

### The Spatial Dimension of Insurgent-Civilian Relations: Routinised Insurgent Space

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## The Spatial Dimension of Insurgent-Civilian Relations: Routinised Insurgent

Francis O'Connor

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# The Spatial Dimension of Insurgent-Civilian Relations: Routinised Insurgent Space

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## ABSTRACT

This working paper is a first step in the development of a conceptual framework to analyse the spaces where insurgents and civilians interact. Building on relational research addressing insurgent support networks and rebel governance, it develops the concept of Routinised Insurgent Space (RIS) as a means to systematically assess the way that movements spatially order interactions with existing and potential supporters. It focuses on four specific examples of RIS: insurgent systems of justice and policing, service provision, prison mobilisation and funerals. It draws primarily on two case studies, the M-19 in Colombia (early 1970s–1990) and the PKK in Turkey (mid 1970s–1999).

## 1 INTRODUCTION

*“Ok brother, this is your last chance, no more, if you want to go, you can go. But if you want to stay here, go back to your farm, go back to your family, because you cannot continue robbing here, if you do, you will be shot”<sup>2</sup>*  
(M-19 militant- Personal Interview, Bogota 2018)

Beyond waging war, insurgent movements go to huge lengths to deliberately interact with civilians in their immediate social environment. These efforts can range from tutoring school children or even building schools, distributing basic necessities like medicine, milk and wellingtons, punishing criminals, orchestrating funerals and commemorative ceremonies, and organising detainees in prison and supporting their families. Why do insurgent movements expend their time and precious resources, risking exposure to the authorities, to help individuals who might not even sympathise with their movement? The simple answer is: to garner legitimacy and through legitimacy, popular support. This is not to argue that insurgent access to material resources is not a priority for but rather that, without a degree of legitimacy and of popular recognition, armed groups are inevitably reduced to a form of banditry; forced to obtain resources through violence and intimidation. Legitimacy is both a perishable resource and a relational phenomenon, accruing only when certain behaviours by insurgent movements are acknowledged by their target audience: it is thus jointly produced by armed movements and their supporters. While legitimacy also has symbolic and performative elements (Podder 2017), its co-production is rooted in the multitude of social ties and reciprocal commitments between armed groups and their supporters.

However, these relational dynamics are neither abstract nor de-contextualised, occurring rather in specific physical environments, strategically selected and prioritized by insurgent strategists. While many rigorous concepts allow us to analyse the relational element of the insurgent movements' constituencies (Malthaner 2011), reference communities (Neidhardt

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<sup>2</sup> Author's translation.

2010), social networks (Staniland 2014; Gould 1995) – the spatial element of this equation arguably remains under developed. This paper seeks to rectify this gap by developing a conceptual framework to theorize the “where” of insurgent interactions with supporters. This framework, built around the core concept of routinised insurgent space, will supplement existing approaches by incorporating spatial dimensions into movement-supporters’ relationships and track them from incipient early mobilisation, through periods of consolidation, institutionalisation and/or decline.

This working paper is a first exploratory step towards a comprehensive conceptual evaluation of how and where insurgent movements interact with their supportive constituencies. In asymmetrical conflicts, the boundary between armed actors and civilians is blurred; oftentimes clandestine activists are engaged in years of activism to which even close family members are oblivious. In multi-actor conflicts, it is often unclear to which group militants belong, and indeed both insurgents and counter-insurgents often engage in mimicry of rivals in order to commit atrocities or obtain resources (Mamidi 2009). These challenges hold true even for those who are positively inclined toward insurgent movements and can partially explain why sometimes insurgents and potential supporters “drift past one another” (Staniland 2014: 29). Accordingly, insurgent movements deliberately engineer or appropriate existing social spaces to facilitate interactions with supportive constituencies, a strategy which this paper argues can be understood as the creation of routinised insurgent space (RIS). In cases of greater insurgent territorial control, they take on a semi-institutionalised character, but they also prevail in contexts of partial insurgent control or where insurgents only enjoy social control. Indeed, they can contribute to the establishment of territorial control rather than being an outcome of it. These spaces become imbued with specific symbolism and aspire to consistency in practise. This paper details how these routinised insurgent spaces are initially formed, the evolving nature and function of ties forged within them, and their spatial variation.

As a working paper on armed movements, it inevitably builds on the immense canon of civil war literature (Kalyvas 2006; Goodwin 2001; Beissinger 2002; Weinstein 2007; Fearon/Laitin 2003) and more recent authoritative works (Steele 2017; Balcells 2017). However, it will mostly draw on two distinct forms of political violence literature, the burgeoning analysis of rebel governance (Arjona/Kasfir/Mampilly 2015; Arjona 2014, 2016a; Kasfir 2005; Arjona 2017; Podder 2014) and the relational perspective that characterises much research on armed groups, in the broadly defined, field of social movements studies (della Porta 2013; Tilly 2003; Alimi/Bosi/Demetriou 2015; Della Porta 1995). These literatures are prioritised because they deal most consistently with the totality of relationships between armed groups and their supporters, and not just on practises of insurgent violence against civilians. Parkinson and Zaks (2018)’s review article draws on organizational sociology to stake a claim for a further distinct organisational approach, emphasising the differentiation of roles within movements, their ties with other actors, the behaviour of organisations’ members and their objectives (2018: 273). Yet, beyond the terminology – organisation as opposed to movement – it is not immediately apparent how such an approach substantially differs from existing concepts well established in the social movements approach.

Although both social movements and rebel governance approaches address similar phenomena, it can be argued that, to a substantial extent, the literatures do not fully engage with one another<sup>3</sup>. While of course it would be absurd to suggest that any specific approach should or should not draw on different theoretical approaches (or indeed any particular

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3 To give a concrete example, Ana Arjona’s outstanding and extremely comprehensive book (Arjona 2016b) does not cite any single work by the most significant scholar in social movement studies, Donatella della Porta.

author), this paper argues that there is much currently unrecognised complementarity between them. The social movement analysis of political violence is well suited to address early phases of mobilisation, escalation from non-violent to violent mobilisation, clandestine violence and urban armed campaigns. While this is widely accepted, social movement studies has also much to offer across the trajectories of violent mobilisation, up to and beyond the threshold of civil wars. It can elucidate relational processes between supporters and opponents, mobilisation in areas of weaker insurgent presence and dynamics with other violent and non-violent politically sympathetic actors. On the other hand, rebel governance is a superb approach for understanding the consolidation of already mobilised insurgent groups, internal dynamics of movements and their steps to implement nascent counter-states in territories under their control. This also includes cases of insurgent successes where armed groups actually proceed to take control of the state. Although it would be exaggerated to baldly assert that these approaches lay either side of a chronological divide: social movements for initial phases and rebel governance for latter periods, in the prevailing literature this has tended to be the case. This paper argues that the combination of both approaches allows a more comprehensive overview of insurgent movement trajectories from their very initial steps to their subsequent transformations, success or demise.

Drawing on the literature on rebel governance and social movement studies, this project analyses four distinct forms of routinised insurgent spaces: (1) Insurgent systems of justice and policing; (2) insurgent service provision; (3) insurgent prison mobilisation and (4) insurgent funerals. Focusing on specific spaces of insurgent agency rather than more macro-level insurgent strategising also lends itself well to more focused comparative analysis. Rather than addressing what insurgencies in different national contexts have in common or not, it focuses on deliberately constructed micro-level spaces which occur across in most insurgencies. All insurgent groups engage in some form of policing, most provide some form of rudimentary services, they all suffer imprisonment which forces them to also organise in prison and, to a lesser extent, many organise symbolic important events like funerals or martyrs' commemoration. This, of course, is not an exhaustive list of routinised insurgent spaces: some movements establish and/or control refugee camps, certain religiously inspired groups can draw on religiously oriented spaces such as mosques/churches and prayer groups, while other movements have used sports clubs or cooking circles as arenas of interaction. However, an extensive trawl through the civil wars literature suggests that the listed routinised insurgent spaces are the most recurrent, across ideological divides and differing socio-cultural and political contexts.

This paper is grounded in ongoing research on two specific movements the PKK in Turkey and the M-19 in Colombia. It is chronologically focused on the PKK's mobilisation from the mid-1970s until 1999 and the M-19 from the early 1970s until its de-mobilization in 1990. The cases have been selected as most similar cases, as both movements enjoyed a degree of territorial control but were for the most of the time active in areas where they enjoyed little more than social control and operated in a semi-clandestine fashion. This research is based on around sixty interviews conducted for the author's doctoral research on the PKK conducted between 2011 and 2014 (O'Connor 2014; O'Connor and Celik 2018). Additionally, albeit in a less structured fashion, the author continues to conduct interviews with members of the Kurdish diaspora, members and sympathisers of the PKK in Europe who have experiences of the conflict in the Kurdish region in Turkey during the period under study. Regrettably, the deteriorating research environment in Turkey has rendered ulterior field research there highly problematic and not viable for the foreseeable future (Tekdemir/Toivanen/Baser 2018). The second case study is based on fieldwork conducted in Colombia in early 2018 which resulted in a dozen interviews with former M-19 militants, commanders and sympathizers. It also draws on an array of M-19 primary source documents such as instructional manuals, party conference proceedings and internal publica-

tions. These primary sources have been embedded in a wide-reaching analysis of the secondary literature on armed movements and their interactions with civilians and their supporters. Therefore, the inductively formulated concepts and analyses of routinised insurgent space are subsequently validated by their contextualisation across a wide array of historically, ideologically and geographically distinct insurgent movements.

This paper aspires to contribute to a better understanding of how insurgent movements establish supportive constituencies. It will clarify what kinds of initiatives allow insurgents, in simple terms, to get to know their immediate social environments and how they manage to structure their interactions with civilians in order to maintain their own security and deter collaboration with incumbent or adversarial movements, and ultimately how they obtain local popular legitimacy. An enhanced knowledge of insurgent support networks will contribute to a better understanding of why certain armed groups successfully endure in spite of often significant structural disadvantages and fierce repression. It will facilitate a better understanding of the spatial variation of insurgent violence and it will potentially advance a conceptual framework to clarify how/if existing insurgent popular legitimacy and organised support networks can render an insurgent movement more or less likely to de-mobilise and to transform insurgent constituencies into electoral constituencies.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Armed groups are the product of relational and reciprocally formative interactions with an array of actors and institutions in their immediate social environments (Bosi/Demetriou/Malthaner 2014; della Porta 2013; Viterna 2013; Ahmad 1982). A relational understanding underpins much contemporary research on political violence, especially the manner in which armed groups and contentious movements interact with the state and its allies (Goodwin 2001; Aras 2014; Almeida 2003; Aretxaga 2003). Alimi makes the further distinction between interactions with authorities and with security forces such as the police (2015). A further relational axis exists rooted in interactions between insurgent groups, civil society actors and political parties of broadly similar ideological orientations, (Mampilly 2011a: 17; della Porta 2014). Aside from the literature by practitioners of violence, both insurgents and counter-insurgents (E. Guevara 1999; Petraeus 2013; Trinquier 1964; Army et al. 2012; Galula 2006; Lawrence 2016), lesser attention had been afforded to the relationship between armed groups and the communities which support them. However, this has begun to be more systematically addressed, in particular by the proponents of the rebel governance literature and recent relationally informed social movement research on violence.

### 2.1 *Rebel Governance*

Importantly, rebel governance is not a coherent singular field of research on political violence; it draws on earlier literature which specifically looks at armed groups' interactions with their supporters (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Ahmad 1982) and more recent research (Staniland 2014; Viterna 2013; Wood 2003) which does not necessarily use the terminology of rebel governance but addresses similar phenomena. It has been summarised as "the set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants during war" (Arjona/Kasfir/Mampilly 2015: 3). Authors have emphasised different elements of rebel governance, such as civilian participation in insurgent governance (Kasfir 2005), the consolidation of insurgent legitimacy and service provision (Mampilly 2011a) and analysis of the extent of governance and how it interacts with pre-existing politicized forms of governance (Arjona 2016b).

One of its scope conditions is that rebel groups must control territory. It generally puts forth a Kalyvasian inspired understanding of territorial control as a "the capacity of a rebel group

to keep its enemies out of a specific area” (Kasfir 2015: 26). Arjona argues that “the theory does not seek to explain social order in areas where armed organizations do not want to control territory” (2016b: 13). Kasfir acknowledges that territorial control is difficult to clearly assess, accordingly, he argues for a weaker version of it: preponderant control (2015: 28). The emphasis on territorial control, even qualified definitions of it (Mampilly 2011a: 59), results in certain limitations.

- I. Firstly, armed movements do not necessarily wait until they control territory before engaging in forms of rebel governance, their efforts at governance can in fact beget control (see Jackson 2018: 25; Ledwidge 2017: 33). Intermittent and limited provision of rebel governance can be used to foster ties with local communities and build legitimacy before insurgent movements are in a position to control territory.
- II. Secondly, the vast majority of insurgent movements, or more precisely would-be insurgent movements, never obtain territorial control but they nevertheless engage in forms of incipient rebel governance. This is especially true of insurgent movements with a substantial presence in urban areas as evidenced by many enduring guerrilla movements such as the IRA in Ireland (White and White 1991), the Tupamaros in Uruguay (Brum 2014), and indeed the M-19 (Le Blanc 2013) and the PKK’s activities in urban environments (O’Connor 2015). Insurgent groups must demonstrate their competence and efficiency to their constituency even when they still operate clandestinely (Ahmad 1982: 249). This is even more important in light of technological developments, climate change and demographic trends which have hastened global urbanisation, leading to the view that most future conflicts will occur in urban contexts (Kilcullen 2015).
- III. Finally, insurgent movements do not control territory evenly; in certain areas they have territorial control while in others they have only a clandestine or periodic presence. As Che Guevara argued, insurgent movements must also make organizational efforts “not only within the liberated area, but also have connections in the adjacent areas. Precisely through these connections it is possible to penetrate a zone for a future enlargement of the guerrilla front”(2002: 81). Accordingly, an exaggerated fidelity to the concept of territorial control limits the remit of the field of rebel governance.

## 2.2 *Social Movement Studies*

Social Movement studies has expanded on its foundational pillars of political opportunity structure (J. M. Jasper/Goodwin 2011), resource mobilization (McCarthy/Zald 1977) and framing (Benford/Snow 2000) to incorporate a relational focus emphasising the dynamic and contingent elements of social change. Emirbayer has described this relational ontology as depicting “social reality in dynamic, continuous and processual terms, and sees relations between social terms and units as pre-eminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substance” (1997, 289; see Tilly 2015: 7; Alimi/Bosi/Demetriou 2015, Chapter 1; Tarrow 2008; Malthaner/Lindekilde 2017). This relational approach is key to understanding political violence by focusing “on interpersonal processes that promote, inhibit, or channel collective violence and connect it with nonviolent politics” (Tilly 2003: 20). Nevertheless, a focus on the relationship between armed movements and their supporters is often overlooked even within this field (see for example Alimi 2015). Heretofore, the most conceptually systematic approach to this critical relationship has been Malthaner’s work on insurgent constituencies (2011).

Constituencies are defined as the “the real social groups in a society, whom the militants address and to whom they refer, with whom they are actually involved in some form of rela-

tionship, and who – at least to a certain degree – actually sympathise with and support the militant groups” (Malthaner 2011: 29). They comprise four sets of relations. Firstly, drawing on the work of Joel Migdal (1975), there are relations of utilitarian social exchange: “stable and mutually rewarding relationships of exchange of benefits and support, and the gradual institutionalization of these exchange relationships which include mutual trust and obligations of reciprocity” (Malthaner 2011: 46). This overlaps with the service provision inherent in rebel governance (Arjona 2016b: 62). The second set of relations is derived from kin and family relations which encompass pre-existing bonds of trust, emotional commitment and reciprocal obligations (Malthaner 2011: 47). This results in the imbrication of the personal and the political, resulting in the reciprocal transformation of the insurgent movement and the constituency (Parkinson 2013) The third set is related to bonds forged endogenously to the insurgent mobilization. This incorporates elements of utilitarian exchange, whereby putative constituency members are convinced by the actions of the armed movement, be they in the provision of collective services or the targeting of existing enemies such as locally disliked landlords or criminals. Malthaner’s final set of relationships are rooted in communal solidarity, generally related to ascriptive identities and found amongst groups who share the perception of an existential threat from an external aggressor. The constituency is thus less broad than related concepts such as radical milieus and more territorialised than radical networks (Malthaner/Waldmann 2014). It is also more conceptually precise than similar concepts such as Staniland’s “social base” (2014: 18) or Orhan’s different use of the same term (2015: 99).

There are three key elements of the constituency that demand further elaboration: the role of territorial control, civilian agency vis-à-vis insurgent movements and the process of insurgent legitimacy building.

#### *Territorial Control*

Regarding the first, the use of the constituency as a concept is not intended to dismiss the importance of territorial control. The constituency remains a territorialised concept, relations between an armed group and supporters are certainly shaped by their immediate social environment and local socio-spatial dynamics and balances of power. Interactions between a guerrilla unit and villagers in a mountainous district, days march from any military or police outpost are qualitatively different to interactions between a guerrilla unit forced to operate clandestinely in a city<sup>4</sup>. However, the constitutive elements of the constituency-armed group relationship are the ties between them rather than the shared existence in a given territory or even belonging to a particular ethnic or religious group. As a concept it is flexible enough to address the mass demographic volatility of conflict, related to forced displacement and migration of an insurgent’s constituency. Nevertheless, it is incontrovertible that groups which boast territorial control have much greater flexibility and capacity regarding how they interact with their constituency. One only has to consider the cases of groups like Hamas (Berti 2015) or the Taliban (Baczko 2013) and how their territorial control has allowed their presence to become more institutionalised and take the form of territorialised governance akin to an emerging state. Yet, the absence of territorial control has not impeded the significant numbers of insurgent groups from implementing elements of rebel governance as a means to obtain popular legitimacy and to establish resilient supportive constituencies. Similarly to Kalyvas’ paradox of which comes first, control or collaboration, one could discuss whether it is popular legitimacy that begets an insurgent constituency or vice versa. Of course, the answer is that it is a composite process: latent insurgent

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4 In Murat Haner’s (2018) biography of a PKK guerrilla this is made very clear in the protagonist’s description of his experiences in mountain villages sympathetic to the movement, pro-state paramilitary villages and in the cities.

legitimacy due to communal bonds, historical continuities or incumbent violence is reinforced by insurgent accomplishments and where insurgent legitimacy is less well rooted, its performance and behaviour can endogenously generate legitimacy.

Accordingly, the insurgent constituency is a concept ideally suited for analysing groups which do not boast territorial control. It can facilitate an analysis of early phase insurgent mobilisation which of course can evolve to obtain territorial control, or – as in the case of the majority of insurgent movements – fail to develop beyond small armed cells with limited popular support. Additionally, it is an apt approach to analyse the margins of insurgent territorial control. If an armed group controls a delimited territory but has wider geographical objectives, they are consequently likely to be contemporarily active in areas where they have territorial control and ones in which they only have a form of social control. Finally, it is arguably better equipped to address armed movements which operate in urban contexts where there is a much lower likelihood of insurgent territorial control.

### *Insurgent Legitimacy*

Insurgent support itself demands further explanation: Arjona disaggregates it into obedience, spontaneous support and enlistment (2017). Obedience entails complying with insurgent groups commands, spontaneous support includes providing voluntarily assistance to them and enlistment means actively joining the movement in some role, not necessarily as a combatant (Arjona 2017: 762). It has alternatively been categorised as voluntary, quasi-voluntary and coercive compliance (Podder 2017: 687). Arjona argues that insurgent movements require at least some spontaneous support and a massive degree of obedience if they are to successfully operate. Once the basic condition of obedience is achieved, insurgent movements can proceed to strengthen their local support through a combination of maintaining order by the use of selective violence and by providing forms of rebel governance (Arjona 2017). Malthaner describes insurgent support relationships as “as dynamic patterns of mutual orientation, dependency and influence emerging from sustained interaction and exchange between armed groups and certain parts of a population, which entail an element of non-coerced (active or passive) collaboration on the part of that population” (2015: 429).

If armed groups are to obtain a degree of non-coerced support and a broader array of compliance, they must be recognised as possessing a degree of legitimacy. Legitimacy can be understood as a “the belief in the justification or the moral validity of a political organisation and its activities (Schneckener 2017: 803) and is usually reflective of “local norms, identities and realities which resonate with target populations” (Worrall 2017: 715). Armed groups without a minimum of legitimacy are doomed to fail as obtaining compliance through coercion is simply too labour intensive and exhausting, leading to a loss of morale and coherence for insurgent movements (Duyvesteyn 2017: 672–73). Legitimacy is not an innate quality; rather it is an interactive and ongoing process (Demetriou 2007: 174). Even the classic Weberian understanding of charismatic legitimacy can be interpreted as only being realised when it is acknowledged by a leader’s followers (Joosse 2014: 271). It is therefore a process in constant re-negotiation and as a result, a group viewed as having legitimacy at one particular time and place can, at a time thereafter, be perceived as illegitimate. Maintenance of legitimacy is particularly challenging for armed groups as violence can serve as a both a legitimising and de-legitimising impact. Violence perceived as defensive and protecting the community can enhance legitimacy but violence viewed as unwarranted or incongruent with local norms can have the opposite effect (Schlichte/Schneckener 2015: 415; Al-Tamimi 2018; Ulezić 2018).

Yet, violence is not the only means of garnering legitimacy for armed groups, they can also possess forms of symbolic or performative legitimacy (Schlichte/Schneckener 2015: 418). They can derive legitimacy from their origins or a shared communal background (Mampilly

2011b: 75), as the inheritors of a specific revolutionary or national tradition. Prior to being ensconced or as in the halls of power in the Kurdish regional government in Iraq, the Barzani family were a good example of such a form of trans-generational legitimacy. Alternatively, an armed group that is seen as particularly brave or willing to sacrifice itself for its 'people' or endure similar privations can garner legitimacy for example the EZLN in Chiapas in Mexico prior to its 1994 uprising (O'Connor/Oikonomakis 2015). Certain charismatic leaders (e.g. Abdullah Öcalan in the PKK or Velupillai Prabhakaran in the LTTE) generate a degree of legitimacy, invested in their person which is then transfused through their movements (Nepstad/Bob 2006: 2; Gerdes 2015). Performative legitimacy can be obtained through delivery-based legitimization (Giustozzi 2012: 193) by the provision of forms of insurgent services and the maintenance of order as previously addressed in the discussion of rebel governance.

Legitimacy is particularly important for insurgent movements in locations and phases where they do not possess territorial control, when they are more vulnerable to detection by state security forces. The quest for legitimacy arises in the early phases of insurgent trajectories (Schlichte/Schneckener 2015: 410). Yet, as evidenced by the majority of armed groups which manage to survive periods of initial vulnerability, nascent legitimacy is sufficient to generate some social control, which is then key to obtaining insurgent support. Compliance in areas of social control is maintained by the collective imposition of mechanisms of social sanction upon those which stray from the orientation of the local community. Such mechanisms of control are founded on "mutual surveillance by community members" and include "forms of social ostracism, public shaming, and exclusion and isolation" (Malthaner 2015: 433). Although, these social sanctions are configured in the context of the implicit or potential threat of insurgent retribution, most social sanctioning is actually enforced by the broader constituency rather than the armed group itself (Sluka 1989: 135–36). Over time, the internalisation of norms expounded by insurgent organisations leads to a form of hegemonic compliance (Bosi 2013: 81). Popular legitimacy allows insurgent movements to survive and expand because it facilitates insurgent social control. Thus forms of symbolic legitimacy, bolstered by various forms of performative legitimacy – service provision or combat performance – lead to social control which facilitates the consolidation of an insurgent constituency and, subject to other factors, can lead to territorial control.

#### *Civilian Agency*

As mentioned above, the constituency is a relational concept, located in the constantly evolving back and forth between armed movements and civilians. It is therefore strongly shaped by the agency of the involved civilians. It must be acknowledged that armed group-constituency interactions develop in a context characterised by the potential deployment of insurgent violence (Mazower 2001: 132) yet it is not simply a unidirectional imposition of force by the stronger on the weaker (Arjona 2016a). Civilians can contest insurgent presence in a number of fashions. Arjona disaggregates civilian disobedience vis-à-vis insurgent authority into resistance, defection or migration (2017: 762). Civilians have numerous, albeit often arduous options, in contexts of prolonged insurgent violence; they can often seek support from other armed actors (Weinstein 2007: 203; Sanin 2008) or establish (usually in conjunction with the state) paramilitary associations such as the *rondas campesinas* in Peru (Degregori 2005), Village Guards in Kurdistan (Özar/Uçarlar/Aytar 2013) or patriot militias in Algeria (Martinez 2000: 151–55). Furthermore, armed groups are not always better armed than civilians. Certain societies, particularly rural and tribally constituted ones, are often in possession of relatively heavy weapons and proficient in their use (Haner 2018: 51; O'Connor 2014: 181). Weak insurgent military capacity is particularly relevant in the early stages of insurgent group formation (O'Connor/Oikonomakis 2015). Civilians can also

make use of a broader range of culturally specific forms of resistance (Arjona 2015; Rappaport 2007) and there have been multiple instances of non-violent resistance against both insurgent and state forces in Colombian peace communities (Masullo Jiménez 2017).

Accordingly, although armed groups commonly possess the means of coercing their constituency, this relative strength is not consistently available, and its deployment would risk undermining their symbolic and political legitimacy. Although armed groups can obtain legitimacy from different audiences i.e. from associations with the state (Schneckener 2017) or via national or international recognition (Podder 2017: 688), one can argue that ongoing symbolic validation by the constituency is the principal source of symbolic legitimacy for armed actors (Ahmad 1982: 246). It is central to insurgent movements' morale that the people they claim to represent and regularly interact with, acknowledge their efforts and co-operate with their demands to a certain extent. It is also true that many militants do not necessarily venture far from their home areas (Goodwin 1997), and thus, if they were to experience rejection by their constituency, it would be a personal as well as a political rejection. As a symbolic acknowledgement by their constituency is a crucial part of insurgent self-identity, it behoves insurgents to respect the normative limits of the constituency (Guillén 1982: 320; Falciola 2015: 258). These normative parameters are not fixed and evolve over the course of a conflict, tolerating more intensive forms of violence in certain stages which would previously or subsequently be regarded as excessive (Beissinger 2002: 40; Casanova 2005). This was well summed-up by former IRA member Eamonn Collins who claimed that when the IRA formulated its armed strategy, they "knew they were operating within a powerful set of informal restrictions on their behaviour, no less powerful for being largely unspoken" (1997: 295). The persistent breaching of these normative limits can definitively undermine insurgent support networks as in the case of ASALA (Dugan et al. 2008: 236).

In summary, the synthesis of the rebel governance approach and relational ontology of recent work on violence by social movements' scholars is well suited to addressing the entirety of insurgent movement trajectories. More specifically it allows a fine-grained analysis of how insurgent movements form the supportive constituencies necessary for their own self-perception as legitimate political actors and for obtaining the material support need to maintain an armed movement. Yet, rebel governance is characterised by a degree of chronological limitations, failing to explain earlier phases of insurgent mobilisation and the margins of insurgent control and presence. Social movement studies are not wholly suited for analysing insurgent consolidation and remain somewhat conceptually fragmented. Nevertheless, the approach outlined in this paper fuses the both schools and complements it with a strong spatial focus on the micro-spaces where armed groups interact with their supporters.

### 3. ROUTINISED INSURGENT SPACES

#### 3.1 *Conceptual Clarification*

The first methodological step in any research agenda is the conceptual clarification of the category to be explained (George 2019; Sartori 1970; Mair 2008). Drawing on Goertz's (2006) understanding of conceptual development, Routinised insurgent space is conceptualised according to its necessary and sufficient conditions. In order to differentiate RIS from other interactions between armed groups and civilians, such as purely coercive or violent ones, from coincidental interactions between armed groups and civilian bystanders (e.g. when militants encounter shepherds or farmers while passing from one area to another), from urgent unplanned interactions (e.g. when militants need medical aid or basic necessities) from rhetorical and communicative interactions which do not entail interpersonal en-

agement (e.g. media or online propaganda), and from unknowing interactions (e.g. when militants deliberately conceal their identities from civilians), it is necessary to list RIS' necessary conditions. For interactions to be categorized as occurring in a context of RIS it is necessary to have 1) an armed group deliberately and strategically engaging with its constituency or putative constituency, and 2) these interactions must occur in specific spaces selected by the armed group. This coincides with a minimal conceptual understanding as it includes "all definitional attributes that are necessary and, therefore are always present" (Gerring and Barresi 2013: 207). It is accordingly minimal in attributes but maximal in extensional range, rendering it apt to address the universality of armed groups' efforts to earn and maintain legitimacy through interactions with their constituencies. In light of Goertz's substitutability test, if either of these two elements are absent, it is not an instance of a RIS but rather one of the aforementioned alternative potential forms of interactions, therefore as a concept its better structured according to its necessary and sufficient conditions rather than family resemblance (2006: 45). According to Satori's ladder of abstraction (1970: 1044), RIS is a medium-level category and its composite forms (insurgent service provision, prison organization etc.) are lower-level categories, whose sufficient conditions are highly context dependent and reflect dynamic structural and relational factors, across and also within case studies.

Insurgent groups' relationships with their supporters have been classed as "distinct relational arena" (Malthaner 2015: 429), routinised insurgent spaces on the other hand address the specific spatial component of this relational arena. Insurgent movements appropriate space "to mobilize as a resource for their goals and to change symbolic meanings" (O'Hearn 2009: 494) and more specifically, routinized insurgent spaces can be understood as specific spaces in which armed group-constituency relations are ordered and routinized. In early phases of insurgency, encounters between militants and potential supporters occur in open non-politicised spaces, often outdoors or in shared spaces like religious centres or even in private dwellings. However, as insurgent groups' presence is consolidated (not necessarily to the point of territorial control), they begin to engineer spaces which are specifically imbued with symbolic and political relevance. These spaces serve as loci for a range of interactions of utilitarian social exchange (insurgent courts systems, schools or markets) and ritualised symbolically laden events (funerals, martyrs' commemorations or rallies). It must be emphasized that all civilians who encounter rebel groups in routinized insurgent spaces are not a priori politicized or even well-disposed to the insurgent movement. Often times in the absence of alternatives they simply need to avail of services exclusively available in such settings or are either implicitly or explicitly pressured by groups to engage with them. Over time, the interactions which accrue in these routinized insurgent spaces facilitate emotional ties, political socialization and popular legitimacy.

These routinized insurgent spaces are influenced by the phases of insurgency and the environments in which they occur. Territorial control facilitates a more institutionalized form of routinized insurgent space, including concrete infrastructure such as hospitals or border crossings staffed by fulltime movement cadres (Mampilly 2011b: 93, 120). In areas characterised by social control, particularly in urban contexts, they are more fleeting and flexible. To give a concrete example, an insurgent court could sit regularly in a specific recognised building and be open to the public in an insurgent controlled rural village as in cases of Taliban courts in Afghanistan (Jackson 2018; Baczko 2013). On the other hand, in an urban context controlled by the state, it might be clandestinely held in private residences. Nonetheless, these spaces have similar aspirations to generate greater ties with insurgent constituencies and consolidate a specific insurgent designed spatial ordering. These routinized insurgent spaces serve as sites of socialization and reinforcement of insurgent legitimacy. They result in the stabilisation of an insurgent habitus in its dealings with its constituency in terms of language and discourse used, rituals observed, and reconfiguration of prevailing

social norms related to gender, class and age. Norms of interaction are informed by both the constituency and the armed group. As Ahmad argues “the symbols of revolution and styles of leadership derive heavily from the local culture and constitute the creative links between the old and the new, between the mystical and the rational bases of legitimacy” (1982: 251).

### 3.2 *Social Ties*

The location where social ties are formed can strongly influence their subsequent development, the likelihood of their subsequent maintenance and the emotional salience with which they are attributed. A tie formed in prison between a non-militant and a political prisoner in the context of the brutalities of prison life is likely to be more emotionally intense than a social tie formed between a clandestine militant and a potential sympathiser on a university campus. Accordingly, routinised insurgent spaces are designed to bestow emergent social ties with credibility (the movement is serious and committed in what it says and does) and emotional resonance (the movement is willing to sacrifice itself and genuinely cares about the broader community). As previously discussed, social ties and networks are a well-established means of analysing insurgent movements’ growth and recruitment. Passy identified three functions of social ties: socialization, structural-connection and decision-making (2001). As an armed group’s constituency develops, these ties become more numerous and inevitably more varied. Additionally, the nature and function of what seems to be ostensibly the same form of tie can be very different at different phases of insurgent mobilization. If we take the case of family or kin ties (Malthaner 2011: 47): in an armed group’s early phase of constituency formation, recruitment is often conducted through family and peer networks in familiar spaces (White 1993: 38; Bosi/della Porta 2012; Viterna 2006; Tezcür 2016; Sageman 2008). In this period, the structural gap between an individual and a movement is diminished when one has a sibling or friend within the movement (Passy 2001: 174). Reciprocal responsibilities of ‘taking care of your family’ can induce siblings to join in order to protect or lessen the potential danger to a brother or sister. Alternatively, having a family member or a peer within a group can de-mystify it and make it less alien, thus easing participation. At this phase of constituency establishment, routinised insurgent spaces are relatively underdeveloped. In subsequent phases of constituency maintenance, when movements are larger and hierarchically structured, having a family member involved could involve a different route to membership.

Another variation of a family tie is related to having family members who have been ‘martyred’ in fighting (Moghadam 2011) or imprisoned (Letamendia 2012). Although still a family or kin tie, it is a very different one to accompanying one’s sibling to a revolutionary meeting in the relatively safe confines of a university or a café in early insurgent phases. These ties are reinforced in more sophisticated forms of RIS, like martyr or prisoner associations. Later, family ties are laden with greater emotional resonance, bolstered by feelings of vengefulness or fear. Movements are cognisant of the emotional potential of such ties and promote specific events and practices targeting family ties to strengthen its constituency: examples of such, are the founding of prisoner support groups or, even more potently, the politicization of funerals and the commemoration of martyrs (Khalili 2007). However, one needs to be cautious to avoid adopting an overly-deterministic approach to understanding family ties. On certain occasions, prevailing family ties and inherent responsibilities can, in fact, restrain potential recruits from joining groups (Malthaner/Lindekilde 2017). In others, the abandonment of familial responsibilities for an insurgent group can antagonize local populations (Goodwin 1997). Fears that armed groups intend to recruit – forcibly or through persuasion – local youths can lead to the formation of pro-state paramilitary groups to preempt further insurgent mobilisation. Finally, many individuals often fall under the influence

of peers or other individuals and adopt strikingly different political and religious positions to their families (O'Connor 2014: 226).

A more spatially informed and chronologically disaggregated analysis of the ties which bind insurgents to their constituencies is needed to account for the reality that the majority of potential recruits in insurgent groups' immediate social environments do not actually become insurgents (Viterna 2013: 44). A dynamic conceptualization of ties also avoids their reification and can explain why certain mobilization and recruitment tactics successfully employed in one phase of the conflict can prove to be less useful in others.

### 3.3 Time

Time should be understood as less a question of the "abstract historical processes" critiqued by Sewell (1996: 247) but rather as series of particular events. Armed group's constituencies are in a perpetual process of re-constitution; supporters become insurgents, supporters are imprisoned, supporters are forced or choose to migrate, become disillusioned and defect to other parties or simply disengage from any active political engagements. It is therefore not possible to identify a single specific point when a constituency transitions from establishment to maintenance. Nevertheless, there is a strong chronological distinction between armed groups incipient phases of mobilisation and subsequent phases once they are consolidated. This, of course, also applies to the extent and comprehensiveness of RIS: in simple terms, RIS is more inconsistent in earlier phases of mobilisation and potentially more developed and consistent in later ones.

It has been documented that founding generations of insurgents differ dramatically from subsequent ones. With later ones socialized in a context of violence and usually – when they are successful – insurgent recruitment expands to different demographics (O'Connor/Oikonomakis 2015; Moyano 1992; Tarrow 1993: 167; Johnston 2014: 37–39; Aydin/Emrence 2015: 19). Thus, early generations of insurgents interact in a very different fashion with their nascent constituency than in later phases. In the initial phase of constituency building, armed groups are dependent on pre-existing social networks, as they can offer little in the way of utilitarian social exchange and there are limited ties endogenous to the nascent mobilisation. However, a creative manipulation of pre-existing ties, not simply familial or friendship ones, often related to weak ties forged in non-clandestine political mobilisation in university politics or trade union activities can facilitate the emergence of a constituency (Staniland 2014: 9). This is particularly true in authoritarian contexts wherein emotionally salient ties are formed in settings like prisons or amongst communities directly impacted by violent state excesses. An ulterior type of tie making in this phase is the judicious use of violence – in an antagonistic or defensive fashion – against adversaries, which are not so militarily potent as to risk insurgent movements' immediate liquidation by challenging them. Typically, this could entail providing protection against violent opponents such as political gangs or attacking local contentious figures such as landlords or disliked bosses or officials.

In later phases of constituency consolidation, insurgents are capable of engaging in more substantial forms of utilitarian social exchange or forging a nascent counter-state replete with an implicit insurgent social contract (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 494). In addition to providing popular legitimacy, the provision of services also serves as a practical means of engineering initial contact with civilians beyond insurgents' existing networks. These initial points of interaction have been referred to as "moments of encounter" (O'Connor/Oikonomakis 2015). The engineering of non-conflictual spaces where insurgents provide necessary services or simply the possibility to present themselves in a non-hostile fashion are crucial for breaking down civilians' suspicions. These moments of encounter can range from the distribution of 'appropriated' wellingtons as was common amongst M-19 guerrillas

in Pasto in Southern Colombia (Personal interview Germany, M-19 guerrilla, 2017), the visit of an insurgent doctor (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 483) or the provision of armed support to striking workers (Villamizar 2002: 341). These encounters serve as means to socialize members of the broader public into adopting a “participant identity” (Viterna 2013: 51). Insurgent support in phases of constituency maintenance can be reinforced by practises of state repression. Indiscriminate state repression commonly results in accentuating pre-existing grievances and consolidating solidarity with insurgents (Almeida 2003; Orhan 2015; Goodwin 2001: 188–169; Bosi/della Porta 2012; Wood 2003; Aras 2014; Hafez 2003; Malthaner 2015).

Insurgent movements’ trajectories and their accordant relationship with their constituencies vary dramatically from early phases of weakness and pronounced vulnerability, periods of consolidation and ultimately either decline or transformation through victory. The nexus of social ties and where they occur, binding armed groups to their constituencies, changes significantly across phases of insurgent activity.

### 3.4 *Spatial Dynamics*

The empirical particularities of armed groups’ relational axes (*vis-à-vis* the state and allied groups, other political actors, and constituencies) must be considered in light of the ‘spatial turn’ of the social sciences (Gambetti/Jongerden 2011; Ó Dochartaigh 2015; Sewell Jr. 2001; Springer/Le Billon 2016). Inspired by some of the defining work on space conducted by social geographers, space is not understood as a natural phenomenon to be quantified and controlled but rather as a phenomenon that it is always “contested and conflictual in so far as social relations and spatial formations are mutually constitutive” (Dikeç 2016: 5). A point redolent of Massey’s assertion that as “there are no purely spatial processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes.” (1995: 51). The inherently spatial component of relationality (Dikeç 2016: 1) has heretofore not been made explicit regarding the relations between armed movements and their sympathisers and broader civilian populations. By understanding space as a contested realm rather than simply a neutral terrain from which to better extract resources, it allows one to acknowledge its use by insurgent movements to reconfigure “symbolic meanings” (O’Hearn 2009: 494) and generate alternative political imaginaries. RIS’ conceptual origins accordingly bridge the reciprocally formative relations between armed movements and other actors and institutions in their immediate social environment, embedded in shifting balances of power derived in spatial contestation. Contestation is more nuanced than the question of ‘territorial control’, thus allowing an analysis of armed groups’ clandestine operations and incremental presence in areas of state domination, as a means of naturalising their informal insurgent practises and institutions.

As Bosi has explained, “space is not a ‘natural’ unit to which individuals adjust but a social artefact, structured through the interactions of people, groups, and institutions that are embedded in specific social relations” (2013: 82). Although physical geographic features such as mountains or forests remain integral to understanding space, emphasis has shifted to the ‘spatial agency’ of social actors and the way they shape their socio-spatial environments. Focus lies on the “fashion in which spatial constraints are turned to advantage in political and social struggles and the ways that such struggles can restructure the meanings, uses and strategic valence of space” (Sewell, 2001:55). Yet, “there is a radical spatial unevenness to violence that defies explanation at the national level” and that most “violent conflicts extend across less than one quarter of the area of the states in which they take place”(Ó Dochartaigh 2013: 120). One cannot therefore generalise at the level of the state, or even region, in terms of the diffusion of insurgency. Accordingly, one must incorporate an awareness of the broader spatial dimensions, such as physical geography (e.g. in mountainous or jungle areas), geostrategic elements (e.g. within which state boundaries, or proximity to borders), into the micro-level analysis of RIS.

An intuitive and rather widespread approach to analyse violence is to distinguish between urban and rural insurgency (de la Calle 2015). It has long been held that “insurgents tend to be universally weak in cities” due to the ease with which incumbent forces can “police and monitor the population” (Kalyvas 2006:133). Fidel Castro went so far as to declare the city the graveyard of the revolutionary (in Ibrahim 2004: 121) Yet, there have been numerous urban insurgent campaigns across the globe (Staniland 2010; Kilcullen 2015; Le Blanc 2013; Lomax 2015), and they are arguably becoming ever more recurrent as in recent examples of the ISIS seizure of the city of Marawi in the Philippines (Knight/Theodorakis 2018) and the massive urban component of the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, the boundaries between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ are often dramatically re-configured in times of conflict. Prolonged conflict inevitably results in population displacement; rural isolated communities relocate to the relative safety of urban environments, congregating in improvised provisional neighbourhoods or in refugee camps. These movements of population can be an integral part of states counter-insurgency efforts (Kalyvas 2006: 123; Jongerden 2007) or more spontaneous and temporary in nature. Rural migrants tend to re-settle collectively in urban centres thus maintaining rural customs and practises and pre-existing solidarity networks (Marr 2004: 167; Grabolle-Çeliker 2012; Wedel 2001). Therefore, in times of conflict, the distinction between the rural and the urban is not necessarily as clear as might be imagined. The concept of constituency because it is not territorially fixed, is a particularly apt conceptual tool to track ongoing insurgent group-supporters’ relations across dramatically reconfigured socio-spatial environments. A displaced or refugee, peasant sympathiser of a particular movement does not necessarily cease to support the movement simply because they have been relocated to a different environment. Indeed, their support for the movement may have even increased. A focus on the insurgent constituency as a relational construct, territorially influenced but not determined, in contrast to territorially rooted concepts like Waldmann’s “radical community” (2005: 254), allows a protracted analysis of the actors actually under study rather than spatial reference points which may be of less relevance.

The specific advantages and disadvantages inherent to the establishment of RIS in urban and rural contexts merit further examination. It is generally more common for insurgents in rural areas to possess a degree of territorial control. The relative security for insurgents in isolated rural areas facilitates prolonged and more open interactions with their constituency and more comprehensive forms of RIS, such as regular insurgent courts and more consolidated forms of insurgent service provision. Extended exposure to guerrillas allows the cementing of greater bonds of emotional and interpersonal solidarity with local residents. This emotional imbrication between insurgents and supporters consolidates and sustains insurgents’ motivation to continue the struggle and emboldens supporters to become more active in their support. Additionally, insurgents can provide a more institutionalized form of insurgent service provision. The appropriation of buildings for use as hospitals or schools or even more substantially, the implementation of land reform granting the use or title of land to peasants (Wickham-Crowley 1987; Ledwidge 2017: 39).

Conversely, both time and space in urban contexts is a more constrained resource, although on occasions where insurgents can safely engage in constituency building in urban centres they can encounter vastly increased numbers of potential supporters and sympathisers, rendering it more time effective. As the revolutionary theorist Abraham Guillén asserted “[...] the revolutionary potential is where the population is” (1982: 317). For example, when an armed group punishes a gang of petty criminals in an urban neighbourhood, this provides a concrete benefit to a much larger number of people than an analogous punishment of a rural cattle thief. Although the natural cover of physical geography is absent in cities, populous slum neighbourhoods and somewhat paradoxically upper-class neighbourhoods can all provide different forms of social camouflage (Ibrahim 2004: 121). An aware-

ness of this urban potential influenced the M-19's strategic planning when it "decided to operate in zones of economic and geopolitical importance, where the masses were the guerrillas' forest rather than in an actual forest, where the [guerrilla forces] would be isolated" (Navarro Wolff in Jiménez Ricárdez 1986)<sup>5</sup>. It must also be recalled that insurgent movements often re-encounter displaced rural dwellers with whom they had some form of relationship in the countryside, thus it is often a question of re-connecting with their existing constituency in a different spatial environment.

#### 4. FORMS OF ROUTINISED INSURGENT SPACE

##### 4.1 *Insurgent systems of justice and policing*

One of the first initiatives with which insurgent movements are tasked is the maintenance of security in order to deter defection, preserve their own operational security and to consolidate their popular legitimacy with their constituency by providing broader security and stability. Insurgent policing services are concrete occasions and a nascent space where constituency members knowingly and actively interact with the insurgent movement and become socialized into their broader political vision. Mampilly argues that this is a necessary first step in rebel governance which is usually then followed by the establishment of some form of dispute resolution mechanism or alternative juridical system (2011b: 17; Wickham-Crowley 1990: 482; Jackson 2018: 7). In instances of stronger territorial control, revolutionary courts can become institutionalised, open to the public scrutiny and staffed by a relatively independent judiciary, as in the case of the IRA's Dáil courts in Ireland (Kotsonouris 1994), the Taliban courts in some areas of Afghanistan (Jackson 2018; Baczko 2013) or the courts operated in Greece by the EAM during the Nazi occupation (Stavrianos 1952: 84; Charitopoulos 2012). However, in most cases of insurgency, particularly in urban areas, insurgent justice tends to develop in a more inconsistent fashion and is primarily realised at the level of policing at the grassroots level. This often occurs in areas with very limited insurgent territorial control and is thus reliant on the broader public accepting the alternative justice systems as more legitimate than the incumbent one and actively engaging with the system. Additionally, the targeting of locally disreputable elements often occurs in the very early stages of insurgent mobilization, as it demands relatively low investment of insurgent resources and can result in immediate popularity dividends.

In times of conflict, parallel to ostensibly political violence, there is often a rise in more common everyday crime, where criminals opportunistically take advantage of the breakdown of formal authority (Munck 1984: 89). On occasion, non-political criminality may be deliberately allowed to flourish by state authorities as a way of creating upheaval in insurgent sympathetic communities (Darici 2011; Munck 1984: 87). Therefore, insurgent movements that are seen as capable of restoring a semblance of order to society - albeit through violent means - often garner immense popular support, at least initially (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 489; Gutiérrez Sanín 2015; Munck 1984; Ledwidge 2017: 74). However, armed movements engagement in policing their constituencies is not always a priority and it can even lead to reputational costs. It can divert resources away from the principal objective of fighting one's opponents and, given the lower burden of evidence inherent in much insurgent policing, it provides a platform for malicious denunciation (Gutiérrez Sanín 2015: 263; Baczko 2013: 105). Additionally, in the absence of rigorous oversight or rivalry between different movements' approaches to policing, it can degenerate into vigilantism (Lia 2006:

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5 Author's own translation.

66), become involved with the very criminal elements it was intended to police (Sanín/Jaramillo 2004) or evolve into a politicised ethnic militia (Harnischfeger 2003).

Nonetheless, the provision of policing and juridical services is a central pillar of the majority of insurgent organisations. As Arjona argues “rebels quickly learn that gaps in dispute institutions offer a unique opportunity to penetrate a community, obtain information about its members and their networks, gain legitimacy, and control civilian behavior. Once their dispute institutions established by the armed group become the preferred mechanism for adjudicating disputes, the organization becomes a central figure in the community” (2016b: 73). However, insurgent justice systems must be consistent with prevailing local social orders (Worrall 2017: 717), as in the case of Somalia where the Union of Islamic Courts combined customary clan dispute resolution norms with Islamic jurisprudence (Mwangi 2010). In the case of the Taliban courts, they more easily gained local recognition as legitimate due to locals’ familiarity and respect for Islamic law (Baczko 2013: 125), but the courts were nevertheless also cognizant of local non-Islamic norms and did not challenge them (Jackson 2018: 19).

A fundamental feature of successful court systems is the capacity to guarantee enforcement of the judgments passed by the court (Ledwidge 2017: 71), and once the likelihood of enforcement is understood locally, the majority of disputes are resolved through mediation without the need for recourse to violent punishment. Nevertheless, the form of punishments implemented must also be attuned to local norms. In the case of a militia in the Igbo region of southern Nigeria, the Bakassi Boys drew on an explicitly anti-Western understanding of justice, juxtaposed with the formal court system significantly shaped by colonial institutions. The Bakassi Boys claimed to possess magical powers – which co-exist with local Christian beliefs – that helped them to accurately judge suspects innocence or guilt (Harnischfeger 2003: 32). The guilty were then punished by being brutally hacked to death in public areas<sup>6</sup> before being set alight. Although the Bakassi Boys’ investigation of suspects was completely secret and the crimes of the punished were not even publicized, the justice of the Bakassi boys maintained popular support because of their connections with the occult and perceived lack of corruption (Harnischfeger 2003: 31). In other forms of insurgent justice, punishments are less violent. In rural areas of southern Colombia, the M-19 sentenced people engaged in domestic abuse or minor thievery to a period of labour for the communal good such as repairing irrigation systems or bridges. In cases of persistent crime or violence, they executed offenders (Personal Interviews, Bogota 2018). In Ireland, the IRA had a scale of punishment ranging from head-shaving, tarring and feathering, beatings, non-lethal shootings, exile and execution. Even within these type of punishments there was variation according to where one was shot, in the knee or the thigh and which caliber of ammunition was used, according to the gravity of the crime or personal connections with members of the movement (Monaghan 2004: 444). Even opaque and brutal forms of insurgent justice can maintain popular support when they are viewed as relatively fair and not corrupt, and they do not contravene local norms (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 489).

#### 4.2 *Insurgent service provision*

After a degree of security for both the movement and the local population has been established (Wickham-Crowley 1987: 482), insurgents’ next move is commonly the provision of certain insurgent services. The scale of service provision varies dramatically; at the more comprehensive end of the spectrum movements like FARC provided “substantial services to the inhabitants of its territory, including health and education systems, a police force to maintain stability, courts to adjudicate civil and criminal disputes, and even loans to farm-

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6 The killing of an accused sorcerer drew a crowd of 20,000 people (Harnischfeger 2003: 35).

ers and small businessmen. It also engaged in extensive public works projects such as building roads and other infrastructure construction” (Mampilly 2011b: 2). On the other end of the spectrum, groups like the Peruvian ELN had a number of militants with medical training who on an ad hoc basis assessed and treated highland villagers that they encountered in remote mountain areas (Béjar 1982: 284). Importantly, although territorial control shapes and influences the types of services provided, it is not a pre-condition to their provision. In areas where insurgent movements only enjoy a clandestine presence they can use their coercive weight to intervene on behalf of their constituency in, for example, labour disputes as the M-19 did repeatedly in Colombia (Villamizar Herrera 1995). Alternatively, as the M-19 also did, they can provide material benefits, albeit in an inconsistent fashion, such as the distribution of material necessities like milk or flour (Personal Interview M-19 militants, Bogota 2018). This supports the argument that armed groups do engage in forms of rebel governance prior to cementing territorial control.

These services have been categorised in different fashions. Mampilly focuses on police and judicial mechanisms, health and education services, and feedback and representative mechanisms (2011b: 62). Wickham-Crowley arranged them into contributions to locals’ material security, defence and policing and representative forums such as local committees (1987: 483). This project puts forward an alternative analytical prioritisation of insurgent services for two reasons: firstly, as representative mechanisms are feasible only with a stronger degree of territorial control and this paper draws mostly on movements with limited or no territorial control, it would not make sense to include Mampilly and Wickham-Crowley’s final criterion. Secondly, in light of the absolute heterogeneity of these services, a step up the ladder of conceptual abstraction focuses on four characteristics which facilitate insurgent service provision: the extent of previous state penetration, direct or indirect provision of services, the scale of insurgent social and/or territorial control, and the skills and specific expertise within insurgent movements.

#### *The extent of previous state penetration*

It has been argued that in areas where the state has previously been largely absent, it renders them more inclined to support rebel governance (Wickham-Crowley 2015: 50). While Mampilly states that it is “only through an understanding of the pre-conflict state-society relationship can we grasp the modalities that produce diverse insurgent governance efforts across cases, as various civilian populations, politically habituated in different ways, make distinct demands upon the rebel political authority” (2011b: 69). Accordingly, specific territories where locals are used to a relatively consistent standard of service provision, such as schools and health services will not be inclined to tolerate inferior forms of said services from insurgents, thus impelling insurgent movements to rapidly re-institute comparable forms of service provision. On the other hand, in territories largely devoid of state presence or characterised by a state presence filtered through rapacious local elites, locals would be likely better inclined to support even rudimentary forms of insurgent service provision.

#### *Direct or indirect provision of services*

The first point directly shapes the second: if there is a lingering state presence via institutions such as schools or hospitals in areas under the influence of insurgents, it can often be an easier decision to facilitate their ongoing maintenance rather than usurping them and providing a likely inferior substitute. This coincides directly with Mampilly’s hypothesis that “if an insurgency emerges in a state with high penetration into society, it is more likely to be able to co-opt pre-existing institutions and networks into its civil administration, thereby improving governance provision”(2011b: 72). In fact, in many civil wars and even in areas of relatively robust insurgent territorial control, there is a lingering state presence via non-military related, state institutions. Additionally, particularly in periods of lower intensity

fighting, a form of open, albeit uneasy coexistence between incumbent and insurgent forces can exist, as in the protracted ceasefire in Nagaland on the Indian-Myanmar border (Thakur/Venugopal 2018; Kolås 2011). In many cases, incumbent governments continue to pay civil servants to provide services to areas under insurgent control. In the territory governed by the forces of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, the Assad regime continues to pay teachers and other civil servants' salaries (Gurbuz 2018). This can often lead to the situation wherein rebel forces are in a position to be able to encourage continued government support for certain forms of administration (Arjona 2016b: 62). In Afghanistan, the Taliban obliges the government to continue to finance the school system while it de facto manages it, vetoing certain appointments and curricula, and monitoring teachers' attendance records (Jackson 2018: 12–16). This uneasy co-existence between insurgent movements and government authorities (usually but not always excluding security forces) also draws into question Kalyvas' (2006) renowned model to distinguish between insurgent and incumbent territorial control because, even when insurgents control a territory, there is often an enduring state institutional presence. While on the contrary, there is no (or at least only very rarely) an equivalent form of residual insurgent institutions in state territory, therefore, the Kalyvasian model of control does not compare like with like.

On the contrary, when there is little or no state penetration, insurgent service provision is confronted with different challenges. It is advantageous in terms of insurgent legitimacy. If an insurgent movement is the first organised entity to provide basic medical services or to teach basic literacy skills, they can more easily obtain the support of grateful locals. This was the case in large "colonised" areas of Colombia settled by displaced peasants during la Violencia in the 1940s and 1950s. Armed groups like FARC and the M-19 in parts rural of areas like Caquetá, Huila and Putumayo were the only state-like authorities the residents there had ever experienced (Personal Interviews Bogota 2018). However, as Mampilly proposes, "if an insurgency emerges in a state with minimal penetration into society, it is less likely to develop an effective governance system than one that emerges in a state that penetrated deeply into society" (2011b: 72). In simple terms, all services will have to be provided directly by insurgent efforts themselves from scratch. This is naturally a much bigger logistical challenge; for example, it is easier to install an insurgent doctor in a medical centre abandoned by state doctors than to build one's own insurgent hospital. This is particularly true in the earlier phases of insurgent mobilisation when movements tend to be weaker and poorer in resources. Accordingly, insurgent services can be furnished directly or indirectly and this is largely shaped by prevailing extent of state penetration in a given area.

#### *The scale of insurgent social and/or territorial control*

As previously outlined, this project does not question the importance of territorial control in shaping the form of rebel governance provided. It is undeniable that, when an insurgent movement has full control of an area, the resulting stability allows for longer term planning by insurgent movements and the greater institutionalisation of forms of rebel governance. It is the difference between clandestine IRA volunteers passing secret judgement in improvised and wholly non-transparent proceedings during the Troubles (1969–1998) (O'Docherty 1993), compared to the public courts cases with formalised appeals process and greater transparency by IRA militants during the Irish war of independence (1919–1921) (Kotsonouris 1994). Even more pronounced differences prevail in the provision of health services, in territories controlled by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia they established a network of so-called baito medical clinics in territories it controlled (Barnabas and Zwi 1997: 42–43). On the other hand, armed groups like the ELN in Peru (Béjar 1982: 284) could provide no more than basic assessment by doctors within the insurgent movement. Nevertheless, they are both forms of insurgent services provided to armed groups' constituencies, simply ones that lie on different ends of the organisational

spectrum. Accordingly, one of the principal factors determining the type and scale of insurgent service provision is territorial control. As territorial control shifts during conflicts, one can also expect to see a related contraction or expansion of insurgent service provision.

#### *Specific expertise within insurgent movements*

A final dimension shaping insurgent service provision reflects the specific capacities of armed groups themselves. If a unit has a doctor they can provide, albeit sometimes only very basic, medical services. If there are insurgent engineers, they can perhaps offer expertise regarding the building of a bridge or a drainage system. A common feature of many insurgent movements, particularly leftist ones, is that they have their origins in urban environments (Wickham-Crowley 1993: 30). Many of these generally young recruits were recruited from university milieus and therefore possess a relatively high level of social capital and intellectual resources. In the case of the multiplicity of would-be revolutionary movements which became active in Kurdistan in the 1970s, many educated and bilingual youths used their higher social capital to translate official documents from Turkish for local Kurds, or helped them write petitions and generally mediate with the bureaucracy of the Turkish state (O'Connor 2014; Ercan 2010). Similar dynamics could be observed in the Colombian countryside when university educated youths offered analogous services to rural uneducated campesinos. However, the expertise of armed groups change endogenously to conflict through the acquisition of new skills, especially in relation to battlefield medicine (Haner 2018: 192–94). Additionally, the demographic profile of insurgent movement evolves, early generations of recruits can often differ dramatically from subsequent ones (Bosi 2007; Bosi and della Porta 2012; Viterna 2006). This is a result of the high fatality rate of all guerrilla movements with skilled guerrillas (e.g. doctors) being replaced by unskilled ones or via an uptake in recruitment from local rural populations with lower education levels (O'Connor and Oikonomakis 2015: 381).

#### *4.3 Insurgent Prison Mobilisation*

A universal feature of insurgent movements' experiences is the reality that a significant proportion of its militants and sympathisers will be imprisoned. It is not uncommon for insurgent groups to have almost as many incarcerated members as active members. The imprisonment of movement leaders like Nelson Mandela and Abdullah Öcalan have become central focuses of movements, and campaigns for their liberation are often a movement priority. Indeed, through their writings many leaders have used their time in prison to refine their movements' political ideologies (Öcalan 2012, 2011; Ocalan 2007). Yet, surprisingly, given its inevitability, the fashion in which insurgent movements organise in prison has received little systematic theoretical analysis. In light of concerns about Salafi-jihadist recruitment in prison, there has been a number of important studies on prison as a potential site of radicalisation (Neumann 2010; Hecker 2018), but these are firmly embedded in a counter-terrorism approach and again do not focus on the movement appropriation of prisons as a site of mobilisation. Laleh Khalili has produced a number of extremely interesting volumes focusing on state usages of the prison system (Khalili and Schwedler 2010; Khalili 2012) and there are several fascinating case studies of prison resistance (O'Keefe 2006; Zeydanlıoğlu 2009; Serin 2013) but there is little systematic conceptual work on prison as a site of potential mobilisation from a movement perspective.

Insurgent prison mobilization is also an interesting phenomenon to question, in a roundabout fashion, the issue of spatial control. Prisons are the zenith of state control, prisoners are completely physically controlled "perfectly individualized and constantly visible" (Foucault in O'Hearn 2009, 496) and even their bodily autonomy is undermined by practises of torture. Taking the understanding of territorial control to its most extreme understanding, there should be absolutely no resistance to authorities in prison. Indeed, in many cases this

does indeed occur, prison fundamentally weakens many movements, but it paradoxically also strengthens others. As O’Hearn argues cultures of resistance can actually thrive in prison as they “provide a mixture of confrontation and opportunities for self-organization rather than too much distance from repression” (2009: 496). In prison environments, minor mundane accomplishments such as the successful smuggling of contraband, the sharing of food, communication with supporters or the media, are elevated to the status of symbolic victories consolidating a perception of collective agency and solidarity (O’Hearn 2009: 507). Naturally this is not entirely dependent on the agency of the insurgent movements. If a state uses detention as a means to wholly exterminate a movement then no amount of prison resistance or organisation would likely result in survival. Yet, in many cases such as during the mass incarceration of Kurdish activists after the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, movements react differently to similarly repressive circumstances, resulting in very different political outcomes (Demirel 2009; Zana 1997; Zeydanlıoğlu 2009; Hakyemez 2017). In this case, the PKK emerged strengthened whereas other Kurdish movements, some even numerically larger than the PKK at the time, were comprehensively dismantled. Accordingly, although it is not the only determinant to insurgent outcomes in prison, the strategies adopted by movements can shape those outcomes and needs to be systematically addressed.

Unlike the other routinised insurgent spaces, in prison much movement attention is focused on maintaining the cohesion and morale of existing militants, thereby a question of internal group discipline, as opposed to expanding insurgent support networks. Nevertheless, it does address issues related to its constituency in a number of ways. Firstly, in prison armed movements encounter other prisoners, some from rival or sympathetic movements, non-militants detained on unsubstantiated political grounds – especially in instances of mass internment – and non-political prisoners. These non-members can become part of an armed movement’s constituency, within the confines of the prison and following their release. Another key feature of insurgent incarceration is that it can potentially create a bridge to their family members, thus bringing them into the movement’s orbit. This can be consolidated through the formation of prisoners’ supports committees and demonstrations expressing solidarity with prisoners. In order to comparatively analyse prisons as a specific form of RIS, it is necessary to focus on four dimensions.

#### *Insurgent Prison Organisation*

How do movements maintain cohesion in prison, do they organise education courses (Westheim 2008), physical education or assign other tasks. Are prisoners allowed to adapt to the rhythms of prison life or obliged to maintain insurgent hierarchies? Of course, much of this depends on the types of prisons in which they are housed, dormitory style ones where prisoners are housed collectively or modern small cell styles, and the form of prison disciplinary regime.

#### *Insurgent Prison Resistance*

What, if any, forms of resistance do prisoners engage in? In the case of the PKK, famously four of its prisoners set themselves a light to protest their conditions and others committed suicide (Zeydanlıoğlu 2009: 11). Irish political prisoners in the IRA and INLA went on a hunger strike resulting in ten deaths in 1981 (Ross 2012; O’Hearn 2009). In other instances, armed groups have organised violent resistance through riots within the prison or have had their comrades on the outside target prison wardens (Teitler 1974: 120; White 1993: 110). Others like the M-19 concentrated on organising prison break-outs (Personal Interviews Bogota 2018)

### *Building ties with other prisoners*

In prison, detainees have the chance to strengthen ties within the movement by meeting prisoners from different geographical or organisational parts of the movement. Additionally, the collective experience of surviving torture and more mundane forms of mobilisation generate dense emotional ties and solidarity. However, these emotionally laden ties are also shared with non-movement prisoners. Many detainees are presumed by the authorities to be members of a movement by virtue of their ethnic background, (e.g. as Kurds after the 1980 military coup in Turkey), or due to their residence (e.g. in Nationalist housing estates in the north of Ireland). Others may be detained because of their involvement in other armed or political movements. These prisoners share the hardships of prison life with insurgent members and often result in them becoming sympathetic to the movement. The manner in which armed groups reach out to these other prisoners is a key component of forging routinised insurgent space in prison: how do they support survivors of torture and brutal interrogation, how do they help maintain the morale, do they help them by organising educational courses or by obtaining better recreational facilities? Efforts like this, in a context of state brutality, create a broader constituency in prison which can then also be harnessed on the outside. In the wake of the 1980 putsch in Turkey, the PKK actively sought-out recently released prisoners to recruit them (O'Connor 2014). This not surprisingly resulted in a massive influx of recruits; as a former prisoner of that time, Selim Dindar, observed "they [the Turkish state] made militants out of people in the Diyarbakır prison. Almost 80 percent of these people went to the mountains [took up arms]. It was very difficult for someone to pursue a normal life after having experienced such brutality" (in Zeydanlıoğlu 2009: 81). Similar processes can be observed in the release of interned Nationalists and the IRA in the north of Ireland (Bew/Gillespie 1999: 37) and amongst student activists detained in Colombia in the late 1970s (Personal Interviews Bogota 2018).

### *Building ties with family members and solidarity associations*

A final feature of insurgent organisation in prisons is that it also generates additional ties between prisoners and their family members, transversally between families of prisoners and in an organised way between the movement and these family members through prisoner support networks. At the individual level, the imprisonment of a brother or a parent can indirectly radicalise other family or friends. Previously non-politicised or politically unengaged individuals can become so outraged by the detention and possible abuse of a loved one that they actively seek to become politically active themselves. Admittedly this can also work in a reverse fashion, whereby families blame the movement rather than the state for their imprisonment. Depending on the nature of the prison regime, prison visiting hours can be an unexpected space where families can re-connect with their imprisoned loved ones. Guerrillas are often absent from and not in contact with their families for years and their imprisonment can be a chance to re-create these connections. Secondly, through the routines of visiting prisoners, families of prisoners get to know one another creating another circle of ties around the movement. These can then be transformed into a political commitment by participation in prisoner support networks. In many cases, these forms of associations, albeit linked often quite openly to insurgent movements, enjoy widespread legitimacy and credibility. In the Basque country, prisoners support groups Gestoras Pro-Amnestia and subsequently Senideak are extremely prominent in the broader Basque movement (Ward et al. 2010; Tellidis 2018). These associations are constantly replenished by released prisoners themselves and the families of newly imprisoned activists. In short, although the logic of prisons is to disrupt insurgent mobilisation, according to how movements react, resist and organise in prison, they can, in fact, become hubs upon which insurgent constituencies can actually be strengthened.

#### 4.4 *Insurgent Funerals*

Along with incarceration, the other certainty of insurgency is death. The fatality rate for most insurgent groups is extraordinarily high; the estimated life expectancy of PKK guerrillas is only three years (Gergin/Duru/Çetin 2015) and the movement is thought to have suffered around 20,000 militant fatalities since 1984 (Tezcür 2016: 250). Paradoxically, even in death, militants can contribute to insurgent consolidation because their funerals can be transformed into highly emotive, collective rallying points between movements and their constituencies. Insurgent funerals have been long used as political platforms or demonstrations of strength or expressions of resilience in many conflicts, as in the case of the IRA in Northern Ireland (Sluka 1995: 89), Hezbollah in Lebanon (Malthaner 2011: 216) and Hamas in Palestine (Allen 2006). Indeed, they are also instrumentalised for similar ends by the state (Kibris 2011). Khalili described how various Palestinian factions' transformation of funerals "into major political events was predicated on borrowing non-political ritual elements from quotidian [...] lives and transforming these elements into symbolically loaded political practices which resonated with a wide public" (Khalili 2007: 125). Thus insurgent funerals, aside from the personal suffering of grieving family members also became occasions of political theatre. Mass funeral processions "act [...] as both mobilizing and pedagogic tools" (Khalili 2007: 124) and serve to create and perform an expression of national unity (Allen 2006: 108). Mustafa Dikeç argues that the very act of physically bringing people together to occupy a particular space "gives political actors a sense of empowerment" (2016: 3). While Bayat explains that street politics, a category to which funeral corteges belong, are sites where people "forge identities, enlarge solidarities, and extend their protest beyond their immediate circles to include the unknown, the strangers" (2013: 13). The presence of constituency members in a shared collective space characterised by a great collective emotional intensity emboldens them, impressing upon them their potential power as a collectivity. This is even more prescient when it occurs in territories controlled by the state, especially urban centres. Funerals are temporarily and spatially delimited spaces of resistance and occasions where the underlying political sympathies of the population, often dormant are brought forth into the public eye.

Of course, not all dead militants' funerals become acts of political theatre, in certain contexts the dead are simply returned to their families for burial, in others state intimidation convinces movements or families to bury the dead without political fanfare and in many other cases bodies are never recovered and remain unidentified on the battlefield or in mass graves. Indeed, they can also be loci of tension, when families blame the movements for leading their children to their deaths. Disputes can erupt as to whether the dead belong more to the families or their movements, as in the case of the thrice buried IRA hunger striker Frank Stagg (Ó Cadhla 2017) or Bakartxo Arzelus, the first ETA militant killed in combat in the post-Franco era (Casquete 2013: 30). And they can also be used as a platform to communicate opposition to a movement, the act of not attending a funeral can be a subtle expression of discontent to movement leaders. The appropriation of funerals as routinised insurgent space crosses religious and ideological divides but not necessarily in a consistent fashion. In the case of the M-19 in Colombia, funerals were not politicised. The fallen guerrillas were simply returned to their families or buried in the countryside. The only significant funeral in the M-19s ranks, even though many of its prominent cadres and leaders had been killed in the conflict, was that of its Presidential candidate Carlos Pizarro and occurred after the M-19 had disarmed (Personal interviews, Bogota 2018). Interestingly, other Colombia movements such as the ELN continue to make periodic use of politicised funerals (El Tiempo 2018). However, the non-usage of funerals as a political platform is in itself a political decision reflecting insurgent – constituency relations and, is itself, worthy of further analysis.

Insurgent funerals have two fundamental roles, performative and instrumental ones (Hearty 2017: 7). As a performance they can reaffirm a movement's enduring presence and strength both as a form of reassurance to an insurgent constituency and as a display of strength to its adversaries. However, this paper focuses on its more rational role in consolidating and maintaining cohesion within its constituency. As previously outlined, the constituency is a relational concept and exists only through its enactment and funerals are an ideal occasion to reaffirm and reproduce ties between insurgent movements and their constituencies. They are also imbued with an inherent form of legitimacy because, although they are laden with political meaning, they also transcend politics by virtue of the inevitability of death and its attendant suffering. Hearty argues that they are particularly useful as a means of drawing in peripheral support (2017: 11), which is borne out by the huge turnout at some insurgent funerals, particularly of high profile insurgents or activists. My previous research affirms this understanding: a very high percentage of my interviewees in Kurdistan, particularly those raised in urban environments explained that their first knowing encounter with members of the PKK occurred at guerrilla funerals (O'Connor 2014). It is thus a space where initial ties can be struck with an insurgent movement.

The funeral of Vedat Aydin in 1991, a prominent Kurdish human rights activist and HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi/People's Work Party) member in 1991, was a recurrent presence in many militants' recollection of their initial interactions with the Kurdish movement. Aydin was murdered by elements of the Turkish security forces<sup>7</sup> and his funeral was attended by 150,000 mourners. The funeral procession was characterised by the chanting of revolutionary slogans and in its aftermath clashes broke out with the security forces resulting in a number of deaths (Gunes 2012: 111; Özcan 2006: 14; Gourlay 2018: 138). Thus individuals with weaker ties to an insurgent movement attend a funeral out of latent political solidarity, kin or family ties, or even simple curiosity and find themselves immersed in a highly emotional space, where a sense of collective identity and collective empowerment (through chanting, funeral specific rituals, temporary appropriation of spaces normally controlled by the state) emerges and is then consolidated by clashes with the security forces leading to a sense of solidarity with the movement. As these clashes often result in deaths, the subsequent funerals provide an occasion for similar encounters to occur such that an escalatory cycle of funerals-clashes-funerals brings movements into closer contact with its constituency<sup>8</sup>.

Insurgent funerals can accordingly be assessed according to their performative and more instrumental functions, albeit there is an overlap between performative and instrumental logics. In terms of performance, the funeral may be viewed as a show of strength oriented to external audiences such as rival movements or the state and/or an opportunity to highlight the ongoing coherence and strength to the insurgents' own constituency. Regarding funerals instrumental function, firstly, this can be assessed by the degree of movement organisation: Are funeral proceedings orchestrated by the movement, are specific movement flags/symbols used, is there a formal 'colour party', is stewarding implemented, are graveside orations conducted? Secondly, what are the movement objectives: are they deliberately engineered as occasions to facilitate ties with the constituency? Are clashes with the security forces intentionally provoked to 'blood' potential new recruits? Or are funerals used as an opportunity to perpetuate the veneration of martyrs, thus garnering a degree of

7 Şükran Aydin and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 46231/99) ECHR 26 May 2005. Available at: <http://echr.ketse.com/doc/46231.99-en-20050526/view/>.

8 A remarkable instance of such a cycle was that of three unarmed IRA militants (Sean Savage, Daniel McCann and Máiréad Farrell) killed by an SAS unit in Gibraltar in 1988. Their funeral was attacked by a loyalist paramilitary, resulting in three deaths and 60 wounded. At the funeral of one of the dead, two undercover British soldiers drove into the mourners before being dragged from the car, stripped and severely beaten and ultimately shot by IRA members at the funeral (see Brennan 2018).

historical legitimacy binding the recently deceased with previous generations of deceased heroes. A final observation about insurgent funerals is that they can also demonstrate the normative parameters of an insurgent movement's constituency. Do revolutionary and decidedly areligious movements tolerate religious funerals or do they eschew prevailing traditions? The extent of continuity of prevailing rituals and beliefs could demonstrate a degree of greater and lesser tolerance to a constituency's expectations, for example, the LTTE choose to bury their dead rather than cremating them as usually occurs in Hinduism (Mampilly 2011b: 115).

## 5. CONCLUSION

The relationship between insurgent movements and their supporters, long keenly observed by insurgent and counter insurgents, has in recent years been brought more systematically into the academic limelight. It has been addressed in rebel governance in terms of how armed movements govern territories under their control and in the relational end of social movement studies regarding the establishment of social ties and their varying functions in facilitating insurgent consolidation. This paper addresses the liminal areas where movements are present without exerting territorial control but nevertheless manage to carve out temporally restricted and spatially constrained spaces of insurgent presence and influence. It is not simply a struggle to quantitatively control space but a process in which a particular social subjectivity is constituted with insurgent movement's constituencies (Hussey 2018). To this end, armed groups formulate varying forms of routinised insurgent space: spaces which are often fleeting but substantial enough to generate opportunities to create ties, imbue them with emotional value and generate political legitimacy which, in the long term, can potentially contribute to territorial control. Yet, even more importantly than territorial control, these spaces are a wellspring of political legitimacy and the source of a reformulated political imaginary which can be also applied to nonviolent post-conflict outcomes. In summary, it is an analysis of movement agency, focusing on the strategies movements choose to employ in building supportive constituencies, how they re-act to expressions of civilian agency and the spaces where they implement these strategies.

This approach has, however, many evident limitations. Firstly, it makes no definitive claims to provide any overarching explanations of conflict outcomes. There are multiple other contingencies which can determine them, including "the ability of the insurgent leadership to maintain a unified and disciplined command structure; situational issues related to the actions of the incumbent government, civilian communities, and other social and political actors in rebel-held areas; and transnational issues produced by the interaction of rebel leaders with international actors" (Mampilly 2011b: 17). And, as the work of Jeremy Weinstein (2007) and others have shown, different movements have different forms of relationships with civilians in their immediate social environments, generating different degrees of insurgent dependencies. Furthermore, movements' ability to inculcate non-predatory and violent behaviours in their rank and file, is often beyond their capacity (Oppenheim and Weintraub 2017). This approach is also likely susceptible to the over-attribution of strategic intentions or movement agency (J. Jasper 2004) to developments that might be just happenstance or coincidence.

Accordingly, the implications of routinised insurgent space can be rather different across movements and across movement trajectories. The four forms of routinised insurgent space analysed here, are also not exhaustive, for example, funerals are almost completely irrelevant in the case of the M-19 but became of central importance to the PKK. Additionally, there are forms of routinised insurgent space within these movements from the early 1990s, which are less widely applicable, but nonetheless internally highly important such as the PKK's focus on female emancipation inherent in its philosophy of *jineoloji* (Roelofs

2018) and attendant female spaces such as workshops and co-operatives for women (Tartort Kurdistan 2013: 109). Finally, it emphasises the non-coercive forms of armed group – civilian interactions. It may seem somewhat counter-intuitive to focus on the non-violent elements of movements defined by their capacity to inflict violence. Yet, for most armed groups actual fighting and preparing to fight, is only but a part of their repertoire of contention and many militants engaged in years of activism in armed groups and never experience combat. Nevertheless, there is a risk of downplaying practises of coercion and even the implicit knowledge of their potential use, when analysing the emergence, consolidation and evolution of routinised insurgent spaces. As an initial step to formulating a conceptual framework to spatially situate insurgent – constituency relations, it requires further assessment and re-conceptualisation by being applied to different cases and in particular to cases where armed group – constituency interactions were characterised more acutely by violence or degenerated into open coercion.

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## Appendix – Armed Movements

Acronym	Name in Original Language (transliteration)	Name in English
ASALA	Ayasdani Azadakrut'ean Hay Kaghdni Panag	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
EAM	Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo	National Liberation Front
ELN <sup>9</sup>	Ejército de Liberación Nacional	National Liberation Army
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna	Basque Homeland and Liberty
EZLN	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional	Zapatista Army of National Liberation
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army
FLN	Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional	National Liberation Forces
HEP	Halkın Emek Partisi	People's Labour Party
LTTE	Tamiḷḷa viṭutalaip pulika	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
INLA	<i>Arm Saoirse Náisiúnta na hÉireann</i>	Irish National Liberation Army
IRA	Óglaigh na hÉireann	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril	The 19th of April Movement
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê	Kurdish Workers Party
TPLF	Həzbayawi Wäyyanä Harənnät Təgray	Tigray People's Liberation Front

9 There were two armed groups named the ELN, one active in Peru for a few years in the mid-1960s and another founded in Colombia in 1964 which is still active. There was no relationship between the two groups.

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