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The Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Program in Southeast Asia: Does It Work? The Case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore

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Abstract

The counterterrorism approach is still harnessed to tackle the spread of radical movement and it is deemed to be a soft strategy for a long-term purpose. In the several past years, the government has been conducting de-radicalization program in attempt to bring the terrorist inmates safely to social life after the prison release. This program commonly conducted in the prison while the inmates serving the jail time for terrorism-related offences. Nevertheless, debates rise due to the fail of the program results which prove some recidivists appear to execute another terror attack. An opinion of prison environment which is considered as a potential breeding ground for radicalization aggravates the government effort to reintegrate the prisoners into normal society. This worsened by the activities like recruiting other prisoners and supporting extremist groups from prison which still often occur in Indonesia. Taking two examples from international scope, France has announced to close its de-radicalization program, meanwhile United States under Trump's leadership prefer to heightened the sentences related to terrorism and to ban Muslim migrants excessively. Meanwhile, Indonesia still convinces that de-radicalization program is one of the most strategic approaches in fighting terrorism, and it is deemed as a soft strategy with a long-term oriented. Therefore, this paper will analyze the effectiveness of the program through theories, facts, and phenomenon. Thus it will yield some recommendations for Indonesian government in strengthening and reshaping its policies.

Key words: *terrorism, radicalization, de-radicalization, and counter-radicalization*

Introduction

Terror attacks still happen in some countries in Western Europe, Turkey, and Southeast Asia and it is worsened by the calls as a genuine message from Islamic State (IS) whose followers have been urged to execute terror attacks in their home country. This leads to the increase number of terrorist inmates in the prison in several past years. Unfortunately, the prison has served as recruitment center and headquarters for ideological extremist (Mulcahy, Merrington, & Bell, 2013). In addition, according to Neuman (2010), prisons are places of vulnerability which produce identity seekers, protection seekers, and rebels in a greater number than other environments. Prison also often gives extremist a chance to regroup and preach their radical ideologies, so that many prisoners who were not radical prior to imprisonment become radicalized through the prison environment (Johnston, 2009, p.3). Now, the challenge is how the government deals with the imprisoned extremist who cannot be assured to reintegrate with the society after the release. According to Ismail and Sim (2016), in 2013, the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) said that 25 out 300 terrorists released from prison had gone back to their old terror habits, and it estimated that the recidivism rate to be at least 15 percent now. This number is not counted yet for some who just went to Syria to join IS after release, which more convincing that prison does not change their extremist beliefs.

Some questions like – where will they go? Who will monitor them? Will they re-offend? Or whether they will be turned away from terrorism after the release from the prison will be challenged (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p.268). The

matter is there is no valid program that is claimed to be a success in running de-radicalization, and there are still many factors such cultural, psychological, and educational are involved. In Australia, consequently, programs have been deemed pointless and criticized by some influential Muslims (The Guardian, 2016). The de-radicalization approach seems to fail to build a constructive thought in battling the extremist idea, which causes more funds are used without any significant results. There is still a debate in the word of the “de-radicalization” itself because there is no consensus on what it really means and ends. In contrary, Hikam (2016) argued that the Indonesian government should still depend on the de-radicalization program because it is a soft approach that involves public participation. Therefore, this paper wants to assess whether the de-radicalization program in Southeast Asia is effective or not. There are three ASEAN countries chosen for the objects in this paper, those are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. According to Kurlantzick (2018), both countries are considered as the leader at a regional level whose population is Muslim majority and has been helping up as a global example of democratization. Meanwhile, Dr. Kumar Ramakrisna, head of policy studies in RSIS (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies), claims that terrorist (ISIS) is going a step further to consider carrying out the attack in the strategic hub and international port in Singapore’s territory. Moreover, Singapore considered as one of the countries in the “crusader coalition” that terror group was battling (Cheong, 2017). These reasons have limited the range of objects into only three countries at the regional level.

Theory

De-Radicalization

Ashour (2008) defines de-radicalization as a process in which radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals while moving towards an acceptance of gradual, political and economic changes within a pluralistic context. In addition, according to Rafique and Ahmed (2013), the de-radicalization program is the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to affect social changed-radicalization. It should not be considered soft, but strategic because de-radicalization aims to prevent further escalation of violence (Dechesne, 2011; p.288). This makes de-radicalization is different with disengagement because it involves an approach to build a conductive dialogue the inmates. Therefore, many claims that de-radicalization is a significant strategic tool in tackling terrorism, and unsurprisingly conducted by many countries.

Based on Dechesne (2014; p. 179 – 180), there are four strategic uses of the de-radicalization, *firstly*, it is excessively used in its response against a more flexible and agile opponent that can hide in a larger crowd (*civil society*); *secondly*, it highlights the difference between de-radicalization, military, and repressive way; *thirdly*, it can occur spontaneously; and *fourthly*, it pertains to the cognitive side of radicalism comprising attitudes, values, and belief. In the case of Indonesia, according to Rabasa, et al. (2010), the de-radicalization has an approach which operates at two levels, *first*, it seeks to develop intelligence on the terrorist network and second is to

return detainees to society, thus the key objective does not to change the terrorist's mindset, but to obtain intelligence on the terrorist network in order to disrupt it and prevent the terrorist attack.

Indonesian government prefers to use cultural aspect as a tool to find a solution to urgently change the mind-set of terrorist prisoners. The cultural approach has been used due to a humane way and developed bonds, which are believed by each other to disrupt the spread of radical ideology and mitigate the extremist character inmates in prison (Martin, 2007). Unfortunately, the debates on the de-radicalization still appear and are due to the no effective outcomes. Istiqomah (2011) said that the de-radicalization program in Indonesia still needs to be evaluated and improved due to limited knowledge and understanding from the apparatus personnel about how to de-radicalize terrorist inmates. This sometimes worsened by the lack of inclusiveness means of it and how to run a clear de-radicalization program in prisons.

Radicalization

Before continuing the analysis of a soft and strategic power which is represented by the de-radicalization program, the concept of radicalization needs to be analyzed further. Payne (2009) claimed that radicalized ideology leads the subject in having extreme ideas and it is deemed as the "battle of idea", not "war on terror", and yet the ideas are still believed as the questions of which ideas, among whom, and at what level of extremism continue to be debated. Alonso et al. (2008) argue that the radicalism is also an ideology that challenges the legitimacy of established norms to lead to violence act, but there can be also radicalism without the advocacy of

violence to strive for the relations of social change.

There are four steps that people turn to be radicalized person. Silber and Bhatt (2007) said that the four levels are (1) pre-radicalization phase; (2) self-identification phase; (3) indoctrination phase; and (4) *jihadization* phase, in which each phase consists a different condition, particularly on the leverage of the subject itself before they already become a perpetrator. The first stage of the radicalization process shows that the condition of the individual is normal before they start to involve in the militant activities. The second stage is self-identification, which the individual keen to learn and understand the radical ideology which indirectly leads them to form irrational ideas. The third stage shows that the individuals tend to learn the radical ideology, and the last stage points the individuals accept and obey the leader command in *Jihad* participating (Aslam, Othman, & Rosili, 2016; p. 154).

Moreover, radicalization emerges when an individual has adopted an extremist worldview that is rejected by main-stream society (Hafez and Mullins, 2015). Therefore, they often legitimate the use of violence as a method to affect societal change. Recently, the radicals often act to be connected with the Islamist extremist. Borum (2011; p.13) stated that opinion is hardly rejected due to the facts that many violent acts are committed by those who support Islam extremist. This is because of Islamist ideology that might pose a security concern, particularly those that are anti-democracy and often blame the West for all Islam's problem, and may support directly or indirectly, or condone the acts of terrorism. Lastly, Hikam (2016) claimed that radicalization is the ideological process which is very vital,

thus its spread must be halted earlier when the government wants to cut or at least to mitigate the radicalization issues. It is not surprising that not many countries face the threats of radical views from their own citizens who now tend to be affected easily. One of the critical cases is the rising of ISIS ideology which boosts the number of radicals groups and supporters.

Counter-Radicalization

While the de-radicalization program focuses on rehabilitating radicalized people in order to re-integrate them into the society, counter-radicalization has an anticipatory action. As quoted by (Schmid, 2013, p.50), it seeks to prevent members from the non-radicalized population from being radicalized, and it comprises in three ways namely, (1) *counter-grievance*, (2) *counter-ideology*, and (3) *counter-mobilization*. *First*, most of the terrorist often legitimate their grievances (Krauter, 2015) due to the economic, social, and political issues, thus the effort of counter-radicalization has the purpose to tackle these grievances which quite often become the reasons why some people become terrorist. *Second*, before terrorist group promoting their extremist ideology, the security apparatus must counter it to prevent its spreading. Previously, Rana (2008) emphasize the importance to neutralize the extremist narrative before becomes a popular theme in public. Once it becomes popular, the ideology will become an encouraging drive in rising of radicalism movement. *Third*, countering-mobilization helps the people to disconnect extremist networks and knowledge.

As Powell (2016, p. 58) claim that counter-radicalization is a prevent strategy, thus a multi approaches are

needed. Not only social and economic approaches but surveillance and intelligence strategies, including military, are important too. In the polarized debate of counter-radicalization theory, there are two major views, *first*, the group who sees social and economic (soft strategy) and *second* is the group who emphasizes the importance of counter-intelligence and coercive action. (Taspinar, 2009, p.75).

The approach of counter-radicalization still avoids the *hard strategy*, because the strategy itself is empowering the community itself. In other words, the resilience of the community is strengthened by the proper understanding of ideology, religion, and even culture. Again, Schmid (2013, p.50) states that to strengthen the capacity building, there are four ways that must be done in counter-radicalization program, namely (1) expanding focus from violent to non-violent extremism; (2) empowering mainstream Moslem voice; (3) addressing the local grievances as local issues; and (4) promoting prosperity and democracy. These four steps are absolutely non-military approach. The implementation can be done through the relations between government apparatus and society, especially religion figures. Tackling the grievances issues such as poverty, injustice, and inequality must use soft strategy and usually it takes long time planning.

In addition, Trethewey and Corman (2009) add the four elements inside the counter-radicalization, those are naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing, and structuring. Naturalizing means restoring socially constructed by facing all belief and meaning behind the extremist ideology that jeopardizes public assumptions. This approach must need some process as Borum (2011, p.8) said

radical beliefs are a proxy. Meanwhile, obscuring means to omit the contradictions behavior between extremist and public opinion, in which the behavior of extremist is a key factor to be assessed to determine whether there is a risk or not (Klausen et al, 2016). The effort of universalizing means to understand the interest and influence of all terror group leaders. All of them must have the universal or common goals to establish the state under the Islamic law. To implement universalizing target in counter-terrorism program, thus engaging subgroups and their leader, politicizing the differences in interest is necessary (Schmid, 2013). And lastly, structuring means to preserve the prevailing ideology by empowering rules and resources. Taking an example in Indonesia, the ideology of Pancasila used to fight back radicalization movement and to structure the social system (Rahman, 2017).

Counter-Terrorism

Previously, the definition of terrorism is a political act that stands at once at the nexus between individual and collective action (Gurr and Marshall in Schmid, 2013). And there is another definition by Matusitz (2013) who stated that terrorism is the use of violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political, religious, ideological, or social objectives. There are many definitions of terrorism; there is no universal and absolute consent on the definition due to the complex and multi-approach on its problem-solving. To counter or to end terrorism, it cannot be done by a single approach, both military and non-military are used by the state. In 2003, US National Grand Strategy combatted terrorism by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This

approach will have a cascading effect across the larger terrorist landscape, disrupting the terrorist's ability to plan and operate (CIA.gov, 2013). Meanwhile, European Union have established four ways in conducting counter terrorism, *first*, preventing people to terrorism by tackling the factor or root cause; *second*, protecting citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability attack, *third*, pursuing and investigating across the borders and globally from terror attack; and *four*, managing and minimizing the consequence of terrorist attack (EUCT, 2005). In addition, Cronin (2009) said that to end terrorism, the state can decapitate like catching or killing the group leader or even negotiating (non-military way) which aims to transit toward a legitimate political process. Cronin (2012, p.192) gave an example of killing Osama bin Laden considered as the US Grand strategy counter terrorism, and it is believed that helping US to prevent Al-Qaeda influence in the world, especially in the US. The influence of the head of group terror is very significant. They have a moral effect to develop their influence to the terror group, especially their ideology. Although *killing* leaders does not completely destroy terror group, but Fisher (2016) said that *killing* group terror should weaken the organization (ISIS), especially depriving its direction and radical ideology spread. Stopping this means to support the effort of counter-radicalism too by other means or hard power. Moreover, preventing radicalism influence could be done by reducing support of all kinds of group terror (Powell, 2016, p.50). Bearing in the mind that group terror like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram must have its bureaucracy/level (Fisher, 2016); therefore using hard power to diminishing its figure could help countries to hamper radicalism influence from group terror. Therefore, the main difference between countering

radicalization and terrorism is using what power in diminishing terror movement. Soft approach (non-military) can be used both for counter-radicalization and terrorism; meanwhile hard power (military) is only used to end terrorism.

De-radicalization Programs in Southeast Asia Countries

Indonesia

The government has established the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT*) through Presidential Decree No. 46 of 2010. This agency has three main duties, *first* to establish national policies, strategies, and counterterrorism programs; *second*, to coordinate related government agencies in the field of counterterrorism; and *third*, to implement the policy by forming the task forces consisting of elements of relevant government agencies (BNPT, 2017). In addition, Sari (2016; p.73), stated that to perform the de-radicalization, BNPT has three main coaching programs, which are personality mentoring, independency mentoring, and continuous mentoring. Personality mentoring aims to fix the radical ideology which is not in accordance with the philosophy of *Pancasila*. This mentoring is being done with the help of the inmate's family who supports the program. Meanwhile, the independency mentoring aims to equip the inmates with soft-skills to get the work after release from the prison. The soft-skills are needed to develop and enhance every detainee capability, thus they will be more ready for the integration process with the civil society. Lastly, the continuous mentoring aims to prevent the potential of post-release recidivism.

In the mid-2017, the Bambu Apus Prison has sent 152 inmates to their

hometown across Indonesia, and this deemed as the successful of the de-radicalization program. (Halim, 2017). Parameswaran (2016), said that Indonesian government has promised to increase the fund of de-radicalization efforts due to the concern of the indoctrination of prisoners to become IS supporters behind the bars. The Indonesian government efforts to tackle the terrorism and radical groups must be praised, because since 2002, Indonesia has experimented initiatives aimed at the countering violent extremism as can be seen with the establishment of BNPT in 2010. (Sumpter, 2017). Moreover, BNPT's programs consist of "a cultural interrogation approach", whereby the officers displayed their own faith of Islam, treated detainees with the respect and attempted to build trust (Rabasa in Sumpter, 2017; p.117).

Malaysia

The major Malaysian de-radicalization initiative is by introducing the Religious Rehabilitation Program. Most of the programs are based on re-education and rehabilitation. Re-education focuses on correcting the political and religious misconceptions of the militants, while the strategy of rehabilitation is adopted for monitoring of the militants after their release (Noor & Hayat in Aslam et al., 2016; p.157). Subsequently, the rehabilitation proves is divided into four phases. *First*, counselors and the police extricate radical ideology or twisted Islamic perception; *second*, counselors open the discussion to address the misunderstood ideologies; *third*, all twisted Islamic ideologies are replaced by correct interpretations of the Holy Quran, and *lastly*, the process is continued by education program about Islam comprehensively (Aslam et al., 2016; p.

158). The Malaysian de-radicalization program is under the Royal Malaysian Police, and it claimed the success by 95%. Most of the inmates had successfully reintegrated which only five percent returned to recidivist. (Ismail, 2016).

Singapore

Even though the case of violent attacks in Singapore is far less than Indonesia, but three out of four Singaporeans believe that it is only a matter of time before the country comes under a terror attack, with Changi Airport the likeliest target. (Cheong, Tan, and Qing, 2016). This survey has been conducted after the Brussels's Airport attack which killed 30 people and injured more than 300 people. Moreover, Lam (2017), said the Ministry of Home Affairs of Singapore confirmed that the country was specifically targeted by terrorist groups in the past years and the terrorism threat to the country remains the highest in recent years, as ISIS has been linked to several violence cases in Southeast Asia Countries.

Due to the least number of terrorist attacks, Singapore has preferred to conduct the CVE (*Countering Violent Extremist*) rather than to focus on de-radicalization. The CVE program has been conducted through the courses given to all students to understand a theoretical foundation in countering violent extremist and radicalization (Taylor and Romano, 2015). The efforts from Singaporean government differ compared to other countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. The government prefers to conduct the "vetting process" to check whether its society have been influenced by radical's views or not. Aslam et al. (2016) said that the vetting process aims to screen the potential detainees actively involved in terrorism. Throughout the process, the

terrorist detainees will be reviewed by the psychologist and given security assessment.

The Failure, Debate, and Assessment of De-radicalization Program

The Case in France

Apart from Southeast Asian countries, France has announced that they will shutter its first and only de-radicalization center for Islamic extremist in the mid-2017, because its experimentation was claimed unsuccessful (Chasmar, 2017). The France de-radicalization center which is called as "The Pontourny Centre" is the voluntary center and has nine participants only who none of them completed the program. Spencer (2017), argued that de-radicalization programs which the West Countries has placed so much hope have long been a failure. This is because the Holy Koran and *Sunnah* are full of commands to make war against the unbelievers, and the idea that *Jihadist* can be "de-radicalized" by reference to them is just a myth told to infidel authorities to lull them into complacency. Previously, in 2016, 400 people were arrested on suspicion of links to jihadist groups, and 2,400 people and 1,000 families are actively monitored. This data also linked to the Bataclan attacks which killed around 120 people (Euronews, 2017). This is why, in the beginning, France really depends on the de-radicalization program which designated to the young people between 18 – 30 ages to halt their association to IS.

Unfortunately, the fact that France Government officially closed its de-radicalization program has opened the debates among experts in examining whether the program is effectively run or not in diminishing the radicals group.

McAuley (2017), said that the failure caused by the lack of evaluation of the mechanisms set up by the state in the area of taking responsibility for radicalization and the lack of a comprehensive prevention strategy. Moreover, some believe that trying to change the perspective of the radical people is not working, thus the effort of preventive measures are more fit and preferable. The report from France implies that de-radicalization does not work because most Islamic radicals do not want to be de-radicalized. This can be seen by the fact that from 8,250 Islamic radicals, only 59 people have inquired about going to France de-radicalization center (Pontourny) since its opening. Among those, only 17 submitted applications and just nine arrived and not a single resident has completed the full ten-month curriculum (Kern, 2017).

Another reason of France de-radicalization program failure was the issue of volunteering, which deemed as the crucial factor that leads into the failure. Crowell (2017) said that the issue of volunteering was very problematic, because it was impossible to someone to declare himself as a radicalized people and announce that he needs a treatment to de-radicalize his mind. The ambiguity of the term of "radicalization" becomes the question, because radicalization is subjective and cannot be categorized as an illness or like suffering from addiction. Some experts continue to argue that government is not supposed to use the de-radicalization term because they cannot invent a vaccine against the radical temptation/Islamist (Dunleavy, 2016). In the beginning, de-radicalization should not take a radical inmate as a patient like in the hospital, but unfortunately, some de-radicalization, particularly in France, implement the programs similar with the

drugs rehabilitation in prison which actually very contradict in dealing the terrorist prisoners.

De-radicalization Program: Are They Effective?

It is not easy as some people think in running the de-radicalization program. Sometimes, it is hampered by the definition of radicalization itself. Yusuf (2016) said the term of "radicalization" is defined in an extremely broad manner, and this becomes more especially difficult given that the concept of terrorism/radicalism is so contested and politically loaded. This lead to the government, for instance Australia, to more prefer the policy of "countering violent extremism" rather depend on their de-radicalization program too much. As a matter of a fact, the Australian government has developed a parallel criminal justice specifically for acts deemed "terrorist/radical acts" (Yusuf, 2016). This show the complexity of de-radicalization occurred, and some believe the program is too instant in removing the radical ideology which already inhibited in every mind of prisoners. Moreover, some countries are still finding the best format to implement the de-radicalization program, and of course the program must be realistically run.

If we saw violence caused by recidivism, means that the de-radicalization program is failed. Actually, the facts of recent attacks in the UK and Western Europe from the *Charlie Hebdo* in France and *Lee Rigby* in the UK point the repeated of terrorist recidivism. , rates of recidivism are understood to be legitimate markers of a program's success, and indeed, they are consistently referred to when discussing the effectiveness of programs and initiatives (Koehler, 2017; P. 172). There is no a certainty to assure that

there will be no recidivism in the upcoming years after the release. Even though the recidivism rate among terrorist can be consistently lower than 'normal criminals' but still it will be always used as a measurement whether the program is success or not. Only in Saudi Arabia who claimed 0 percent of recidivism, but meanwhile in Europe the rate is nearly 30-40 percent (Pettinger, 2017; p. 11).

In the case of UK, Marsden (2015), said the de-radicalization program still needs to be explored, thus it will have a clear set of metrics that reflect what successful reintegration 'looks like'. The program should notice on '*push and pull*' factors to make sure the ex-prisoners are not surprised when they try to integrate with the community. The *push factors* deemed as the reaction to leave the group because he/she has lost a faith in it. Meanwhile, the *pull factors* underline the essence of achieving a normal life after prison, so the financial incentives, the jobs, and the support from the family are important. In further explanation, Bjorgo in Johnston (2009; p.12), explained *Push factors* may consist of a loss of faith in the ideology of the group or the feelings that the violence went too far or even the loss of confidence in the group. Meanwhile, *pull factors* consist of a longing for the freedoms of a 'normal' life".

Previously, many scholars have distinguished the meaning of de-radicalization and disengagement. According to Kruglanski et al. (2014; p.87), disengagement denotes the discontinuation of active participation in violence whereas de-radicalization denotes a belief system that supports violence. This means the de-radicalization program focus on halting the ideology which has been portrayed as a triggering and motivating key factor. The challenge

is can the program change the radical ideology to normal perspective? In which, it is difficult to measure its progress. It becomes harder when de-radicalization program occurs when a group or an individual no longer believe in a violent ideology; meanwhile 'disengagement' occurs when a group or people no longer engage in violence (Johnston, 2009; p. 9). This is a key point why conducting de-radicalization program is much more difficult rather than disengagement. It will take a very long time to convince inmates to leave the radical view behind, rather to stop being engaged in any kind of violent acts.

More critics come from Dechesne (2011; p. 2), who said that de-radicalization may not require any coordinated action to get it underway, or in other words, de-radicalization may rise spontaneously. This means that structured programs do not guarantee a success to eliminate radicals view in every inmate's head. On the contrary, many countries still depend on the structured programs to run de-radicalization strategy, and this cost a high amount of state budget. If the de-radicalization process is really occurred in the 'spontaneously stage', then every structured programs are a waste of government spending. This has been criticized by some scholars who believe that the de-radicalization program tends to spend budget inefficiently.

Assessing the De-Radicalization Program in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore

Assessing the progress of the de-radicalization program in those countries will give the results whether the programs run effectively or not. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are countries in which Muslim is the highest population and they are still depending on the de-radicalization

program to minimize the number of radical groups.

Indonesia

Performing the program in prison clearly needs an adequate fund and reliable practitioners, especially the person who capable in teaching the Koran meanings without against any law in Indonesia. Moreover, the practitioners must have the ability in approaching inmates and his families and networks. The family connection is a vital part to success the program, so the family support from outside prison is clearly needed, and it is a responsibility for the practitioner to make it happens continually. The failure of the program is usually caused by the instant process, so the program officer cannot understand the root of the problems why the inmates still stand with their radical paradigm. From the previous research, Sukabdi (2015) found that some inmates believe the de-radicalization program does not alter their views and they do not understand on what strategy the government will change them into normal people. In addition, from the FGD and interview, Sukabdi found an inmate who totally denies the program. He believes the program cannot change his heart to love Allah and Jihad, and only possible to stop bombing (Sukabdi, 2015).

To assess whether the program is success or not, I evaluate the behavior transformation of every inmate who just follows the program routinely. It is not easy to assure them to avert their behavior, from pro-violence to contra-violence, moreover for the challenge for them to integrate with the social community after the release. In this reason, Sapiie (2016) said that the program is not really optimal because it cannot convince the former terrorist to return

back to society after serving their sentences. In fact, the main purpose of the program is to bring the ex-extremist to their community, but unfortunately, it is contradicted by the facts that many recidivists joined their previous radical group. This can be seen by the case of Thamrin attack in 2016, which one of the five perpetrators was a former terrorist convict, thus it was a concrete example of the de-radicalization program failure (Sapiie, 2016). Finding this fact, the result of de-radicalization program obviously needs to be assessed in some certain stages.

Lestari (2016), moreover, said that the de-radicalization program in Indonesia is under fire. Her opinion is same with the previous reason, because the terror attacks have continued with the perpetrator who just released from prison bars. It also shows the example of the police's inability to completely monitor the former detainees in terrorism-related cases. Another reason that points the failure of the program is the accessibility in every prison. This means that every crowded prison actually is no longer effective to run program. In fact, the more crowded prison, the bigger the possibility to spread the extremist ideas among detainees, thus many international experts still claim that a breeding ground for Islamic extremism (Beech, 2016).

The general results from assessing de-radicalization program shows three answers; *first*, many prisons lack of capable staff who runs the program. The officer with the educational background of social-security science is really needed

to back up the prison. It is a different matter if the prison still uses the staff who only capable in engaging criminal acts to run the de-radicalization program. *Second*, the program often stops after the release; in fact it should maintain the life of ex-prisoners outside the bars. The government has a difficulty in seeing ex-prisoner's network in his new environment. Due to this, the government has failed in solving the question why there are still many recidivists perform terror acts. And the last one is the condition of the prison that too overcrowded, so the program could not run effectively. Even though the program has been implemented by the capable staff, but as long as the prison environment is not supported with the good condition, hence the desired goals cannot be achieved.

In addition, from the primary data taken from the field research by Samto Isnanto (2017), the number of inmates of terrorism cases in prisons until 2015 has reached 215 people in 47 prisons scattered in 13 provinces, which can be seen from Table 1.

From his research from 2009-2015 in Surakarta Prison, Isnanto found that the challenges do not come from the inmates, rather the prison officer or supervisor who do not possess special ability in conducting the de-radicalization program. Mostly, the officer/supervisor only has the understanding of law enforcement and criminalization, thus the lack of human resources readiness, facility resources, guidance preparation, and control-monitor still persist.

Table 1. The Capture of Terrorists in Indonesia Until 2014

No	Status	Total
Indonesia		
1	Inmates in prison	215
2	Released from prison	598
3	Death penalty	3
4	Killed in the scene	103
Foreign Countries		
1	Repatriated from Turkey	169
2	Killed in Syria	53
3	Suicide bombing	4

Source: Isnanto (2017)

Malaysia

Looking to the neighbor country – Malaysia, seems they are really appreciated by the international community. Malaysia has achieved recognition from international organizations over the success of its de-radicalization program. The government has claimed a total of 130 people were arrested in connection with IS, and had been placed under the program. Malaysia has succeeded to collaborate through the Welfare Ministry to support the finance for the program and many psychological experts (Povera, 2016). Malaysia's advantage compared to Indonesia is they have formally enacted the relationship between the prison with welfare department, which is very important to make sure the prosperity and safety of every inmate after the release. Meanwhile, Indonesia seems still need to find the best format to build the relationship between the related stakeholders. This is much contradicted with the Malaysia's achievement which claims the success rate

in implementing de-radicalization by 95%. This is caused by the Malaysian government effort who success in building and modifying its experience to design rehabilitation program in order to respond to the current generation of Islamist militants (Besant, 2016). Moreover, Malaysia also strengthens the relationship with the neighbor states, particularly in exchanging the ideas on de-radicalization and rehabilitation. This makes this country has a knowledge advantage to perform their program compared to Indonesia.

Having a success implemented strategy lead Malaysia to set broader discussion in the international level. Malaysia's counterpart in exchanging the views on de-radicalization is not only ASEAN members, but international states like US, Japan, and South Korea. Malaysia has a good image in annihilating the communist influence during 1960's, and the method in combatting communist has been transformed to fight IS threats. According to Najimi and Ramli (2016),

Malaysia has a long experience in the de-radicalization program due to the successful of campaigning against a communist insurgency in the aftermath of World War. This makes Malaysia has a standard temple on diminishing any kind of radical perspective in their country. Their standard temple is clearly considered as the good method, which can be seen by the few of number terror attacks. Moreover, there is no case of recidivism who conducts terror attack in the last several years in Malaysia.

Singapore

Since 2007, Singapore has been aware with the potential threat from radicals group, thus the government has gathered 122 Muslim organizations to condemn and reject the ideological extremism (Hassan, 2007). After that, the number of terror attacks in Singapore is none until now. Even though the number or attacks is none, but the government still has a procedure for de-radicalization program such counseling time and financial support for the detainee. Aslam et al. (2016; p. 158) said that Singapore has performed continuous and comprehensive efforts undertaken by the government to combat terrorism, which should be praised and improved in the de-radicalization program is an obligatory with the uncertainty of political atmosphere at present to ensure harmony among the citizens are protected and to ensure national security free from militancy which sought to develop radicalism around the world.

Even though, there are no terror attacks in Singapore, but in September 2017, the government under ISA (International Security Act) has arrested two suspects – Imran Kassim (male) and Shakiran Begam (female), who tried to go to Syria for Jihad purpose (Channel News

Asia, 2017). The screening has been performed well by Singapore because the government has vowed to not let any Singaporean to become radicalized. The government emphasizes the effort of disengagement, for instance adding the policy to screen every citizen they have. This is not hard compared to Indonesia, because Singapore citizen is only 5.6 million, or only half of Jakarta.

Prioritizing Counter-Terrorism through Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) Policy

Tackling terrorism issues is quite complex and it takes many approaches. Due to the fail of the de-radicalization program in France and the rising debate of de-radicalization, thus the effort must put forward the preventive way that seems more plausible. Powell (2016) affirmed that the objectives of preventing (countering) will be achieved by responding immediately and working with a wide range of sectors. To response terrorism threats, the government can implement the military other than to optimize what security apparatus have done. In Indonesia case, Supriyatno (2014, p.218), said that Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) – *Operasi Militer Selain Perang* (OMSP) in Indonesian – can be used to tackle non-military threats such as terrorism, even though it requires political decisions from parliament.

Using MOOTW actually is like to combine the military-intelligence-territorial operations, which aims to secure the territory security. For the US case, their counter-terrorism forces are active in 40 percent of the world's countries (76 countries), and their presence comes with striking repercussions (Besteman and Savell, 2018). The U.S. has emphasized the “war on terror”, and it has been 17 years since

the attack of World Trade Center. The US government has provided its latest military technology and hardware, including to training local military personnel in Africa and Middle East countries. Since 2005, the MOOTW aims to end terrorism threats, which Blais (2005, p.5) claims that the program has provided a quick response measures that includes preemptive, retaliatory, rescue operations, and normally, counter-terrorism program requires specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action.

Previously, before the reformation era, Indonesia has done the same thing as the U.S., in which the qualified personnel to tackling the terrorism threats is under the responsibility of Special Detachment 81 (*Gultor Kopassus*). However, due to Anti-terror Law no. 16/2003, terrorism handling currently under the control of Indonesia Police (*Polri*) with the formation of Detachment-88 in 2003. It is been 15 years that *Polri* still fighting terror groups, and now the number of personnel have been strengthened by the additional of 600 Densus-88 personnel, bringing the total personnel to 1.300 (Soeriaatmadja, 2018). The presence of TNI to tackle terrorism has decreased significantly and the effort of MOOTW seems never to exist, because based on the anti-terror Law, *Polri* is the main actor to maintain the security at the national level, including terrorist attack.

This leads to the ineffectiveness of MOOTW due the TNI who is not supported by the anti-terror law, whereas using MOOTW can yield a significant result in combating terror groups. As quoted by Supriyatno (2014, p.219), there are four elements of MOOTW namely *offense, defense, preventive diplomacy, and recovery*. The element of offense aims to capture the leader and to destroy terrorist

and networks (Baker, 2007), which, the military force (TNI) can be used to help *Polri* implementing its operation. The challenge of the synergy between TNI-*Polri* is still being debate due to the regulations and applicable law. From the perspective of *Polri*, terrorism is considered as the criminal acts, thus the effort to diminish them still not using the MOOTW. In addition, Prasetyo (2016, p.46), the implementation of current collaboration by TNI-*Polri* is only limited to the policy makers levels at the headquarters, however, the collaboration at the forefront level such as Military Rayon Command/*Koramil (Babinsa)* and *Police Sector/Polsek (Bhabinkamtibnas)* still has not happened yet. Moreover, the doctrine of tackling terrorism between TNI and *Polri* is different, as Putranto (2014) said that police aims to enforce the law, while TNI aims to defend its territory from any kind of threats, including terrorism. This leads into the debate of TNI-*Polri* collaboration and cannot implement MOOTW. The rest MOOTW elements (defense, preventive diplomacy, and recovery) also cannot be implemented as long as Indonesian government still finding the best format of TNI-*Polri* collaboration.

The question is how to implement MOOTW, thus TNI can support *Polri* to fighting end terrorism? The answer is having the National Security Council (*Dewan Keamanan Nasional*), as Singapore, Malaysia, and major players such US, UK, and Russia did. As Praditya (2016, p.45) said that the main purpose of National Security Council is to formulate the security policies and strategies, which include how to tackle terror attacks by TNI assistance. Unfortunately, the draft bill (laws) of National Security Council has been rejected and still has not received approval yet from the parliament (Mukti,

2015). The strategy to implement MOOTW cannot be run as long as the country (Indonesia) possesses National Security Council and its law. Again, according to Praditya (2016, p.55), Singapore already had its national security agency called NSCS (National Security Coordination Secretariat) which formed in 1999. This agency (NSCS) aims to strengthen coordination between Singapore's defense agencies (military-police-intelligence agency), thus they can prevent terrorism acts with the assistance from the military based on its Law. Meanwhile, Malaysia also already had National Security Division (*Badan Keselamatan Negara*) which formed in 2006, and it aims to coordinate national security issues, including terrorism (Praditya, 2013, p.57). The further explanation can be seen by Table 2.

Meanwhile, if we see major players, they have their National Security, like National Security Council for the US; Security Council of the Russian Federation for Russia; and MI5 for the UK. Therefore, the conclusion is that the country must own its national security acts/council as a single entity to coordinate military-police in tackling the terror threats. In other words, the MOOTW can be done effectively to combat terrorism as long as there is no law on it. In Indonesia case,

Polri still regarded as the leading sector due to the Laws.

Solutions for In-effectiveness of De-radicalization Program

There are some strategic solutions to answer the debate of the effectiveness of de-radicalization, however, the writer divides into two conditions:

1. If the government still keep running the de-radicalization program:

First, the program officers in prisons must understand the concept of de-radicalization, and they cannot only have the knowledge background of criminal science and extra-ordinary crime.

Second, program officer in prisons can handle the radicalized inmates by embracing the existence of their family and religion figures. Moreover, the program officer has the ability to interpreting (*tafsir*) the Qur'an.

Third, for Indonesia case, BNPT must be authoritatively and financially empowered to conduct the de-radicalization program. The main agenda is to provide many qualified program officers to oversee de-radicalization course.

Table 2. Comparison between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Security Councils

Countries	Security Council	
Indonesia	(none)	Cannot implement MOOTW optimally
Malaysia	BKN (<i>Badan Keselamatan Negara</i>)	Can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus could perform MOOTW effectively
Singapore	NSCS (National Security Coordination Secretariat)	Can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus could perform MOOTW effectively

Source: Praditya, 2016; elaborated

2. If the government stop the de-radicalization program (for Indonesia case):

First, empowering the counter-terrorism policy with the help of military (TNI) through MOOTW. This should be supported by the applicable laws and regulations (revision of anti-terror law) to enable the MOOTW works.

Second, to have National Security Council/acts immediately like Singapore and Malaysia did, thus the collaboration between TNI-*Polri* would be run effectively by one/single entity.

Third, strengthening the intelligence operation to capture the group leader and prominent actors of terror, thus their influence can be cut immediately. This role falls under the BIN (National State Intelligence Agency) as the leading sector to coordinate TNI and *Polri* in gathering intelligence information. This is very useful for Indonesia while the government still don't have National Security Entity.

Fourth, strengthening joint patrols and intelligent sharing through ADMM (ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting) to secure from terrorist and radicalism movement. From Indonesia case, the ADMM can be chosen as a place to perform Indonesia Defense's preventive diplomacy.

Conclusion

De-radicalization program cannot be harnessed as a primary way to annihilate the extremist movement, because the process to de-radicalize is a long process and it is not an instant stage. There is no certain step to de-radicalize inmates, and it is still debated among the scholars and

experts. The government cannot cut the radicals ideology immediately, but they can stop violence acts which are called as a disengagement strategy. Moreover, Indonesia needs to re-evaluate what is the best format for the de-radicalization program, thus it will deliver a desired result. And lastly, after comparing the program in Indonesia with two neighbor countries (Malaysia – Singapore), the cultural aspects only deemed as a crucial factor only in Indonesia, while others depend on the quality of the program without engaging cultural approach. Meanwhile, the effort to implement MOOTW to crush the terror group by TNI is still being limited by the applicable Law in Indonesia. Until now, Indonesia can only perform its counter-terrorism under the *Polri* responsibility.

About the Author

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