

Transnational foreign cultural policy - Beyond national culture: prerequisites and perspectives for the intersection of domestic and foreign policy

Weigel, Sigrid

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Monographie / monograph

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Weigel, S. (2019). *Transnational foreign cultural policy - Beyond national culture: prerequisites and perspectives for the intersection of domestic and foreign policy*. (ifa-Edition Kultur und Außenpolitik). Stuttgart: ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen). <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62984-6>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>



ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy

Transnational foreign cultural policy – Beyond national culture

Prerequisites and perspectives for the intersection of domestic
and foreign policy

Sigrid Weigel

ifa

ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy

Transnational foreign cultural policy – Beyond national culture

Prerequisites and perspectives for
the intersection of domestic
and foreign policy

Sigrid Weigel

Assisted by: Zaal Andronikashvili, Christian Schön

Content

Preamble	5
Introduction	6
FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICY – DEVELOPMENT AND RHETORIC	14
1. (Re-)orientation of the FCEP or: Tilting at windmills	14
1.1 The seventies: Reform under the banner of “intergovernmental social policy”	14
1.2 The eighties: Development policies.....	16
1.3 Around 2000: Increase in political tasks in the course of globalisation.....	18
1.4 2014 et seqq.: Reorientation of FCEP 2020.....	20
2. Discourse and conceptualisation of foreign cultural policy	22
2.1 Soft power.....	22
2.2 Cultural diplomacy	24
2.3 Nation branding	26
2.4 Competing narratives	27
CONCEPTS OF CULTURE	31
3. Concepts of culture – Implications in terms of the history of ideas and cultural policy prerequisites	31
3.1 Culture as aesthetic education – German connotations	31
3.2 Culture as a concept of description and interpretation – Approaches from cultural science.....	33
3.3 Cultural exchange and cultural difference	35
3.4 FCEP – Between federal and regional politics, domestic and foreign, art and culture.....	37
BEYOND THE NATION STATE?	41
4. The issue of the nation state in the light of post-colonial criticism	43
4.1 The post-colonial criticism of the Western development model	43
4.2 The imagined nation and theory of homogenisation	45
4.3 Criticism of the model status of the modern nation state	48
4.4 Consequences for foreign cultural policy	50
5. Post-national constellation? – On the relationship between state and nation	54
5.1 Historical asynchrony – the example of Eastern Europe.....	55
5.2 The ambivalence of the nation state and the future of Europe	58
5.3 On the dynamic of state and nation during the emergence of the European nation states.....	63
5.4. On the relationship between human rights and nationality	65

CHANGING CULTURES AND SOCIETIES	68
6. Resubmission of national culture – the role of culture	68
6.1 The “non-negotiables” – pre-judicial commonalities and dialectic of the majority.....	68
6.2 Normative discourses – “Who does (not) belong”, – “national identity” and “Leitkultur”	72
6.3 Belated nation – “culture nation” and the concept of people	77
6.4 Work on memory – upheavels in dealing with German history	81
6.5 Academia – German language humanities and cultural science abroad.....	86
7. Transformation processes – global and national	89
7.1 The Janus face of transnationalism – mobility studies and global governance.....	89
7.2 Migration and development policy	94
7.3 Refugees and migration – on the logic of assimilation and multiculturalism.....	100
7.4 Integration – diaspora communities, parallel societies and Islam dialogue.....	104
7.4 Lived democracy – political culture, social freedom and citizen participation.....	110
Bibliography	118
About the author.....	136

Preamble

In the future, foreign cultural policy will have to be more post-nation-state-oriented and increasingly European in order to give Europe a stronger voice in the world. Only in this way can the liberal democratic order be defended with its social concept of freedom of expression and a critical civil society both externally and internally. The credibility of foreign cultural policy, which represents values such as democracy, freedom of expression and the rule of law, is only as strong as the society that lives these values internally. For this, there should be a congruence of internal and external cultural policy across departmental boundaries. And only through the involvement of civil society actors within can transnational networks for strengthening the Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy (FCEP) be further developed.

The author of the present study, Sigrid Weigel, advocates this. She takes stock of the historical development and opening of the FCEP, critically examines the various concepts currently in use nationally and internationally, identifies places where Germany's credibility could be endangered internally, and points to a FCEP which interlocks foreign and domestic in a stronger way. Interlocking is essential, since, according to the author, "only the measures of the FCEP can be sustainable, which are also supported by culture and society within, it [the FCEP] relies on cooperation partners who work within the country for a democratic society, for integration and citizen participation." Departmental boundaries are hereby challenged provocatively.

I would like to sincerely thank Sigrid Weigel for her outstanding work and dedication. My thanks also go to the director of ifa's Research Programme, Odila Triebel, as well as Sarah Widmaier and Anja Schön, who accompanied the project conceptually and editorially.

This study was developed within the framework of ifa's Research Programme "Culture and Foreign Policy". Here, experts examine current topics in foreign cultural and educational policy and formulate recommendations for actors within FCEP. International cultural relations need to be systematically studied in order to develop sustainable future strategies for foreign cultural policy.

Ronald Grätz,

Secretary General, ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)

Summary

This study examines the historical prerequisites and the conceptual implications of foreign cultural policy in the age of global socio-cultural transformation processes for which national departmental policy is no longer suitable. The areas of activity of foreign cultural and educational policy (FCEP) are continuously becoming more and more intertwined with the political culture of dealing with those conflicts which develop through globalisation and a growing cultural diversity within due to the fact that global and national processes of change are interlocking increasingly, especially in the reciprocal relationship between transnational economy, migration and socio-cultural changes within the country. Germany's future FCEP must operate on a transnational level and be able to rely on domestic stakeholders and non-state actors at the same time. In light of the growing expectations on the FCEP, this study argues to ascribe more political importance to the FCEP by bindingly incorporating its expertise into other departments. In this sense, the study is primarily, but not exclusively, aimed at the Federal Foreign Office.

An overview of the development of the German FCEP, the analysis of rhetoric, conceptualisation and different cultural concepts are the starting points for the discussion on a contemporary FCEP that is committed to global regulatory objectives, acts in consultation with partner countries and focuses on cooperation with stakeholders in civil society both nationally and internationally. Since domestic intercultural policy and foreign cultural policy go hand in hand. Nevertheless, the biggest problem of an effective regulatory FCEP is German politics' increasing loss of credibility and the lack of reflection in the EU's foreign and development policy regarding the legacy of the colonial past.

Contrary to the post-colonial rejection of the nation state, this study argues in favour of strengthening democratic and constitutional structures at a regional, national and European level in light of the erosion of nation state sovereignty without a democratically legitimised equivalent on the supranational level. At the same time, a comprehensive programme of social integration is needed for the increasingly divided society. It is a prerequisite for a societal culture of recognition in the increasingly diverse society. In doing so, the focus is on the question of pre-legal, cultural commonalities as the basis for the existence of the constitutionally enshrined fundamental rights in a pluralistic society. The study examines the current situation and makes specific suggestions and recommendations.

Sigrid Weigel, 20 December 2018

Introduction

“As paradoxically as it may sound, foreign cultural policy must start in one’s own country.”

(Hans Heinrich von Herwarth, 1965)

“...and it is our intention to proceed from a foreign policy of nations to a foreign policy of societies.”

(Ralf Dahrendorf, 1969)

After the end of the Cold War, the global victory of democracy was assumed in international politics. Since then, there have been fundamental changes caused by the growing gap between the winners and losers of globalisation (internationally, within Europe as well as domestically), by global waves of migration, crises and conflicts, climate change, new autocracies, the shady supremacy of transnational concerns and politics loss of control over the financial markets. Against this backdrop, *national policy concepts tailored to departments* reach their limits. *New strategies of global governance in transnational networks, the interlinking with domestic politics* and a *greater involvement of the civil society* are needed.

That applies particularly in regard to foreign cultural policy. If in the past the aim was primarily to communicate a suitable image of Germany to other countries, then for decades there has been an ongoing broadening in progress: by way of commitment to global regulatory objectives (strengthening international law, supporting transformation and democratisation processes, supporting sustainable resource-saving economies, crises prevention etc.). The power of persuasion of such an ambitious FCEP is dependent on the credibility of its measures; and it is judged by its practical political work, foreign and domestic. Global governance objectives require a political practice beyond conventional bilateral and multilateral foreign policy. Such practice must seek its partners among stakeholders who have set themselves the same objectives; these stakeholders are increasingly NGOs and other local and/or transnationally networked civil society actors. A precondition for this are further efforts for department-overlapping measures, which do not pass beyond the realms of possibility, as long as they are within the area of competence and responsibility of German politics and as long as the political will is given. The study analyses the *perspectives of German foreign cultural policy that go beyond a nation state focus* as well as the following necessary *interlinkages of FCEP with other departments and domestic as well as non-state actors in partner countries*. In the following, the historical and conceptual prerequisites for this question are investigated, the current problem situation is outlined and practical suggestions are made.

A brief journey through the development of Germany's foreign cultural and educational policy (FCEP) over the past 50 years (Chapter 1) shows that the process of broadening began with a *commitment to development policy objectives*. Since then, FCEP has found itself in a structural dilemma between responsibility for the stated fundamental values and the international competitive interests of Germany. If FCEP is not to degenerate into the moral conscience and an instrument to compensate for damage caused by globalisation, then the broadening of the expectations placed on it must correspond to it being ascribed *more political importance*. Since every measure of foreign trade or international commercial policy *indirectly pursues cultural policy* in the sense that it impacts the culture of economic activity, the social structure and the way of life in the partner countries, a sustainable FCEP is dependent on being closely connected with cultural policies on a federal and regional level, with development policy and trade as well as foreign trade politics. Therefore, the expertise from FCEP *must be firmly and regularly incorporated in other policy departments*.

Recently, above all *more rhetorical importance has been ascribed to FCEP* using terms such as soft power, cultural diplomacy and competing narratives etc. An examination of the origin of these concepts (Chapter 2) makes it clear that they originate almost entirely from Cold War politics as cultural policy seconds of power political interests. A serious FCEP does not need such rhetoric. However its biggest obstacle is German domestic policy's and EU policy's loss of credibility.

Broadening the tasks of FCEP is associated with an expanded concept of culture. It does not have to come into conflict with the support for artistic projects and quality standards. However, the FCEP should be aware with which concept of culture it is working. The prerequisites in terms of the history of ideas for individual cultural concepts illustrate the fact that they are in different ways burdened with ideological baggage and national hubris or they exhibit the potential for intercultural perspectives (Chapter 3). The necessary interaction between domestic and foreign cultural policy means that strengthening civil society abroad must correspond to the complementary support of domestic projects as knowledge and experience carriers in terms of contact with otherness and difference. In addition to the showcase projects, *wide-ranging support of local intercultural artistic and musical projects* is needed. In the field of academia, internationalisation is currently increasingly leading to monolingualism (international English) and a tendency for the transfer to be in just one direction. In this regard, FCEP (in cooperation with German science policy) is needed in order to further institutionally develop the Europeanisation of the humanities and cultural studies and to work against the existing asymmetry in "trans-

lation politics" in order to internationalise the German-language humanities and cultural sciences through targeted funding of translations.

In the course of incorporating national policy in the EU, UN or other supranational bodies and under the impression that the European nation state has come under pressure in the international political discussion, the current reorientation of the FCEP is primarily debated, amongst other things, under the question of a 'post nation state cultural policy'. Consequently, it is centrally about the *questions concerning the future of the nation state* and concerning possible *transformations of the national culture on Germany's journey to a culturally diverse immigration society*.

The nation state is one of the key concepts of European history that are subjected to radical criticism by *postcolonial theory* (Chapter 4). Whereas the criticism of the Eurocentric view of the Western historiography and the cultural hegemony of the West over the Orient remains to a broad extent very abstract, the criticism of nation is primarily based on the idea of a *homogeneous nation*, which leads to the exclusion of (religious, ethnic or cultural) others; moreover postcolonialism rejects the transferability of the European ways to other regions in the new world order. In contrast, the function of *nationalism* is contentiously judged, on the one hand as an instance of isolation and exclusion of homogeneous nation states and on the other hand as an instance of integration for countries with great cultural diversity. In this regard, in cooperation with the partner countries which are in the process of nation building, the FCEP firstly has the task of developing *plural forms and ways of exiting postcolonial, post-imperial and post-soviet conditions*. Instead of communicating the 'values for which we stand', an exchange according to the stated principles of mutuality 'among equals' requires a *dialogue without prejudging the outcomes* as it is called for by voices from outside of Europe. Not least, in the interests of FCEP's credibility it is also necessary to incorporate the involvement of German history within the history of colonialism and its after-effects that are still visible today in the image of European and German culture and in the policy of the cultural heritage as well, i.e., reinforce the perspectives of postcolonial countries in the policy of restitution. A partner-like exchange also requires the admission that even for a major part of the German/European population the realisation falls short of the declared global objectives and the 'values' that the FCEP wants to promote. However, *cooperative work on shared problems which are still to be dealt with domestically (such as social injustice or environmental issues)* can reduce the asymmetry in the development cooperation to some extent and respond to the scepticism regarding a new western *hegemony dressed up as culture*. Development cooperation literally means to not only

work together on developing countries but to also work together when it comes to realising public policy objectives in one's own country as well as in partner countries.

For the European nation states, the question of a *post nation state cultural policy* encounters different requirements (Chapter 5). This is not just because of the historical asynchrony, in particular between Western Europe and those post-soviet countries that have only recently gained their sovereignty and treat cultural politics as a question of national identity but is also due to the current weakening of state sovereignty due to multinational corporations and the loss in acceptance of parliamentary democracy. Transferring nation state competencies to supranational bodies is problematic as long as it is linked with a loss of democratic processes (as in the case of the EU). Cultural politics do not stay untouched by the current pointed controversies on questions of national sovereignty. These directly impact democratic culture (shown in such cases as Brexit and Catalanian independence movements). In addition, the history of human rights teaches that they will always remain ideal and abstract when they are not secured by civil rights and a democratic political culture. Recent developments also show that 'the people' answer with nationalistic tendencies and often with calls for strong leadership when the state shows weakness or when the rule of law fails. Foreign cultural policy that wants to overcome national borders is dependent on a domestic culture, which actualises the basic principles formulated with the German constitution through a lived democratic culture but is free from nationalistic ideologies and resentments. The dynamic of the current conflicts can be illustrated by a historical-structural analysis of the emergence of the various European nation states (formed out of the elements of sovereignty, territoriality and nation). It shows that a fundamental tension in the relationship between the *sovereignty* and *constitutional aspect* on the one hand and *the nation* on the other is inherent in the nation state. The problematic nature of the nation state is therefore found *less so in the nation state form of political community but rather in the tension-filled dynamic of its components*.

This problem concerns the modern secular state in particular in regard to those pre-legal prerequisites that have taken the place of religion: as the relative common ground of the convictions that underpin the fundamental rights. In this regard, freedom of religion and expression (within the limits of existing laws), even for such minorities in whose own convictions these values are not enshrined, take centre place. This problem, which is posed through the transformation into an open society of pluralistic ways of life and cultural diversity, is currently being discussed under the heading *non-negotiables*; the solutions are being sought in *various concepts of culture* (Chapter 6). In this regard, it comes to light that value-orientated discourses are by their nature basically intolerant. They elevate

their own approach to life to be the standard and legitimise that with “cultural national roots”. The prerequisites are a “national culture” and a “national identity” which historically have never existed in this form since these concepts are the product of narratives guided by unity that were brought forth by humanities in the 19th century. This context also includes the seemingly unsuspecting concept of a “cultural nation”, which imagined the belated German nation as the intellectually superior nation of inner values, namely in a counter position to the images of a superficial “civilisation” (France) and a “cold parliamentarism” (England). Due to this ideological contamination the concept “cultural nation” is less suitable for cultural policy – for describing Germany as a cultural nation indirectly implies the assumption of other nations to whom this attribute cannot be ascribed.

An alternative to the normative orientations is found in collaborative *work on memory*. The lessons from German history, which have given the German constitution its particular character, cannot be the object of a confession for the younger generations of Germans nor for the migrants. Both of these groups have no direct reference experience with this history. Against the backdrop that the German “culture of memory” is increasingly becoming content-empty rituals and gestures of pathos, historians are demanding collaborative work on the awareness of history. For that reason, one can and must include the experiences of the migrants, e.g., by having a focus on historical *constellations and topics* in which *German history is linked with the history of the countries of origin*.

By following global regulative goals FCEP answers to the transformation processes caused, or rather accelerated by globalisation. These lead to increasingly strong interdependences between domestic and international socio-cultural processes, e.g., in the connection between foreign policy, trade policy, development policy and migration movements, in regard to the erosion of national and global democratic processes domestically and in partner countries, and in the relationship of the prerequisites for a successful integration policy with the development of parallel societies and the upturn in nationalistic ideologies. Thus, in pursuing its objectives, the FCEP is increasingly more reliant on the policies of other departments. And due to the fact that only those aspects of FCEP can be sustainable which are carried by domestic culture and society, it is reliant on cooperation partners that advocate a lived democratic society, integration and citizen participation within the country. This is why the study needs to thematically touch on the discussion of the domestic prerequisites of a “foreign policy of societies” (Dahrendorf); because foreign cultural policy begins, as Herwarth already pointed out in 1965, „within one’s own coun-

try". And since then, the connection between foreign and domestic has become much tighter (chapter 7).

The concept of transnationality initially included the promise of overcoming nation state limitations through universal mobility and the development of international arenas for cultural diversity. However, the field is currently dominated by multinational concerns and transnational criminality. Under these conditions, international policy is searching for new forms of global governance, e.g., the cooperation of local stakeholders and transnational civil society networks. There are encouraging models for collaboration between the market, local producers, and European consumers. Though development policies so far, particularly in regard to Africa, did not lead to the removal but rather to an increase in the economic and social asymmetries, which directly affect the possible actions of FCEP. Even though this is a department-overlapping mammoth-operation it is now high time to fundamentally examine Germany's Africa policy. All the more so because it is currently running the risk of becoming subordinate to short-term strategic interests, which would contradict the principle of the sustainability of foreign cultural policy.

"Multiculturalism", which was developed as a counter pole to the accelerated assimilation pressure, suffered a similar fate to the concept of "transnationalism". However, it becomes apparent that both concepts, that of multiculturalism and that of assimilation, are based on the idea of a quasi "collective identity". In the political arena this idea leads to mutual isolation and has contributed to the development of parallel societies. A policy of integration in the form of a *socially and spatially differentiated cultural practice* and a *societal culture of recognition* must be developed as a counter measure. Germany still lacks the comprehensive awareness of an immigration society where there is room for *cultural multilingualism*. In order to get there, the lessons learned from the existing detailed research on the predominantly failed integration of the German Turks must be dealt with: by way of efforts to overcome the "media ghettoisation", an overhaul of the German policy on Islam, which ultimately led to a strengthening of conservative Islam and to Turkish national policies having influence in Germany, a reform of the naturalisation policy and much more. On the other hand, there are innumerable local initiatives and projects that carry out very successful integration work. *Decentralising the refugee and integration policy* would not only avoid many problems that are currently being created but would also have greater sustainability.

That requires above all a *lived democracy* and a relative social peace. Currently, there are numerous factors that are obstacles: the growing division between rich and poor in

Germany, politics' loss of control and acceptance, the radical structural change in the public and the erupting tension between East and West. Lacking the feeling of belonging and the impression of being a second class citizen, i.e., indicators of insufficient integration are shared by the majority of the inhabitants of the East German Länder as well as many migrants and those at risk of poverty. *But how can you expect empathy with refugees from those who perceive themselves as victims of a, as they see it, cold-hearted society?*

"The quality of dialogue is an indicator of the state of health of our democracies," says the Manifesto of the *European Year of Citizens* 2013. In the sense of this benchmark, above all different formats to increase citizen participation are needed, for instance, the *Folkhøring* as tried and tested in Scandinavia for negotiating the most divisive topics. And it is high time to take seriously the problems which form the serious core of the demands of populist tendencies, for instance by means of the *reappraisal of the German unification process by a peace commission*.

What Germany needs is a *comprehensive programme for the social integration of the divided society within Germany as a prerequisite for the acceptance, credibility and coherence of a successful and forward looking foreign cultural policy*. And consequently, just like foreign policy must start domestically (cf. Herwarth 1965), so should the detailed, experience-led knowledge that FCEP has of other cultures, migration, integration, participation and cooperation between public offices and civil society stakeholders be deployed in the domestic migration debate and policy.

FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICY – DEVELOPMENT AND RHETORIC

1. (Re-)orientation of the FCEP or: Tilting at windmills

The *review process* for German foreign policy, which was initiated in 2014 by former Foreign Minister Steinmeier under the motto “Crisis – Order – Europe”¹ includes the foreign culture and education policy (FCEP). Its goal is fundamental reorientation of the FCEP and valorisation of its role. In this context, the general principles of the previous decades, such as cosmopolitanism, cultural diversity and mutual understanding are continued. Against the backdrop of globalisation, social-cultural transformation processes, trouble spots around the world and an increase in military conflicts, objectives such as *crisis prevention and mitigation* come to the forefront. In the ensuing reflections on the exploration of a new basic programme, the search for alternative concepts to nation (state) politics plays an important role against the backdrop of crisis and criticism of the “nation”.²

When reviewing the programmes of past decades, it becomes clear that this review process follows a series of repeated reorientations. If the foreign cultural policy³ was traditionally about promoting the German language abroad and communicating a “balanced image of Germany”, i.e., “an image of intellectual and artistic creativity in our country both in the past and the present”,⁴ then in recent decades it has been successively *broadened* by the addition of societal, developmental and democratic political objectives. The respective changes and caesuras of the world political situation are visibly reflected in the FCEP programmes.

1.1 The seventies: Reform under the banner of “intergovernmental social policy”

At the end of sixties when during the term of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt a debate on the reform of foreign policy erupted,⁵ the end of the establishing phase of the Foreign

¹ Review 2014 – Außenpolitik weiterdenken, eds. German Federal Foreign Office

² Cf. appeal by the head of the Directorate of Culture and Communication at the German Federal Foreign Office: Andreas Görden, Menschen bewegen. Speech on occasion of the year-end of the Directorate of Culture and Communication at the German Federal Foreign Office, 12.12.2017.

³ For an overview, see Frank Trommler (2013): Kulturmacht ohne Kompass. Deutsche auswärtige Kulturpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert. Köln.

⁴ In regard to the 8th thesis on the “continuation of previous measures” in: Zehn Thesen zur kulturellen Begegnung und Zusammenarbeit mit Ländern der Dritten Welt, March 1982, p. 14.

⁵ Cf. in this regard Eckart Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, Munich 2010, p. 651-693.

Service coincided with the dismissal of a traditional understanding of diplomacy. Already the “commission for the reform of the foreign service” – the so-called Herwarth Commission, which was set up in September 1968 by the German Federal Foreign Office – assumed in its report presented in 1971 that the era of “defending foreign political interests” as “communication from government to government within the traditional definition of diplomacy” was over. It was now a question of “involving all politically operative powers and societal formations”.⁶ Hans von Herwarth coined the maxim that *foreign cultural policy must start in one’s own country*.⁷ Its task was defined by the commission led by him as the “cultural exchange between states and societies” and emphasised the *mutuality of the exchange* (in contrast to the one-sidedness of mediating culture) and its *long-term orientation* (in contrast to information policy); the international schools were ascribed a special role. Already in this regard, a *broader concept of culture* is touted which goes beyond the communication of German literature, music and language.

While the commission report simply understood “intergovernmental social policy” as the observation and analysis of interdependent socio-political factors,⁸ Ralf Dahrendorf, at the time the parliamentary state secretary at the German Federal Foreign Office, gave this concept a much more fundamental meaning in a keynote address to the Bundestag at the end of 1969.⁹ In connection with an ironic turn against “pompos” statements of the kind that culture has nothing to do with politics but is “rather exclusively about the crucial principles of the Occident”, he argued for the idea of an “intergovernmental cultural and social policy” and conceptualised the far-reaching intention “*of transitioning from a foreign policy of countries to a foreign policy of societies*”. Whereby he pre-empted the current civil society orientation of the FCEP, i.e., the direct exchange between civil society stakeholders

⁶ Hans von Herwarth (ed.), Bericht der Kommission für die Reform des Auswärtigen Dienstes, presented to the German foreign minister. Ed. German Federal Foreign Office, Bonn 1971, p. 22. The commission was set up in September 1968 by Brandt, who at the time was the foreign minister (of the grand coalition), as an internal commission of the German Federal Foreign Office and in spring 1971 the twelve member commission (in addition to the chairman, Walter Scheel and Klaus Dohnanyi among others were members) presented its report to Brandt, who had then become Chancellor (of the SPD-FDP government).

⁷ Hans Heinrich Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Die Bedeutung des Kulturellen in den auswärtigen Beziehungen, in: Aus der Schule der Diplomatie. Beiträge zu Außenpolitik, Recht, Kultur, Menschenführung, Dusseldorf/ Vienna 1965, p. 403-412, p. 407. Herwarth, who gained many years of experience as an ambassador, was an advocate of the old school which understands cultural exchange as mutual learning process and a discussion without predefined results between people from different cultures.

⁸ Bericht der Kommission für die Reform des Auswärtigen Dienstes (1971), p. 60.

⁹ Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesamtplan für die Auswärtige Kulturpolitik. Notwendigkeit eines wechselseitigen Verständnisses der inneren Entwicklung der Völker. Vierte Epoche einer zwischenstaatlichen Kultur- und Gesellschaftspolitik, in: Bulletin der Bundesregierung No. 147, 03.12.1969, p. 1254-1256.

beyond state institutions. As a result, an *interaction of foreign and domestic policy* is necessary. In this regard Dahrendorf created a standard that today, almost half a century later, is more valid than ever:

“In our age, successful foreign policy requires the mutual understanding of the domestic developments of the peoples. Foreign policy is as good as its underlying *understanding of other countries* and as successful as the *understanding of one’s own country by others* that results from it.”

Thus, the effort and will for *mutual understanding* are at the centre of foreign cultural policy, i.e., *less focus is placed on the communication of a specific image, specific values or objectives*. In the case of Dahrendorf, this understanding grew from a period of transition and “intellectual discussion and productive unrest”.

In the cultural policy principles of 1970s, in addition to abstract objectives such as international understanding and securing peace, social policy tasks were dominant. In light of the division of Germany, they primarily focused on an “intergovernmental social policy” (borne by associations), “youth exchange, adult education and sport”. Also in this context a *broader concept of culture* is called for in order to address “more intensively the contemporary cultural and civilisational problems in the future”²⁰.

1.2 The eighties: Development policies

The report from the Herwarth Commission had already referred to the necessary interlocking of “development policy and foreign cultural policy on journey from aid to exchange”²¹. In 1982, the FCEP was given a corresponding orientation by being linked to the objectives of the “third world policy”, i.e., “cultural cooperation between industrial and developing countries” in order to support the “development and emancipation processes” of the latter. Motivated by the failure of the principle of “capacity building” self-help resources were to be strengthened with cultural policy instruments. Since *development* is defined here as a “compound of cultural, social and economic development”,²² *the concept of development* undergoes a *cultural broadening*, while at the same time *cultural policy* accrues a *support function for economic development*. Consequently culture is ultimately ascribed the task of *compensating* the *asymmetry* between the donor and receiver countries

²⁰ Leitsätze für die auswärtige Kulturpolitik, December 1970, p. 5 and 10.

²¹ Bericht der Kommission für die Reform des Auswärtigen Dienstes (1971), p. 44.

²² Zehn Thesen zur kulturellen Begegnung und Zusammenarbeit mit Ländern der Dritten Welt (1982), p. 11.

that underlies development policy by way of the *principle of mutuality*: “Cultural relationships require mutual understanding and knowledge of each other.”¹³

As a result *fundamental problems* emerge, which are carried forward to the current FCEP:

(i) In the context of development policy, which is today described in a more politically correct manner as development cooperation, the culturally broadened concept of development implies that “third world countries” are also regarded as *cultural development countries*, which contradicts the postulate of *cultural diversity*, i.e., “the diversity of cultures is what makes the world rich”.¹⁴

> *There is a general tension between asymmetrical development policy and reciprocal cultural policy and this fact is to be considered in regard to all measures of foreign cultural policy in Africa and emerging countries. (> 7.2)*

(ii.) The assumption of a socio-cultural deficit for the success of a development policy objective hides the reverse side of the relationship between economy and culture, namely that *every* local economic or trade policy measure has a socio-cultural impact.

> *International economic and trade policy is ultimately foreign cultural policy.*

Today, it especially concerns the principles of free trade in constellations of unequal economic conditions (in particular trade with African countries), which reinforces the existing asymmetries¹⁵ and can have a fatal impact regarding destruction of the local economic culture.

> *What is urgently needed is a binding preventative development and cultural policy check of the planned measures of foreign economic policy and international trade policy in regard to their long-term impact. Recommendations that trust in the self-regulation of the economy¹⁶ are in this regard no way sufficient.*

¹³ Ibid. p. 14.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 10.

¹⁵ Cf. Robert Kappel, Deutschlands neue Afrikapolitik vor dem Aufbruch, in: GIGA Focus Afrika, No. 1, March 2017.

¹⁶ According to the *Nationale Aktionsplan*. Umsetzung der VN-Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 2016-2020. AA 2017.

1.3 Around 2000: Increase in political tasks in the course of globalisation

The insight into the cultural impact of German policies elsewhere was reflected for the first time in the paper that in 2000 was to introduce a revision process or a turnaround. For the German FCEP the principle was formulated of working closely together “with other political fields, in particular development policy and foreign economic policy”. And the EU was called upon to consider “the needs of the field of culture” more in other political fields (e.g., economic policy, competition policy, consumer policy and regional policy).¹⁷

When in the course of the reunification process in 1990 a new law on the foreign service was passed¹⁸, universal objectives, such as safeguarding peace, human rights, international law and maintenance of livelihoods, replaced the competition of systems, which had been dominant until 1989. Under radically changed conditions, i.e., globalisation, growing discrepancies between economic development and democratisation processes or rule of law, the end of the confrontation between blocks, the eastward enlargement of the European Union, the new international role of unified Germany, xenophobia and debates about immigration, the expectations placed on the foreign cultural policy of the 21st century are *significantly politically expanded* in the paper on the revision process 2000. At the same time, the expectations are positioned internationally in the context of multilateral cultural policy (UNESCO). Defined as an “integral component of a [foreign policy] orientated towards the prevention of conflict and safeguarding peace”, FCEP is to contribute to strengthening “the democratic idea”. As a result, *its objectives are now explicitly orientated towards values*¹⁹, i.e., promotion of democracy, implementation of human rights, sustainability of growth and strengthening civil society. It corresponds to the principle of mutuality also on the *strategic level*: through partnership-like cooperation with stakeholders in other countries. The main target group is considered to be the “current and future leadership groups, multipliers and opinion formers in politics, business, academia, culture and the media”; correspondingly a clear focus is placed on education and academia. In addition, a tendency to *denationalise* the measures is emerging; regarding the implementation of the FCEP reference is made to “independent intermediary organisations”, “public private partnerships” and on an international level to “forums of dialogue and global networks”.²⁰

¹⁷ Forum: Zukunft der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik, Berlin, 04.07.2000, p. 6 et seq. and 17 et seq.

¹⁸ Gesetz über den Auswärtigen Dienst (GAD), in: Enrico Brandt/Christian Buck (ed.): Auswärtiges Amt. Diplomatie als Beruf. 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 2002, p. 367-375.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 6. and p. 16.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 17. and p. 19 et seq.

The *connection between domestic and foreign perspectives* is highlighted again. The objective of getting foreign addressees to be interested in Germany is linked to the fact that the “Germans themselves must be open to foreign culture”, that intolerance against foreigners must be combated and that the legal and institutional barriers for immigration must be dismantled. Since the call was addressed to “everyone who is responsible for domestic cultural and education policy”²¹, however, it has remained but an appeal.

In the wording for the orientation of individual fields and regional focuses (EU, East-Central Europe and CIS, USA, Islamic countries, other regions of the world) in the 2003 FCEP programme, *cultural heritage* is given a prominent status for the first time by way of (i) the “repatriation of cultural artefacts”, which is considered as part of the “issues around overcoming the last consequences of the Second World War”, and (ii) a “special programme: maintenance of culture in the regions of the third world” that supports these countries in “preserving the cultural identity”.²²

This comprehensive political use of the FCEP was continued in the following years. With the aspiration of securing Germany’s influence in the world and “helping to responsibly shape globalisation” with the aid of FCEP, FCEP has now been conceptually armed and it is described as “cultural diplomacy”.²³ (> 2.2) From this development *fundamental problems* emerge:

(i.) The assignment of diverse expectations in connection with growing political problems on a global scale lacks a complementary ascription of more political importance to the voices of foreign cultural policy in other policy areas.

> *When the aspiration of “helping to responsibly shape globalisation” is to be more than a rhetorical phrase, then, as recommended by UNESCO, the expertise of FCEP is as a rule to be incorporated into other departments.*²⁴

(ii.) The aspiration of the German FCEP to support democratisation processes and rule of law in other countries and to promote civil societies locally must let itself be measured against the reality in Germany and the German EU policy. “However, the demand for the

²¹ Ibid, p. 9, 11, 17 and 20.

²² Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik, 2003, p. 42 et seq. and 58 et seq.

²³ Auswärtige Kultur und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung, September 2011.

²⁴ Bericht zur Rolle der Kulturpolitik für die Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung (Sustainable Development Goals, SDG): “The integration of culture in sustainable development”. Re | Shaping cultural policies. Advancing creativity for development. UNESCO 2018, p. 27; <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/>

respect of human dignity is only as credible as the country and society which invoke it.”²⁵ In the recent past, the credibility of the German foreign and European policy has suffered heavily: historically, e.g., as a result of the “psychologically serious transgression” in infringing the Maastricht criteria, which were drafted under the German leadership for the introduction of the euro²⁶ and most recently, e.g., by the revocation of climate goals by a country which for a long time had internationally presented itself as the pioneer of ambitious climate policy. The German voice also suffers in the dialogue on human rights or in the context of “development cooperation”, which concerns the implementation of employment and social standards (as postulated in the “Aktionsplan Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte” [action plan for economy and human rights])²⁷, if it allows, for instance, the EU to indirectly support extreme human rights violations²⁸ in that subsidies worth millions go to large concerns in the agricultural industry without these subsidies being tied to the observation of social standards (employment law, minimum wage) and principles of sustainability, and in this way the EU Commissioner for Agriculture is de facto implementing a devastating refugee policy that is completely contrary to the EU conventions.

> The biggest obstacle to the objectives of the FCEP is the increasing loss of credibility of German domestic policy²⁹ and German EU policy, in which the orientation towards the lobbying interests of Germany's industry counteracts the noble principles of the programmatic papers.

1.4 2014 et seqq.: Reorientation of FCEP 2020

These problems have become even worse against the backdrop of accelerated globalisation, the worsening negative impact of the policies of transnational concerns, the global movement of refugees, terrorism, digitalisation and the limitation of civil society arenas, and also under the impression that the “world is permanently in crisis mode”. The dilemmas of German foreign policy – which is caught between Germany's international

²⁵ Volkhard Knigge, Warum Flüchtlinge KZ-Gedenkstätten besuchen sollen, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.12.2015.

²⁶ Christoph von Marschall, Wir verstehen die Welt nicht mehr. Deutschlands Entfremdung von seinen Freunden, Freiburg 2018, p.44.

²⁷ Nationaler Aktionsplan. Umsetzung der VN-Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 2016-2020. German Federal Foreign Office 2017, p. 20.

²⁸ Such as the catastrophic working and living conditions of refugees who work in the large concerns of the European agricultural industry. Cf. the excellently researched documentary by Vanessa Lünenschloß and Jan Zimmermann, “Europas dreckige Ernte”, BR 2018, broadcast by ARD on 09.07.2018.

²⁹ As someone said in the 2014 review process, “German domestic policy is standing in the path of its ambitious foreign policy”, Lawrence Freedman in Review 2014 – Aussenpolitik weiterdenken, p. 21.

competitive interests and the international responsibility for the global regulatory objectives³⁰ (such as strengthening international law, supporting processes of transformation and democracy, advocating sustainable and resource-saving industries, prevention of crises and mediation etc.), i.e., between the idea “that our foreign policy impact is based primarily on our innovation and the attractiveness of our social model with its specific balance of freedom, security, prosperity and rule of law”,³¹ and the growing loss of credibility – these dilemmas form the backdrop for the future FCEP. So in the discourse of the review, there are increasingly appeals to uphold moral values, such as honesty, candour, reliability and trustworthiness etc. At the same time, the expectations on the FCEP are increasingly directed towards its communication competencies: “The strategic communication task for a network-orientated foreign policy is found in promoting dialogue and exchange between stakeholders and target groups and not lapsing into foreign policy (monologic) propaganda.”³² However, FCEP wants to and must be much *more than the communicative agent of German foreign policy*.

Therefore, the broadening of FCEP, as specified in the coalition agreement of the government in 2018, is consistent. Nevertheless, if it is limited to an increase in the budget and it does not result in *the FCEP being given more political weight* by generally assigning its expertise a binding role in the evaluation of planned measures of German international policy, then its maxims remain but cheap proclamations. Under the condition of the de facto limited influence on other departments, the FCEP, in regard to hugely increased expectations being placed on it, ends up in a problematic position: as a kind of *moral conscience* of German policy, and as an *instrument of compensation* for consequential damage from globalisation its efforts are like tilting at windmills.

Consequently, the public reaction to the broadening of the FCEP in the coalition agreement was divided. Broadening the FCEP was essentially approved but criticism and concerns were expressed that art and culture were to be instrumentalised to promote the national interests, and there was also scepticism as to whether culture is “at all equipped, let alone suitable for such offensives in ‘competing narratives’”.³³

³⁰ Ibid, p. 11.

³¹ Ibid, see Review 2014, p. 12.

³² As mentioned by Oliver Will, *ibid.* p. 30.

³³ Jochen Stöckmann, *Aufwertung der Kultur könnte sich als Bumerang erweisen, on: deutschlandfunk.de* (05.02.2018); https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/kulturpolitik-aufwertung-der-kultur-koennte-sich-als.691.de.html?dram:article_id=410068

2. Discourse and conceptualisation of foreign cultural policy

The increased requirements placed on the FCEP correspond to a rhetorical armament in the discourse *about* foreign cultural policy: with terms such as *soft power*, *cultural diplomacy*, *digital diplomacy*, *competing narratives and nation branding* among others. The majority of these terms have in common that they enhance cultural policy and understand it as an instrument of global political or even geostrategic objectives. The origin of the concepts from the Cold War, power politics and market logic as well as the analysis of the power political implications make it clear that they are difficult to reconcile with the regulatory principles of the German FCEP that are based on fundamental rights.

2.1 Soft power

The term gained its theoretical shape from the US American political scientist Joseph Nye Jr., who defined “soft power” for the first time in 1990 as a third power alongside military and economic power³⁴. After years of political work as the chairman of the “National Intelligence Council” and as the deputy defence secretary of the USA, he further developed the concept against the backdrop of the changed power political conditions and with a view to the Iraq war and terrorism. He published it in his book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004). In this book, culture is described as a means of *influence* in the international competition between powers and values, i.e., as a means to “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” and as an “ability to shape the preference of others”. In this regard, “soft power” is often described as “co-optive power” or “attractive power”. Its *means* – “soft power resources are the assets that produce that attraction”³⁵ – are according to Nye the *culture*, the *political values* and the *foreign policy* of a country.

However, the practice is older than the term, as is shown by his review of American policy in the Second World War and during the Cold War, e.g., Roosevelt’s establishment of the “Office of War Time Information” (OWI), the “Voice of America” and the role of Hollywood:

³⁴ Joseph Nye, *Bound to lead. The changing nature of American power*. New York 1990.

³⁵ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York 2004, p.6.

“Hollywood executives, motivated by a mixture of patriotism and self-interest, were happy to cooperate. Well before the Cold War, according to Richard Pells, American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of the Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also America’s culture and values, the secret of its success, to the rest of the world.”³⁶

The “Congress for Cultural Freedom” (CCF) should also be considered in this context, which immediately after the war was theoretically reflected on as a *cultural approach* and *another way in international relations*³⁷. The CCF Paris office in the 1950s/60s promoted innumerable projects (exhibitions, newspapers, symposiums and artistic projects) in more than thirty countries, without the primarily left-liberal intellectuals and artists suspecting that the CCF was financed by the CIA.³⁸ It lacks no irony that precisely projects of *autonomous* art, which in principle reject being used for an objective, were so to speak engaged in the “competition of systems”.³⁹ In its exaggerated form, it makes a problem clear that is symptomatic for all state financed FCEP, namely the state controlled funding of free exchange and freedom of expression.

The origin of the power political concept of foreign cultural policy can be traced even further back, as is argued by Kurt Düwell using the example of Gustav Stresemann who, like Nye, spoke of the same triad, “The weakening of the security policy as the ‘first stage’ should as it were be balanced on the ‘second stage’ by the partially still existing German economic power and on the ‘third stage’ by Germany’s creative powers in culture, art and academia.”⁴⁰

> Insofar as the concept of “soft power” was developed as a policy instrument of influence to support military power policy it springs from an instrumentalisation of culture for power-political purposes. This contradicts the principles of a FCEP based on mutuality and cooperative cooperation “between equals”.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 102.

³⁷ The title and subheading of the book by Ruth Emily McMurray/ Muna Lee, North Carolina 1947.

³⁸ This set of problems was addressed by the exhibition “Parapolitik” at the Haus der Kulturen der Welt 2017; cf. also Gilles Scott-Smith/ Charlotte A. Lerg (ed.), *Campaigning Culture and the Cold War. The Journals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom*, Palgrave Macmillan 2017.

³⁹ Cf. Paul Ingendaay, *Der Agent, der aus der Kultur kam*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8.12.2017, p. 13.

⁴⁰ Kurt Düwell, „Soft Power“ und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, vol. 98/H. 2 (2016), p. 439-450, p. 444.

2.2 Cultural diplomacy

In English, the term *cultural diplomacy* is mainly used as a synonym for *cultural foreign affairs* or *cultural foreign relations* and insofar has no clear definition. The spectrum of meanings ranges from propaganda and foreign policy using the resources of culture to any type of intercultural exchange. Since US American history takes up the largest portion of the research on cultural diplomacy, a link to the Cold War is very often made. In their 2010 summary of historical studies in international comparison, Gienow-Hecht/ Donfried observed three different concepts of cultural diplomacy: (i) deployment of culture as an instrument of state politics (examples are the USA and the USSR), (ii) means of making connections to countries that are politically problematical (in the original text described as *unpalatable*), (iii) international cultural exchanges of non-state stakeholders.⁴¹

In German, the term *Kulturdiplomatie* [cultural diplomacy] in comparison to *Kulturpolitik* [cultural policy] has a different connotation. In the vocabulary of political terms diplomacy describes formal bilateral and multilateral relations and negotiations between authorised representatives of sovereign states and it is based on clearly defined principles (such as diplomatic immunity), rules and instruments of political action. In general language use, it gives rise to the phrases “art of diplomacy” and “diplomatic conduct”, e.g., negotiating skills, indirect manner of speaking, partial non-disclosure, communicative friendliness and willingness to compromise with the objective of asserting as many as possible of one’s own interests or at least getting as close as possible to a specified objective.

In the programmes of foreign cultural policy, the term cultural diplomacy always appears when it is a question of *strategic* matters or of culture as an *instrument* of foreign policy. In this regard cultural diplomacy is seen as a type of *task force* for the muddled constellations in foreign policy⁴² or even as an instrument to increase the influence of one’s own culture. Consequently, the debate around the document “Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations” in 2016 was introduced by the question, “how can the European Union and its Member States maximize the impact of culture in foreign

⁴¹ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht/ Mark C. Donfried (ed.), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, Berghahn 2010, p. 9 et seq.

⁴² “Cultural diplomacy is one of the few instruments that remain when traditional diplomacy reaches its limits,” said Michelle Müntefering in an interview with the Spiegel magazine. “Kulturpolitik ist Außenpolitik”, in: *Der Spiegel* 21, 19.05.2018, p. 125.

policy?”⁴³ Such a *discourse on maximisation* produces tensions with regard to the stipulated guiding principles of the 2016 EU strategy paper. It speaks of “a new spirit of dialogue, mutual listening and learning”, of communication, reciprocity and helping to shape⁴⁴; they are all principles that rather characterise an exchange *without prejudging the outcome*. Correspondingly, *cultural diplomacy*, which understands culture as an instrument of foreign policy, was particularly critically discussed at a 2012 New York conference on the topic: on the one hand regarding an *overextension* of FCEP in that cultural exchange can bring about many things, but certainly not peace according to Wolfgang Petritsch, and on the other hand regarding the instrumentalisation of art, which per se runs contrary to the character of artistic works.⁴⁵

In their ifa study on the role of culture in foreign policy, Higgott/Proud wrote of another concern regarding the aforementioned EU programme. They assume that especially in the Middle East and in developing countries the *cultural diplomacy* from Europe will be met with scepticism. It is not so much directed against the values of the Western culture but rather it is founded in (i) distrust left over from the past and (ii) the de facto lack of inter-European application of a “joint and desirable European culture, as it is [suggested] by some of the declared *brands* of the normative European power”: “HR Mogherini’s 2016 assertion that Europe was a cultural superpower was particularly inept.”⁴⁶

> *If the concept of cultural diplomacy submits cultural policy to the logic of diplomacy, as the representation and negotiation of interests by representatives of sovereign states, it can only with difficulty be reconciled with the specified objectives of FCEP.*

⁴³ Maximising the impact of cultural diplomacy in EU foreign policy, European Commission Press Release 07.04.2014.

⁴⁴ EU, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, Brussels 08.06.2016, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Monika Mokre, Kulturpolitik statt Kulturdiplomatie. (Report on the conference of the “Austrian Cultural Forum” New York on the topic of cultural diplomacy, 12.10.2012, [igkultur.at \(http://www.igkultur.at/artikel/kulturpolitik-statt-kulturdiplomatie\)](http://www.igkultur.at/artikel/kulturpolitik-statt-kulturdiplomatie)).

⁴⁶ Richard Higgott/ Virginia Proud, Populist-Nationalism and Foreign Policy. Cultural Diplomacy, International Interaction and Resilience, ifa 2017, p. 72.

2.3 Nation branding

This term is not used explicitly in cultural and foreign policy principles, because its commercial advertising strategy imagery is all too evident. Nevertheless, in practice the concept motivates a substantial amount of measures, for instance in campaigns in which the image of a country is consolidated, e.g., “Du bist Deutschland” [you are Germany] and “Malaysia truly Asia” i.a. The term itself is attributed to British political advisor Simon Anholt who also developed the “national brand index” (perception of a country from abroad recorded in surveys) and the “good nation index” (ranking on the basis of measurable criteria). *Promoting a sympathetic image* of one’s own country has always been a component of foreign cultural policy, given that the transfer from various uncoordinated forms of cultural exchange practices in past centuries only grew into the organised form of political action (in the second half of the 19th century⁴⁷ or the start of the 20th century⁴⁸) because policy makers no longer wanted to solely trust in the cultural appeal of their own nation.⁴⁹ In this regard, the communication of an image of one’s own nation that is as positive and as attractive as possible is the starting point for foreign cultural *policy*. And anyway the boundaries between appeal advertising, self presentation, image maintenance and propaganda are fluid. However, even the creator of the term “nation branding” now distances himself from his concept:

“I am very sceptical regarding the term ‘nation branding’ in the way that it is understood today. [...] Advertising is very good at selling products. But Germany is not for sale. The people instinctively recognise such campaigns for what they are: the propaganda of a foreign state. [...] And interestingly, the biggest customers of PR agencies are the so-called rogue states.”⁵⁰

He refers to the increasing tendency of commissioning PR agencies to carry out measures of FCEP.

> For a serious FCEP, the idea of nation branding is proscribed because marketing concepts contradict both the communication of balanced image of Germany and the specified principles of FCEP.

⁴⁷ Herwarth dates the start of targeted cultural work back to the establishment of the “Alliance France” in 1883 and the Dante Alighieri Society in 1889, Herwarth, *Die Bedeutung des Kulturellen* (1965), p. 40. 47.

⁴⁸ Gienow-Hecht/ Donfried, *Cultural Diplomacy* (2010), p. 18 and 22.

⁴⁹ Düwell, *Soft Power* (2016), p. 442.

⁵⁰ “It takes a long time for people to learn to love a country.” Interview by Luise Checchin with Simon Anholt, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 09.12.2015.

2.4 Competing narratives

A less suspicious concept of competition, i.e. *competing narratives* often takes the place of *nation branding*. At a 2017 conference co-organised by the Goethe Institute on “Competing Narratives: On the Global Crisis of Liberal Narratives” it was stated, “Currently, illiberal narratives are gaining ground internationally and are putting liberal narratives and thereby the open society under pressure.”⁵¹ Therefore, in the context of globalisation *competing narratives* have taken the place of the *competing systems* from the two blocks era. Now it is about opposing *worldviews* and *values*. When using narratives, the intention is to avoid abstract and static values (e.g., freedom of expression and sustainability) and instead to place confidence in the persuasiveness of narratives about developments, stakeholders and actions.

The concept of *narratives* stems from literary studies where it is part of differentiated methods to investigate the important elements of fictional texts (narrative perspective, action patterns and genre patterns, rhetoric, imagery and much more). It was transferred to non-fiction texts in the course of the “linguistic turn” in the seventies/eighties. It occurred with critical intention and from the insight that even academic texts followed a narrative in addition to the specific rules regarding legitimation, finding the truth and presenting evidence. The criticism by French philosopher Francois Lyotard regarding the *grand narratives of modern times* targeted the teleological models of development and progress of these meta narratives.⁵² American historian Hayden White went even further when he not only identified genre patterns, such as tragedy, satire and others in historiography texts but also generally described historical narratives as “verbal fictions”.⁵³ Whereas the focus on the narratives leads to increased attention regarding the type and manner of how linguistic interpretive patterns, rhetoric, verbal imagery and others shape the image of historical, social and political events, the dedifferentiation of fiction and historiography in contrast leans towards post-modern arbitrariness.

The term of narrative should only be used if an actual story that follows specific traits is meant; otherwise the analytical potential of the term is diluted. However, in the conversation around *competing narratives* the critical analytical perspective is lost anyway because

⁵¹ 24./25.03.2017 Berlin, organised by the Goethe-Institut in cooperation with Heinrich Böll Stiftung, BDI and the Centre for Global Cooperation Research: <https://www.goethe.de/en/uun/ver/wdn.html>

⁵² Francois Lyotard, *Das Postmoderne Wissen*, (1979), Vienna 1986.

⁵³ Hayden White, *Auch Klio dichtet, oder die Fiktion des Faktischen: Studien zur Tropologie des historischen Diskurses*, (1978) Stuttgart 1986, p. 102; cf. also idem., *Metahistory. Die historische Einbildungskraft im 19. Jahrhundert in Europa*, (1973), Frankfurt/M. 1991.

consequently the presentation and communication of topics are aligned to market logic and the addressees become *consumers*, which contradicts the maxims of mutuality and of *dialogue*. “Today, even political speaking and thinking is greatly influenced by an entrepreneurial language and logic.”⁵⁴ Furthermore, the talk of competition suggests that the addressees can *choose* between the different narratives. However, narratives are not random for they structure the *interpretation* of reality and are therefore potent. Yet, the controversial *interpretation* of specific *issues* (e.g. climate change), *historical developments* (e.g. secularisation) or *socio-cultural problems* (e.g. integration) cannot be the subject-matter of the competition but the examination of experience-based and knowledge-based analysis and the discussion. In competing narratives the struggle for the issue itself falls behind.

The term offer, which is often encountered in this context, is symptomatic of it. It makes a difference, though, whether the narrative is regarded as a mere *instrument of opinion forming/ political influence/ lobby work*⁵⁵ or as an offer to discuss, e.g., in the museums policy where the narrative means the manner in which the collections are exhibited:

“As a cultural foundation we have the task of developing narratives that are so good that in the competition of the narratives they represent *attractive offers of participation* – and ultimately the question of integration is *but this*. If we manage to tell the stories which are connected to our cultural heritage in a manner so that *integration offers* arise from them, then our work has been successful.”⁵⁶

And yet, even this committed attempt to make a cultural policy contribution to the current integration policy confuses *interpretation offers* with *integration offers*. Integration needs much more than a narrative; it requires political, social and educational offers. The rhetoric of the competing narratives does not only entice cultural policy to have overconfidence in itself, at the same time it underestimates the gap between the two offers.

⁵⁴ Maria do Mar Castro Varela/ Nikita Dhawan, Postkoloniale Studien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Die IB dekolonisieren, in: Frank Sauer/ Carlo Masala (ed.), Handbuch internationale Beziehungen, 2nd edition Wiesbaden 2017, p. 233-253, p. 246.

⁵⁵ Cf. e.g. the study of the “ecological narrative” and biofuel E10, Niels Hauk: Die grüne Revolution an der Tankstelle? Die Relevanz politischer Narrative am Beispiel der Einführung des Biokraftstoffes E10, in: Frank Gadinger/ Sebastian Jarzebski/ Taylan Yildiz (ed.), Politische Narrative. Konzepte – Analysen – Forschungspraxis, Wiesbaden 2014, p. 173-200.

⁵⁶ Markus Hilgert, Wettbewerb der Narrative, interview by Nadja Al-Khalaf with the secretary general of the Kulturstiftung der Länder [Cultural Foundation of the Federal States], 26th July 2018, <https://www.kulturstiftung.de/im-wettbewerb-der-narrative/> (emphasis added by: S.W.)

Much more precarious is the aspect of *comparability*, which is inherent in the logic of competition. It is particularly the case in times when the German FCEP, in the sense that it regards itself as “being in the competition of narratives with, e.g., USA, Russia or China”⁵⁷, is faced with a situation in which the populists are far advanced regarding the use of digital networks⁵⁸ and xenophobic propaganda narratives, campaigns with fake news and Twitter politics are taking up more and more space in the networks of foreign international communication. However, wanting to enter the competition with such methods is like wanting to cast out the Devil with Satan.

What it is actually about is explicitly stated in the 2018 coalition agreement: the global “competition for minds, ideas and values” and the role of the FCEP “in Germany’s reputation and influence in the world”. In this context, competing narratives are seen as the cure-all. In connection with strategic foreign communication’s task of promoting a realistic image of Germany, it is said that it is necessary “in order to assert itself in the competing narratives and to be able to act in various regions of the world against the hybrid distortion of information”.⁵⁹ This statement is based on the correct diagnosis that in foreign communication a clear deficit is to be recorded in connection with the structural change of the public in the era of digitalisation. However, in this regard expertise is required as well as a comprehensive and intelligent concept to establish *multi-lingual, interactive platforms* whose communication formats correspond to the maxims of the FCEP that are based on the fundamental rights. The digital upgrade of Deutsche Welle alone is only just a start.

*

In the summary of the discussed concepts it becomes clear that although all meta terms for foreign cultural policy discussed here lead to a rhetorically driven ascription of more political importance to cultural policy, they overstrain or overestimate it and at the same time adapt cultural policy to the laws of power politics or the economy.

⁵⁷ As said by Michelle Müntefering in an interview with Sonja Zekri, *Wettbewerb der Narrative*, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 15.06.2018.

⁵⁸ Cf. the empirically supported analysis in Higgot/ Proud, *Populist-Nationalism* (2017), p. 50.

⁵⁹ Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD [coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and SPD], 07.02.2018, p. 154.

> *A serious FCEP does not need this kind of rhetorical armament. Foreign cultural policy is much more and far more serious than soft power, cultural diplomacy or competing narratives. With respect to communicating fundamental democratic values, the experiences of lived democracy are anyway more convincing and sustainable than narratives.* (> 7.5)

All the concepts described follow a programme that addresses the *partner as customer, client* or even as *the object of the exertion of influence* with the objective of disseminating specific values, images or narratives. That is the diametric opposite of *mutuality, dialogue* and *exchange*. For only a dialogue without prejudging the result can call itself an exchange; in the words of the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty:

“A dialogue has to be genuinely non-teleological, i.e. one must not presume, on any a priori basis that whatever position our political ideology suggests as correct will be necessarily vindicated as a result of this dialogue. For a *dialogue* can be genuinely open only under one condition: that no party puts itself in a position where it can unilaterally decide the final outcomes of the conversation. This never happens between the ‘modern’ and the ‘non-modern’.”⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critiques of Subaltern Studies* (1995), in: Vinayak Chaturvedi (ed.), *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial*, London/ New York 2000, p. 256-280, p. 273.

CONCEPTS OF CULTURE

3. Concepts of culture – Implications in terms of the history of ideas and cultural policy prerequisites

Thoughts about a realignment of FCEP always touch the specific understanding of ‘culture’ and ‘education’ which come to play. Both are ideas that are closely intertwined with German intellectual history and have thereby gained specific manifestations and partly also nationalistic tendencies. This is why it is important to be aware of the differing cultural semantics and cultural rhetorics coined by specific constellations of intellectual history, in order not to load the international exchange with unintentional revocations.

3.1 Culture as aesthetic education – German connotations

When a differentiation is made between a *narrow* and a *broad concept of culture*⁶¹, then the first one relates to the aesthetic understanding of culture, namely the *arts* as a specific form of expression and manner of perception. This concept of culture is predominantly associated with the cultural sector and reifies itself in its *institutions* (museums, theatres, opera houses, cinemas etc.) and the artistic *branches* (music, dance, literature, fine arts, film etc.). However, long since the boundaries between the branches or genres have been moving due to numerous mixed and transitional forms, and through the internationalisation of the art scene and new forms of performance, which feed on traditions from different cultures. At the same time, the conventional differentiation between high culture and entertainment or popular culture has increasingly become obsolete. Nevertheless, such a distinction, be it direct or even indirect, still plays a part in the cultural and subsidies policies, foreign and domestic, e.g., through particular budget items for supporting artistic basis initiatives, and on the other hand also as a result of the trend to build costly prestige projects (such as the Elbphilharmonie). In cultural policy discourse a *broadening* of the concept of culture is in most cases linked to artistic projects that campaign around socio-political problems. Such projects have recently increasingly been on bilateral and multilateral “cultural exchange” and intercultural programmes. (> 7.4)

⁶¹ This essay only discusses the aspects of the concept of culture that are relevant to FCEP as well as their prerequisites in terms of the history of ideas and theories. For the discussion on the concept of culture fills whole libraries; accordingly an older overview of the history of the concept even gave 150 definitions: Alfred Louis Kroeber/ Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture. A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (1952), New York 1963. And as a result of the “cultural turn” in the humanities, there has since been an increase in the meanings of the term.

In terms of the history of ideas, the idea that artistic forms of expression promote a specific manner of perception and recognition dates back to Schiller's programme that featured in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man (Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, 1795)*. It comes from the same era as the bourgeois concept of *Bildung* [education]. As a specific German term of education, *Bildung* means the intellectual and spiritual development of a person or rather his/her formation into an individual personality; it is achieved not only with the help of experience and learning but also through training the *imagination*. Literally understood, the German word for imagination *Einbildung* refers to the interaction between education (*Bildung*) and image (*Bild*), and it illuminates the idea that the form of beauty leaves an imprint on the souls as *a signature of beauty (Signatur des Schönen, Karl Philipp Moritz, 1788/89)*.⁶²

"*Kultur*" and "*Bildung*" occupy a special position in the German history of ideas. The concept of *Bildung* has significantly shaped the discourse on the cultural and aesthetic education, which is why the close link between the two terms is denoted as the "German interpretative pattern".⁶³ Consequently, the concept of culture hides many pitfalls in the context of cultural exchange and translations. References are repeatedly made that the German word *Kultur* corresponds more closely with the French and English word *civilisation*. However, the German word *Kultur* includes a considerable semantic excess that has been accrued to it from the German history of ideas. Since Kant, culture has been defined as different to civilisation and has been linked to the antipodes of internal and external education; in this way civilisation is interpreted as "societal courtesy" and "external decency".⁶⁴ "*Kultur*" acquired a problematic national charge in the 19th century when the desire for national unity was expressed in diverse projects to construct a "spiritual nation", which was ennobled by the name "culture nation" and was claimed to be superior to other nations. The nationalism invested into it became clear in the setting of the First World War and was used among other things as an ideological weapon against France by way of coining opposites, e.g., culture/Germany = deep vs. civilisation/France = superficial. At the same time, the German nationalist understanding of culture is also encoded with an anti-political stance. (> 6.3)

⁶² Sigrud Weigel, *Grammatologie der Bilder*, Berlin 2015, p. 50 et seqq.

⁶³ Georg Bollenbeck, *Bildung und Kultur. Glanz und Elend eines deutschen Deutungsmusters*, Frankfurt/M. 1994; Aleida Assmann, *Arbeit am nationalen Gedächtnis. Eine kurze Geschichte der deutschen Bildungsidee*, Frankfurt/M. 1993.

⁶⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784)*, Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 8, Berlin 1923, p. 26.

3.2 Culture as a concept of description and interpretation – Approaches from cultural science

The broader term of culture is a product of the modern age, in the sense that it accompanies the “self observation of Europe”⁶⁵ and has taken on shape in the process of self-reflection on the European history of civilisation. This process can be roughly presented in three steps. Firstly, the differentiation between natural and cultural history served the purpose of understanding culture as what people have added to nature through their being together (Pufendorf, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations – Vom Natur- und Völkerrechte* 1711). A somewhat different distinction is made by Giambattista Vico in *The New Science (Scienza Nuova* 1725) in that he differentiates between the uncreated and the created (by humans) and assumes that we can only recognise as true that what is made by ourselves (*factum*).

In a second step, it is about the culture of different nations, which are examined in Herder’s *Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-91). A comparative perspective follows on from the approach of development history described as the “chain of culture and enlightenment”. In this context, Herder rejects the concept of “race” (as a classification according to descent) and instead assumes a universal concept of “one and the same human species”.⁶⁶ He tries to explain the different “organisation of peoples” or “nations” as resulting from a juxtaposition of “genetic force” (the “living organic power” and the “flow of generations”) and favourable or unfavourable climatic conditions, in his words from the “discord between genesis and climate”.⁶⁷

A further step is marked by the work of ethnology, anthropology and cultural sciences in the systematic research of rituals and ways of life in the past and present of different peoples, as was carried out in the second half of the 19th century. Edward B. Taylor’s *Primitive Culture* (1871) is considered to be one of the founding texts in this regard. His book starts with an extremely comprehensive definition of cultural science. Under the title “The Science of Culture” it reads, “Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is the complex whole, which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom,

⁶⁵ Fundamentally in this regard, Dirk Baeker, Kultur, in: Karlheinz Barck et al. (ed.), *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden*, vol. 3, Stuttgart, Weimar 2001, p. 510-556; the quotation on p. 517.

⁶⁶ Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, Bd. 6 der Werke in zehn Bänden, ed. Martin Nollacher et al. Frankfurt/M. 1989, p. 255.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 270-285.

and any other capabilities and habits, acquired by man as a member of society.”⁶⁸ One must not expect a description of so-called primitive cultures under the title of his book. Rather, Taylor investigated the “course of intellectual culture” by analysing individual cultural systems (the language of emotion, the way of counting, the mythology) in regard to similarities or links between past cultures and the modern age. His central theory is that of the *survival* of seemingly bygone or overcome ideas in modern cultures.

Subsequently, the concept of culture develops a critical potential in that a central methodological prejudice of Eurocentrism is overcome; namely the difference between an ethnological examination of early and foreign cultures with their religions, myths and rituals and the description of industrial societies on the basis of its social and political conditions. As a concept of description, culture affects all *material and symbolic practices* that a historically, geographically or socially specific culture calls forth, passes on or re-fashions. ‘Culture’ describes the particular manner through which human cooperation is regulated, i.e., habitus of actions and interactions. The objective is the understanding of cultural systems, which according to Clifford Geertz can be denoted as *thick description*.⁶⁹

It was above all Tylor’s theory of *survival* of ancient forms of cultural life and knowledge in the modern age, which gave wings to the emergence of an interdisciplinary *cultural science* of the type that emerged around 1900 and at the start of the 20th century in the German speaking regions. It was developed by predominantly Jewish intellectuals who at the time were working on the edge of or outside the established academic guild and included authors such as Aby Warburg, Sigmund Freud, Georg Simmel, Ernst Cassirer, Helmut Plessner, Walter Benjamin, Erich Auerbach and Karl Mannheim among others. Benjamin characterised this cultural science as a “new spirit of research” and work in boundary areas.⁷⁰ Several of these authors also intensively responded to the natural scientific knowledge of their time; in contrast to the specific German version of humanities, which Wilhelm Dilthey established as *Geisteswissenschaften* in opposition to natural science. While Dilthey’s concept is embroiled in Germany’s project of a “culture nation” that is superior to other nations, the works by cultural scientists around 1900 are marked by an European or cosmopolitan approach. For example, Aby Warburg, the founder of interna-

⁶⁸ Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches in the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom*, London 1871, p. 2.

⁶⁹ Clifford Geertz, *Thick Description: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture*, in: *Interpretation of Culture*, New York 1973.

⁷⁰ Walter Benjamin, *Strenge Kunstwissenschaft* <second version>, in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. III, ed. Hella Tiedemann-Bartels (1972), Frankfurt/M. 1980, p. 369-374, p. 374.

tionally renowned “Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek” (in Hamburg, since 1933 in London), was interested in the “good European”, which he examined in his study of the migrations of images, symbols and gestures through time and space.

The authors of the cultural science developed around 1900 were also linked by the work on a concept of history that overcomes the Eurocentric development model of a progress teleology and instead examines the correspondence between different cultures or historical constellations. In this understanding of history, the past is regarded according to its meaning for the present and indeed as the product of the “present’s” living examination of the historical experiences and those symbolic and material forms of culture in which the social memory has become reified.⁷¹ In 1933, this creative development came to an abrupt end when its representatives were forced into exile and those who had gained a position at a university, were stripped of their office. As a result of the “cultural turn” in the humanities that was initiated in the seventies of the 20th century, a reappropriation of this intellectual heritage is taking place in order to update its epistemic potential for the present day. (> 6.5)

3.3 Cultural exchange and cultural difference

The foreign cultural policy is structurally based on a *concept of national culture* insofar as it arose from the desire of representing one’s own country to other countries. From this point of view, culture is used in the interests of gaining distinction vis-à-vis other nations. It is in the nature of the matter that in the context of international and intercultural cooperations, the word culture is often automatically associated with a national feature. Especially the traditional objective of conveying a “balanced image of Germany” by presenting the “intellectual and artistic achievements of the country” implies a national branding of culture. And it is always the case, be it consciously or unintentionally, when talking about Indian, Italian or American culture etc. Every comparative observation tends towards conceiving what is being compared as a unit that is equipped with “characteristic” attributes. Then from the external perspective the diverse cultural forms of expression appear in the image of *the* culture of a country; in such a manner that an imaginary unity and coherence is created behind which the internal heterogeneity and plurality fade. In reference to the latter, talk of a “culture from Germany” as opposed to a „German culture“ is much more appropriate. Nevertheless, the practice of representing Germany as a culturally diverse country (as many Goethe-Institutes do) should be appropriate to the cultural

⁷¹ Cf. Benjamin’s project of a “prehistory” of the modern age using Paris in the 19th century as an example; Walter Benjamin, *Passagen-Projekt*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Frankfurt/M. 1982.

reality domestically. In this sense the politics of connecting artistic and civil society projects of cultural diversity within and with partner countries are welcomed and should be further developed.

The phenomenon that talk about *different cultures*, either internationally or domestically, almost automatically refers to *the* culture of a nation, a country, a religion or a specific social or ethnic group, applies to the rhetoric of *cultural difference* as well. Motivated by the predominantly good intention of perceiving and recognising cultural differences between groups, cultural units are rhetorically created, for example “the Muslim culture”, “the Jewish culture” etc. In this regard, every discourse on difference is confronted with a dilemma: the difference-orientated intention of taking cultural diversity seriously and recognising other ways of life and convictions produces on the downside the constitution of collectives that are attached to specific characteristics. For the individuals, it gives rise to the Procrustean bed of a national or cultural identity. (> 6.2 and 7.2)

For several decades, “difference has become a political and social value”, which has led to the linkage of culture and sovereignty in political discourse.⁷² In this way the constitutional sovereignty shifts to culture in order to become a political argument in the shape of “cultural sovereignty”. However, in the political field the argument of cultural difference leads to problematic effects. Either it becomes a means of dissociation with the consequence that differentiation (as a technical term *discrimination* from the Latin *discriminare*) turns into *discrimination*. Or, with the emphasis of the respective uniqueness and otherness, a “cultural sovereignty” is claimed, whereby cultural differences are used as instruments in the battle for recognition.

Against this backdrop, François Julien in his critique of “cultural identity” suggests not to define the existing cultural diversity and plurality by using the concept of difference. “The transformation is the origin of the cultural and therefore it is impossible to attach cultural characteristics.”⁷³ In this way he argues that culture should not be understood as a canon of values or concept of identity, but that *cultural resources* are to be seen in language, art and literature and also in religious traditions, customs and ideas, which even if they are not equally distributed can be used as commonality. For precisely in their diversity, the cultural resources reveal “the common that is not homogenous”.⁷⁴ Since

⁷² In this regard G. Feindt, B. Gißibl, J. Paulmann (ed.), *Kulturelle Souveränität. Zur historischen Analyse von Deutungs- und Handlungsmacht*, Göttingen 2016, p. 7.

⁷³ François Julien, *Es gibt keine kulturelle Identität*, Frankfurt/M. 2017, p. 47.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

distances but not categorical differences exist between the cultural resources, he conceptualises the place where the resources can be productive as inbetween.

> For the foreign cultural policy it makes a significant difference with which understanding of culture it is working; it must be aware which implications are inherited with individual concepts from the history of theory and concepts. On the one hand there is a concept of culture that is entangled in history with nationalistic hubris and on the other hand culture is understood as the exchange of manners of expression, knowledge and thought that has always been practised. This understanding is reflected in the paradigm change of FCEP towards the co-production with actors from partner countries.

3.4 FCEP – Between federal and regional politics, domestic and foreign, art and culture

The new orientation of the German foreign cultural policy is confronted with a series of *structural problems* that ought to be managed with creativeness and imagination. There are tensions: (i) between the *publicly* financed and defined FCEP and the *non-state* stakeholders, i.e. between strategic planning, i.e. a top down policy, and the bottom up principle of initiatives, (ii) between the *central government authority* of the FCEP and the *federal funding of culture and education* domestically, (iii) between the *strategical* objectives of foreign policy and the maxims of a *cooperative* and mutual intercultural exchange, (iv) between the *international advocacy for fundamental rights and democracy* and the open character of artistic work that is not driven by objectives.

A *broader concept of culture*, the engine for expanding and increasing the role of FCEP, does not have to be in opposition to *artistic niveau and quality requirements* (as is sometimes feared) provided that art is not degenerated into a mere platform for discussion. With the maxims of cooperation and mutuality the FCEP rather dismisses the one-way communication of traditional promotion of German culture, through which artists and cultural workers ran the risk of becoming representatives of a positive image of their country of origin. In this regard, it is a welcoming trend that partner countries and Germany initiate and support *open arenas* for joint intercultural projects by artists and authors, intellectuals and academics, educational initiatives and civil society groups. These arenas serve as *forums* for specific experiences with lived cooperation, for joint projects by artists from different places of origin, for exchange and cultural translations, for the examination of difference experiences, current conflicts and repressed moments of each respective and of joint history as well.

Since the realisation of the FCEP is reliant on the engagement and creativity of the *independent intermediary organisations and initiatives* in the partner countries and also in Germany, the support for *civil society abroad* (in particular in countries with lacking, endangered or unstable democratic structures) must correspond to a complementary support of *domestic actors* as knowledge and experience carriers in terms of contact with otherness and difference. Such tasks that arise from growing cultural diversity require a more and more department-overlapping policy and a continuous exchange between the Federal Minister for Culture and Media and FCEP – in order to focus the perspective for sensible funding and needed infrastructure domestically through a perspective from outside: for example through supporting successful local initiatives also outside of the large cities and above all in a more balanced ratio to the recently favoured *prestige projects* of high culture. Currently these prestige projects are not matched by any suitable *general broad support* of artistic and musical education. However, the cultural and aesthetic diversity and the level of literature, music and art are based on the cultural and musical school and extracurricular education of a society. Yet, concerning the inclusion of local authorities in international cultural exchange, the empirically-based ifa study on the “Synergien auswärtiger Kulturpolitik im Inland” (Synergies of foreign cultural policy domestically) identifies a large deficit⁷⁵.

Intercultural artistic and musical projects do not only count among the most successful integration initiatives but they also form one of the most creative, effective and sustainable *areas of experience when dealing with cultural differences* both domestically and abroad⁷⁶, in high culture as well as in school education and extracurricular socialisation. The investment in cultural prestige projects, such as the “Barenboim-Said-Akademie”, only has a sustainable effect for intercultural understanding if it is accompanied by a programme of comprehensive support for *intercultural music projects* also beyond high culture, e.g., with culturally mixed music groups in schools⁷⁷, urban and rural areas. Projects such as the

⁷⁵ Ulrike Blumenreich/ Ole Löding, Synergien auswärtiger Kulturpolitik im Inland. Am Beispiel von Kommunen, ifa 2017.

⁷⁶ For the musical exchange beyond cultural boundaries see the example of the Music in Africa online platform, which was established by the Siemens Stiftung and is supported by the German Federal Foreign Office: www.musicinafrica.net.

⁷⁷ For example, in Agenda 2030 for musical education at schools by the “Bundesverband Musikunterricht” (German association for musical education) from 2016, there is no reflection at all about the increasing portion of pupils who come from different cultures. Even though the “increasingly perceived heterogenisation of the pupils” is addressed, it is only in regard to the different previous knowledge, skills, interests and preferences that the pupils have. Strangely, the potential of non-European music traditions from the musical memory of migrants is not an issue. BMU-Positionen 9/2016.

Salem Opera at the Komische Oper Berlin⁷⁸, which successfully opens its doors to the city and to socio-cultural groups who traditionally stay away from the houses of “high culture”, should be organised *nationwide in museums, theatres, opera houses and concert halls*. Cultural federalism is a “valuable commodity. For one, because it prevents something from happening that we have already experienced in German history, namely that culture is centrally ‘enacted’ from one city and by a few bodies. And secondly, because cultural diversity is synonymous with culture”⁷⁹. The high valuation of culture federalism in Germany is a lesson learned from the political instrumentalisation of culture by a state system of dictatorship. However, the German federal cultural and education policy, like every type of support, is also a means of control that must be used in the interest of a *greater connection between domestic and foreign culture policy*. In order to equip certain fields of education and cultural policy with better financial resources it is not necessary to change the constitutionally defined allocation of authority between the German national government and the Länder. This objective can be achieved much more easily through a change to the tax allocation formula between the German national government and the Länder.

Resources for cultural policy and for supporting artistic, musical and cultural education are *investments in the creative and critical potential of a society*. It is less about specific solutions for current problems than about their seismographic identification and about their interpretation beyond the established criteria and discourses. And it is about the development and strengthening of individual and social skills, such as perception, sensitivity, sensibility, empathy, cognitive capacity, ability to judge, recognition of others etc., i.e., it is about those basal (inter) human virtues without which it is difficult to understand and appreciate the universal claim of validity for human rights and fundamental rights. This insight is reflected on by current topics in the debates about cross national cultural policy foundations, in which the exponents of international cultural policy exchange their experiences. An example of which was the 2017 “Salzburg Global Seminar” under the heading *The Art of Resilience: Creativity, Courage, and Renewal* against the backdrop of increasing crises, inequality and polarisation at a global level: “Today’s world is disrupted by manifold sources of shock, violence, and conflict. The complexity and sheer speed of change are testing the limits of people, place and community.”⁸⁰

⁷⁸ https://www.komische-oper-berlin.de/entdecken/selam_opera/

⁷⁹ As said by Markus Hilgert, the secretary general of the Kulturstiftung der Länder [Cultural Foundation of the Federal States], *Wettbewerb der Narrative* (2018).

⁸⁰ February 7-12, 2017, Salzburg Global Seminar, Session Report 573, Summary.

The development of a culturally diverse democratic society and a serious integration policy, which is most successfully practised by local civil society stakeholders, are the conditions for a credible foreign policy which is dedicated to the objectives of supporting democracy and exchange. For this purpose, a broad and general intercultural awareness is needed, because understanding other countries, religions and ways of life cannot only be left to “experts”. Against the backdrop of globalisation and the transformation into a culturally diverse society, we must all become experts in cultural multilingualism.

BEYOND THE NATION STATE?

Against the backdrop of globalisation, European policy and the increasing cultural heterogeneity of European societies, the current reflections focus mainly on perspectives *beyond a national (state) cultural policy*. The first steps in this direction have been initiated by way of the ten planned cultural institutes in association with the “Goethe-Institut” and “Institut Français”. However, the approaches go far beyond that in the direction of foreign “cultural and education policy that is turning away from a *mainly aesthetic understanding* and towards a *social responsibility*. It believes that it is taking on precisely this responsibility by placing the *joint development of culture and knowledge* at the forefront in *combating nationalism* and in this way is fighting for a *post nation state cultural policy*.”⁸¹

If in this regard the element of “post nation state” more specifically means the organisational-strategic *action level* of the FCEP and the question of stakeholders, then it is pointing in different directions: (i) on the one hand in the direction of the “*foreign policy of societies*” as conceived by Dahrendorf in 1969, i.e., the withdrawing of state actions in favour of committed resources from civil society, which corresponds to the understanding of the mutuality between the German cultural policy abroad and the opening up vis-à-vis foreigners domestically, and in this regard it aims towards a greater interconnection between the approaches abroad and domestically, and (ii) on the other hand in a direction tending towards integration and the removal of national policy in a *joint European multilateral cultural policy* and/or in larger *supranational networks and organisations*; here experiences of the existing cultural policies of supranational organisations (regarding the questions of bureaucracy, formality and time budgeting) should be included.

Since the proclaimed post nation state cultural policy also outlines a *programmatic approach*, the question arises as to how such a FCEP relates to distinct steps or even barriers in the transitional process from individual state actions to the transnational level on the *overall policy field*, be the latter in the form of individual bilateral and multilateral cooperations (e.g., Europe Houses), be it in the way of the EU towards an European constitution (which currently has little prospect) or “European sovereignty” (Macron’s appeal), be it in the search for “new forms of governance between the market, state and self-

⁸¹ As said by the head of the Directorate of Culture and Communication at the German Federal Foreign Office: Andreas Görgen, *Menschen bewegen* (2017).

organisation”⁸² or be it in bolder utopias of a “global citizenship”. It is a question of if and in what way cultural policy can help shape the ongoing transformations, for example by (i) contributing in Europe to knowledge of European history, to working through current conflicts and to strengthening a common cultural consciousness, and (ii) in international cooperation by working with partner countries on strategies for forms of cultivation and production that are compatible with health, environmental and social standards: *overcoming individual state thinking and actions through the medium of culture*.

In this regard the concept of “post nation state” is not unproblematic on account of its ambiguity; precisely in the context of cultural translations a precise conception is important, however. It is unclear how it relates to, e.g., the ambiguous concept of “transnationality” (> 7.1), or to the diagnosis of the “postnational constellation” (Habermas)⁸³ or rather of the “post democracy” (Guérot)⁸⁴, whose critical diction clearly refers to the loss of sovereignty and democracy in nation state politics in the face of globalisation and the transfer of individual state competencies to Brussels. Furthermore, in the context of foreign communication and European or international negotiations the concept may well be *currently* encountering significant resistance. Firstly, because the conceptual field of *nation/ nation state/ nationalism/ national culture* is extremely ambiguous in terms of semantics and is beset with highly controversial historical experiences and evaluations. Secondly, because similar to a question such as “What comes *after* the nation state?”⁸⁵ the *post* in the term “*postnation state*” includes some implications that are in no way universally valid, let alone in a European or EU-context: In the *historical* respect, the nation state is thereby positioned in a development history of the body politic, and the prior existence of a nation state or an earlier epoch of nation states is presumed. From a *conceptual* point of view the discurs about “a future beyond the nation state”⁸⁶ answers to the postcolonial critique of the nation state as a genuinely European concept. If, however, in this discourse Europe shows up as a ‘forerunner’ in terms of overcoming the nation state then the pattern of Eurocentrism is unwillingly perpetuated, since the figure of the ‘forerunner’ implies that

⁸² Kristine Kern, Globale Governance durch transnationale Netzwerkorganisationen, in: Dieter Gosewinkel et al. (ed.), *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational*, Berlin 2004, p. 285-307, p. 295.

⁸³ Jürgen Habermas, *Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie* (1998), Online Akademie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, www.fes-online-akademie.de.

⁸⁴ Ulrike Guérot, *Warum Europa eine Republik werden muss! Eine politische Utopie*, Bonn 2016, p. 31 et seqq.

⁸⁵ This was the title of a symposium held by the civil society organisation “European Alternatives” at the Berlin International Literature Festival (September 2018), whose subheading addressed the matter more precisely, “A congress to imagine a future beyond the nation state”, <https://euroalter.com/>

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

others will follow. As such, the basic dismissal of the nation state can no more claim universal validity than the European nation state – which the Europeans forced onto many postcolonial countries in the first place.

In this respect, it is important to examine the *history*, the *criticism*, the *problems*, the *limits*, and also the *potential* of the stated concepts in the setting of the idea of nation. And it is also important to ask what place national traditions and concepts should take in the transnational context.

4. The issue of the nation state in the light of post-colonial criticism

4.1 The post-colonial criticism of the Western development model

The post-colonial theory has arisen from the criticism of the Eurocentric view of European historiography, above all from its claim to universal validity while simultaneously ignoring other, non-European ways of thinking and developments. It departs from the close interlocking of cultural and power politics. At its heart is the criticism of those thought patterns that bring about the cultural *hegemony of the West over the Orient – or over the “global south”* – by underpinning in the academic discussion, in art and in literature the real colonisation through discourses about the superiority of the West and the backwardness of the Orient. One of their founding texts, Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1979), established this connection based on a paradigmatic analysis of the history of European Oriental studies in the 19th century.⁸⁷ Subsequent to Said, the post-colonial theory assumes that the West declares its concepts and values as universal and has forced them upon other parts of the world that it has economically, politically and culturally conquered. Consequently, all key terms of the European self-understanding were subjected to a radical criticism, i.e., the model of *historical development* with its equation of enlightenment, modernism and progress as well as the *dichotomy* of central concepts, such as belief and knowledge, reason and the non-rational, Orient and Occident, self and other.

The *post* in post-colonial does not simply mean the period after the liberation of the colonies but also the survival and continuing influence of the colonial logic. At its core it concerns the “current international systems perpetuating the economic, political, institutional, cultural and legal situation of the colonial rule” in that “an European and US-American supremacy linked to a problematic paternalism” is allowing the West “to un-

⁸⁷ Said, Edward W., *Orientalism*, New York 1979.

dermine the hard won sovereignty of post-colonial states".⁸⁸ The criticism is particularly severe regarding the current international law and the structure of supranational organisations being contaminated with the colonial legacy in that standards and concepts of sovereignty, which are derived from European history, are the basis of international law.⁸⁹

The survival of the colonial patterns of thinking also affects the FCEP, for instance, in the debate about restitution or, more general, in the discourse about development cooperation, in which the "simple" or "traditional" societies are -- often implicitly -- compared with "complex" or "developed" Western societies and consequently the asymmetrical conditions are continued. Until today the criticism on using the European development model as the measure of all things stands at the centre of postcolonial theory; as was recently reiterated in the much-noticed book of the Senegalese economist Felwine Sarr *Afrotopia* (2016). The text of Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe, *De la Postcolonie* (2000) can be seen as a "programme text" of this criticism. It is a basic critique of Western development- and cultural policy: He states that the Western development and cultural policy is driven by its own notion of a teleological development and modernisation with a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation in Africa. The usual recipes such as "good administration", "civil society", "market economy", "conflict resolution" and "democracy development" are not conducive to generate new knowledge about Africa or to use local existing knowledge, but rather their objective is to align societies in Africa to Western standards. The Africa knowledge of the Western stakeholders lacks connection to the African reality; indeed it is "indépendente de toute référence"⁹⁰. But above all, all the Western stakeholders lack appreciation for African criteria, values, institutions and rationalities. It starts with a lack of knowledge of the African languages, without which no adequate work of understanding can be carried out.⁹¹ However, later Mbembe also accused the Anglo-Saxon post-colonial theory of arguing without reference to the subject⁹², whereby he refers to the extensively theoretic and very abstract character of post-colonial theory with its focus on thought patterns and discourse, as a result of which historical ascertainties and differentiations fall behind.

⁸⁸ Varela/Dhawan, *Postkoloniale Studien in den internationalen Beziehungen* (2017), p. 236 and 235.

⁸⁹ As described by Australian legal scholar Antony Anghie in a study on the history of international law, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*, Cambridge 2004.

⁹⁰ Achille Mbembe, *De la Postcolonie. Essai sur l'imagination politique dans l'Afrique contemporaine*, Paris 2000, p.18.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁹² Achille Mbembe, *Critique de la raison nègre*, Paris 2013.

One of the concepts that lie at the heart of the post-colonial criticism is that of the *nation* as a “powerful historical notion in the West”⁹³. However, in this critique the criticism of the *nation as a construct of (ethnic or cultural) unity* is mixed with the criticism of the *nation state as a political system* within territorial borders with the function of both inclusion and exclusion, i.e., the criticism of the *nation* in the sense of the people and of the *nation state*. In the abundance of literature (which can hardly be surveyed), three approaches can be distinguished: (i) the interpretation of the nation as imagination or an almost phantasmatic idea, (ii) the criticism of the tendency towards ethnic homogenisation, as which the history of the European nation states is interpreted, and (iii) the rejection of the model character of the nation state in an international approach.

4.2 The imagined nation and theory of homogenisation

The first approach concerns the invention of nations that follows from Ernest Gellner’s statement, “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist”.⁹⁴ Benedict Anderson refers to this role of nationalism in the process of nation building in his much-quoted book *Imagined Communities* (1983), in which he describes nation as a notion of “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”⁹⁵. As an idea of a modern political form of organisation, it nevertheless concurrently draws on traditional concepts (origin, people). Therefore, a fundamental ambiguity is inherent in the nation as Homi Bhabha argues in his subsequent post-colonial classic, *Nation and Narration* (1990), which studies the “system of cultural significations”⁹⁶ that spawns nations. This approach is essentially about the politics of symbolism, i.e., of ideas, myths and emblems, which are in play during the *constitution* of the nation as a political entity, or about *nationalism* as the driver of *nation building*. This approach corresponds to the cultural science-based historical research⁹⁷, which has produced comprehensive studies on the foundation myths and discourses in the history of the individual European nations, the most numerous being about the French Revolution.

⁹³ Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, New York 1990, p. 1.

⁹⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London 1965, p. 169.

⁹⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, (1983) London 2006, p. 6.

⁹⁶ Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (1990), p. 2.

⁹⁷ Cf. e.g., Ronald G. Asch/Dagmar Freist (ed.), *Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozess*, Cologne 2005; Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger (ed.), *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?* Berlin 2005 (*Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, appendix 35).

The second approach, which is simultaneously the harshest criticism of the nation, places the *nation state* on a level with a uniform *nation* (in the sense of people or ethnicity) and assumes that in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries the European nation state has performed a process of *homogenisation*. The result of which is what Czech historian Miroslav Hroch calls *strictu sensu* nationalism, namely the absolute priority of the values of a nation, understood as a homogeneous ethnic group, above all other values and interests.⁹⁸ This image corresponds to a definition of the nation state, which prevails in large parts of post-colonial theory, “The nation-state [...] is based on the idea of a single people in a single territory constituting itself as a unique political community.”⁹⁹

The homogenisation theory not only merges the criticism of the ethnically homogeneous nation state as the Western model with the history of Europe, it also disregards the historically extremely diverse history of European nation building in the modern age as well as the actual cultural, religious and linguistic heterogeneity of many European countries. The idea of the homogeneous unity of a nation was already objected to by Ernest Renan in his famous lecture at the Sorbonne, *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?* (1882). In it, he rejected all supposedly *natural parameters* (origin/ethnicity, language, religion/custom, geography) stating, “Man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor of his religion, nor of the course of rivers nor of the direction taken by mountain chains.”¹⁰⁰ And he counters it with an emphatic concept of the *modern nation* as a “principe spirituel” and as a “community of solidarity”¹⁰¹. Arisen from “a series of facts that point in the same direction”, the existence and future of the modern nation is dependent on the will of the people. Therefore he describes the nation as a “daily plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.”¹⁰² In the current debate, this conviction corresponds most closely with the concept attributed to Dolf Sternberger of “constitutional patriotism”¹⁰³, i.e., the understanding of the modern nation state as a community of citizens whose political equality is guaranteed by the constitution. In this regard, Habermas emphasises the integrative capacity of the process of nation building and thereby offers a non-ethnic

⁹⁸ Miroslav Hroch, *From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe*, in: *New Left Review* 198 (March–April 1993), p. 3–20, p. 4; cf. also Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today*, in: *Anthropology Today* 8, 1. February 1992.

⁹⁹ Jane Burbank/Frederick Cooper (ed.), *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton 2010, p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ Ernest Renan, *Qu’est ce qu’une nation?*, Paris 1882. Eng: *What is a nation? Lecture on 11th March 1882 at the Sorbonne, with an essay by Walter Euchner*, Hamburg 1996, p.37.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 34 and p. 35.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 16 and p. 35.

¹⁰³ Dolf Sternberger, *Verfassungspatriotismus*, (1970) Frankfurt/M. 1990.

interpretation of “nation” as a “cultural substrate of civic solidarity”, writing, “The political integration of a large-scale society is part of the indisputable achievements of the nation state.”¹⁰⁴

This aspect of integrative capacity is also emphasised by some authors who are not suspected of being Eurocentric and who attribute nationalism¹⁰⁵ an important role with regard to the process of post-colonial nation building. Using the example of the post-imperial foundation of India (after the division of the territory of British India by the colonial power in 1947), Sunil Khilnani outlines in *The Idea of India* (1997) the policy of a nationalism which does not refer to a common origin, religion or language, but rather establishes a *nationalism of diversity* using the concept of a nation of citizens with equal rights. Khilnani’s book discusses in detail Nehru’s foundation concept, which arose from the conviction that the actual cultural and religious differences of the heterogeneous population of the Indian subcontinent could only be protected through the constitution of an Indian nation in the framework of a modern, secular and democratic nation state, for whose development Nehru used the administration structures left behind by the British. “India was a society neither of liberal individuals nor of exclusive communities or nationalities, but of interconnected differences. [...] Citizenship was defined by civic and universalist rather than ethnic criteria, which guaranteed a principle of inclusion in India’s democracy.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, *The Idea of India* presents the historical success story of the foundation of a state in the form of an *imagined community* and a nation state. However, it is a success story that in recent history has been troubled by a growing aggressive Hindu nationalism defined by religion.

The Idea of India appears to be a suitable case to support Habermas’s theory, “Wherever democracies of the Western type emerged they took shape of the nation state.”¹⁰⁷ However, even if this statement were to withstand a historical examination, it does not necessarily mean that the inversion of the argument is also true, i.e., that only the form of the nation state can bring forth democratic states.

¹⁰⁴ Habermas, *Die postnationale Konstellation* (1998), p. 6. From a rather critical viewpoint, such an achievement of integration using the example of “national integration” of the rural farmers and the southern regions in the modern nation state is described by Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914*, Stanford 1976.

¹⁰⁵ E.g. Nikita Dhawan/ Shalini Randeria, *Perspectives on Globalization and Subalternity*, in: Graham Huggan (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies*, Oxford 2013, p. 559-586.

¹⁰⁶ Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (1997), Penguin Book India 2012, p. 172/173.

¹⁰⁷ Habermas, *Die postnationale Konstellation* (1998), p. 4.

4.3 Criticism of the model status of the modern nation state

The most relevant aspect for the FCEP is the *rejection of the modern democratic nation state as a model* for the “rest”¹⁰⁸ of the world. In his article, “The western model is rotten”¹⁰⁹, in which Pankaj Mishra uses an overview of the current political situation of various states around the world to try to work out structural development problems, it is said, e.g., “that the dynamics and specific features of western ‘progress’ were not and could not be replicated or correctly sequenced in the non-west.” He underpins this observation with the diagnosis of historically much more difficult conditions of development under which emerging countries with larger, religiously and ethnically heterogeneous populations strive for better living conditions and fundamental rights, as compared with the exceptional conditions under which industrialisation and modernisation took place in 19th century Europe, for example much smaller and relatively homogeneous populations, expansion policy as well as the conquering and exploitation of non-European regions etc. From this comparison, Mishra derives a kind of principle, namely the asynchrony, even *the incompatibility of industrialisation and democratisation* and in doing so explains the clear democratic deficit of many emerging countries and many younger post-colonial nation states. And he underpins his theory with the argument that nowhere in Europe did the industrial progress of the 19th century occur under the conditions of a developed parliamentary system and guaranteed fundamental rights.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, he adds that the development of states such as Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and South Korea after 1945 shows that a flourishing capitalist economy has always been accompanied by the deprivation of democratic rights.

A further argument for the end of the Western model is the development of global capitalism under whose reign formerly democratic nation states fight today to maintain their national consensus. This concerns precisely states whose establishment was once dedicated to the objective of social justice (India, Israel), where new nationalism is rising among the elite or the majorities (examples are the concepts of a “Hindu Nation” and a “Jewish State”). Consequently, Mishra concludes that the deterritorialisation of poverty and wealth by way of mobile and transnational capital has made it impossible to achieve the formation of states whose genuine objective is a broad social and economic upturn *within national borders*. And therefore, the concept of the democratic nation states in itself is considered as failed. The question of *alternatives*, however, remains largely unanswered.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Stuart Hall, *The west and the rest: Discourse and power*, in: Stuart Hall/ Bram Gieben (ed.), *Formations of modernity*, Cambridge 1992, p. 275-320.

¹⁰⁹ Pankaj Mishra, *The western model is rotten*, in: *The Guardian*, 14.10.2014.

¹¹⁰ In it Mishra quotes French philosopher Raymond Aron, *The Opium of Intellectuals* (1955), London 1957.

Since Mishra claims that the process of *nation building* has failed in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the decentralisation of Indonesia, the biggest country with a Muslim population, has helped to stabilise it, Mishra favours decentralisation and e.g., for Iraq he has no other suggestion than a return to the empire, “a return to Ottoman-style confederal institutions that devolve power and guarantee minority rights.”

This suggestion is in line with a recent historical re-evaluation of *empires* – as a political unit with multi-ethnic and multi-religious population – that is evidently inspired by the fact that the question of cultural differences plays a dominant role in the critical discourse on the nation state. For instance a study with comparative examinations of empires in world history begins with the statement that “making state conform with nation” is a recent phenomenon and that the existence of almost two hundred states that are equal before international law is but sixty years old. It is confronted with a somewhat romantic image of the long history of empires: “For much of the last two millennia, empires and their rivalries, in regions or around the world, created contexts in which people formed connections – as ethnic or religious communities, in networks of migrations, settler, slaves, and commercial agents”¹¹¹. However, the authors cannot deny the elements of power and violence in the history of empires and also refer to the huge differences between the individual empires in their long histories. It may be doubted whether future perspectives can be derived from this history.

*

The post-colonial discourse has allowed some aporias to emerge that continue in internal controversies. Structurally, it concerns the dilemma of a continuing dichotomy: If orientalism is defined as a negation of differences in favour of a hierarchical West-East relationship, then the criticism of colonialism and orientalism in most cases conversely ends in an overemphasis of differences, and that often produces scepticism against cross-border projects. In addition, the blanket rejection of Western concepts has by implication in parts promoted the concept of pre-colonial identities and led to a renaissance of *indigenisation*¹¹² or to the construction of “national identities” on the basis of indigenous

¹¹¹ Jane Burbank/Frederick Cooper (ed.), *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton 2010, p. 2.

¹¹² Cf. e.g., the criticism of “indigenous obscurantism” by Indian historian Sumit Sarkar, *Orientalism Revisited: Saidian Frameworks in the Writing of Modern Indian History*, in: Chaturvedi, *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial* (2000), p. 239-255. However, Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty opposed it and criticised the “hyper rationalism” of many Indian academics. He argues for a critical position regarding the European Enlightenment discourse without “a wholesale rejection of the tradi-

cultures.¹¹³ Invoking cultures before the age of colonialism is described as the *invention of tradition* because in many respects a fallback on constructs is necessary, due to the broken tradition through colonialism and globalisation.¹¹⁴ Further effects of a position of ultimate difference are the widespread scepticism regarding cosmopolitan concepts and the resistance against forms of supranational (political or cultural) associations. In former colonies and sometimes also in Eastern Europe, these concepts and associations are under suspicion of representing a new form of Western hegemony. At the same time, the theoretical discourse of post-colonialism has produced a *phantom image of the "West"* or rather the Western model, which is historically and geographically undifferentiated and makes it difficult to investigate the specific conditions and problems in the history of the development of states.

4.4 Consequences for foreign cultural policy

(i) Firstly, from this criticism there arises a call to Europe *to overcome the repression of history in regard to its own involvement in colonialism*, to grant the examination of its own colonial past a suitable place in its self-image, international self-portrayal and intercultural dialogue, and to not omit colonial history in the drafting of the FCEP objectives such as "strengthening human rights" and "democratisation". This demand includes examining the "continued effect of the colonial project in the conventions, values and practices of Europe"¹¹⁵ and reflecting on their place in the economic success story of the European modern age. Due to the current axis shift of power in the process of globalisation, Europe is compelled to renegotiate its role. That can only succeed when as a self-reflecting actor it addresses the impositions of its past on other regions.

> *Precisely therein lies an important field of work for foreign cultural policy.*

(ii) Such reflection is necessarily followed by a questioning of *European (self) certainties* in dialogue with other cultures. Only when the intercultural dialogue assumes that not just the "one-size-fits-all notion of modernity"¹¹⁶ but also other varieties of development and also other cultures of economy, in short *that other modernities are possible*, is it possible

tion of rational argumentation", *Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism* (2000), p. 259 et seq.

¹¹³ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton 1993.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Hobsbawm, Eric J./ Ranger, Terence (ed.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983.

¹¹⁵ Higgot/ Proud, *Populist-Nationalism and Foreign Policy* (2017), p. 16.

¹¹⁶ As written by Pankaj Mishra in the article: Ahmet Hamdi Tampinar and the waiting of history, in: *The Guardian*, 28.02.2015.

to speak of a real mutual exchange. Consequently, Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty calls for an open, unconditional dialogue on equal footing that is free from a predefined result (specific political, economic or cultural forms to be aspired to). It should be a dialogue not based on the currently ruling dichotomy of “modern” and “not modern” while leaving sufficient room to examine the intercultural polysemy of languages and practices.¹¹⁷ In an ironic turn, he writes, “Colonialism stopped us from being fully modern.” In this context, he refers to the complexity of *cultural translations* and the consequences of *mistranslations*, from which follows the experience of “living as bad translation” for people like him. Subsequent to the observation that, what is described as India’s religious practices has nothing to do with the European concept of religion, it reads:

“It may precisely be an irony of our modernity that we are constantly called upon to believe in what only requires to be performed, to treat a bad translation as though it was a perfectly adequate one, that is to say, to be what we also are not. This is not a question of having to dissemble or simulate, it is rather a question of having to live poorly, in and as bad translations.”¹¹⁸

(iii) Likewise, it results in the call to actively participate in the cultural exchange with a *realistic image of European and German culture*. It requires the admission that the *realisation of human rights*, the reality of democracy and equality, the fight against corruption and the living conditions, working conditions and fundamental rights of large parts of the European population *lag far behind the “values” that the FCEP wants to promote*. “The joint development of culture and knowledge”¹¹⁹ requires dialogue participation as a partner that has to struggle with the negative effects of globalisation in its own country as well. Only through *cooperative work on shared problems* is it possible to further reduce the asymmetry in the development cooperation and respond to the scepticism regarding a new Western *hegemony dressed up as culture*.

(iv) Also the question regarding how to support the processes of nation building and modernisation, democratisation and stabilisation of the political conditions and the improvement of living conditions must be examined without predefined answers. The perpetuation of the existing asymmetries can be only interrupted if *multiple forms and ways of ending the post-colonial, post-imperial or post-Soviet conditions* are sought that correspond to

¹¹⁷ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism* (2000), p. 272 et seq.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

¹¹⁹ Görgen, *Menschen bewegen* (2017)

the specific local situation. There is no need for global solutions according to patterns such as the “awarding of IMF credits” and blanket demands for the “private investment of foreign capital”, because as is already evident this policy has created new post-colonial dependency, e.g., through high indebtedness with the consequence of enforced sales of lucrative mining rights and the weakening of local economic systems that are unable to compete with the production forms of foreign investors on the domestic market. (> 7.2) Rather what is needed is the theoretically and historically well-founded and experience-based research of adequate forms of political and economic culture suitable for *the respective specific local conditions*.

> For that purpose, the development or/and support of “Centres of Political Culture” is suggested in such partner countries, which are currently undergoing an economic, political and socio-cultural transformation process. They should be places of partnership-like research with interdisciplinary teams consisting of international experts (from the fields of politics, economics, cultural science and regional research) and academics from the region who have expertise and experience regarding the regional specific socio-cultural and historical conditions, in order to work on matters of nation building, global governance, the maintenance and improvement of culture-specific forms of economy under the conditions of globalisation and the promotion of democracy etc.¹²⁰

(v) A current controversial question concerns the link between *colonialism and cultural heritage*, i.e., what to do with items and exhibits from non-European cultures that are in the ownership of German museums and other institutes. It concerns all institutes that embody a colonial knowledge system as the heirs of the “idea according to which the *intellectual* appropriation of the art and knowledge artefacts is necessarily linked to their *material* appropriation”¹²¹. At the centre of it are the ethnological museums and institutes, museums of arts, museums for non-European cultures (such as the Museum for Islamic Art), but also the Humboldtforum. Simply changing the nomenclature and giving it the title “world museum” and interpreting the large collections (which are found in the European metropolises) as “lending libraries of the world”¹²² will not solve the problem of restitution. The claims for restitution, which have long been raised and recently were

¹²⁰ In contrast to the “Maria Sibylla Merian Centers for Advanced Studies” launched by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research, these institutes should be installed on site and not be limited to twelve years.

¹²¹ Bénédicte Savoy, *Die Provinienz der Kultur. Von der Trauer des Verlusts zum universalen Menschheitserbe*, Berlin 2017.

¹²² Neil McGregor, *Herausforderungen eines Weltmuseums*, in: *Berliner Schloss – special edition*, no. 86, p. 36-39, p. 39.

strengthened by the report by Sarr/Savoy¹²³, can no longer be put off. They demand current specific steps in order to work together with the countries affected to find a solution. Alongside the issues of *restitution and provenance research*, the point is to radically change the Eurocentric, often exoticising and colonial viewing of the exhibits. That can only happen by way of *participation and a comprehensive transformation of museum concepts*. A first result is found in the guidelines on *dealing with collections from colonial contexts* prepared by the German Museums Association. The specific implementation will be very difficult; a model for the discussion on approaches could take on the format of a *round table on the colonial legacy*, as was initiated in Hamburg.

Frequent arguments used against possible restitution to Africa are that the institution of the museum is a European concept and that, furthermore, in Africa they have neither the expertise in curatorship nor the prerequisites for the housing, conservation and exhibition of artefacts. That may have been true in the past; however, it is not longer true of the post-traditional societies of the present day. At the latest since Senghor's cultural policy¹²⁴, there has been an interest in museums on the African continent; numerous museums exist, in several countries museums are currently being established and recently, China has created new facts by funding the construction of a large museum for the history of the black civilisations in Dakar, which provides enough space for returned artefacts. In this regard, the FCEP is needed in many respects.

> In the provenance research in German museums, the perspectives of the affected countries should be included by way of an (increased) participation of representatives of the cultures of origin; here the expertise of FCEP is invaluable in order to develop a sustainable form of cooperation. With regard to the museums in Africa, the programme for training curators from and in the partner countries is welcomed. Furthermore, the construction of museums should be supported.

¹²³ Felwine Sarr, Bénédicte Savoy, *Restituer le Patrimoine Africain*, Paris 2018.

¹²⁴ Cf. Hans Belting, Andrea Buddensieg, *Ein Afrikaner in Paris. Léopold Sédar Senghor und die Zukunft der Moderne*. Munich 2018.

5. Post-national constellation? – On the relationship between state and nation

Currently, the nation state is not only the subject of post-colonial criticism, it has also been put under pressure through very real processes. Recently an increasing *erosion of nation state sovereignty* through globalisation is to be noted, in particular as a result of the “shadow sovereignty”¹²⁵ of the globally acting companies, financial markets and technology firms. In addition, there is a weakening of constitutional control through internationally networked illegal players (drug trade, money laundering, people smuggling etc.). (> 7.1) Such developments require multinational and supranational efforts in order to counter them with measures of regulative and structural policy. However, the *uncontrolled weakening of national sovereignty* through globalisation has led exactly to the fact that there is greater resistance against initiatives for strengthening the international community with the partial, *planned limitation of national sovereignty* by supranational organisations and regulations. Instead, many states focus on the competition for location benefits. And numerous younger states, which only gained their sovereignty in the 20th century, are often hesitant to participate in a “self-limitation of sovereignty agreed in accordance with international law”,¹²⁶ while others attempt to seal themselves off from the negative consequences of globalisation with the aid of an ethnic-religious nationalism¹²⁷ and focus on isolationism.

In the international context, there are considerable historical *asynchronies* in regard to the building of nations and nation states. A general dismissal of the nation/nationalism on a global scale is sometimes met with considerable resistance, for instance in some emerging countries (such as India) and also in some post-colonial states. And also the increasing East-West conflict in the EU is founded in the serious *asynchronies* between West European states and those post-Soviet countries which are in the process of constituting or stabilising their nations, out of which some resistance arises against Brussels’ standards that touch on the national sovereignty of these still young nation states. Both the fears about globalisation and the demand of supranational norms are answered with the same reaction: an increased nationalism. Consequently, there is frequently recourse to national myths and emblems from long-gone times, which produces a new ethnic nationalism or

¹²⁵ Susan George, *Shadow Sovereigns. How Global Corporations are Seizing Power*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2015.

¹²⁶ Joachim Bentzien, *Die völkerrechtlichen Schranken der nationalen Souveränität im 21. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt/M. 2007, p. 18.

¹²⁷ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The Paradox of Nationalism in a Global World*, in: Ulf Hedetoft, Mette Hjort (ed.), *The Postnational Self*, Minnesota/ London 2002, p. 3-17.

ethnonationalism¹²⁸. However, also the fundamentally different experiences and political concepts from the two-block era continue to have an effect on the arisen differences between Eastern and Western EU member states. From an Eastern European point of view, concepts such as cosmopolitanism and internationalism still have the smack of Soviet doctrine.

5.1 Historical asynchrony – the example of Eastern Europe

National sovereignty and *international law approaches* nevertheless do not form simple opposites. The *Charter of the United Nations*, which was ratified in 1945 and explicitly refers to the devastating experiences of the Second World War (see the Preamble), is the basis of the international order of the past decades. In the Charter the member states (51 at the time, 193 today) formally recognise the “sovereign equality of all its members” (art. 2.1).¹²⁹ Many hopes which focus on the long-term overcoming of nation state structures are linked to the member states being bound in such a way through treaties of international law. However, on the other hand the *United Nations* strengthens the nation state because the UN is an association of states, whereby in the text of the Charter *state* and *nation* are used as synonyms. Only states within the sense of a unit of state territory, state population and state authority¹³⁰ are legal entities in terms of international law (the UN expanded this definition to state founded organisations such as the EU).

It is this character of an association based on the principles of national sovereignty that serves to subject the relationships of the states with and to each other to the same regulations that sets boundaries not only to UN policy, for example in regard to issues of “humanity”¹³¹ (such as climate change, for which a separate association of member states was formed which holds the UN Climate Change Conference). It is also one of the core principles of international law, the “*self-determination of peoples*” (art. 1.2 of the UN Charter), that plays into the hands of the proliferation of nation states and the tendency towards homo-

¹²⁸ Not in the sense of Walker Connor’s *Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding* (1994), in which nationalism and ethnonationalism are equated because the author assumes a narrow concept of nations based solely on origin. Cf. on the other hand in regard to the recourse of the right-wing conservative Hungarians to the Magyars and the Turkic people, Joseph Croitoru, *Rondo a la Turca e zingarese*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 04.04.2018, p. N3.

¹²⁹ The power hierarchy comes into effect in the Security Council. Its five permanent members (with the right to veto) are “solely due to an historical constellation”, i.e., “the alliance from the Second World War”. Dan Diner, *Zeitschwelle. Gegenwartsfragen an die Geschichte*, Munich 2010, p. 147.

¹³⁰ From Georg Jelinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, Berlin 1909.

¹³¹ Menno Aden, *Menscheit als Völkerrechtssubjekt?* In: *Internationales Privates Wirtschaftsrecht*, Munich 2009, p. 20 et seq.

geneous nation states. Through this principle, every people that defines itself as a unit (by way of a common language, culture, religion or ethnicity) is potentially given the status of nation and thus a claim to a sovereign state. In this regard, international law acts ambiguously towards the concept of nation state. While the UN, on the one hand, embodies the idea of an international and supranational community, at the same time the principle of national sovereignty promotes – through the close association of state and nation – national sovereignty and the legitimacy to form a nation state.

This development becomes particularly clear when looking at the example of Eastern Europe. On the map of East-Central Europe, the changed power structure has in the past repeatedly led to the redrawing of borders with serious consequences. In a territory which in the post-Napoleonic European order after 1815 was occupied by four empires (Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Prussia), there were 14 nation states after 1918 and today there are 24.¹³² In line with the right of “self-determination of peoples” there were two constellations in the 20th century when several nation states were simultaneously built. In 1918 a number of new states (such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) emerged from the crumbling empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. In addition, the borders were adjusted according to the principle of “ethnic origin”¹³³ with the consequence of multiple “population exchanges”.¹³⁴ Furthermore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union after 1989 spawned alongside Russia 14 successor states. Consequently, *the 20th century shows a much stronger tendency towards the homogeneous national state than the 19th century*, which is often regarded as the pivotal age of the European nation state.

Against the backdrop of the experience that in history their borders have repeatedly been a plaything in changing power relationships, national sovereignty is for many *post-Soviet states* a major value that is to be defended, and not least for this reason there is an increased nationalism in many of these countries. That also goes for the nations that have emerged from the dissolution of multi-ethnic states (such as Yugoslavia). The nationalism in these countries appears at first glance to be a recourse to “national identities”, which were repressed in the former Soviet republics. However, the Stalinist nationality policy, which is characterised by the separation of cultural and political nationalism, continues to have an effect on this nationalism. The negation of a political concept of nation in Eastern

¹³² Stefan Troebst, *Tidal Eastern Europe. Die pulsierende Staatenlandschaft Ostmitteleuropas (1000-2000)*, in: Andronikashvili/ Weigel, *Grundordnungen* (2013), 213-229, p. 218.

¹³³ Supported by US American President Woodrow Wilson’s blueprint for peace with his fourteen point plan.

¹³⁴ Karsten Knipp, *Im Taumel. 1918 – Ein europäisches Schicksalsjahr*, Darmstadt 2018.

Europe after 1922 or after 1945 through incorporation in the Soviet Empire does not mean that nationalism did not play a part. Already in his early work on *Marxism and the National Question* (1913), Stalin defined the nation as an ethno-linguistic or cultural territorial unit and his later nationality policy was based on separating “national form” (language, culture) and “Soviet content”. In this regard, in the former Soviet republics *culture became the primary stage for nationalism*. Without reference to political reality, it concentrated solely on the past, which was cut-off from present-day life and in this way idealised and mythically glorified. Several conflicts which erupted politically and several military conflicts in the post-Soviet era have been predicted in the works of Soviet historians (e.g., the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict or the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict).¹³⁵ In the post-Stalin era from the sixties onwards, attempts were made to create a uniform, non-national Soviet culture, which together with the failure of an integrative Soviet Union project further encouraged the strengthening of cultural and ethnic nationalism. After 1989, many Eastern European countries inherited the images of the past from the era of Stalin’s nationality policy and made them the foundation of their domestic and foreign policy. After the break-up of the USSR, such national narratives were more or less the only reference value for a new political community. Inspired by the revival of national and religious traditions and accelerated by “the ‘rediscovery’ of national myths and places of memory”¹³⁶, this cultural nationalism (sometimes with a religious accent, as in Poland, sometimes with an ethnic accent as in the recourse to the Magyars in Hungary) now comes into conflict with the political forms of a modern democratic nation state.

Consequently, there is presumably little chance of success in advising the Eastern European countries solely with political terms and formal criteria, which are obligatory for all member states of the EU in the same way. A better understanding of the different historical experiences is needed, however, the prerequisites for it are lacking.¹³⁷ The majority of the German and Western European population have little knowledge regarding the history and culture of Eastern Europe and rely on handed-down stereotypical images of the “East”.¹³⁸ For example, the majority of Germans know a lot about Polish anti-Semitism

¹³⁵ Zaal Andronikashvili/ Emzar Jgerenaia/ Franziska Thun-Hohenstein, *Landna(h)me Georgien. Studien zur kulturellen Semantik*, Berlin 2018.

¹³⁶ Marketa Spiritova, *Ethnografische Perspektiven auf Erinnerungsorte, nationale Mythen und EU-Europäische Standortbestimmungen im östlichen Europa*, in: Daniel Draszek (ed.), *Kulturvergleichende Perspektiven auf das östliche Europa. Fragestellungen, Forschungsansätze und Methoden*, Regensburg 2017, p. 9-32, p. 19.

¹³⁷ Ivan Krastev, *Europadämmerung. Ein Essay*. Translated from English by Michael Bischoff, Berlin 2017.

¹³⁸ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford 1994.

but worryingly little about the devastating crime and destruction of the Nazi German occupation in the years 1939-45, whose victims were not only the Jews but millions of Poles, other “ethnically” undesirable groups and countless Polish intellectuals.¹³⁹

The lacking historical awareness of the different historical experiences also bears on the current controversy about the European refugee policy. Due to the fact that, for example, Europe’s political responsibility for a reasonable and regulated *migration policy* vis-à-vis African countries (as a supplement to the asylum policy) derives from Europe’s involvement in the history of colonialism, then above all the former colonial powers are called upon, i.e., *primarily Western European states* (Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Italy). These considerations have nothing to do with excusing a nationalism that dismantles democracy and incites xenophobia. It is more about the culture and policy of memory and about how to integrate the necessary debates and negotiations concerning different principles and objectives in a discourse which is aware of the shadows of the past that are cast on the current negotiations. (> 7.2)

> The FCEP is needed in this regard in order to consolidate the historical awareness and cultural memory of both what unites the countries of Europe and what divides them. The German-Polish Textbook Commission is a start in this regard. However, beyond that it is a question of developing a discourse within bilateral and international communication that overcomes the form of the political debate with a pattern of accusation, recrimination and apology.

5.2 The ambivalence of the nation state and the future of Europe

In Western European countries the democratic nation state has also come under pressure from several angles simultaneously – whereby European unification and plans to strengthen European sovereignty through further shifting national competences on to an EU level are today viewed much more sceptically than they were before the turn of the century.

(i) The *uncontrolled losses of sovereignty and fundamental rights* have the most serious consequences. The processes of globalisation, i.e., the increasing unregulated power of transnational concerns, an interstate competition exacerbated by “location competition” and the uncontrollable activities of the financial markets, weaken the “function and legitimacy prerequisites of nation state democracies”, in particular fiscal sovereignty and

¹³⁹ Jochen Böhrer, *Der Überfall. Deutschlands Krieg gegen Polen*, Frankfurt/M. 2009.

margins for economic and socio-political structuring.¹⁴⁰ These developments are exacerbated and accelerated through the digitalisation of global trade and the financial system, whose operators take on roles that “until then had been reserved for state offices, such as land registries, resident’s registration or banks.”¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the privatisation of infrastructure, public space and communication media leads to transformation processes in the public sphere and society, to the shrinking of the public arena and the loss of urbanity, i.e., the most important life lines of modern democracies. And the digitalised market and communication networks create a global alignment of consumer behaviour, life style and habitus: a new *transnational* homogenisation.

(ii) Also the *intended, controlled delegation of nation state competencies* to supranational bodies, above all to the EU, impacts central processes of a modern nation state, which in the case of the EU member states has predominantly taken on the shape of a democratic constitutional state with the traditional separation of powers. The relativisation of territorial sovereignty through the creation of the Schengen area has only shifted the problem of border security: in terms of the treaty it has been moved to the external borders of the EU, de facto it has been placed on the shoulders of the few countries whose borders coincide with the EU external borders.

As forward-looking as the project of a supranational European Union once was, as little success it has had in creating a structure on its level that satisfies the standards of a democratic system. As analysed not only by Dieter Grimm, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice have assumed a life of their own separate from the democratic processes in the Member States of the EU, and have broadly withdrawn from parliamentary control. Since the European Court of Justice has given EU-Community law precedence over national law, the treaties have retrospectively so to speak become “constitutionalised”. In doing so the rulings of the European Court of Justice effectually gain the status of an “enforcement of the constitution”. These rulings circumvent the European

¹⁴⁰ Habermas, *Die postnationale Konstellation* (1998), p. 2 et seqq.

¹⁴¹ Peter Buchmann, *Das Ende des Nationalstaats. Alles wird zu Daten. Sie lassen sich übers Internet verbreiten. Grenzen verlieren an Bedeutung, der Staat an Einfluss.* SRF, 18.01.2018 (World Web Forum): there a differentiation is made regarding: the right of issuing bank notes since with digital currencies the state control of the currency and supervision of currency and money stock are undermined; jurisdiction is circumvented by replacing conventional contracts with automated programmes/smart contracts; security is undermined due to excessive demands on the army and prosecution services through cyber space attacks and dependency on IT companies as a result of the delegation of tasks to them; fiscal sovereignty is circumvented due to the avoidance of tax obligations by e-commerce; and personal rights are undermined because their protection by national jurisdiction is limited on the global internet.

Parliament and lead to “serious interference in the well established structures of the Member States”.¹⁴² A similar diagnosis is also applicable to the EU Commission, namely a government that exercises executive functions without being legitimated by an elected parliament. Ulrike Guérot summarises the current legitimacy deficit in the EU as follows, “The national parliaments are *no longer* sufficiently competent, the European Parliament is *not yet* sufficiently competent.”¹⁴³ Furthermore, the monetary union transfers central currency and fiscal competences to the sovereign European Central Bank (ECB), which not only determines¹⁴⁴ the economic, investment and fiscal policy of the Member States by way of its interest and monetary policy but its policies also bring about a radical change to the traditional forms of social and old age benefits, the intergenerational economy and consumer behaviour – with far going socio-cultural consequences. They encroach on the lifeworld culture of EU citizens and ultimately lead to an increasing distance between growing population groups and the EU as well as the political system in general.

“The majority of all EU citizens, about two thirds, still support the European idea. [...] However, they no longer have confidence in the EU. In recent years, this loss of confidence was around 20 percentage points. [...] Only 30 percent of the Germans, French and British [...] support the project of the ‘United States of Europe’.”¹⁴⁵

The diminishing support or rather the decreasing acceptance of the current state of the EU and of EU-politics within member states’ populations let the discussions about forms of a potentially more united Europe seem utopian at the moment. To achieve this objective, the population has to be included on a much greater scale in the discussion about alternative perspectives: whether this be a ‘European nation’, a strengthening of European sovereignty (with the help of common fiscal policy, tax policy and social policy and the creation of a common legal framework), a European republic¹⁴⁶ based on a commonwealth of a “transnational community of solidarity”¹⁴⁷, a ‘Europe of regions’ or ‘Europe of cul-

¹⁴² Dieter Grimm, *Europa ja – aber welches? Zur Verfassung der Europäischen Demokratie*, Munich 2016; idem., *Europas Verfassung*, in: *Die Zukunft der Verfassung II. Auswirkungen von Europäisierung und Globalisierung*, Berlin 2012, p. 212-240. – On the ongoing expert discussion of Brussels’ practice of “rule of law” cf. the “Verfassungsblog on matters constitutional” run jointly by the WZB (Berlin Social Science Center) and Wiko Berlin: <https://verfassungsblog.de>

¹⁴³ Guérot, *Warum Europa eine Republik werden muss!* (2016), p. 34, emphasis by S.W.

¹⁴⁴ Joseph Vogl, *Der Souveränitätseffekt*, Zurich 2015.

¹⁴⁵ Guérot, *Warum Europa eine Republik werden muss!* (2016), p. 24.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Robert Menasse, *Kurze Geschichte der Europäischen Zukunft*, in: Peter Hilpold/Walter Steinmair/Christoph Perathoner (Hg.), *Europa der Regionen*, Berlin, Heidelberg 2016, S. 36.

tures'.¹⁴⁸ The "integration of citizens has so far been insufficiently implemented."¹⁴⁹ Currently, the EU is further away from such prospective models than it has ever been – especially, because it does not succeed in mastering the present concrete and burning problems: such as a common refugee policy, regulating the financial market, curbing tax evasion and taxing multinational corporations, realizing climate policy goals, and much more. Dealing with these problems is much more important for most EU citizens than leading a discussion about far-away targets that do not seem very reasonable when considering the current state of the EU. It will be difficult to interest the population in a future-aimed European debate when looking at the recent reluctance of German government politics relating to common European actions (climate protection, digital tax). However, the largest hurdle is the diminishing credibility of Brussels-based politics whose concrete actions so often go against the propagated self-conception as a community of values: if EU-subsidies, e.g., are not bound to social and environmental standards and interests of lobbyists water down proposed legislation about global governance beyond recognition.

The so-called 'citizens' dialogs' organised in the member states in 2018 were a start, however, it needs to be kept in mind when analysing the results that the people participating in such events are mostly citizens with a generally positive view on the European project. Nevertheless, they also formulated basic deficits and claims such as a change in political structures of the EU, transparency, public accessibility, closing the social and economical gap or rather aligning working requirements and social standards as well as decreasing economical competition between member states.¹⁵⁰ This 'citizens' dialog' identified several neuralgic problems, which are ultimately quite similar to those represented – in an aggressive form – in populist forums where they are coupled with the construction of enemy images and ideologies. The way in which EU-political committees deal with the results of their initiated 'citizens' dialogues' will show itself as an important credibility check. One thing is certain: The EU will only have a future if its current organisational and decisionmaking structures are democratised, its elected parliament gains greater importance and the discrepancy between rhetoric/self-presentation and real politics becomes smaller. Generating a "European narrative," which is often recommended as a strategy for the Europeanisation of Europe, will not be able to remedy the decline in acceptance.

¹⁴⁸ Olaf Schwenke, *Europa der Kulturen – Kulturpolitik in Europa*, Hamburg 2010.

¹⁴⁹ Josef Isensee, *Union – Nation – Region: eine schwierige Allianz*, in *Hitpold/Steinmair/Perathoner, Europa der Regionen* (2016), S. 10.

¹⁵⁰ *Bürgerdialog zur Zukunft Europas*. Bericht der Bundesregierung. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, November 2018.

(iii) All of these are processes upon which *cultural policy* has little influence. However, it can contribute *to the examination of the described tendencies being conducted in a serious, knowledgeable, but above all creative manner* because otherwise the ever critical EU discourse plays into the hands of a general hostility to politics. The potentially biggest danger is currently the “erosion of national democracy” through the *loss of acceptance of the parliamentary system and its channelling into populist and aggressive nationalist ideologies*. In their empirically-based study of nationalist populism in Europe, Higgot/Proud date the accelerated spread of right-wing populist, Eurosceptic parties and their election success back to the financial crisis in 2008, as the trigger for the growing discontent with the gap between the winners and the losers of globalisation. Even though there are very different national manifestations, these parties are linked by the following characteristic stances: Euroscepticism, a backward-looking nationalism (the recourse to an alleged natural distinct nationality which is threatened by anything foreign), xenophobia, discrimination against “intellectual elites”, a rejection of cosmopolitanism, the notion of corrupt politicians and the rhetoric of a “we” that is directed against a common enemy.¹⁵¹ However, this growing distance to the EU and loss of acceptance of the political system go beyond the supporters and electors of Eurosceptic parties. And increasingly often, the hostility to politics takes on aggressive forms, from shitstorms against individual politicians to the violent actions against the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Nevertheless, the current polarisation of the debate and the wide-spread cheap moral outrage or defamation regarding the described Eurosceptic and politics-sceptic stances is counter productive as it leads to further hardening and works into the hand of the populist forces. The objective should be rather to understand populism as a phenomenon, which reacts to real existing problems and social imbalances (>7.5) with an excursion into fatal old and new national ideologies. One of the slogans of the Brexit movement, “take back control from Brussels”, can be understood as a popular expression of a rampant dissatisfaction with the EU, which as shown has justified reasons. In this sense, it should be a matter of *taking seriously the real problems behind populism* in order to be able to counter anti-democratic, nationalist and xenophobic tendencies and indeed to do so without window dressing and romanticising of the ongoing social and cultural changes. The cohabitation of people with different cultural traditions, habits and religions with irreconcilable

¹⁵¹ Higgot/ Proud, *Populist-Nationalism and Foreign Policy* (2017), p. 18 et seqq.

convictions and ideals is not simply an “enrichment”¹⁵²; it will lead to radical changes in the lifeworld of Germany and Europe. (> 7.3 and 7.4)

The increase in nationalistic tendencies and the growing distancing from the political system can be interpreted as a reflex reacting to *the image of a weak state*, i.e., the image of politicians who are not capable – or accused of being not willing – of ensuring social justice, reducing poverty, inhumane working conditions (sub-contracted labour, on-call work, wage dumping and so on, up to forms of modern slavery) and humiliating living conditions (rate of unemployment benefit), and prohibiting “obscene profit margins and drastic income parities”¹⁵³, and the image of politicians that squander tax money (Berlin airport, Stuttgart) and so on. The constellation arising from this situation is symptomatic. *Where the state shows weakness or the constitutional state fails, “the people” answers with nationalist tendencies* – and frequently with the call for strong leadership.

5.3 On the dynamic of state and nation during the emergence of the European nation states

Actually the tension if not the opposition of components that constitute the nation state is characteristic for it and also for the modern nation state in the form of a democratic constitutional state, i.e., in Germany a “democratic and social federal state” (German Basic Law, art. 20, para. 1). This tension between the *ideational sovereignty* on one hand (“all state authority is derived from the people”, German Basic Law, art. 20, para. 2) and *the sovereignty of enforcing instances* on the other hand (the government and the legislative, executive and judicial bodies), in other words the tension between the *nation* and the *state*, indicates a dynamic structurally inherent in the nation state. Given that the modern nation state is based on a conflation of statehood and nationality, the opposition of these two components has always been encoded in it. In that regard the current situation points to a fundamental historical structure in the relationship between the *sovereignty and constitutional aspect* on the one hand and the *aspect of nationality* (as an aspect of the entirety of the “people”) on the other hand.

In his study on the emergence of the various nation states in European history, US American historian James Sheehan does not follow the usual “Westphalian narrative” (the

¹⁵² The belief in enrichment through the refugees, which in autumn 2015 was still setting the tone, was held at the time predominantly with a view to young workers in a country that has a demographic trend towards an aged population, e.g., by the economist of Deutsche Bank, the head of the German Federal Employment Agency and the Chancellor.

¹⁵³ Habermas, *Die postnationale Konstellation* (1998), p.9.

Peace of Westphalia being the hour of birth of mutually sovereign states in Europe). Instead, he presents in detail the logic in the emergence of the European nation states. The starting point is “sovereignty”, which is defined as the claim of the rulers to primacy and autonomy of authority or rather as a matter of legitimate power. Since such a claim could only be raised for a limited territory and only enforced within specific borders, the sovereignty of the state and territoriality are historically linked, initially so in the shape of an absolute monarchy. Already in this context, the process of a consolidation of power through laws began, i.e., a transformation from “force into law”¹⁵⁴.

The concept of “sovereignty” was introduced in the 16th century by Jean Bodin (in *Six Livres de la République*, 1576) with reference to the territorial feudal state and the absolute monarchy. Sheehan’s overview of the genesis of the European nation state confirms that the territorial sovereignty historically actually preceded the modern nation state. The nation state was formed only through the additional moment of nationality, i.e., through the principle of national self-determination, which in the historical formation phase was initially raised by the people (*populus*) against the monarch’s claim of legitimate authority. His/her legitimacy was then replaced by the legitimacy of the nation, which in turn was legalised by a constitution.

In this way, alongside *territoriality* the constituent parts of a modern nation state are *law* and *nationality*, which mutually substantiate each other. “Authentic states were supposed to be based on national communities; authentic nations were supposed to have states of their own.”¹⁵⁵ While territoriality concerns the drawing of borders vis-à-vis other sovereign states, the modern nation state is encoded with a permanent internal conflict through the fusion of *state and nation*. Since the constitution of the state is legitimised by the nation or rather the people, i.e., the *demos* of democracy, even though on the map of Europe there was rarely a coincidence of state territory and a single nationality, the formation of nation states re-prompts a process of *constituting nationality by way of culture* in the 19th and 20th century. It had the effect that national identities were formulated and national groups were formed, which defined and demarcated themselves from each other in terms of language, ethnicity or religion; the result was a history of displacement, resettlement and violent conflicts. In the modern nation state the relationship between *demos and ethnos*, meaning between the ‘constitutive people’, the community of nationals, of

¹⁵⁴ James Sheehan, The Problem of Sovereignty in European History, in: *American Historical Review*, 111, No. 1 (Feb. 2006), p. 6.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 9.

citizens, the electorate and tax payers on the one hand and the people that is defined by background and tradition, on the other hand, represents a permanent potential for conflict, and that has not only been the case since the most recent wave of migrants and refugees.

5.4. On the relationship between human rights and nationality

This nation state logic that is fraught with tension also affects *human rights* in their relationship to the *fundamental and civil rights*. For although the idea of nation within the meaning of an homogeneous people serves as an argument to *exclude people of a different origin*, the sovereign state with its constitution otherwise forms the basis for *guaranteeing the fundamental rights of its citizens*, which means that the nation state is characterised by a fundamental ambiguity. Subsequent to the historical experiences from the Second World War of mass persecution, displacement and the production of innumerable refugees and stateless people, after the war Hannah Arendt undertook a fundamental examination of the history and the reality of human rights. In the chapter on “The Perplexity of the Rights of Man” (in her German version “The Aporias of Human Rights”) in her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), Arendt argued on the one hand that the emergence of the idea of human rights arose from the Enlightenment and the reference to the ‘natural law’; as justification the latter took the place of historically “rooted rights” and the legitimation of sovereignty by “the grace of God”. Out of it arose the common justification context between people’s sovereignty and human rights “in the name of nature” in opposition to the previous legitimisation of dynasties, „Man appeared as the only sovereign in matters of law as the people was proclaimed the only sovereign in matters of government“, whereby it appeared „only natural that the ‚inalienable‘ rights of man would find their guarantee and become an inalienable part of the right of the people to sovereign self-government.“¹⁵⁶

On the other hand, Arendt illustrated the fundamental aporia in the idea of human rights, on account of their role, “to guarantee what could not be guaranteed politically or had never before been guaranteed by politics.”¹⁵⁷ As a cornerstone of the constitution, i.e., as the highest and most general principle of the constitution of modern states, the specific political rights have since then been premised on human rights, while however at the same time the “various rights of the citizens embody and specify the inalienable right of

¹⁵⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), New Edition with added Prefaces, San Diego, New York, London 1985, p. 290-302, p. 291.

¹⁵⁷ Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totalitärer Herrschaft* (1955), München 1986, p. 453 (Arendt inserted this dense statement to her German translation which differs considerably from the English version).

man, which is per se conceptualized as independent from citizenship and national difference.¹⁵⁸ Following a discussion on the situation of different groups (displaced persons, stateless persons, refugees, expelled minorities), Arendt summarises that “none of these groups could be certain of their basic human rights if they were not protected by a state whose sovereignty one was subjected to by birth or international affiliation.”¹⁵⁹ That means that the human rights, although superordinate to and presumed for the constitutional rights of a state must in reality be covered by the basic rights of a certain state, which are principally subordinate to them.

In the order of the international community created after the Second World War – with the UN (with 193 member states today) and its many institutions and special organisations – the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) forms one of the central references for a series of subsequent specifications and supplements. Without any international law or legally binding status, the UN declaration is only attributed a normative or moral status: that of a benchmark for international resolutions and treaties, sometimes also for multilateral treaties with a binding character. The extent and degree to which real living conditions correspond to the principle of “universal, equal, inalienable, and indivisible human rights” continue to be dependent on the specific civil rights or on the protection which, in the case of failure, is guaranteed by other states to an individual or certain groups.

*

So long as no other fundamental rights guaranteeing body has taken its place national politics, political efforts on a federal, regional and local level are still the first and most effective field of action in the protection and/or the strengthening of democratic, social and ecological ways of life: as basis and precondition for equivalent initiatives at a European and international level. Due to the fact that the international order created after 1945, which at least had formally set-out common rules and principles, is obviously more and more eroding,¹⁶⁰ the worry about the weakening of national sovereignties is not only a symptom of a populist discourse of fear.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 456.

¹⁶⁰ Marc Engelhardt, *Weltgemeinschaft am Abgrund. Warum wir eine starke UNO brauchen*, Berlin 2018; Similarly from power and security policy perspective, see also: Wolfgang Ischinger, *Welt in Gefahr. Deutschland und Europa in unsicheren Zeiten*, Berlin 2018.

From the described current constellation, Sheehan's structural analysis of the European state building and Arendt's understanding of the indispensability of state guaranteed civil rights, it can be concluded that the issue of the nation state is *less about the nation state as such* or as a whole, but rather about *the dynamic of its individual components*.

> On this side of the debate about the future organisational form of the EU several problems have become apparent to be worked on in the efforts to overcome the national biases. Thereby one must understand the described dynamic as the setting of the current erosions and transformations and to actively perceive it as an area of action and communication of cultural policy. Even if this is not the main task of FCEP the outside perspective, which actors bring to domestic discourses is an important correcting measure. The strengthening of democratic and constitutional structures is the basis that the current domestic socio-cultural changes are managed in the interests of social peace, which is the prerequisite for Germany to play a formative role in the transnational context.

CHANGING CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

6. Resubmission of national culture¹⁶¹ – the role of culture

6.1 The “non-negotiables” – pre-juridical commonalities and dialectic of the majority

The relationship between citizenship and nationality changes with the actual development of Germany towards an immigration society with increasing cultural diversity. For each individual this means that they either join the community by birth or through naturalisation, -- with varying effects for the character of ‘belonging’ to what Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde calls the “pre-juridical commonalities” on which the modern democratic constitutional state, which actually does not define itself (any more) through national homogeneity, still is dependent. Nevertheless, and despite the above mentioned developments, Germany is not an immigration society in the constitutional sense as can be seen in contrast to the US, the classic model of an immigration society.

In her assessment of the American Revolution and the Founding Fathers of the United States of America¹⁶² Hannah Arendt repeatedly referred to the fact that in the USA the constitution is the unifying bond of the state, “a government of law and not of men”. Based on the history of the USA as an immigration society that could not rely on common traditions or culture, it is the historic model of a *nation of will* (*Willensnation*). In the procedure of “naturalisation” the specific character of this nation is brought to bear in a particular way, because not only is knowledge of the country (such as language, culture, history and constitution) demanded but so is an exclusive loyalty. Naturalisation in the USA does not only require an oath of allegiance and loyalty to the constitution and the law but it also requires that all other loyalties are renounced, to be precise, “all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty”.¹⁶³

During naturalisation the acceptance of the constitution represents a formal act, whereas those who are citizens through birth are automatically placed in a binding relationship to the constitution. Their acceptance is so to speak assumed through birth. It precedes the individual’s life and produces the impression of a natural belonging, which is

¹⁶¹ Christoph Bartmann/Carola Dürr/ Hans-Georg Knopp (ed.), *Wiedervorlage Nationalkultur. Variationen über ein neuralgisches Thema*, Göttingen/ Munich 2010.

¹⁶² Hannah Arendt, *Über die Revolution*, Munich 1965.

¹⁶³ Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America, <https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/naturalization-test/naturalization-oath-allegiance-united-states-america>

then often regarded as an exclusive privilege. The democratic nation state's structure guarantees its citizens the protection of their fundamental rights but is in turn reliant upon its citizens, i.e., on them actively exercising their rights as the ideational sovereign and observing their obligations, e.g., as tax payers, voters or fellow citizens.

The constitution or the Basic Law is considered to be non-negotiable. The speech by the German Federal President on German Unity Day 2017 referred to this point:

“Whosoever seeks to make Germany their home, joins a community that is shaped by the order of the *Basic Law* and by the *common convictions: rule of law, observance of the constitution and equal rights for men and women*. All of that is not just the wording of the law but it is indispensable for a successful *co-existence* in Germany, and it can *not be the subject of negotiation*.”¹⁶⁴

In order to not be the subject of negotiation, the *non-negotiables* therefore need a majority who support them. For, as Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde identified, the “free, secular state [lives] from prerequisites” that it “itself cannot guarantee”.¹⁶⁵ The fact that the constitution is reliant upon the fundamental rights and principles which are set out in it being shared by the citizens refers to the tradition of the nation state, i.e., to its – not “grown” but rather historical – genesis, in other words its reliance on the culture upon which the constitution is based.

The constitutional concept of *constitution*, which describes the “legally shaped status of a state”, coincides in the history of modern constitutionalism with the term of the law, which “governs the construction and orientation of the state authority”. According to Dieter Grimm that is the result of a legal narrowing of the term “constitution”, which has “increasingly [eliminated] its non-legal components”.¹⁶⁶ “However, these *non-legal* components are the foundation and prerequisites for the basic laws that a society gives itself in order to constitute itself as a political-legal entity”. They are a type of basic order concerning the self-image of a political community which dates back to before the constitution,

¹⁶⁴ Walter Steinmeier, Speech on German Unity Day, Mainz, 03. 10.2017, <http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2017/10/171003-TdDE-Rede-Mainz.html>

¹⁶⁵ Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, Preamble, in: *Der säkularisierte Staat. Sein Charakter, seine Rechtfertigung und seine Probleme im 21. Jahrhundert*, Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung, Munich 2007, p. 8.

¹⁶⁶ Dieter Grimm, *Verfassung* (II.), in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politischen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhard Koselleck, vol. IV. 1990. P. 863. Cf. also Dieter Grimm, *Souveränität. Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlüsselbegriffs*, Berlin 2009.

“This means that the non-legal components of the concept of constitution refer to experiences, convictions and principles according to which a community is formed.”¹⁶⁷

Böckenförde’s description of the democratic constitutional state as a *secularised state* refers to the birth of the modern state out of the secularisation of the political order of formerly Christian societies. The secularised state that takes its justification from the setting-out of human rights (initially in the 1776 *Bill of Rights* and the *Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen* in 1789; in the German Basic Law art. 1) sets out the freedom of religion as one of the central fundamental rights, whereby it implicitly acknowledges its emergence and growth from a formerly Christian community. The reference to God in the preamble of the German Constitution brings this origin to mind, whereby it no longer serves as legitimisation but reminds the “German People” of the responsibility. The first sentence “Conscious of their responsibility before God and man” is much more an indication that the Basic Law understands itself as a lesson from the crimes that the Germans committed during the “Third Reich”.

With his examination of the emergence of the “non-negotiables” out of the secularisation, Böckenförde asks what has taken the place of religion, i.e., the former unifying bond. In this context he debates the “level of *pre-judicial commonalities* and sustaining ethos that is indispensable for a thriving cohabitation in a liberal order”.¹⁶⁸ He very critically regards different variations of civil religion, e.g., the reference to “certain continuances of religious culture”, which “are actually or even institutionally integrated into the political system” when expressed symbolically in order to indirectly religiously legitimate the secular society in this way.¹⁶⁹ Equally as critically he discusses the attempt to replace the lost reference to religion through a *common set of values*. For in it, the confessional character of religion, which has been overcome in the liberal democracy, is again revived by the demand to confess to a specific set of values. “Such a civil religion, declared as a common set of values by the state order, is by itself *intolerant*. It demands a positive confession”. However, a confession targets the individual *basic convictions* and in doing so goes beyond the constitutional requirement of “loyally following the existing laws while enjoying freedom of thought”¹⁷⁰; furthermore, it is in conflict with freedom of expression. What remains is

¹⁶⁷ Zaal Andronikashvili/ Sigrid Weigel, Zur Frage der Grundordnungen in Europa nach 1989. Introduction, in: idem. (ed.), Grundordnungen. Geographie, Religion und Gesetz, Berlin 2012, p. 7 et seq.

¹⁶⁸ Böckenförde, Der säkularisierte Staat (2007), p. 24, emphasis by S.W.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 27 et seq.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 28 and p. 29.

culture, i.e., those pre-juridical commonalities which exist in the cultural lore, traditions, mental conditions and habitual attitudes.

This argument has nothing to do with homogenisation because such cultural continuances are *neither normative nor static*. They developed historically, are constantly moving and changing, and they are the subject of discussion and negotiation. Conversely, modern secular culture does not mean that it is fully free from being shaped by traditions and conventions, by their language and concepts or by a specific regional culture heritage from which it emerged. These elements are instead inherent in modern culture and are adopted or rather they survive in the lived culture including its constant modifications (> 3.2). Against this backdrop, it is plausible that from the increasing religious diversity a dilemma may arise that can be characterised as the *dialectic of the majority*. Democracy is reliant on a majority that share and actively support the cultural prerequisites of the constitutionally protected fundamental rights. However, its logic likewise implies in principle the possibility that other majorities may emerge who when using the right to freedom of opinion and religion question precisely these rights and endanger the constitution in its existence. This fragility of democratic forms is not only true for Europe.

For instance, Khilnani in *The Idea of India* describes the paradox success¹⁷¹ of the democratisation in Indian nation state born from liberation (> 4.2). To the extent that the citizens of the secular state, who are by majority Hindu, exercised their political right to vote, a religious Hindu nationalism, which questions the secular character of the state and the rights of religious minorities (in particular Muslims), has increasingly gained ground. Böckenförde discusses the respective problem from two angles. On the one hand, he sees a “new type of unifying bond above a plural and partially diverging cultural reality” precisely in the freedom of religion and in the “protection of religious convictions in that what is holy to them against defamation and disparagement”.¹⁷² On the other hand, he discusses a potentially necessary “self-defence of the secular state”, namely if applicable to ensure that the members of a minority which “permanently actively shows resistance to freedom of religion, thus seeking to destroy it when the political opportunities are presented, e.g., by way of forming a majority”, remain a minority.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (2012), p. 58 et seqq.

¹⁷² Böckenförde, *Der säkularisierte Staat*, p. 36.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 39. – On the problem of democratic majorities from a sociological perspective cf. Bernd Guggenberger/ Claus Offe (ed.), *An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie. Politik und Soziologie der Mehrheitsregel*, Opladen 1984.

It is to be hoped that such a constellation in which the dialectic of the majority changes remains just a constitutional thought experiment. However, that is dependant on the quality of the *lived democracy* and also on the *cultural and educational policy*. It is assigned the complex task of supporting and keeping alive through education and culture the awareness of history, traditions, conventions and convictions which created and sustain the democratic secular state with its fundamental rights such as freedom of religion and expression and the right of minorities to their own way of life. And it is also assigned the task of argumentatively defending this basic order to minorities while at the same time ensuring and creating space for their right to a different culture and deviating opinions. That has nothing to do with a normative concept of culture. For the lived culture must be open for the most different life plans and lifestyles; openness, changeability and negotiability of the lived culture only reach their limits where they question the validity and observation of the fundamental rights.

In regard to the openness, there is a *difference between domestic and foreign cultural policy*.

> While the intercultural dialogue of the FCEP in the international approach and in regard to the much more radical transformation processes which some of the partner countries (especially in Africa and Asia) are currently undergoing must be principally held without predefined results, because the European model cannot be used as a yard stick, the same openness to results is not applicable to the same extent in regard to the domestic cultural and educational policy as it operates within the boundaries of the “non-negotiable”. Instead it finds itself in the dilemma of supporting an open and tolerant society with different lifestyles, convictions and religious cultures, and of developing creative forms of exchange while at the same time protecting this culture against its constitutional basic order being challenged.

6.2 Normative discourses – “Who does (not) belong”, – “national identity” and “Leitkultur”

The actual problem of the modern nation state is consequently found less in the state aspect; rather it exists in the *question of a “relative commonality” of the culture of this country beyond a homogeneous normative culture*. For this question, the respective *argumentation structure, terminology and rhetoric* play a part that is not to be underestimated. To the extent that migration and the so-called refugee-question dominate political discourse, voices can be heard again in the debate about ‘German culture’ that see ‘German culture’ under

threat and consequently revert back to various, often normative definitions of what is ‘German’.

The Böckenförde question of *pre-judicial commonalities* concerns fundamental convictions in the sense of an ethos supporting the democratic fundamental rights or an “ethos supporting the state order”¹⁷⁴. In its character, however, it fundamentally differs from a normative discourse which sets out universally valid values and binding rules, is aimed at demarcation and exclusion, and in this way regularly leads to intolerance towards other people, ways of thinking and lifestyle habits. In the sense that *culture* describes the dynamic field of experiences, convictions and ways of life, it is not to be codified in the form of a canon of values, whereas the consensus on human dignity, personal rights and freedoms, which grew out of history, is fixed in the catalogue of fundamental rights. The transmitted and lived social and political culture was and is repeatedly subject to major historical changes, such as in the age of industrialisation, as again in the modern urban-life world characterised by media and transport innovations, and also currently as culture is changing with increasing acceleration under the conditions of the ongoing global transformation processes, demographic developments and worldwide waves of migration. The habits, ways of life, and behaviours of the individual already experienced a strong diversification in the modern age, and this trend has intensified in the 21st century. The debates held under the title of a *Leitkultur* and the most recent controversy about what or who “belongs to Germany” are only a symptom for such changes. However, they answer with the attempt to maintain or defend something that has never existed in this form.

The most recent debate about what or who “belongs to Germany” or does not belong is characterised by a *rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion*. This rhetoric implicitly presumes an *authorised instance* that decides on the matter, and furthermore a *binding benchmark* for respective decisions regarding inclusion and exclusion, and for these reasons it is normative and authoritarian by its nature. However, the instance that is legitimised to decide on the matter of belonging is the Basic Law. It stipulates that the criterion of belonging is citizenship, which is why the negotiations on the regulation of citizenship for immigrants are also labelled the *battle for belonging*¹⁷⁵. However, the Basic Law only recognises “Germans” without any differentiation, disregarding their gender, parentage, race, language, homeland, origin, faith and their religious or political opinions (art. 3) and it grants “all

¹⁷⁴ Böckenförde, *Der säkularisierte Staat* (2007), p. 31.

¹⁷⁵ Jürgen Mackert, *Kampf um Zugehörigkeit: Nationale Staatsbürgerschaft als Modus sozialer Schließung*, Wiesbaden 1999.

Germans" the same rights, which includes the guarantee of an "undisturbed practice of religion" (art. 4). Therefore, no further going or more narrowly defined belonging can be derived from the German constitution. When politicians, who of all people should know that these fundamental rights are non-negotiable, ignore this fact then it is clearly about something else. It is about claiming the interpretational sovereignty over the political and social culture in a climate of rampant insecurity, in which familiar habits and assumed certainties appear to be threatened. In doing so, own, ultimately personal notions of a certain way of life and lifestyle and own values are asserted as binding for the whole country.

The statement that a phenomenon or a group belongs to Germany constructs a closed unity embodied by a national collective, which therefore assumes something that has never existed in that way. Just as the family ideal of a nuclear family consisting of father, mother and children never corresponded to the real living conditions of the middle class society of the 19th century, from which this ideal model emanates, because the majority simply lacked the financial resources for this way of life, equally *a uniform German national culture has never existed*. As can be seen from several statements from the protagonists of this debate, it essentially concerns a question of the idea of a "German identity", which may not be given up as is claimed. In this context, the German identity is traced back to vaguely defined "cultural roots" (e.g., "Christian-Jewish character" or "cultural identity of Germany") and is legitimised with these "roots". The debate uses some terms of social science but considerably distorts their meanings, which is particularly the case for *identity* and *belonging*.

Identity (from Latin *idem*, meaning the same) is originally a term of logic that describes the principle of indistinguishability (two things being identical). In the administrative language, the term describes the legal identity of a person whose personal data and characteristics are registered in order to not be confused with another person (identity recognition). However, the meaning, which psychology and social science ascribed to the term in order to designate the self-understanding of an individual (lat. the indivisible) is its most conventional usage. In the psycho-social development of children the isolation from their mother or another caregiver is a considerable step; at the same time, the child learns to understand him-/herself as a social being in the mimic, gestural and linguistic interac-

tion with the caregiver.¹⁷⁶ If successful, this process leads to a more or less stable self who determines his/her own place in distinction from others and forms a certain self-image. Therefore, identity describes the self-understanding of an individual, which arises in the interplay of distinction and belonging.

In social sciences *belonging* means the self-understanding of an individual of belonging to a group. Although belonging is not freely electable because a person is born into a specific group of origin, the socialisation and development of the individual decide how they behave towards their group of origin, i.e., whether they identify with them or isolate themselves from them and seek another belonging. Since people are nevertheless identified with their group of origin by others, individuals “cannot arbitrarily distance themselves” but must in some way address their origin. Belonging is therefore about the relationship of the individual to social units, such as group of origin, family, class, peer group. In the present-day immigration society it increasingly concerns belonging to a collective that is defined ethnically, culturally, religiously or nationally. (> 7.4) Belonging is often marked by visible external characteristics. That is particularly evident in current youth culture by way of consumer behaviour, clothes, habitus, slang or participation in specific social networks etc.

The notion of a collective identity is paradoxical. If the concept of identity is transferred from an individual to a group, a collective, a people or a nation, then they are constructed as a homogeneous unity, and the plurality of the individuals is transformed into one and the same overall personality. However, one of the fundamental conditions of the *conditio humana* is plurality, namely “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” as Hannah Arendt writes in *The Human Condition* (1958) and “that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live”. Arendt’s statement is not only true for earth, but also for every individual country. Therefore, the fact of plurality is the most common and most fundamental condition of life and, according to Arendt, it “is specifically the condition—not only the *conditio sine qua non*, but the *conditio per quam*—of all political life.”¹⁷⁷ As a result, in Arendt’s theory the political arises in and from the *space between people*; it is the place of action, of exchange and of interaction. In

¹⁷⁶ Peter Fonagy et al., *Affektregulierung, Mentalisierung und die Entwicklung des Selbst*, Stuttgart 2004; Erwin Lemche, *Emotion und frühe Interaktion. Die Emotionsentwicklung innerhalb der frühen Mutter-Kind-Interaktion*, Berlin 2014.

¹⁷⁷ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (1958), Chicago, London 1998, p. 7 et seq. – *conditio sine qua non* (lat. condition without which not) = necessary condition, *conditio per quam* (lat. literally condition through which) = sufficient condition.

light of human plurality, every notion of a *collective identity* ends in uniformity and homogeneity. Collective identities constitute and stabilise themselves by way of *homogenisation*, demarcation against other collectives and *exclusion of those who are different*. “Identitarian demands are the expression of rejections, which for their part [are] the product of the world becoming uniform,” writes French philosopher François Jullien in the essay *There’s No Such Thing as Cultural Identity*.¹⁷⁸

“A lead culture belongs to every identity”¹⁷⁹, states Bassam Tibi, who coined the term of *Leitkultur*. He initially introduced it in reference to a “European *Leitkultur*”¹⁸⁰; and a little later, in connection with the German debate about the integration of migrants, he demanded to develop a European *Leitkultur* for Germany.¹⁸¹ Since the phrase of a “*German Leitkultur*” moved into the daily and party political controversy around the turn of millennium, it has repeatedly appeared at regular intervals. In 2007, the confession to a German *Leitkultur* was included in the basic programme of the CSU political party and the variant of a “*Leitkultur in Germany*” was included in the basic programme of its sister party, the CDU.

In the debate, the content is usually vague because the “*German Leitkultur*” is connected to the commonplaces of the history of ideas, such as Christianity, Enlightenment and Humanism, to a “consensus of values” or to “common roots” or “common traditions”; or it ends in the call for “decency, values and virtue”. However, what is clear is who is being addressed because it is directed at immigrants and refugees with the demand to adapt to a national culture, which is declared as binding.

The concept of the German *Leitkultur* is as normative as it is undetermined. Therefore Heribert Prantl’s criticism that it is “not an integrating but rather a polarising concept”¹⁸² is accurate. In terms of concept, the *Leitkultur* concerns the codes of practice derived from the construction of a “national identity”; “*German Leitkultur*” and “*German identity*” are *two sides of the same coin*. However, the idea of a uniform “*German identity*” does not withstand an empirical investigation for in modern day Germany no “homogeneous entity”

¹⁷⁸ François Jullien, *Es gibt keine kulturelle Identität*. Berlin 2017, p. 56.

¹⁷⁹ Bassam Tibi, *Leitkultur als Wertekonsens. Bilanz einer missglückten deutschen Debatte*, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, issue 1-2/2001.

¹⁸⁰ Bassam Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*, Munich 2000.

¹⁸¹ Bassam Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität? Leitkultur oder Wertebeliebigkeit*, Munich 2001.

¹⁸² Heribert Prantl, *Warum de Maizières Leitkultur-Katalog gesellschaftsschädlich ist*, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 01.05.2017.

can be identified as an ethnological study on this question found out.¹⁸³ Equally, it does not withstand an historical examination for the constitution of the German nation state can in no way look back on common roots, rather it has a long and extremely varied history and diverse, heterogeneous cultural roots. The project of forming a unified nation from this inconsistent past has proven to be arduous work on the conception of a German *culture nation*.

6.3 Belated nation – “culture nation” and the concept of people

For about the last decade, talk of the *German culture nation* or labelling Germany as a culture nation (*Kulturnation*) has conquered the rhetoric of politicians’ speeches and in part also the feuilleton of newspapers. Previously used in connection with the recognition of the “national cultural heritage” (Weimar, Schiller year 2004), the concept was prominently introduced into the political rhetoric when the then German President Köhler said in his speech on German Unity Day 2008 that “since our country has been reunified” we can again be experienced “as one culture nation, which as a whole inspires our live”.¹⁸⁴ Since then the notion of a German culture nation or Germany as a cultural nation has taken over political rhetoric, press and the media.

Claiming to be a “culture nation” is, for Germany, a country that has been unified in terms of territory and constitution since 1990, remarkable, since the *culture nation* in the political terminology actually describes *a nation without state*, namely a people who defines itself based on origin or a common tradition, language, ethnicity or other criteria but currently does not have or does not yet have a state. 19th century Italy and Germany are considered as classic examples of culture nations in the (Western) European history. They are two states whose belated national unity (Italy in 1861, the German Reich in 1871) bore a historically anachronistic, namely monarchic character. The counter part to culture nation is the “state nation” (or “nation by will”), a territorially defined state with a single constitution in which population groups live who are different in terms of language, culture and/or ethnicity (textbook examples: Switzerland and the USA). This pair of terms is attributed to historian Friedrich Meinecke, who summarised the German history of

¹⁸³ Irene Götz, *Deutsche Identitäten. Die Wiederentdeckung des Nationalen nach 1989*, Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 2011.

¹⁸⁴ “Rede von Bundespräsident Horst Köhler beim Festakt zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit am 03. Oktober 2008 in Hamburg”: http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Horst-Koehler/Reden/2008/10/20081003_Rede.html – Further examples in Sigrid Weigel, *Die Lehre des leeren Grabes. Begründung der deutschen Kulturnation nach 1871 und nach 1989*, in: Andronikashvili/ Weigel, *Grundordnungen* (2013), p. 147-165. The following section broadly refers to this study.

ideas (from Humboldt, Schlegel and Fichte via Hegel and Ranke to Bismarck) in the book *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* (*Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 1907) that fixed the terminological distinction that has since been established. In review of the 19th century, he coined the concept of the culture nation to describe the process that during this era had produced and formed the idea of the German national culture.

This process was driven by the *concept of the people* and the *idea of a "spiritual nation"*¹⁸⁵ with the simultaneous "lack of an idea of state" as expounded by Helmut Plessner in *Die verspätete Nation* [The belated nation] (1935/ 1959).¹⁸⁶ The constitution of a homogeneous state was preceded by the work on the concept of a common origin, language and tradition. For Germany is a belated nation also in this regard. Although Martin Luther's translation of the bible in the 16th century was a first important step in the consolidation of new high German, it was only in the second half of the 18th century that a homogeneous German language with a binding grammar and a common diction was formed from the numerous dialects, while at the same time, a shift from Latin to German occurred in the scholarly language of the universities. Consequently, it became necessary to introduce new words for innumerable academic terms for which until then there had been no German equivalent. Only gradually from the diverse origins did a homogeneous language emerge from which a new literature could arise. However, the idea of a German national culture also needed for its foundation a story; telling such a story along the guidelines of unity was in the hands of the newly established German philology.

When in 1812 Friedrich Schlegel was giving his lectures on the *History of Ancient and Modern Literature*, "modern literature" had just reached its third generation while the complete occidental literature appeared to be its prehistory and was illustrated as such through the image of a family tree that is cultivated through the new German literature. Due to the belated establishment of a classic language of literature, it is possible to speak, in the words of Heinz Schlaffer, of a *Kurze Geschichte der deutschen Literatur* [short history of German literature] (2004). In the 1830s, Georg Gottfried Gervinus undertook to present the *Geschichte der Poetischen Nationalliteratur der Deutschen* [history of the poetic national literature of the Germans] (1835-42) from its beginnings with the Teutons to the German

¹⁸⁵ „Rede von Bunde“ in German; the word „Geist“ is a keyterm of this discourse, which is difficult to translate. It means mental or intellectual, but includes a considerable component of spiritual.

¹⁸⁶ Helmut Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation. Über die politische Verführbarkeit des bürgerlichen Geistes*, Frankfurt/M. 1974, p. 41. – Already after sociologist Plessner's emigration to Groningen (the Netherlands) in 1934, the book came about from a series of lectures given by him at the local university under the title "Das Schicksal des deutschen Geistes im Ausgang seiner bürgerlichen Epoche" [The fate of the German intellect at the exit of its bourgeois period] (1935).

classicism in the form a meta narrative according to the principle of “inner historiography”. It culminated “teleologically in that German unity, which was being demanded just then”.¹⁸⁷ The project followed the same programme as was expressed by Jacob Grimm at the first conference of German philologists in 1846, “to establish policy from history”.¹⁸⁸ However, the project of the *German dictionary*, which was started by the Grimm brothers in 1838 tracing instances of individual words in the German language back to the 16th century, could only be concluded after a century (the 1st volume was published in 1854 and the final, 32nd volume in 1960).

The result of this “intellectual achievement” was given the title of a “special culture nation” in 1889 by Wilhelm Dilthey, who is considered to be the founder of *Geisteswissenschaften*, the specific German version of humanities. In a programmatic speech, in which he advocated the establishment of national literature archives, he acknowledged that the “German mind” has a “peculiar universality”. From the perspective of attained national unity, i.e., the formation of the “youngest of the nation states” he discusses the historical belatedness, stating “while other peoples were spreading on land and sea, in our country a cohesion of spiritual life forms was beginning”, and in this way he turns the belatedness into an intellectual superiority. Even though “our slowly developing people [produced] a literature as the last of all cultural nations”, yet in it all “ideality of European thinking and writing” is collected, according to Dilthey. In such a way, the works of Lessing, Herder, Goethe and Schiller become monuments of a culture nation that despite being belated embodies the pinnacle of all European cultures.¹⁸⁹

It is not solely the precarious heritage of an intellectual-cultural superiority phantasm that burdens the term “culture nation”, it is also its connection with the function of the term “people”. For “unity of the people” and “culture nation” are two sides of the same coin, i.e., the German national culture constructed in the 19th century. The role of the people as “a political idea” which replaces the lacking idea of state was analysed by Plessner in connection with his description of “Bismarck’s Reich as a major power without

¹⁸⁷ Esther Kilchmann, *Verwerfungen in der Einheit. Geschichten von Nation und Familie um 1840*, Munich 2009, p. 48; cf. also Jürgen Fohrmann, *Das Projekt der deutschen Literaturgeschichte. Entstehung und Scheitern einer nationalen Poesiegeschichtsschreibung zwischen Humanismus und Deutschem Kaiserreich*, Stuttgart 1989.

¹⁸⁸ Jacob Grimm, *Verhandlungen der Germanisten zu Frankfurt am Main am 24., 25. and 26. September 1846*, Frankfurt/M. 1847, p. 16; quoted from Kilchmann, *Verwerfungen* (2009), p. 48.

¹⁸⁹ Wilhelm Dilthey, *Archive für Literatur* (1889), in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 15, ed. Karlfried Gründer, Göttingen 1991, p. 1–16.

idea of state".¹⁹⁰ Although the establishment of the Reich was regarded as the "fulfilment of a holy desire", according to Troeltsch's review¹⁹¹, the work on the self-image of an intellectually and morally superior culture nation did not rest. Rather it was accelerated, internally in the discourse about the German people as "a community by mind"¹⁹² for which Jews represented a disturbance. This discourse fed a "latent education anti-Semitism"¹⁹³ that together with biological race theories embedded modern anti-Semitism into German nationalism.¹⁹⁴ And externally, the "culture nation" served to present a moral and intellectual depth of German culture as a counterpart to negative images of France and England as countries of superficial civilisation and a "cold" parliamentarism.

From the concept of German culture, which became ideologically charged during the previous century, grew not least the "mental mobilisation"¹⁹⁵ for the war in which the "representatives from science and art"¹⁹⁶ were so numerous involved in 1914. "Because this most inward people, this people of metaphysics, of pedagogy and of music is not a politically but a morally orientated people" as Thomas Mann wrote in 1914 in "Gedanken zum Krieg" [Thoughts about war].¹⁹⁷ And even after the millions of deaths in the First World War, Ernst Troeltsch, the emerging state secretary in the education ministry of the Weimar Republic, still spoke of this war also being a "moral and cultural war."¹⁹⁸ And in light of the defeat he again invoked the "inner unity and greatness of the nation" as well as the German national feeling: as "feeling of unity for all that speaks the German language and has a German soul."¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁰ Plessner, *Verspätete Nation* (1974), p. 41.

¹⁹¹ Ernst Troeltsch, *Deutsche Bildung* (1918), in: *Schriften zur Politik und Kulturphilosophie (1918-1923)*, ed. Gangolf Hübinger, Berlin/ New York 2002, p. 161-206, p. 203.

¹⁹² Ernst Troeltsch, *Humanismus und Nationalismus in unserem Bildungswesen*, Berlin 1917, p. 41.

¹⁹³ Aleida Assmann, *Arbeit am Nationalen Gedächtnis* (1993), p. 89.

¹⁹⁴ Peter Pulzer, *Die Entstehung des politischen Antisemitismus in Deutschland und Österreich 1867 bis 1914*, Göttingen 2004.

¹⁹⁵ Wolfgang Mommsen, *Bürgerstolz und Weltmachtstreben. Deutschland unter Wilhelm II. 1890-1918*, Berlin 1995, p. 83 et seqq.

¹⁹⁶ According to an "appeal to the cultural world" in October 1914, in: *Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg*, with an introduction by Klaus Böhme, Stuttgart 1975, p. 47.

¹⁹⁷ Thomas Mann, *Gedanken zum Krieg*, in: *Essays vol. I: Frühlingssturm*, ed. Hermann Kurzke, Stephan Stachorski, Frankfurt/M. 1993, p. 188-205, p. 191 et seq.; in addition Jan Andres, "Politik" in der konservativen deutschen Kulturkritik: Paul de Lagarde, August Julius Langbein, Thomas Mann, in: Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), "Politik". Stationen eines Wortgebrauchs im Europa der Neuzeit, Frankfurt/M. 2007, p. 339-361.

¹⁹⁸ Troeltsch, *Deutsche Bildung* (1918/2002), p. 169.

¹⁹⁹ Ernst Troeltsch in an article in the newspaper "Berliner Tageblatt" in February 1919: *Nationalgefühl*, in: *Schriften zur Politik und Kulturphilosophie* (2002), p. 57.

Written under the impression of Hitler's seizure of power and the rapid *Gleichschaltung* [forcible conformity] of society, science and culture, Plessner's study of the history of the idea of people (*Volk*) since the Reformation is tacitly subject to the question as to how the success of the *völkisch* [racial] ideology of the National Socialists can be explained. His analysis goes further than the frequently offered explanation of the rise of National Socialism out of the insult from the lost war and the Treaty of Versailles. While Plessner's book traces the *formation of an exaggerated idea of people*, which only belatedly took the form of state by way of a half-hearted constitution, he highlights the emergence of a *spiritual and anti-political nationalism* which goes far back and to which the Nazis could connect to with their phantasm of a "*völkisch* society".

> *Whosoever speaks of Germany as a culture nation today should be aware of the ideological heritage he or she is entering. Labelling Germany as a culture nation implies – no matter how inadvertently – that other nations do not have any culture and suggests the superiority of such a nation over nations who do not carry this title.*

6.4 Work on memory – upheavels in dealing with German history

Understanding culture as a history of memory and historical memory offers an alternative to national culture. Niklas Luhmann understands culture as the "memory of society" and refers to the "filter of forgetting/remembering and using the past to determine the variation framework for the future".²⁰⁰ Already in Cicero's rhetoric teaching it was stated, "*historia vita memoriae*" meaning history is the life of the memory.²⁰¹ Some historians object to this; for example Le Goff wants to differentiate between "history" and memory as the "raw material of history".²⁰² However, work on memory is indispensable for cultural policy because it determines the manner in which current problems are dealt with. Above all, the approach to *history is of prime importance for the external perception* of the current German society and culture and for international exchange.

Instead of the abstract order of past, present and future, the memory perspective takes on the point of view of the historical subject, i.e., that of men at the centre of ongoing events. Their respective present then enters into in a relationship with past events and their transmission; history opens up to the present and future. In this sense, Reinhard Koselleck's "space of experience and horizon of expectation" are to be understood. He

²⁰⁰ Niklas Luhmann, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt/M. 1997, p. 588.

²⁰¹ Cicero, *De oratore*, 2.36

²⁰² Jacques Le Goff, *Geschichte und Gedächtnis*, (1977) Frankfurt/M. 1992, p. 12.

describes them as “anthropological pre-givens” for the individuals, with which they process their experiences, actions and thoughts and place them in a context of sense and time.²⁰³ In this way, the past and tradition are not understood as heritage or a stable continuance but as historical experience and the subject of constant examination. Consequently, history constantly shows itself in a new light to those who are alive at that time because different facets emerge from the shadow of the past and become recognisable. This quality of the “now time” was termed by Walter Benjamin as the “historical index” of images from past events; it does not only imply that they belong to a certain time but “above all that they only become ‘readable’ at a certain time.”²⁰⁴ Due to this quality of “being readable” or “recognisable”, he does not talk of the present but of the now time (*Jetztzeit*). This manner of recognition is by no means random as history is transferred to us in an already interpreted form: “Historical understanding is essentially to be comprehended as the survival of what was comprehended.”²⁰⁵ In this sense the “work on memory”²⁰⁶ always requires opening up symbolic and written conceptions of history (in the form of texts, images, symbols, memorials, rhetorical formulas etc.), i.e., “cultural memory”²⁰⁷ in the process of remembering for renewed questioning.²⁰⁸ However, *remembering* is an individual mental process that is accompanied by emotions. Aristotle was already differentiating in this way between memory and remembrance.²⁰⁹

This differentiation between the materialised or rather symbolised memory and the activity of remembering is blurred in the talk of “collective memory”, in which the collective, similar to the term “collective identity” (> 6.2), appears as a unit like a natural person and the memory is naturalised. The term is generally attributed to French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who was murdered in Buchenwald concentration camp. However, what Halbwachs investigated was the “social context” of the memory of enduring societies or groups and in what way the memories of the individuals are shaped by it, for in-

²⁰³ Reinhard Koselleck, ‚Erfahrungsraum‘ und ‚Erwartungshorizont‘ – zwei historische Kategorien, in: *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*. Frankfurt/Main 1989. p. 349-375, p. 352.

²⁰⁴ Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk* (1982), p. 577.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

²⁰⁶ Michael C. Frank/ Gabriele Rippl (ed.), *Arbeit am Gedächtnis*, Munich 2007.

²⁰⁷ Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*, Munich 1992, p. 52.

²⁰⁸ In all attempts to differentiate between cultural, communicative, social, embodied, artificial and natural memory, it is ultimately about the relationship between transmitted, symbolised and consolidated forms on one hand and a living work on memory or fluidity on the other hand. Cf. Sigrd Weigel, *Lesbarkeit – Zum Bild- und Körpergedächtnis in der Theorie*, in: *Bilder des kulturellen Gedächtnisses*, Dülmen-Hiddingsel 1994, p. 39-57.

²⁰⁹ Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscencia* 451a-453a, German translation in: *Die Erfindung des Gedächtnisses*, texts collected and introduced by Dietrich Harth, Frankfurt/M 1991, p. 55-58.

stance, the memory of a family or of religious groups.²¹⁰ Put that way, Halbwachs' question actually touches on the current upheavals to how German history is handled that are occurring as a result of globalisation and the immigration society. It is a question that is highly relevant to FCEP. In Germany, this question faces two currently dominant discourses: the construction of *German sites of memory*²¹¹ and the "culture of remembrance" in the post-history of the Holocaust.

The concept of *lieux de mémoire* originates from Pierre Nora's work on the sites of memory of the French nation, i.e., sites (site is used as a metaphor encompassing buildings, writings, events and habitus among other things) that embody the national traditions and identity. In the case of Nora himself, the relevance of such sites of memory is derived from the loss of a former allegedly authentic, natural social memory of "so-called primitive or archaic societies"²¹², which are replaced by them. National *sites of memory are therefore the modern cultic sites of the nation*. In the German adaptation, Nora's sites of memory are interpreted as collective memory, whereby it comes to a *problematic linkage between national and collective memory*. The opening of the view to history through the memory perspective is again closed in this way; and the *sites of memory* prove to be a different variety of "national culture".

In contrast, the discourse of the *culture of remembrance* in Germany refers primarily to the Holocaust and National Socialism. The culture of remembrance includes different forms of commemoration (memorials, days of remembrance, memorial sites, *Stolpersteine* [cobble stones in memory of victims of the Nazi regime] and many more) as well as media formats such as the TV programme *History* (with its stereotypical mix of "contemporary witness" statements and re-enactments). With an increasing distance to the events, this whole culture of remembrance is taking on a stereotypical ritualistic character, in which the historical events and the different, even irreconcilable experience perspectives of former victims, perpetrators and followers that clashed more than three decades ago in the "historians' controversy"²¹³ disappear. Equally the suppression, the sugarcoating and the

²¹⁰ Maurice Halbwachs, *Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen*, Frankfurt/M. 1985 (Orig. *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, 1925); *Das kollektive Gedächtnis*, Frankfurt/M. 1985.

²¹¹ Etienne Francois/ Hagen Schulz (ed.), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, 3 vols, Munich 2001.

²¹² Pierre Nora, *Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis* (1984), Berlin 1990.

²¹³ The dispute was about the call of German historians for the "historicisation" of the Holocaust (i.e., integrating it into the historiography). They claimed to have an objective standpoint, even though like Martin Broszat they belonged to the Hitler Youth generation. This appeal was criticised predominantly by Jewish historians who advocated the relevance of the survivors' experience perspective. See Dan

still unprocessed involvement of individual people, office-holders and institutions in the crimes of Nazi Germany become lost in it. The culture of remembrance is generally attributed with a commonality creating function,²¹⁴ in the post-history of National Socialism, however, it takes on a conciliatory function which accommodates the desire to draw a final line under the past. In this type of a culture of remembrance Auschwitz becomes a metaphor and the remembrance takes on the form of a historically empty pathos-formula, according to Volkhard Knigge.

The director of the Buchenwald Memorial Site criticises not only the “emphatic illusionary rhetoric” and the utilisation of remembrance as the “royal road for the education on democracy and human rights” but also the concept of the culture of remembrance as such because it abstracts from the bearers and the specific experiences. As an alternative, he advocates the active *work on awareness of history*: “It is only the linking of historical knowledge, understanding and judging that creates the conditions to commemorate the persecuted in a well-founded manner, to make plausible values and legal standards in universal perspectives in reference to historical experience and to be able to recognise them as being in one’s own interests.”²¹⁵

The return to historical learning as a prerequisite for the development of an awareness of history becomes all the more urgent as the specific responsibility and liability which is derived from German history is increasingly losing the personal connection to those who were involved. This development is due not only to the increasing number of “Germans with migrant backgrounds” but already at earlier points in time in view of the generations born after the war. While National Socialism, the war and the Holocaust form the backdrop of experience against which the German Constitution was drafted, this horizon fades into remoteness and is turning into history. The entry into the lasting responsibility arising from German past, which also “for the following generations means the lasting responsibility, although not the personal guilt,” as phrased by the German President in 2017 in the already quoted speech on the non-negotiables, is hardly achieved by way of an “acknowledgement of our history”. Such a commitment can’t be achieved by demanding or prescribing that the lessons from this history, such as the “rejection of all *völkisch* think-

Diner (ed.), *Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit*, Frankfurt am Main 1987.

²¹⁴ Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis* (1992), p. 30.

²¹⁵ Volkhard Knigge, Statement in the context of the ifa workshop “Jenseits von Innen und außen. Perspektiven postnationaler Kulturpolitik”, 24.05.2018, Berlin, p. 3.

ing, of racism and of anti-Semitism”, are a component of “being German”.²¹⁶ The *history*, even if it is the context of justification of the non-negotiable fundamental rights, can *not [be] the subject of the statement of belief* and a defined national identity *but is the subject of learning and examination*.

Despite or precisely because of it, the refugees should visit the concentration camp memorials according to Knigge. He adds their work is not about imposing a national image of history and according identity expectations, rather it aims at “understanding political and societal causes that favour, legitimise and or even make compulsory authoritarian rule and anti-humanity”.²¹⁷ In a report in the Spiegel magazine about the Buchenwald memorial, it was simply stated that the work of memorials is not “purely political work” but is about “preserving the basic humane character of a society”.²¹⁸

Since migrants and refugees bring their own historical experiences and memories with them to our country, their history must be included in the process of coming to terms with the past. However, a simple expansion or addition alone would not be very effective; rather the question what their history has to do with ours should be addressed. That means that those *historical constellations and topics of “entangled” or rather “connected history”* in which *German history interlocks with the history of the countries of origin* should be examined.²¹⁹ In this regard, all stakeholders in the culture of remembrance/history policy and the FCEP are needed because their internal knowledge of the countries of origin is of indispensable value for this project.

> The suggestion is made to establish expert commissions in which not only historians but also cultural scientists, religious scholars and those with practical experience from Germany and the countries of origin participate. These commissions should work out points of correspondence and contact between the history of countries of origin, European and German history, and thereby

²¹⁶ “Die Lehren zweier Weltkriege, die Lehren aus dem Holocaust, die Absage an jedes völkische Denken, an Rassismus und Antisemitismus, die Verantwortung für die Sicherheit Israels – all das gehört zum Deutschsein dazu” [The lessons from two world wars, the lessons from the Holocaust, the rejection of all *völkisch* thinking, of racism and of anti-Semitism, the responsibility for the security of Israel. All of that is part of being German], Steinmeier, speech on German Unity Day (2017).

²¹⁷ Knigge, Warum Flüchtlinge KZ-Gedenkstätten besuchen sollen (2015).

²¹⁸ Andreas Greve, „Weinen bildet nicht“. Was in Buchenwald heute zu lernen ist, in: Spiegel Spezial 08/1999, p. 132-137, p. 137.

²¹⁹ For instance, the alliances in the two world wars, the Young Turks and their connection to German politics, the Muslim-German cooperation in National Socialism etc. Topics such as genocide, displacement, exile, witnesses, post-war order, divisions etc.

develop suggestions for FCEP projects such as memorial spaces of “connected histories”, projects for youth work, municipal politics, etc...

Also in the process of the *Europeanising of Europe*, matters of history policy and culture of remembrance play an important part. It is often required to substantiate the awareness for a common European culture by means of work on the *common history of Europe*. Due to the fact that the awareness of a common history can hardly be based on a history of wars, territorial disputes, power struggles and displacements, even though in reality the history of Europe was for large periods of time exactly this, some voices demand that one must then construct a common history of Europe or rather a “European narrative”; but this is contrary to all work on the awareness of history. If the objective of the Europeanisation of Europe is a culturally, religiously and linguistically plural and open society, then the proactive examination of the diverse origins of the European culture, precisely also those that are outside of current day Europe, is much more educational. The cultural diversity of the future Europe is illuminated in light of the historical *heterogeneity of the European cultures*: on historical stages of cultural multilingualism, i.e., the places of overlapping and encounters, of cooperation and opposition of different religions; in moments and events in which Europe was reordered; in migration and translation channels of people, things, skills, techniques and arts, and so forth.

> In this regard, suggestions are made to establish a museum for the cultural diversity of European history in Germany, the conceptualisation of which should include FCEP expertise, and to take the initiative in the EU so that not only Brussels has a “house of European history” but all EU countries have one. For this to work, a close cooperation between the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media and FCEP is needed.

6.5 Academia – German language humanities and cultural science abroad

The prerequisites for supporting academic exchange as well as promoting German language and culture abroad, which are part of the core tasks of FCEP, have significantly changed in recent decades. In the post war period, German studies abroad and exiled Germans were important partners of the Goethe Institutes. However, in recent decades German studies abroad have visibly lost in academic importance, at least in places where they are still defined by the subject of “German language and literature”. Many institutes were closed or integrated in reduced form into other institutes, e.g., in the USA. However, where German studies are currently in high demand the motivation is often found in the image of Germany as a popular land of immigration and not as much in an interest in German culture. At the same time, a remarkable counter movement occurs: alongside the

primarily practical interest in the German language in those who want to move to Germany or want to work for German companies abroad, a *shift towards the German-language history of ideas and cultures* takes place in the faculties of humanities of the universities (German-language philosophy, psychoanalysis, science of arts, cultural science around 1900, critical theory). Therefore many still successful German Departments have carried out a change process towards interdisciplinary German Studies-institutes. The German speaking cultural science with correspondences to similar theories, especially in France (Annales-school, Collège de Sociologie, et al.) and Italy (e.g. microhistory) carries a European signature and emerged in many cases from a cosmopolitan consciousness. The mentioned approaches are particularly attractive because they are not only characterised by *cross-culture and interdisciplinary procedures* but their theories also show a *dimension of historical depth* that a great part of the (Anglo-American) "Cultural Studies" lack. In recent years, in particular the history of concepts /historical semantics and cultural science around Warburg, Benjamin, Simmel and others (> 3.2) have become *internationally demanded "export articles"*. The interest in it motivates many doctoral candidates and academics to come to Germany and also to learn German in order to be able to study the relevant works in the original language and research the archives. While external interest in the specific profile of this type of cultural science is growing, the international spread is slowed down by a lack of translations. In that regard, there is a *potential that is not yet being sufficiently used by the FCEP and which is in need of special funding*, in cooperation with the Federal Ministry for Education and Research.

The internationalisation of the universities has hugely revived the exchange of students and academics on all levels. In contrast, the *reciprocity of knowledge transfer* has not come that far. For in the course of the globalisation of international academia, there is an *increasing monolingualism* of scholarship (in "global English"). For humanities and cultural sciences, whose topics are largely of a linguistic nature, it creates a dilemma that is difficult to solve. Since the process of recognition and writing in the language of the subjects to be researched leads to much more complex results than it would in a foreign language, research cannot simply swap to English. On the other hand, international academia only takes notice of English language publications. In this regard, the humanities and cultural sciences are *reliant on translations into English*. Yet English-language publication houses in the USA and Great Britain are extremely reserved when it comes to the publication of

translations²²⁰. Therefore, *some own effort on the part of the Germans* is imperative in order to support translations in this field, without being dependent on the English-language publishing market.

The translation statistics also show an extremely asymmetric state of affairs. While in Germany nearly 65% of all translations from other languages are translated from English, less than 5% of German books that are translated into another language are translated into English.²²¹ In the field of humanities, this practice is especially absurd because the majority of German scholars are capable of reading the English-language original publications, while the opposite is only true for a minority. Therefore, the trend towards English monolingualism also has the consequence that American cultural theories with their concepts and diction spread globally and in this way take on an almost hegemonic status. This development has not inconsiderably led to the international impact of an abstract version of post-colonial theory, which has a very partial reference to the specific experiences of the countries and cultures in whose universities it is predominant. (> 4.1). This in turn influences the international exchange as many professional counterparts in the area of FCEP in partner countries have an academic education which was formed by theorems and the rhetoric of Anglo-American 'Cultural Studies'.

In this sense, it is high time to rethink the accent of the German academic policy which is intended to promote the internationalisation of academia in order to avoid internationalisation narrowing down to a one-way transfer. Internationalisation at the moment is mainly a change from German to English research and teaching. The trend towards English monolingualism has the consequence that international academic exchange greatly channels itself to exchanges with the USA. That is also true, amongst other things, for the instrument of the *Wissenschaftskollegs* [institutes for advanced studies] established at many universities that is intended to promote the internationalisation of research (with fellows from abroad); in this regard it is clearly dominated by academics from the USA. However, it would be in the interest of the European project to further support the academic exchange with other European countries, -- also through translation politics. As *translation politics are by nature cultural politics*. This should not be left to the market-oriented interests of English-speaking publishing houses.

²²⁰ Quite a number of titles which were selected for translation support by the Deutscher Buchhandel association, i.e., whose translation is financially secured, have never found an English language publisher.

²²¹ For detailed figures cf. Julia Bähr, Andre Piron, Buchwerte, in: Feuilleton live in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13.10.2018, p. 88.

> Thus, Macron's idea of founding a European university should actively be supported from the German side. The format may vary between site-dependent universities and decentralised network-institutions. Overall, the FCEP should support the international spread of the German-language history of ideas, humanities and cultural science and break new ground in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research. Suggestions are made (i) to establish and promote a German university publishing house that translates, produces and sells German social science and cultural science research for the international English-language book trade, (ii) to not solely concentrate translation assistance into English but also to expand it to other European languages, and (iii) to not only base the support criterion of internationality on the participation of foreign academics in German projects but also on the transfer of German research to foreign (young) academics both abroad and domestically.

7. Transformation processes – global and national

In the first decades after the end of the Cold War, a “global victory of democracy”²²² was assumed. Since then, the scene has fundamentally changed as a result of globalisation, and consequently the political discourse and the search for action approaches have also changed. In the “new world order” of globalisation and the increasing number and diversity of transnational stakeholders and areas of action, an understanding of *Global Governance* as a “lattice of horizontal and vertical government networks”²²³ reaches its limits, *just as the conventional political division of domestic policy and foreign policy does*. It also impacts cultural policy, which to date has resided as either a department of domestic policy or foreign policy action, because global transformation processes as well as the changes in public life and the socio-cultural conditions in Germany are increasingly interlocking.

7.1 The Janus face of transnationalism – mobility studies and global governance

The discourse about transnational phenomena is a subordinate effect of the debate on *globalisation*, i.e., on economic and political transformation processes with radical social, ecological and cultural consequences. While in the political controversy those in favour and those against globalisation are practically irreconcilable, research is dedicated to the

²²² Brigitte Weiffen, *Die Ausbreitung der Demokratie – eine Komponente der Globalisierung?* in: Johannes Kessler/Christian Steiner (ed.), *Facetten der Globalisierung. Zwischen Ökonomie, Politik und Kultur*, Wiesbaden 2009, p. 96-116, p. 96.

²²³ Ann-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order*, Princeton 2004, p. 166.

chances *and* the darker side of the international flow of goods, capital and data, which developed in an accelerated fashion since the last third of the 20th century by way of technological innovations, the World Wide Web and the political decisions on privatisation and deregulation. On the part of historiography, the attempt has been made to mitigate the concept of globalisation by way of an historicisation, in which early modern forms of economic, political and cultural networks (including seafaring, long-distance trade, inter-regional confessional and cultural associations)²²⁴ are interpreted as early forms of globalisation. While, under the heading of *transnationalism* the whole spectrum of cross-border forms of networking, which arose from the process of globalisation are studied.

The concept can already be found in research towards the end of the 20th century; the term appeared primarily in political science approaches to the change of the instances and regulation of world policy by way of transnational relationships. Since the start of the 21st century, i.e., since globalisation has increasingly shown its ugly face, above all the *non-state transnational stakeholders and networks* have been focussed upon: (i) on the one hand, the multinational companies, which broadly circumvent state control and in this way rise to become shadowy powers²²⁵ and lead to a *privatisation of world politics*²²⁶; the illegal flow of money²²⁷, through which the states lose out on a large proportion of tax income²²⁸; the rapidly growing cross-border organised criminality (trafficking people, drugs, weapons, environmental resources, as well as money laundering), which today represents a “major ‘growth industry’”²²⁹; and also international terrorism, (ii) however, on the other hand are the NGOs, civil society networks and transnational forms of protest and activism. In addition to this Janus face of the transnational reality, the debate is made more difficult by the fact that in the literature the term does not have a single meaning. In social and cultural

²²⁴ E.g., Jürgen Osterhammel, Niels P. Peterson: *Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen*, Munich 2003.

²²⁵ Using the example of the financial markets and individual sectors, such as the pharmaceutical industry, Fritz R. Glunk, *Schattenmächte. Wie transnationale Netzwerke die Regeln unserer Welt bestimmen*, Munich 2017.

²²⁶ Tanja Brühl et.al. (ed.), *Privatisierung der Weltpolitik: Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess*, Bonn 2001.

²²⁷ An analysis of the current situation is included in the study by Ilka Ritter, *Illegale Finanzströme: eine Analyse und erste Handlungsempfehlungen*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2017.

²²⁸ According to the calculations of the European Parliament, the tax loss in Europe is one trillion euros annually, *ibid.*, p. 21.

²²⁹ Mats Berdal/ Mónica Serrano (ed.), *Transnational Organized Crime and International Security. Business as Usual?* London 2002, p. 2; cf. also the report from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), *The Globalization of Crime*, 2010; Franca van der Laan, *Transnational Organized Crime*, Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 2017.

sciences, it is linked with the topic of mobility and in the political discourse with the issue of global governance.

In the beginning, the concept of transnationalism profited from the criticism of the nation state. In the cultural studies, it initially appeared as a glitzy concept for overcoming national limitations in all regards, e.g., personal mobility beyond national borders as a chance to develop fluid arenas and identities. In this approach, migration is discussed as the mobility of individuals, groups and cultural practices, from which the new forms of cross-border societies and cultures emerge. This concept arose at the intersection of post-modern theory (with its interests in the deconstruction of clear determinations) and the phenomenon of the global increase in migration. The theoretic discourse produces a plethora of metaphors for the movement and connectivity. Consequently people talk of networks, integration, flows, fluidity, paths, nomads, moving subjects and cosmopolities and much more. A high theoretical attraction clearly appertains to the terms *mobility* and *transnationality*. Simultaneously with the founding of the *Mobilities* journal a *mobility turn* was signalled in 2006. A plethora of platforms, research focuses, journals of “mobility studies”, a multitude of case studies on the life world of certain migrant groups and a series of studies on transnational biographies, families and social structures came about. And the publication of a *Handbook of Mobilities* (2014)²³⁰ signified the academic canonisation. In this discourse the theory of *transnational spaces* takes on a key role. They are understood to be social arenas beyond the national societies that emerge from the mobility of people and their cultural practices, and they therefore stand for the utopia of culturally fluid life and symbol worlds, and a cosmopolitan approach.²³¹ They are defined as “relatively enduring, self-spreading condensed configurations of social everyday practices, symbol systems and artefacts that are distributed between several places or rather between several areas”, and are neither delocalised nor deterritorialised.²³²

However, there is also criticism of the “myth of the transnational space”²³³. In an examination of the *cultural logic of transnationality* American anthropologist Aihwa Ong presented a critique of the idealisation and glorification of mobility in transnational ap-

²³⁰ Peter Adey et al. (ed.), *The Handbook of Mobilities*, London 2014.

²³¹ Weert Canzler et al (ed.), *Tracing Mobilities: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective*, London, New York 2016.

²³² Ludger Pries, *Internationale Migration*, Bielefeld 2001, p. 53.

²³³ E.g., Michael Bommes, *Der Mythos des transnationalen Raumes. Or: Worin besteht die Herausforderung des Transnationalismus für die Migrationsforschung?*, in: Dietrich Thränhardt/ Uwe Hunger (ed.), *Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat*, Leviathan Sonderheft 22/2003, p. 90-116.

proaches. The “misleading impression” is given that everyone can “in the same way profit from mobility and modern communication media and that transnationality is something liberating for everyone”.²³⁴ By contrast, Ong investigated the contradictory effects of migration. Her title *Flexible Citizenship* concerns people with several passports who embody the separation of “state ordered identity” and “personal identity”, caused by political changes, migration and the changing global market. Her book is based on many years of research on the migration culture of Chinese living abroad. She observes the formation of practices of “flexible subjects”, which can be described as a strategy of risk avoidance with simultaneous profit maximization. She claims the example of Chinese living abroad shows “an extremely stratified and exclusive system of transnational ‚brotherhood’, which avoids any reciprocity of *citizenship* thanks to opportune nationalities at a time.”²³⁵

The political discourse on transnationalism is, in contrast, occupied with the questions of *global governance*. At the start of this century, “associative policy networks on the transnational level” were still seen as “beacons of hope” for an improved political management of the North-South relationship and as instruments of a new kind of governing in the form of the “global public policy”, yet at the same time the scepticism regarding their effectiveness was starting to be expressed.²³⁶ By now, the hope has somewhat dwindled, yet at the same time the necessity has become more urgent. Transnational networks are considered today as important instruments in the battle against the supremacy of multinational companies, against the “transnationally networked economy of violence” and for overcoming of “transnational conflicts”²³⁷. That is true in particular for countries with “precarious statehood” or “institutionally fragmented state structures”. Researchers agree that “the resources introduced by transnational political stakeholders” carry significantly less weight “if a state agency alone has the necessary means for decision and implementation” than if the opposite is the case.²³⁸

²³⁴ Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Staatsbürgerschaften. Die kulturelle Logik von Transnationalität*, (1999) Frankfurt/M. 2005, p. 21.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83 et seq.

²³⁶ Andreas Nölke, *Transnationale Politiknetzwerke in den Nord-Süd-Beziehungen*, in: *NORD-SÜD aktuell*, 1/2005, p. 67-85, p. 67.

²³⁷ Christoph Weller/ Richard Bösch, *Globalisierung und transnationale Konflikte: Frieden aus einer Global-Governance-Perspektive*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2015.

²³⁸ Andreas Nölke, *Transnationale Akteure und internationale Politik: Theoretische Forschungsperspektiven und empirische Illustration am Beispiel von Nichtregierungsorganisationen*, in: *Handbuch Internationale Beziehungen* (2017), p. 779-802, p. 785.

In light of the clearly increasing loss of individual state control competency and the only relative enforceability of international standards, *the role of the NGOs has significantly gained weight in the debate* (it is particularly the case in regard to the observance of standards of international law on topics such as human rights and environmentally-friendly economies), whereby the *cooperation with state and supranational institutions* is always a prerequisite. The evaluation of the effectiveness of transnational networks is controversial in the sense that it can ultimately only rely on individual case studies, in which highly disparate conditions are adopted. In the recent discussion, a “diversity of stakeholders” is observed, whose measures would ideally complement each other.²³⁹ However, at the same time a diversification in the role of different stakeholders is becoming apparent. This diversification is of interest for the FCEP because in the process *cultural policy aspects* also come into play, namely in the *interaction between domestic and foreign policy*.

The political structure of such networks can be shown using the example of the *Forest Stewardship Council* (FSC) (a label for timber using a globally applied certification of sustainably managed forests), in which the possibilities of “*global governance through civil society self-organisation*” were elicited.²⁴⁰ This example is particularly interesting precisely for partner countries of the development cooperation because it concerns a “combination of civil society self-organisation and market mechanisms”, hence economic interests also play a role. The success of the measure is thanks to the collaboration of various stakeholders: over there, in the export countries, with the joint development including all stakeholders of forestry methods that simultaneously meet the ecological requirements and the needs of the local population; here, in the import countries, with the change in consumer awareness and buying behaviour right up to boycotts. However, the author also emphasises the relevance of national and international standardisation processes and legislation as reference values for the success of such networks. Even when the remarkable success remains relative on global scale, the *cultural policy effects are not to be underestimated*. However, they were not discussed in the study. The above example shows how knowledge and moral outrage can be translated into practical, focused actions that feeds into everyday life and has a specific audience in mind, as opposed to general behavioural norms about the environment or energy-saving behaviour.

> *Transnational networks of this kind, which are way ahead of common practice, could be used as models for the FCEP because in them the culture of economics and consume interlock with far-*

²³⁹ Weller, Bösch, *Globalisierung und transnationale Konflikte* (2015), p. 12 and p. 21.

²⁴⁰ Kristine Kern, *Globale Governance durch transnationale Netzwerkorganisationen* (2003), p. 285.

reaching consequences for the socio-cultural ways of life in the partner countries and in Germany. In the domestic and foreign cooperation, they promote a social, market conform and environmentally friendly economic culture as well as a corresponding consumer awareness and they count on civil society stakeholders and strengthen self-organisation. Even though such transsectoral practices have been pushed for for a long time in the area of climate discourse, the model of transnational networks is still used relatively little for the perspectives of global governance.

7.2 Migration and development policy

Since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, the topic of migration has occupied the media and the political debate. However, the phenomenon appears to still be barely understood in terms of its world-historical relevance. In light of the demographic development of falling birth rates in industrialised countries, compared with exponential growth in the population of Africa and Arab countries as well as the climate refugees who are to be expected (whose livelihood is taken away due to whole regions drying up), future decades will be characterised by migration movements that will change the image and conception of migration radically. Some academics say that we are entering into a new era of the “migration of peoples” and that migration from Africa to Europe will play the most prominent role. The current efforts to “combat reasons for flight” do not in any way meet this fact. Even the title does not reflect reality because only a portion of the current-day migrants are refugees in the conventional sense.

When in the current debate the keyword “migration of peoples” is mentioned, then it is usually in connection with horror scenarios in which the downfall of Europe is predicted and the association with pre-modern migration movements stokes fear. In contrast, historians are trying to counter the image of an acute state of emergency by way of *historicisation* in order to make the debate objective. Be it with the history of migration in modern-era Europe (since the Huguenots), which shows that migration is part of the history of Europe and that it is “almost always to the benefit” of the receiving society.²⁴¹ Or be it through a “global history of flight in the 20th century, which due to the world wars, several dictatorships, the Cold War, the displacement of whole groups of people, colonialism and the end of the colonial empires represents a historical high point of “forced migration”. Jochen Oltmer ends his overview of the individual refugee movements and the millions of refugees in the last century with the observation that nevertheless, the European states were “hardly the destination of forced migration in the last quar-

²⁴¹ Philip Ther, *Die Außenseiter. Flucht, Flüchtlinge und Integration im modernen Europa*, Berlin 2017, p. 19.

ter of the century". Rather, the states of the "Global South" are home to the largest share of refugees registered in the world, and it is indeed a growing trend (from 70% in 2003 to 86% in 2014).²⁴² As this fact primarily concerns refugees from areas of war and crisis, the increase in flight fleeing from poverty will nevertheless make Europe a more important migration destination again.

Germany, as one of the main causes of the mass flight in the 20th century (alongside the European colonial powers), is ascribed a special political responsibility to take in refugees; this responsibility has been expressed in the German *right to asylum*. As already mentioned, this historic prerequisite should be considered in the EU debate on the "allocation of the refugees" in particular in the negotiations with the East European countries. (> 5.1) And when the conversation is about the special political responsibility of Germany, which is derived from the crimes of Hitler's Germany, then this aspect should not longer be forgotten.

> This responsibility is also part of "learning from German history" such as the "rejection of all völkisch thinking, of racism and of anti-Semitism". Correspondingly, it is necessary that work on the awareness of history additionally includes the connection between National Socialism, flight and asylum and the link between colonialism and migration. (> 6.4)

In previous decades, migrants to Germany were predominantly *migrant workers* or refugees from dictatorships who found themselves in *political exile* in Germany. It is only in recent years that the image has changed. In this regard, the so-called refugee crisis is a return of a suppressed or forgotten phenomenon, which in the meantime has nevertheless changed its face. The new and future challenge exists in the fact that the difference between asylum seekers and those who are fleeing from poverty or intolerable, hopeless living conditions, is becoming blurred. This difficult demarcation is even clear in the UN statistics. According to the UN migration report in 2017, there were globally 258 million *migrants* (people who left their country of birth at least one year ago), of which 10% were *refugees*; in 2016, the figure was 25.9 million. On the other hand, the UNHCR Annual Report assumed that in 2016 65.6 million people around the world were fleeing. Even the

²⁴² Jochen Oltmer, *Kleine Globalgeschichte der Flucht im 20. Jahrhundert*, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung "Das Parlament"*, 66. 2016, No. 26/27, p. 18–25, Online edition: <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/229811/flucht-historisch>; Oltmer is historian at IMIS (Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies at the University of Osnabrück); cf. *Handbuch Staat und Migration in Deutschland seit dem 17. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2016, which was also edited by him.

*UN Global Compact for Migration*²⁴³ leaves the question open in that it speaks of “migration in all its dimensions” – just as the compact generally has the character of a mere declaration of intent, supplemented by a catalogue of tasks for bilateral and multilateral agreements and regulations for an orderly migration policy.

However, differentiations are not only legally indispensable in order to decide whom to accept. Also different types of migration (reason, country of origin, age, education etc.) result in very different relationships to the country of origin (family, political, religious i.a.) and therefore present the host country as well as the immigrants with specific integration challenges. The social scientific research differentiates, for instance, between migrants for work, refugees, migrants for education, migrants on account of the environment, family and illness.²⁴⁴ In this list from 2003, *migrants from poverty* are still not mentioned. These migrants, due to their precarious living conditions, leave a country that is in a desolate economic state and make their way to Europe where they imagine having better living conditions. However, precisely for this group the *distinction from “refugees”* in the narrow sense of the word (caused by persecution) is the most difficult and at the moment, this is the issue of the most heated debates.

Equally, a group at the other end of the scale is missing: the *so-called expats*, i.e., managers and experts who work for multinational companies away from their home countries and who generally only live for a limited time in one place. The example of this group shows the lack of reciprocity in a particular way. The theory of transnational spaces and cross-border identities corresponds most closely to this group, whose members are often regarded as modern nomads because from the “mobility turn” perspective migration is positively evaluated as “an integral component of individual ways of life”²⁴⁵. Measured against this benchmark, the state of being settled conversely appears in a negative light and is defined as “sedentarism” the subject of ideological criticism –whereby also efforts to combat reasons for fleeing appear in a negative light. However, recently in Germany such views have been heard less frequently. Voices that consider development policy as a means to respond to the causes of migration have gained ground again, “In the long run, however, the aim must be to create sustained development and opportunities for ‘decent

²⁴³ Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration:
<http://www.un.org/depts/german/migration/A.CONF.231.3.pdf>

²⁴⁴ Michael Bommers, *Der Mythos des transnationalen Raumes. Oder: Worin besteht die Herausforderung des Transnationalismus für die Migrationsforschung?*, in: Thränhardt/ Hunger, *Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat* (2003), p. 90-116, p. 94 et seq.

²⁴⁵ Julia Verne, Martin Doevenspeck, „Bitte dableiben!“ Sedentarismus als Konstante der Migrationsforschung in Afrika, in: *IMIS-Beiträge* 42/2012, p. 61-112, p. 76.

work', to motivate people to remain in their home countries and benefit from local alternatives to migration."²⁴⁶ Currently, the "refugee crisis" has catapulted the development cooperation — under the title of "combating the causes for migration and flight" — right to the top of the political agenda. FCEP operates in the same area with its far-reaching global governance perspectives that are opposed to the negative consequences of globalisation and the dismantling of democracy.

However, the *objectives of the FCEP and the development cooperation* (such as sustainable development, promotion of democracy etc.) *do not tolerate any orientation towards short-term strategic interests*. In this sense, the already described dilemma of German foreign policy between the international competitive interests of Germany and the responsibility for global regulatory objectives (> 1.4) is particularly striking in the current *Africa policy*. E.g., the reporting on the Chancellor's trip to Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria in 2018 is symptomatic of it. While the trip was reported on in the politics pages of the press under the heading "combating the reasons for flight" and "negotiating repatriations", the economy pages dealt with the investment interests of the German economy and Africa as a future market for export. The orientation of the Africa policy to promoting foreign trade, private investments and credit policy (as in the G20 "Compact with Africa") again provoked criticism that does not only concern individual measures but rather its fundamental orientation. Reputable voices warn against counter-productive effects of the previous and current policy (weakening of local economic systems, over-indebtedness and much more). On the basis of comprehensive data on the development of the individual African countries, many experts have diagnosed an increase in asymmetry and a "scenario of patrimonialism". This is for the most part the result of the currently preferred instruments such as the mutual free trade agreements and private investments whose tax income does not benefit the countries concerned (and in addition are an area of massive tax evasion)²⁴⁷. The summary reads that Africa needs a "turning away from the less successful ways of the past" and "a different way rather than catching up on development."²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Aderanti Adepaju, Internal and International Migration within Africa, in: Pieter Kok et. al. (ed.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa. Dynamics and Determinants*, Cape Town 2006, p. 26–45, p. 27.

²⁴⁷ For example, in 2016, 42 billion euros of investments through state development aid in African countries (Sub-Saharan Africa) faced an estimated tax avoidance of at least 33 billion euros. Nico Beckert, *die verlorenen Milliarden. Steuerflucht im Bergbausektor*. Haus Wasserburg, May 2017: <http://www.hauswasserburg.de/aktuelles/materialien/downloads.html>

²⁴⁸ Robert Kappel, *Afrika braucht einen anderen Entwicklungsweg* (29.5.2018), on: Makronom: <https://makronom.de/afrika-braucht-einen-anderen-entwicklungsweg-26684>; also see the studies by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, e.g., the detailed study on the topic of agriculture: Sabine Sütterlin/ Alexandra Reinig/ Reinhard Klingholz, *Nahrung, Jobs und Nachhaltigkeit. Was Afrikas Landwirtschaft leisten muss*, August 2018.

The reasons for growing asymmetries are extensive and have got a basic and structural character; they lie in postcolonial conditions where the prosperity of the West is based on exploitation in a modified form. „Studies show that for our affluent consumption per German roughly 50 people in developing countries suffer working conditions similar to slave labour. This needs to stop“, according to the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Gerd Müller.²⁴⁹ This mammoth task cannot be dealt with through individual actions; it requires an equal amount of mammoth effort and the will to make fundamental and major changes.

> Since these problems and the stated controversies concern the long-term development of Africa, the FCEP should reach out to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and take the initiative in this regard and undertake a fundamental questioning of the previous Africa policy. The start could be formed by a joint conference called “Germany’s Africa Policy under investigation”, in which critics can speak so that working groups can then be established to examine certain specified questions.

Complicating matters is the ongoing relocation of ecological problems to Africa, which to date has been discussed too little. For instance, in the political discussions about the expansion of electromobility in Germany, the other side of the coin has largely remained hidden: the conditions under which the raw materials needed for it are mined, i.e., lithium and cobalt in Congo and other African countries.

> The drafting of ecologically ambitious objectives for Germany or Europe, which do not include the social, health and safety, and environmentally friendly factors regarding the foreign production sites in the supply chains, is not acceptable in terms of human rights or development policy.

Regarding approaches to migration in Germany, the so-called *immigration law* is currently under discussion as the royal road. Corresponding to the logic of immigration policy in general, this debate primarily concerns Germany’s approaches to the economy’s

²⁴⁹ Gerd Müller in an interview with Anja Stehle/ Christian Unger, „For China it is about Africa’s resources“. Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Müller, explains why he is critical towards the investments of the People’s Republic of China and how he wants to stop child labour. Berliner Morgenpost, 18.1.2019, p. 28. Original quote: „Untersuchungen zeigen, dass für unseren Wohlstandskonsum pro Deutschen durchschnittlich 50 Menschen in den Entwicklungsländern unter sklavenähnlichen Bedingungen arbeiten müssen. Das muss ein Ende haben“

interest in qualified workers in order “to secure skilled personnel”²⁵⁰. This policy creates problems in two directions. On the one hand, this debate obeys short-term economic interests without considering the long-term issues of integration. Therefore, it repeats a logic that had already been followed in the recruitment of “gastarbeiter” without evaluating the clear mistakes of this policy. On the other hand, in doing so global development policy aspects are neglected, yet precisely from the perspective of the FCEP these aspects must be advocated. Migration research investigates the topic of migration primarily according to the question *what consequences does the emigration have for the countries of origin*. Through this change in perspective, the immigration policy appears less straight forward. The effects on the countries of origin are extremely different and to date have not been researched sufficiently. While some emerging countries (such as India and China) have benefited from the migration of the elite (e.g., through diaspora networks in ambitious sectors, capital investment and monetary transfers by those living abroad and return migration), other countries lose their investment in education and the potential of highly qualified personell for the development of the country: “Since in previous decades developing countries have served above all as the extended workbench of the industrialised nations, a trend is now to be noted that developing countries are also used as the extended brain bank.”²⁵¹ This question is dependent upon the respective conditions (i.a. country of origin, sector) and requires a more precise analysis. Under the aspect of *global justice*, the countries of origin would be entitled to *compensation for education costs* upon the recruitment of workers when these countries are economically less developed states.

Because the law on immigration is focused on highly-qualified workers there is a danger of hindering development or forcing destabilisation in the countries of origin due to their emigration. This in turn ultimately feeds back into the causes of migration and flight. Nevertheless, so far the debate around emigration legislation is discussed one-sidedly from the perspective and interests of the German economy.

> *In the discussion on the immigration law and its drafting it would be the task of the FCEP to include its expertise on pre-requisites, causes and effects of migration in the countries of origin: the socio-cultural effects of the emigration of elites, the cultural/creative brain-drain.*

²⁵⁰ Report of the 13th Integration Minister Conference 2018, Bavaria, p. 42:
https://www.stmas.bayern.de/imperia/md/content/stmas/stmas_inet/integration/180411_ergebnisprotokoll_intmk2018.pdf

²⁵¹ Uwe Hunger, Brain drain und brain gain: Migration und Entwicklung, in: Thränhardt/Hunger, Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, Wiesbaden 2003, p. 35-57, p. 69.

7.3 Refugees and migration – on the logic of assimilation and multiculturalism

Although many stakeholders, especially civil-society stakeholders, have achieved enormous things in recent years, Germany has to date neither found a way of suitably dealing with the people who are seeking protection or residency in Germany nor to suitably discuss the topic of “refugees and migration”. Although in 2015 many excellent initiatives and activities were in the public eye, the topic has in the meantime become a pawn for ideological and party-political interests, whereby the latter has been encouraged by the manifold failure of constitutional and administrative policy instruments. To date, we are still lacking a *German migration compact*, in which all involved stakeholders (national government, *Länder*, local authorities, representatives from administration, business and culture, civil society initiatives, representatives of migrants etc.) participate. Suggestions are on the table. While international agreements and EU papers set out value-based notions of how things should be for an “inclusive integration”²⁵² and national policy regularly sets out a comprehensive catalogue of objectives and necessary measures (e.g., conference of the integration ministers), the actual implementation lags far behind. Non-governmental organisations have carried out detailed evaluations of the previous experiences; these evaluations build on what has been achieved, analyse mistakes and include specific suggestions, e.g., for a “national refugee compact for integration and participation” and an overarching “network of stakeholders on all levels of action”.²⁵³

> In this context, the expertise of the FCEP is also needed. Consequently, just as foreign policy must start domestically (> 1.1), its knowledge of other cultures, migration, integration, participation and cooperation between public offices and civil society stakeholders should also be deployed in the domestic migration debate and policy: through mediation and imparting of the FCEP-work domestically, the offer of information target groups that are focused around questions of integration, and through forums dealing with the cultures of the countries of origin.

That is particularly important as the direction that the plans and measures of German national refugee policy is taking is diametrically opposed to all experiences and findings from migration research and furthermore, it is actually producing numerous problems which then promote the scandalisation of the debate. First of all, this is the case for the

²⁵² E.g., the paper from the “Policy Lab for inclusive integration” by the European Council: Inclusive integration strategies: Towards a shared model, Strassbourg 2018; <https://rm.coe.int/policy-lab-on-inclusive-integration-inclusive-integration-strategies-t/16808ae1c6>

²⁵³ The *Allianz Vielfältige Demokratie* initiated by the Bertelsmann-Stiftung is named as an example: Gisela Erler/ Margit Gottstein, *Lehren aus der Flüchtlingspolitik 2014-2016. Überlegungen für die übergreifende Kommunikation, Koordination und Kooperation*, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2017, p. 12 and 14.

centralisation of the administration (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) and accommodation (key word “anchor centres” [Ankerzentren]). For one thing is undisputable: local communities are the crucial place for successful integration according to the unanimous conviction of those who are involved in the work. They recommend *decentralisation* and *transferring decisions and organisation to the local level*, i.e., to the place where the cooperation with the various volunteer initiatives takes place.²⁵⁴

In particular the central *accommodation of refugees* can always only be an emergency solution and a temporary measure. Collective accommodation over a longer period of time, in particular when those affected are not permitted to work, contradicts all socio-psychological findings and all experiences with camp structures. And for those traumatised by war, they are damaging and produce long-term patients²⁵⁵ and they foster the emergence of aggression, violence and delinquency. It is known from research on camps that criminal structures have a tendency to grow from the social culture of camps and these structures are attractive to mafia-like organisations. In this regard, *combating “refugee traffickers”* starts with the *policy of accommodation*. It is also a development psychological truism that single male youths, irrespective of their cultural, ethnic or religious group, are particularly susceptible for forming cliques with aggressive behaviour that deviates from norms.²⁵⁶ This problem should have already been recognised in 2015 due to the age and gender composition of the refugees and it could have been considered in the policies for accommodation.

To date, the debates and problem solutions have been dominated by the rhetoric of the “refugee crisis” although in the mid-term to long-term the topics of *migration, integration* and *cultural diversity* have to be addressed. Discussed from the point of view of the “refugee crisis”, the phenomenon of migration is reduced to *immigration*. Even if the demographic trend (shrinking population) is presented as an argument *for* migration, the conversation is always only around low birth rates while the phenomenon of emigration is normally forgotten. Yet the figures are considerable; recently statistics showed more than

²⁵⁴ In this regard a catalogue of projects can be listed that on a local level and with meagre resources carry out successful integration work, in Berlin e.g. the volunteer initiative Neue Nachbarschaft/Moabit e.V. or Schlesische 27, Kunst und Bildung (Verein zur Förderung interkultureller Zusammenarbeit e.V., which receives basic funding from the Land of Berlin).

²⁵⁵ Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber et al. (ed.), *Flucht, Migration und Trauma: Die Folgen für die nächste Generation*, Göttingen 2017. Among other things, the book reports on a pilot project to supporting refugees in a reception centre.

²⁵⁶ Wolfgang Melzer et al. (ed.), *Handbuch Aggression, Gewalt und Kriminalität bei Jugendlichen*, Bad Heilbrunn 2015.

one million emigrants annually.²⁵⁷ More important than the statistics is the fact that the Germans who go abroad in this way are invisible in the *concept and image of migrants*. However, the reality of German emigrants could make it clear that migration has become a normal component (albeit not for everyone) of contemporary history, even in countries which are not shaken by crises. Taking Germans who leave the country but are still connected to their culture of origin into consideration could make it evident how misguided it is to demand complete assimilation from immigrants.

Every type of migration puts the traditional *concepts of home country, belonging and individual identity* into motion with multifarious results. However, migration never means a complete metamorphosis or a complete change from one “national identity” into another. (> 6.2) Whosoever leaves his or her home country, be it voluntary or under compulsion, and goes to another country, is not necessarily looking for a “home country” there. And just as little as the emigrated Germans intend to become American, British or Swiss, “being German” is not the objective of those that come to us.²⁵⁸ Namely that would demand renouncing or suppressing childhood impressions, origin, language, memories and emotional connections to the culture of origin, and that can cause diseases. In this regard, there are pertinent reflections by Jewish authors who were driven into exile, e.g., Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the psychological consequences of a forced assimilation in her text “We Refugees” (1943).²⁵⁹ The demand on migrants to become German follows the concept of a forced *assimilation* (from the Latin *assimilare*, make similar, impersonate). In the sociological sense assimilation²⁶⁰ means a harmonisation with a group whose orientations are assumed upon giving up one’s own orientation. That is not only detrimental and infeasible for those affected; it also means a loss for the migrants and the destination country. In contrast, in the case of successful integration, a life in *cultural multilingualism* and the ability to convey reciprocal understanding for different cultures springs from migration. Therefore, ideally immigrants can become intermediaries and translators between their country of origin and German society.

²⁵⁷ According to figures from the Statistics Portal, in 2015 there were 1.5 million immigrants, 1 million emigrants, in 2016 1.8 million immigrants, 1.3 million emigrants, in 2017 1.5 million immigrants, 1.1 million emigrants: de.statista.com.

²⁵⁸ The phrase “Whosoever seeks to make Germany their home” and the phrase “all that is part of being German” form the brackets of the passage in the speech by the German President that was addressed to the “newcomers”, Steinmeier in his speech on German Unity Day (2017).

²⁵⁹ Hannah Arendt, *Wir Flüchtlinge*, translated by Eike Geistel, Stuttgart 2016.

²⁶⁰ Jutta Aumüller, *Assimilation. Kontroversen um ein migrationspolitisches Konzept*, Bielefeld 2009.

From the criticism of assimilation emerged the counter model of a *multicultural society*. In the descriptive sense, the term²⁶¹ addresses quite simply the reality of a de facto immigration society in whose population every fourth person and every child under five now has a migration background. There is no way back to an autochthonous “German culture”, which anyway has never existed (> 6.3); and that would also not be very desirable – one only needs to remember the narrow-mindedness of post-war Germany. Anyway, cultural diversification is a consequence of global transformation processes through which communication, consumer behaviour and popular culture assimilate on the one hand, however, simultaneously on the other hand the individual behaviour and ways of life are greatly differentiated. This becomes evident, e.g., in the polarisation between advocates of “traditional family values” and proponents of the recognition of same sex partnerships and their equality in regard to marriage and family. Although the first group actually gains strength through immigration from traditionalistic societies, from its camp comes the most vehement rejection of migrants. It can only be explained by the fact that the discourse on *cultural difference*, in which it is often rather a question of ethnic, religious or national differences, overlies other societal differences.

However, the concept of the multicultural society was and is often used rather in a programmatic sense, as a concept of a culturally diversified society with a relative autonomy of groups, which are defined as *communities* with a specific “cultural identity” (or religious identity). A forced version of multiculturalism demands, in the wake of *communitarianism* and Taylor’s *policy of recognition*²⁶², a formal anchoring of cultural pluralism in the form of the institutionalised representation of different communities culminating in difference based rights. Although in the 1990s such a policy had many supporters, it is now subject to comprehensive criticism. This criticism concerns the “latent collectivism” and the problem that the idea is based on a concept of *community* that unquestionably requires “agreement within the primary community” or rather an “internal consensus of values” and thus supports repressive norms of belonging,²⁶³ which are anyway stronger in traditionalistic cultures. Such trend towards value rigorism was already criticised by Plessner in his work on *Grenzen der Gemeinschaft* [Limits of community] (1924).

²⁶¹ Frank Beyersdörfer, *Multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Begriffe, Phänomene, Verhaltensregeln*, Münster 2004.

²⁶² Charles Taylor, *Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung*, Frankfurt/M. 1993.

²⁶³ Agathe Bienfait, *Im Gehäuse der Zugehörigkeit: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Mainstream-Multikulturalismus*, Wiesbaden 2006, p. 19; a polemic criticism was produced by Kenan Malik, *Das Unbehagen in den Kulturen: eine Kritik des Multikulturalismus und seiner Gegner*, Berlin 2017.

In the political discussion, the camps of *assimilation and multiculturalism* are irreconcilable, yet they ultimately have *much in common*. Both are concepts in terms of identity politics that assume a virtually natural cultural identity based on origin that is to be “preserved”.

7.4 Integration – diaspora communities, parallel societies and Islam dialogue

Not least the development of *parallel societies*, which have been fostered by the climate of multiculturalism²⁶⁴, has led to the matter being rethought. In this respect, the assumption of a connection between the logic of multiculturalism and the development of parallel societies is confirmed by the ethnological research on *diaspora communities*. Their milieus have a tendency towards conserving traditionalistic values, religious conventions and behavioural standards, which are anachronistic compared to the processes of development, modernisation and transformation that are taking place in the countries of origin in the meantime. Diaspora communities conserve an image of the “old homeland” that becomes more and more alienated from reality. Such a tendency can also be observed internationally according to Indian American cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, who describes the globally growing number of diaspora communities as *ethnospaces* and observes in them a tendency towards “nostalgia without memory”.²⁶⁵

Religion in particular has increasingly become a “place of retreat for the diaspora”.²⁶⁶ That is also the case for the German citizens of Turkish origin. The percentage who would describe themselves as religious increased by 25% (to 82%) between 2000 and 2013²⁶⁷. This increase is particularly observed among the third generation.²⁶⁸ Also among the returnees (with Turkish citizenship) 20% are part of the second and third generations, i.e., they were born and raised in Germany.²⁶⁹ The high preference for inter-Muslim partnerships also

²⁶⁴ Using the Netherlands as an example and with a comparative evaluation of different political practices, it is discussed in Ruud Koopmann’s *Assimilation oder Multikulturalismus? Bedingungen gelungener Integration*, Berlin 2017.

²⁶⁵ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minnesota, London 1996, p. 30.

²⁶⁶ Ther, *Die Außenseiter* (2017), p. 336.

²⁶⁷ Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung, *Teilhabe und Befindlichkeit, Identifikation und politische Partizipation türkeistämmiger Zugewanderter in Nordrhein-Westfalen und in Deutschland*, Essen 2018: <https://cdn.website-editor.net/09fe2713f5da44ff99ead273b339f17d/files/uploaded/2017.pdf>

²⁶⁸ Claudia Diehl, Matthias Koenig, *Religiosität türkischer Migranten im Generationenverlauf – ein Befund und einige Erklärungsversuche*, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 38/2009, p. 300–319.

²⁶⁹ Stefan Alscher, Axel Kreienbrink (ed.), *Abwanderung von Türkeistämmigen. Wer verlässt Deutschland und warum?*, Nuremberg 2014, p. 7.

contributes to the isolation and stability of Turkish diaspora communities. The comprehensive research on the German Turks (who predominantly came to Germany as *gast-arbeiter* through recruitment between 1961 and 1973) regards such phenomena as indicators of an *integration that failed* in many respects.²⁷⁰ Measured against integration criteria (such as language proficiency, education, employment market, contact to other groups), lower integration is to be recorded for them in comparison to other groups of migrants. The question about the *feeling of belonging*²⁷¹ shows a mixed picture. The number of those who feel a bond to both countries hovers around 30%, while the number of those who feel a bond to Germany is consistently below the number of those who feel a bond to Turkey. Recently, this group rapidly rose to just under 50% – an alarming signal for a *falling level of integration upon the increase in the amount of time spent in the country*.

As an explanation for the failed integration, research names numerous factors: the local formation of ghettos (which was forced as a result of high rents and a higher than average unemployment rate), discrimination, violence against foreigners (arson attacks, NSU murders), educational disadvantages and deficits, poor employment chances especially for those with higher qualifications, lacking access opportunities to status systems, the feeling of lacking recognition and the “feeling of being second class citizens”, which was expressed by many of those surveyed. All in all an image emerges that the distance to the values of the host country has become greater for the German Turks, while at the same time, in comparison to the first generation the third generation “places more value on consciously standing by their own culture”.²⁷² The *intra-family transfer of standards and values* plays a decisive role for the orientation of the second and third generation to the values of the “old home country”. Distanced from the majority culture, the bond to “old homeland” passed down through the generations consequently considerably contributes to the conservation of the “cultural identity” of a minority, whereby the structure of the parallel society continues. In this regard, research emphasises *the key role of the first generation in the integration process, also in regard to the subsequent generations*.

²⁷⁰ E.g., Martina Sauer/ Dirk Halm, *Erfolge und Defizite der Integration türkeistämmiger Einwanderer. Entwicklung der Lebenssituation 1999-2008*, Wiesbaden 2009; Heike Diefenbach, *Kinder und Jugendliche aus Migrantenfamilien im deutschen Bildungssystem. Erklärungen und empirische Befunde*, Wiesbaden 2010.

²⁷¹ The statics cover the years 1996 to 2015; they were asked about their “bond to their home country” in regard to Germany, Turkey, both or none: <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/243864/tuerkeistaemmige-in-deutschland-heimatlos-oder-ueberall-zuhause?p=all#fr-footnode3>

²⁷² Detlef Pollak et al., *Integration und Religion aus der Sicht von Türkeistämmigen in Deutschland*. Representative survey by TNS Emnid commissioned by the “Religion and Politics” Cluster of Excellence at the University of Münster, Münster 2016, p. 20.

This insight reveals the explosive nature of the current policy regarding interaction with the newcomers for the future of society. What goes wrong here and now creates long-term problems that are then no longer solvable and incidentally they also result in huge consequential costs for the education and health sectors and also for the security system. A lot can be learned from the example of France. In France, it has now been recognised that *fundamentalist Islamism and terrorism* are for the most part domestically produced in the parallel societies of the banlieues where the radicalisation of the youth without life perspectives has set into motion a spiral of violence which is far out of politics' reach²⁷³.

> *Integration now is essential to secure long-term domestic peace.*

From these analyses it can be deduced that we need a concept of integration that does not address the collective or cultural identity of specific national, religious or ethnically branded communities. Such a practice almost inevitably brings with it a problematic politicisation, because it means holding negotiations with representatives or self-elected spokespersons of the respective communities. In the political arena cultural identity often becomes a "means for implementing particular interests".²⁷⁴ What instead is needed is *integration as a socially and spatially differentiated cultural practice*, which takes place in daily life everywhere, i.e., at work and in all areas of life. Its core is a different understanding of recognition, not the communitarian policy of recognition but a *societal culture of recognition*.

The conflict between equality and difference, which dominates the theoretical discourse about cultural difference, without exception refers to communities. However, integration concerns individuals and specific ways of life of individuals, families or certain groups. Integration is not a uniform process rather it unfolds in very different forms and areas of life, including *neighbourhood and friendship* as well as *participation, social belonging and public visibility* of people of non-German origin and, as a condition, *space for a life in cultural multilingualism*. Above all, integration is a mutual process; it is based in *reciprocity*. Place and scene of integration is the *society*, and the conditions and basis for successful integration is the lived democracy, in which there is space for plural and di-

²⁷³ Cf. the works of French sociologist Gilles Kepel, expert on the Arabic world, who has presented the empirically supported examination of the banlieues, i.a., *Banlieue de la République*, Paris 2012; *Terreur dans l'Hexagone. Genèse du djihad français*, Paris 2015; *Der Bruch. Frankreichs gespaltene Gesellschaft*, (2016) Munich 2017.

²⁷⁴ Karl-Heinz Kohl, *Alte Heimat, neue Heimat? Die Rückbesinnung auf das Eigene in einer globalisierten Welt*, in: *Forschung & Lehre* 4/2017, p. 304-305.

verse ways of life not just for migrants but for other minorities too. At least that is the aspiration.

Germany is de facto a country of immigration, which nevertheless continues to lack the *awareness and the culture of a country of immigration*. “The intercultural opening up of administration and civil society”, increasing the “share of employed people with a migration background” and the modernisation of immigration law²⁷⁵ are long overdue steps. The transformation into a modern society of cultural diversity can only succeed by way of a greater *visibility and participation* of immigrants and women in all areas of political and cultural public life, especially also in decision making roles. It is only successful when migration background and gender no longer require any special mention. Part of being a country of immigration is the possibility of living a life of *cultural multilingualism* that allows the new citizens to feel like citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bilingualism also builds a bridge to people who (still) do not speak German and hence also a bridge to the diaspora islands with a monolingual social culture. The problematic disintegration of many German Turks is not least down to the consumption of Turkish-language media in Germany, i.e., an extensive “media ghettoisation”²⁷⁶. In this way, a significant number of them are cut off from the political debate in Germany.

> *One of the most urgent objectives is to remedy the lack of Turkish-language TV and internet programmes by public television broadcasters and to establish a German-Turkish channel (e.g., following the Arte model). In this regard, the FCEP could take the initiative and contribute its expertise, i.e., its Turkey-related expertise, its foreign media-political knowledge and its experience with Deutsche Welle.*

It is not clear whether the recent great increase in German Turks feeling bound to Turkey is an effect of the increasing influence of Turkish policy on German Turks or if it is the other way round and their orientation towards Turkey has increased their interest in Turkish politics. What is certain is that both factors are connected to each other and this sinister type of politicisation is an obstacle to integration. Since the *right to vote* in Turkey for German Turks living in Germany has led to Turkish party politicians using this local public for their interests, these most recent experiences should be included in the discussions on the *legal reform of naturalisation*. Some voices have for instance suggested binding

²⁷⁵ IntMK 2018 [Integration ministers’ conference], Bavaria, p. 24 and 47.

²⁷⁶ Türkische Medien in Deutschland, Almanya Info Dienst No. 4, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=2aae0c64-e263-288d-d54f-41ffb1a42d57&groupId=252038

dual citizenship to the democratic principle of “one man, one vote”. Such a solution would correspond to the constellation outlined by Böckenförde: opening the society to cultural and religious plurality, however, at the same time self-defence of the secular state.

> In this regard the FECP is needed in order to bring their expertise from international cultural work into the discussion of naturalisation, citizens’ rights and voting rights in the context of international experiences, for example: which experiences were gained in other countries with dual citizenship?

Forming religious plurality has proven to be one of the most difficult tasks, on the part of the society, which struggles to recognise religious symbols of Islam in public life and social arenas, and equally on the part of the Muslim migrants because the religion as the “place of retreat for the diaspora”²⁷⁷ considerably contributes to the social isolation and formation of parallel societies. In this regard, conflicts and objective problems surrounding the *exercise of the freedom of religion by Muslims and their integration into a secular state* must be openly discussed and actively shaped. And this has to take place beyond the opposite clichés of Islamophobia and the romanticising of Islam as a peaceful religion in every regard. Only in an atmosphere of recognition of others can it be discussed whether and in what aspects principles and conventions of the Islamic communities and associations come into conflict with fundamental rights in Germany. To date, the so-called headscarf debate has channelled the discussion towards symbol politics and functions as a distraction from more important questions.

As Böckenförde emphasises, freedom of religion is subject to “no cultural restriction”²⁷⁸ and it applies equally to each religion. On the one hand, freedom of religion means that the Basic Law guarantees “undisturbed practice of religion” (art. 4), and on the other hand it also guarantees the religious neutrality of the state and hence that of all state offices and positions. The German Constitution also guarantees the independent administration of the religious associations “within the limits of the law that applies to all” (art. 137.3). One problem concerning the implementation of religious freedom for Islam in Germany arises from the fact that the freedom of religion and the separation of state and church is based on a confessional concept of religion which is only partially compatible with the character of Muslim religions. As is known, mosques are much more than places to practice religion; they are social spaces and as a result even shelters, which can also be

²⁷⁷ Ther, *Die Außenseiter* (2017), p. 336.

²⁷⁸ Böckenförde, *Der säkularisierte Staat* (2007), p. 34.

politicised by interested parties. However, the non-involvement of the state as a supplement to the free exercise of religion also, if not more so, applies to a foreign state. Since Germany's previous policy regarding Muslims in the country has ultimately led to a strengthening of conservative and fundamentalistic Islam and it has not managed to prevent freedom of religion being misused as an instrument for nationalist propaganda and for exercising the influence of a foreign state, a *fundamental revision* is called for. That is particularly the case for the failed policy of primarily working with Islamic umbrella associations (e.g., on the topic of religious education, academic chairs for Islamic theology) and mainly negotiating with them (German Islam Conference). In order to "drive back radical Islam in Germany" (as is stated in the coalition agreement) and to promote integration, the cultural and educational policy must undertake all efforts to promote more liberal and tolerant types of Islam. In contrast, the liberal associations are actually often explicitly excluded. A lesson in this regard is the establishment of the Berlin Institute for Islamic Theology.²⁷⁹ In this way, the foundations for the future are laid because the religion experts educated there will teach generations of pupils.

> A suggestion is made to pool islam-political debates in the initiative for a basic discussion along the lines of "German Islam policy under investigation", in the sense of a fundamental review of measures taken up to now. A central topic hereby is the unsolved relationship between the secular state and different interpretations of Islam, i.e., the question of the confession/ denomination of Islam within the German state-church law. FCEP, especially the department "religion and foreign affairs", should bring its expertise into this discussion, its experiences from countries with different variations and forms of Islam, particularly a "European" Islam.

²⁷⁹ The history of the foundation of the "Berlin Institute for Islamic Theology" at Berlin Humboldt University (HU), where religious education teachers inter alia will be trained in the future, and the appointment of representatives of Islamic associations to the advisory board, which decides the appointment lists, is a lesson for this failed policy, which strengthens conservative Islam in Germany. The argument that the HU had to cooperate with the "associations with most members" is not plausible, and even less plausible is the reason for the non-consideration of liberal associations because they had too few mosques and "coopting liberal associations would be an encroachment of the state and HU, for they may not tailor Islam in Germany to suit their own preferences." The foundation director of the institute, Michael Borgolte, in an interview, <https://www.hu-berlin.de/de/pr/institut-fuer-islamische-theologie/aktuelles/interview>.

7.4 Lived democracy – political culture, social freedom and citizen participation

“The quality of dialogue is an indicator of the state of health of our democracies,” says the Manifesto of the *European Year of Citizen 2013*²⁸⁰. That does not only concern the *promotion of democracy in foreign policy*, but also *German society domestically*. The social and political consequences of globalisation are also obvious in an affluent nation like Germany. The problem of lacking integration does not only concern migrants but also the East-West integration and the consequences of social injustice because German society has been drifting further and further apart for some years. The loss of importance of the “major parties” is just a sign of it. The most important axes of this drifting apart are: *East-West, poor-rich, religious-secular*. However, the topics in which this drift is played out are: *refugees, Europe and Islam*. And all of that is occurring in a society whose public life and political culture are subject to a radical structural change. One has not to be like Cassandra to be worried about the relative commonality as a unifying bond, which Böckenförde describes as the pre-judicial prerequisites of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In order to counter the alienation (both passive and active, felt and structural) of growing population groups from “politics” comprehensive efforts for more *citizen participation* and new forms of involvement are urgently needed.

The digitalisation of the communication and information media has meant a radical *structural change to public life*²⁸¹ through which precisely that kind of public sphere, whose emergence was described with Habermas’ title loses its meaning and role: “the civic public” as a forum of information, debate and opinion formation whose emergence is historically linked with the struggle for the democratic constitutional state and its implementation. The “fourth estate” of democratic systems is increasingly losing influence due to “digital disruption” with the result of a *fragmentation of public life* and a *deprofessionalisation of information*. The indicators are known: (i) media consumption shifts from daily newspapers, radio and TV to the *internet*. 57% of Germans read the news online every day.²⁸² In contrast the reach of the so-called leading media is rapidly shrinking.²⁸³ (ii)

²⁸⁰ EYC 2013, quoted according to Frank Heuberger, Mirko Schwärzel, The Chances of Framework Agreements for a Citizen-Powered Europe, Europa Bottom-Up No. 7, Munich 2014, p. 20.

²⁸¹ Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied am Rhein 1962 to 1987.

²⁸² Tanjev Schulz et al., Erosion des Vertrauens zwischen Medien und Publikum?, in: Media Perspektiven (5/2017), p. 246-259, p. 249.

²⁸³ The reach (not circulation) of SZ is 1.24 million, FAZ is 0.76 million, Spiegel is 6.56 million, according to Media Analyse: <https://www.agma-mmc.de/media-analyse/ma-tageszeitungen/>; Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbung e. V. (as on 02/2018).

Information and debates shift from professional journalism to *social media*, which in 2015/16 was used by 80% of all internet users in Germany.²⁸⁴ (iii) Consequently, the *character of information* changes and the influence of *fake news*, which is used as an aggressive propaganda instrument by populist nationalism, grows.²⁸⁵ (iv) The form of *public opinion formation*, which is essential for democratic societies, *evaporates* to an individualised selection of news, which is a result of the “filter bubble” technology and leads to existing stances being strengthened and to “selective exposure” behaviour.²⁸⁶

The loss of the discursive public sphere is reinforced by the *disappearance of public space* due to the commercialisation of inner cities, the privatisation of housing, the explosion in the cost of rent and inhabitants being displaced to the outskirts. However, public space is a lifeline of modern public life. What has been idealised in mobility studies as transnational areas, are in the case of expats and internationally mobile managers from the world of business and politics actually new *parallel societies of the elite*, which represent a problem for the solidarity of society that is just as serious as the “Turkish quarters”. Social science studies show that many members of this elite have lost the connection to the social reality of the population.²⁸⁷

In the wake of this development, the *distance of many people to the established political system* has significantly grown, culminating in aggressive forms of hostility towards politics. The most noticeable indicators are the shift to the right and the popularity of aggressive nationalistic ideologies. The election wins of the AfD are an indicator. It is all the more worrying for there is no tangible social explanation for the group of AfD voters,

²⁸⁴ Facebook is the most used (13 million users are active daily, 20.5 million weekly and 31 million monthly), 64% of the total population uses WhatsApp, for young people YouTube, WhatsApp and Instagram are the most popular, Twitter has 1.8 million active users weekly and 0.6 million daily. Figures from Social Media Atlas 2015/16: <http://social-media-atlas.faktenkontor.de/2015/index.php> and ARD/ZDF-Online Studie 2016/17; JIM (Youth, Information and Multimedia) studies on the media usage of young people carried out by Medienpädagogischer Forschungsverbund.

²⁸⁵ “Sound-bite and simplification replace argument, nuance and fact. Presentation is deceptive and manipulative in style and openly hostile to opposing viewpoints.” Higgot, Proud, Populist Nationalism and Foreign Policy (2017), p. 49.

²⁸⁶ Carsten Ovens, Filterblasen – Ausgangspunkte einer neuen, fremdverschuldeten Unmündigkeit? in: *kommunikation@gesellschaft*, vol. 18, article 7, p. 1-25.

²⁸⁷ Cf. the study carried out by Michael Hartmann with the WZB (Berlin Social Science Center), *Soziale Ungleichheit – Kein Thema für die Eliten?* Frankfurt/M. 2013; idem., *Deutsche Eliten: die wahre Parallelgesellschaft?* in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (15/2014): <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/181764/deutsche-eliten-die-wahre-parallelgesellschaft?p=all>

whose social demography does not significantly differ from that of the total population.²⁸⁸ This trend cannot be shrugged off as populism because it is a symptom of a *loss of acceptance of the parliamentary system*, with which the population has reacted to the fundamental change of course of German policy since the departure from the social market economy under the banner of globalisation and economic liberalism. From the perspective of the population, the loss of confidence can be explained with impositions on the citizens to have understanding for phenomena such as: (i) discrepancies between spending billions of tax payers money for flagship projects (BER airport, Stuttgart21), subsidies for large companies (such as Siemens) and bank rescues on the one hand and on the other decisions about socially relevant rates such as unemployment benefits or increasing the minimum wage by a few cents in times of “good tax income”; (ii) the loss of control by those in charge (see list from the German Federal Audit Office, tax evasion worth billions/CumEx scandal, involvement of the domestic intelligence service in the NSU etc.) and (iii) the *loss of political culture* through party political and individuals’ interests in profiling themselves and pursuing admittedly unreasonable projects, only to let an individual minister “save face” (e.g., car tolls).

Above all the *growing division between the rich and the poor*²⁸⁹ divides society and greatly *endangers social peace*. Wealth becomes the explosive charge of societal solidarity when it threatens the self-respect and human dignity of others.²⁹⁰ This country presents itself with a cold hearted face towards the large number of people who are shut out of social life due to unemployment benefit rates, who despite working cannot finance their family’s living costs and who are expected to take on jobs that are adverse to health and family life such as “on-call work”. In Germany, one of the wealthiest countries with prosperous economic growth, poverty induces enormous humiliation. *But how can one expect empathy with refugees from those who see themselves as victims of a, in their eyes, cold-hearted society?*

²⁸⁸ The theory that the AfD is an elite phenomenon refers at best to the large number of high school graduates among the party members, 84% of which are male, while among voters the scene is exactly the opposite; in this regard academics are underrepresented. The economic orientation of the party members is primarily shaped by economic liberalism and distrust of the recipients of social benefits. Cf. Hubert Kleinert, *Die AfD und ihre Mitglieder. Eine Analyse mit Auswertung einer exemplarischen Mitgliederbefragung hessischer Kreisverbände*, Wiesbaden 2018; Richard Hilmer et al., *Einstellung und soziale Lebenslage. Eine Spurensuche nach Gründen für rechtspopulistische Orientierung, auch unter Gewerkschaftsmitgliedern*, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Working Paper der Forschungsförderung No. 44, July 2017.

²⁸⁹ Half of the net wealth in Germany is in the hands of the upper 10% of households, while the lower half of households together has around 1% of the net wealth at its disposal. *Der fünfte Armuts- und Reichtumsbericht der Bundesregierung* [5th report on poverty and wealth by the German government], April 2017, short version, p. 13.

²⁹⁰ In this regard: Christian Neuhäuser, *Reichtum als moralisches Problem*, Berlin 2018.

It is no surprise for cultural anthropology that fears of crises are directed against “foreigners”. This phenomenon follows the scape-goat logic and is well known from the history of anti-Semitism and xenophobia. It is also known that xenophobic and anti-Semitic stances are most prevalent in places where real social contact with the people concerned is at its lowest and instead images of the imaginary “stranger” can freely circulate. Such explanations correspond to the clustering of xenophobic incidents and violent offences in East Germany (percentage of foreigners in East Germany: 3.8%, in West Germany: 11.8%). However, also concerning this phenomenon, the correlation between the statistics on violence and social economic factors can’t explain the problem.²⁹¹ What is more important for the current situation is that in East Germany the fears of globalisation (feeling of being one of the losers or fear of becoming one as a result of crisis) come in addition to the hurt from the *experience of a collective devaluation*²⁹² from the winding up of the GDR economy and social culture and amplify these feelings. More than two decades after reunification, the diagnosis of “one nation – two cultures” is still applicable in many aspects.²⁹³ The hurt is deep-seated. It has been produced by the dominant rhetoric of a *rationalisation of existing inequality with the criterion of lacking productive capacity* that often occurs in descriptions of the former GDR. The employees must have felt that the judgement “internationally not competitive”, with which in the course of restructuring the GDR economy closures and redundancies were justified, was a judgement about them as well. Lacking the feeling of belonging and the impression of being a *second-class citizen*, i.e., indicators of insufficient integration, are shared by the majority of the *inhabitants of the East German Länder* as well as *many migrants and those at risk of poverty*.

When it is a question of involving civil society more in the issues and political decision-making processes, then it is not enough for individual government or administrative offices to provide the opportunity for citizens “to make statements”²⁹⁴ or for politicians to

²⁹¹ Michael Kohlstruck, Rechte Gewalt in Ost und West. Wie lassen sich die höheren Zahlen in den neuen Bundesländern erklären? (18.06.2018) in: Deutschlandarchiv der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. <http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutschlandarchiv/270811/rechte-gewalt-in-ost-und-west>

²⁹² Everhard Holtmann et al., Deutschland 2014. 25 Jahre Friedliche Revolution und Deutsche Einheit – Ergebnisse eines Forschungsprojekts, Berlin 2015, p. 162–164 and p. 225.

²⁹³ Martin and Silvia Greiffenhagen, Eine Nation – Zwei politische Kulturen, in: Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Deutschland. Eine Nation – doppelte Geschichte. Materialien zum deutschen Selbstverständnis, Cologne 1993, p. 29–45.

²⁹⁴ On the website of the German Federal Government entitled Bürgerbeteiligung. Die Energiewende gelingt als Gemeinschaftsprojekt [Citizen participation: The energy revolution succeeds as a community

appear at town meetings in order “to communicate” their objectives or political decisions. It may also be doubted whether, e.g., the protest against a grievance or a political measure in the form of “participatory media usage”, i.e., though an online click can be considered as a form of *civic engagement*²⁹⁵. Rather forms are needed that allow a comprehensive dialogue and exchange on controversial topics between politicians and citizens, and also among citizens themselves in dialogue between different groups and convictions. In this regard, in the German Federal Foreign Office a department for “domestic citizen dialogue and public relations: foreign policy in Germany” was established.

As well as the direct democratic forms of citizen participation (such as elections, referenda, votes), *new, informal forms of citizen participation* have recently developed above all on the local authority level, such as, e.g., town meetings, forums or panels, working groups, future workshops, round tables and the like. Recently, “many people, both citizens and planners [have also placed] much hope” in e-participation “as a new form of citizen participation”.²⁹⁶ There are e-formats such as online questionnaires or Open Space online. However, the population considers the forms of online participation, also called e-governance methods, as being less effective.²⁹⁷ The fact that to date forms of citizen participation have been rather weakly developed on Länder and national levels is more likely due to political stakeholders tending to reject citizen participation, as has been revealed in surveys.²⁹⁸ However, without the politicians’ willingness and desire it will not be possible to further involve civil society. In contrast very diverse forms of civic engagement have recently emerged, in the course of which on the one hand trends towards professionalisa-

project]: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/energiewende/fragen-und-antworten/allgemeines/buergerbeteiligung-455794>.

²⁹⁵ Cf. the last section in: Erster Engagementbericht – Für eine Kultur der Mitverantwortung. Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission und Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung [First report on engagement - for a culture of co-responsibility. Report from the expert commission and statement from the German Federal Government], Drucksache 17/10580, p. 488 et seqq.

²⁹⁶ Benjamin Häger/Matthias Wiesrecker, Neue Formen der Bürgerbeteiligung?! Ergebnisse einer Online-Befragung der Stadtplanungsämter deutscher Mittel- und Großstädte zum Einsatz und zur Bewertung von Bürgerbeteiligung, 2014, p. 1. https://www.netzwerk-buergerbeteiligung.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/PDF-Dokumente/newsletter_beitraege/nbb_beitrag_haeger_wiesrecker_141105.pdf

²⁹⁷ According to the study by Bertelsmann Stiftung, Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg (ed.), Vielfältige Demokratie. Kernergebnisse der Studie „Partizipation im Wandel – Unsere Demokratie zwischen Wählen, Mitmachen und Entscheiden“, Gütersloh 2014, p.13. In accordance with the study by Initiative D21, E-Government Monitor 2014 – Nutzung und Akzeptanz von elektronischen Bürgerdiensten im internationalen Vergleich, 2016: <https://initiatived21.de/publikationen/egovernment-monitor-2016-english-description/>

²⁹⁸ According to the findings of a survey by Marie Hoppe, Wertewelt Bürgerbeteiligung. Eine Studie zu den Einstellungen von Politik, Verwaltungen und Bürger/innen (= mitarbeiten.skript No. 07), Verlag Stiftung Mitarbeit, Bonn 2014.

tion have been observed and on the other hand there are initiatives, which try to explore the democratic potential of the internet²⁹⁹.

“A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of living together, of conjoint communicated experience,” according to American philosopher John Dewey just over a century ago.³⁰⁰ Today, the idea of *participative democracy* is attributed to him. Its goal is to counter the depletion of the majority democracy into the simple system of voting, especially as this trend is accelerated by the policy of opinion polls (from the “Sunday question” and the political barometer to the Allensbach polls). Participation means more than exchanging opinions and opinion building. Participation in decision making requires participating in knowledge on the respective topic, its implications and the consequences of specific decisions. Consequently, it concerns forms, which allow and make it possible to gain an insight into the complexity of problems, to explore knowledge on the topic and to come to a decision through the exchange of arguments.

Such an innovative format of citizen participation has been tested and implemented since the 1990s in the Scandinavian countries in the form of the *Folkehøring*, which is also termed the “deliberation forum”. It is not an institution but an ad-hoc format that is used for individual, very complex and conflict-laden topics, which are controversial among the public. In terms of form, it is a forum in which a representative population group actively participates in a negotiation process. Its objective is the development of a new common position on the content. The procedure consists of exchange, joint information (where experts can be questioned), debate and drafting of a joint solution. In this way interested citizens become expert citizens both in regard to the topic as well as in regard to the processes of political action. The experiences are in all respects positive. Evaluations of the format show that among the participants there is a clear increase in knowledge and understanding for the arguments of the opponents while those participants who are undecided form their own point of view.³⁰¹

> This format of active citizen participation, which is of great peace- and sociopolitical value, is particularly suitable for difficult and controversial issues. Domestically, these are topics such as organ donation, same sex marriage, digitalisation of education, dual citizenship, introduction of a

²⁹⁹ E.g., the initiative publixphere e.v.: <https://liqd.net/de/>

³⁰⁰ John Dewey, *Demokratie und Erziehung. Eine Einleitung in die philosophische Pädagogik* (1916), Weinheim 2011, p. 121.

³⁰¹ Vibeke Normann Andersen/Kasper Hansen, *How deliberation makes better citizens: The Danish Deliberative Poll on the euro*, in: *European Journal of Political Research*, 46/2007, p. 531–556.

quota, issues in connection with refugee policy and integration; within FCEP they are formed through the neuralgic questions in partner countries (which can be decided by local representatives). It is suggested to compile information (e.g. with help of a seminar) about different formats for actors abroad.

In regard to the *failed East-West integration* other formats are necessary because it is less about solving a problem and more about coming to terms with the past. The fact that reunification is termed unification (Unification Treaty) and accession (accession area) in the political terminology but in the vernacular it is often referred to as annexation is an expression of the irreconcilable point of views: on the one side the constitutional level and on the other the experience perspective of those involved. The conflicting interpretations of the approach to the restructuring of the GDR system are reminiscent in the epistemic regard (not in the matter itself) of the historians' controversy when the functionalistic interpretation of German historians was criticised because it ignored the experience perspectives of those involved. There is comprehensive research into the unification process and the restructuring of the whole system: there is the Stasi Records Agency, there are legal ways for coming to terms with the past for victims of the GDR regime, and the "privatisation agency investigation committee" is looking at cases of fraud and embezzlement during the privatisation of state-owned companies. However, what continues to have an effect today are the traces of the whole process left behind on those people who see themselves as losers. It appears to be time for a *comprehensive examination of this turning point* in German history, which has such a lasting influence on the present.

> Therefore, a suggestion is made to examine the reunification process. To the preparation and conception of such a commission the FCEP could contribute the experience that it has gathered abroad with justice, truth and peace commissions.

According to my knowledge there is no model for a commission in this special case. The previous examples of truth and reconciliation commissions or also peace and justice commissions predominately concern the coming to terms with past violence and violations of human rights after a regime change, normally during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. However, the commission suggested here is not to be about coming to terms with the GDR but about *coming to terms with the history of the unification process*.³⁰²

³⁰² Recently, Martin Dulig, the SPD spokesperson for East German matters, also suggested "general societal examination with the instrument of an all-German truth and reconciliation commission", press release of SPD 136/18.

Nevertheless, the objectives of the existing truth commissions, namely to shed light beyond the legal events and to allow the victims to experience justice, correspond to the objective of the suggested commission. Above all, truth commissions are “the unusual attempt to arrive at a conception of history that is closer to reality.”³⁰³ The only thing that such commissions can achieve is “to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse,” according to Michael Ignatieff.³⁰⁴ That is true for legends, narratives and rhetorical formulas alike. In the case of the restructuring of the GDR system, it is among other things about the experiences which are encapsulated in the rhetorical formula that the restructuring naturally also had victims. A commission, which is a forum for such experiences, maybe provide the chance of transforming anger, desperation and feelings of injustice into clarification. Such a commission must be essentially borne by civil society; especially the influence of party political interests must be kept from it. One of its most important tasks is mediation.

> What Germany needs is an all-encompassing programme to reinstate social peace and to encourage domestic socio-cultural integration for a divided society. The goals of FCEP such as the promotion of democracy, strengthening civil society and citizen participation can only be transported with persuasiveness if they have first priority within domestic politics, i.e. in the formation of socio-cultural living- and working conditions and within the domestic political culture. Only then will FCEP find those domestic cooperation partners that it requires in order to work on the cultural-political perspective of a 'foreign policy of society'. This is not merely a question of credibility of FCEP for outsiders and its acceptance within. It is also a prerequisite for the possibility of implementing the programme of a global governance-enhanced FCEP. The connected reevaluation of FCEP needs to have a strong, established and persuasive domestic voice within the country: as encouragement to live what Germany claims to stand for on an international stage and for which its representatives want to advocate and espouse.

³⁰³ Wolfgang S. Heinz, Lehren für den „Tag danach“. Wie Wahrheitskommissionen helfen können, Konflikte beizulegen, in: Internationale Politik, May 2005, 44-50, p. 50. The article discusses some specific examples. To date there are experiences from 40 countries.

³⁰⁴ Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, in: Index on Censorship No. 5/1996, p. 110-113, p. 113.

Bibliography

Aden, Menno (2009): Menschheit als Völkerrechtssubjekt?, in: Internationales Privates Wirtschaftsrecht, Munich

Adepoju, Aderanti (2006): Internal and International Migration within Africa, in: Pieter Kok et. al. (ed.), Migration in South and Southern Africa. Dynamics and Determinants, Cape Town, p. 26–45

Adey, Peter et al. (ed.) (2014): The Handbook of Mobilities, London

Alscher, Stefan/Axel Kreienbrink (ed.) (2014): Abwanderung von Türkeistämmigen. Wer verlässt Deutschland und warum?, Nuremberg: Federal Department of Migration and Refugees

Anderson, Benedict (2006 [1983]): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London

Andres, Jan (2007): „Politik“ in der konservativen deutschen Kulturkritik: Paul de Lagarde, August Julius Langbein, Thomas Mann, in: Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), „Politik“. Stationen eines Wortgebrauchs im Europa der Neuzeit, Frankfurt/M., p. 339-361

Andronikashvili, Zaal/Sigrid Weigel (2012): Zur Frage der Grundordnungen in Europa nach 1989. Einführung, in: idem (ed.), Grundordnungen. Geographie, Religion und Gesetz, Berlin

Andronikashvili, Zaal, Emzar Jgerenaia, Franziska Thun-Hohenstein (2018): Landna(h)me Georgien. Studien zur kulturellen Semantik, Berlin

Anghie, Antony (2004): Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, Cambridge

Anholt, Simon (2015): Interview by Luise Checchin, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 09.12.2015

Appadurai, Arjun (1996): Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minnesota, London

Arendt, Hannah (1985 [1951]): The Origins of Totalitarianism, San Diego, New York, London, p. 290-302

Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah (1986 [1951]): Elemente und Ursprünge totalitärer Herrschaft, Munich, p. 452-470

Arendt, Hannah (1998 [1958]): The Human Condition, Chicago, London, p. 7 et seq.

Arendt, Hannah (1981 [1960]): Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben, Munich

Arendt, Hannah (1965): Über die Revolution, Munich

Arendt, Hannah (1996): TV interview with Roger Errera, in: Hannah Arendt, Ich will verstehen. Selbstauskünfte zu Leben und Werk, ed. Ursula Ludz, Munich, Zurich

Arendt, Hannah (2016): Wir Flüchtlinge, translated by Eike Geistel, Stuttgart

Aristoteles (1991): De memoria et reminiscencia 451a-453a, German translation in: Die Erfindung des Gedächtnisses, texts collected and introduced by Dietrich Harth, Frankfurt/M, p. 55-58

Aron, Raymond (1987 [1955]): The Opium of Intellectuals, London

Asch, Ronald G. /Dagmar Freist (ed.) (2005): Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozess, Cologne

Assmann, Jan (1992): Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen, Munich

Assmann, Aleida (1993): Arbeit am nationalen Gedächtnis. Eine kurze Geschichte der deutschen Bildungsidee, Frankfurt/M

Aumüller, Jutta (2009): Assimilation. Kontroversen um ein migrationspolitisches Konzept, Bielefeld

Gesetz über den Auswärtigen Dienst (GAD) (2002), in: Enrico Brandt/ Christian Buck (ed.): Auswärtiges Amt. Diplomatie als Beruf. 2nd edition, Wiesbaden, p. 367-375

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (1970): Leitsätze für die auswärtige Kulturpolitik, Bonn

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (1971): Bericht der Kommission für die Reform des Auswärtigen Dienstes: vorgelegt dem Herrn Bundesminister des Auswärtigen Dienstes, in: Aus: Vierteljahresschrift der Vereinigung Deutscher Auslandsbeamten e.V., 34.1971

Bibliography

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (1982): Zehn Thesen zur kulturellen Begegnung und Zusammenarbeit mit Ländern der Dritten Welt, March, Bonn

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (2000): Forum: Zukunft der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik, Berlin, 04.07.2000, conference publication, Berlin

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (2003): Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik, Berlin

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (2011): Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung. Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten, Berlin

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (2014): Review 2014 – Außenpolitik weiterdenken, Berlin

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.) (2017): Nationaler Aktionsplan. Umsetzung der VN-Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 2016-2020, Berlin

Bähr, Julia/Andre Piron (2018): Buchwerte, in: Feuilleton live in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13.10.2018

Baeker, Dirk (2001): Kultur, in: Karlheinz Barck et al. (ed.), Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, vol. 3, Stuttgart, Weimar, p. 510-556

Bartmann, Christoph, Carola Dürr, Hans-Georg Knopp (ed.) (2010): Wiedervorlage Nationalkultur. Variationen über ein neuralgisches Thema, Göttingen/Munich

Beckert, Nico (2017): Die verlorenen Milliarden. Steuerflucht im Bergbausektor. Haus Wasserburg, May 2017, retrievable at: <http://www.hauswasserburg.de/aktuelles/materialien/downloads.html> [11.01.2019]

Belting, Hans/Andrea Buddensieg (2018): Ein Afrikaner in Paris. Léopold Sédar Senghor und die Zukunft der Moderne, Munich

Benjamin, Walter (1980 [1972]): Strenge Kunstwissenschaft <second version>, in: Gesammelte Schriften, vol. III, ed. Hella Tiedemann-Bartels, Frankfurt/M., p. 369-374

Benjamin, Walter (1982): Passagen-Projekt, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Frankfurt/M

Bentzien, Joachim (2007): Die völkerrechtlichen Schranken der nationalen Souveränität im 21. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt/M.

Berdal, Mats/Mónica Serrano (ed.) (2002): *Transnational Organized Crime and International Security. Business as Usual?* London

Bertelsmann Stiftung, Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg (ed.) (2014): *Vielfältige Demokratie. Kernergebnisse der Studie „Partizipation im Wandel – Unsere Demokratie zwischen Wählen, Mitmachen und Entscheiden“*, Gütersloh

Beyersdörfer, Frank (2004): *Multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Begriffe, Phänomene, Verhaltensregeln*, Münster

Bhabha, Homi (Hg.) (1990): *Nation and Narration*, New York

Bienfait, Agathe (2006): *Im Gehäuse der Zugehörigkeit. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Mainstream-Multikulturalismus*, Wiesbaden

Blumenreich, Ulrike/Ole Löding (2017): *Synergien auswärtiger Kulturpolitik im Inland. Am Beispiel von Kommunen*, ifa: Stuttgart. (Ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy)

Böckenförde, Ernst Wolfgang (2007): *Preface*, in: *Der säkularisierte Staat. Sein Charakter, seine Rechtfertigung und seine Probleme im 21. Jahrhundert*, Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung, Munich

Böhme, Klaus (ed.) (1975): *„Aufruf an die Kulturwelt“ im Oktober 1914*, in: *Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg*, with an introduction by Klaus Böhme, Stuttgart

Bollenbeck, Georg (1994): *Bildung und Kultur. Glanz und Elend eines deutschen Deutungsmusters*, Frankfurt/M.

Bommes, Michael (2003): *Der Mythos des transnationalen Raumes. Oder: Worin besteht die Herausforderung des Transnationalismus für die Migrationsforschung?*, in: Dietrich Thränhardt/Uwe Hunger (ed.), *Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat*, Leviathan Sonderheft 22/2003, p. 90-116

Brühl, Tanja et al. (ed.) (2001): *Privatisierung der Weltpolitik: Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess*, Bonn

Bundesregierung (2018): Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 07.02.2018, Berlin

Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (ed.) (2017): 5. Armuts- und Reichtumsbericht der Bundesregierung, Kurzfassung, Bonn

Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (ed.) (2012): Erster Engagementbericht – Für eine Kultur der Mitverantwortung. Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission und Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 17/10580, Berlin

Burbank, Jane/Frederick Cooper (ed.) (2010): Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton

Canzler, Weert et al. (ed.) (2016): Tracing Mobilities: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective, London, New York

Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000 [1995]): Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critiques of Subaltern Studies, in: Vinayak Chaturvedi (ed.), Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, London/New York, p. 256-280

Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000): Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism

Chatterjee, Partha (1993): The Nation and its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton

Cicero: De oratore, 2.36

Conze, Eckart et al. (2010): Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, Munich, p. 651-693

Croitoru, Joseph (2018): Rondo a la Turca e zingarese, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 04.04.2018

Dahrendorf, Ralf (1969): Gesamtplan für die Auswärtige Kulturpolitik. Notwendigkeit eines wechselseitigen Verständnisses der inneren Entwicklung der Völker. Vierte Epoche einer zwischenstaatlichen Kultur- und Gesellschaftspolitik, in: Bulletin der Bundesregierung No. 147, 03.12.1969, p. 1254-1256

Dewey, John (2011 [1916]): *Demokratie und Erziehung. Eine Einleitung in die philosophische Pädagogik*, Weinheim

Dhawan, Nikita/Shalini Randeria (2013): Perspectives on globalization and subalternity, in: Graham Huggan (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies*, Oxford, p. 559-586

Diefenbach, Heike (2010): *Kinder und Jugendliche aus Migrantenfamilien im deutschen Bildungssystem. Erklärungen und empirische Befunde*, Wiesbaden

Diehl, Claudia/Matthias Koenig (2009): Religiosität türkischer Migranten im Generationenverlauf – ein Befund und einige Erklärungsversuche, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 38/2009, p. 300–319

Dilthey, Wilhelm (1991 [1889]): *Archive für Literatur*, in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 15, ed. Karlfried Gründer, Göttingen, p. 1–16

Diner, Dan (ed.) (1987): *Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit*, Frankfurt am Main

Diner, Dan (2010): *Zeitenschwelle. Gegenwartsfragen an die Geschichte*, Munich

Düwell, Kurt (2016): „Soft Power“ und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, vol. 98/issue 2, p. 439-450

European Commission (2014): *Maximizing the impact of cultural diplomacy in EU foreign policy*, Press Release 07.04.2014, retrievable at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-382_uk.htm [11.01.2019]

European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2016): *Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations*, joint notification to the European Parliament and Council, 08.06.2016, Brussels

Engelhardt, Marc (2018): *Weltgemeinschaft am Abgrund. Warum wir eine starke UNO brauchen*, Berlin

Erlar, Gisela/Margit Gottstein (2017): *Lehren aus der Flüchtlingspolitik 2014-2016. Überlegungen für die übergreifende Kommunikation, Koordination und Kooperation*, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

European Council (2018): Inclusive integration strategies: Towards a shared model, Strassbourg 2018, abrufbar unter: <https://rm.coe.int/policy-lab-on-inclusive-integration-inclusive-integration-strategies-t/16808ae1c6> [11.01.2019]

Feindt, Gregor, Bernhard Gißibl and Johannes Paulmann (ed.) (2016): Kulturelle Souveränität. Zur historischen Analyse von Deutungs- und Handlungsmacht, Göttingen

Fohrmann, Jürgen (1989): Das Projekt der deutschen Literaturgeschichte. Entstehung und Scheitern einer nationalen Poesiegeschichtsschreibung zwischen Humanismus und Deutschem Kaiserreich, Stuttgart

Fonagy, Peter et al. (2004): Affektregulierung, Mentalisierung und die Entwicklung des Selbst, Stuttgart

Francois, Etienne/Hagen Schulz (Hg.) (2001): Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, 3 volumes, Munich

Frank, Michael C./Gabriele Rippl (ed.) (2007): Arbeit am Gedächtnis, Munich

Geertz, Clifford (1973): Thick Description: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture, in: Interpretation of Culture, New York

George, Susan/Shadow Sovereigns (2015): How Global Corporations are Seizing Power, Cambridge (Mass.)

Gellner, Ernest (1965): Thought and Change, London

Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C.E. and Mark C. Donfried (ed.) (2010): Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, Berghahn

Götz, Irene (2011): Deutsche Identitäten. Die Wiederentdeckung des Nationalen nach 1989, Cologne, Weimar, Vienna

Görge, Andreas (2017): Menschen bewegen. Speech on occasion of the year end of the Directorate of Culture and Communication at the German Federal Foreign Office, 12.12.2017

Greiffenhagen, Martin/Silvia Greiffenhagen (1993): Eine Nation – Zwei politische Kulturen, in: Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Deutschland. Eine Nation – doppelte Geschichte. Materialien zum deutschen Selbstverständnis, Cologne, p. 29–45

Greve, Andreas (1999): „Weinen bildet nicht“. Was in Buchenwald heute zu lernen ist, in: Spiegel Spezial 08/1999, p. 132-137

Grimm, Dieter (1990): Verfassung (II.), in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politischen-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhard Koselleck, vol. IV.

Grimm, Dieter (2009): Souveränität. Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlüsselbegriffs, Berlin

Grimm, Dieter (2012): Europas Verfassung, in: Die Zukunft der Verfassung II. Auswirkungen von Europäisierung und Globalisierung, Berlin 2012, p. 212-240

Grimm, Dieter (2016): Europa ja – aber welches? Zur Verfassung der Europäischen Demokratie, Munich

Grimm, Jacob (1847): Verhandlungen der Germanisten zu Frankfurt am Main am 24., 25. und 26. September 1846, Frankfurt/M.

Guérot, Ulrike (2016): Warum Europa eine Republik werden muss! Eine politische Utopie, Bonn

Guggenberger, Bernd/Claus Offe (ed.) (1984): An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie. Politik und Soziologie der Mehrheitsregel, Opladen

Habermas, Jürgen (1974 [1962]): Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied/Berlin

Habermas, Jürgen(1998): Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie.

Häger, Benjamin/Matthias Wiesrecker (2014): Neue Formen der Bürgerbeteiligung?! Ergebnisse einer Online-Befragung der Stadtplanungsämter deutscher Mittel- und Großstädte zum Einsatz und zur Bewertung von Bürgerbeteiligung, retrievable at: https://www.netzwerk-buergerbeteiligung.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/PDF-Dokumente/newsletter_beitraege/nbb_beitrag_haeger_wiesrecker_141105.pdf [11.01.2019]

Halbwachs, Maurice (1985): Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen, Frankfurt/M. (Orig. Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, 1925)

Hall, Stuart (1992): The west and the rest: Discourse and power, in: Stuart Hall/Bram Gieben (ed.), *Formations of modernity*, Cambridge, p. 275-320

Hartmann, Michael (2014): *Soziale Ungleichheit – Kein Thema für die Eliten?* Frankfurt/M.

Hartmann, Michael (2014): Deutsche Eliten: Die wahre Parallelgesellschaft? in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (15/2014), retrievable at: <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/181764/deutsche-eliten-die-wahre-parallelgesellschaft?p=all> [11.01.2019]

Hauk, Niels (2014): Die grüne Revolution an der Tankstelle? Die Relevanz politischer Narrative am Beispiel der Einführung des Biokraftstoffes E10, in: Frank Gadinger/ Sebastian Jarzebski/ Taylan Yildiz (ed.), *Politische Narrative. Konzepte – Analysen – Forschungspraxis*, Wiesbaden, p. 173-200

Heinz, Wolfgang S. (2005): Lehren für den „Tag danach“. Wie Wahrheitskommissionen helfen können, Konflikte beizulegen, in: *Internationale Politik*, May, p. 44-50

Herder, Johann Gottfried (1989): *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, vol. 6 der Werke in zehn Bänden, ed. Martin Nollacher et.al. Frankfurt/M.

Herwarth, Hans Heinrich von (1965): Die Bedeutung des Kulturellen in den auswärtigen Beziehungen, in: *Aus der Schule der Diplomatie. Beiträge zu Außenpolitik, Recht, Kultur, Menschenführung*, Düsseldorf/Vienna 1965, p. 403-412.

Higgot, Richard/Virginia Proud (2017): *Populist-Nationalism and Foreign Policy. Cultural Diplomacy, International Interaction and Resilience*, ifa: Stuttgart. (Ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy)

Hilgert, Markus (2018): *Wettbewerb der Narrative*, interview by Nadja Al-Khalaf with the secretary general of the Kulturstiftung der Länder [Cultural Foundation of the Federal States], 26th July 2018, <https://www.kulturstiftung.de/im-wettbewerb-der-narrative/> (emphasis added by: S.W.)

Hilmer, Richard et al. (2017): *Einstellung und soziale Lebenslage. Eine Spurensuche nach Gründen für rechtspopulistische Orientierung, auch unter Gewerkschaftsmitgliedern*, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Working Paper der Forschungsförderung No. 44, July 2017

Hobsbawm, Eric J./Ranger, Terence (ed.) (1983): *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983

Bibliography

- Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1992): Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today, in: Anthropology Today 8, 1. February
- Holtmann, Everhard et al. (2015): Deutschland 2014. 25 Jahre Friedliche Revolution und Deutsche Einheit – Ergebnisse eines Forschungsprojekts, Berlin
- Hoppe, Marie (2014): Wertewelt Bürgerbeteiligung. Eine Studie zu den Einstellungen von Politik, Verwaltungen und Bürger/innen (= mitarbeiten.skript No. 07), Bonn
- Hroch, Miroslav (1993): From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe, in: New Left Review 198 (March–April 1993), p. 3–20
- Hunger, Uwe (2003): Brain drain und brain gain: Migration und Entwicklung, in: Thränhardt/Hunger, Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, Wiesbaden, p. 35-57
- Ignatieff, Michael (1996): Articles of Faith, in: Index on Censorship No. 5/1996, p. 110-113
- Ingendaay, Paul (2017): Der Agent, der aus der Kultur kam, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8.12.2017
- Ischinger, Wolfgang (2018): Welt in Gefahr. Deutschland und Europa in unsicheren Zeiten, Berlin 2018
- Jelinek, Georg (1909): Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin
- Juergensmeyer, Mark (2002): The Paradox of Nationalism in a Global World, in: Ulf Hedetoft, Mette Hjort (ed.), The Postnational Self, Minnesota/ London, p. 3-17
- Julien, Francois (2017): Es gibt keine kulturelle Identität, Berlin
- Kant, Immanuel (1784): Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 8, Berlin 1923
- Kappel, Robert (2017): Deutschlands neue Afrikapolitik vor dem Aufbruch, in: GIGA Focus Afrika, No. 1, March 2017

Bibliography

Kappel, Robert (2018): Afrika braucht einen anderen Entwicklungsweg (29.5.2018), retrievable at Makronom: <https://makronom.de/afrika-braucht-einen-anderen-entwicklungsweg-26684> [11.01.2019]

Kepel, Gilles (2012): Banlieue de la République, Paris

Kepel, Gilles (2015): Terreur dans l'Hexagone. Genèse du djihad français, Paris

Kepel, Gilles (2016): Der Bruch. Frankreichs gespaltene Gesellschaft, Munich

Kern, Kristine (2003): Globale Governance durch transnationale Netzwerkorganisationen

Kern, Kristine (2004): Globale Governance durch transnationale Netzwerkorganisationen, in: Dieter Gosewinkel et al. (ed.), Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational, Berlin, p. 285-307

Khilnani, Sunil (2012 [1997]): The Idea of India, Penguin Book India

Kilchmann, Esther (2009): Verwerfungen in der Einheit. Geschichten von Nation und Familie um 1840, Munich

Kleinert, Hubert (2018): Die AfD und ihre Mitglieder. Eine Analyse mit Auswertung einer exemplarischen Mitgliederbefragung hessischer Kreisverbände, Wiesbaden

Knigge, Volkhard (2015): Warum Flüchtlinge KZ-Gedenkstätten besuchen sollen, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.12.2015

Knigge, Volkhard (2018): Statement in the context of the ifa workshop "Jenseits von Innen und außen. Perspektiven postnationaler Kulturpolitik", 24.05.2018, Berlin

Knipp, Karsten (2018): Im Taumel. 1918 – Ein europäisches Schicksalsjahr, Darmstadt

Kohl, Karl-Heinz (2017): Alte Heimat, neue Heimat? Die Rückbesinnung auf das Eigene in einer globalisierten Welt, in: Forschung & Lehre 4/2017, p. 304-305

Bibliography

Kohlstruck, Michael (2018): Rechte Gewalt in Ost und West. Wie lassen sich die höheren Zahlen in den neuen Bundesländern erklären? (18.06.2018) in: Deutschlandarchiv der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, retrievable at: <http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutschlandarchiv/270811/rechte-gewalt-in-ost-und-west> [11.01.2019]

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (n.d.): Türkische Medien in Deutschland, Almanya Infodienst No. 4, retrievable at: https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=2aae0c64-e263-288d-d54f-41ffb1a42d57&groupId=252038 [11.01.2019]

Koopmanns, Ruud (2017): Assimilation oder Multikulturalismus? Bedingungen gelungener Integration, Berlin

Koselleck, Reinhard (1989): „Erfahrungsraum“ und „Erwartungshorizont“ – zwei historische Kategorien, in: Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt/Main, p. 349-375

Krastev, Ivan (2017): Europadämmerung. Ein Essay. Translated from English by Michael Bischoff, Berlin

Kroeber, Alfred Louis/Clyde Kluckhohn (1963 [1952]): Culture. A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, New York

Le Goff, Jacques (1992 [1977]): Geschichte und Gedächtnis, Frankfurt/M.

Lemche, Erwin (2014): Emotion und frühe Interaktion. Die Emotionsentwicklung innerhalb der frühen Mutter-Kind-Interaktion, Berlin

Leuzinger-Bohleber, Marianne et al. (ed.) (2017): Flucht, Migration und Trauma: Die Folgen für die nächste Generation, Göttingen

Lyotard, Francois (1986 [1979]): Das Postmoderne Wissen, Vienna

Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M.

Mackert, Jürgen (1999): Kampf um Zugehörigkeit: Nationale Staatsbürgerschaft als Modus sozialer Schließung, Wiesbaden

Bibliography

Malik, Kenan (2017): *Das Unbehagen in den Kulturen: eine Kritik des Multikulturalismus und seiner Gegner*, Berlin

Mann, Thomas (1993): *Gedanken zum Krieg*, in: *Essays vol. I: Frühlingssturm*, ed. Hermann Kurzke, Stephan Stachorski, Frankfurt/M., p. 188-205

Mar Castro Varela, María do/Nikita Dhawan (2017): *Postkoloniale Studien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Die IB dekolonisieren*, in: Frank Sauer/Carlo Masala (ed.), *Handbuch internationale Beziehungen*, 2nd edition Wiesbaden, p. 233-253

Marschall, Christoph von (2018): *Wir verstehen die Welt nicht mehr. Deutschlands Entfremdung von seinen Freunden*, Freiburg

Mbembe, Achille (2000): *De la Postcolie. Essai sur l'imagination politique dans l'Afrique contemporaine*, Paris

Mbembe, Achille (2013): *Critique de la raison nègre*, Paris

McGregor, Neil (2016): *Herausforderungen eines Weltmuseums*, in: *Berliner Schloss – special edition*, No. 86, p. 36-39

Melzer, Wolfgang et al. (ed.) (2015): *Handbuch Aggression, Gewalt und Kriminalität bei Jugendlichen*, Bad Heilbrunn

Mishra, Pankaj (2014): *The western model is rotten*, in: *The Guardian*, 14.10.2014

Mishra, Pankaj (2015): *Ahmet Hamdi Tampinar and the waiting of history*, in: *The Guardian*, 28.02.2015

Mokre, Monika (2012): *Kulturpolitik statt Kulturdiplomatie*, report on the conference of the "Austrian Cultural Forum" New York on the topic of cultural diplomacy, 12.10.2012, retrievable at: <http://www.igkultur.at/artikel/kulturpolitik-statt-kulturdiplomatie> [11.01.2019]

Mommsen, Wolfgang (1995): *Bürgerstolz und Weltmachtstreben. Deutschland unter Wilhelm II. 1890-1918*, Berlin

Müntefering, Michelle (2018): *Kulturpolitik ist Außenpolitik*, in: *Der Spiegel* 21, 19.05.2018

- Müntefering, Michelle (2018): interview with Sonja Zekri, Wettbewerb der Narrative, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung 15.06.2018
- Neuhäuser, Christian (2018): Reichtum als moralisches Problem, Berlin 2018
- Nölke, Andreas (2005): Transnationale Politiknetzwerke in den Nord-Süd-Beziehungen, in: NORD-SÜD aktuell, 1/2005, p. 67-85
- Nölke, Andreas (2017): Transnationale Akteure und internationale Politik: Theoretische Forschungsperspektiven und empirische Illustration am Beispiel von Nichtregierungsorganisationen, in: Handbuch Internationale Beziehungen, p. 779-802
- Nora, Pierre (1990 [1984]): Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis, Berlin
- Normann Andersen, Vibeke/Kasper Hansen (2007): How deliberation makes better citizens: The Danish Deliberative Poll on the euro, in: European Journal of Political Research, 46/2007, p. 531–556
- Nye, Joseph (1990): Bound to lead. The changing nature of American power, New York
- Nye, Joseph (2004): Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York
- Oltmer, Jochen (2016): Kleine Globalgeschichte der Flucht im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung "Das Parlament", 66. No. 26/27, p. 18–25, retrievable at: <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/229811/flucht-historisch> [11.01.2019]
- Oltmer, Jochen (ed.) (2016): Handbuch Staat und Migration in Deutschland seit dem 17. Jahrhundert, Berlin
- Ong, Aihwa (2005 [1999]): Flexible Staatsbürgerschaften. Die kulturelle Logik von Transnationalität, Frankfurt/M.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen/Niels P. Peterson (2003): Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen, Munich
- authorless (2018): Protokoll der 13. Integrationsministerkonferenz, on 15th and 16th March 2018 in Nuremberg, retrievable at: https://www.stmas.bayern.de/imperia/md/content/stmas/stmas_inet/integration/180411_ergebnisprotokoll_intmk2018.pdf [11.01.2019]

Ovens, Carsten (2017): Filterblasen – Ausgangspunkte einer neuen, fremdverschuldeten Unmündigkeit? in: kommunikation@gesellschaft, vol. 18, article 7, p. 1-25

Plessner, Helmuth (1974): Die verspätete Nation. Über die politische Verführbarkeit des bürgerlichen Geistes, Frankfurt/M.

Pollak, Detlef et al. (2016): Integration und Religion aus der Sicht von Türkeistämmigen in Deutschland. Representative survey by TNS Emnid commissioned by the "Religion and Politics" Cluster of Excellence at the University of Münster, Münster

Prantl, Heribert (2017): Warum de Maizières Leitkultur-Katalog gesellschaftsschädlich ist, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 01.05.2017

Pries, Ludger (2001): Internationale Migration, Bielefeld

Pulzer, Peter (2004): Die Entstehung des politischen Antisemitismus in Deutschland und Österreich 1867 bis 1914, Göttingen

Renan, Ernest (1996 [1882]): Qu'est ce qu'une nation?, Paris. German: Was ist eine Nation? Rede am 11. März 1882 an der Sorbonne, mit einem Essay von Walter Euchner, Hamburg

Ritter, Ilka (2017): Illegale Finanzströme: eine Analyse und erste Handlungsempfehlungen, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Said, Edward W. (1979): Orientalism, New York

Salzburg Global Seminar (2017): Session Report 573, Summary, February 7-12

Sarkar, Sumit (2000): Orientalism Revisited: Saidian Frameworks in the Writing of Modern Indian History, in: Chaturvedi, Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, p. 239-255

Sarr, Felwine/ Bénédicte Savoy (2018): Restituer le Patrimoine Africain, Paris

Savoy, Bénédicte (2017): Die Provinienz der Kultur. Von der Trauer des Verlusts zum universalen Menschheitserbe, Berlin

Sauer, Martina/Dirk Halm (2009): Erfolge und Defizite der Integration türkeistämmiger Einwanderer. Entwicklung der Lebenssituation 1999-2008, Wiesbaden

Schwärzel, Mirko (2014): *The Chances of Framework Agreements for a Citizen-Powered Europe*, Europa Bottom-Up No. 7, Munich

Scott-Smith, Gilles/Charlotte A. Lerg (ed.) (2017): *Campaigning Culture and the Cold War. The Journals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom*, Palgrave Macmillan

Schulz, Tanjev et al. (2017): *Erosion des Vertrauens zwischen Medien und Publikum?*, in: *Media Perspektiven* (5/2017), p. 246-259

Sheehan, James (2006): *The Problem of Sovereignty in European History*, in: *American Historical Review*, 111, No. 1 (Feb. 2006)

Slaughter, Ann-Marie (2004): *A New World Order*, Princeton

Spiritova, Marketa (2017): *Ethnografische Perspektiven auf Erinnerungsorte, nationale Mythen und EU-Europäische Standortbestimmungen im östlichen Europa*, in: Daniel Draszek (ed.), *Kulturvergleichende Perspektiven auf das östliche Europa. Fragestellungen, Forschungsansätze und Methoden*, Regensburg, p. 9-32

Sternberger, Dolf (1990 [1970]): *Verfassungspatriotismus*, Frankfurt/M.

Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung (ed.) (2018): *Identifikation und politische Partizipation türkeistämmiger Zugewanderter in Nordrhein-Westfalen und in Deutschland*, Essen, retrievable at: <https://cdn.website-editor.net/09fe2713f5da44ff99ead273b339f17d/files/uploaded/2017.pdf> [11.01.2019]

Stöckmann, Jochen (2018): *Aufwertung der Kultur könnte sich als Bumerang erweisen*, auf: deutschlandfunk.de (05.02.2018), retrievable at: https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/kulturpolitik-aufwertung-der-kultur-koennte-sich-als.691.de.html?dram:article_id=410068 [11.01.2019]

Stollberg-Rillinger, Barbara (ed.) (2005): *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?* Berlin (*Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, appendix 35)

Sütterlin, Sabine, Alexandra Reinig and Reinhard Klingholz (2018): *Nahrung, Jobs und Nachhaltigkeit. Was Afrikas Landwirtschaft leisten muss*, Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, Berlin

Taylor, Charles (1993): *Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung*, Frankfurt/M.

Ther, Philip (2017): Die Außenseiter. Flucht, Flüchtlinge und Integration im modernen Europa, Berlin

Tibi, Bassam (2001): Leitkultur als Wertekonsens. Bilanz einer missglückten deutschen Debatte, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, issue 1-2/2001

Tibi, Bassam (2000): Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft, Munich

Tibi, Bassam (2001): Europa ohne Identität? Leikultur oder Wertebeliebigkeit, Munich

Troebst, Stefan (2013): Tidal Eastern Europe. Die pulsierende Staatenlandschaft Ostmitteleuropas (1000-2000), in: Andronikashvili/Weigel, Grundordnungen, p. 213-229

Troeltsch, Ernst (1917): Humanismus und Nationalismus in unserem Bildungswesen, Berlin

Troeltsch, Ernst (1918): Deutsche Bildung, in: Schriften zur Politik und Kulturphilosophie (1918-1923), ed. Gangolf Hübinger, Berlin/New York 2002, p. 161-206

Troeltsch, Ernst (2002): Nationalgefühl, article in the newspaper "Berliner Tageblatt" in February 1919, in: Schriften zur Politik und Kulturphilosophie, p. 55-60

Tylor, Edward B. (1871): Primitive Culture: Researches in the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom, London

UNESCO (2018): Bericht zur Rolle der Kulturpolitik für die Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung (Sustainable Development Goals, SDG): Kulturministerien in die Umsetzung der SDG einbinden. Kulturpolitik neu | gestalten. Kreativität fördern, Entwicklung voranbringen, retrievable at: <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/> [11.01.2019]

van der Laan, Fanca (2017): Transnational Organized Crime, Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations

Varela, María do Mar Castro/ Nikita Dhawan, Postkoloniale Studien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Die IB dekolonisieren, in: Frank Sauer/Carlo Masala (ed.), Handbuch internationale Beziehungen, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 2017, p. 233-253

Verne, Julia/Martin Doevenspeck (2012): „Bitte dableiben!“ Sedentarismus als Konstante der Migrationsforschung in Afrika, in: IMIS-Beiträge 42/2012, p. 61-112

Bibliography

Vogl, Joseph (2015): Der Souveränitätseffekt, Zurich

Weber, Eugen (1976): Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914, Stanford

Weiffen, Brigitte (2009): Die Ausbreitung der Demokratie – eine Komponente der Globalisierung? in: Johannes Kessler/Christian Steiner (ed.), Facetten der Globalisierung. Zwischen Ökonomie, Politik und Kultur, Wiesbaden, p. 96-116

Weigel, Sigrid (1994): Lesbarkeit – Zum Bild- und Körpergedächtnis in der Theorie, in: Bilder des kulturellen Gedächtnisses, Dülmen-Hiddingsel, p. 39-57

Weigel, Sigrid (2013): Die Lehre des leeren Grabes. Begründung der deutschen Kulturnation nach 1871 und nach 1989, in: Andronikashvili/Weigel, Grundordnungen, p. 147-165

Weigel, Sigrid (2015): Grammatologie der Bilder, Berlin

Weller, Christoph/Richard Bösch (2015): Globalisierung und transnationale Konflikte: Frieden aus einer Global-Governance-Perspektive, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

White, Hayden (1986 [1978]): Auch Klio dichtet, oder die Fiktion des Faktischen: Studien zur Topologie des historischen Diskurses, Stuttgart

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) (2010): The Globalization of Crime,

White, Hayden (1991 [1973]): Metahistory. Die historische Einbildungskraft im 19. Jahrhundert in Europa, Frankfurt/M.

Wolff, Larry (1994): Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford

About the author

Prof. Dr. Sigrid Weigel is an expert in literary studies and cultural science, she has taught in Hamburg, Zurich, Berlin and Princeton among others and from 1999 to 2015, she was the director of the Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL – Centre for Literary and Cultural Research). She established a programme of intercultural literary studies at the University of Hamburg in the 1970s/1980s, she has worked for many years on the topic of cultural memory, cultural heritage and national culture/culture nation, and at the ZfL, among other things, she headed up projects on the plural culture of Europe, on dialectic of secularisation and the survival of religious cultures.

Contact: weigel@zfl-berlin.org; <http://www.zfl-berlin.org/person/weigel.html>

Imprint

This study was developed in the context of ifa's Research Programme "Culture and Foreign Policy" and is published in the ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy.

The Research Programme is funded by the Federal Foreign Office.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of ifa.

Publisher: ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e. V.),
Charlottenplatz 17, 70173 Stuttgart,
P.O. box 10 24 63, 70020 Stuttgart,
Germany, info@ifa.de, www.ifa.de
© ifa 2019

Author: Prof. Dr. Sigrid Weigel

Editing:
ifa Research Programme
"Culture and Foreign Policy"

Translation: TL Translationes GmbH

Credits: © iulias, shutterstock

Design: Eberhard Wolf, Munich

ISBN: 978-3-948205-04-1

Further ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Publications



Higgott, Richard; Proud, Virginia: „Populist-Nationalism and Foreign Policy: Cultural Diplomacy, International Interaction and Resilience“, Stuttgart: ifa, 2017 (ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy)



Meister, Stefan (ed.): „Understanding Russian Communication Strategy: Case Studies of Serbia and Estonia“
Stuttgart: ifa, 2018 (ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy)



Rebok, Sandra: „Wahrnehmung Humboldts in Lateinamerika. Chancen und Herausforderungen einer Themensaison“ Stuttgart: ifa, 2019 (ifa-Edition Kultur und Außenpolitik)



Vries, Gijs de: „Cultural Freedom in European Foreign Policy“
Stuttgart: ifa, 2019 (ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy)

Available online: www.ssoar.info or www.ifa.de



Transnational foreign cultural policy – Beyond national culture

Prerequisites and perspectives for
the intersection of domestic and foreign policy

An overview of the development of the German foreign cultural and educational policy [FCEP], the analysis of rhetoric, terminology and different cultural concepts are the starting point for the discussion of a contemporary FCEP, which is committed to global regulatory objectives, acts in dialogue with partner countries and relies on cooperation with civil society actors, at home as well as internationally.

Intercultural politics at home and foreign cultural policy go hand in hand. The biggest problem of a globally effective FCEP is the loss of credibility of German development policy as well as a lack of reflection concerning EU development policy with regard to the legacy of colonial history.

Contrary to the postcolonial rejection of the nation state, the study argues for a strengthening of democratic, constitutional structures.