

The G8 Global Partnership: from Kananaskis to Deauville and Beyond

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**The G8 Global Partnership:
From Kananaskis to Deauville and Beyond**

Hakan Akbulut

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* Except for minor updates, this paper was completed in the second half of 2012 during author's appointment with the **Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)**.

Abstract

At the G8 Deauville Summit in 2011, the decision was taken to extend the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) beyond the initially envisioned period of ten years, projected to end in 2012. This paper explores the evolution of the GP and examines the question of how the renewed Partnership might be reconfigured in terms of composition, structuring, areas of operation and priorities to take threat reduction work ahead in the post-2012 period. Drawing also from material published by the G8 and taking into account pronouncements by key officials, this paper overall argues that flexibility and inclusivity will be the defining features of the renewed GP that can be expected to fit into many dresses in terms of programming, membership, and the area of operation. Moreover, the assertion is made that the renewed Partnership could be a hybrid, on the one side, bringing in and building on the experiences, lessons-learned, expertise, networks, and principles of the old-GP, and, at the same time, extended and supplemented with elements drawn from the nuclear security summit (NSS) series anticipated to conclude in 2014.

Keywords

G8 Global Partnership, threat reduction, nuclear security, nonproliferation, Russia, weapons of mass destruction

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Introduction

The *G8¹ Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction* (GP) was launched shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in an effort “to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology” (G8 2002). Given the necessities and priorities of the time, related projects and associated funds provided by the Partners were to be focused on Russia. So, in line with the principles agreed upon at Kananaskis (Canada) in June 2002, \$ 20 billion in funds were to be committed in equal shares by the US and the remaining G8 states for a period of 10 years – earning the initiative also the label “10 plus 10 over 10”. A large portion of this amount was to be used for destroying the remaining chemical weapons stocks of Russia, dismantling its decommissioned submarines, and engaging former weapons scientists.

However, despite the prioritization of projects in Russia, at the very outset, the decision was taken to gradually expand the GP’s membership and geographical focus. The statement issued by the G8 at Kananaskis thus included an invitation to other countries that supported the same goals and were prepared to adopt the principles and guidelines agreed upon to pursue dialogue with the G8 on joining the Partnership. As of December 2012, membership in the GP had grown to 25 states and was likely to grow further given the Partnership’s “open-door policy” and the decision taken at the Deauville Summit (France) in 2010 to extend the Partnership beyond the period of 10 years envisioned initially.

Against this background, this paper sets out to summarize the evolution of the GP, explore its main objectives and achievements in broader terms and discuss how the renewed Partnership might be reconfigured in terms of composition, structuring, areas

¹ The G8 comprises the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK, and Russia. The EU has also been participating in G8 (formerly G7) meetings since 1977. Except for the fact that only the participating countries are entitled to assume the rotating presidency, the Union enjoys the same rights and obligations associated with membership.

of operation and priorities to take the threat reduction work ahead in the post-2012 period.

GP's Birth, Principles, Guidelines and Functioning

By the time the GP was launched, the threat posed by inadequately secured CBRN material had not gone unnoticed and efforts to cope with such threats were already in place. The US in particular had been undertaking serious efforts and spending immense amounts of money from the early 1990s onwards to mitigate the challenges posed by the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union. The *Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program* which was launched as early as 1992 and has ever since addressed issues such as weapons dismantlement, nuclear material security and nuclear scientist engagement, constitutes a prominent case in point.² Moreover, a first summit on nuclear safety and security was held between the then G7 and Russia in Moscow in 1996 (Hibbs 1996). What is more, by that time, nuclear safety and security related projects on the territory of the former Soviet Union (FSU) were also being implemented by other actors such as the EU through its TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) Program that focused mainly on nuclear safety but also tackled nuclear material accountancy, illicit trafficking and scientist redirection (see Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 18). Nevertheless, the bulk of the job was being done by the US that was thus carrying the lion's share of the financial burden. As a budget of \$ 400 million annually in the initial phase had grown to around \$ 1 billion over the years, there was an increasing demand on the part of the US, especially the US Congress, for a more balanced cost sharing with other wealthy countries (cf. Ibid., 17).³ At the same time, the events of 09/11 pushed international terrorism, including

² As of May 2012, among others, 7,619 nuclear warheads had been deactivated, 902 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) destroyed, and 155 bombers eliminated (Lugar 2012). Moreover, 24 nuclear weapons storage sites had received physical security upgrades (ibid.). In addition, by December 2011, 400 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) had been downblended (Benedict 2011).

³ The relevance of a "fairer" cost sharing was exemplified by the remarks of the then US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, John Wolf, made during an interview with Leonard Spector on August 28, 2002 (CNS 2002): "We think that the programs we fund in Russia and the former Soviet Union are in our interest and there are good reasons why we fund those programs. But neither Russia nor our partners should ever be in a position of assuming that we will do all of these things irrespective

potential nuclear and radiological terrorism, to the forefront of international attention. The event created a sense of urgency and gave a momentum to efforts to keep CBRN material, know-how, and technology out of the hands of non-state actors such as terrorists.

Ultimately, the issue of a greater contribution by the non-US G8 members to nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorism alongside a sustained US financial commitment was tackled at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in June 2002 leading to the launch of the GP – with the US and Canada acting as the driving forces behind the initiative (Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 22-23). The agreed formula of the US, on the one side, and the remaining G8 states, on the other side, committing \$ 10 billion each to projects related to non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear security over a period of ten years constituted a mixed result. Given the existing levels of US funding and the guidelines adopted according to which not only new, but also “enhanced” or “expanded” projects would be listed as GP contributions and “[a]ll funds disbursed or released after its [GP’s] announcement” (G8 2002) would be eligible as related expenditures, the agreement did not necessitate a significant rise (if at all) in funding commitments on the part of the US (see Chuen/Jasinski/Meyer 2002). At the same time, the GP guaranteed sustainability and provided reassurance that US engagement and funding would continue for another ten years. Moreover, in the case of the other G8 states, the agreed framework entailed the necessity to extend involvement in threat reduction work and significantly increase related funding.⁴

The statement announcing the launch of the GP also listed a set of principles to be followed to achieve the goals formulated. It also outlined a number of guidelines for project programming and implementation. The principles, overall, reflect a commitment to the adoption and promotion of existing non-proliferation and nuclear

of their commitments, including Russia's commitments. And I'm not talking simply about cooperation on the Guidelines issue, but also their own financial contribution, because, if you look at it, the Russia of 2002 is financially quite different than the Russia of 1998. They have 50-something billion dollars in the bank.”

⁴ So-called debt for program exchanges were installed as an optional financing tool.

security measures and instruments – including relevant treaties, measures to guarantee material accountancy, physical security, and effective border and export controls. In addition, the Partners are called upon to dispose “fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced” (G8 2002). In line with the established guidelines, projects can be of a bi- or multilateral nature and should be designed and implemented in a manner guaranteeing “effective monitoring, auditing and transparency” (ibid.) and granting liability protection as well as exemption from taxes, duties and alike to the donors. The formulation of clear milestones to measure progress, the protection of intellectual property rights, sensitive information as well as of equipment, the grant of privileges and immunities to the representatives of government donors and the consideration of environmental aspects constitute further criteria to be applied in project programming and implementation.

In 2002, the Partners also agreed to set in place necessary mechanisms to annually review progress giving consideration to issues such as priority-setting, the identification of potential project gaps and overlaps, and “the consistency of the cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives”.⁵ This gave birth to the GP Senior Officials Group (GPSOG) established “to review progress of the initiative and to co-ordinate projects” (G8 Senior Officials Group 2003).⁶ However, by the time of the Sea Island Summit in 2004, a two-track structure had emerged. Beginning with January 2004, a new Senior Group had started work on a broader range of non-proliferation issues including the provision of guidance to a Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) that would be “responsible for expert-level implementation of

⁵ As mentioned above, the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of nuclear materials and the redirection and engagement of former weapons scientists were at that time identified as priority areas to be pursued in Russia.

⁶ In Kananaskis, the G8 also decided to form the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) by the time of the following summit. The NSSG “responsible to Leaders, provides technically informed strategic policy advice on issues that could impact safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy” (G8 2008).

the initiative” (G8 Senior Group 2004; see also Kobjakov/Orlov 2005, 18). As a result, the GPWG established itself as the core instrument that reviews progress, coordinates work (including efforts to engage new donors and recipients) and helps to solve emerging problems; or to put it in the words of Heyes and Bowen (2010, 18), the GPWG acts as “the international policy group that oversees the partnership”. It brings together senior diplomats from the GP countries four to five times a year. The representative of the country holding the G8 presidency at that point also chairs GPWG meetings. Overall, the approach of the G8 has been to limit the creation of new bodies and to utilize existing structures and channels (see for example G8 Senior Group 2004). Where necessary, sub-working groups have been formed. The Biological Security Sub-Working Group whose meetings are being attended by the members of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and the representatives of international institutions such as Interpol, WHO, or the Food and Agriculture Organization constitutes a case in point (Stanley Foundation 2012).

The Expansion and Accomplishments of the Partnership

A year after its launch, six new countries were to join the GP as donors, namely Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland (G8 Senior Group 2004). In 2004, Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand also acceded to the GP (ibid.). The inclusion of new partners was, as already mentioned, anticipated at Kananaskis and constituted also a necessity to meet the pledge of raising € 10 billion in non-US contributions. However, in comparison to the amounts pledged by some G8 countries such as Germany (up to € 1.5 billion) or Italy (€ 1 billion),⁷ the aggregate financial commitment of the countries that joined the GP in 2003 of approximately \$ 200 million appeared as comparatively modest, yet still relevant.⁸ The so-called method of piggy-backing enabled the smaller

⁷ Following amounts had been pledged by the Partners by the time the G8 Evian Summit was held in 2003 (G8 Senior Officials Group 2003): US, \$ 10 billion; Germany, € 1.5 billion; UK, \$ 750 million; France, € 750 million; Japan, \$ 200 million; Italy, € 1 billion; Canada, Can \$ 1 billion; the EU, € 1 billion; Russia, \$ 2 billion.

⁸ According to Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 22), non-G8 countries had spent \$ 375 million by 2010. The Nuclear Threat Initiative also provided funds to GP projects.

countries to channel their contributions through projects managed by greater donors rather than working out separate agreements with Russia. For example, the Czech Republic provided around \$ 150,000 for the purchase of equipment needed for the provision of energy supply to a chemical weapons destruction facility then under construction in Shchuchye (cf. Kobayakov/Orlov 2005, 3). In a similar fashion, in April 2010, it was announced that New Zealand would contribute to a Canadian-led project aimed at improving nuclear material security at a number of Russian sites (cf. Office of the Prime Minister 2010).

On the part of the recipient countries, Ukraine was to join the GP in 2004. The number of members grew to 24 in early 2012 with Kazakhstan's admission as another state eligible for GP funds. Most recently, as the first Latin American country to do so, Mexico acceded to the GP in December 2012.⁹ Overall, despite statements proclaiming a global role for the GP, FSU territory, and more than any other country, Russia, formed the main area of operation for the initiative. Nonetheless, at Hokkaido Toyako (Japan), in 2008, the principle was endorsed that projects should be implemented all over the globe in order to cope with threats wherever they emerged (cf. G8 2008). At the same time, it was highlighted that the Partners remained committed to completing projects in Russia. In line with this, the 2010 report on the GP held that Partners such as Canada, the US, the EU, Finland or Japan were all implementing projects in regions including Central Asia, Africa or the Middle East (G8 2010). "These projects reflect[ed] the resolve of partners to address evolving WMD challenges through the Global Partnership while continuing work toward completion of priority projects in Russia and Ukraine", the report went on. The annex listed, for example, projects on biosecurity and biosafety financed by Canada in the Kyrgyz Republic, "training and reorientation in

⁹ The related press release of the Mexican Foreign Ministry holds that "Mexico's participation in the group will improve Mexico's technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in nuclear security and the physical protection of nuclear materials, and will contribute to strengthening the regime established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC), and the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BWC). It will also contribute to fulfilling the commitments made by Mexico during the Nuclear Security Summit" (SRE n. d.). So, it is not obvious whether and to what extent the country will be contributing to threat reduction work abroad.

the field of bio-chem [sic!] technology” offered to Iraqi scientists funded by Italy, workshops on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) financed by Japan in countries such as Iraq, Cambodia, or the Philippines, or the installation of biosecurity equipment in a laboratory in Afghanistan and the provision of related training by Japan. In addition, it was outlined that the US had spent around \$ 1.7 billion on projects in non-FSU countries including Iraq, Libya, Kenya, Indonesia and Malaysia between 2002 and 2009 (G8 Global Partnership Working Group 2010).

By 2012, \$ 21 billion had been spent on GP projects (US Department of State 2012). While it is obvious that the original aggregate pledge of \$ 20 billion has been met, not all participating countries have lived up to their commitments; Italy¹⁰ and France constituting cases in point (Stanley Foundation 2012; Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 31). Russia, in contrast, had originally pledged an amount of \$ 2 billion. Yet, according to the consolidated data available in the annex to the 2010 report, Russia was to spend \$ 5 billion in the period 2002-2012 on chemical weapons destruction alone (G8 Global Partnership Working Group 2010). Another \$ 618 million were spent on nuclear submarine dismantlement. Apart from comparatively smaller contributions by newcomers, this additional funding provided by Russia can be assumed to have allowed for a positive balance.

Given the financial contributions mentioned before, it seems to be warranted to briefly summarize the main accomplishments of the first ten years. As stated at the outset, the dismantlement of decommissioned Russian submarines, the destruction of Russian chemical weapons stocks, disposition of nuclear material and redirection of former weapons scientists constituted priority objectives for the Partnership. Yet, the activities of the Partners went well beyond these priority areas and included, for example, physical security upgrades, improvement of border security and detection

¹⁰ While Italy had originally pledged \$ 1 billion, the country had spent only \$ 140 million by 2010 (cf. Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 31). The French contribution of \$ 135 million by 2010 also fell short of fulfilling the original pledge of \$ 750 million.

capabilities, and radiological¹¹ and biosecurity¹² related projects. As no report on the GP activities was published after the Chicago Summit,¹³ following information can be drawn from the 2011 report issued in Deauville to outline the major workload accomplished by the Partnership (G8 2011b):

- 50% (20,000 tons)¹⁴ of the chemical weapons stocks of Russia were destroyed as of December 2010, which could only be achieved via the construction of respective destruction facilities;
- 117 out of 120 decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Northwest region and 73 out of 78 in Russian Far East were dismantled; related work was expected to be completed in 2012;
- facilities and infrastructure for the safe and secure storage of reactor compartments, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel were constructed or refurbished;
- 539 highly radioactive Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) used to power Russian lighthouses were “dismantled and replaced”;
- support was provided to Ukraine in its efforts to deal with Chernobyl’s legacy, including the design and construction of a storage for highly radioactive sources; in addition, physical security upgrades at other facilities have been funded and equipment for radiation detection at the borders provided;
- projects aiming at improving nuclear material accountancy and protection were funded in Russia;

¹¹ Note that a G8 Action Plan on securing radioactive sources was adopted in Evian (France) in 2003.

¹² Bioterrorism was referred to in the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation (G8 2004) adopted in 2004 as a “unique”, “grave” threat; the Plan committed the G8 to adopting related countermeasures.

¹³ At Chicago, the debt crisis in Europe, the upheavals in Arab countries, and food security in Africa, and the situation in Afghanistan were dealt with while the GP seemingly did not constitute an agenda item. There is no reference made to the GP in the Camp David Declaration. Only a brief paragraph on the GP restating the commitment of the Partners to completing work in Russia, helping countries to fulfill pledges made at the two Nuclear Security Summits, and expanding membership along with a listing of the priorities of the initiative can be found in the “Annex to the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting Chair’s Statement” (G8 2012).

¹⁴ According to Paul F. Walker, this amount had grown to 24,000 tons by 2012 (cf. Stanley Foundation 2012).

- 4,000 projects and “capacity building activities” have been funded at the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow and at the Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine (STCU) in an effort to redirect former weapons scientists;
- 3,000 “sustainable jobs” were created in Russian closed cities and institutes in countries such as Armenia and Ukraine.

Apart from the work accomplished, the GP also generated a number of other benefits. The experience made and knowledge acquired during project implementation can, for instance, be utilized for future threat reduction work elsewhere. Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 20) point out that Britain, for example, will be able to build on lessons-learned during dismantling Russian submarines once the country starts disassembling its own decommissioned submarines. More generally, both donors and recipients can draw from the networks formed among involved personnel and the managerial expertise generated (*ibid.*, 67). The practice of piggy-backing, enabling countries to contribute to projects managed by other countries and thus making it easier for particularly small countries to participate in threat reduction work abroad, is certainly worth continuing (*ibid.*, 75). This is all the more beneficial as piggy-backing simplifies the management of the entire enterprise for the recipient country, since it has to deal with a single country instead of a group of states.

Nevertheless, all of these benefits and achievements aside, the GP has, of course, not been a perfect endeavor and also encountered a number of problems and shortcomings. Priority setting, programming and project implementation have not always been free of problems or friction. Progress in implementing Partnership goals and projects was, for instance, hampered in some cases by the failure of donors and Russia to reach agreement on issues such as liability protection, tax-free status, and access to relevant facilities (see Butler 2004). For example, according to Kobayakov and Orlov (2005, 8), because the US and Russia could not solve the issue of access to sensitive sites with nuclear material, in the first two years after 09/11, the amount of

nuclear material at Russian sites receiving physical security upgrades decreased when compared to the pre-09/11 period. This was in conflict with the decision taken in the wake of the terrorist attacks to complete upgrades not by 2011, as initially foreseen, but by 2008. What is more, money earmarked for this very purpose was spent on other programs given the failure of the two parties to solve access issues. Kobayakov and Orlov (2005, 9) further hold that, apart from insufficient funding, unresolved questions related to liability protection were also responsible for the failure to implement the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement the US and Russia had signed back in 2000. The agreement envisaged the disposal of at least 34 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium by each country, but did not include any provisions on liability. In the meantime, the 1998 US-Russian Technical Cooperation Agreement regulating liability expired in 2003. A protocol settling the liability issue was signed in 2006 and signed into law only in 2011 after the two countries had succeeded in solving outstanding issues related to the disposition program in 2010 (cf. Horner 2011). The almost exclusive focus on Russia, the failure to admit a greater number of additional recipient countries and to modify priorities, mostly due to the opposition of Russia, constitute further points of criticism brought forward by observers. At this point, it is worth reminding that Russia has enjoyed a comfortable position to keep the GP on the course desired given the consensual decision-making within the GPWG (see for example Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 7). The performance of the GPWG has also encountered some criticism. In the view of Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 59), “the role of the group as a vehicle for monitoring progress, providing strategic guidance and undertaking detailed evaluations to ensure that lessons learned are widely disseminated across the GP community has been largely ineffective.” Add to this the fact that not all Partners have lived up to their financial pledges and that, at least in the initial period, not all the money earmarked for projects in Russia reached the country (cf. Kobayakov/Orlov 2005, 23). Necessary lessons will have to be drawn from these and other problems and failures encountered in the first phase of the GP for the period after 2012.

The Renewed Partnership

The G8 tackled the question of extending the Partnership beyond 2012 in 2010 during its Muskoka Summit (Canada). Yet, no agreement was possible at that point, reportedly due to the opposition of the German government (cf. Crail 2011). Such opposition was, on the one hand, conditioned by financial concerns given the economic and debt crisis. On the other hand, the Germans were not convinced as to whether an effective use of funds could be guaranteed and monitored for future “new types of projects” (ibid.). Reluctance on the part of Germany caused a delay rather than a permanent deadlock and the decision to extend the Partnership was taken a year later when the G8 gathered in Deauville. However, in contrast to 2002, this time, the decision to continue cooperation was not matched with specific financial pledges of the G8 countries. Instead, the declaration simply held that decisions on funding would be taken by the participating countries “on a national, joint, or multilateral basis” (G8 2011a). Still, the US declared it was planning to provide another \$ 10 billion for the next ten years “subject to annual Congressional appropriations” (US Department of State 2012). In a similar fashion, Canada pledged another \$ 367 million for the period 2013-2018 (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2012). It remains to be seen how much money will be earmarked by the other Partners for threat reduction programs. The GP website of Germany (Federal Foreign Office 2012), for example, only holds that “[f]rom 2012 onwards projects will be funded in line with their specific requirements and not on the basis of [ex ante] national pledges.” It is plausible to assume that the debt crisis will come to bear on the readiness of especially European countries to make large sums available for threat reduction programs.

As for the areas of priority for the renewed Partnership, the 2010 Muskoka Summit defined nuclear and radiological security, biosecurity, scientist engagement, and the facilitation of the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540¹⁵ as the

¹⁵ Resolution 1540 obliges states to create necessary legislation and the regulatory framework, to put in place effective border and export controls and guarantee the physical security of relevant material to prevent proliferation; especially proliferation to non-state actors. Moreover, states are asked to provide

main issues the Partners should focus on in the post-2012 period (G8 2011b). What exactly could be done in each field is outlined in the document titled “G8 Global Partnership Assessment and Options for Future Programming” issued at Deauville (G8 2011b). In the field of nuclear and radiological security, a role for the GP is, for example, seen in helping countries to fulfill commitments made during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. The report also lists specific tasks that could be fulfilled in Russia and Ukraine (“and other countries where applicable”) in confirmation of the understanding that FSU territory will continue to constitute one of the focal points for the renewed Partnership; e.g. continued spent fuel management, the lifting of sunken nuclear submarines and “hazardous radiological objects”, dismantlement of nuclear powered ships¹⁶ and decommissioning of weapons-grade plutonium production facilities. Scientist engagement – which may, for instance, take the form of awareness-raising, sharing of best practices and providing support to civilian projects in an attempt to achieve an involvement of experts with relevant knowledge – is also to continue to appear highly on the GP-agenda in the post-2012 period. With regard to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), the report goes on to hold that “[b]y providing equipment, expertise and training, GP partners could enhance WMD non-proliferation and counter-terrorism capacities in countries seeking to meet 1540 obligations and lacking the ability to do so, upon their request.” Even though not listed as one of the priorities for the renewed Partnership, given the fact that not all of existing stocks (especially in Russia) have been destroyed and not all countries have acceded to the CWC yet, the Partners declare their readiness to address eventual related challenges in the future, too. In line with this, the list of priorities is not of an exclusionary nature and it is explicitly stated that “other priorities may be added as appropriate.”

The questions regarding the amount of funding that will be available for future programming, the type of projects to be implemented and the countries or regions

assistance to those countries lacking the resources and capabilities to meet these obligations on their own.

¹⁶ Kobyokov and Orlov (2005, 7) referred in 2005 to 41 ships awaiting dismantlement.

where such funds will be spent, are undoubtedly closely tied to the issue of the future composition of the Partnership in terms of membership. The Partners and the GPWG have been reaching out to potential new members and exploring the possibility of bringing in countries such as China, India, Argentina, Brazil or South Africa. Turkey as a rising power at the crossroads between the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe is seen as another potential candidate (see also Stanley Foundation 2012). Overall, extending the membership in a manner that creates a greater geographic balance and brings in countries that might add to the resources of the GP, in terms of financing, political weight, and technical and managerial capacities will constitute a major undertaking in the years ahead. An expanded Partnership will undoubtedly render it easier for the initiative to live up to its claim to operate beyond any frontiers and respond to threats wherever they emerge.

At the same time, eventual geographical expansion and the inclusion of potential political heavy weights from different parts of the world will bring structural questions to the forefront. So far, the non-G8 GP member-states seem to have reconciled themselves to some sort of a second-class membership. According to Bonnie D. Jenkins, US State Department's Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs and the Chairperson of the GPWG in 2012, prior to her assuming the chair, non-G8 partners did not even attend all meetings of the group and acted "more like observers than participants" (see Stanley Foundation 2012). By her own account, under her chairmanship, these countries have been invited to all meetings, which helped to render the process more "collaborative and interactive" (ibid.). In line with this, Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 60) maintain that "there appears to have been little real opportunity for non-G8 GP countries to influence priorities, despite the significant sums of money and expertise that some have committed to projects." It is unlikely that countries like China, India, or Brazil would be content with a second-class membership. Thus, expansion will most likely intensify debates about the question as to whether the GP should be taken out of the G8 format (see Stanley Foundation 2012). For Jenkins, this is something that will have to be addressed in the future and could indeed

materialize (ibid.). The same position is shared by Sabine Nölke, the Director General of the GP Program at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, who pointing to the current practice of having the GPWG chair rotate with the G8 presidency, views this as an issue to be addressed should countries such as India or China join the Partnership (ibid.).

Overall, from today's perspective, there seems to exist an intended level of vagueness or nebulousity. While the areas of priority have been defined, it has been done in a manner leaving almost any threat reduction effort eligible for GP accounting. It is especially difficult to think of any CBRN material or technology related activity that cannot be subsumed under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 – facilitating the implementation thereof was listed at Muskoka as one of the major tasks for the renewed Partnership. In addition, the post-2012 GP is anticipated to operate worldwide and not to almost exclusively focus on a specific region or country. What is more, the question as to what amount will be committed to fulfill this overwhelming mission remains to be answered; only a few countries have so far pledged specific sums. This vagueness can be expected to translate into a great level of flexibility and allow the GP to fit into many dresses in terms of programming, membership, and the area of operation. Indeed, the mission statement formulated in the abovementioned document "G8 Global Partnership Assessment and Options for Future Programming" (G8 2011b) attests to this notion of a catch-all approach or coverage:

After 2012, the GP should evolve towards, on the one hand, a mechanism for the identification and analysis of third countries' assistance needs, upon their request, in their endeavours against WMD proliferation and, on the other hand, a group for the assessment of the capabilities and skills its various members are able to contribute, either individually or collectively delivery of this assistance [sic!]. These efforts should be done in coordination with existing multilateral mechanisms, including the 1540 Committee.

In the light of these parameters, one can expect the renewed Partnership to constitute a *loose coalition of the willing* to promote threat reduction. It could be a *hybrid*, on the one side, bringing in and building on the experiences, lessons-learned, expertise, networks, and principles of the old-GP, and, at the same time, extended and supplemented with elements drawn from the nuclear security summit (NSS) series anticipated to come to an end in 2014. The distinguishing feature of both formats has been the concrete work done in the field. Rather than creating an institutionalized paper tiger, keeping up this momentum and getting work done within a loosely organized, flexible, collaborative network of states coordinating and reporting their threat reduction activities and achievements would constitute a much more favorable outcome. The renewed GP might grow to the size of the NSS (yet, leaving the door open to additional participants) and cover a vast variety of threat reduction activities, including not only those implemented abroad, but also measures adopted at home. So far, projects reported to the GP included only those implemented in other countries – the only and major exception to this has been Russian funding of projects within the country. In contrast, within the NSS format, countries’ “house gifts” or “gift baskets” – pledges made by single states or groupings of states on relevant work to be done within a specified period of time – in most cases also included threat reduction work at home. Moreover, such work sometimes consisted of removing HEU or spent fuel. In other cases, countries announced they would adopt new legislation, sign up to international treaties, or host relevant conferences. In short, a very broad portfolio of activities and measures has been treated as eligible for NSS “accounting”. Transferring such practice to the GP seems to be both favorable and warranted as this would doubtlessly add to its “flexibility” and “inclusivity”. If the assumption that any security gap anywhere poses a threat to the security of all is meant to guide threat reduction work, there seems to be no reason to squeeze the GP into a tightly tailored set of responsibilities and geographical scope.

Indeed, the participants of the 2010 NSS were identified by Bonnie D. Jenkins (2010) as potential new members for the GP (see also Crail 2011). Moreover, Jenkins offered the

view that “[t]he GP should include any project funded to ensure chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or materials do not land in the hands of proliferators, nonstate [sic!] actors, and terrorists regardless of where they operate.” Such an approach would obviously allow for almost any kind of threat reduction work carried out anywhere to be attributed to the GP. In fact, Heyes, Bowen and Chalmers (2011, 73) argue that the reason for the Obama administration to organize the NSS in 2010, a few month before the G8 summit, was to take place in Muskoka was “at least in part, to add momentum to the process of refocusing GP efforts away from Russia and towards the goal of securing fissile material on a global basis.” In yet another article published in 2010, Heyes and Bowen (2010, 22) assert that if the nuclear and radiological security had been tackled “in tandem with the start of the GP’s work in 2002, the urgency for the Obama initiative might not have existed.” A reconfigured GP that is truly global in terms of geographic outreach and mission portfolio could thus be expected to make up for the termination of the NSS series.

As a collaborative network of like-minded states willing to promote threat reduction, there would not be any necessity for the GP to be organized hierarchically or to uphold a two-tier structure divided between the G8 states and the non-G8 states. This would not foreclose the possibility for the G8 states and other big players with greater resources at hand to act as “primus inter pares” and take responsibility for bigger projects or contribute more extensively. The Working Group could (in line with given practice) function like a clearing house that collects and disseminates information about given needs and available capabilities. In addition, the GPWG could continue to “watch” over the program and help to prevent overlaps and potential duplication. Overall, the Group would fulfill management responsibilities within a horizontally organized network. Obtaining very specific pledges with regard to the nature of the contribution and the time horizon within which such commitments were to be realized, ensuring a reporting to the GPWG on the progress made and the consolidation and sharing of such information by the Group, would constitute core elements for the functioning of such a system. Guaranteeing that the contributions of

states are made visible could provide a major incentive for states to join the collaborative undertaking, raising their international profile.¹⁷ It would also allow for public naming and shaming in cases where states do not live up to their commitments. In order to ensure that the attention given to the topic by the higher echelons of power, which is in turn said to render securing necessary funds much easier, is sustained, one could also think about holding GPWG meetings at the level of ministers or heads of states in greater intervals (a cycle of five years similar to the NPT review mechanism could be an option) on the sidelines of preferably G20 summits or of the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly (to keep the costs of such meetings down).

Notwithstanding the fact that the details of such a collaborative effort would have to be clarified, what has been described above could constitute its general outline. It is obvious that such a structure should also encompass relevant international organizations (IAEA, OPCW,...) and NGOs¹⁸ – in line with current practice. The expertise they bring in should help to keep money consuming institutionalization at a minimum level, identify both needs and resources, and generate synergies. It is worth reminding that on many occasions GP members have worked through the IAEA, for instance, and committed money to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund in order to support work on nuclear and radiological security (cf. Heyes/Bowen/Chalmers 2011, 73).

Overall, the tasks fulfilled in the future are likely to be of a different nature than the work accomplished in Russia. Prevention work rather than CBRN related fire-fighting is likely to dominate the agenda and take the GP to regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East, where a number of countries have devised plans to utilize nuclear energy. However, some first-generation work will have to be carried out in the FSU – for example, as mentioned above, in the form of the dismantlement of nuclear

¹⁷ Kobyakov and Orlov (2005, 3) argue that “small-scale” contributions by some countries to the GP were motivated by an expectation that this would, among other things, raise the country's international profile and have a positive public relations effect.

¹⁸ According to information provided by Bonnie D. Jenkins, the GPWG met with NGO representatives before each session of the Group in 2012 to discuss relevant issues (Stanley Foundation 2012).

powered ships; yet, Russia will most likely be expected to carry the burden mainly itself given the inflow of energy Rubles (including those in the nuclear field) and arms sales earnings.¹⁹ Moreover, first-generation projects could again appear high on the agenda should the strategic context change and countries with CW stocks accede to the CWC (see also Stanley Foundation 2012),²⁰ states decide to drastically reduce existing fissile material stocks, or the US/NATO and Russia agree on an elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

This paper set out to outline the evolution and functioning of the GP, summarized its main achievements, and tackled the question as to how its future might look like. Spending approximately \$ 21 billion in a joint effort on threat reduction, mainly in Russia, is an impressive achievement. As shown above, a great deal has been done to cope with the WMD legacy of the former Soviet Union. However, it is important to note that threat reduction work can never be conclusive and has to be carried on. Thus, sustaining this momentum, ensuring necessary commitment on the part of old and potential new partners, and continuing work in the years ahead is the challenge. Nevertheless, this needs to be done in close consideration of and co-ordination with other necessities and requirements. Even though the threat posed by WMD is global and there seems to exist agreement that the consequences of related incidents would be painful, it would be illusive to assume that every country viewed threat reduction as a pressing issue that should be prioritized over other needs. This is even less the case in times of financial and debt crises, which will most likely come to bear on the readiness of European G8 members to commit extensive funds to the GP as well. As a consequence, rather than expecting such countries to adapt their spending to GP

¹⁹ According to Bowen and Heyes (2010, 17-19), the GP could have done more to communicate its achievements to the public. From their point of view, the (almost) exclusive focus on Russia was one major reason making GP members “downplay their financial contributions to the partnership”. Given the fact that Russia has been making a lot of money with energy exports and reclaiming its great power status, the public would probably have shown little understanding for the expenditures on CTR in this country, so Heyes and Bowen (ibid.).

²⁰ Among others, countries such as Israel, Syria and North Korea have still not fully acceded to the Treaty.

priorities, it would be more promising to adapt the GP to the existing budgetary realities. Indeed, as shown above, the GP seems to have been reconfigured in a manner guaranteeing the highest level of flexibility in terms of priorities, future membership and funding. So, the renewed Partnership will most likely be one bringing together a vast variety of countries performing a vast variety of work in a vast variety of regions and states in accordance with their own technical and financial capacities. The unknowns from today's perspective are the lifespan of this *coalition of the willing* and the extent of resources it will commit to threat reduction work – both remain to be seen.

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