengleresque, and he borrows heavily from the language of the [German] conservative revolution’s cultural system. But [Nikolai] Danilevskii, [Konstantin] Leont’ev and especially Lev Gumilëv and the Eurasianists of the 1920s and 1930s are given their due.

For example, as a result of the impact of integral Traditionalism for Dugin’s thought, he has distanced himself from the classical Eurasianist view of Orthodoxy as being superior to Islam. Instead, he has put “traditional Islam” (as opposed to supposedly non-traditional Wahhabism) on one level with Russian Orthodoxy. While the classical Eurasianists had also sympathies for Islam, they wrote negatively about the Koran. They attacked Eastern religions—not the least Buddhism—as being “Satanic.” Dugin, on the contrary, has openly shown sympathy for many Eastern religions, and made positive references to representatives of Western Satanism. For Dugin, Orthodoxy by itself plays obviously a less important role than it did for the

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559 Allensworth, The Russian Question, 259.
560 Novikova and Sizemskaya, “Dva lika evraziistva.”
561 Mitrofanova, Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira,” 137; idem, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 52.
562 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 183.
563 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 185-186.
classical Eurasianists who were already by their upbringing devout Orthodox believers. Dugin, in contrast, has only recently become a member of an Orthodox Church of the Old Belief which, however, accepts the supremacy of the Moscow Patriarchy. Being framed by the ideas of Evola and other Traditionalists, Dugin sees Orthodoxy only as one of several religions that have preserved the initial “Tradition.” No such ideas can be found in classical Eurasianism. Whereas classical Eurasianism may well count as a brand of—what Mitrofanova calls—“political Orthodoxy,” Dugin’s “neo-Eurasianism” should, contrary to a classification made by Mitrofanova too, perhaps not.564

The classical Eurasianist point of view concerning the separateness of different civilizations from each other is, in some regards, similar to Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations. In contrast, Dugin puts, in a Guénonian vein, more emphasis on a conflict between Eurasian Orthodox, Islamic, Buddhist and other civilizations that have allegedly preserved, to one degree or another, the “primordial Tradition” and are thus united by virtue of their common fundamental social values, on the one side, and those—Western or Western-influenced—cultures that are inflicted with decadence and degradation as a result of their departure from the original hierarchical social order of the Tradition, on the other.565 Moreover, Dugin allows, again inspired by West European Traditionalism, for principal differences within various world religions. He differentiates between their “Eurasian” or “traditional” subsections, on the one side, and their “Atlanticist” or “profane” deviations, on the other, elevating this division into the major line of world conflict. While Dugin’s “Eurasian” camp may thus, for instance, include certain Jewish “Traditionalists,” the latter “Atlanticist” coalition encompasses as different congregations as the Christian Orthodox Constantinople Patriarchy, Wahhabism, Protestantism, or Puritanism.566

Dugin thereby does not talk about the conflict between Orthodoxy, Islam and Buddhism, for instance, or about “the clash of civilizations” in the Huntingtonian sense. Instead, he focuses on conflict between various deviations from Tradition. The West is the only civilization which has not descended from “real” Tradition, and that is why all Traditional religions should unite against it.567

564 Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy
565 Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy.
566 Mitrofanova, Politizatsiya “pravoslavnogo mira,” 136-137.
567 Idem, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 53. It seems to me that, therefore, Andrei
Not only does Dugin’s biography—outlined in more detail below—indicate the presence of other sources for his thinking than Eurasianism. A comparison between “neo-Eurasianism” and classical Eurasianism reveals further differences these two bodies of thought.

Similarities between Classical Eurasianism and “Neo-Eurasianism”

To be sure, it is certainly the case that classical Eurasianism was, like Dugin’s “neo-Eurasianism,” radically anti-Western and anti-democratic, organicistic and potentially totalitarian. The fact that Petr N. Savitskii was influenced by early German geopolitics is reminiscent of Dugin’s debt to German anti-democratic thought. Equally, the sympathies that Roman Yakobson and Petr Suvchinskii, apparently, had for futurism are reminiscent of Dugin’s interests. There are also some substantive similarities.

This concerns, for instance, the resemblance between Dugin’s vision of the future and Nikolai Trubetskoi’s wish that the earth should be divided into “systems of autarkic worlds.” Both the classical Eurasianists and “neo-Eurasianists” have shown considerable sympathy for Bolshevism which they both saw as an, in distinction to Marxism, Russian national phenomenon. Like Dugin, the Eurasians endorsed the October Revolution, and were interested in Nikolai Ustryalov’s National Bolshevism. When Dugin explicitly approved of the October Revolution of 1917 and praises Lenin, this can be seen as a sign of continuity with the classical Eurasianists who “considered their ‘constructive’ attitude toward the Russian revolution as a leading distinction between them and other groupings of Russian exiles and a main rea-

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571 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 93.

572 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 94.
son why they, rather than these others, would renew Russia.” Savitskii even once wrote that Lenin was greater than Chingis Khan who was regarded, by the classical Eurasianists, as the founder of Russia-Eurasia. The classical Eurasianists’ partial approval of the Soviet regime led their fellow émigrés to call them “Orthodox Bolsheviks.”

What is further noteworthy is the particular, affirmative self-description of the classical Eurasianists as “nationalists.” The authors of the 1921 manifesto of classical Eurasianism Iskhod k Vostoku (Exodus to the East) wrote in their introduction: “[W]e direct our nationalism not merely toward ‘Slavs,’ but toward a whole circle of peoples of the ‘Eurasian’ world, among whom the Russian people has the central position.” This is a sentence which would seem to represent Dugin’s aspirations well too. The same goes for the classical Eurasianists’ interest for the concept of a “Third Way.” Further, in the words of Stefan Wiederkehr, both teachings, classical and “neo-

“Eurasianism

reduced [their polycentric conception of world history] in their political practice to a Manichean bipolar world view. That was because the historical mission of Russia-Eurasia consisted, in their eyes, in unifying all those who defend the multiplicity of cultures against the main enemy. The latter was accused of an intention to push through its own cultural model as a standard world-wide.

Nevertheless, it seems also clear that classical Eurasianism was considerably less aggressive than Dugin’s “neo-Eurasianism.” To be sure, the classical Eurasianists’ ideology was, as indicated above, “close to totalitarian” and their scholarly practice “exclusively ‘national’.” Pavel Milyukov has accused Eurasianism of mysticism and of closeness to German racism. One might even consider classical Eurasianism as a form of (proto-) fascism, as Fedor Stepun has explicitly done. Laruelle has detected similarities between classical Eurasianism and Italian Fascism as well as

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573 Riasanovsky, “Afterword: The Emergence of Eurasianism,” 123.
574 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 211.
575 As quoted in Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 101.
576 Iskhod k Vostoku (Sofiya: Tipografiya “Balkan,” 1921), III-VII.
577 Vinkovetsky and Schlacks, Exodus to the East, 4.
578 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 78.
580 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 8.
581 Ibid., 43.
582 On the concept of proto-fascism, see Griffin, The Nature of Fascism.
583 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 43.
the French extreme right, i.e. the writings of its intellectual leaders Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) and Charles Maurras (1868-1952). They also defined themselves, like Dugin’s followers, as both a political party and religious order.

**Discrepancies between Classical Eurasianism and “Neo-Eurasianism”**

Notwithstanding, a comparative reading of texts by the classical Eurasianists, on the one side, and by Dugin and his followers, on the other, reveals differences in contents, style, and tone which are altogether more significant and go deeper than the listed similarities. In particular, Dugin’s overt sympathy for certain precursors, fellow-travellers, brands, manifestations, and successors of German Nazism constitutes a thick dividing line between classical Eurasianism and “neo-Eurasianism.” Trubetskoi wrote already in 1935—i.e. long before World War II, the Holocaust and Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union—that “our views on the idea governing a truly ideocratic state are irreconcilable with the colonial imperialism so manifest in the modern European ideocratic (‘fascist’) movements.” That is a kind of principled rejection of inter-war fascism which contradicts, in particular, early Duginism. One should, moreover, keep in mind that Dugin made his various affirmative statements on Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany after the Axis powers had devastated large parts of Russia. Whereas, for the classical Eurasianists, their affirmative view of the concept of a “Third Way” meant that Russia should choose a path between communism and capitalism, yet avoid fascism, Dugin has presented various forms of inter-war European fascism as permutations of exactly—what he calls—the “Third Way” and “Conservative Revolution,” concepts he adheres too. In an article finished in May 1991, Dugin, for instance, wrote that the fullest and most total (though, one has to admit, not the most orthodox) embodiment of the Third Way was German National Socialism. In principle, the phrase “national socialism” has an obviously “conservative revolutionary” character in as far as such a unification of the right-wing concept of nationalism with the left concept of socialism in the under-

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584 Ibid., 87.
585 Ibid., 47, 49.
587 Laryuel’, *Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva*, 78.
standing of the ideologues of this party [the NSDAP] was meant to underscore that we are talking about exactly a Third, and neither a right nor left, Way.\textsuperscript{588}

Though both the classical and “neo-Eurasianists” have acknowledged their closeness to Italian Fascism, their sympathetic critique of Mussolini’s regime was of a different nature: The classical Eurasians tended to pick for criticism certain—what they saw as—excesses of Italian Fascism like its leader cult, imperialism, or sacralization of the Italian people.\textsuperscript{589} They rejected the cult of raw force and war.\textsuperscript{590} In contrast, Dugin has, somewhat reminding similar arguments made by Julius Evola,\textsuperscript{591} attacked inter-war fascism, including Italian Fascism, as having been too moderate and having made too many compromises with the old elites. Predictably, therefore, Dugin has been most sympathetic to the Nazi-sponsored, more radical 1943-1945 North Italian Social Republic of Salo which “fulfilled all criteria of the Third Way.”\textsuperscript{592} The classical Eurasianists distinguished themselves among their Russian fellow ultranationalists with their principled critique of Nazism—especially its pan-German and Aryan ideas—\textsuperscript{593}—long before the Third Reich turned eastwards and when a Nazi-Soviet cooperation still seemed possible. In contrast, Dugin has, in spite of writing after World War II and the Holocaust as well as their extensive description in scholarly and publicistic texts, found many positive aspects in Nazi theory and practice, and, in particular, in selected sections of the Nazis’ most cruel organizations the SS, like Hermann Wirth’s Ahnenerbe Institute and SD, for explicit praise.\textsuperscript{594}

Dugin does also not hesitate to admit that, concerning the relationship between Germany’s “Conservative Revolution” of the 1920s and early 1930s and Nazism, “it is impossible to deny continuity—though their direct identification with each other would be also unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{595} With this statement, Dugin is closer to liberal, left-wing and mainstream Western scholarly views on the role of the German “Conservative Revolution” in the Weimar Republic than to the apologetic writings of many West European New Rightists who have, again and again, attempted draw a line of division be-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{588} Dugin, Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya, 14.
\item \textsuperscript{589} Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 100.
\item \textsuperscript{590} Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 261.
\item \textsuperscript{591} Umland, “Classification, Julius Evola and the Nature of Dugin’s Ideology.”
\item \textsuperscript{592} Dugin, Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya, 17.
\item \textsuperscript{593} Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 101.
\item \textsuperscript{594} Dugin, Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya, 25; idem, Giperboreiskaya Teoriya (opyt arioso-skogo issledovaniya) (Moskva: Arktogya, 1993), 3-72.
\item \textsuperscript{595} Dugin, Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya, 21.
\end{itemize}
tween the “Conservative Revolution” (their officially acknowledged predecessors), on the one side, and Nazism, on the other. The European New Right, sometimes, even presented people like Ernst Jünger as principled anti-fascists. The fact that Dugin, in contrast, does not care to make such distinctions and frankly acknowledges the link between his publicly acknowledged intellectual forefathers—the same German “conservative revolutionaries”—and the ideology that brought death, deportation, enslavement etc. to millions of Eastern Slavs and other peoples of “Eurasia” is remarkable. Whereas the classical Eurasianists condemned racism and especially racial anti-Semitism for its “extreme anthropological materialism,” Dugin, though also not being a biologically racist anti-Semite (in the narrow sense), has not hesitated to mention the relevance of “racial belonging [rasovaya prinadlezhnost’]” to people’s identity. He devoted space in his major book Foundations of Geopolitics on attacking Jews—a subject that has been extensively dealt with in a book by Vadim Rossman (and can therefore be ignored here).

Further worth-mentioning differences concern the intellectual biographies and disparities in the epistemology of the classical Eurasianists, on the one side, and Dugin and his followers, on the other. Dugin’s movement grew out of an eccentric circle of anti-Soviet mystics who had engaged in self-experiments and taken an interest in various forms of esotericism and extremism. The Eurasianists in contrast had, mostly, grown up in the liberal atmosphere of late Tsarist St. Petersburg. Before fleeing Russia, they had been part and parcel of Russia’s intellectual elite, and received regular under- and post-graduate university training. In spite of their radical anti-Westernism and rejection of dry empiricism, they continued to view themselves as academics engaged in scholarly research. While also holding metaphysical, rather than rationalist world views, they still valued scientific analysis. Savitskii, for instance, took an interest in quantitative techniques and attempted to apply natural science methods to the humanities.

**Dugin’s Late Embrace of Russian Eurasianism**

Dugin, apparently, started reading seriously Eurasianist texts only after he had been formed intellectually by Western Traditionalism and mysticism, the German “Con-

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596 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 134.
597 Dugin, Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya, 21.
598 Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism.
599 Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 70-72.
servative Revolution" and Nazism, as well as the ideas of the French Old and New Right. Thus, in his seminal article "The Great War of the Continents" written in 1991, Dugin mentions the classical Eurasianists only *en passant*, and in connection with German geopolitics.\(^{600}\) When, in 1992, Dugin held an important roundtable with representatives of Western and Russian extremely right-wing political and intellectual circles, its subject was the geopolitics of "Eurasia." However, as Stefan Wiederkehr commented,

> [t]his debate [...] represented not Eurasianism in the sense of the émigré movement between the world wars. [...] Dugin, to be sure, mentioned in passing classical Eurasianism when he recalled, for his conversation partners, the history of Russian geopolitical thought; yet he mixed up Nikolai Trubetskoï with his uncle Evgenii and called Petr Savitskii erroneously N. Savitskoi [...]. These mistakes make clear how little Dugin was, at this point, familiar with classical Eurasianism. He used the term "Eurasia," but in the sense of Western geopolitical thought.\(^{601}\)

In his major 1994 political manifesto *The Aims and Tasks of Our Revolution*, Dugin still hardly mentions Eurasianism.\(^{602}\)

Whereas classical Eurasianism has, in spite of its radical anti-Westernism, continued to be viewed, by Western observers, with a certain—sometimes, considerable—degree of empathy, if not sympathy, "neo-Eurasianism" has been, aptly, labelled by Western observers "geopolitical anti-Semitism,"\(^{603}\) "neo-National Bolshevism,"\(^{604}\) "fascism,"\(^{605}\) or "neo-fascism."\(^{606}\) Though having been a former student of Professor Aleksandr Panarin who, shortly before his death, endorsed Dugin, the Russian émigré political scientist Andrei Tsygankov too has put Dugin under the unsympathetic

\(^{600}\) Dugin, *Konspirologiya*, 94-95.

\(^{601}\) Wiederkehr, "Kontinent Evrasija?", 127-128.


\(^{606}\) E.g. Ingram, "Alexander Dugin."
and apt label of “revolutionary expansionism.”607 Another, well-informed Russian author even presented Dugin—in view of his temporary affiliation with Limonov’s above mentioned National-Bolshevik Party in 1994-1998—under the heading Nazism in Russia.608

Apart from significant differences in the degree of hostility towards perceived foreign and domestic enemies of Russia, there are also disparities in basic concepts of both ideologies.609 By way of acknowledging the heritage of the classical Eurasianists, Dugin

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608 Likhachev, Natsizm v Rossii. While the intention of Likhachev’s classification is understandable, it might, for methodological reasons, be more useful to consider Dugin not a neo-Nazi, but, perhaps, “merely” a neo-fascist. On this issue, see Umland, “The Post-Soviet Russian Extreme Right;” idem, “Concepts of Fascism in Russia and the West,” and idem, “Tri raznovidnosti postsovetskogo fashizma.” What is more worrying (and, also, more typical of Russian reflections on this issue) is Mitrofanova’s defense of “neo-Eurasianism” against its classification as “fascist” on the basis that “neo-Eurasianism” is not racist. Without reference to the literature on comparative fascism, Mitrofanova announces that one could only regard “neo-Eurasianism” as fascist, if one decided to “call fascist generally all non-democratic ideologies.” Mitrofanova, Politizatsiya pravoslavnogo mira," 142. Not only is the question whether Dugin’s ideology can be classified as racist or not hardly answerable as quickly as Mitrofanova does in her book. What is more important is that narrowly biological racism cannot be regarded as a definitional core-criterion of generic fascism. Such a conceptualization would imply that Italian Fascism (at least, in the form it had taken before it became influenced by Nazism in the late 1930s) would have to be regarded as only partly fascist, or even non-fascist. It is also not trivial that one of the persons who has explicitly demonstrated that Dugin is pro-fascist is Dugin himself. See Aleksandr Dugin, “Fascism—Borderless and Red,” in: Griffin, Loh and Umland, Fascism Past and Present, 505-510. Judging from this and other publications of Dugin on the issue, it seems that Dugin may have a better understanding of the nature of generic fascism than Mitrofanova. Moreover, it appears that, at a later point in her book, Mitrofanova contradicts herself when she argues now that, for inter-war Russian émigré “fascism [sic!], racism was absolutely not characteristic—apparently, because its leaders took as a basis not German Nazism, but Italian Fascism.” Mitrofanova, Politizatsiya pravoslavnogo mira,” 156. Finally, Mitrofanova’s assertion in her book (ibid., 142) that “anti-Semitism is not characteristic of the Eurasianists [i.e. of Dugin and his followers—A.U.]” seems oblivious of the relevant scholarly literature on this issue, above all, of the findings of Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism, 23-71, and Likhachev, Politicheskii antisemitsizm v sovremennoi Rossii, 34-42.

manipulates their legacy in a way reminding a similar strategy by the above mentioned late Soviet geographer-ethnologist Lev N. Gumilëv. The following short excursus illustrates the point.

III.5.4 Excursus I: Gumilëv’s “Eurasianism”

The Gumilëvian World View

Gumilëv’s rabidly antisemitic theory of ethnogenesis amounts to an attempt to give a peculiar, novel kind of racism a (pseudo-) scientific basis.610 His teaching constitutes, “in terms of its breadth and complexity, a hard to grasp collection of speculative hypotheses, unproven claims, questionable psychologisms and pseudo-scientific propositions.”611 It claims that ethnies are not only culturally, but also biologically defined, literally natural groups who, over the period of several centuries, cyclically rise and fall—a view reminiscent of the ideas of Nikolai Danilevskii and Oswald Spengler.612 Their ascent is determined—and here Gumilëv goes beyond Danilevskii and Spengler—by “micromutations” caused by solar or galactic emissions leading these ethnies to become particularly passionate and to give birth to selfless, heroic leader figures driven by moral goals and prone to an ethic of self-immolation.613 The ethnies’ or larger “superethnies” descent, in turn, can be triggered by intermixture with other,

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612 Parland, The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia, 22.

613 Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism, 73-74.
often parasitic peoples (e.g. Jews)—a dangerous process that leads to the formation of “chimerical” civilizations destined to decline. Vadim Rossman has pointed to the strange terminology that Gumilëv uses describing the latter process: “parasites,” “vampires sucking human blood,” “cancerous tumour which devours healthy cells,” and “tapeworms in the stomach of the animal.” It should not come as a surprise that “scholarly” writings using such phrases have become popular in the post-Soviet Russian extremely right-wing scene. “Many nationalist leaders and ideologists began [in the 1990s] to use [Gumilëv’s] theories as legitimization for their political agenda, using terminology from his theory of ethnogenesis, and even incorporating his pseudo-scientific language into their political programs.”

Gumilëv’s bizarre theory is of interest here less in terms of its content or importance for Russia’s ultra-nationalist discourse. What makes it interesting for this study and for an understanding of post-Soviet Russian discourse, is that it has, in spite of having won no notable support among geneticists or radiologists, become incredibly popular among Russian intellectuals, in general, and infiltrated deeply middle and higher education programs, in particular. “[A]fter glasnost, […] millions of his books were published, and an avalanche of other publications about his theories appeared in Russian periodicals.” “The ethnogenetic special vocabulary developed by him […] enjoys wide application in popular-scientific specialized literature and publicism.” In Victor Yasmann’s words,

[Gumilëv’s] books significantly contributed to the gigantic intellectual counter-revolution that was taking place in the shadows of the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the USSR. […] [I]n Russia and other parts of the former Union, Gumilëv has had an enormous intellectual impact, and […] has enjoyed immeasurable support from key intel-

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614 Of his many books, the most important ones in this context are Lev Gumilëv, Konets i vnov’ nachalo: Populyarnye lektsii po narodovedeniyu (Moskva: Rol’, 2002), and idem, Etnogenez i biosfera zemli (Sankt-Peterburg: Azbuka-klassika, 2002). It is telling that the latter book was printed in the publisher’s series “Academia.”

615 Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism, 75.


617 The prominent Russian geneticist N. Timofeev-Resovskii, called Gumilëv, according to Gumilëv’s widow, a “mad paranoic.” As quoted in Korenyako, “Etnonatsionalizm, kvaziistoriografiya i akademicheskaia nauka,” 51. See also Ignatow, “Esoterik als Geschichtsdeutung,” 40.

618 Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism, 72.

“Moreover, an image has been created of Gumilëv as a great man, criticism of whom is sacrilege.”

A foreword to a recent edition of his most important book *Ethnogenesis and the World’s Biosphere* under the title of “A Gulliver among Liliputs” starts with the following sentences:

Lev Nikolaevich Gumilëv was not simply an outstanding human being. People like him do not exist in our times. The great attraction of his personality was the combination of a multiplicity of qualities, characteristics and conditions. [His] mind and horizon, passion and irony, generosity and simplicity… And in all this—a dimension of human personality unseen, unusual for the modern world, and measurable to nothing.

The author goes on to compare Gumilëv to Charles Darwin, Galileo Galileus, Girolamo Savonarola, Aristotle, Nicolaus Copernicus, and Isaac Newton. Even some non-Russian authors who are, in general, critical of Gumilëv have, at times, paid tribute to the “originality” of his ideas. The recently founded elite Eurasian University at Kazakhstan’s new capital Astana has been named after Lev Gumilëv. It has been reported that President Vladimir Putin publicly praised Gumilëv at the celebration of the 1000th birthday of the capital of Tatarstan Kazan’ on 26th August 2005. The theories and concepts of Gumilëv are regular points of reference in major TV talk shows and documentaries on Russian and world history. Korenyako comes to the conclusion that

L[ev] Gumilëv has sharply lowered the level of academic professionalism recognizable by the broad audience [of Russia], and has, thanks to a literary talent and an envying productivity shown […]: In the eyes of public opinion, one can become a "great scholar" and “master of thoughts [vlastitelem dum]” by not only refraining from trying to rise above the level of professional recognition.\footnote{Dmitry Shlapentokh, “Russia’s Foreign Policy and Eurasianism,” URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080205a.shtml.}

\footnote{Yasmann, “Red Religion,” 25.}
\footnote{Shenfield, *Russian Fascism*, 44.}
\footnote{A. Ikonnikov-Galitskii, “Gulliver sredni liliputov,” in: Gumilëv, *Etnogenes i biosfera zemli*, 7-24, here 7.}
\footnote{Ibid., 12, 20.}
\footnote{Ignatow, “Esoterik als Geschichtsdeutung,” 14, 37. See also Naarden, “I am a genius, but no more than that”, or Paradowski, “The Eurasian Idea and Leo Gumilëv’s Scientific Ideology.”}
621 Shenfield, *Russian Fascism*, 44.
623 Ibid., 12, 20.
624 Ignatow, “Esoterik als Geschichtsdeutung,” 14, 37. See also Naarden, “I am a genius, but no more than that”, or Paradowski, “The Eurasian Idea and Leo Gumilëv’s Scientific Ideology.”
a dilettante, but by also avoiding all reflection concerning one’s own, often most serious mistakes.  

Gumilëv and Classical Eurasianism  

As Marlène Laruelle has shown, Gumilëv’s claim that he is the “last Eurasianist” and, in Russia, widespread view that he is indeed the last representative of classical Eurasianism are doubtful.  

While the Eurasianist outlook was—in its debt to geography, understanding of Russian national identity, sympathy for Asia and anti-Westernism—partly similar to Gumilëv’s world view, the Eurasianists’ emphasis on cultural difference between Eurasians and Europeans is fundamentally different from Gumilëv’s socio-biological approach to ethnies or “superethnies”—an attitude, according to Laruelle, more related to certain tendencies in Soviet social sciences in the 1960s-1970s than to classical Eurasianism.  

In Ilya Vinkovetskii’s words,  

[Lev Gumilëv] had read a few, but not many, Eurasian[ist] works. [His] own ideas, including his theory of ethnogenesis and the concept of “pas-sionarnost’ [drive, passion],” went well beyond the pale of traditional Eurasianism. His indulgence in cosmism was far more pervasive than that of the Evraziya [the Eurasianists’ major periodical] contributors [who had become followers of Nikolai Fedorov—A.U.] rejected by [the two major theorists of classical Eurasianism Nikolai] Trubetskoï and [Petr] Savitskii.  

Laruelle also points out that the Eurasianists had a largely positive view of Islam

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626 Korenyako, “Etnonatsionalizm, kvaziistoriografiya i akademicheskaya nauka,” 44.  
628 Recent editions that include the core of Gumilëv’s theory of ethnogenesis include Lev Gumilëv, Etnogenez i biosfera zemli (Sankt-Peterburg: Azbuka-klassika, 2002); idem, Konets i vnov' nachalo: Populyarnye lektsii po narodovvedeniyu (Moskva: Rol'f, 2002).  
whereas Gumilëv, more often than not, saw Islam negatively.\textsuperscript{631} One could list other divergences.

In Laruelle's words, “[t]he idea of a synchrony between the work of the Eurasianists and Gumilëv is [however] of principal importance for his disciples: With his assistance, they are trying to misappropriate somebody else’s intellectual property.”\textsuperscript{632} With regard to the major ideas of both classical Eurasianism and “neo-Eurasianism,” it is doubtful that, as Thomas Parland has written, Gumilëv “served as a bridge between classical Eurasianism and its contemporary equivalent neo-Eurasianism.”\textsuperscript{633} Neither did Gumilëv need much of classical Eurasianism for his theory of ethnogenesis, nor did Dugin, initially, use either classical Eurasianism (as indicated above and illustrated below) or Gumilëv’s theory of ethnogenesis for the development of his views on word history. Rather, Dugin, only later, inserted a number of the classically Eurasianist ideas and some of Gumilëv’s terminology into his writings.

\textbf{III.5.5 Dugin's Re-interpretation of “Eurasia”}

\textit{Eurasia and Europe}

One of the differences between the Eurasianists and Gumilëv is reminiscent of the disparities between the former and Dugin.\textsuperscript{634} Though it might not be the most essential incongruence between classical Eurasianism and “neo-Eurasianism,” it is, perhaps, the most visible one: The denotation of Eurasia itself in the works of the Eurasianists, on the one side, and Gumilëv and Dugin, on the other.\textsuperscript{635} While the specifi-

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\item \textsuperscript{631} Laruelle', "Kogda prisvaivaetsya intellektual'naya sobstvennost'," 14. However, Gumilëv saw Islam is much more positively than Judaism. See Rossman, \textit{Russian Intellectual Antisemitism}, 81.
\item \textsuperscript{632} Laruelle', "Kogda prisvaivaetsya intellektual'naya sobstvennost'," 10. See also Shnirel'man, \textit{Intellektual'nye labirinty}, 103-122
\item \textsuperscript{633} Parland, \textit{The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia}, 118.
\item \textsuperscript{634} Dugin, in his turn, has adopted certain of Gumliëv’s concepts, like \textit{passionamost’}. See Dugin, \textit{Tseli i Zadachi Nashei Revoyutii}, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{635} It should come as no surprise, in view of the above, that one channel for Dugin’s entry into the academic mainstream (to be described in more detail below) has been—what one may call—“Gumliëvism.” See, for instance, Aleksandr G. Dugin, “Evolyutsiya Natsional’noi Idei Rusi (Rossii) na raznykh istoricheskikh etapakh,” in: \textit{Lev Nikolaevich Gumliëv: Teoriya etnogeneza i istoricheskie sud’by Evrazii. Materialy konferentsii}. \textit{2nd} Vol. (Sankt-Peterburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2002), 9-35. This can, however, not be taken to be a sign of closeness between Dugin’s and Gumliëv’s ideas as might be concluded from a comment by Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered mnei Dugin’amu i mladshego Pereustroit’ mir.” What links Gumliëv and Dugin, apart from their radical anti-Westernism, are less their particular ideas or their supposed debt to Eurasianism than their equally unfounded claims to represent legitimate successors of classical Eurasianism and their
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cally Eurasianist concept of Eurasia was largely congruent with the territory of the Soviet Union of the 1920s-1930s. Gumilëv includes, for historical reasons, Tibet into his understanding of the Eurasian community—thus, according to a note by Laruelle, departing from the conceptualization of Eurasia by the classical Eurasianists. Dugin goes much further and includes most of the landmass of Europe and Asia into his concept of Eurasia—territories that would, by the classical Eurasians, be regarded as parts of Asia, and not Eurasia. Dugin has gone as far as to label Charles de Gaulle a representative of the “Third Way,” an ideology he himself adheres to. Though Dugin has mentioned Great Britain and, for some reason, China as not belonging to the “Eurasian,” but as being part of the “Atlanticist” civilization, and interpreted Japan, following Sir Halford Mackinder, as a continental Eurasian civilization, his conceptualization of “Eurasia” is thus closer to the geological meaning that the term originally had. The concept of “Eurasia”—as a unified tectonic unit—had been first elaborated on by the Austrian geographer Eduard Suess (1831-1914) in his three-volume work Das Antlitz der Erde (The Earth’s Face) published in 1885-1901. Suess, in turn, had apparently adopted the term from the famous Ge-
man scientist Alexander von Humboldt.643

Manifestly contradicting the classical Eurasians, Dugin, in his various writings, includes large parts of continental Europe, not the least some of its Western parts, into “Eurasia.” For instance, he writes in his seminal article “The Great War of the Continents” that

Jean Parvulesco [a major source for Dugin, as repeatedly documented in the here quoted article—A.U.] comprises within the concept of “ours” the whole network of adherents of the Great Continental Bloc—from Japan to Belgium, from China644 to France, from India to Spain, from Iran to Germany, from Russia to Italy. For Parvulesco, “ours” means that the Eurasianist Order itself is synonymous with all of its brands and groups which are, consciously or not, manifestly or latently, in the zone of its geopolitical, mystical and metaphysical influence. “Ours”—this is the united eschatological front of the Continent, the Front of the Land, the Front of the Absolute East, the Western province of which is Europe itself, “our” Europe, a Europe rejecting “the West,” the Europe of Tradition, Soil [and] Spirit.645

The classical Eurasianists, in contrast, saw Western Europe—all of it—as constituting “Romano-Germanic Europe” that does not belong to “Eurasia,” but is Russia’s or even humankind’s greatest enemy. Nikolai Trubetskoi, for instance, proclaimed in 1920: “There is only one true contradiction: the Romano-Germans and the other peoples of the world, Europe and humanity.”646 Dugin, on his part, wrote in 1992:

In the geopolitical system of coordinates for the last centuries, one can clearly trace a fundamental opposition of two continents: America and Eurasia. [...] The basic principle of this contradiction is: Europe together with Russia against America. Its continuation is the opposition of Eurasianism and Atlanticism. The term “West” simply does not exist in this conception. Europe is here the geopolitical an-

644 The inclusion of China in this list contradicts Dugin’s own later elaborations on China’s role in the contemporary world.
645 Dugin, Konspirologiya, 130.
646 Trubetskoi, Nasledie Chingis-Khana, 90, as quoted in Wiederkehr, “Kontinent Evrasija,” 128.
Eurasia and the US

Thus, the United States, in Dugin’s world view, “replace ‘Romano-German Europe’ as the enemy image.”

Writes Dugin:

The USA is a chimerical [a Gumilëvian term—A.U.], anti-organic, transplanted culture which does not have sacral state traditions and cultural soil, but, nevertheless, tries to force upon the other continents its anti-ethnic, anti-traditional [and] “babylonic” model.

This contradicts, for instance, the Eurasianist and Orthodox theologian Georgii Florovskii (1893-1979) who, at one point, praised “genuine American pragmatism,” and wrote that it is exactly “on ‘European’ soil [on which] Pragmatism becomes colourless and impersonal.”

In another article, Florovskii wrote, among other affirmative statements on the US, that America has developed “a tradition of radical rejection of philistinism.”

Even Petr N. Savitskii (1895-1968)—who is Dugin’s primary point of reference in Eurasianism—seemed to have an ambivalent image of the United States. He compared Russia-Eurasia with the US and, for instance, wrote that

[i]t is possible to think that the leading centres of culture, its most influential concentrations, are already located not only in Western Europe as had been the case not long ago, but also in Russia-Eurasia and in North America, and that these two regions, or, to be more precise, two continents, are lining up next to Europe and “replacing” it in the sense of taking upon themselves part of the activity of cultural creativity [...].

It contradicts the core of Dugin’s conceptualization of world history when Savitskii, in 1921, went on to predict that “[w]ith the passage of time North America is of course developing, and will successfully develop, an independent tradition. But at its source,
it carries only that tradition which is present in the culture of [Romano-Germanic] Western Europe."653 This is the exact opposite of what Dugin has been opining on the US.

Moreover, the classical Eurasianists were prepared to take the US in certain regards as a model. This concerns, for instance, economic nationalism, the Monroe Doctrine, the unification of the North and South of the American continent, a continental self-consciousness, or the US’s non-membership in the League of Nations.654 Yet, because of the presence of cultural traits of the Romano-Germanic world—i.e. those cultures that Dugin is prepared to include into his idea of “Eurasia”—in the North American tradition (and not, as Dugin would argue, some specific “Atlanticist” element), the US remained ultimately suspect to the classical Eurasianists.655

Geopolitics, Conservative Revolution, and Obfuscation

The substantial change of emphasis in the image of Russia’s major enemy from Europe to the US is, according to Ignat’ev, “a result of the fact that [Dugin] artificially mixes Eurasianism with geopolitics and accepts the so-called ‘first law of geopolitics’—the idea of the eternal fight between continental and maritime civilizations […].”656 Earlier, Vinkovetskii had remarked that Dugin seems to owe a much greater debt to the likes of [Karl] Haushofer and the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt657 than to [Petr] Savitskii and [Nikolai] Trubetskoi. His occult-laced “Eurasianism” is based on a vision of an age-old incessant struggle for world domination between the secret orders of “Eurasianists” (“the Great Land,” traceable to Rome) and “Atlanticists (“the Great Ocean,” traceable to Carthage). The authors of *Exodus to the East* [the manifesto of classical Eurasianism of 1921—A.U.] are depicted not as creators of Eurasianism, but merely as members of the secret Eurasian order acting, along with Haushofer, as

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655 Laryuel’, *Ideologiya russkogo evrazistva*, 121.

656 Ignat’ev, “Anti-Dugin ili mify geopolitik i real’nosti.”

its “disclosers.” Whatever Dugin [...] is trying to achieve, it seems to have very little to do with Eurasianism in the classic sense.\textsuperscript{658}

While thus Dugin’s teaching can be classified—like the classical Eurasianists’ theory—as a “geosophy,” the two geographical determinisms present here are different: Whereas the classical Eurasianists emphasised various characteristics of Russia’s climate, landscape and culture as unifying and defining “Eurasia,”\textsuperscript{659} Dugin uses geopolitical ideas adopted from Western thinkers like Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), Johan Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), or Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), and culturalist arguments copied from the German “Conservative Revolution” to argue for the uniqueness of his much larger “Eurasia.” The classical Eurasianists, to be sure, also were aware of Western geopolitics and wrote, like Dugin, about the contradiction between oceanic and continental civilizations and their affinities to parliamentarianism and authoritarianism respectively. Yet these considerations had little consequences for their definition of “Eurasia.”\textsuperscript{660}

The relative resemblance between the geological meaning of “Eurasia” and the denotation the term has in most of Dugin’s theories is thus, obviously, no indicator of moderation or common sense in “neo-Eurasianism.”\textsuperscript{661} Rather, Dugin’s various re-conceptualizations of “Eurasia” are a symptom of the instrumental function that “Eurasianism” has for him. He skilfully uses the ambivalence of the concept of Eurasia as connoting a peculiar synthetic culture (as in classical Eurasianism), on the one side, and the European-Asian landmass (as in geology), on the other, for his purposes. In Vinkovetskii’s opinion, he “appears to use obfuscation as deliberate strategy.”\textsuperscript{662} Dugin’s one-time collaborator Eduard Limonov confirms that “Dugin is a paradoxical man who can support ten points of view or more at the same time.”\textsuperscript{663} In the words of Ignat’ev, “Dugin perverted Eurasianism and transformed it into an eclectic mixture adding to it, apart from geopolitics, elements of European Traditionalism and rac-


\textsuperscript{659} Laryuel’, \textit{Ideologiya russkogo evraziizma}, 118.

\textsuperscript{660} Laryuel’, \textit{Ideologiya russkogo evraziizma}, 120.

\textsuperscript{661} This is also illustrated by the fact that, as Mitrofanova points out, Dugin, in one of his publications, includes into the “Great Eurasian Empire of Thousand Flags” not only the Eurasian continent, but also Australia, parts of Africa and Greenland. Mitrofanova, \textit{Politizatsiya “pravoslavnego mira,”} 243.


\textsuperscript{663} As quoted in Lee, \textit{The Beast Reawakens}, 320. See also Shenfield, \textit{Russian Fascism}, 197.
ism.” Dugin may, in doing so, have profited from the general lack of terminological and conceptual discipline in post-Soviet social scientific and journalistic discourse. He is able to present his fundamentally Western-inspired world view as resulting from a, supposedly, adequate adaptation of a well-respected Russian theory to post-Soviet circumstances.

It is true that one of the most important sources of Dugin’s thought, the German “Conservative Revolution” of the 1920s-1930s, displayed considerable similarities with classical Eurasianism and was also of relative high intellectual quality. At the same time, however, it is also the case that “disgust towards the West and liberalism took, in the case of the German anti-Westerners, an even more decisive form than in the case of the Eurasianists.” It is exactly the German “conservative revolutionaries” moralistic amorality, their megalomania, craving for a new “Caesar,” and plans for German world-rule, as well as their open propagation of war and terror—all elements for which no equivalents can be found in classical Eurasianism—which seems to have made their ideas particularly attractive for Dugin.

The Eurasianist Label and Interpretation of Dugin

The term “neo-Eurasianism” serves Dugin not only to dilute the extremist aspects of his ideology, but also to cover the largely Western sources of his thought. One Russian commentator has called Dugin’s ideology a “cleverly marketized import product.” Eduard Limonov called Dugin Russia’s “Cyril and Methodius of fascism”—in as far as Dugin brought from the West a new belief. The latter is a circumstance that, if it were to come to the forefront, would contradict his public profile as a Russian patriot and create for him image problems similar to the ones mentioned above with regard to Zhirinovskii’s, Barkashov’s, Limonov’s and Zyuganov’s public stand-

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664 Ignat’ev, “Anti-Dugin ili mify geopolitik i real’nosti.”
666 Ibid., 61-62, 64. One might add that some “conservative revolutionaries,” like Ernst Jünger and Ernst Niekisch, in a certain way previewed a statement by Dugin (see Appendix), in that they attacked Hitler before he came to power as being too much of an opportunist. Lyuks, “Evraziistvo i konservativnaya revolyutsiya,” 66.
667 It is noteworthy that, in the early 1930s, the far-reaching geopolitical plans of the “conservative revolutionaries” caused concern by a Eurasianist publicist of this time, A. Antipov. See Lyuks, “Evraziistvo i konservativnaya revolyutsiya,” 67.
668 Polyannikov, “Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyshleniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’”
669 As quoted in Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereustroit’ mir.”
Similar motivations might be behind Dugin’s recent posing as an Orthodox Old Believer and Christian fundamentalist although it is—contrary to a claim by Anastasiya Mitrofanova—“difficult to call Dugin’s political philosophy and practice [Christian] Orthodox.” As mentioned, Dugin formally committed himself to the Old Belief only relatively late, in 1999.

In conclusion, “neo-Eurasianism” is a term that should be used carefully with regard to Dugin. It is a construct in so far worth paying attention to as it has been the term chosen, especially since the late 1990s, by Dugin himself as the major label for the classification of his views. Contrary to an assertion made by A. James Gregor in a discussion on Dugin’s ideology and sources, the descriptions that political actors create for themselves should be of interest to taxonomists in the social sciences. However, an uncommented application of the term Eurasianism without quotation marks to the Dugin phenomenon would not only be misleading. In as far as the social sciences belong to the world of their objects of study, it could, in view of the above contextualization, be seen as supporting Dugin’s tactics of political mimicry, and as helping him in his efforts to infiltrate the Russian political mainstream and Ivory Tower. Dugin’s embrace of Eurasianism appears as part and parcel of his strategy to become accepted in Russia as a serious academic scholar and political analyst.

In as far as Western views of Russian politics sometimes exert a certain impact on Russian public and scholarly debates, authors in the West too might want to use “Eurasianism” with regard to Dugin with care. This is because such a classification would suggest that as bizarre a publicist as Dugin is vindicated as a successor of the

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670 This is in spite of the fact, the the classical Eurasianists were themselves influenced by Western philosophers, such as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), and Henri Bergson (1859-1941), and especially German Naturphilosophie. See Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziista, 56-57. Interestingly, the classical Eurasians were aware of possible image problems arising from this circumstance too. Writes Laruelle: “Eurasianism experienced a deep influence of the classics of German philosophy and their contemporaries in the West. At the same time, the Eurasians never quoted the authors on whose works they relied (with the exception of O. Spengler), because these thinkers were regarded as Romano-Germanic and, therefore, worthy of criticism.” Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziista, 50. Victor Yasmann claims that the classical Eurasianists were also heavily influenced by geopoliticians, such as Sir Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, Friedrich Ratzel, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Maull and Rudolf Kjellén. See Yasmann, “Red Religion,” 22. While some Eurasianists were aware of these authors and used their ideas, Western geopolitics still did not exert, as Yasmann seems to suggest, a formative impact on Eurasianist thought.


672 Verkhovskii, Politicheskoe pravoslavie, 9, 124, 251.

673 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 197.

674 Gregor, “Andreas Umland and the ‘Fascism’ of Alexander Dugin.”
founders of phonology and Prague Linguistic Circle (Trubetskoi, Yakobson) as well as of Structural Geography (Savitskii). Dugin would be put in a position to claim the legacy of an, in Leonid Luks' words,

[...] conception [in the development of which] ethnologists, geographers, linguists, historians, jurists, etc. took part. This [circumstance] sharply distinguishes [classical] Eurasianism from the majority of ideologies that emerged in inter-war Europe. In this case, those involved [i.e. the classical Eurasianists—A.U.] were not dilettantes and political doctrinists, but people who had passed the school of science [and] mastered the art of sophisticated analysis.

When seen as a proper neo-Eurasianist, Dugin—in spite of the dubious course of his academic career—appears as a scholar stepping into the footsteps of former Professors at the Philology Department the University of Vienna (Trubetskoi), Russian Law School in Prague (Alekseev and Shakhmatov), Russian Agricultural Institute at Prague (Savitskii), and Kaunas University Department of History (Karsavin). Three members of the original Eurasian circle later became tenured professors at respected US universities: Vernadskii at Yale’s Department of History, Yakobson at Harvard' Department of Philology, and Florovskii at Columbia’s Department of Theology. Classical Eurasianism’s relative popularity among Russian intellectuals was and is determined, not the least, by the considerable intellectual acumen of its followers, and their international eminence, not the least by the respect they enjoy in the West. Dugin, obviously, wants to profit from this reputation.

Dugin seemingly also wants to capitalize on the particular admiration that the classical Eurasianists enjoy among sections of the Russian state apparatus. Victor Yas mann quotes an unnamed Soviet author who wrote in September 1991 that “for long time the slogan ‘Evraziistvo’ was subtly cultivated by the General Staff, the KGB and the Party apparatus.” Yasmann adds that “[i]n a classic sense of clientelism, key members of the KGB who monitored the émigré community and also handled ethnic issues found themselves persuaded by the ideology they were supposedly combat-

Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 32, 110.
Laryuel’, Ideologiya russkogo evraziistva, 128-129.
Last but not least, an unqualified scholarly classification of Dugin’s view as a form of Eurasianism would constitute a contribution to the terminological confusion and conceptual stretching which is so characteristic of contemporary Russian political, publicistic and scientific discourse, and which seems to be deliberately fostered by various political entrepreneurs and technologists for whom a devaluation of the value of serious political discourse is beneficial. Dugin’s tactics are nothing peculiar in post-Soviet Russia. Ilya Vinkovetsky wrote already in 1996 that

ideologues and popularizers of all stripes have twisted Eurasian ideas to fit their own particular aspirations. Their creations, which differ greatly from the original ideas of Eurasianism, cannot be termed “Eurasian,” and it is even debatable if they should properly called “neo-Eurasian.”

In quotation marks or/and with the prefix “so-called,” the construct “neo-Eurasianism” can and, perhaps, even should be used in outlines of Dugin’s political tactics similar to the one tried here. But it should be applied with caution and caveats in ideological analyses aiming to informatively conceptualize his political ideology and intellectual position in comparative and historical terms.

III.5.6 Excursus II: Conceptualizing “Duginism”

Yet, what is then the core myth of Dugin’s thought? Which are the most relevant sources of Dugin’s thought? And which term would be most suitable to describe the crux of his ideology and strategy? Though we have a number of more or less well-informed Russian and Western-language interpretations of Dugin’s numerous writings, these questions are—in view of Dugin’s considerable erudition, the multifariousness of his statements and the fluidness of his views—difficult to answer. As one

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679 Yasmann, „Red Religion,” 24. If that were true, it would create additional problems of interpretation concerning Dugin’s early seminal article “The War of the Continents” where he claimed that the KGB was and is an agent of “Atlanticism” and not “Eurasianism” (in the peculiar Duginian sense) in Russia. See Dugin, Konspirologiya, part II.


681 The reason for asking this particular question and for the entire discussion set out here is well expressed in Sartori’s memorable phrase: “As we are […] prisoners of the words we pick, we had better pick them well.” See Giovanni Sartori, “Guidelines for Concept Analysis,” in: idem, ed., Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1984), 15-48, here 60.
Russian observer has commented, Dugin’s doctrine has been “compiled from ideas of thinkers of various times and peoples.”

“Revolutionary Expansionism,” “Geopolitical Anti-Semitism,” “National Bolshevism,” “Geopolitics,” “Traditionalism”

The following excursus departs from the study’s primary focus on identifying Russian uncivil society as an understudied sub-sector of the post-Soviet extreme right. It instead surveys several scholarly conceptualizations of Dugin’s ideology that provide alternatives to the partly misleading classification of his views as simply neo-Eurasianist. In that regard, the excursus follows a secondary aim of this study to show that “neo-Eurasianism” serves as a cover-up for an ideology much less moderate than Dugin’s self-image of the last years would suggest. Those scholars who have interpreted Dugin’s ideology from a comparative perspective have formulated concepts that go beyond of what “neo-Eurasianism” might imply. While these terms are better suited to explicate the core ideas and aggressiveness of Dugin’s world view, some seem still insufficient to capture the essence of his beliefs.

For instance, Tsygankov’s and Rossman’s above-mentioned constructs “revolutionary expansionism” and “geopolitical anti-Semitism” are both apt and well-chosen. However, while they can and, perhaps, should be employed to describe Dugin’s views, they (were meant to) only highlight selected aspects of his ideology. “Geopolitical anti-Semitism” would in so far be insufficient for characterizing Dugin’s views as it is the United States, rather than the Jews, that appear as the most relevant enemies of Russia, in Dugin’s writings. Also, at times, Dugin has retracted from the rabid anti-Semitism he had presented, for instance, in the first edition of his above-mentioned major work *Osnovy geopolitiki*, and detected, in the Jewish national and revolutionary movements, sections that he views as belonging to, or compatible with, “neo-Eurasianism.” Notably, his movement “Eurasia” included some marginal Jewish representatives from not only Russia, but also Israel.

Concerning the, also in general adequate, construct “revolutionary expansionism” proposed by Tsygankov, somewhat different qualifications have to be made. Though Dugin’s ideology is—like, for instance, Zhirinovskii’s blueprint of a “last dash to the south”—both “revolutionary” and “expansionist,” it is—unlike Zhirinovskii’s plan—

682 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mlashego perestroyot’ mir.”
more than that. In 1993, Zhirinovskii envisaged, in his party’s newspaper *Liberal* and the first edition of his main book *Poslednii brosok na Yug*, Russia’s rebirth mainly through her military territorial expansion towards the South, and an annexation of Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran (as well as, by implication, other countries, such as Pakistan). To be sure, territorial expansion plays an important part in Dugin’s vision of Russia’s future too. But it is merely one part of Dugin’s envisaged fundamental re-make of both, world politics and Russian society. Zhirinovskii seemed, in his 1993 blueprint, prepared to merely reform Russia’s political system (without remaking Russian society entirely), and leave current international relations to a considerable degree intact. Zhirinovskii was “only” proposing to divide the less developed parts of the world into new influence zones. Moreover, he was, as he mentioned in a conversation with me in August 1993, counting on the West’s cooperation in this new division of the world, leaving, for instance, Africa to Western Europe and Latin America to the US.

In contrast, Dugin’s vision goes both, domestically and internationally, beyond Zhirinovskii’s 1993 plans. “Neo-Eurasianism” is even more utopian than Zhirinovskii’s doctrine as it implies a thorough de-liberalization and de-Westernization of Russian society and fundamental reconstitution or abolishment of major international organizations including NATO, the EU, G8, OSCE, Council of Europe and so forth. Not only would Russia leave, or behave differently towards, these organizations—as implied in Zhirinovskii’s blueprint. As Dugin sees continental Europe, Japan, the Muslim world and other countries as potential allies in a world-wide anti-American alliance, world politics, as we have come to understand, would cease to exist, and be replaced by a new Cold War—if not eventually by World War III. While the latter outcome could also happen in the case of an implementation of Zhirinovskii’s 1993 plan, Dugin’s view of the world’s future, in some of its permutations, amounts to an open advocating of confrontation with the United States. Thus, “revolutionary expansion-ism” might be a term that is not only insufficient as it refers to just the foreign policy part of a larger agenda. It might, paradoxically, be “too soft” for an adequate character-ization of Dugin’s foreign policy agenda.

The above mentioned term “neo-National Bolshevism” introduced by Markus Mathyl

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and taken up by Mischa Gabowitsch seems, in a number of ways, more suitable than “revolutionary expansionism” and “geopolitical anti-Semitism.” It indicates the radicalness of Dugin’s views and expresses well the synthesis of various ideas that “neo-Eurasianism” in fact represents. It can be also seen as an adequate reflection of how Dugin himself continues to see his world-view. For instance, in March 2005, he addressed a conference entitled “National Bolshevism: Lessons for the 21st Century”—in spite of his recent tactics to replace “National Bolshevism” with “neo-Eurasianism” as the major label describing his ideology. At this conference, “he repeated his previous position that today National Bolshevism (or Eurasianism) entails supporting Putin in spite of [the latter’s] liberalism and other shortcomings.” In statements such as these, Dugin tries to reconcile his surprising turn to a “radically centrist,” often enthusiastic support for Putin’s regime, and his earlier role as a co-founder of the anti-systemic National-Bolshevik Party.

“National Bolshevism” could thus be seen as not only being able to comprise “revolutionary expansionism” and “geopolitical anti-Semitism,” but even as representing an adequate terminological solution for a conceptualization of Dugin’s ideology. Alas, the concept “National Bolshevism” itself appears as too fluid and to have been stretched too many times in order to serve as a useful taxonomic tool, in general.

The construct has been used for such different phenomena as pro-Soviet Russian émigré nationalism, Stalinism, a particular variety of leftish German inter-war ultranationalism, certain varieties of late Soviet Russian ultra-nationalism, and Zyuganov’s synthesis of the Russian Idea and socialism. Further applications of the term could be listed.

Some of the confusion about this term may stem from the fact that “Bolshevism” itself has been used with different implications: Sometimes it is synonym for Russian communism, sometimes for its particular Leninist interpretation only (excluding, for instance, Trotskyism). In some cases, it refers to radical egalitarianism; in others, on

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the contrary, it implies strict elitism. It is thus not even entirely clear what exactly would become nationalized in “National Bolshevism.” Would “National Bolshevism” be a right- or left-wing ideology, or neither, or both? While “neo-National Bolshevism” is, in terms of its extension, not as limited as “revolutionary expansionism” and “geopolitical anti-Semitism,” its intension seems too nebulous in order to serve as a useful concept in social analysis.

A different approach might be read into Mark Sedgwick’s informative work that deals extensively with the Dugin phenomenon in the context of a history of the international pan-religious movement of Traditionalism that has already been mentioned above in connection with the importance of Guénon for Dugin’s intellectual biography. An important advantage of this approach is that it emphasizes the non-Russian origins of Dugin’s world view. On the other hand, it seems an open question whether Dugin is justified in claiming—as he has done many times (especially, for the benefit of his club of trusted supporters)—that he is indeed a Traditionalist. It would seem to depend on one’s opinion on what terrain of ideas Traditionalism as a concept referring to Guénon’s perennial philosophy is supposed to cover. Above all, it would depend on one’s assessment of which practical political implications Traditionalism may be allowed to have or not have. Should the term be applied at all to those actors whose ambitions are manifestly political?

To be sure, Traditionalism did, as appears from many sources, play an important role in the formation of Dugin’s world view. Above all, Traditionalism’s manifest rejection of the contemporary world and Cartesian approach to empirical reality have been reproduced in Dugin’s writings many times. However, apart from elements such as these, it remains unclear what the substance of Dugin’s ideology really owes to Traditionalism. For instance, it seems doubtful that Dugin’s identification of the Tradition with the original culture of “Eurasian civilization” is still within the realm of perennial philosophy. Rather, it appears that, for Dugin, the importance of Traditionalism is similar to the role it played for the intellectual development of his long-term associate

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690 Sartori, “Guidelines for Concept Analysis.”
691 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World.
692 In a way, the issue resembles a problem inherent in all assessments of religious fanaticism: Should a monk, on the one side, and a religiously inspired terrorist, on the other, be both covered under the same heading just because they both are radical believers in the same faith? How important is the religion in religious fundamentalism? For this particular case: What relevance did Traditionalism really have for the formation Dugin’s world view? For a further discussion of this issue, see Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 21-30.
Geidar Dzhemal for whom, in Sedgwick’s words, “Traditionalism became a stepping-stone rather than a destination.” 693 Last but not least, it is debatable whether it was really Guénon, i.e. the actual founder of Traditionalism, who constitutes the most important reference point for the Russian Traditionalists. As again Sedgwick noted, “Russian Traditionalists, though taking their lead from Guénon’s explanation of modernity, generally reacted to (after 1991, at least) more on the model of [Julius] Evola.” 694

A further attribution found in most writings on Dugin is that he is a contemporary proponent of geopolitics in the tradition of Sir Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer. This is in many regards a correct classification. It is also an element in Dugin’s thought that sets him apart from another self-proclaimed “Eurasianist,” the above-mentioned late Lev Gumilëv who “never addressed the problem of geopolitics explicitly, and did not employ conventional geopolitical distinctions, like that between Atlanticism and Eurasianism that figures so prominently in the works of Aleksandr Dugin.” 695 But even with regard to Dugin’s relationship to geopolitics, one would have to make qualifications. As Stephen Shenfield noted

[w]hen […] we look more deeply into Dugin’s geopolitical ideas, we discover an essential difference marking Dugin off from the mainstream of the Mackinder school. For the other geopoliticians, the confrontation between sea power and land power is a historical generalization open to sociological explanation and empirical criticism. Dugin traces the roots of confrontation to other realms lying well beyond the reach of empirical investigation—to a conspiratorial contest between ancient secret orders of Eurasianists and Atlanticists, and ultimately to a clash of forces emanating from two of the four elements of alchemy—namely, water and fire. In Dugin’s world view, even geopolitics is built on mystical foundations. 696

Reminding the function of other terms that Dugin uses for self-description—

693 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 260.
694 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 222. Giovanni Montini, the future Pope Paul VI, wrote in 1928 about the twenty-six-year-old Evola that the latter was “surrendering the search for truth in favor of intellectual excitation, that is to say those strange forms of cerebralism and neurasthenia, of intensive cultivation of incomprehensibility, of pseudo-mystic preciosity, of cabalistic fascination magically evaporated by the refined drugs of Oriental erudition.” As quoted in Laqueur, Fascism, 97.
695 Rossman, Russian Intellectual Antisemitism, 94.
696 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 196.
Eurasianism, National Bolshevism, Traditionalism, Conservative Revolution—the elusiveness of “geopolitics” serves him well to interpret the concept in his own way.  

*The Connection to the European “New Right”*

In conclusion it seems that—as, for instance, Crèmet in 1998 and Laruelle recently suggested—the best general category to put the Dugin phenomenon under is the above-introduced neo-Gramscian European “New Right” (henceforth ENR). While this construct itself is, like “National Bolshevism” or “Conservative Revolution,” of questionable conceptual value, the phenomena that have been described as precursor or varieties of the ENR might provide the best points of departure for a comparative interpretation of both the strategy and the ideology of Dugin. This concerns the substance and development of the Dugin phenomenon as well as some direct links between the ENR and Dugin’s movement.

It was no other than Dugin’s earliest guru Julius Evola who formulated already in 1950 what would become the central motto of both, the ENR and the Dugin movement decades later: “The essential task is to prepare silently the spiritual ambience in which a new form of authority might take shape.” Not only is this, as should have become obvious in the above descriptions of the ENR and Dugin’s rise, a fundamental similarity between the strategy of the West European and Russian “New Right.”

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700 Umland, “‘Konservativnaya revolyutsiya.’”


702 In the words of Stephen Shenfield, “[m]ost of Dugin’s writings serve the purpose of creating an intellectual climate that will make [the, what he calls, Last] revolution possible.” Shenfield, *Russian Fascism*, 195.
The contents and structure of their thinking are also similar in a number of ways. Walter Laqueur, in the mid-1990s, still wrote that “[t]he Nietzschean, elitist doctrines of Evola and the French New Right have been rejected by most Russian right-wing extremists as unsuitable and even counterproductive on Russian soil.” This seems to be not any longer the case. One could argue that, in the meantime, actually the reverse has happened: One the one side, the leaders of the French New Right have been moving away from a purely Evolian world view and incorporated many seemingly left-wing elements.

For one of the leading writers and publishers of the European New Right, Alain de Benoist, Evola and Guénon were of interest—especially historical interest—but no longer of great importance. De Benoist had read most of their works, and had even written on them, but his own ideas explored in the various journals and magazines he controlled were often constructed on bases incompatible with any variety of Traditionalism.

In Russia, on the other side, Dugin’s growing influence has meant that Evola’s name and basic ideas are now well-known among many Russian right-wing intellectuals. Dugin is now recognized as a theoretician of anti-Americanism even in West European New Right circles. It is thus doubtful that the following 1996 statement of Walter Laqueur still fully applies today:

Patriots in Moscow claim, not without justice, that the Russians have a tradition of ultranationalism and socialism and that the new-fangled doctrines of Western metaphysicians have no relevance to their country. [T]he Russian cult of anti-Satanism, the adulation of the tsar and (state) church, and the all pervasive Konspiratologia [in turn] are out of place in Western Europe.

In any way, the interconnections between the West European and Russian New Right are multifarious as indicated in the above summary on the ENR and description of Dugin’s ideology and strategy. It is interesting that the ties between the Western and Russian counter-cultural scene go back to Soviet times. When, in the 1980s, latter NBP-co-founder and Dugin-associate Eduard Limonov moved to Paris, he met Alain de Benoist and worked for a while as editor for de Benoist’s Idiot International,
a journal of left and right extremism once founded by Jean-Paul Sartre.\textsuperscript{706} It does not surprise thus that, according to Walter Laqueur, “[t]he French and Belgian New Right supplied literature and apparently also some money to Russian neofascist groups.”\textsuperscript{707}

It is also noteworthy that the francophone \textit{Nouvelle Droite} had been exerting influence on the Russian elite’s thinking already before it became popular within the Russian extreme right as a result of Dugin’s purposeful adoption of the ENR’s strategies and ideas since his visit to Western Europe in 1989 and meetings with ENR representatives in the early 1990s. For example, Mitrofanova reported in 2005 that many politicized [Christian] Orthodox intellectuals are enthusiastic about the ideas of the French New Right theorist Alain de Benoist and tend to present him as their own “discovery.” However, the author of this book [i.e. Mitrofanova], as a 1994 graduate of the Department of Philosophy of […] Moscow State University, may confirm that de Benoist’s theories were being analyzed by professional philosophers as early as in the end of the 1980s and presented to students during various courses in contemporary French thought.\textsuperscript{708}

While Dugin’s adaptation of West European “New Right” for Russian conditions had thus a certain pre-history and can be seen as critical for an understanding of the substance and functions of his ideas, in this case too, the connection between Duginism and the “New Right” is not a straightforward one. That is because Dugin’s enthusiasm for this connection was not shared by de Benoist himself […] he originally advised Dugin against the use of the name \textit{Elementy} [Dugin’s major journal in the 1990s titled after the ENR’s journals in Western Europe], and as soon as [de Benoist] became aware that he was on the editorial committee [of Dugin’s new journal], he wrote requesting that he be removed from it. De Benoist later explained that although he liked Dugin personally and was sympathetic towards his views, he felt that he and Dugin were following very different intellectual lines in very different circumstances and he did not want any responsibility for a publication in a language he could not read.\textsuperscript{709}

\textsuperscript{706} Shenfield, \textit{Russian Fascism}, 203.
\textsuperscript{707} Laqueur, \textit{Fascism}, 142.
\textsuperscript{708} Mitrofanova, \textit{The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy}, 146.
\textsuperscript{709} Sedgwick, \textit{Against the Modern World}, 333.
In conclusion, it seems only safe to locate Dugin’s ideology under the generic concept of fascism and to call him a neo-fascist. This classificatory solution has been repeatedly argued by students of “neo-Eurasianism” including Alan Ingram, Stephen Shenfield, Markus Mathyl as well as myself, and validated by Dugin himself—which is why it has been not further discussed here.\textsuperscript{710} A neat terminological solution for the issue of how to label the peculiar variety of neo-fascism that Dugin presents can, however, not be presented here. For doing this, further in-depth research into the political writings and behaviour of Dugin and their analysis from a comparative perspective would be necessary. To come to a final conclusion for how to classify him, one may have to wait until Dugin ceases to publish and be active politically. It cannot be excluded that Dugin may introduce—apart from “Traditionalism,” “Conservative Revolution,” “National Bolshevism,” “Neo-Eurasianism,” etc.—further concepts and terms expressing his views.

In any way, for the purposes of the present study, deeper elaboration of this issue is not necessary. What this section merely argued is that Dugin’s various self-descriptions should neither be ignored entirely nor be always taken at face value. While certain statements on the nature of his ideology are valuable clarifications of “where he comes from,” other terms and concepts that Dugin has introduced in presenting his views have an apologetic and manipulative character. In German, one would call some of Dugin’s terminology an \textit{Etikettenschwindel}—a “labelling fraud.” Rather than adequately reflecting the origins and nature of his views, they fulfil important roles within Dugin’s Gramscian strategy of reforming civil society discourse, and gaining, via “political mimicry,” influence on mainstream elites in Russia’s governments, parliaments, mass media, universities, etc. They are designed to reassure the Russian elites of the benevolence, rootedness and conservatism of his ideas. At the same time, concepts such as “neo-Eurasianism” justify a continued expression of the extremely anti-Western core of Dugin’s ideology that had been less cryptically expressed during the early and mid-1990s. His various neologisms are important for the current analysis in that they are tools that enemies of democracy in Russia and elsewhere have been using to blur the distinction between “civil” and “uncivil society.”

III.5.7 Dugin’s Relevance in Context

It would be too early to speak of a deep contamination of Russian civil society resembling that of the German voluntary sector during the Weimar Republic, and a principal subversion of intellectual discourse by anti-democratic ideas similar to the one in many European countries in inter-war Europe.\textsuperscript{711} Mitrofanova even stated as late as 2005 that, “at the moment, \textit{nothing} indicates that [...] a transition [to an intellectual domination by Dugin and similar people] will transpire in the foreseeable future.”\textsuperscript{712} This might be overly deterministic and would appear to be, partly, in contradiction to Mitrofanova’s own findings. However, it seems also doubtful that, as Charles Clover claimed in a 1999 \textit{Foreign Affairs} article, the certainly existent “correlation between Dugin’s ideas and those of the Russian establishment” was, already in the late 1990s, much more than mere co-variation and an expression of the general shift to the right in Russian foreign policies.\textsuperscript{713} This process had started as early as 1993, i.e. even before Zhirinovskii’s rise.\textsuperscript{714} Although Dugin presumably had, in the late 1990s, some impact on the thinking of Russia’s elites, the sources of some


\textsuperscript{712} Mitrofanova, \textit{The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy}, 193, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{713} Clover, “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland.”

Russian actions, mentioned by Clover, as the discussion of the possibility of a return of the Kuril Islands to Japan (once proposed by Dugin in order to recruit Japan into the Eurasian anti-American alliance), or a rapprochement with Iran and Iraq, probably, laid elsewhere.

What seems at hand in Clover’s article of 1999 and in other early warnings concerning Dugin may be an example of the well-known “omitted variable bias” described in the social science methodology literature. In view of the general shift of Russian foreign policies towards a more anti-Western line and the concurrent rise of Dugin already under El’tsin, one could, indeed, get the impression that Dugin started to influence Russian high politics as early as in the late 1990s. Yet, it is more likely that both of these changes were due to various third factors—above all the effects on Russian public opinion of NATO’s eastward expansion and military activities in the Balkans.715 These and other developments (omitted variables) contributed to a rise of anti-Westernism in Russian society at large, if not a re-configuration of the Russian political discourse and spectrum—largely, independently of Dugin’s activities, at that time.716 While Dugin’s ideas, on the one side, and official Russian policies, on the other, thus started to display some congruence, the relationship between them was, at least in the late 1990s, still a spurious one.717 There is, as Walter Laqueur has noted, the danger of crying “wolf” too often.718

With hindsight, the main thrust of Clover’s warning of 1999 has, in view of Dugin’s continuing rise in the new century, proved to be, of course, apt. More recently, the importance of ideas posing under the label “Eurasianism”, in general, in post-Soviet discourse has certainly risen.719 While it would still be an exaggeration to claim, as a

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717 Gerring, Social Science Methodology, 199.
718 Laqueur, Fascism, 121.
719 Although, Markus Kaiser might, in his article on Eurasianism in the post-Soviet sphere, have been overstating his case with regard to the propagation of quasi-Eurasianist ideas by Nursultan Nazarbaev (greatly admired by Dugin). Kaiser also claimed that, by 2004, “[t]he Russian President Vladimir Putin [had] acknowledged the idea [of a Eurasian Union], but not done a single step towards its political implementation." Markus Kaiser, “Einführung: Die russischen Debatte und ihre Re-Orientierung zwischen Asien und Europa," in: in: Idem (ed.), Auf der Suche nach Eurasien, 111-124, here 116. This may, in turn, have been an underestimation of the repercussions of the rise of Eurasianism—however understood—on politics. In addition, Kaiser does not sufficiently highlight, in his altogether informative paper, extreme anti-Americanism as a major ideological tenet of “neo-Eurasianism." Instead, he mentions Eurocentrism as “neo-Eurasianism’s” opposing
German proponent of geopolitics did in 2004, that "Dugin’s book *Foundations of Geopolitics* is today the most successful political science work in Russian language,"\(^7\) Dugin’s role in Russia has indeed grown. At a roundtable on radio *Ekho Moskvy* in August 2006, Emil Pain compared it to the position of Samuel Huntington in the US.\(^7\) The outspoken political newspaper commentator Andrei Piontkovskii observed in October 2006: “The Nazi scoundrel [gadina] Dugin—openly in love with the aesthetics and practice of the SS men (read his [major above-mentioned 1990s journal] *Elementy*)—does not disappear from the state television channels having become one of the leading official ideologues of the regime.”\(^7\) Therefore, the indirect, long-term repercussions of the manifold activities of intellectuals like Dugin in Russia could, at one point or another, make a difference in Russian domestic and foreign policies. The question would, however, still be—how much of a difference?\(^7\)

In any way, it is, in view of the above, doubtful that some of the more optimistic recent accounts on Russian uncivil society—i.e. prognoses predicting its stagnation or descent—are adequate. For instance, Likhachev made, with regard to the extremely right-wing electronic and print organs, the following statement in 2002:

> The [ultra-nationalist] opposition has lost the fight for print mass media (not to mention electronic ones). Of course, such newspapers as [the daily] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* [Soviet Russia] and [the weekly] *Zavtra* have a circulation [300,000 & 100,000 respectively—A.U.] that is only little smaller than that of the main all-Russian publications of a centrist and liberal orientation. However, with regard to a

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\(^7\) For example a recent statement by the Head of the Russian Ministry of Interior, Rashid Nurgaliev, sounds frighteningly similar to Dugin’s thinking. Nurgaliev opined that “[t]oday [the terror’s inspirers’] main goal is to step up anti-constitutional activity in our country, to change Russia’s position in the interests of Western countries.” As quoted in *Kyiv Post*, 17th February 2005, 6. The linking of Western interests and policies with terrorist acts by Muslims in Russia has been a frequent theme in “neo-Eurasian” publications.
whole range of indicators—volume, frequency of appearance [peri-
odichnost'], informational value, flexibility [operativnost'], analytical value, [and] finally, layout—the gap between oppositional and “ordi-
nary” newspapers is more than obvious. And the influence of mass med-i-a on the people’s consciousness and social attitudes is determined not only by circulation numbers, but also by the listed fac-
tors. 724

Though this might be a valid statement with regard to the relative failure of certain older Russian ultra-nationalists and their newspaper, journals and WWW-sites, it seems less applicable to Dugin’s web-rings and books, in particular, and many similar publicists’ presence in mainstream electronic and print media, in general. 725 Rather, there is a contrary trend of proliferation of such publications, and, in particular of books and book-series. To be sure, as a Russian journalist visiting Moscow’s XVII International Book Fair in September 2005, at which a scandal arose because of the many ultra-nationalist and antisemitic books present there, observed

[t]here is nothing new in the fact of the existence of such literature (let’s called it, for our purposes, “patriotic”). It always existed. What recently changed is purely on the outside: how these books look like, where they are sold, the status of the publishers, the circulation numbers and de-
mand of the readers. […] Gone are the days of low-paper quality [bum-
aga, sil’no smakhivayushchaya na obertochnuyu] and of printing that made your hands dirty. Before us are not brochures, but books. Solid, well-formatted with professional jackets. Colourful, attractive. […] Gone are the days of trading with “patriotic” goods at “specially designed places.” Now you do not need to make special efforts to buy a piece of chauvinism. On the contrary: it is difficult to avoid. Because you can meet it now everywhere. In book supermarkets and in WWW shops, and even at an International Fair. […] The average circulation number of literature under the slogan “One country, one nation, one Führer

725 Likhachev’s statement (ibid.) would even with regard to Zavtra’s editor-in-chief Aleksandr Prokhanov be in so far misleading as Prokhanov, certainly, did not reach a mass audi-
ence through Zavtra itself; yet, he had, as mentioned above, considerable success with some other publications, such as his award-winning political novel Gospodin Geksogen that were and are read far beyond the lunatic fringe.
“is, approximately, 3,000 copies. For non-commercial literature, this number is very significant.”

In summer 2006, Moscow’s XIX International Book Fair too was marked by a scandal by the heavy presence of the antisemitic publishing houses *Algoritm* and *Russkaya Pravda.*

The perceptive Russian-Jewish émigré scholar and one of the founding fathers of post-Soviet Russian right-wing extremism studies Aleksandr Yanov observed, in a 2005 article called “The War of Ideas,” that

there are now so many [ultra-nationalist publicists]—these home-made neo-conservatives, eloquent and passionate defenders of the “Russian civilization”—in Moscow, that one starts feeling uneasy. Even worse is, however, the growing popularity of their propaganda among a significant part of the political elite.

Yanov goes on to quote prominent ultra-nationalist publicist, Senior Fellow of Moscow’s prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and *Rodina* faction State Duma deputy Nataliya Narochnitskaya. In an interview for the leading right-wing extremist weekly *Zavtra*, Narochnitskaya reported about the reception of her major 2002 pamphlet *Russia and the Russians in World History* in June 2003:

[M]y ideas, which in 1993-96 one could only publish in [the major russophile “thick journal”] *Nash sovremennik* [Our Contemporary] or voice in the [nationalist TV] program of Aleksandr Krutov, and which even for the sympathizing, but within-system public appeared then as epatage, are now on demand everywhere and in all offices, including the highest ones. Take the fate of my book *Rossiya i russkie v mirovoi istorii* [which is] an antiliberal and anti-Western bomb; yet it is read by everybody—not only the opposition, but [also by] businessmen, professors and high-ranking officials. There is a natural change of personnel on all levels of

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power, and in life, in general. [...] Such a recovery of social and national consciousness necessarily brings about positive fruits which is why our militant Westerners are panicking. It is impossible not to see this change. One has to carefully nurture it, it is unavoidable, and it already starts to have a life of itself. 

Thus, Dugin’s impressive ascent—while having, so far, few immediate effects on Russian high politics—is merely one sign that “[t]he ‘patriots’ have left their ghetto and their books continuously appear as less and less marginal reading and enter the mainstream.” Though Dugin is by no means yet a widely known figure among ordinary Russians, his position in Russian society, already in 2001, was, according to Stephen Shenfield, “such that he [could, already then] not be dismissed out of hand as a figure of the ‘lunatic fringe.’” Dugin has become a major actor on what Thomas Metzger calls “the ideological marketplace,” the flow of information and ideas, including those, which evaluate and critique the state. This includes not only independent mass media but the broader field of autonomous cultural and intellectual activity: universities, think tanks, publishing houses, theatres, filmmakers, and artistic performances and networks.

Dugin’s rise is only one among many indications that political liberalism, philosophical rationalism, and ethical universalism are beaten in retreat in Russia’s public and intellectual discourse today.

The West European “New Right,” above all the French Nouvelle Droite and German Neue Rechte, have now, inspired by the famous Gramscian theory, for more than three decades been trying to erode the hegemony of the democratic ideal in main-

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729 Shenkman, “Iz marginalov—v meinstrim.”
730 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 199.
731 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 222.
732 Mitrofanova came, in her study of “political Orthodoxy,” of 2005 to the conclusion “that having had no significant successes in the sphere of macropolitics, the political Orthodox, namely, fundamentalists and nationalists, have managed within the last ten years to build numerous alternative social institutions and paramilitary organizations at the grassroots level. Leaning upon these institutions they have been able to influence larger and more moderate political organizations and to infiltrate them thus contributing to [a] general ‘Orthodoxization’ of the political discourse.” Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 204.
stream Western political thinking—with only limited success. In contrast, Dugin as well as a whole number of similar publicists may, currently, be on their way to re-orient a substantial section of post-Soviet Russia’s inexperienced social, cultural and political elites towards a new anti-Western utopia.

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734 One is reminded of an observation by Herrmann Rauschning, once a supporter of the “Conservative Revolution,” of inter-war Germany. Rauschning stated that German society in the Weimar Republic was to such a degree infiltrated with various myths and legends that the population was close to mass psychosis. Mentioned in Lyuks, “Evraziistvo i konservativnaya revolyutsiya,” 61.
Ultra-nationalist political blocs or politicians had so far only sporadic electoral appeal and organizational success in Russia. This fact can, in view of the weighty symbolic and ideological dilemmas the parties currently occupying this spectrum are facing, however, be neither taken as a proof for some fundamental lack of susceptibility of the majority of Russians to extremely right-wing ideologies, nor be interpreted as an indication of some principal incapability of Russia’s ultra-nationalist forces to eventually convert putative, potential popular support into political power. One might even argue that such figures as Zhirinovskii and Barkashov had a beneficial effect on Russia’s democratization: They quickly occupied the intra- and extra-parliamentary fascist niches in the new post-Soviet political spectrum in the early 1990s, and may thus have helped to prevent the rise of a leader with, in Russian nationalist terms, a more acceptable family background than Zhirinovskii’s, and a party with less offensive political symbols than the RNE’s. Not entirely unlike the German post-war extreme right, the Russian ultra-nationalists have, so far, been plagued by constant divisions. What Walter Laqueur wrote in the mid-1990s on Russian ultra-nationalism, seems still valid today: “The extreme right wing is […] hopelessly divided […], but altogether, it is not a negligible force.”

In the last Russian parliamentary elections of December 2003, the official election results for those three anti-Western ultra-nationalist groupings that, in the proportional part of the voting, passed the 5%-threshold were:

- 12.61% for the KPRF,
- 11.45% for the LDPR, and

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736 Walter Laqueur has remarked: “The Poles and other Slavic people have no reason to be grateful to the Nazis and their racist theories of eastern Untermenschen. As a result, there are few outright neo-Nazis in Russia and Eastern Europe, and most of the far Right’s leaders recognize that in the post-Communist era, different approaches and new ideas must be used.” Laqueur, Fascism, 122.

737 Laqueur, Fascism, 115.

738 Laqueur, Fascism, 184.
This and the additional 11 seats won by the KPRF and 8 seats won by Rodina in single-member districts translated in December 2003 into 51 seats for the KPRF, 37 seats for the LDPR and 36 seats for Rodina, i.e. altogether 124 for these three parties out of 450.739

What is remarkable in these numbers is that the LDPR, after a continuing decline since its triumph in December 1993 (22.92%), had, in the previous 1999 State Duma elections, received merely 5.98%.740 In fact, the LDPR’s 11.45% in the proportional part of the voting in last State Duma elections was the second best result it ever received in federal-level elections.741 The party’s December 2003 success and Zhirinovskii’s recent relatively good results in various opinion polls which put him among the three most popular politicians in Russia have come to the surprise of many observers, including myself, who, like Shenfield, found it, after the 1999 State Duma elections, “very hard to envisage a dramatic and sustained reversal in the [LDPR’s] fortunes.”742 Given the recent public opinion polling results, the LDPR is well set to stay in Russian high politics for the years to come.

Rodina, on its part, managed to pass from scratch and with a remarkable margin the 5%-barrier and collected, in contrast to the LDPR, a respectable number of further deputies (eight) in the single-member districts. This happened in spite of the fact that Rodina had been created only a few months before the elections. What is further noteworthy is that the spectrum of anti-Western parliamentary parties has with the impressive return of the LDPR and surprising performance of Rodina in its first electoral test become significantly more varied than in the previous Duma, and been filled with some colourful personalities. The latter concerns, for instance, several veteran ideologists and activists of Russian nationalism like Sergei Baburin, Nataliya Narochnitskaya, Valentin Varennikov, Aleksandr Krutov, Nikolai Pavlov, Andrei Savel’ev and Aleksandr Chuev—none of whom had been a member of the 3rd (post-

741 In May 1999, Zhirinovskii received 17.4% of the turnout and thus came in third in an election of the Governor of Belgorodskaya oblast’. See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.cityline.ru/politika/vybory/re99t.html. In other regional elections, such as in Tuva and Pskovskaya oblast’, the LDPR or its representatives also did pretty well.
742 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 111.

It may have been these quantitative and qualitative leaps that caused alarm among some Russian human rights activists.\footnote{As reported in Aleksandr Kolesnichenko, “Skrytaya ugroza,” \textit{Novye izvestiya}, 27\textsuperscript{th} January 2004, URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.newizv.ru/news/?id_news=4163&date=2004-01-27.} The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights counted, in January 2004, 126 members of—what they called—the “faction of nationalists” in the 4\textsuperscript{th} State Duma. The human rights activists included in this count—paralleling the classification used in this book—all deputies from not only the \textit{LDPR} and \textit{Rodina}, but also from the \textit{KPRF} faction (and, apparently, also some independent nationalist deputies). The human rights activists thus concluded, in their report, that almost 30\% of the new State Duma members are “nationalists,” and that these men and women may “destabilize the socio-political situation” in Russia on the eve of the 2007 parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections.\footnote{As quoted in Kolesnichenko, “Skrytaya ugroza.” One might add that the MBHR has a somewhat tainted reputation among Russia’s anti-racist activists and scholars studying post-Soviet Russian nationalism. In some way, my following reply to the MBHR’s alarm can be read in support of such critique of the work of the MBHR.}

This might be a topical warning. However, if seen in the immediate historical context, the current degree of presence of radically anti-Western forces in the 4\textsuperscript{th} post-Soviet State Duma is, actually, not alarming. That is because the comparably good results of Zhirinovskii’s party, and Rogozin’s and Glaz’ev’s alliance in the December 2003 elections have to be weighed against the concurrent, relatively poor performance of the \textit{KPRF} and its then allied Agrarian Party, as compared to its successes in the second half of the 1990s. This concerns especially the previous, December 1999 parliamentary elections in which the \textit{KPRF} had triumphed within both, the proportional part of the voting in which it had overtaken the pro-Putin \textit{Edinstvo} [Unity] bloc slightly (with 24.29\%) and in the voting in single-member districts where it had trounced \textit{Edinstvo} even more impressively. It is true that, if one compares only the sums of percentages in the proportional part of the voting for the \textit{KPRF} and \textit{LDPR} in 1999 (24.29\% + 5.98\% = 30.27\%),\footnote{URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.nupi.no/russland/elections/1999_SD_} on the one side, and for the \textit{KPRF}, \textit{LDPR} and
Rodina in 2003 (12.61% + 11.45% + 9.02% = 33.08%), on the other, there was a 2.21% increase in the vote for those ultra-nationalist parties that managed to pass the 5%-threshold. Yet, even this circumstance appears as, eventually, not that impressive in as far as an entirely new participant, Rodina, had entered the race for relevant nationalist votes in December 2003.

What is more, while the results of the ultra-nationalist parties passing the 5%-threshold increased slightly and the LDPR and Rodina performed impressively, the overall number of deputies belonging to the camp of radically nationalist State Duma factions, in fact, decreased. That is because the KPRF’s support in the proportional part of the elections sank dramatically from 24.29% in 1999 to, as mentioned, to 12.61% in 2003, and the KPRF gained also far fewer seats in the voting in single-member districts. Above all, the overall composition of the Duma changed. Thus a comparison of the seats won by anti-Western electoral blocs that had passed the 5%-threshold in the proportional part of the elections to the 4th and 3rd post-Soviet State Dumas (Table 4) reveals a decrease of six from 1999 to 2003.  

As far as classifying the ideologies of individual candidates (such for instance the world view of the former Vladivostok Mayor Viktor Cherepkov who entered the 4th State Duma) is more difficult than typologizing the programs of entire political blocs or parties, I have refrained here from including in this count putatively ultra-nationalist independent deputies, i.e. those who have entered the parliament via an SMD and without the help of a party or bloc represented with a faction in the Duma. This is for the sake of the argument made here not necessary in as far as I am more interested in the organizational capacities of certain ideological camps. Adding independent anti-Western deputies in the 3rd and 4th State Duma would, in any way, only little change in the argument I am trying to make here, i.e. my claim that the overall presence of radically anti-Western political forces in the Duma has not changed dramatically between 1999 and 2003, but rather diminished somewhat. It should be kept in mind, however, that the number of radical nationalists in both Duma’s is—as reflected in the count of the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights—somewhat higher than the one stated in the tables 3 and 4. Kolesnichenko, “Skrtyaya ugroza.”

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747 final.html.
Table 4: Seats won by electoral blocs with a manifestly anti-Western outlook in the State Duma elections of December 2003 and December 1999-2003 (excluding ultranationalists not officially affiliated to an electoral bloc).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4th State Duma: Number of elected deputies per electoral bloc in December 2003</th>
<th>3rd State Duma: Number of elected deputies per electoral bloc in December 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPRF</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodina</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If one compares the respective numbers for two other points in time—e.g. April 2005 and May 2000, at moments when most repeat elections had been conducted and the factions had more or less consolidated (sixteen months, and five months after the elections, respectively)—the pictures stays basically the same. Once one adds the whole membership body of the Agro-Industrial Bloc—formed with support from the KPRF and constituting a part of the nationalist camp in the Duma—to the overall count for the strength of the anti-Western factions of the 3rd State Duma, these groupings had assembled altogether 19 deputies more in May 2000 than they comprised in April 2005 (Table 5).

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748 In 1999, the LDPR took part in the State Duma elections under the label “Zhirionovskii Bloc.”
Table 5: Numerical strength of factions with a manifestly anti-Western outlook in the 4th and 3rd (post-Soviet) State Dumas 2003-2007 and 1999-2003 (i.e. excluding ultra-nationalists not affiliated to any faction).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4th State Duma: Number of faction members according to the State Duma’s WWW-site in April 2005</th>
<th>3rd State Duma: Number of faction members reported in Parlamentskaya gazeta for May 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPRF</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR\textsuperscript{749}</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodina</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Industrial Bloc</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This trend continued a tendency which had already been observable in the change of numerical faction strength of the radically anti-Western forces from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} post-Soviet State Dumas in 1995-1999.\textsuperscript{750}

Moreover, the Rodina bloc that in 2003 added 29 deputies elected on its ticket to the Duma was, as mentioned in the introduction, an organization that had been created by the Kremlin and thus always an uncertain future. It is unclear whether this new actor in Russian parliamentary politics would have been ever more than an ephemeral phenomenon. While, for instance, in a April 2005 opinion poll by the reputed Levada Center, the LDPR was, in comparison to the December 2003 election results, able to approximately hold its support among likely voters (11%) and the KPRF even increased its support to 16%, Rodina’s popularity among likely voters, on the other side, fell from 9.02% in the December 2003 elections to 6% in this poll,\textsuperscript{751} i.e. below

\textsuperscript{749} In 1999, the LDPR took part in the State Duma elections under the label “Zhirionovskii Bloc.”

\textsuperscript{750} Parlamentskaya gazeta, 18\textsuperscript{th} May 2000; URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4312.html##9. See also “Main Forces in the State Duma and Dynamics of Change 1993-95,” URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.nupi.no/russland/elections/Forces_State_Duma_93_95.html.

\textsuperscript{751} URL (last accessed October 2006): http://www.levada.ru/press/2005050401.html; also
the 7%-threshold necessary to pass in order to enter the next State Duma that will be solely elected through proportional voting. In any way, Rodina's main successor organization has now merged with the Pensioners Party and Party of Life in order to form a new Kremlin-supported electoral bloc under the label Spravedlivaya Rossiya (Just Russia). This merger as well as the break away of Sergei Baburin's group of radically nationalist deputies from the original Rodina faction mean that the major successor group of the original Rodina alliance cannot be counted any more as an extremely right-wing force, but will, within the new Kremlin-sponsored alliance, probably play the role of a moderately nationalist grouping.

As a result, the alarm among Russian human rights activists with regard to the changes in the composition of the Duma in January 2004 mentioned above seems only partly justified. What, in December 2003, did happen was an increase in the presence of especially prominent ultra-nationalist politicians in the State Duma, and a diversification of the radically anti-Western spectrum represented in the legislature. Notwithstanding, in purely quantitative terms, the earlier downward trend of ultra-nationalist party politics since 1995, as expressed in the decreasing overall numerical strength of radically anti-Western factions in the State Duma, has continued in the new century. Thus, arguably, extremely right-wing parliamentary party politics remains in relative decline, or is, at least, stagnating.

In connection with these developments, one should also mention that the general rise of moderate nationalism to the pinnacle of the Russian state through the consolidation of Putin's and Edinaya Rossiya's hold on power in 2003/2004 can be seen as being, especially in the short run, bad news for Russian ultra-nationalist party politics. That is not only because the “party of power” and, above all, Putin himself have adopted many of the themes explored by ultra-nationalists under El'tsin, and thus, partly, “stolen” the extreme right’s agenda—a phenomenon reminding the lean years of the French extreme right under Charles de Gaulle who “[w]ith his vision of a Great France […] could not be outflanked from the Right.”752 The leading Russian political sociologist Lev Gudkov reported “that in spite of increasing nationalist sentiments, the electoral support of nationalist organizations has not grown because mitigated nationalist slogans are ‘tapped’ by respectable politicians.”753

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752 Laqueur, Fascism, 106.
753 As quoted in Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 200.
In another sense, Putin’s re-centralization could also become a serious impediment to a further rise of ultra-nationalism because the administration’s more or less sophisticated “discouragement” of radical political dissent and protest concerns the opposition criticizing Putin from an anti-Western point of view as much as dissension based on pro-Western prerogatives. The eminent student of inter-war fascism Stanley G. Payne came, in his broad comparison of the conditions that had been suitable for a grab of power by fascists in the 1920s-1940s, to the conclusion that non-fascist authoritarian regimes had proven to be among the best safeguards against rising fascism in times of crisis.\(^\text{754}\) Laqueur too has written that

> [T]he historical record shows that fascism (like terrorism) could succeed only in a liberal democratic system. It had a chance only where it could freely agitate. When competing with a military dictatorship (Romania or Spain)—let alone a Communist regime—it invariably suffered defeat.\(^\text{755}\)

The curious “anti-fascist” potential of Russia’s new semi-authoritarianism has, in accordance with Payne’s and Laqueur’s thesis, been indicated in the authorities’ sustained persecution of the two most extreme among the above mentioned groupings, the \textit{RNE} and \textit{NBP}—parties that developed relatively freely under El’tsin’s politically more liberal regime.\(^\text{756}\) Recently, Putin said that “[w]e shall do the utmost to make skinheads and fascist elements to disappear from the country’s political map.”\(^\text{757}\)

On the other hand, it is doubtful that recent developments, such as the decreasing numerical strength of anti-Westerners in the State Duma or the establishment of a semi-authoritarian regime by Putin, constitute sufficient evidence for already arguing, as Likhachev did in 2001, that “the time of the national radicals is over.”\(^\text{758}\) Rather, in Russia today, we could be observing a somewhat similar development as that de-

\(^{754}\) Payne, \textit{A History of Fascism}.  
^{755}\) Laqueur, \textit{Fascism}, 18.  
^{758}\) Likhachev, “My i nash diagnoz.”
scribed above in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. When Leonid Luks describes what was happening between 1871 and 1914 in Imperial German politics and society, one feels reminded of recent developments in Russian liberalism. In Wilhelmine Germany,

[...]through their adaptation to the vocabulary of radical nationalism many liberals accepted, after their political defeat (the conservative turn of Bismarck of 1878) also their spiritual defeat. Within the discourse on the “German Jewish question” the position of [Heinrich von] Treitschke [whose role and standing in Imperial German society I compared to that of Panarin’s in post-Soviet Russia—A.U.] became more and more prominent. This happened notwithstanding the fact that the support for the antisemitic parties of the late 19th and early 20th century was, by no means, impressive; they were only a marginal phenomenon in the Reichstag. In contrast, anti-Jewishness was becoming ever more influential within Germany’s political class, and, not the least, in academic circles.759

As mentioned above, this comparison of late Imperial Germany and post-Soviet Russia and of their nationalist ideologies is only partly justified. Still, the German example suffices to falsify those interpretations that measure extremely right-wing support only by assessing the electoral successes of ultra-nationalist parties.

Opinion polls tell us that the Russian population has made a shift from a largely pro- to a predominantly anti-Western, especially anti-American stance in the course of the 1990s.760 Notably, many of those Russian voters who can be otherwise characterized as liberals have, in the late 1990s, especially in connection with NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe and bombing of Yugoslavia, become critical of the West. In 2005, Mitrofanova argued that the activity of Russian uncivil society (i.e. the largely non-party organizations she covers with her concept of “political Orthodoxy”) had made a contribution to the spread of xenophobic views in Russian society,761 namely to a rise of the number of respondents supporting the slogan “Russia for the Rus-

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sians!” from 35% in 1999 to 55% in 2004.\textsuperscript{762} Reputed sociologist Lev Gudkov comes, on the basis of his sociological surveys, to the conclusion that “the whole political spectrum gradually drifts towards nationalism […].”\textsuperscript{763}

Moreover, both xenophobia, in general, and anti-Americanism, in particular, are spread—as one would expect from the above activities of Dugin—not only among the masses, but also within the elite.\textsuperscript{764} While, according to an essay by Gudkov in 2002, for instance, general xenophobia (though not anti-Americanism) in Russian society experienced, at that point, a small decline, it remained stable among those with higher education.\textsuperscript{765} In spite of these trends, Russian radically anti-Western parties have, at the same time, lost electoral appeal since their best performances in the State Duma elections of the 1990s (KPRF, LDPR), or suffered from more or less significant splits (RNE, NBP).

The above sketch of the rise of Aleksandr Dugin from a lunatic fringe figure to a highly placed political advisor and ideologist as well as some other developments outside

\textsuperscript{762} Russkić kur’er, 17th December 2004.

\textsuperscript{763} As quoted in Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 200.

\textsuperscript{764} William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). On anti-Americanism, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, “Russian Attitudes toward America: A Split between the Ruling Class and the Masses,” World Affairs 164, no. 1 (2001): 17-23; Lev Gudkov, “Ich hasse, also bin ich”: Zur Funktion der Amerika-Bilder und des Antiamerikanismus in Rußland,” Osteuropa 52, no. 8 (2002): 997-1004; and Hoffman, “No Love from Russia.” In June-July 2005, a non-systematic WWW-poll of the Ekaterinburg Agency Novyi Region (New Region) found that 58.8% (2481) of the respondents to the question of Russia’s current adversaries thought of the United States as Russia’s main enemy. The Muslim countries came second with 13.53% (570). Only 12.12% (514) thought that Russia has no enemies. See URL (last accessed October 2006): http://nr2.ru/ekb/32194.html. While this survey has little meaning for an assessment of anti-American inclinations in Russian society at large, it is noteworthy that the issue of Russia’s enemies was here presented to people who use the Web as an information source and who have the time and interest to answer a question about Russia’s external relations. One suspects that the poll thus partly reflects feelings in the Russian population’s most politically sensitive and active sections. In 2002, Likhachev observed that “[t]he ‘American’ emerging from the [nationalist daily] Sovetskaya Rossiya reminds one of the image of the German created by Soviet propaganda during the time of the Great Patriotic [i.e. Second World] War. Moreover, sometimes—especially in caricatures—one can find a direct allusion ascribing to a caricature ‘American’ traits of a [German] ‘fascist.’” Likhachev, “Yazyk Vrazhdy v oppozitsionnykh politicheskikh izdaniyakh,” 87. On the historical context, see Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

party politics, such as the rapid growth of the skinhead movement, give reason for pause. The study has shown that Dugin, while being so far an actor largely operating outside political society narrowly understood, has made inroads into major political institutions including the State Duma, Federation Council, Cabinet of Ministers, and Kremlin—used as a metaphor comprising not only the Presidential Administration, but the larger entourage of the President of the RF including his political technologists. Equally significant is that, at the moment of finishing this study, Dugin was on his way of entering the Ivory Tower of academia and becoming a participant of mainstream scholarly discourse.

The comprehensiveness of his self-promotion and infrastructure of his foreign and domestic ties allows one, moreover, to set Dugin apart from many of his competitors in the field of ultra-nationalist publicism. These rivals’ books might have larger circulation numbers than Dugin’s, but they mostly remain locked in the extra-political realm, have few links into Russia’s administrative, political and academic elite, and often act as isolated individuals lacking an institutionalized network to spread and apply their ideas. Dugin and his movement are, in these regards, ahead and thus qualify as an—in Eckstein’s sense—“crucial case.” Dugin’s example does not fully explain the character of the Russian extreme right, but is still sufficient to falsify interpretations such as the above that assign to the Russian extreme right a degree of social relevance only marginally higher than that of West European ultra-nationalism. They illustrate that organized Russian ultra-nationalism might, after a certain peak in the mid-1990s, currently experience not its endgame, but an interregnum—a phase of redefinition and formation of its ideas, position, image, strategy and structure. The surprisingly swift upsurge of the Rodina bloc out of nowhere into a notable force in the Russian parliament in 2004-2006 and the impressive resurgence of the LDPR-vote in December 2003 can be seen as indicating the enduring electoral potential of Russian ultra-nationalism.

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766 Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science.”
768 As Markus Kaiser observed in 2003: “The social ‘demand’ for Eurasian ideology and the growth potential of this demand seem currently much higher than the recognition of the [miniscule] ‘Eurasian Party’ [led by Abdulvakhed Niyazov] among the electorate.” Kaiser, “Einführung,” 121. The so-called Eurasian Party—a project started after, and conceived to be a rival of, Dugin’s movement—is such a marginal phenomenon in Russian politics that I have ignored it, in this survey, entirely. Its only noteworthy characteristic is the involvement in it of Pavel Borodin, a former Secretary of the Russian-Belarussian Union project and politician well-known for his corruption.
Russian right-wing extremist party politics may, to be sure, remain unable to overcome the dilemmas listed at the beginning within the near future. It is worth noting, however, that when, in the past, both pre- and post-war potent ultra-nationalist parties rose, they repeatedly did so suddenly, moving from—sometimes total—obscurity to considerable popularity within only a few years. When this happened, it was more often than not the case that a vibrant uncivil society, in general, and anti-democratic intellectuals, in particular, had done some theoretical, ideological and propagandistic ground-work before. The German “Konservative Revolution” of the 1920s, and the French post-1968 “Nouvelle Droite” are merely the most prominent examples for an elaborate intellectual preparation of a subsequently rapid rise of an ultra-nationalist party, i.e. the NSDAP, in the case of inter-war Germany, and Front national, in the case of post-war France.

These observations may be interpreted to have the following implications for future research into contemporary Russian right-wing extremism: Although ultra-nationalist party politics is not likely to remain as insignificant as it is today, the currently prominent, above listed parties may not be able to overcome their handicaps soon. It is thus unclear who could emerge as a possible leader in the future, and which party might be able to take better advantage of Russia’s already substantial anti-Western electorate. Under these circumstances, greater attention to Russia’s uncivil society—ranging from well-institutionalized high-brow think-tanks to fluid gangs of teenage skinheads—might not only be adequate in terms of the growing relevance of this object. It might, for the time being, also be a pragmatic approach: As far as we do not

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769 Stefan Breuer, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993). In Leonid Luks’ words, the „the Nazis were able to use these allies [the „conservative revolutionaries“] with profit for themselves in as far as they [the Nazis] gained spiritual support and additional opportunities to infect public opinion with their ideology.” Luks, „Evrasiistvo i konservativnaya revolyutsiya,” 66.

770 Griffin, “Plus ça change!”

771 “The new generation of FN [France’s Front national] leaders has more or less successfully evaded the disgrace and stigma that adhere to the history of the French extreme right in the popular imagination. The work of a movement that came to be known as Nouvelle Droite was crucial in allowing young right-leaning intellectuals to gain legitimacy and to distance themselves from groups with disreputable histories […].” Douglas R. Holmes, Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000), 78.

772 The recently heightening attention to Russia’s growing skinhead-subculture in Russian and Western journalism and publicism might, under a political point of view, be overdrawn though. As Walter Laqueur has remarked “[…] the skinheads are unreliable allies and an undependable source of recruitment [for neofascism]. There is little that unites them, and they lack identity as much as continuity. There are few skinheads over thirty, with the new street gangs appearing and disappearing as quickly as fashions in music. […] The young people attracted by these gangs are not the material likely to be of much use to
yet know whether, how and when Russian ultra-nationalist political society will overcome its various impasses, certain findings on Russia’s uncivil society might be of a more lasting relevance than further research into its volatile party system. From a 2003 broad study of uncivil society in East European countries other than Russia, it emerged that, in general,

in Eastern Europe, a process of politicization of civil society has taken place, whereby political parties (attempt to) exercise more and more control over c[society] o[rganization]s, which, in turn, are more and more apt to forge alliances with certain, usually like-minded, political parties. The result is not necessarily a complete inclusion of c[society] o[rganization]s in the state, but clearly a significant curbing of their autonomy through a process of controlled incorporation into the network organized by political parties.773

If anything, this is even truer of recent developments in Putin’s new Russia.

The four right-wing extremist parties introduced here—the LDPR, KPRF, RNE, NBP—have already been scrutinized to some degree in scholarly studies.774 Sometimes, the particulars of their development have, as in the case of Kitschelt’s focus on radical right-wing parties in Western Europe,775 been presented as telling us the whole or, at least, main story of the extreme right in Russia today.776 This would, in

the neofascists. […] They are, in brief, a problem for the police and the educators, rather than the politicians. […] Future historians will probably find [the skinheads] a fascinating footnote in the history of late-twenty-century customs and manners rather than politics.” Laqueur, Fascism, 130. On the other hand, it should be added that this conclusion was drawn with regard to developments in the West during the post-war period—and not related to the somewhat different Russian skinhead-movement of the new century.


Kitschelt with McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe.

view of the above contextualization, be insufficient or even misleading.\textsuperscript{777} As long as Russia’s public consciousness and elite discourse remain impregnated with anti-Western stereotypes, and penetrated by cryptic and sometimes not so cryptic integrally nationalist ideas, it is to be expected that these attitudes will find organizational expression. At least, in the near future, we should expect to find such institutional manifestations, however, not only, and, perhaps, not so much in the realm of political society as in the voluntary sector. Therefore, Russia’s growing uncivil society currently constitutes a promising research topic for students of Russian ultra-nationalism and associationism alike.\textsuperscript{778}

\textsuperscript{777} Mitrofanova’s following statement in her related book is similar to the above argument: “The impact of Orthodox political movements on Russian society may insignificant if judged by their electoral success (considering that many of them never participated in elections). Most […] Orthodox political organizations have ‘activists’ but have no ‘sympathizers’ who would, for example, vote for them. For this reason, Orthodox political organizations prefer to pursue strategies other than traditional party politics.” Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 187.

\textsuperscript{778} Mitrofanova predicted in spring 2005 that “[n]ationalist and fundamentalist ideas […] will most likely transcend the limits of a ‘subculture within subculture’ and penetrate [the] national political agenda. This will happen due to the fact that […] fundamentalists and nationalists […] have been able to build up networks of alternative social institutions (hospitals, schools, summer camps, etc.). Such institutions have been of extreme importance for all political religions [i.e. most of the Russian nationalist spectrum—A.U.] because they permit them to win mass support at the micropolitical level. Success at the macropolitical level seems to be the next hurdle for these organizations.” Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy, 199.
Appendix: Some of Dugin's Sources and Allies

Note: An inclusion of a person into this list does not necessarily imply that Dugin’s ideology is, in every respect, a legitimate elaboration of the ideas, or represents a closely related expression of the views of the respective person. It merely indicates that Dugin himself has, with more or less justification, claimed an association between his ideas and those of the respective person. By no means, all relevant sources and allies of Dugin are mentioned, but only those that I thought to be the consequential ones. The lesser known Russian figures are more extensively introduced than the various Western theoreticians and publicists who usually have been objects of in-depth research.


Geidar Dzhemal (b. 1947), an Azeri born in Moscow, and early associate of Dugin. Dzhemal, in 1967, became a member of the circle of Yurii Mamleyev and Eduard Golovin, and, in 1980, joined the Naqshbandiyya Sufi Muslim order in Tajikistan. In the late 1980s, Dzhemal and Dugin entered and left together the antisemitic, ultranationalist Pamyat’ group, and became subsequently the founders of “neo-Eurasianism,” with Dzhemal developing, in particular, its pro-Muslim branch. During the 1990s, Dzhemal became a prominent Islamist publicist in Russia, and co-leader of the microscopic Party of Islamic Rebirth. At one point, he was allied to Aleksandr Lebed and the Movement in the Support of the Army. In 1995, Dzhemal tried, unsuccessfully to enter the State Duma. Though the relationship between Dzhemal and Dugin was, at times, strained—for instance, when Dzhemal was affiliated for some time to the rival, microscopic Eurasian Party of Russia of Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov—they have recently renewed their cooperation. See http://www.kontrudar.ru/.

Julius Evola (1896/1898-1974), an Italian artillery officer, painter, publicist, Dadaist, magician and creator of a politicized version of Guenonian Traditionalism that transmuted into a peculiar brand of proto-fascism. Evola’s open criticism of Mussolini’s Fascism as too tame brought him into conflict with the Italian authorities, a circumstance that contributed to the preservation of his reputation after World War II. Evola has exercised influence on a wide variety of European anti-democratic movements ranging from neo-Fascist Italian terrorism to the French Nouvelle Droite. While Dugin has, in public, been more deferential to Evola’s teacher Guénon, Evola’s writings may have had an even deeper impact on the intellectual development of young Dugin who translated some of Evola’s text into Russian and published them in Moscow. See http://arctogaia.com/public/evola/, http://www.arctogaia.com/public/fm/finis2.htm.

René Guénon (1886-1951), the French founder of Traditionalism, a world view that claims that there was once a primordial universal religion (“Tradition”) which has been lost through degradation, but the traits of which can be found in various contemporary religions such as Sufi Islam, Buddhism, or Catholicism. Though the works and concepts of Guénon are major reference points in Dugin’s theoretical writings, it

Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereustroit’ mir.”
Gregor, “Andreas Umland and the ‘Fascism’ of Aleksandr Dugin.”

**Evgenii Golovin** (b. 1936), poet, philosopher, translator, literary critic, mystic, and prominent member of Mamleev’s Yuzhinskii circle which, in the early 1980s, started calling itself *Chernyi orden SS* (Black Order of the SS) and Golovin *Reichsführer SS*. Golovin studied philology at Moscow State University, and gained, as a student, access to the closed section of the USSR’s largest, Lenin Library. He discovered Traditionalism in the early 1960s, and was one of the earliest and, perhaps, most important mentors of young Dugin. He has continued to cooperate closely with Dugin after the break-up of the Soviet Union within, for instance, Dugin’s so-called New University. Otherwise, Golovin is said to live the life of an eremite in a small flat in Gorki-10, close to Moscow. See http://golovin.evrazia.org/, http://www.arctogaia.com/public/golovin/.

**Lev Gumilëv** (1912-1992), son of the famous Russian poets Nikolai Gumilëv (1886-1921) and Anna Akhmatova (1889-1966), prisoner of the GULag, and disputed Russian ethnologist and historian. On his theory, see the excursus on Gumilëv above. In 1996, the University of Akmola in—what is today—Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan, was renamed into Eurasian Lev Gumilëv University (http://www.emu.kz) which has since become an elite college of Kazakhs. See http://www.arcto.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1269; http://www.arcto.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=817

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781 The principal study on Guénon and the history of “Traditionalism” is Sedgwick, *Against the Modern World*, an outstanding work that also includes some analysis of Dugin.

782 Timur Polyannikov, “Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyshleniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’”

783 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mlshegogo pereustoit’ mir.”


785 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mlshegogo pereustoit’ mir.”
Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), a military scientist, founder of the German school of geopolitics, and co-author of the original Lebensraum (living space) theory. Having become a professor of geography at the University of Munich, Haushofer, in the 1920s, founded the Institute of Geopolitics and Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (Journal of Geopolitics). A teacher and friend of Nazi leader Rudolf Heß (1894-1987), Haushofer has been accused of providing principal building blocks for the foreign policy and military doctrines of the Third Reich. However, while being supportive of an expansion towards the East, Haushofer was not a representative of Nazism proper. A year after his son Albrecht (1903-1945) had been executed by the Nazis because of participation in the July 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, Haushofer committed suicide. Haushofer is a major reference in Dugin’s magnum opus Osnovy geopolitiki. See http://arctogaia.com/public/osnovygeo/geopol1.htm#7%22, http://www.arctogaia.com/public/fm/finis16.htm.

Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), one of Germany’s most important writers of the 20th century and a leading representative of the inter-war intellectual movement that became known as the „Conservative Revolution.” Having received high decorations for his military service during World War I, Jünger became quickly a noted novelist and prolific right-wing publicist of the 1920s. While Jünger declined several attempts by the Nazis to incorporate him into their movement, his many radically anti-liberal artistic and journalistic writings contributed to the delegitimization of the Weimar Republic and were widely read among German right-wingers. In spite of his dubious activities in the 1920s, Jünger became, after World War II, a well-respected figure in German intellectual life. For Dugin, Jünger has been one of several Western role models. See http://arctogaia.com/public/juenger/.

Eduard Limonov (b. 1943), a Soviet avant-garde poet and prose writer from Kharkov who emigrated in 1974 to the US and later to France where he received French citizenship. In 1976, he wrote the novel Eto ya—Edichka (Its me, Eddie) with which he became known in both, Russia and the West. In 1989, Limonov’s novels started to appear in the USSR, and, in 1991, he received back his Soviet citizenship. Since then, Limonov has become a frequent contributor to various ultra-nationalist periodicals. In 1992, Limonov became a member of Zhirinovskii’s “shadow cabinet,” and co-


Yurii Mamleev (b. 1931), a well-known Russian mysticist, novelist and metaphysic who, in the 1960s, co-founded the occultist Yuzhinskii circle which Dugin entered in 1980, and which had a formative influence on young Dugin. Having been forced to emigrate in 1975, Mamleyev went first to the United States where he taught at Cornell University and, in 1983, to France where he taught at the Sorbonne. In 1991, he returned to Moscow where he became a prominent collaborator of Arktogeya and taught at Dugin’s New University. He is also an adjunct professor at Moscow State University where he teaches Indian philosophy. Mamleev has been called “a representative of the aesthetics of evil,” and describes in his cryptic novels scenes of human perversion and degradation. See http://www.rvb.ru/Mamleyev/index.htm, http://arctogaia.com/Mamleyev/, and http://arctogaia.com/public/Mamleyev/.

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786 Pribylovskii, Vozhdi, 66-67; Rogachevskii, Biographical and Critical Study of Russian Writer Eduard Limonov.
787 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 226, 330.
788 Likhachev, Natsizm v Rossii, 101.
789 Kaledin, “Terapiya okazalas’ bessil’noi pered maniei Dugina-mladshego pereustroit’ mir.”
790 Polyannikov, „Po tropam Khimery, ili razmyshlenniya o evraziistve i ‘novom mirovom poriadke.’”
**Arthur Moeller van den Bruck** (1876-1925), German art historian, political theorist and right-wing publicist. Moeller was one of the leading representatives of the Weimar Republic's major fascist, yet non-Nazi intellectual movement which would later be called the “Conservative Revolution.” His ultra-nationalism was peculiar for its rabidly anti-Western bent and heavy pro-Russian bias. Apart from being author of pamphlets with titles like *Das Recht der jungen Völker* (The Rights of the Young Nations) and *Das Dritte Reich* (The Third Reich), Moeller became known in Germany as the editor of the first full (“red”) collection of Fedor Dostoevskii’s writings. See http://www.arcto.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=427.


**Yukio Mishima** (pseudonym of Kimitake Hiraoka; 1925-1970), Japanese novelist and playwright. Mishima defended Japan’s traditional values, fought against decadence, and sought to revive the Samurai tradition through his *Tatenokai* (Shield Society), a paramilitary brotherhood stressing physical fitness and the martial arts. He ended his life through *sepukku* (ritual suicide). See http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6824/misima.htm.

**Claudio Mutti** a militant Italian Muslim and follower of Guénon, Evola and, at one point, Franco Freda. A teacher of Hungarian and Romanian, Mutti lost his job at the University of Bologna and served a prison term for terrorist activities. Mutti has published Italian translations of texts by Dugin, Dzhemal and Ayatollah Khomeini, and is “important [...] as one of the focal points in the late twentieth-century international network of Traditionalists, linking smaller Traditionalist groups in Romania, Hungary, Italy, France, and Russia.” See http://arctogaia.org.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=481.

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Ernst Niekisch (1889-1967), major representative of inter-war German “National Bolshevism,” a left-wing sub-section of the Weimar Republic’s major fascist intellectual movement known as the “Conservative Revolution.” A member of several German socialist and communist parties, Niekisch was rabidly anti-Western and pro-Soviet, yet also antisemitic, antifeminist, imperialist, and ultra-nationalist. He openly criticized Hitler for being insufficiently anti-Western and revolutionary, and was thus imprisoned in 1937-1945. After World War II, he made a surprising academic and political career in the East German Soviet satellite state before breaking with the GDR’s regime in 1953 and settling in West Berlin. See http://www.arcto.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=518; http://www.arcto.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=987;

Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), major German political theorist and internationally renowned legal scholar who was a member of the NSDAP from 1933-1945 as well as an active apologist of the Nazi regime as president, in 1933-1936, of the Vereinigung nationalsozialistischer Juristen (Association of National Socialist Jurists). Schmitt’s writings and various legal and political concepts continue to exert influence on international extremely right-wing thought until today. http://www.arcto.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2.

Vladimir Stepanov, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Philosophy who belonged to Golovin’s circle and managed to get, during Soviet times, in contact with the “(non-Traditionalist) British neo-Suf [Muslim], the prominent novelist and poet Robert Graves.”793

Talgat Tadzhuddin (b. 1948), studied Islamic theology in Bukhara and Cairo in the 1970s. In 1980, he was elected Mufti of the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia, and has been heading the successor organization of this organ, the Central Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Russia and the European Countries of the CIS, since 1990. In 2001, he became one of the co-founders of Dugin’s Eurasia Movement, and prominent propagator of a Russian-Muslim anti-American alliance. See http://eurasia.com.ru/leaders/tadjuddin.html.

793 Sedgwick, Against the Modern World, 223.
Jean-François Thiriart (1922-1992), Belgian national socialist, optometrist and convicted collaborator with the Nazi German occupation forces in France. In the 1960s, Thiriart developed a form of pan-European revolutionary ultra-nationalism, and founded the neo-fascist groupuscule Jeune Europe which was both anti-Soviet and anti-American. Thiriart was also a co-founder of the abortive National Party of Europe, an attempt to create a pro-European coalition of right-wing extremist parties from Germany, Italy, Great Britain and other countries. Later, Thiriart changed his anti-Soviet views, spoke in favour of National Bolshevism, and came to see the communist regimes of Russia, China, and Romania with sympathy. Shortly before his death in 1992, he met in Moscow the former second secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Egor Ligachev (as well as Prokhanov and Dugin). See http://arctogaia.com/public/thiriart/.

Nikolai Ustryalov (1890-probably, 1938), a functionary of the late Tsarist Constitutional-Democratic Party and, after emigrating from Soviet Russia, a leader of the intellectual Smena vekh (Changing Signposts) movement. Ustryalov’s positive assessment of the role of the Soviet regime in restoring the Russian empire was called “National Bolshevism.” See http://www.arctogaia.com/public/v5/v5-1.shtml.

Herman Wirth (1885-1981), a Friesian philologist, historian and musicologist who searched for an Ancient history of the “Aryan-Nordic race,” sympathized with certain brands of Nazism, and became, in the mid-1930s, together with Heinrich Himmler and Richard Walther Darré, a co-founder of the SS research institute Ahnenerbe (Heritage of the Ancient Predecessors) which he, however, left shortly afterwards because his research did not gain the esteem he expected. Dugin devoted a special section of his Finis Mundi radio program and some of his writings to Wirth. See http://arctogaia.com/public/wirth/, http://www.arcto.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=63, http://www.arctogaia.com/public/fm/finis7.htm
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