Cultural Patterns of Enlargement: Do Small Central European States Share Common Values?\textsuperscript{71}

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**Abstract:** The ongoing process of Europeanization raises the question of citizen support. Political actors in the relevant states seek to promote the acceptance of civil society for this development. The political bid for consensus building around EU integration and the enlargement process is accompanied by public campaigns. Against this background this paper deals with selected images that figure prominently in these campaigns, using three small EU members of the Central European region – Austria, Hungary and Slovakia – as examples. Starting from the assumption that national and European images used in the respective campaigns refer to underlying cultural patterns as frames of political orientation one may analyse commonalities and differences in the perception of political roles of the respective states in the new Europe.

**Keywords:** EU integration and enlargement, political advertisement, public campaigns, images, cultural patterns, CEE, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia

**Preface**

The following remarks are based on preliminary results of a comparative and multidisciplinary research project which is currently being conducted within the framework of the research programme *New Orientations for Democracy in Europe*, funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. The Public Construction of Europe (PCE)\textsuperscript{72} project combines qualitative social science approaches with methods of semiotic analysis and focuses on the symbolic level of politics, in particular on the field of political advertising and campaigning.

*The Public Construction of Europe* starts from the following assumptions:

– The ongoing process of Europeanization raises the question of citizen support, which cannot be taken for granted;

– Political actors in the relevant states seek to promote the acceptance of civil society for this development;

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\textsuperscript{72} http://gerda.univie.ac.at/advertisingeurope (Project Management: Andreas Pribersky, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna): the consortium consists of the Department of Political Science of the University of Vienna, the Institute for Socio-Semiotic Studies, the Institute of Political Science of the University of Lyon, the Department of Political Science of the University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration in Budapest and the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Arts of the Comenius University in Bratislava.
The political bid for consensus building around EU integration and the enlargement process is accompanied by political advertisement and public campaigns; these political campaigns have become a decisive policy-making instrument due to the importance of the mass media, which has transformed the entire texture of politics, in political communication.

Nowadays, the political sphere is mainly perceived as an infinite sequence of images. Andreas Dörner (1999 & 2000) calls this phenomenon the “visual turn” in political mediation.

Against this background, the purpose of the PCE project is to analyse those representations of Europe and the EU that appear in political advertisements and are generated in political campaigns on European integration and enlargement.

Below, selected images that figure prominently in these campaigns will be presented and analysed from a comparative point of view, using Austria, Hungary and Slovakia – three small EU members of the Central European region – as examples. Assuming that national and European images used in political campaigns refer to underlying cultural patterns (including identity and mentality aspects) as frames of political orientation, one may analyse commonalities and differences in the respective self-perceptions and the role models the particular states follow in the new Europe.

The three small European states, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, have been chosen due to:

- common historic experiences they share and that proved their resilience despite the European divide after 1945, and the separation over decades as a consequence of the Iron Curtain, on the one hand
- similar political culture patterns as characterized, inter alia, by Peter A. Ulram (2003), that mark significant differences between the Central European and other European regions, on the other hand.

Starting from these presumptions, one may ask how the selected countries evaluate their European role and how far the challenges they actually face within the European integration and enlargement process are represented in public views and political images used in EU campaigning. Also, to what extent the small size of the three states plays a decisive role should be questioned: is it seen as a chance, as an asset or does – from their point of view – smallness entail specific threats caused by the EU integration process? Furthermore, the issue is to be raised whether smallness is generally addressed in the respective campaigns, and whether it is chosen as a central theme.

The choice of themes and images was analysed by identifying themes which are frequently and prominently used in Austrian as well as Hungarian and Slovak EU campaigns – albeit with a different emphasis.

Below I will focus on three selected groups of themes occurring in EU campaigns:

- EU accession as a historic turning point and a benchmark for the definition of the country’s European role;
- EU membership as a promise of advantages and better chances;
- EU as a global player that provides new role models for small states.
EU accession as a watershed in national history and ultimate proof of the country’s importance for Europe

In 2005 Austria celebrates not only the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Second Republic and the 50th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty as well as the declaration of permanent neutrality, but also the 10th anniversary of the country’s entry into the European Union. The latter has been labelled by politicians as the real end of the post-war period, the final step in the process of rebuilding Austria after the Second World War. Furthermore, in the wake of 1989, as a consequence of the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Austria faced an identity crisis of sorts due to the loss of its role as the “island of the blessed” in between the two blocs. The role of a neutral meeting point and trustworthy go-between in the centre of Europe had been crucial for the national self-image for more than four decades and fitted the role of a small state in international relations perfectly.

EU membership offered the chance to redefine Austria’s place in international politics. Political advertisement reacted to the challenge in using the slogan “We are Europe” (“Wir sind Europa”) as a core message in the accession campaign. It is remarkable that this slogan was employed again to promote Austria’s first presidency of the European Council in 1998. As a matter of fact, the slogan maintains the European identity of the country, corresponding to rather than conflicting with national identity. In the Austrian collective memory its European identity has been maintained as part of national identity.

At the same time, the slogan alludes to the traditional Austrian self-image of a bridge between East and West, well known from the tourist image of Austria as the “heart of Europe”. In the run-up to accession referendum variations of the slogan “We live in Europe – We love Austria (“Wir leben in Europa – wir lieben Österreich”), “We are Europeans – We remain Austrians” (“Wir sind Europäer – Österreicher bleiben wir”) were used by the Austrian People’s Party.

Logo and slogan of the Austrian EU accession campaign 1992–1994 (Demner, Merlicek & Bergmann)

The connecting role of the country as a meeting point is as important for Hungarian self image as it is for the Austrian self-image and is also closely connected with
the metaphor of the bridge, frequently presented in tourism brochures. The image of Hungary as the most western country in Central and Eastern Europe – “Hungary as the Western Part of the East” was the traditional joke about the country during the Kádár period – is quite relevant to the supposed cultural and historical tradition of Hungary. Hungarian culture was always seen as integrating, an identity aspect that is said to help the country to fulfil its European role.

The bridge symbol served as the central theme of the accession campaign and also for the most spectacular ceremonial events in the national accession celebrations. The three most famous bridges of Budapest were decorated in different guises: the Lánchíd (Chain) Bridge, for example, offered a birthday breakfast for children born on 1 May. Celebration events used the bridge metaphor profusely, and bridge-related events took place all over the country: The topical association was: “We cross to Europe over the bridge” (Kápitany – Kápitanyi, 2004).

With reference to a famous poem of the Hungarian poet Endre Ady, Hungary is traditionally seen as a ferry country, oscillating between East and West. This theme also addresses the mediator function and was taken up in the run-up to EU accession by the Hungarian weekly HVG. The journal raised the rhetorical question “The ferry berths?” on the cover page. The picture showed a rope tied around a peg on a ship landing stage, which was decorated with the golden stars of the EU. The HVG cover conveys the impression that the small country is finally anchored to the West because of EU accession.
Hungary’s entry into the EU in 2004 was evaluated in political and public discourse as a watershed in national history. The respective debates also expressed the feeling that Hungary had only temporarily been separated from the Western part of the continent by the Soviet occupation. As a result, so-called EU junk-parties were popular in Budapest on the eve of EU accession. Collection spots were designated in the capital for objects people did not want to take along to the beautiful new world of the European Union. The objects dropped off were primarily symbols of socialist ideology. Against this backdrop, the EU means the West, the small state has to join, as it is expressed in a statement of the MSZP politician József Tóbiás: “Hungary faces two routes – a highway which leads to Europe and a swampy field path which leads to the Balkans; there is no third route“ (Népszabadság, 29 January 2003).

Compared to Austria and Hungary, the public debate about EU integration had been delayed in Slovakia. This was mainly due to domestic political developments – at least until the autumn of 1998, the question was not whether Slovakia wanted to join the EU but if the EU wanted Slovakia to join. In the case of Slovakia, EU membership was connected with the attitude of getting rid not only of the communist past but as well of those anti-democratic traditions and political culture patterns that were associated with the government of former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. From this point of view the process of Europeanization meant that Slovaks were exposed to institutions and cultures which were simply far more efficient than their own. Thus, the, Slovaks tried to identify themselves with the peoples of Western Europe. The positive perception of the EU is a reciprocal image of how people perceived Slovakia, which they most frequently
described as poor, timid, lacking democratic quality as well as having a clear potential for the future and – as a small state – relying on somebody else’s help. The image of the Union was therefore very attractive and seemed to compensate for those deficits that Slovak citizens perceived negatively in respect to their own country. The campaign in general reflected the non-controversial nature of the EU issue in Slovakia.

While Slovakia, from the perspective of its citizens, lacked European maturity in the field of politics to some extent, it was clearly pointed out in the media and public discourse that geographically speaking, the country had always been a part of Europe. Nevertheless, fears of a loss of national sovereignty of the small state were voiced in the run-up to the accession. The accession campaign reacted, inter alia, by presenting Slovakia as the missing star in the symbolic configuration of the EU.

Poster used in the Slovak EU accession campaign 2003.

Slogan: “We have the future in our hands” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)

Poster used in the Slovak EU accession campaign 2003.

Slogan: “Let’s not leave it to the others” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)
EU membership as a prospect for advantages and better chances for the country

Austrian EU membership was promoted by the government also as a promise for the increase of prosperity and economic growth. The slogan “Prosperity or Stagnation?” (“Wohlstand oder Stillstand?”) referred to the “Austrian success story” of the Second Republic that is anchored in the collective memory as a popular auto-stereotype and refers to both political and economic matters. It signals that with EU membership the success story would continue. Staying outside the EU, then, was tantamount choosing stagnation.

Slogan of the Austrian EU accession campaign 1992–1994

Moreover, refusing EU entrance by means of voting “No” in the 1994 accession referendum was portrayed as a way to marginalize the country in European and international politics. The slogan “Together or Lonely?” (“Gemeinsam oder einsam?”) suggested the request for cooperation within a larger and more powerful community, particularly for a small country like Austria. The suggestion was that under the roof of the EU, Austria, as a small state, would be able to cope much easier with those challenges and threats it faces in contemporary international economics and politics. The campaign was successful, and in the final analysis, 66.6 per cent of those who participated in the referendum voted for EU accession.
The Austrian enlargement campaign from 2002 to 2004 also resorted to the argument that especially small states are not able to solve their problems alone, by using the slogans “Cross-border problems require cross-border solutions” and “Europa – we increase our chances” (“Europa – wir vergrössern unsere Chancen”). The topics presented as cross-border problems were mainly migration, asylum, crime and ecological issues such as nuclear power plants in the border regions of the country.

It has to be noted that – though Austria shifted from the borders to the centre of the EU due to the 2004 enlargement round and Austrian companies strongly expanded into the CEE region during the last decade – the majority of Austrians were not in favour of EU enlargement in the East, an attitude that does not correspond to the aforementioned bridge metaphor. With the exception of Hungary, the former Eastern Bloc states of Central and Eastern Europe were not welcomed as EU members by the majority of the Austrian population as respective surveys showed (cf. Hintermann et al., 2001). Thus, the government tried to promote EU Eastern enlargement by means of a topic-oriented campaign, which, by the way, was hardly noticed by Austrian citizens.
The Hungarian accession campaign (cf. Kurtán, 2005), implemented by a national foundation (ÖSEUK), which was founded by the government in order to prepare Hungarian society for EU entry (http://www.ufi.hu/feltolt/ufi2003aprilis.pdf) – aimed at providing information about the advantages of EU membership and underscoring the importance of the referendum. Campaign materials such as placards, folders and advertisements in the print media, in the first phase, focused primarily on those social groups that were supposed to be particularly afraid of the consequences of EU membership, especially farmers, peasants, workers in agriculture and small entrepreneurs. The subjects suggested, for example, that EU membership would provide better chances for Hungarian agriculture, family businesses and small companies, on the one hand, and present the chance to expand to other European countries, on the other hand.
The governmental campaign was complemented by statements of Hungarian politicians such as that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, László Kovács, who stated that EU membership would not cause disadvantages, but at most some difficulties, and finally the result would make up for those troubles (Népszabadság, 17 February 2003). The small states issue was not addressed particularly in this argumentation.

The Slovak EU referendum campaign (Gyárfášová, 2005) was very general in its slogans (“We have the future in our hands”, “Let’s not leave it to the others”) and carried images of open hands, with yellow EU stars – several of them in one hand, while in the other hand just one – symbolized the bid for joining the stronger club. The slogan “It’s better to be in than out!” also pointed in the same direction. It was shown in two ways: firstly as a picture that shows a boy and a girl divided by an almost invisible glass wall; and secondly, a depiction of a fish lying outside an aquarium, out of water, in a dangerous situation.
Boomerang free cards/ Slovak EU accession campaign 2003. Slogan: “It's better to be in than out” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)

Positive public attitudes towards EU membership provided ideal conditions for the smooth course of the Euro referendum campaign. The Slovak referendum campaign did not target any specific social group and did not put a question mark over the EU membership issue. It thus reflected the stage of the EU debate in Slovakia, where EU entry was a strategic priority not just for the political élite and above all seen as a ticket for little Slovakia to join a sound and prestigious club.

However, public opinion polls conducted in spring 2003 signalled that the main problem would not be the final outcome, but sufficient voter participation and the validity of the plebiscite (there is a 50 per cent turnout quorum in Slovakia). Eventu-
ally, voter turnout reached 52 per cent of eligible voters, which was less than in other CEE countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, but more than in Hungary (45.62 per cent). The “Yes” for Slovakia’s EU membership was more than resounding (92 per cent), as was the case in Hungary (83.76 per cent).

**New role models for small states?**

According to the EB 62 survey (autumn 2004), 57 per cent of Slovak citizens thought that their country’s EU membership is a good thing. This figure is close to the EU 25 average (56 per cent) and is the second highest among the 10 new member states. Support for Hungary’s EU membership stood at 49 per cent in autumn 2004. In the case of Austria, 46 per cent viewed the country’s EU membership as an advantage.

Moreover, according to Eurobarometer, 62 per cent of Austrians came out in favour of a more assertive stance of the EU in world politics. An increase in this figure can be observed since spring 2004, especially in security matters. This contrasts with the fundamental identity factor of neutrality, which has been connected with the special role of the small Austrian state in international politics for a long time. The Austrian population seems to be in favour of EU integration as a security project too. Surveys show that Austrians still stick to neutrality as part of their identity, and the neutrality topic was used as a frequent leitmotif in EU campaigning (especially in the European Parliament election campaigns, which have not been analysed in this paper). However, 72 per cent also supported the further development of a common European foreign, security and defence policy, free of NATO influence. The opinion is held that decisions on European defence policy should be primarily taken by the EU (46 per cent); 30 per cent preferred the national government, and only 7 per cent NATO.

Interestingly enough, 63 per cent of Hungarians supported an EU common foreign policy as well as their own foreign policy, and 84 per cent agreed that the EU should further develop a common defence and security policy. Seventy-five per cent of Hungarians agreed that the EU should have a rapid reaction military force to be deployed as a trouble-shooter in case of an international crisis. Against this background it has to be mentioned that although Hungary has been a NATO member since 1999, the Hungarian EU campaign also focused on the advantage of an international security system in which large powers and their neighbours, in particular the smaller states, would act together and which would guarantee protection.

The Common Foreign Policy of the EU towards third countries was supported by 75 per cent of Slovaks, and the highest percentage of supporters (86 per cent) was recorded for the Common Defence and Security Policy. This result is probably related to the lack of interest among Slovaks in their country’s membership of NATO (Slovakia has been a member since 2004) on the one hand, and the lack of tradition in foreign policy formulation, on the other hand. Fifty-five per cent of Slovaks felt more secure thanks to Slovakia’s EU membership, but in general they did not think
their country is particularly threatened because they perceive Slovakia as too small and uninteresting to become a potential target for an attack. Fifty-six per cent wanted decisions in the field of European defence policy to be made jointly at EU level. As in Hungary, a significant majority agreed that the EU should have a rapid military reaction force to guarantee stability and peace in the world.

On top of that, public opinion polls show that smallness is mainly perceived as a potential problem for the countries’ future development. The campaigns reacted to this stereotype: The “in/out” topic was prominently used in the Austrian and the Slovak campaigns, by advertising the necessity of belonging to a larger political player in order to safeguard prosperity and economic growth, in order to guarantee that the small country avoids staying outside and thus would have to cope with forthcoming political and economic challenges alone. Entrance into a larger community was presented not only as an increase of future chances but a step towards protection and shelter as well.

At the same time citizens in all of the three countries are rather pessimistic as regards their influence in EU politics, i.e. the influence of their country. When it comes to Slovakia, only 37 per cent believed that their country’s voice counts in the EU, while in the EU 25 the corresponding figure is 68 per cent. Eighty-three per cent of Slovaks believed that the largest countries have the most power in the EU (in the EU 25 overall this opinion is shared by 75 per cent of citizens).

In respect to EU accession and enlargement campaigns it has to be stated that such topics as common foreign, defence and security policy are hardly mentioned as a concrete advantage of EU membership or a field of politics where small states too could potentially find new roles to perform on the international scene. A tentative explanation might be that EU campaigns in most countries tend to focus on so-called domestic issues and identity aspects. Ordinary citizens are not particularly interested in foreign policy.

The small state topic occurs in political campaigning on European integration and enlargement in all of the three countries as an important aspect of the national self-image, but there is no clear idea what the smallness of the respective countries could mean in the framework of a new European and geopolitical configuration and what chances it offers for the construction of a new role in international politics.

The issue that was stressed in the campaigns under analysis was the traditional European character of the small states as an identity-founding pattern that had to be proved by successful EU integration. At the same time, the entry into the European club was presented as a decisive break in the countries’ post-war history: for Austria it meant the final step of the rebuilding of the state after 1945 and the crowning of the Austrian success story. As regards Hungary and Slovakia, EU membership was linked with the decision to clearly become part of the West (Europe), as opposed to remaining in the East (sometimes identified with the Balkans). By the way, it has to be mentioned that this issue was discussed in Austria as well, on the eve of EU accession, but not with the same emphasis. The Austrian and Hungarian campaigns both stressed the
connecting and mediating function of their countries, a pattern that perfectly fits the
traditional roles of small states and goes with the national self-image. Both campaigns
also reflected tourist images of the countries.

To summarize, what is missing in the analysed campaigns – though debated among
political élite and discussed in the media – is a clear idea about the future role of the small-
er states in European enlargement, neighbourhood and international politics. Moreover,
one can hardly find any views that would indicate concepts for the formation of a new
regional or topic-related group. The diversity among European small states seems to offset
commonalities, such as shared political interests or specific properties of smallness.

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Per Asper Ad Astra. Human Security in International Relations Practice: a Comparative Study of Foreign and Development Policies of EU/HSN Member States

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Abstract: In the last 10 years “human security” has even become something of a buzzword, used by United Nations agencies, national development agencies, international as well as national NGOs and, last but not least, by international relations scholars. Besides the UN, there are other international forums where the incorporation of human security issues into foreign and development policy has been discussed – primarily in the Human Security Network (HSN) and the European Union. The main goal of this text is to analyse and compare the contemporary understanding of human security in EU/HSN member states and the human security strategies, instruments and approaches of these states. I argue that EU/HSN countries have based their human security conceptualization on strong developmental and humanitarian elements, and all of them have accepted security-development interdependence. However, the human security paradigm is not anything, what is in EU/HSN states’ policies embedded; these states have been accepting and using human security only as far as their national security strategy and EU membership makes it possible.

Key words: human security, Human Security Network, European Union, Austria, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia

Debates about security and strategies and instruments for conflict resolution have retained their place at the core of international relations theory and practice for several decades. In the post-Cold War period, when many bloody local and intrastate conflicts have broken out, a broad debate began among politicians as well as scholars about new sources of insecurity, possibilities to meet new threats and risks and about the role of the state and of international organizations in the maintenance of security. The debates showed an agreement that security is crucial, but disagreement as to what it entails and how it should be maintained.

In the 1990s in the debate about security and conflict resolution a new term appeared – “human security”. In the last 10 years “human security” has even become something of a buzzword, used by United Nations (UN) agencies, national development agencies, international as well as national NGOs and, last but not least, by international relations (IR) scholars. From the vocabulary and politics of UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), we have the feeling that human security is a broadly accepted...
term and deeply rooted approach. However, there is a group of IR actors who generally have not accepted this term – and these are states.

Despite this resistance by some states, a (small) group of countries emerged which more or less accepted the human security concept in their foreign and domestic policies. Some of the states supporting human security established a group of like-minded countries called the Human Security Network (HSN). The Network emerged from the cooperation between Canada and Norway as part of the campaign to ban landmines. It was formally launched at a conference at of Foreign Ministers (of Austria, Canada and Norway) in Bergen in 1999. Today the HSN has 12 member states: Austria; Canada; Chile; Greece; The Netherlands; Ireland; Jordan; Mali; Norway; Slovenia; Switzerland and Thailand, along with South Africa as an observer. The Human Security Network today represents “a coalition of the willing” which, politically and financially, supports various programmes and activities to strengthen human security.

Besides the HSN and the UN there are other international forums where the incorporation of human security issues into foreign and development policy has been discussed – primarily in the European Union (EU). In recent years many workshops and conferences have taken place among EU institutions, EU member states, EU member states’ NGOs and scholars about the need to incorporate human security into the EU agenda. One of first official steps in this incorporation was a document presented by Javier Solana in December 2003 – *a Secure Europe in a Better World: a European Security Strategy*. This document sees both the regional and global environment as one of the key conditions of European (EU) security. The Strategy puts forward the key security challenges, specifically terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures on EU borders and organized crime (Solana, 2003: 6 – 9). Key referent objects are the EU, its member states and population. Solana’s paper also accepts non-military threats as a challenge and understands *security as a first precondition of development and vice versa* (Solana 2003: 6 & 19). The most important instrument for ensuring EU (member states) security is ensuring the human security of the EU as well as the non-EU population (Solana, 2003: 4). To sum up, in terms of European security strategy one of most important security strategies is securing human security inside EU borders and beyond.

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74 The Human Security Network grew out of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and Norway, signed at Lysfen Island, Norway in 1998. The HSN wanted, through an informal and flexible mechanism, to promote actions on behalf of human security. The HSN is today a forum for consultation and its actions are based on ministerial meetings at least once a year (Fuentes, 2001).

75 One of the states which also supports human security but is not a member of HSN is Japan. It supports human security programmes and strategies primarily within the UN framework, particularly the activities of the Human Security Commission, UNDP and UNHCR.

76 The development-human security nexus is seen also in other EU documents – see for example the *Annual Report 2004* on the European Community’s development policy and external assistance.

77 … in an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand … (Solana, 2003: 11). … Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well governed (Solana, 2003: 12).
The European security strategy therefore includes at least two security paradigms: national security and human security. However, the “war on terrorism” marginalizes human security and development issues in EU policies. Development aid is becoming secondary to, and subsumed by, foreign policy concerns.

The deepening of discussion and the first practical steps towards incorporating human security into the EU agenda can be observed during the EU presidency of Ireland (first half of 2004) and the Netherlands (second half of 2004). The Irish and Dutch EU presidencies significantly influenced the understanding and integration of human security into EU policies. As the Irish and Dutch example shows, EU/HSN member states can have a great impact on the integration and embedding of human security into EU security doctrine and policies. In addition to Ireland and the Netherlands, the EU/HSN member states are Austria, Greece and Slovenia.

The main goal of this text is to analyse and compare the contemporary understanding of human security in EU/HSN member states and the human security strategies, instruments and approaches of these states. This can give us a perspective on future EU security conceptualization, strategies and instruments, which are still in the process of formation.

The article is divided into four parts. Firstly, I will introduce a brief history of the concept of human security. Secondly, I will show how HSN member states understand human security and what the difference is between the HSN’s conception of human security and other human security conceptions, mainly the conception of the UN and its agencies. Thirdly, I will discuss the main issues of the HSN’s agenda, i.e. issues which the HSN – as a group of like-minded states – prioritizes. I will also briefly mention the values, principles, norms and rules that HSN states share. The fourth part of the article analyses the human security conceptualization and priorities of individual EU/HSN member states (not all member states prioritize all issues in the same way) and demonstrate the instruments and strategies which are used by these states to realize their human security priorities.

My text is based primarily on research of the activities and official documents of EU/HSN states, such as annual foreign policy yearbooks, development reports and statements of EU/HSN representatives; I also studied official web pages, documents and activities of EU/HSN states’ partners, especially those of non-governmental organizations.

A brief history of the concept of human security

Although the national security paradigm dominated IR in the last 50 years, the emphasis on the security and the sovereignty of the individual is a much older idea (for more see Rothschild, 1995). The liberal or pluralistic understanding of security as an objective of individuals and groups as well as of states was characteristic, in general, of the period from the mid-17th century to the French Revolution. The military sense of security, where it is an objective of states, was a new concept that coincided with the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Rothschild, 1995). In fact, until the beginning of the 20th century, security was seen as a condition both of individuals and of states. However, the two world wars, increasing armaments and expanding armies, and finally the nuclear path of the superpowers in the 1960s led to a redefinition of security, which lost both non-military and non-state features. Since the second half of the 1940s in the USA and since the beginning of the 1960s worldwide, the national security conception dominated in IR theory and practice (Earle, 1943; Morgenthau, 1948 & 1993 & 1952; Souers, 1949; Huzar, 1950; Furniss 1952; Wolfers, 1952 and Waltz, 1979).

In late 1980s a more significant transformation of the concept of security started. This was influenced mainly by the work of the Copenhagen School (scholars from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, such as B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, P. Lemaitre and M. Kelstrup) and of the Third World School (A. Acharya and M. Ayoob). Both challenged the national security paradigm by debate about referent objects of security and sources of threats. Buzan, Acharya and Ayoob more or less recognized individuals and groups (e.g. humankind and the family) as a referent object of security too, and the particular importance of non-military threats such as underdevelopment, environmental degradation, resource scarcity and the like. These authors criticized the realist vision of security for the individual, who was made synonymous with citizenship, i.e. security comes from being a citizen, and insecurity from being a citizen of another state. According to these IR scholars, individuals have explicit rights, which are not dependent on the (non-)existence of the state or citizenship.

The idea of rights for the individual or groups, which should exist independently of the state, led to the emergence of the human security concept in the theory as well as practice of IR. IR practice has had an even deeper impact on the conceptualization of human security. The main driving forces in this process during last decade have been the United Nations and Canada and the HSN.

UN versus HSN human security discourse

There are many and varied formulations of human security; most formulations emphasize the interdependence between development and security, the welfare of ordinary people, maintaining basic human rights and the realization of human potential. As noted above, we can identify in contemporary IR discourse two main approaches to human security: the first is the United Nations approach; the other is that of the HSN (or of Canadian or middle-power states). First, it is necessary to make clear the differences between these two approaches and then introduce their common elements before we analyse the foreign and development policies of EU/HSN member states, because the difference/commonality is crucial for this analysis.

The UN human security agenda is based on the human security definition of the UNDP, which “understands security first and foremost as the prerogative of the

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individual, and links the concept of security inseparably to ideas of human rights and dignity to the relief of human suffering” (Hammerstand, 2000: 39). The major components of the UN human security conception are freedom from fear and freedom from want. According to the UN’s conception, human security has various categories or dimensions such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Human Development Report 1994: 24 – 25). However, the main feature of the UN’s human security conception is prioritising the individual over the state. State security is merely the means by which to achieve individual security – the state is a means to an end, not an end in itself. One of the most important aspects of the UN’s human security conception is the clear human security-level of the development-security nexus. This approach essentially equates human development and human security by proposing that human security involves alleviating all types of human insecurity.

The HSN perspective on human security differs from that of the UN. The HSN uses the human security concept as an umbrella to cover a wide humanitarian agenda, including support for the International Criminal Court, the ban on landmines, prohibition of child sexual and labour exploitation and preventing, suppressing and punishing human trafficking. The HSN’s conceptualization of human security focuses on the security of people, complementing the traditional emphasis on state security. In the HSN perspective, the necessary conditions of human security are maintenance of territorial integrity, the building of good (domestic) governance and the broader responsibility of the international community. The HSN connects the level of human security clearly to the level of development, as does the UN, but the development is not understood purely economically. Development in the HSN perspective integrates strong human rights aspects. That is why one of the HSN strategies supports the internalization (embedding) of human rights norms and values. The HSN’s approach is more narrowly focused than the UN’s approach; it focuses on protecting individuals and communities against any form of violence.

To briefly sum up this section, what are the differences between the two conceptions of human security and what are their common features? The main common feature of both perspectives is acceptance of non-military and indirect threats such as underdevelopment, population displacement, and the clear security-development nexus. The main difference relates to the understanding of the role of the state and of the international community in the maintenance of the security of the individual. The UN’s conception has long ignored the state as the guarantor of individual security. The UN pays more attention to global forces (such as economic disparities, environmental degradation, etc.) and economic (developmental) conditions (such as fair trade and minimum living standards). The HSN’s conception prioritizes the enlargement of international (global) acceptance of humanitarian law, human rights (and their internalization by various actors) and socio-economic equity by being careful to respect the sovereignty of the state. HSN member states do not understand human security as a substitute for conventional security, but rather as a component of it, adding the
element that the first priority is concern for the welfare of people, citizens and civil society (Fuentes, 2001: 84).

**HSN agenda and strategies**

Since the establishment of the HSN in 1999, the issues of priority which form the basic framework for HSN member states’ activities and projects have been formulated. At the first ministerial meeting, the participants clearly stated that human security can be advanced through protection and promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, good governance, a culture of peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Fuentes, 2001). Between the Lysřen meeting in 1998 and the last ministerial meeting in Thailand in late 2004 the following issue areas were established in the HSN agenda:

- **Millennium development goals:** All HSN member states accepted the list of MDG and participate in fulfilling them (for more information see www.milleniumdevelopmentgoals.org).
- **Anti-personnel landmines:** Landmines are seen as one of most serious hurdles for local economic development and as a serious threat to the health of all local people, primarily children. The HSN aim is to ban the use of landmines worldwide and to remove the mines from contaminated countries to increase the security and support the development of local communities in post-conflict periods.
- **Small arms:** Widespread illegal ownership of small arms has had a great impact on almost all intrastate conflicts in recent decades. There are regions where small arms are a part of daily life. The HSN aim is to establish a control mechanism for national, regional and international illicit and licit traffic of armaments, decrease the number of illegally held small arms and weaken the culture of weapons by building peaceful civil societies.
- **Children in armed conflict:** In recent decades children have been almost entirely hidden by all types of armed conflict. The HSN aim is to identify the specific needs of children in armed conflict, primarily to prevent recruitment of children into regular as well as irregular armies, to help former child soldiers in leaving the armies and finding alternative ways of life and to help children harmed by armed conflict (psychosomatic disorders, mine victims, etc.). One element of this issue is the fight against all forms of labour and sexual exploitation of children.
- **International humanitarian and human rights law:** The HSN member states are convinced of the strong relevance of international humanitarian and human rights law for increasing human security. The aim of the HSN is to broaden the human rights norms incorporated into international law and to broaden the group of states which sign, ratify and respect these international norms. Two elements of this aim are the support of the International Criminal Court and the improvement of the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Conflict prevention: The HSN member states are convinced that a working early warning system and early prevention of the outbreak of violence can decrease human suffering and many material losses. The HSN aim is to strengthen the capacity of the UN as well as other international, regional and local frameworks to develop cooperative strategies for prevention of the use of violence. An organic part of this aim is the promotion of gender dimensions in peace-building.

- Transnational organized crime, including trafficking in persons: In connection with many local and intrastate conflicts, there is an increase in the amount of resources obtained by guerrilla forces, warlords and other actors through transnational organized crime. The aim of HSN member states is to make the international trade of resources more transparent (compare, for example, the Kimberley process as an instrument of controlling illicit and licit traffic of diamonds79) and to develop the legal framework to combat transnational organized crime.

- Resources for development: the HSN confirms the broadly accepted human security-development nexus, the key condition for fulfilling previous tasks being to concentrate sufficient resources and to invest them meaningfully and transparently.

As mentioned above, HSN works as a group of like-minded countries, whose foreign policies are guided by a “human internationalist orientation, which features an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty” (Behringer, 2003: 2). The HSN framework makes possible collective action of all or only some of the members, as well as the collective action of some members together with non-members and also individual action. In the first years of HSN existence, the member states usually took advantage of collective action. As Ronald Behringer notes, collective action made it possible for these medium-sized powers states to exercise effective leadership in international politics (for more see Behringer, 2003). These collective action cases include the attempt to create a rapidly deployable brigade for United Nations peacekeeping, the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, the initiative to establish the International Criminal Court, the effort to produce international regulations on the legal trade in small arms and light weapons (Behringer, 2003: 1), the initiative to produce international regulations on children fighting in armed conflicts and, last but not least, on preventing, suppressing and punishing people trafficking (see Table 1).

In the last three or four years, we can often observe the cooperation only among some HSN countries which was officially confirmed at a meeting in Santiago. At the HSN meeting in Santiago de Chile (2002) member countries even officially concluded that human security should be discussed not only in global forums, but that the

discourse on human security concerns in regional frameworks should be increased (Address by H.E. the Austrian Foreign Minister B. Ferrero-Waldner). Thus, many bilateral or trilateral projects among HSN countries have been established in recent years and months (see below).

In the following section I will show the specific national human security approaches and strategies of HSN states to open the floor for comparison and for analysing the possible influence of EU/HSN member states on the EU security conceptualization.

**Austria**

Austrian foreign and security policy has been based on neutrality since 1955. As a neutral country, Austria – very similar to Ireland – has oriented itself towards multilateral cooperation within the UN. Austrian military forces have traditionally participated in various peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and it has funded many UN development aid activities. In response to the Gulf War, the prevailing view in Austria changed: it now holds that obligations under the Statute of the UN take precedence over obligations under neutrality. Further changes of Austrian neutrality were mostly influenced by the country’s membership of the EU (since 1995) and by adopting Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The acceptance of the CFSP and ESDP profoundly changed the organizing principles of Austrian security policy, which “is today characterized as non-allied rather than neutral” (Resolution of the Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine). The contemporary Austrian foreign and security policy is dominated by state-centred strategies (as in most EU member states and in the CFSP), which were furthermore strengthened in accordance with the “war on terror” (Resolution of the Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine).

One of the national security strategies seems to be human security and development support. Austrian security policy respects the idea that geographical distance no longer guarantees sufficient protection of national security and that long-distance instabilities and underdevelopment can threaten the country (Resolution of the Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine). In the Austrian perspective, human security and development projects can be a way to ensure the state’s national security.

Austria became a member of HSN in 1999 and chaired the Network for the period 2002–2003. Between 1999 and 2005 it adopted the HSN concept and is one of the most active member countries. The Austrian human security approach has been deeply influenced by the country’s neutrality and later changes to this policy. The principal issues of Austrian human security policy are women’s rights (legal regulation of violence against women, particularly a ban on female genital mutilation), children’s rights (particularly a ban on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and support of programmes for children affected by armed conflicts) and human rights generally (abolishing the death penalty, human rights education, protection of
minorities and rights of refugees and internally displaced persons) (Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003).

The main Austrian human security strategies comprise development cooperation (for comparison of development aid see Table 2); support and assistance to programmes and funds of the UN system (particularly UNIFEM, UN Human Rights Commission, UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO, WHO); grants for humanitarian non-governmental organizations, creation of a human rights education system and initiation of international humanitarian law norms and their incorporation into national laws (see Table 1; Austria and Norway regularly put forward a resolution on internally displaced persons, within the UN). Austria’s partners in human security initiatives are mainly HSN countries and governmental (UN and OSCE/chaired by Austria in 2000) and non-governmental organizations (International Red Cross Committee and Austrian organizations).

The responsibility for development policy belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Department VII Development Cooperation, cooperation with Eastern Europe and coordination of international development policy. In 2002, upon passing the new Federal Development Cooperation Act the several-year long restructuring process of the Austrian Development Cooperation was finished. The Act provides an improved basis for Austrian development cooperation activities. The Act also strengthened the legal status of Austrian NGOs, which are the most important partners of Austrian human security policy (Three-Year-Programme 2004–2006 on Austrian Development Policy: 23 – 29). Austrian development policy is guided by a commitment to combating poverty, ensuring peace and human security, preserving the environment, and protecting natural resources (Three-Year-Programme 2004–2006 on Austrian Development Policy). Two years later, in 2004, an amendment to the Development Cooperation Act was passed which created a new structure – the Austrian Development Agency (ADA). The ADA, which started operation in 2004, is responsible for implementing projects and programmes for development cooperation and cooperation with Eastern Europe. ADA especially focuses on promoting human rights, democratic participation and responsible governance, as well as on conflict prevention. The main area of Austrian interest is Southeastern Europe and Iraq.

Austria concentrates on various mine-action funding and the support of demining – in 2002 it served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty and since 2003 it has financed demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Mozambique. In 2004 Austria co-organized and chaired “The Nairobi summit on a mine-free world”. Together with Slovenia and Jordan, Austria established the Initiative to assist war-traumatized children and child victims in Iraq, as part of post-conflict reconstruction activities. Austria also supports the Slovene Centrum TOGETHER (see below) and is the main donor to the Austrian Aid for Mine Victims, an NGO.

Austria (MFA) funds the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Graz and the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights in Vienna. Both institutes create academic bases for Austrian human security initiatives.
and prepare policy papers and manuals. During the Austrian HSN presidency the Child Rights Training Curriculum “Child Protection, Monitoring and Rehabilitation” and the Manual on Human Rights Education was prepared, which has been translated into English, Spanish, French and Arabic. Austria also broadly supports the creation of regional human rights centres, which provide local human rights training. The main idea behind these Austrian human rights activities is to bridge the gap between universal human rights standards and their implementation; between programmatic concepts and a systematic response on the ground (Chair’s summary. Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the HSN).

Greece

Greek security and defence policy had been traditionally focused on “hard” security, particularly on territorial defence. The Greek security conceptualization started to change in the 1990s, when “soft” security concerns, including migration and refugee flows, took centre stage in the national debate. This significant change in foreign policy reflects the new Greek geopolitical position in the post-Cold War period, which was caused by the end of Greek geopolitical marginalization mainly because of the shifting of security challenges from the centre of Europe to the periphery. Greece became an important actor not only in the Balkans, but also in the Black Sea region, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. The country’s foreign policy was also strongly influenced by changes within Greek society and in the economic and political imperatives of a more European policy. Changes in the EU agenda after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties accelerated profound changes in Greek foreign policy; some scholars even say that it is undergoing a process of strong Europeanization (Lesser – Larrabee – Zanini – Vlachos 2001: 68 & 103 – 105). Europeanization involves profound change of value-orientation and of the organizing principles of Greek foreign and security policy, which is still markedly state-centred. However, in many cases we can observe a growing respect for human security.80

Greece became a HSN member in 2000, and its human security activities are very limited in comparison with Austrian efforts. Greece, which recognizes the human security-development nexus is at the half-way stage in its adoption of HSN ideas and is one of the least active member countries. The principal issues of Greek human security policy are peace building, rule of law, human rights (Greece strongly supported the establishment of the International Criminal Court), demining activities, eradicating organized crime and support of good governance. Greece is one of the EU/HSN states with the lowest development cooperation grants. The country itself has participated in EU development cooperation since 1999.

80 Possible evidence of Greek human security acceptance could be in the near future the agenda of the Greek UN mission within the UN Security Council, because Greece became a UN Security Council non-permanent member for the period 2005–2006.
The main Greek human security strategies comprise support for all development cooperation and demining initiatives in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region\textsuperscript{81}. The responsibility for development policy belongs to the International Development Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The national development agency – Hellenic Aid – was established within the MFA in 2000. Hellenic Aid partners are mainly regional or national NGOs, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), the International Orthodox Christian Charity and the Athens-based International Mine Initiative\textsuperscript{82}.

Greece concentrates on various mine-actions and support of demining, mainly because of regional conditions. It understands the demining process as a confidence-building and conflict prevention instrument within the region and with its neighbours – Greece itself actually used landmines on the borders with Turkey and Bulgaria\textsuperscript{83}. Greece and Turkey decided to join the Mine Ban Treaty simultaneously (in May 2003), and Greece is now carrying mine clearance operation in the Epirus and Macedonian regions, and supports demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Lebanon. In addition to helping in the demining process, Greece also assists mine survivors. The main bodies involved in this assistance are the Ministry of Defence, the National Health Service and the Hellenic Red Cross.

Official development cooperation is the responsibility of the national development agency Hellenic Aid. The Responsibilities of Hellenic Aid involve designing and implementing the national strategy for urgent humanitarian aid and development cooperation. Hellenic Aid concentrates its activities on food security, providing aid in emergencies and support of good governance (supporting civil society and institutional capabilities). In comparison to Austria, Greece focuses its development activities strongly on Southeastern Europe. Since 2002 a Five-Year Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HIPERB) has been in force. HIPERB has financed specific projects in the areas of agriculture and processing. The main partners for Hellenic Aid are NGOs actively involved in the Balkans and ECHO\textsuperscript{84}.

One of the newest Greek initiatives, which are presented as a part of the human security framework and which is more or less symbolic, is the creation of the International Olympic Truce Centre (officially launched in Athens in 2000). The Centre grew out of the agreement between the International Olympic Committee and the Greek Governmental should encourage the use of sport and the Olympic ideal to promote a peaceful world\textsuperscript{85}. However, until now no projects have been begun.

\textsuperscript{81} Greece is a member of the Pact of Stability for South Eastern Europe and also a member of the Black Sea Cooperation Initiative.
\textsuperscript{82} For more see www.deming.gr.
\textsuperscript{83} Greece maintains minefields on its border with Turkey and along the Evros River in the north of the country. There are also mined areas dating from the Greek Civil War (1947–1949) in the Epyrus, Grammos and Vitsi Mountains, and in areas near the border with Bulgaria (Landmine Monitor Report 2003).
\textsuperscript{84} www.mfa.gr/print/english/foreign_policy/cooperation/creation.html, 2 May 2005.
\textsuperscript{85} www.olympictruce.org, 4 May 2005.
Ireland

Ireland has been a neutral country strongly oriented towards multilateral cooperation within the UN. The priorities of Irish foreign and security policy have for many years included participation in UN peacekeeping, development aid, humanitarian cooperation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations. Neutrality is more deeply embedded in Irish society and politics than it is in Austria, but when we observe contemporary Irish neutrality, it is going through the same crisis as in the Austrian case. The main reason for the Irish neutrality problem is Irish EU membership, primarily development of the CFSP/ESDP. The UN-oriented multilateral security strategy was replaced by a state-centred security paradigm oriented towards NATO and an armed EU (White Paper on Defence, 2000). This crisis was demonstrated during the referendum on the Nice Treaty, when EU opponents used posters saying “Hello NATO, good-bye UN” (Doyle, 2005: 3). This clearly shows that many Irish people understand EU/NATO strategies as incompatible with UN strategies and the neutral status of the country.

The human security orientation is today mostly visible in development aid policy. Although Ireland became a member of the HSN in 1999, it is adopting the human security catalogue relatively slowly. Ireland has been adopting a holistic human security paradigm, which focuses on all threats, both those of a violent and those of a structural nature. While in the case of Austria and Greece the main driving force behind human security initiatives are national governments, in the Irish case the government, including the MFA, lagged far behind – the main driving force was NGOs. The strongest Irish human security actor is Dóchas, The Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organizations. Dóchas has organized many workshops, conferences and other activities to pressure the Irish government into integrating the human security concept not only into Irish, but also into EU external policies. In the last two years Ireland has supported the change of the HSN from an informal network into more formal fora (Opening Address by Mr. Tom Kitt TD).

Ireland experienced a great deal of progress in adopting human security vocabulary and initiatives in late 2003 and in the first half of 2004, in the period of Irish EU presidency. But we can observe Irish activities relating to the human security paradigm before, in the early 2000s, when Ireland was a UN Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent member (Ireland’s term in the UNSC was 2001–2002). The UN Security Council has had discussions on geographically defined issues, as well as occasional meetings on thematic issues, where the Irish human security perspective was most visible. Though the Irish UN mission decided not to hold any such debate (Doyle, 2005: 22), Ireland participated very actively in debates about conflict resolution, the relationship between conflict prevention and development aid, the negative humanita-

86 Irish Defence forces have participated in UN peacekeeping since 1958.
87 As John Doyle explains, Ireland took a tactical decision not to use the Council as a platform to raise issues on which it had no hope of making progress (Doyle 2005: 28).
rian impact of sanctions, and women and security (primarily on the effects of conflict on women and girls and the contribution of women to conflict resolution). During 2001 and 2002 the establishment of the International Criminal Court was discussed many times within the Security Council. Ireland promoted the establishment and full functioning of the ICC in clear opposition to the USA; Ireland has also rejected any suggestions of exemptions for US soldiers or US members of UN missions.

As mentioned above, the period when progress in Irish human security activities was most visible was during the Irish EU presidency. The Irish EU presidency priorities were implementation of the EU Guidelines on Children in Armed Conflict and the adoption of EU Guidelines on Support for Human Rights Defenders. Dóchas’ pressure during Irish EU presidency led to the initiation of the first (but informal) meeting of the EU’s development cooperation ministers, which aimed to focus the debate on the development-security nexus. The main result of the NGOs’ discussion with development ministers and the Irish MFA was the consensus about future rules for development aid: development aid has to be securitized and incorporated into security measures such as peacekeeping operations or other UN mandated security missions, because “the language of the ‘war on terror’ won’t overtake that of development” (Opening address by Mr. Tom Kitt TD).

Ireland is one of the strongest supporters of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. It strongly prefers three issues of human security policy and MDG, which in the Irish foreign policy agenda are not officially connected to human security, but are main points in the HSN agenda: 1) Development aid; 2) Human rights (particularly promotion; protection and support of children’s rights and the International Criminal Court); and 3) Provision of UN peacekeeping personnel. This was made possible by the evolution of Irish national security beyond the narrow role of territorial defence towards issues of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and crisis management. The main driving force in development aid and other human security activities is, besides Irish NGOs, the Irish MFA (partly in cooperation with Ministry of Defence) and the national development agency, Development Cooperation Ireland (so-called Ireland Aid or DCI). Ireland Aid, which was established in 1974 (compare the Greek and Austrian cases), is assigned to a minister of state for development cooperation and human rights.

When researching Irish human security activities, we can always see a more cross-sectoral and comprehensive approach. The Irish strategy of development aid is based on coherence between trade and development policy (the Irish motto is “trade people out of poverty”). Irish human security activities incorporate strategies on gender, governance, HIV/AIDS and development activities. In comparison to Greece, Austria and Slovenia, the Irish development cooperation initiatives are not oriented towards European countries, but more or less outside Europe, particularly towards sub-Saharan Africa. As part of the development aid policy (for a comparison see

89 In March 2003 East Timor became the first country to receive Ireland Aid assistance country outside sub-Saharan Africa (www.dci.gov.ie/print.asp, 4 May 2005).
Table 2) the Irish MFA supports various programmes fighting against HIV/AIDS, projects eradicating poverty, and educational projects (*The Report of the Ireland Aid Review Committee*).

**The Netherlands**

After their negative experience with neutrality, the Netherlands gave preference to NATO and EU membership after the Second World War. The country, which became a member of the HSN in 1999, adopted a rather “intermediate” position in respect of the human security paradigm in which the NATO state-centred security strategy continue to dominate Dutch security policy (Silva, 2001: 65), while the individual-centred security paradigm is promoted slowly, and primarily in development cooperation (similar to Ireland and Austria). The Netherlands has traditionally supported multilateral UN operations and humanitarian and development programmes, but as a former colonial empire it has also preserved its own special relationship with many countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Development, humanitarian and technological aid thus has a long tradition in Dutch foreign policy. The colonial heritage, together with issues such as international drug and people trafficking and pandemics such as HIV/AIDS or SARS, has blurred the traditional distinction between national and international security issues.

During the last few years, five main goals of Dutch foreign policy can be identified: 1) strengthening of international governance; 2) promoting international peace, security and stability; 3) promoting European cooperation; 4) reducing poverty in a sustainable way; and 5) maintaining and strengthening bilateral relations. As we can see, there are three goals which are part of the HSN agenda – points one, two and five. The key to successful international governance, maintenance of peace and the reduction of poverty is, according to the Dutch policy agenda, ensuring an effective international legal order, effective conflict prevention and conflict management (particularly peacekeeping and peace-building) and, last but not least, effective and productive support of Millennium Development Goals.

The main driving force in Dutch human security activities is the, General Directorate for International Cooperation (GDIS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The GDIS is headed by a minister without portfolio, the Minister of International Cooperation. The Netherlands has traditionally engaged in the fight against poverty and funded initiatives supporting marginal sectors of developing countries (ethnic minorities, women, children, immigrants etc.). Between 2000 and 2001 the Dutch approach became more like that of the Irish – the Netherlands now supports human security through trade measures and fiscal and economic reforms (Silva, 2001: 66). The Dutch MFA itself calls this approach “an integrated foreign policy”, with close links between issues of peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade, poverty, the environment and migration (Policy Agenda 2005). During its EU presidency period, 

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the Dutch policy continued in the Irish way and emphasized the centrality of conflict prevention, the Mine Ban Treaty, human rights and “the human rights deficit” in EU development policies. The Netherlands promoted a similar policy agenda during its presidency of the OSCE (during 2003) and under its Security Council membership (in the period 1999 – 2000).

The Dutch integrated approach uses all instruments (political, diplomatic, military, civilian and trade and development cooperation) in a coordinated way, by creating the Dutch Stability Fund, which combines Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funds. All mine action assistance was transferred to the Stability Fund\(^91\). Since 1999 the Netherlands has been further reforming its development aid policy, in which bilateral lines of cooperation with more than 100 countries were replaced by bilateral cooperation with around 20.

Although the Dutch government has not fully integrated the human security concept into its vocabulary, the Netherlands has always played a leading role in defending human rights and the validity of international humanitarian law (Silva, 2001: 67), eradicating poverty (the Netherlands is the biggest donor among EU/HSN member countries – for a comparison see Table 2) and improving the situation of women and children in armed conflicts. The Netherlands has supported all the HSN’s activities to ban the use of landmines and to demine, and to control the illicit and licit trade in small arms and light weapons.

The Netherlands advocates security as a condition for development and vice versa; the main Dutch human security strategies comprise development cooperation, all-round support for peacekeeping operations, grants for humanitarian non-governmental organizations and initiation of international humanitarian law norms and support of their worldwide acceptance. In comparison to Austria, Greece or Ireland, the Netherlands does not hugely support the UNDP or other UN agencies promoting the “paternal” concept of human security. The major factor in determining the level of the Dutch contribution is the effectiveness of these institutions. The Dutch MFA hardly ever gives aid directly to governments; it often implements its human security projects through grants for humanitarian and development NGOs.

**Slovenia**

The Slovene EU/HSN position is very different from that of all the countries discussed above: Slovenia is a small, newly independent post-Communist country, which for the last 15 years has been confronted with many conflicts in Southeastern Europe. The Slovene historical experience and location on the margins of an unstable region has led the country to develop a special sensitivity for interethnic understanding and multicultural coexistence. The situation in Southeastern Europe also initiated Slovene EU and NATO membership. Slovenia, aware of its smallness and weakness, has been looking since its independence for multilateral recognition and guarantees; its foreign

policy focuses strongly on multilateral action. That is why Slovenia accepted one of the main guidelines of the HSN – support of development, proliferation and internalization of international law norms – very quickly. Slovenia itself was, after gaining its independence, very active in the legislative sector and signed and ratified many acts protecting national minorities, human rights and humanitarian principles. It is even one of the few states which have accepted the possibility of UN-led humanitarian intervention.

Slovene HSN membership is very similar to that of Greece: with the end of the Cold War Slovenia moved from the security periphery to the European security centre. The Slovene security conceptualization is profoundly influenced by the unstable regional environment and negative historical experience, and there foreign and security policy is clearly dominated by the state-centred approach. However, the major sources of national security threats are asymmetric; non-military sources of threats are becoming even more frequent. The appropriate response to asymmetric threats lies, according to the Slovene Ministry of Defence, in the formation of a unified and integrated system covering security as well as development elements. Slovenia emphasizes the interdependence between the security of the state, the individual, society and the international community (Strategic Defence Review, 2004). Development, humanitarian and technological aid contributes to the greater security of Slovenia.

As the smallest EU/HSN member country, Slovenia became a HSN member in 1999. Its main human security strategies comprise aid for children in armed conflicts, including child soldiers, human rights education, control of small arms and light weapons, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the ban on landmines, and demining. Development cooperation remains for the time being on the periphery of Slovene human security strategies. The main reason for this has been the relative poverty of the country and the great costs of comprehensive economic reforms at the beginning of the 1990s. Since Slovenia is an EU member country, the amount of development aid and the level of development cooperation is increasing in accordance with EU demands (The Consequence of Enlargement for Development Policy 2003) (for a comparison see Table 2). The main areas of interest for Slovene human security projects have been, for many years, Southeastern Europe and, more recently, Iraq.

The Slovene partners within human security initiatives are mainly HSN countries (Austria and Jordan) and governmental (UN – especially UNICEF – and the OSCE – chaired by Slovenia in 2005) and non-governmental organizations. In fact, all Slovene human security projects are primarily implemented by Slovene NGOs or NGOs in which the country participates. These NGOs gain their main resources for the carrying out of human security projects from the Slovene MFA or Austrian, American, Irish and

84 Slovenia shares the perception of the UN General Assembly and supports the UN’s new policies relating to security, which state that in cases such as those related to crime on a large scale against the civilian population, the protection of human life shall be a priority before the sovereignty of the state. … That is why Slovenia strongly supports the concepts of humanitarian intervention (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the UN).
Canadian governments. Therefore, when we speak about specific Slovene initiatives, we have to mention the NGO activities.

Slovenia is not only active in the legislative area, but it also takes on practical actions to further the implementation of the adopted HSN standards. Through joint projects between Slovenia and the Council of Europe, both are contributing within the Stability Pact to the building of democracy and setting up of the mechanisms for human rights protection in the whole of Southeastern Europe. Slovenia is also very active in human rights bodies within the UN.

A concrete instance of carrying out the human security paradigm is Slovenia’s assistance to traumatized children in Southeastern Europe. This assistance is organized by the biggest Slovene NGO, Slovene Philanthropy. First the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) was established, which assisted war-affected children in the former Yugoslavia and Transcaucasus; later the Regional Centre for the Psychosocial Welfare of Children – TOGETHER – was created. As well as giving aid to children, Slovene Philanthropy and TOGETHER concentrate their activities on refugees and asylum seekers and on human rights education. Both institutions organize psychosocial programmes for school staff, health service workers, parents, and others.

A contemporary Slovene-led activity, which is supported by Austria and Jordan, is a project assisting Iraqi children. The initiative, which is carried out by TOGETHER, aims to alleviate the suffering of children, prevent long-term psychosocial trauma, and introduce activities to improve mental health, as well as develop activities for the rehabilitation of children. Jordan also cooperates with Slovene-run ITF to start demining operations in Iraq. Furthermore, Slovenia is fully supporting the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, the protection of sustainable development, establishment of the International Criminal Court and, last but not least, combating the illegal trade in small arms.

Conclusion

This article analysed the conceptualization of human security in EU/HSN countries and their strategies for increasing and strengthening human security, in order to show how these states could influence EU policies and security conceptualization in the future. Some of the findings of the research are really surprising and show the human security policies in a different light than they were previously seen. The research also affirms the deep difference between the UN’s and the HSN’s human security conceptualization.

EU/HSN countries have based their human security conceptualization on strong developmental and humanitarian elements, and all of them have accepted security-development interdependence. However, the human security paradigm is

94 www.together.si, 4 May 2005.
not anything, what is in EU/HSN states’ policies embedded; these states have been accepting and using human security only as far as their national security strategy makes it possible. Human security seems in many cases to be a mere annex of national security because increasing and strengthening of the former is one of many strategies states use to ensuring their own national security. Contemporary national security is mainly understood as the security of a state and its citizens, who are threatened not only by military, but also by many non-military and asymmetric threats. Humanitarian, development and technological aid should stabilize target states or societies, increase their level of development, decrease the probability of an outbreak of violence, and thus minimize the insecurity spillover effect. It follows that the security-development nexus in EU/HSN countries means something different from the UN human security conceptualization.

In the approach of EU/HSN countries, the security-development nexus unambiguously means: the development of a target state/society strengthens its stability (i.e. reaching a state of non-violence or of negative peace), which increases the security of EU/HSN countries and their inhabitants. In the UN’s approach, the security-development nexus means: the development of target for a society strengthens its stability and builds a safe environment for everyday life of its inhabitants, which allows further development aid or investments. In the long-term perspective, this approach brings positive peace; it means not only freedom from fear, but also freedom from want. The self-interested motive of EU/HSN countries is indicated also by the territorial orientation of human security projects and the territorial distribution of humanitarian, development and technological aid. Although living conditions in Rwanda, Somalia or Cambodia are poorer and more miserable than in Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea Region or Transcaucasia, most Austrian, Slovene and Greek development or humanitarian resources go to the latter three regions. Despite the slightly different Irish and Dutch cases – Ireland is an island and the Netherlands a maritime country surrounded by peaceful, highly developed Western European nations – neither country helps the poorest and most needy people.

Another finding of the present research is the influence of Europeanization and of the integration of the CFSP and ESDP into EU and national policies in the human security conceptualization and the practical politics of EU/HSN countries. As shown, humanitarian and development cooperation has a long tradition in the Netherlands, Ireland and Austria. The evolution of the CFSP and ESDP as state- and military-oriented policies and the beginning of the “war on terror” have disrupted or at least slowed down the progress of humanitarian and development cooperation within these three countries. We can even say that EU membership has had a negative impact on embedding human security into Dutch, Irish and Austrian policy. Ireland and also the Netherlands tried to overcome, during their EU presidency, this military orientation, emphasizing the security-development nexus. The strengthening of cooperation and of coordination of development and humanitarian activities among EU member countries (and also among EU member countries and NGOs) and the commitment
to increase the amount of Official Development Aid in the next decades demonstrate that the Irish and Dutch efforts have shown results. Austria will be the next country to have the opportunity to integrate human security elements into EU policies in the first half of 2006.

Greece and Slovenia are very different cases. Regional conditions and historical heritage are reasons why both states have had a state-centred and military-oriented security conceptualization and why human security has been entirely new for them. Both states also do not have any historical experience with humanitarian, development and technological cooperation. While in the case of Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands EU membership has actually slowed down the progress of the human security paradigm, in the case of Greece and Slovenia EU membership has played a completely different role. Europeanization of Greek and Slovène politics and society has been changing the value-orientation and organizing principles of their foreign and security policy. EU membership (in the case of Slovenia, preparation for EU membership) has thus had an unambiguously positive impact on the embedding of human security into Greek and Slovène policy.

We need not be as pessimistic as some aspects of this analysis might lead us to be. Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Greece and Slovenia have many times supported multilateral rule-based international order and human security issues like the ICC, the ban on landmines, help for children and human rights, which did not result in direct (political, economical or security) gains. This gives us hope that human security will one day be an inherent part of international relations practice.

**Table 1: Ratification of international rights/child protection treaties by HSN members (State as at May 2005)**

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<td>R</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<tr>
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<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<tr>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>R</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R = ratified; S = signed
References and resources *(Child Rights Training Curriculum. Child Protection, Monitoring and Rehabilitation 2003: 33)*

- Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989); entry into force: 2 September 1990
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000); entry into force: 12 February 2002
- International Labour Organization Convention 182 concerning the prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour (1999); entry into force: 19 November 2000
- Geneva Convention (III) relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949); entry into force: 21 October 1950
- Geneva Convention (IV) relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949); entry into force: 21 October 1950
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I and II) (1977); entry into force: 7 December 1978
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Convention”, 1997); entry into force: 1 March 1999
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); entry into force: 22 April 1954
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); entry into force: 1 July 2002

### Table 2: Official development assistance per capita: EU/HSN member states (in USD; 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EU Donor Atlas 2004: 59
References


The Dutch EU Presidency from a development perspective. Analysis and point of actions. Working paper. NGO-EU Presidency campaign based on ECDPM research.


Internet resources

Development Cooperation Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs, www.dci.gov.ie

Dóchas. The Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organizations, www.dochas.ie


Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece, www.mfa.gr

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, www.minbuza.nl
Regional Centrum TOGETHER, www.together-foundation.si/
Slovene Philanthropy, www.filantropija.org/
The Olympic Truce, www.olympictruce.org

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