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# Self-placement of the Unemployed in the Social Hierarchy

#### **Evidence from European Countries**

#### Ellu Saar, Jelena Helemäe, and Kristina Lindemann

#### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Unemployment has risen during the recent recession. However, the experience of unemployment varies considerably across European countries (Gallie 2013b). To study the unemployment experience in different European countries, a social exclusion approach was combined with a social stratification approach utilizing a measure of subjective social position which indicates how people perceive their relative position in the social hierarchy. In evaluating their social position people make comparisons within societal contexts. We hypothesize that the country-level economic and institutional context impacts the experience of unemployment, the way people interpret it, and thus affects the subjective social position of the unemployed. Our main goal was to study the impact of different macro-level economic and social characteristics on the subjective social position of the unemployed. We focused on a comparison of the subjective social position of unemployed persons against the remaining populations of 18 European countries<sup>2</sup> using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009 Social Inequality module.

<sup>1</sup> The paper has been prepared as part of the research project "Cumulative processes in the interplay of educational path and work career: explaining inequalities in the context of neoliberalization" funded by the Estonian Research Council (project no IUT31-10). The research was supported by the EU through the European Social Fund.

<sup>2</sup> As our main aim is to study the impact of contextual structural variables on subjective social position, our analysis was restricted to European countries because previous analyses have indicated that Europeans are more likely to see themselves within a larger continental perspective than would Japanese or Americans see themselves within a global perspective (see, for example, Sweeney and McFarlin 2004).

#### Subjective Social Position, Social Comparison and Societal Context

Unemployment and the unemployed remain quite marginal for class analyses on a theoretical as well as a political level. In stratification research the measurement of social position is often based on income, occupational position, or other occupation-related characteristics. Critics claim that when measured in such a way, the objective social position does not specify how individuals are truly ranked in society (Bottero 2004) but on how certain visible characteristics possessed by all individuals are ranked (Hiller 1973).

The emergence of the concept of social exclusion was directly related to the emergence of the threat of high unemployment and the threat it posed to national modes of integration (Kronauer 1998). Thus, the social exclusion paradigm is acutely attuned to unemployment. In the literature, social exclusion is considered a multidimensional concept (Jordan 1996; Nolan and Whelan 2007). Burchard et al. (2002, 39) state that "an individual is socially excluded if he or she does not participate in key activities of the society in which he or she lives". One of these activities is work.

From the perspective of the social exclusion concept, people are more 'in' or 'out' of mainstream society than 'up' or 'down' the class structure (Beland 2007). However, social exclusion is a relative concept, i.e. individuals are socially excluded merely with respect to other members of their society. Social comparison is a fundamental mechanism linking objective facts to subjective evaluations (Gruder 1977; Suls et al. 2002) and it should have a very important role in shaping how people interpret unemployment.

Subjective social position can only be adequately understood if due consideration is given to the role of frames of reference. Reference group theory argues that people evaluating their own position compare themselves with other individuals or groups (Merton 1957; Kelly 1968). People perceive a broader social world from their own viewpoint and their families' and friends' situations, and they assess their position in society in light of the people around them (Evans et al. 1992; Evans and Kelley 2004). Merton and Kitt (1950) maintain that people use others in their own groups as well as 'non-membership reference groups' to assess their circumstances and position. Subsequent research suggests that there is a great deal of diversity in the referent others with whom comparisons are made (Suls et al. 2002). Klein (1997) has established that aggregate information influences self-evaluation more than individual objective characteristics.

Thus, similar objective characteristics can lead to a different self-evaluation depending on the frame of reference and on the social context (Delhey and Kohler 2005; Fahey 2006; Marsh et al. 2008; Whelan and Maitre 2009; 2013). Literature on how subjective social position is affected by macro-level economic and social characteristics has been available for some time and is ever-expanding (see for example Evans and Kelley 2004; Andersen and Curtis 2012; Lindemann and Saar 2014).

Andersen and Curtis (2012) find support for the classic arguments of Marx and Weber that class-related differences are larger if economic inequalities between social positions are more pronounced in a society. This result is also in accord with the expanded reference group argument: people may be increasingly aware of the extent of inequality and living in an unequal society might lower their subjective social position because they make comparisons across country boundaries and the whole of society (see also Wilkinson 2000). Being unemployed in a highly unequal country might bring about both real and perceived (self-)exclusion: because in such (probably neoliberal) countries support for the unemployed is rather limited and movement into unemployment is often brought about by poverty, uncertain future prospects and consequently low social status. In such countries a slide into unemployment might result in both a real and perceived individual period of sharp downward mobility of unknown duration. In highly unequal countries, i.e. those with high income inequalities, people might perceive that being unemployed means being "out" of the "legitimate" hierarchy of (classed) positions.

There are a number of competing hypotheses and empirical results on the influence of the unemployment rate on subjective social position. The threat of unemployment might lower the subjective social standing of individuals because it increases uncertainty in society and makes all people feel vulnerable. A rise in the national unemployment rate might indicate an economic downturn, which might, in turn, have a significant negative impact on the subjective social position of individuals (Evans and Kelley 2004). However, being unemployed in a country where the unemployment rate is high is not the same as being unemployed in country where the unemployment rate is low. One possibility is that high unemployment will aggravate the distress felt by the unemployed because the perceived opportunity to escape in circumstances of high unemployment level is reduced (Gallie and Russell 1998). Alternatively, high unemployment may reduce the stigma attached to unemployment, because in the countries with a high unemployment rate unemployment is part of the social system, thus the unemployed are not seriously marginalized. This explanation fits into a broader theory which holds that an individual's relative, rather than absolute position matters most for their subjective social standing. Here "relative" is understood both in terms of comparison with others and with themselves at different times over the life course. The unemployed might not identify themselves with the current temporary situation of being unemployed, but rather think of themselves in terms of "what they usually" are (or were before becoming unemployed).

Development of active employment policies might have an effect on the experience of unemployment. Higher expenditures on active labor market policies can reduce the risk of long-term marginalization from the labor market. When the unemployed have the possibility of improving their skills through training, they are more likely to find a job and this might decrease their marginalization (Gallie and Paugham 2000) and also make them consider their situation as temporary. Financial support for the unemployed is also likely to be a critical factor for the way the welfare state affects the experience of the unemployed. In countries where generous financial support is provided over a relatively long period, the unemployed are more likely to live in similar conditions as the employed. They have more opportunity to search thoroughly when they are looking for a job and this will mean that they are less likely to be stigmatized, and will tend to be perceived to be more highly placed in the social hierarchy.

Such quantifications of the various dimensions of the welfare state often start out as critiques of the oversimplification of welfare state typologies. However, these analyses carry their own dangers. As Svallfors (2010) makes clear, researchers tend to assume that the effects of macro-variables are the same regardless of countries' values and other dimensions. Svallfors considers this assumption highly questionable; the regime concept is intended to move away from this assumption. Palme (2006) and Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009) conclude that the most important effects derive from the institutional design of the welfare state and that such design effects can take complex forms (Whelan and Maitre 2010). Hence, we suppose that, as well as objective measures of welfare policies, the regime concept also expresses norms, values and discourses, and among these the attitudes of the state (and indirectly of the society) towards the unemployed (see Clasen and Clegg 2003).

Gallie and Paugham's (2000) unemployment welfare regime typology, distinguishing four regimes, focuses on the degree of benefit coverage and the level of financial compensation for the unemployed and expenditure on active employment policies. The liberal regime provides a low level of financial compensation and there is little development of active labor market policies. The main idea is to encourage the unemployed to take responsibility for themselves and in this type of regime there is a strong risk that the unemployed will suffer from stigmatization. The Southern Europe sub-protective regime is distinguished by the crucial role of family support systems. Labor market policies are poorly developed and selective, few of the unemployed receive benefits, the level of financial compensation is low and the long-term unemployment rate is high. Due to strong family support and the high unemployment rate it would be reasonable to assume that the stigmatization of the unemployed is much lower than in liberal countries. The social democratic regime is characterized by an emphasis on universalism and the individualization of rights. It offers comprehensive coverage of the unemployed, a much higher level of financial compensation and a more ambitious active employment policy. This type of regime could be expected to be the least stigmatizing of the unemployed. The corporatist employmentcentered regime provides a much higher level of protection for the unemployed than the liberal and Southern European regimes, but entitlements depend primarily on life-long employment. This system tends to create a division between insiders and outsiders, and thus we expect the stigmatization of the unemployed to be at a medium level: higher than in Southern Europe and the Nordic countries, but lower than in a liberal regime.

The Gallie and Paugham study did not include Eastern European countries. Some more recent studies have identified additional regime types applicable to these countries (see Stovicek and Turrini 2012; Gallie 2013b; Whelan and Maitre 2010; Bohle and Greskovitsh 2012). The post-socialist corporatist regime comprises the Central European countries with mostly transfer-oriented labor market measures. The post-socialist liberal group comprises Baltic countries along with Bulgaria (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). These countries have low levels of coverage, relatively low-income support and very low levels of expenditure on active labor market policies. The differences in the subjective social position of the unemployed and others could be expected to be similar to the post-socialist corporatist regime and the Western Europe corporatist regime. Furthermore, we expect that post-socialist liberal regime countries and the UK (a Western liberal regime) behave similarly.

#### Variables and Methods

Subjective social position was measured using a 10-box display from bottom to top. The question was formulated as follows:

In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale?

This question differs from traditional class identification measures because it is comparable across cultures, it avoids forcing respondents to choose one of several specified categories and eliminates highly politicized terms such as 'working class' and 'middle class' (Evans and Kelley 2004).

One aim of the analysis was to identify how contextual variables modify the effect unemployment status has on subjective social position. *Labor market status* describes the respondent's current position in the labor market. This variable distinguishes between unemployed and all other groups. The *level of education* indicates the highest level that the respondent has achieved and is recorded as follows: (1) below upper secondary education, (2) upper secondary completed, (3) above upper secondary (other qualification than university) and (4) university degree completed. *Household income* is measured in quartiles, which show the respondents' relative position in the distribution of incomes in their country. Other independent variables included in the analysis are *gender* and *age* (also the quadratic term of age).

Several national-level social and economic factors that might affect subjective social position were analyzed. We measured *income inequality* using the Gini coefficient (based on disposable household income data). The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Gini measures were obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2009). We use data on the long-term (lasting more than 12 months) unemployment rate, measured as the proportion of long-term unemployed among the labor force, to take into account time-sensitive dimensions of social comparisons. We expected that an active labor market policy might have an impact on the experience of unemployment. To take this into account, expenditures on active labor market policies measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are included in the models. Including Expenditures on passive labor market policies measured as a percentage of GDP in the models, allows us to estimate the impact of social support on self-placement in the social hierarchy.<sup>3</sup> We differentiated six unemployment regime types based on previous typologies (Gallie and Paugham 2000; Bohle and Greskovits 2012). In our study the liberal regime includes the UK; the Southern

<sup>3</sup> The unemployment replacement rate (the ratio of unemployment benefits a worker receives relative to the worker's last gross earnings) is another way of measuring the generosity of financial support provided to the unemployed by state agencies. Our preliminary analysis (not presented here but available upon request) confirms that expenditures on active and passive labor market measures are better predictors of subjective social position than the unemployment replacement rate.


sub-protective regime comprises Spain and Portugal; the social democratic regime Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway; the corporatist employment-centered regime Austria, Belgium and France; the post-socialist corporatist regime Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia; and the post-socialist liberal group Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria.

Hierarchical linear models were used to estimate the effect of different country-level contextual variables on subjective social position. First, an empty model with no explanatory variables to predict subjective social position was calculated. The aim being to see how much variance exists at the country level. Then we calculated a model with individual level variables. This model was for comparison with all succeeding ones, except more complicated contextual models. The next step was to analyze the effect of contextual variables on subjective social position. Different models were run where country level variables were entered stepwise in order to check whether the results were robust. A separate model for each contextual variable was then composed, and for each of these models we also added cross-level interactions based on our hypothesis. All models include individual level characteristics (gender, age, level of education, household income, labor market status). Our aim was to find out the extent to which different contextual variables affect how the unemployed and all other groups estimate their social position. In order to test whether the effect of unemployment is dependent on the macro context, employment status and macro-level characteristics were utilized (see Appendix 2).

#### Subjective Social Position of the Unemployed in Europe

Previous analysis thus far indicates that estimation of one's social position varies to a great extent between European countries – the mean of the subjective position ranges from 3.97 in Bulgaria to 6.50 in Finland (Lindemann and Saar 2014). Figure 1 shows that the differences for unemployed people are on the same level: from 3.02 in Bulgaria to 5.56 in Finland. In general, Nordic countries (with the exception of Norway) have the highest average estimation along with Belgium, while the unemployed living in post-socialist countries and, surprisingly, in Norway, have the lowest opinion of their social position. There might be two different explanations for the big differences between countries. First, subjective social position might measure location in the social hierarchy as much as subjective wellbeing. Second, respondents are using an extended reference group to evaluate their social position.

However, the differences between the mean social position of the unemployed and of all of the population are the lowest, not in the Nordic countries, but in Southern Europe and also in Poland and Slovenia. The biggest differences are found for Norway, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.




*Figure 1* The mean of the subjective position of the population at large and of the unemployed in European countries

#### The Macro-social Context

We expected that income inequality, the long-term unemployment rate and public expenditure on passive and active labor market policies should have an impact on the subjective social position of the unemployed. Figure 2 shows that income inequality has a strong effect on subjective social position. Higher income inequality reduces one's opinion of their social position. The difference in subjective position between the unemployed and other groups is smaller the more unequal the income distribution. In other words, the expected gap between the unemployed and other groups is markedly smaller in countries with higher income inequality.

The analysis indicates that the long-term unemployment rate somewhat lowers people's estimation of their social position. It might be that the higher long-term unemployment rate indicates higher social risks and lower living conditions for all people in European countries. However, the impact is similar for the unemployed and other social groups. Contrary to previous expectations the unemployed do not have a higher standing in societies where the unemployment rate is high. The reason could be that the survey was conducted in 2009, at which time it was not clear how extensive and long-lasting the economic difficulties and the related threat of unemployment in European societies would be.

Expenditures on active labor market policies have an positive effect on subjective social position. The effect is stronger for the unemployed compared to all other groups. It seems that the development of active employment policies reduces the risk of the long-term marginalization of the unemployed. The level of financial compensation has some weak effect but only for the unemployed. This means that in countries where a high level of replacement of earning is provided the degree of social stigmatization to which the unemployed are subjected is somewhat lower. In countries where financial compensation is more limited, the risk of cumulative growth of difficulties for the unemployed is higher.




#### Predictive margins for employment status

Note: 90% confidence intervals

*Figure 2* Relationship between subjective social position and contextual variables (income inequality, long-term unemployment rate, public expenditure on active labor market policies, ALMP), unemployed vs. other groups (employed and inactive).

Figure 3 demonstrates that, controlling for other factors, the gap between the unemployed and other groups is markedly smaller in the Southern Europe sub-protective regime<sup>4</sup>, indicating that in these countries the effect of unemployment on subjective social position is significantly weaker compared to other European countries. For the remaining country groups the gap in subjective social position between unemployed and other groups seems to be quite similar in size, although the gap is largest in the UK. Notably however, the figure illustrates that while the gap between the unemployed and all other groups in the Southern countries is very narrow, the subjective social position of both groups, especially employed and inactive, is relatively low, while the subjective social position of the unemployed and others in the Nordic countries registers as higher than elsewhere. This raises the question about the greater insecurity of the employed in Southern Europe. The unemployed in the UK and liberal post-socialist countries have an especially low opinion of their position, indicating that the liberal regime tends to disadvantage and stigmatize unemployed people.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix 3 for details of the model.



*Figure 3* Relationship between regime type and unemployed vs. other groups (employed and inactive): predicted subjective position

#### Conclusions

Cross-country analysis indicates that unemployment has an effect on subjective social position. In countries where the long-term unemployment rate is high, people, irrespective of whether they are unemployed or not, generally have a lower opinion of their position in society. Our research though has not confirmed the big-fish-little-pond argument, which suggests that where unemployment is generally high, the experience of unemployment will be less distressing, as it will be less stigmatizing since it is a fate shared by many others. If anything, it seems that unemployment aggravates the difficulties that people experience when unemployed but also lowers the feeling of security for employed and inactive people.

Income inequality lowers subjective social position for all members of society and not just those who are unemployed. In fact, the gap between the unemployed and other groups decreases in significance with increasing inequality. Rather than indicating that higher levels of inequality exacerbate the consequences of being unemployed, our analysis suggests that unemployment has a stronger impact where inequality is lower. This means that experiencing unemployment where income inequality is low, and where one might expect that relative deprivation and stigmatization of the unemployed is avoidable, appears to exacerbate its impact.

Higher expenditures on active labor market policies increase the subjective social position of all social groups, but particularly that of the unemployed, reducing their risk of marginalization and stigmatization. Surprisingly, expenditure on passive labor market policies has no such effect. Thus, social investment policy seems to be more important than social protection policy to avoid the social deprivation of the unemployed.

Our expectation was that the effect of unemployment on subjective social position would be filtered by the unemployment welfare systems in protecting the unemployed. However, we supposed that the unemployment regimes would also be differentiated by long-term political and ideological developments (e.g., in terms of balance of the state, market and family as three sources for managing social risks). Thus, even with similar levels of expenditure and similar lists of measures, the way of political argumentation matters as well. For example, avoidance of victim blaming argumentation in "solidaristic" (Nordic) regimes might help to avoid stigmatization of vulnerable groups as well.

Our analysis shows that cross-regime variation in the relative impact of unemployment on subjective social position is modest. The main difference observed suggests that the impact of unemployment is lower in the Southern regime countries (Portugal and Spain) and is substantially stronger in the liberal regime (the UK). It is likely that family structures in these southern countries play a more salient role and, that in situations of very low state welfare provision, strong family support may help to buffer the negative impact of unemployment (see also Gallie 2013a). Some of the Southern distinctiveness may arise from the lower security and satisfaction among other social groups, especially the employed (see Steiber 2013). In a liberal regime financial support for the unemployed is relatively low and it has a negative impact on the subjective social position of the unemployed. Although the gap between the unemployed and other groups in Nordic countries is at a medium level, the subjective position of the unemployed in these countries is relatively high compared to all other countries indicating the positive effect of a protective unemployment welfare system.

To close, we offer a few critical remarks related to the chosen design. We were not able to control who becomes unemployed. In some countries, specific occupational groups with lower objective status might have a higher risk of unemployment. Thus, the previous occupational position of an individual might have contributed to a current low evaluation of their social position. Another issue concerns our choice to compare the levels of perceived social status of the unemployed with the rest of population. As the share of non-active people in the population may differ across countries, it should be pointed out that our analyses are not limited to strict comparisons between the unemployed and the employed.

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|               | Individual-level data                           | -level data  |  | Country-                                 | Country-level data   |  |
|---------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| Country       | Mean subjective<br>social position <sup>a</sup> | Mean subjective<br>social position,<br>unemployed <sup>a</sup> | Long-term<br>unemployment <sup>b</sup> | Income inequality<br>(Gini) <sup>c</sup> | Expenditures on<br>active labour market<br>policy, % of GDP <sup>b</sup> | Expenditures on<br>passive labour<br>market policy, % of<br>GDP <sup>b</sup> |
| Finland       | 6.52  | 5.56   | 1.9                                    | .255                                     | 0.86   | 1.78   |
| Norway        | 6.11  | 3.80   | 0.9                                    | .222                                     | 0.51   | 0.47   |
| Austria       | 6.01  | 4.89   | 1.2                                    | .271                                     | 0.66   | 1.40   |
| Sweden        | 5.89  | 4.98   | 1.7                                    | .225                                     | 0.81   | 0.57   |
| Belgium       | 5.86  | 4.97   | 4.1                                    | .247                                     | 1.26   | 0.45   |
| Denmark       | 5.78  | 5.08   | 1.8                                    | .265                                     | 1.40   | 1.57   |
| Poland        | 5.27  | 4.86   | 3.6                                    | .294                                     | 0.60   | 0.34   |
| Great Britain | 5.24  | 3.75   | 2.6                                    | .357                                     | 0.04   | 0.31   |
| Spain         | 4.98  | 4.49   | 8.4                                    | .321                                     | 0.14   | 0.87   |
| Estonia       | 4.94  | 3.95   | 9.8                                    | .311                                     | 0.68   | 3.14   |
| Slovenia      | 4.93  | 4.47   | 3.3                                    | .234                                     | 0.40   | 0.68   |
| France        | 4.89  | 3.92   | 3.9                                    | .286                                     | 0.83   | 1.46   |
| Czech Rep.    | 4.87  | 3.80   | 3.0                                    | .249                                     | 0.22   | 0.37   |
| Slovakia      | 4.85  | 3.60   | 9.8                                    | .234                                     | 0.23   | 0.61   |
| Latvia        | 4.47  | 3.84   | 10.4                                   | .365                                     | 0.51   | 0.69   |
| Portugal      | 4.42  | 4.20   | 5.5                                    | .340                                     | 0.58   | 1.39   |
| Hungary       | 4.04  | 3.20   | 5.4                                    | .261                                     | 0.53   | 0.72   |
| Bulgaria      | 3.97  | 3.02   | 5.7                                    | .352                                     | 0.09   | 0.45   |

The mean of subjective social position for each country and values for national-level variables

Appendix 1

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|  | Model 1                     | -                         | Model 2      | 2            | Model 3 |              | Model 4     | 4            | Model 5 | 5            | Model 6 | 9            | Model 7      | 7            | Model 8     | 8            |
|--|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------|--------------|-------------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
|  | Coef. <sup>1</sup>          | St.<br>error <sup>2</sup> | Coef.        | St.<br>error | Coef.   | St.<br>error | Coef.       | St.<br>error | Coef.   | St.<br>error | Coef.   | St.<br>error | Coef.        | St.<br>error | Coef.       | St.<br>error |
| Individual level                               |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| Men  | .138+                       | .020                      | .137+        | .020         | .138+   | .020         | .138+       | .020         | .137+   | .020         | .138+   | .020         | .137+        | .020         | .138+       | .020         |
| Age  | 031+                        | .003                      | 031+         | .003         | 031+    | .003         | 031+        | .003         | 031+    | .003         | 031+    | .003         | 031+         | .003         | 031+        | .003         |
| Age2   | +000.                       | 000.                      | +000.        | 000.         | +000.   | 000.         | +000"       | 000.         | +000.   | 000.         | +000.   | 000.         | +000.        | 000.         | +000*       | 000.         |
| Education (ref. below upper secondary)         | condary)                    |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| Upper secondary                                | .448+                       | .027                      | .448+        | .027         | .449+   | .027         | .448+       | .027         | .448+   | .027         | .449+   | .027         | .448+        | .027         | .449+       | .027         |
| Lower tertiary qualification                   | .694+                       | .033                      | .694+        | .033         | .694+   | .033         | .694+       | .033         | .694+   | .033         | .694+   | .033         | .694+        | .033         | .694+       | .033         |
| University degree                              | 1.113+                      | .031                      | $1.113^{+}$  | .031         | 1.113+  | .031         | $1.113^{+}$ | .031         | 1.113+  | .031         | 1.113+  | .031         | 1.113+       | .031         | $1.113^{+}$ | .031         |
| Labour market position (ref. all other groups) | ll other gro                | (sdnc                     |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| Unemployed                                     | 602+                        | .043                      | .043 -1.071+ | .281         | 602+    | .043         | 602+        | .043 -1.071+ | 1.071+  | .281         | 602+    | .043 -       | .043 -1.071+ | .281         | 602+        | .043         |
| Income (1st quartile)                          |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| 2nd quartile                                   | .465+                       | .031                      | .465+        | .031         | .465+   | .031         | .465+       | .031         | .465+   | .031         | .465+   | .031         | .465+        | .031         | .465+       | .031         |
| 3rd quartile                                   | .773+                       | .032                      | .773+        | .032         | .773+   | .032         | .773+       | .032         | .773+   | .032         | .773+   | .032         | .773+        | .032         | .773+       | .032         |
| 4th quartile                                   | 1.268+                      | .033                      | 1.268+       | .033         | 1.268+  | .033         | 1.268+      | .033         | 1.268+  | .033         | 1.268+  | .033         | 1.268+       | .033         | 1.268+      | .033         |
| Country level                                  |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| Gini for income                                | -7.973+ 2.894 -8.078+ 2.893 | 2.894                     | -8.078+      | 2.893        |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| Long-term unemployment                         |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| rate   |                             |                           |              |              | 038+    | .008         | 038+        | .008         |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
| % of active LM measures                        |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              | -988-   | .374         | -976+   | .374         |              |              |             |              |
| % of passive LM measures                       |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              | *600.        | .005         | *600.       | .005         |
|  |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |
|  |                             |                           |              |              |         |              |             |              |         |              |         |              |              |              |             |              |

| <i>Interactions</i><br>Unemployed x Gini for<br>income<br>Unemployed x long-term<br>unemployed x % of active<br>LM measures<br>Unemployed x % of passive<br>LM measures             | بە                        | 1.690* .949    | <u>ರ</u>       | 0. 000        | 003                 |                      | .131   | . 100. | .002 |
|---|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------|--------|------|
| Country variance  | .322                      | .321           | .204           | .204          | .330                | .329                 | .386   | .386   |      |
| Likelihood-ratio test <sup>3</sup>  | 00.                       | 00.            | .00            | 00.           | 00.                 | .00                  | 00.    | 00.    |      |
| Number of individuals   | 21,284                    | 21,284         | 21,284         | 21,284        | 21,284              | 21,284               | 21,284 | 21,284 |      |
| Number of countries   | 18                        | 18             | 18             | 18            | 18                  | 18                   | 18     | 18     |      |
| <sup>1</sup> Regression coefficient; <sup>2</sup> Standard error; <sup>3</sup> Compared to individual level model, Prob > chi2 * $p < 0.10$ , $^+p < 0.01$ <i>Source: ISSP 2009</i> | ndard error; <sup>3</sup> | Compared to in | dividual level | model, Prob > | chi2 $^{*} p < 0.1$ | 0, + <i>p</i> < 0.01 |        |        |      |

### Appendix 3

Estimates from hierarchical linear regression models predicting subjective social position using types of countries, standard errors in parentheses

| Individual level                               | Мо        | del 1  | Мо         | odel 2  |
|--|-----------|--------|------------|---------|
| Men  | .138***   | (.021) | .138***    | (0.020) |
| Age  | 031***    | (.004) | 031***     | (0.003) |
| Age2   | .001***   | (.000) | .001***    | (0.000) |
| Education (ref. below upper secondary)         |           |        |            |         |
| Upper secondary                                | .449***   | (.027) | .450***    | (.027)  |
| Lower tertiary qualification                   | .693***   | (.034) | .692***    | (.035)  |
| University degree                              | 1.112***  | (.034) | 1.112***   | (.031)  |
| Labour market position (ref. all other groups) |           |        |            |         |
| Unemployed                                     | 802***    | (.044) | 798***     | (.124)  |
| Income (1 <sup>st</sup> quartile)              |           |        |            |         |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile                       | .469***   | (.030) | .461***    | (.032)  |
| 3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile                       | .763***   | (.032) | .768****   | (.032)  |
| 4 <sup>th</sup> quartile                       | 1.268***  | (.034) | 1.264***   | (.034)  |
| Regime type (ref. social democratic)           |           |        |            |         |
| Corporatist                                    | 276       | (.280) | 298        | (.283)  |
| Sub-protective                                 | -1.081*** | (.318) | -1.174***  | (.322)  |
| Post-socialist corporatist                     | -1.050*** | (.246) | -1.092***  | (.249)  |
| Post-socialist liberal                         | -1.537*** | (.280) | -1.586**** | (.283)  |
| Liberal  | 650       | (.411) | 661        | (.415)  |
| Interactions                                   |           |        |            |         |
| Unemployed x Corporatist                       |           |        | .101       | (.166)  |
| Unemployed x Sub-protective                    |           |        | .455****   | (.155)  |
| Unemployed x Post-socialist corporatist        |           |        | .241*      | (.145)  |
| Unemployed x Post-socialist liberal            |           |        | .136       | (.157)  |
| Unemployed x Liberal                           |           |        | 261        | (.244)  |
| Country variance                               | .136      |        | .136       |         |
| Likelihood-ratio test <sup>1</sup>             | .00       |        | .00        |         |
| Number of individuals                          | 21,284    |        | 21,284     |         |
| Number of countries                            | 18        |        | 18         |         |

 $^1$  Compared to individual level model, Prob > chi2  $\,^*$  p < 0.10,  $^{**}$  p < 0.05,  $^{***}$  p < 0.01 Source: ISSP 2009