'Modern' Madrasa: Deoband and Colonial Secularity
Ingram, Brannon D.

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Abstract: »Eine 'moderne' Madrasa: Deoband und koloniale Säkularität«. This article situates the emergence of the Deoband movement, an Islamic revivalist movement based at India’s Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband madrasa (seminary), within concepts of colonial secularity in British India. It shows how the decline of first Mughal and then British patronage for Islamic learning, as well as the post-1857 British policy of non-interference in ‘religious’ matters, opened up a space for Deobandi scholars to re-conceive the madrasa as a ‘religious’ institution rather than one engaged in the production of civil servants, to reimagine the ‘ulama’ as stewards of public morality rather than professionals in the service of the state, and to reframe the knowledge they purveyed as ‘religious’ knowledge distinct from the ‘useful’ secular knowledge promoted by the British. The article treats this production of ‘religious’ knowledge and space as discourse of distinction similar to those explored elsewhere in this HSR Special Issue.

Keywords: Islam, colonialism, madrasa, modernity, secularity.

1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the failed Indian uprising of 1857, the Government of India Act of 2 August 1858 disbanded the East India Company and transferred sovereignty over India to the queen. On 1 November 1858, Queen Victoria issued the following proclamation to her new subjects:

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge

Brannon D. Ingram, Northwestern University, 1860 Campus Drive, Crowe Hall 4-135, Evanston IL 60208, USA; brannon.ingram@northwestern.edu.

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and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure. (Philips and Pandey 1968, 11)

While at first glance this may strike some as a policy of benign non-interference, Karena Mantena argues that it was, far more, a concession to “native inscrutability” (Mantena 2010, 4). Simply put, the British concluded that the events of 1857 had primarily ‘religious’ – rather than social, political, or economic – causes. From 1857 onward, as Ilyse Morgenstein Fuerst demonstrates, ‘religion’ became the primary lens through which the British understood their Muslim subjects, and any subsequent resistance to British rule was, necessarily, born of purely ‘religious’ motivations (Fuerst 2017).

Demarcating a religious space ostensibly free from interference was a strategy of rule the British had adopted elsewhere. Throughout their colonies, from Ireland to India, the British advanced policies of disestablishment – a rule to which the Church of England at home was an exception – facilitating the emergence of ‘religion’ as a private domain of conscience that Muslims and Hindus alike became keen to protect against state encroachment (Chatterjee 2011, 11). Some of the British, accordingly, saw the Victorian Proclamation not so much as constraining British interference in native religious affairs as consigning religion to a “private” domain that facilitated, rather than restricted, Christian missions. The barrister P. F. O’Malley saw the Proclamation as authorizing Christian missionary efforts even by an official of the empire, who is “still left to follow in his private capacity the dictates of religious duty, and to assist as he has hitherto done in the great Missionary work” (O’Malley 1859, 6).

The Proclamation also pointed to a new, albeit tenuous, notion of the ‘secular’ in colonial India. Scholars have long dismissed earlier notions of the secular as the decline of religion. They have also challenged more recent notions of the secular as religion’s privatization. Scholars have, most recently, understood the secular as a form of power that distinguishes ‘religion’ from its various others – whether ‘superstition,’ ‘culture,’ ‘politics,’ or something else (e.g., Agrama 2012; Asad 2003; Fernando 2014; Nedostup 2010). Following Robert Cover’s dictum that “Every denial of jurisdiction […] is an assertion of the power to determine jurisdiction and thus to constitute a norm,” Iza Hussin sees the Victorian Proclamation as a performative act (“jurisdiction”), declaring which spaces would be marked by “religion” and which would remain under the purview of the state (Hussin 2016, 63-4). Post-1857 discourses of official neutrality towards natives’ ‘religion’ were in large part discourses that named a range of phenomena – institutions, traditions, forms of knowledge – as ‘religious.’ Indeed, as I explore below, the British were willing to support madrasas only if their curricula included ‘secular,’ and not only ‘religious,’ subjects.

In 1866, just a few years after Victoria’s Proclamation, the Dar al-'Ulum Deoband was founded and, soon, began to fill this new space marked off as ‘religious.’ It was precisely within an emergent colonial modernity that the
madrasa as a ‘religious’ space and the ‘ulama’ as a class of ‘religious’ scholars became entrenched in the very identity of the Deoband movement. This article explores a number of questions at the origin of Deoband. Why did a movement that claimed to seamlessly revive Islamic tradition emerge precisely at the height of colonial modernity, with all of its political, epistemic, and psychic ruptures? To what extent is the movement’s valorization of ‘tradition’ an outcome of that very modernity? This article suggests it is too simple to view Deoband as “traditional” in some respects (for instance, in terms of accentuating Hadith and Islamic law) and “modern” in others (institutionally and administratively resembling a British college more than a classical madrasa, for example). It proposes, rather, that tradition and modernity are so co-constitutive that Deoband’s traditionalism is what makes Deoband modern. Deobandi valorization of “tradition” – as, above all, in its singular focus on “transmitted” knowledge (manqulat) above its “rational” counterpart (ma’qulat), discussed below – is hard to conceive before colonial modernity and emergent discourses of the Indian secular gave new meaning to tradition itself. Deoband as a “religious” institution with a mission to promote knowledge of Qur’an, Hadith and Islamic law, and the ‘ulama’ as “religious” scholars charged with cultivating public morality, are two sides of the same coin minted in the 19th century. Moreover, while the texts that Deobandi scholars study are not modern, the idiom through which they communicate that learning to the public is, in part because ‘the public’ itself is largely (though not exclusively) modern (Scott and Ingram, 2015).

To be clear, I am not arguing that Deoband is solely the product of colonial modernity. For one, such an argument would grossly overstate the extent to which colonialism shaped the lives of the colonized. Much recent literature on colonialism has, in fact, stressed the limits of colonial power and imperial reach (e.g., Tambe and Fischer-Tiné 2009). More importantly, it would understate the extent to which the Deoband movement is anchored in texts and discourses that long predate colonialism. I see modernity, therefore, not as something that ‘happened’ to the Deoband movement. It is not a reified ‘thing’ that travels from Europe to India, a “virus that spreads from one place to another,” in Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s words. It is, rather, a “global and conjunctural phenomenon” (Subrahmanyam 1998, 99-100).

I speak of ‘modernity’ here in two distinct but intersecting registers. The first comprises the sum total of new ideas, practices, institutions, and socialities that scholars often call “colonial modernity.” In the following, I seek to delineate how Deoband emerged within and against colonial modernity while heeding Frederick Cooper’s warnings against reifying ‘colonial modernity’ as an agent in its own right (Cooper 2005, 117, 142-3). The second is modernity as a reflexive attitude, a self-conscious distanciation between past and present,
especially insofar as it values the present over the past. Broadly, I show here how Deobandi scholars were profoundly shaped by the first modality of the modern – institutionally, discursively, and in what they regarded as properly ‘religious’ – even as they consciously rejected ‘modernity’ in the second sense. That is, Deobandis did not understand their movement as a ‘modern’ one, let alone modernist. Most Deobandis understood themselves as anti-modern. But in making this claim, we must also be attentive to the ways in which Deobandis understood the very category of the ‘modern’ (jadid). Ashraf ‘Ali Thanvi (d. 1943), for example, conceived modernity in epistemic terms. For him, it was an attempt by certain Muslims to adapt ‘Islamic’ knowledge to Western science. Typified by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), this ‘modern theology’ (‘ilm al-kalam al-jadid) was anathema to Thanvi, an intellectual capitulation to the modern against which he believed the madrasa should serve as a bulwark.

(Thanvi 1926) In short, the Deoband movement is ambivalently modern, thoroughly shaped by, and inseparable from the contexts of its origin at the height of British imperial domination and the changes – social, institutional, technological, political, economic – that it ushered in, even as many Deobandi scholars resolutely rejected ‘modernity’ as they construed it.

This article makes two main arguments. First, the Victorian discourse on religion and religious institutions after 1857 intersected with, and amplified, Muslim scholars’ reimagining of the madrasa as a ‘religious’ space and the knowledge they had mastered as ‘religious’ knowledge, in contrast to the ‘useful’ secular knowledge promoted by the British. Second, in the wake of Mughal decline and the near-evaporation of the traditional patronage networks they had supported, the ‘ulama’ rebranded themselves as custodians of public morality rather than professionals in the service of the state – a state that had largely ceased to exist – a simultaneous de-professionalization and privatization of the ‘ulama’ through which they took on a more active role in shaping individual subjectivities and public sensibilities. They did so within an emergent discursive space marked off as ‘religious’ and, in this sense, colonial secularity operated as a discourse of distinction that was, nonetheless, never uniform and always liable to fluctuations.

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1 Numerous scholars have discussed this aspect of modernity. See, inter alia, Giddens 1990 and Koselleck 2002.

2 This is an ambivalence comparable to the one that Humeira Iqtidar examines in contemporary Pakistan, where, she argues, Islamist groups like Jama‘at-i Islami and Jama‘at ad-Da‘wa simultaneously reject ‘secularism’ yet facilitate discourses of the secular. See Iqtidar 2011, 38-54.

3 Thanvi indicates that he was inspired, in part, by the Ottoman jurist Husain al-Jisr al-Tarabulusi’s (d. 1909) influential critique of scientific materialism, al-Risala al-Hamidiyya (1888), translated into Urdu in 1897 (Thanvi 1926, 4). On Husayn al-Jisr, see Elshakry 2013, 131-59 and 356, n. 34.
2. A "Modern" Madrasa

The Dar al-‘Ulam Deoband is a particularly renowned madrasa in a long history of Islamic educational institutions, going back at least to the 10th century, when the first madrasa originated in Khurasan. The madrasa subsequently spread to Baghdad by the mid-11th century, to Cairo in the late 12th century, and eventually to India by the early 13th century (Berkey 1992, 8-9). In time the madrasa became, along with the Sufi lodge (khanqah), the most recognizable and near-ubiquitous institution of medieval Islamic society. Traditionally, madrasas’ principally oral mode of learning centered around the memorization of texts. This does not mean that these texts were somehow frozen; instead, as Michael Chamberlain elegantly expressed it, they were “enacted fortuitously in time,” and could thus be invoked to serve various needs in various contexts (Chamberlain 1994, 143). In the medieval madrasa, there was no set curriculum, no slate of exams; students who mastered a given text would get an ijaza, a certificate permitting them to transmit those texts in turn. Indeed, during this period, it was less important “where an individual studied” as it was “with whom one had studied,” a system that “remained throughout the medieval period fundamentally personal and informal, and consequently, in many ways, flexible and inclusive” (Berkey 2007, 43). And since they did not charge tuition fees, madrasas typically depended on charitable endowments (awqaf) to sustain themselves.

The Dar al-‘Ulam Deoband changed much of this, even as Deobandi scholars sought to retain key features of the oral economy of the transmission of Islamic learning. Over the course of several years after 1866, Deoband’s founders implemented a number of novel innovations: a fixed program of study for all students, a slate of exams to gauge students’ progress, formal graduation ceremonies, a central library, salaried faculty, and purpose-built structures for study and instruction as opposed to mosques or homes. Students would come to Deoband, in theory, not to study with a specific person – though the renown of specific scholars did attract students from far and wide – but to study at Deoband as an institution. In these respects, it bore more resemblance to British colleges in India than the classical madrasa. Indeed, Barbara Metcalf argued that it was at Delhi College where Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi (d. 1880) witnessed the advantages of the British administrative approach to educational institutions – ironic given the lengths to which early Deobandis sought to avoid British influence in virtually all other spheres of Muslim public life (Metcalf 1994, 94).

But it was the founders’ conscientious decision to rely on individual donations, rather than political or courtly patronage, that most distinguished it as a ‘modern’ madrasa. In the older system of patronage, a donor (waqif) was typically rooted in a specific neighborhood or town, was affiliated with a specific family, and knew the beneficiaries of their donation (Kozlowski 1985, 60-78).
By contrast, Deoband began with a handful of tiny donations from local Muslims. In one narrative told of Deoband’s origins, after dawn prayers at the Chatta Masjid, Muhammad ‘Abid Husain (d. 1912), who would later become Deoband’s first chancellor (muhtamim), made a pouch from a handkerchief and went around the neighborhood collecting donations: two rupees here, five rupees there. As an historian of the Dar al-‘Ulum observed, “It was strange and novel indeed to establish an educational institution with public donations (‘awammi chande) which would be free from the influence of the government” (Rizvi 1977, vol. 1, 150-1). Barbara Metcalf rightly saw the “participation of people with no kin ties and the system of popular financing” as the twin pillars of the Deobandi approach (Metcalf 1982, 94).

The Dar al-‘Ulum was, notably, not a charitable endowment (waqf).4 Nanautvi himself made this a centerpiece of his vision for the institution. In his founding principles for the Dar al-‘Ulum, Nanautvi stipulated, first and foremost, that “as much as possible, the workers of the madrasa should always seek to increase donations” and to seek them from the “commoners” (‘awamm) who would receive divine blessing (baraka) for their donations. He urged future leaders of the institution to avoid “assured income,” noting the “harm of patronage from the government and the affluent” (Tayyib 1957, 9-11). This model, dependent on individual donors, was easily replicable. The second seminary based on the Deobandi model, Mazahir al-‘Ulum in Saharanpur, was founded a mere six months after Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband (Zakariyya 1972, 5; Mirathi n.d., 22). Muhammad ‘Abid Husain, meanwhile, remained active in soliciting funds for a new congregational (jami’) mosque, begun in 1870, that would accommodate the seminary’s growing number of students. This was significant both because the mosque was built with individual donations and because it broke with the precedent of having only one congregational mosque per city – Deoband already had one, built in the early 1st century – whose Friday khatib was appointed by the ruler, a political context that no longer applied after 1857 (Haroon 2017, 84-7).

It is for all these reasons that Margrit Pernau calls Deoband a “project of the emerging middle class,” in which the ongoing importance of birth and lineage was complemented by “piety, asceticism and a willingness to work hard” (Pernau 2013, 273). What Pernau also calls the “privatization of the ulama” was premised, in part, on breaking those relationships of patronage and reconstitut-

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4 However, it did in time court the support of wealthy patrons, most notably the Nizam of Hyderabad, who became an annual contributor to the institution (Minault 1998, 197). Interestingly, while the end of Hyderabad’s princely state in 1948 naturally meant the end of the Nizam’s patronage, Nehru intervened personally to continue monthly support for the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband from the central government, insofar as “Deoband has provided quite a good number of nationalist Muslim workers.” Deoband was not unique in this regard. Nehru did the same for Aligarh Muslim University, Benares Hindu University, and a number of other institutions that the Nizam had supported (Sherman 2015, 80).
ing the madrasa as a ‘private’ space – but ‘private’ only insofar as it was independent of the state (Pernau 2003, 110). These ‘private’ ‘ulama’ were intimately involved in the constitution of new publics. I argue, however, that this valorization of lay Muslim patronage and rejection of government and courtly support are twin manifestations of a broader trend in how the Deobandi ‘ulama’ began to understand themselves as custodians of lay Muslim sensibilities rather than professionals in the service of the state. This, in turn, depended on etching out a purely ‘religious’ space for the madrasa itself.


There were other dimensions of the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband that were deeply entangled with colonial modernity. The very idea of the ‘ulama’ as exclusively (or near-exclusively) ‘religious’ professionals was fairly novel. There are antecedents for this notion in the premodern period, of course. As early as the Delhi Sultanate, Zia al-Din Barani (d. 1357) distinguished between the ‘otherworldly’ ‘ulama’ (‘ulama’-yi akhirat) and those who opted for a ‘worldly’ career (‘ulama’-yi duniya) (Ahmad 1970, 6). But under the Delhi Sultans, the principal function of madrasas was educating scholars for state employment (Riaz 2010, 71). The Mughals, too, patronized Islamic educational institutions which trained the ‘ulama’ to become civic officials. The most well-known example of this mutually dependent relationship between Mughal administration and the ‘ulama’ was Farangi Mahall, a family of scholars named after the residence (mahall) in Lucknow given to the family by the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (d. 1707) that had been previously occupied by a wealthy European (farang). A member of this family, Mulla Nizam al-Din (d. 1748), created the Dars-i Nizamiyya (The Nizami Curriculum) in the early 18th century, stressing the rational sciences (ma’qulat) to prepare young ‘ulama’ for work in the civil administration of new princely states that emerged in the wake of the post-Aurangzeb fragmentation of Mughal power (Malik 2008a, 199; Robinson 2001, 44-46, 53). The ma’qulat included subjects such as logic (mantiq), philosophy (hikmat), dialectical theology (kalam), rhetoric, and astronomy, distinguishing them from the ‘transmitted’ sciences (manqulat) – Hadith studies, Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). As Mulla Nizam al-Din designed it, the Nizami curriculum only contained one work on Hadith: the Mishkat al-Masabih (Ikram 1975, 606).

Scholars during this period did not see the manqulat and ma’qulat as rival discourses of knowledge – let alone seeing the one as ‘religious’ and the other as ‘secular’, as Yoginder Sikand has noted – but as complementary parts of the same whole (Sikand 2005, 34; Islahi 2007, 29-30). This complementarity has roots that stretch back long before the colonial period, as Jamal Malik observes.
Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), for one, distinguished between “traditional” (naqliyya) sciences (studies of the Qur’an and sunna) and “philosophical” (’aqliyya) sciences. While emphasizing the manqulat, Shah Wali Allah, too, believed the ma’qulat allowed scholars to, in Malik’s words, “strengthen faith through rational proofs” (2008b, 5-6). While the two are conceptually distinct, Ebrahim Moosa has rightly noted their deep interdependence. Architects of the Nizami curriculum understood the ma’qulat to provide the intellectual resources for comprehending the manqulat (Moosa 2015, 110 and passim). The ma’qulat were regarded as being useful for training individuals for careers in administration because they developed critical intellectual skills. One historian of Islamic education in India argues the whole point of the ma’qulat was “exercising the mind” (zehni mashq) (Islahi 2007, 82). Philosophy and logic were not studied as ends in themselves, but were understood by the ‘ulama’ as “tools” for “mental exercise” (zehni varzish) (Ansari 1973, 260). From this perspective, of course, the primacy of the manqulat is taken for granted; it merely argues that ma’qulat are essential for understanding them.

In Deoband’s early years, Nanautvi seems to give this complementarity at least partial credence. In 1873, he wrote that a student at the Dar al-‘Ulum would

attain proficiency in all the rational and transmitted sciences (’ulum-i ‘aqliyya o naqliyya). God willing, they will have the capacities to acquire all the ancient and modern sciences (’ulum-i qadima aur jadida). The reason for this is that, in these madrasas … religious knowledge alone is insufficient. Rather, we also deal with subjects that hone the intellect, just as in previous times. (Rizvi 1977, vol. 1, 171)

This is not a view shared by Nanautvi’s principal collaborator in the founding of Deoband, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905). For Gangohi, the manqulat was not only properly ‘religious’ knowledge but the only knowledge worth knowing. He dismissed the ma’qulat as useless, if not dangerous. When he became sarparast (“patron”, in a spiritual rather than financial sense) of the Dar al-‘Ulum in 1879, following Nanautvi’s death, Gangohi began to shape the Deobandi curriculum according to his vision.

Born in 1829 in the north Indian village of Gangoh, Gangohi went to Delhi in his youth to study Hadith with prominent Hadith scholar Shah ‘Abd al-Ghani (d. 1878). He was also a Sufi master of the Chishti and Naqshbandi orders (Mirathi 1977, vol. 1, 40-62, 88-96). One of the principal ways Gangohi left

5 The Chishti order has two branches: the Nizami branch and the Sabiri branch. The Nizamiyya stems from Nizam al-Din Awliya and the Sabiri branch stems from ’Ala al-Din ’Ali Sabir, both disciples of Farid al-Din Ganj-i Shakkar. The historical record on the Nizami Chishtis is far more profuse than that of the Sabiris. The most important Sabiri Chishti prior to the 19th century was ’Abd al-Quddus Gangohi, ancestor of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. In the 19th century, Hajji Imdad Allah al-Makki, the latter Gangohi’s master, became the single most influential Sabiri master since ‘Abd al-Quddus (Ernst and Lawrence 2002, 118-19).
his mark on the Deoband movement is his insistence that *manqulat* take precedence over the *ma’qulat*, to the near complete exclusion of the latter. Gangohi once tried to convince his Sufi disciple Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri (d. 1927) to leave his post at a *madrasa* after it introduced philosophy and astronomy, but relented when he learned that Saharanpuri would not have to teach it (Mirathi n.d., 61-63). Gangohi himself completed the entire Nizami curriculum as a student in Delhi, including all the subjects that were customary at the time: logic, philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy. But when he began teaching, he abandoned the rational sciences, seeing them as sources of “unbelief and associating God with others” (*kufr o shirk*). Gangohi once explained to a student that the *ma’qulat* was rife with statements that would invoke God’s anger when uttered, even by those who did not believe a word of them. The student protested, however: “But sir, what can we do? We are compelled [to study them], for without them we will not get jobs.” Gangohi replied, “If someone offered you a hundred rupees a month to carry a basket of outhouse waste back and forth across the bazaar, would your dignity permit you to take this job?” The student was evidently silenced (Mirathi 1977, vol. 1, 94). This was not merely a matter of dignity, however. The possibility that a student might inadvertently utter a statement of infidelity (*kufr*) was a matter of salvation or damnation. It is for similar reasons that he urged Muslim parents in Saharanpur not to send their children to schools run by Christian ministers because the students were expected to read Christian books and sing hymns. In an 1883 *fatwa*, drawing on Hanafi scholar Ibn ‘Abidin, Gangohi argues that deliberately expressing a statement of unbelief (*kalimat-i kufr*), even in jest, rendered one an unbeliever (*kafir*). Even parents who allowed children to attend such schools are toying recklessly with unbelief, he said, reasoning from a principle in Mulla ‘Ali al-Qari’s (d. 1606) commentary on the Hanafi *Fiqh al-Akbar*: “Approving of *kufr* is itself *kufr*” (*al-rida bi-l kufr kufrun*). His point is simply that words have ontological consequences – whether they are proclaimed in a missionary school or a *madrasa* – and thus Muslims needed to approach the rational sciences with the utmost circumspection (Gangohi 1985, 53-5).

Changing British policies towards the patronage of Muslim scholars was yet another context for this new validation of ‘religious’ knowledge over ‘rational’ knowledge. Initially, the British took over the patronage that had begun to wane with the decline of Mughal power. They relied extensively on native *munshis* (scribes) literate in Persian, the administrative and literary language of the Mughal empire (Bayly 1996, 69-78). When Muslims in Calcutta petitioned Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, to establish the Calcutta Madrasa in 1780, they did so by reminding him that the Nawabs of Bengal, who

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6 It is important to note that Deoband was not the first institution to emphasize *manqulat* over *ma’qulat*. The Madrasa Rahimiyya, founded by Wali Allah’s father Shah ‘Abd al-Rahim (d. 1719), was perhaps the first, and certainly impacted the Deobandis (Pearson 2008, 9).
preceded the British, had patronized Islamic learning. Hastings was motivated in supporting Muslim learning by both the expediency of rule and an admiration for ‘Oriental’ learning and culture. As Thomas Metcalf put it, it was a “mixture of scholarly curiosity and administrative convenience” (Metcalf 1994, 10).

But as numerous scholars have shown, Hastings’ patronage was also bound up with his belief that Muslims and Hindus needed to be governed by their own texts, for which the ‘ulama’ would serve as intermediaries and interpreters. The Hastings plan of governing Muslims and Hindus according to their religious texts was expanded in the Regulation III of 1793 (the Cornwallis Code), which sought to govern Hindus and Muslims according to the “laws of the Shaster and the Koran.” As company merchant Thomas Twining put it,

> the people of India are not a political, but a religious people [...] They think as much of their religion as we of our Constitution. They venerate their Shastah and Koran with as much enthusiasm as we our Magna Charta. (‘A Letter’ 1808, 405)

The belief that Indians are inherently religious implied, for many, that the company ought to support religious institutions as a key mechanism of governance (Adcock 2013, 25-9). This ‘Orientalist’ position, insisting that the British should actively promote Islamic learning and Persian language as a means of creating imperial functionaries, prevailed until it was eclipsed by the ‘Anglicist’ position in the 1830’s, which saw Islamic (and Hindu) learning as utterly inferior to European learning (Zastoulpi and Moir 1999). Drawing on support from Evangelicals and Utilitarians, this position was exemplified most famously by the oft-cited Minute of Macaulay in 1835. The most vocal critic of the Orientalist position was Charles Trevelyan, who inveighed against Government support for Arabic and Persian, calling for the swift replacement of instruction in these languages with English:

> Buried under the obscurity of Sanskrit and Arabic erudition, mixed up with the dogmas of religion, and belonging to two concurrent systems made up of the dicta of sages of different ages and schools, the laws are at present in the highest degree uncertain, redundant, and contradictory … The expositors of the law are the muftis and pundits; men, who deeply imbued with the spirit of the ancient learning to which they are devoted, live only in past ages, and are engaged in a perpetual struggle to maintain the connection between the barbarism of antiquity and the manners and opinions of the present time. Their oracular responses are too often the result of ignorance, pedantry, or corruption. (Trevelyan 1838, 152-3)

In the midst of these seismic shifts, the Deoband movement responded to the destruction of patronage networks with a new discourse of authenticity, centered on reconstituting ‘severed’ links to medieval disciplines of learning and the moral life of the individual Muslim. Carl Ernst describes this process as a shift
from a local inflection of universalist Islamicate learning under aristocratic patronage to a defensive posture of authenticity articulated by a new class of religious scholars under the pressure of foreign colonial rule. (Ernst 2011, 250)

The transition was not immediate, and never uniform. Gangohi’s biography is full of stories about Sufi disciples of his who studied at Deoband and then went on to work in civil administration. At one point he mused, “When we were students, anyone who studied Arabic would be highly valued for the top administrative posts.” Gangohi’s uncle pressured him to take a government post, but relented when he “realized I would never agree to work for the British” (Mira-thi 1977, vol. 2, 290).

It is essential to note that these shifts away from Muslim scholarly elite as scribes, administrative personnel, and, later, go-betweens for the British are essential for understanding the concomitant shift towards a new self-appointed role of the ‘ulama’ as stewards of public morality, exemplified by the Deobandis but evident among their rivals as well. However, I do not wish to suggest that the ‘ulama’ were unconcerned with public morals before colonialism, in India or elsewhere. The inspector of markets (muhtasib) would be one example of a legal official whose primary role was maintaining public morals. Kristen Stilt demonstrates how the Mamluk-era muhtasib was essentially the public face of the law, “as much a part of the legal landscape as the judge or mufti,” tasked not only with ensuring fair and equitable trade but also with making sure market patrons attend congregational prayer and maintain the fast during Ramadan (Stilt 2011, 38-42, 73-6). In India, it appears the muhtasib under Aurangzeb policed public behavior such as wine-drinking and gambling (Richards 1995, 175). The difference between these efforts and the Deobandis’ concern for public morality was that the latter was mediated by a new print culture in which Deobandi ‘ulama’ sought to shape public religiosity by way of, among other genres, short primers on ‘correct’ Islamic belief and practice (Ingram 2014).


In the Religious Endowments Act (Act XX) of 1863, the government formally divested itself of any control over ‘religious’ endowments or institutions – with some initial legal ambiguity about what constituted ‘religion’ from the vantage of the state. It mandated that the government “divest itself of the management of Religious Endowments” and relinquished any control over religious endowments’ finances or leadership, but reserved the right to continue supervision of the “secular” aspects of any endowment that was “partly of a religious and partly of a secular character” (Agnew 1882, 396-407). The Act was intend-
ed to replace the Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810 and the Madras Regulation VII of 1817, in which the Board of Revenue effectively served as patron of temples and mosques, acts which came under fire from Evangelicals who criticized the idea that the British should be actively involved in patronizing ‘heathen’ religious institutions. Nile Green has argued that the state’s retreat from involvement in ‘religious’ affairs created a vacuum that was filled (always tenuously) by a new religious “marketplace” (Green 2011, 11-2 and passim).

Thus, we can broadly understand the period from 1780 to 1863 as one in which the British replaced the Mughals in patronizing Muslim law and education, and then created a vacuum by gradually withdrawing that patronage, culminating in the 1863 Religious Endowments Act. That being said, some prominent British continued to argue that the government should have a role in patronizing institutions such as the Calcutta Madrasa, since the scholars trained there “did not show any hostility to the Government during the period of the mutinies,” in the words of the Viscount Canning (d. 1862), Governor-General during the 1857 Uprising (Malik 1997, 206).

It was not only legally and discursively that Deobandis came to see the madrasa as a space impervious to state intrusion; it was also physically removed. As mentioned, while Deoband was only a train ride away from Delhi, the qasbah certainly afforded Deobandis less scrutiny than they would have had in the city that would soon become, by 1911, the imperial capital. Deoband was largely beyond the radar of colonial surveillance until the early 20th century, insofar as they occupied a sphere of “religion” that had already been “rendered distinct from ‘politics’” (Green 2011, 7). The colonial archive reflects the near indifference of the state towards Deoband, until Deobandi ‘ulama’ became actively involved in anticolonial politics. When the Dar al-Ulum Deoband did come under scrutiny for the political activities of several prominent Deobandi scholars, the institution tried to deflect such attention by reassuring British officials that the institution was purely ‘religious’ and not at all ‘political.’ As Deobandi scholars began to support the civil disobedience movement of Gandhi, the British put pressure on the Nizam of Hyderabad, who had begun contributing annually to the institution beginning in 1887, to discontinue his support (Rizvi 1977, vol. 1, 200). In response, no less a political figure than Husain Ahmad Madani (d. 1957), then head teacher (sadr mudarris) of Deoband, wrote:

I have to state that the Dar-ul-Ulum School, from the time it was brought into being, devoted its attention solely to imparting religious teaching and the propagation of the Muhammadan religion. It silently did its duty in this field ... In these days when political and other movements grew in India, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama [sic] declared the policy of the Dar-ul-Ulum on platforms and by means of articles published in various newspapers. The local Officers and the Governor of the Provinces were appraised that the Dar-ul-Ulum adhered to its old policy of keeping aloof from politics, and confined its activities only to imparting religious teaching, and so far as it could be imagined, no suspicion...
attached to the working of its Dar-ul-Ulum and to the policy it followed. ("Letter" 1931, emphasis added)

This was, to be sure, a strategy on Madani’s part to deflect suspicion away from Deoband, but it points to a larger assumption about the madrasa as an ‘apolitical’ space. By the early 20th century, then, it seems mutually exclusivity of religion and politics was self-evident, to the extent that what Deobandis did was not only accepted as ‘religious,’ but the memory of it ever being anything but religious was a blurry one. Thus, a certain Maulvi Rahim Bakhsh of Bahawalpur concluded, after a visit to Deoband in 1908, “the instruction in this seminary, in accordance with the older style of the East, is purely religious (khalis mazhabi)” – even though this ‘style’ was, in fact, quite new (Rizvi 1977, vol. 1, 219, emphasis added).

The transition of the ‘ulama’ from ‘worldly’ state-employed professionals to ‘otherworldly’ religious experts is mirrored in the transition from a madrasa education as ‘useful’ knowledge to ‘useless’ knowledge. That is, as a madrasa education was rebranded as ‘religious,’ it ceased to be ‘useful.’ The discourse on useful knowledge goes back to the origins of the British presence in the subcontinent, but it is especially the product of Utilitarians’ critiques of Indian learning generally and their fierce opposition to supporting ‘Hindoo’ and ‘Mahomedan’ institutions of learning specifically. The Education Despatch of 1854 was perhaps the definitive call for supplementing, if not replacing, “Asiatic learning” with “useful” knowledge. It was nothing less than “one of our sacred duties to [confer] upon the natives of India those vast moral and material blessings which flow from the general diffusion of useful knowledge, and which India may, under Providence, derive from her connexion with England” (House of Commons 1854, 155-73). But this attitude already bore real consequences for decisions surrounding the funding and patronage of Islamic educational institutions. Thirty years before the Despatch, James Mill lambasted the use of government funds for ‘native’ colleges in an 1824 letter to the revenue department: “The great end should not have been to teach Hindoo learning or Mahomedan learning, but useful learning.” In establishing “Seminaries for the purpose of teaching mere Hindoo, or mere Mahomedan literature,” he continued, “you bound yourselves to teach a great deal of what as frivolous, not a little of what was purely mischievous, and a small remainder indeed in which utility was in any way concerned” (Moir and Zastoupli 1999, 116). With the retreat of British patronage underway, Muslims in Calcutta pleaded in 1835 to keep the Calcutta Madrassa open, defending madrasa education as ‘useful’ precisely because it would lead to government work. They praised the British for their support of “kazee[s],” for the use of “futwahs in trials,” and defended the Madrassa on the Anglicist’s terms:

Through the establishment of the Mudrissa, many students are annually instructed in useful knowledge, and thence proceeding into the interior obtain
high appointments in the cities and zillahs [districts] of Hindoostan. (Moir and Zаступли 1999, 190 and 192)

Despite such pleas, support for madrasas diminished and madrasa education was increasingly condemned as ‘useless’ because it was essentially religious. Colonial authorities believed primary level religious education (e.g., in village maktabahs) could be the basis of overcoming Muslims’ “backwardness” and forming loyal subjects, so long as they taught a mix of “religious” and “secular” subjects (Sengupta 2011). In December 1867, a little over a year after the madrasa at Deoband was founded, the British government approved a grant of 50 rupees per month to the Mahomedan Female School in Bangalore “on condition that the ordinary branches of secular knowledge should be regarded as an essential part of the education course in that institution,” insisting on “secular reading and writing” in addition to “Alcoran” (India Political Department, coll. 54). Even this concession to religious subjects was too much for some British administrators. In June 1858, a director of public education in the Punjab reported going through “all the old Persian books […] prohibiting everything which is grossly indecent on one ground, and everything which pertains to religion on another ground.” The same director criticized the local policy of hiring teachers from madrasa to teach in newly established public schools, and providing funds for schools connected to mosques: “while proclaiming our principle of religious neutrality, and our desire to spread secular education, we [are] propagating Muhammadanism.” Accordingly, he ordered “all village schools to be removed from the precincts of mosques and other buildings of a religious character [and] the disuse of all books of a religious character in the schools” (Leitner 1971, Appendix VI, 19-20; Zaman 2002, 63). Here, secularity is defined partly through subjects of study and partly through spaces of study.

Madrasas that taught only “religious” subjects could not qualify for government support, hence an 1872 survey of the Northwest Provinces classified such schools as “indigenous (unaided),” meaning they received no government funding. Among the “indigenous” schools surveyed were the then-new seminaries of Dar al-'Ulum Deoband and Mazahir al-'Ulum Saharanpur (Atkinson 1875, vol. 2, 192-93). In the same year, a commission led by Sayyid Ahmad Khan called for Muslims to establish schools where “useful knowledge might be taught along with religion” (Khan 1872, 8). But the madrasas of the “old system,” the report averred, listing Dar al-'Ulum Deoband as a prime example, were “altogether useless to the nation at large, and … no good can be expected from them” (Khan 1872, 55, emphasis added). The Indian Education Commission of 1882 encouraged local Muslim schools (maktabahs) to add “secular” subjects, but as late as 1892 a report in Bengal lamented that the “course of instruction” in such schools “does not go beyond the mere mechanical repetition of the Koran” and does not impart “any real practical education” (Sengupta 2011, 137).
In a searing indictment of this approach to ‘indigenous education,’ published in 1883, the Orientalist G. W. Leitner, Principal of Government College Lahore, argued that such disrespect for religious learning forced the ‘ulama’ to withdraw into enclaves defined principally by their distinction from ‘secular’ education. Due to British meddling, the cultivation of “sacred classical languages” was monopolized by a “priestly class” who “withdrew into the background.” “By the elimination of the priestly classes from our educational councils,” he concludes, the British introduced a social bouleversement, in which neither birth nor traditional rank, nor the reputation of piety, liberality, or courage, seemed to weigh with Government […] against the apparently more practical usefulness of the supple parvenus who began to monopolise official favour. (Leitner 1971, ii-iii, emphasis in original)

Leitner’s view, of course, was not universal among his contemporaries. An 1885 report on the Northwest Provinces and Awadh concluded that “no special measures on behalf of Muhammadans are required, as Mussalman education in these provinces is by no means in a backward state” (Malik 1997, 209). Nevertheless, Leitner’s diagnosis might illuminate why scholars like Gangohi “withdrew into the background” and saw the madrasa as just such an enclave. In a letter written in 1884, a year after Leitner’s study was published, Gangohi inverted the calculus of ‘useful knowledge,’ writing that it is, in fact, philosophy – an important feature of the ma’qulat – that is useless:

“Philosophy is a useless thing. No conceivable benefit (nafa’) can be gained from it. Three or four years are wasted on its study. It dulls the minds of men and distracts from religious matters.

“Thus,” he goes on, “this wicked art has been removed from the madrasa and has not been taught at the Deoband madrasa in the last year,” though he surmises that some teachers continued to teach it clandestinely (Gangohi 1996, 52). If Gangohi is correct, the shift away from the ma’qulat at Deoband was abrupt indeed, for as Leitner himself observed, the Deoband curriculum still included numerous works on logic, astronomy, geometry, and mathematics as late as 1882 (Leitner 1971, 76). Other Deobandis, too, proudly defended the anti-utilitarianism of the madrasa. Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri’s relatives wanted him to learn English and get a position in the government. “God saved me from learning English and gave me the fortune of religious knowledge (‘ilm-i din),” he declared (Mirathli n.d., 23). In an essay written in 1912, Ashraf ’Ali Thanvi, likewise, concluded the madrasa should be “a purely religious school. It should neither be influenced by, nor mixed with, worldly concerns,” for to mix “worldly and religious aims would ultimately lead to a worldly orientation” (Thanvi 2004, 667).

The point is that Thanvi was already operating in a colonial episteme in which a religious/secular binary was hegemonic, for even attempts to describe the mutual imbrication of the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ in pre-colonial Mus-
lim education were bound by the inevitable recourse to that binary. As a 1936 study of Islamic education before the British put it:

Education was regarded as a preparation for life and for life after death. Hence it was that religion was at the root of all study: Every maktab and madrasah had a mosque attached to it, and in every mosque there were separate classes for the instruction of students in sciences other than religious, so that secular instruction might go hand in hand with religious instruction. (Jaffar 1936, 28, emphasis added)

Noting that the secular and religious go “hand in hand” still presupposes the distinction itself.

Muslims in India and elsewhere, of course, have pushed back against such a stark epistemic breach between the religious and the secular in Muslim education. In 1927, the British convert to Islam, Marmaduke Pickthall, castigated madrasas that shun ‘modern’ knowledge under the pretext of calling it ‘secular’, for, in his view, Islam reveres all knowledge as ‘religious.’ “Most Muslims nowadays speak of religious education as something quite apart from education as a whole, as if it meant the teaching of Fiqh [law] only,” he wrote.

From the proper Muslim standpoint, all education is alike religious. […] In a real Muslim school, there would be no separate ‘religious’ education […] No terms such as ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ exist in proper Muslim phraseology. (Pickthall 1927, 101)

From a historical perspective, Pickthall had a point. As Muhammad Qasim Zaman has shown, while the notion of ‘useful’ (nafi’) knowledge certainly has some precedent in medieval Islamic societies, the notion of the madrasa as “purely religious” does not. It is an “eminently modern” one with “little precedent in medieval Islamic societies” (Zaman 2002, 64). It is, I would argue, an example of how the discourse of modernity produces its other. As Ebrahim Moosa argues,

The very success of the secular public square anticipates and requires the emergence of an exclusive religious sphere. Hence the madrasas fill that exclusive religious sphere with consummate ease and enable the discourse of individual religious salvation to morph into identity politics. (Moosa 2015, 200)

Just as the first Deobandis conceived of the madrasa as a ‘religious’ space set against colonial secularity and considered themselves as ‘religious’ experts, whose signature distinction was the mastery of knowledge for which colonial authorities had no use, they also looked beyond the madrasa to emergent publics of lay Muslims whose salvation they took it upon themselves to safeguard.

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