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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Gladkiy, Y. N., Gladkiy, I. Y., & Eidemiller, K. Y. (2017). Islamic diffusion in the baltics: the fruit of European multiculturalism. *Baltic Region*, 9(3), 30-44. <https://doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2017-3-3>

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SOCIETY



ISLAMIC DIFFUSION IN THE BALTICS: THE FRUIT OF EUROPEAN MULTICULTURALISM

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This article considers Western Europe as a principal centre that has been attracting migrants over recent decades, primarily, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The Baltic region states are chosen for demonstration. Although they have different proportions of Muslim immigrants, Muslim diasporas are the most numerous and rapidly growing ones in the Baltics. Undoubtedly, Muslim communities across the region enjoy certain similarities. The differences they have are explained, among other factors, by national policies towards migrant integration. This article aims to identify the features of Muslim migration to the Baltic States in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The authors analyse the timeline of Muslim immigration to the Baltic region. It is stressed that, despite current difficulties, Germany and Finland are more successful in integrating immigrants than, for instance, Sweden and Denmark. Just like other Western European countries, the Baltic States have not developed a conceptual framework for their migration and integration policies towards Muslim immigrants. The authors describe possible Muslim integration scenarios — the Singaporean and Palestinian ones, simulation, and confrontation. Given their apparent conscientious refusal to adapt and integrate migrants, the Baltic States are most likely to face the Palestinian scenario.

Key words: multiculturalism, immigration, Muslim community, Baltic region states, adaptation of migrants, integration scenarios

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Submitted on April 19, 2017

doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2017-3-3

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Rethinking multiculturalism. Regardless of theoretical interpretations, the essence of multiculturalism — *unity in diversity* — is very rarely questioned. This holds true for the universal determinants of multiculturalism. They are recognised by all countries that implement the ideas of cultural pluralism and see a nation as a cultural mosaic rather than a melting pot. These determinants are social justice, cultural democracy, and racial, ethnic, religious, and class equality.

Even the Baltics, whose politicians had refused to recognise the principle of multiculturalism, had to give in before signing the Treaty of Accession to the EU (1998). The countries declared their commitment to the principles of multiculturalism and readiness to embrace ‘non-Estonians’, ‘non-Latvians’, and ‘non-Lithuanians’ as part of their communities. However, these declarations did not stop the authorities from insisting on the ethnic rather than civic principle of nation-state building. The national policy was based on the assimilation model of multiculturalism. What failed in these countries is the antidemocratic assimilation policy rather than multiculturalism.

Discussions on multiculturalism seemed to have approached a point of no return when the leaders of powerful Western European states — Angela Merkel, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy — named multiculturalism a path to state failure and the dissolution of the European community. The critics of the multiculturalism ideology are taking advantage of the growing nationalist sentiments among Europe’s native-born population. This is happening in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Major arguments against multiculturalism include ‘threats’ to the national harmony and cohesion and the imminent loss of identity, national culture, traditions, beliefs, national languages, and national history. Proponents of liberal nationalism, feminism, cosmopolitanism, etc. — Brain Barry, Susan Moller Okin, and others — do not only stress the contradictions in the multiculturalism discourse but also bring to the fore its fatal flaws [10; 23].

Recognising the failure of multiculturalism, pronouncing it ‘dead’, means abandoning a whole range of philosophical concepts of multiculturalism and tolerance — from Charles Taylor’s theory [28] to the ideas of authoritative contemporaries. Among the latter, it is necessary to mention Michael Walzer, who studies the problems of communitarianism, tolerance, and cultural pluralism [7], Iris Marion Young, the author of the diversity policy concept [31], Chandran Kukathas and Bhikhu Parekh, the proponents of the liberal egalitarian and libertarian multiculturalism [17; 24], and *Will Kymlicka, who devised the theories of American multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship* [18; 19].

In most regions of the world, cultural differences are growing rather than narrowing. Thus, the main problem of multiculturalism — ‘coupling the legal concept of justice and the priority of human rights, which lie at the heart of citizenship in a liberal society, with the rights of national, religious, sexual, and other minorities’ [2, p. 254] — is still urgent, regardless of whether it is perceived as a theoretical, empirical, or practical issue.

Multiculturalism is a major headache for many Western European governments and the proponents of multiculturalism and tolerance ideas.

The timeline of Muslim immigration into the Baltic region. Numerous works analyse the evolution of the ethnic and denominational structure and its effect on the transformation of the sociocultural and political space of Northern Europe (see the landmark works of Jørgen Nielsen [21; 22]). Unfortunately, these studies do not compensate for the lack of statistical data. This holds true for the events and processes triggered by the Arab Spring, which had a profound effect on the Muslim immigration into the region. However, it is possible to create a timeline of the Muslim immigration into Western Europe, particularly, the Baltic region states.

In a simplified form, the Muslim immigration is divided into two periods. The *post-war* period — from the 1950s to the mid-1970s — is associated with mass labour migrations and the *current* one — from the mid-1970s to the present — with the national policies of attracting labour force to Western European countries. A more detailed historical analysis yields a greater number of periods.

The *first period* of the Muslim immigration into the Baltic region dates back to ‘time immemorial’. In the 14th century, natives of the Golden Horde were summoned to the Polish-Lithuanian lands. In the 18th century, the Prussian king Friedrich II established a Muslim military unit, which brought together Bosnians, Albanians, and Tatars. Of course, these migration flows were rather insignificant and did not result in ethnic and social turbulence.

The *second period* is associated with the post-war years until 1975. From the early 1960s, Western Europe attracted immigrants — natives to the traditionally Muslim territories of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Pakistan. In the mid-1970s, the parliaments of all Western European countries adopted measures regulating immigration.

In the *third period*, from 1975 to 1995, immigration was regulated by national legislation. On January 1, 1995, the two major states of the Baltic region — Finland and Sweden — acceded to the EU. Denmark had been a member state from January 1, 1973. At the time, the Muslim immigration into Europe and other parts of the world was war-related. After almost five decades of peace, the geographical centre of the Muslim world was engulfed by violence.

The *fourth period*, from 1995 to 2015, is associated with the European migration crisis. The composition and features of the Muslim immigration into Northern Europe remained the same. However, the immigration entry rules — specified in both national laws and EU regulations — did change. From the beginning of 2011, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU states were faced with the virtually uncontrolled immigration surges from North and East Africa and Western Asia.

The *fifth period* started in 2015. It is associated with the European migration crisis. Despite the geographical remoteness from the hot spots, Europe has shared the burden of the consequences of the civil wars in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and other regions of the world. The continent became a desired destination for refugees. Some authors believe that the situation in Northern Europe is the most alarming.

Irregular immigration makes it difficult to quantify the precise scales of the current Muslim immigration into the region. Thus, one cannot fully trust even the official statistics.

Muslims in the Baltic Sea region: facts and statistics. Grand mosques — the masterpieces of the Muslim temple culture designed for Friday services — have been erected in almost all European capitals. There are plans to build mosques in Tallinn, Riga, and Reykjavik — regions where Muslims account for a few percent, permille, or even permyriad of the population. Muslims comprise from 5 to 25 % of the Baltic capitals’ residents. There is a common problem of Muslim ‘diffusion’, which manifests itself differently in each country.

A common Baltic trend is the decreasing Lutheran congregation. The numbers speak for themselves. In 1990, 89 % of Sweden’s population belonged to the Church of Sweden. In 2016, this proportion dropped to 63.2 %. Over the same period, the congregation of the Church of Denmark decreased from 89.3 % to 76.9 %. In Norway, 86.6 % of the population identified themselves as belonging to the Church of Norway in 2001 and only 72.6 % in 2016. The most dramatic decrease was experienced by the Church of Iceland — from 88.6 % in 2000 to 71.5 % in 2016 [12; 13—15].

If the trend persists — i. e. the Christian population of the Nordic countries continues to decrease at a rate of 1 % per year — Christians will account for only 50 — 60 % of the total population of the Nordic countries by 2025. Muslims will comprise half of Western Europe’s believers.

Germany is the stronghold of Islam in the Baltics in terms of the total number of the Muslim population. According to expert estimates, 4.4—4.7 million Muslims lived in the country in 2015 and 82.2 million in 2016 [12].




Fig. 1. The proportion of Muslims in the population of the Baltic region states and Norway in 2015, %




Fig. 2. The increase in the proportion of the Muslim population in the Baltic region states and other major European countries

Compiled based on [1] and adjusted by the authors to incorporate the Arab Spring data.

Germany's first mosque was built in the Wünsdorf camp for Muslim prisoners-of-war (often dubbed *der Lambmondlager* — the Crescent camp) in 1915. The mosque was demolished in 1925. However, the Muslim strata of German society had formed much earlier. In 1745, the Prussian king established a Muslim military unit, which brought together Bosnians, Albanians, and Tatars. A corps numbering approximately 1,000 Bosnians was created in 1760. The first foreign workers, most of whom came to Germany from the rural areas of South-East Anatolia, manifested themselves as part of German society in the FRG, soon after Germany had been divided and West Berlin had been isolated by a concrete wall.

Since then, the number of Muslims has been steadily increasing. The FRG/GDR division is still discernible on both the economic and ethnic/denominational maps. The former FRG is home to three-thirds of the country's Muslim population. There are several reasons for this. The most important one is that, until 1990, the only source of immigration into the GDR was the Socialist camp. Another reason is that, as surveys show, 'Eastern Germans' — whose mentality was strongly affected by the Soviet regime — express distinctly negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. However,



Ossies are much more tolerant to Muslims than *Wessies* are. In the federal states of the former GDR — as well as in Rhineland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hamburg — teachers are allowed to wear headscarves.

Although Germany's Muslim community is heterogeneous, people of *Turkish* origin constitute the overwhelming majority (63 %). Unlike most other European countries, Germany has large Muslim communities living in rural areas. This holds true for the states of Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, Bavaria, and North Rhine-Westphalia [29; 32; 33].

Sweden's Muslim *Ummah* developed in the 1970s when immigrants from Iraq and Iran were joined by the natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina (part of Yugoslavia at the time), Somalia, Morocco, and some other Middle Eastern countries. Only in 2011 — 2014, Sweden's Muslim population increased by 2 %. In 2015, Muslims accounted for 7.5 % of the country's population. The available data suggest that Sweden's Muslim population is becoming the second-largest community in Europe, after Christians (Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox). Muslims comprise the most rapidly growing religious group across the continent. Islam is the second-largest religion in Sweden. There is a Swedish Islamic Academy. Islamic parties have been established in the country. Specialised journals are being published. Moreover, there are fifty Muslim cemeteries in the country.

Most Swedish Muslims (approximately 75 %) live in the cities — Stockholm, Uppsala, and Gothenburg. The Øresund Bridge, which connects Denmark's capital Copenhagen and Sweden's city of Malmö, creates a continuous territory densely populated by Muslims.

The first wave of the Muslim immigration into *Denmark* dates back to the 1960s when the country was in search of cheap labour. Immigrants were arriving from North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan. Ten thousand Muslim families found a new home in Denmark. In the 1980s, forced migrants were coming from Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine. Later, refugees from Somalia, former Yugoslavia, and other regions followed.

According to the official statistics, Denmark issued almost 85,000 residence permits in 2015. As of April 1, 2016, the country's population reached 5,717,014 people, including 501,057 immigrants, 290,333 of which were of non-European origin [14]. The data on the Muslim population in Denmark are not consistent. The Danish authorities do not register religious affiliations except for that with the Church of Denmark. Danish researchers keep track only of registered community members. However, the numbers quoted by authoritative local researchers give food for thought. The sociologist from the University of Copenhagen Brian Arly Jacobsen quotes the following 2016 statistics. As of January 2016, 70.9 % of Danish Muslims were citizens of Denmark — most of them naturalised. This proportion decreased from January 1, 2015 (73.7 %). The total Muslim population of Denmark was estimated at 284,000 people (5 % of the population) as of January 1, 2016, and 263,800 people as of January 1, 2015 (4.7 %). Half of Denmark's total population lives in the capital region [16].

The first Muslim community in *Finland* appeared when the country was part of the Russian Empire. Tatar merchants and imperial officials were coming to the Grand Duchy of Finland with their families. The Finnish Tatars integrated into Finnish society. This is a unique example of a successful multiculturalism policy, at least, in Northern Europe.

Before becoming the second largest denomination in the country, the Muslim *Ummah* had incorporated numerous immigrants from Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Russia, Albania, Nigeria, Syria, Morocco, and Algeria. At the turn of the century, the number of Muslims in the country exceeded 70,000 people (alternative sources estimate it at 150,000—170,000 people). As a result, Orthodox Christians became only the second-largest religious community.

As in the other countries of the region, Muslim communities concentrate in the cities, primarily, Helsinki (figures 3, 4). There is a mosque 40 km away from the capital. Built by Tatars in 1944, it was the northernmost mosque in the world. Sometimes, studies mention ten mosques in Helsinki. However, they are not separate buildings but spacious prayer halls, most of them rented.




Fig. 3. Changes in the proportion of Muslims in the cities of the Baltic region




Fig. 4. Changes in the proportion of Muslims in Western European cities

Norway is not part of the Baltic region. However, this subarctic Nordic country is linked to its Baltic neighbours by numerous sociocultural and logistical ties. In 1992, the country became a member of the Council of the Baltic Sea States.

As is the case in the other Nordic countries, the Muslim population of Norway constitutes the most numerous denominational minority. As early as 2007, Statistics Norway registered 79.1 thousand members of different Muslim communities, which was 10 % above the 2006 level. In 2010, this number reached 99,000 people. In 2015, 141,000 officially registered Muslims lived in the country. Alternative and independent resources insist that the real number is 2 — 2.5 times higher. Overall, Muslims account for 7 % of the total population of Norway. The distribution of Muslims across countries and municipalities is very uneven. Each tenth resident of Oslo is Muslim, whereas the proportion of Muslims in Akershus — Norway’s second largest city — is 1 in 55.

Despite its social attractiveness, Norway has not become a desired destination for migrants. This is explained by the climate and other natural phenomena. There is evidence that families running from wars in the Middle East are willing to return to the refugee camp at the Lebanon border because their children cannot adapt to Norway’s polar days and nights. Moreover, vitamin B deficiency affects children’s skeleton systems and may cause developmental delays. This holds true for the other subarctic countries.

Poland has been slightly affected by the ‘global counter-offensive’ of Islam. The country’s ultraconservative, monoethnic, Catholic society is not

ready for a diffusion of its national identity, which has happened in France and is happening in neighbouring Germany. As a Christian community, Poles are not willing to let their society be used in another experiment [25]. However, all this has little effect on the Muslims that managed to adapt to such an ‘unfriendly’ Catholic environment. The Muslims, who have become full citizens of Poland, are not subject to discrimination. This holds true for both Polish-Lithuanian Tatars, who are seamlessly integrated into the local society but stay true to their identity and religion, or Somalis, who came to the country twenty years ago.

The country’s 4,000 **Muslim Tatar** community lives in the three traditional Tatar villages of Bohoniki, Kruszyniany, and Sokółka and in the cities of Gdansk, Białystok, Gorzów Wielkopolski, etc. [25]. The Tatars came to the country in the 14th century, when Tatars from the Golden Horde — renowned warriors and merchants — were summoned to the Polish-Lithuanian lands. The total number of Muslims in the country is estimated at 30,000—35,000 people. The Muslim community brings together immigrants from ‘Socialistic’ African countries, former Yugoslavia and the USSR, Chechens, and 7,000 ethnic Poles who have converted to Islam [3]. The latter number is an estimate of Poland’s Muslim Religious Association and it requires verification.

The *Ummahs* of **Lithuania**, **Latvia**, and **Estonia** are not numerous. However, that was not always the case, especially, in the Lithuanian lands. The first Muslims — a 40,000-strong army led by Jalal al-Din Khan, the son of the Golden Horde’s Khan — arrived at the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 14th century. The army was summoned by Grand Duke Vytautas to fight against the Teutonic Order in the Battle of Grunwald. After the Order had suffered a defeat and lost its military capability in the course of the Great War (1409 — 1411), some Tatars remained in the Duchy and successfully assimilated into the population. Duke Vytautas organised the Tatar villages into a fortified belt along the Žemaitija border. The belt ran across the surroundings of Lithuanian castles near Trakai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Lida, Kreva, Navahrudak, and Grodno.

In 1941, after the Baltics had been occupied by Nazis and turned into the *Reichskommissariat Ostland*, local collaborationists started persecuting Jews, Roma, and Muslims. Almost all Muslims fled to Poland. Most of the rest were murdered or executed. The total number of the Muslim victims is unknown. Lithuania’s Muslim community has never recovered its former numbers. Today, Muslims are leaving Lithuania for socioeconomic reasons. A rough estimate suggests that approximately 10,000 Muslims remain in Lithuania. There are mosques, Muslim shops, and cultural centres but the life of the country’s Muslim community is not what it used to be.

The post-war history of Latvia’s and Estonia’s Muslim communities is rather similar, except for several details. From 10,000 to 12,000 Muslims live in Latvia (below 1 % of the total population) [12]. Estonia’s Muslim community has recovered its numbers and it is still growing. The estimates of the

number of Estonian Muslims range from 1,500 (officially registered) to 30,000 people. However, it is safe to assume that there are more Muslims living in Estonia today than in Latvia and Lithuania combined. The number of Muslims living in Estonia is close to those in Poland. Estonia's Muslim community is very heterogeneous. The supreme mufti of Estonia Ildar Muhamedšin is a Tatar. The majority of the community is comprised of Azerbaijanis, Turks, and immigrants from Central Asia and African countries.

The relations between the Muslims and the Baltics' authorities are rather complicated. This concerns both everyday discrimination and political issues — such as the construction of mosques in Riga and Tallinn. The EU plans for refugee relocation have failed in the Baltics. The few families who had decided to move to Lithuania were faced with almost absolute poverty and aggression from the local population. Having received the first benefits, most of them left the country.

A country of an enormous territory bordered by numerous seas, **Russia** is not a Baltic Sea state proper. Therefore, only the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, Saint Petersburg, and some other northwestern territories will be considered as part of the Baltic region. Some experts estimate the number of Muslims living in Saint Petersburg at 12 — 13 % of the city's total population.

The secular Soviet traditions affect the estimates of the number of Muslims in Russia. It is usually estimated at 15 — 20 million people, i. e. 13 % of the country's total population. Many Muslims are seasonal workers that are not registered or accounted for. Since 2005, multicultural Russia (with the prevalence of Orthodox Christianity) has been an observer in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (ICO) — an international association that brings together 57 countries. Represented in the UN and the EU, the ICO strives to become the voice of Muslims across the world.

Europeanisation of migrants or islamisation of Europeans? The models for integrating immigrants into national societies differ in the methods for the social adaptation of immigrants [4; 7—9; 11; 26; 27; 3, etc.]. Some authors argue that France is using an **assimilation** model, Germany a **segregation** model, the UK a **pluralistic** model, etc. [29]. Any person born in France is considered a citizen, based on *jus soli*. The French model encourages migrants to embrace the host society's values and behaviour stereotypes. Immigrants are expected to abandon their former identity. In this case, immigrants can be considered full members of the society [5].

Germany's **segregation** model is based on the *jus sanguinis* principles. It is rather difficult for a person born to an immigrant family in Germany to become a full citizen. This leads to the formation of isolated immigrant communities. At first, the UK's pluralistic model was associated with the British Nationality Act that created the status of a 'Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies' (primarily, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). After 1985, the thesis about the 'multicultural nature' of British society came to the fore. Traditionally, immigrant communities have enjoyed extensive rights.

Recently, the UK has limited the inflow of foreign labour to high-skilled professionals. To this end, the immigration points system was introduced. It takes into account education, qualifications, prospective income, etc.

The immigration laws of the economically developed Baltic region states are based on the above immigrant naturalisation models. In the Nordic countries, which strive to limit the level of migration flows, it is virtually impossible to acquire citizenship in the framework of professional immigration. Exceptions are made for persons with sought-after professions or substantial fortunes, capable of contributing to social and pension funds. In the Eastern Baltic countries, only business immigration is encouraged. One must meet the charter capital requirements to start a business in the Baltics. Brussels's refugee quota system is increasingly at odds with the immigration laws of most EU countries.

There are far deeper contradictions. Integration and immigration strategies are devised by not only the European Commission directorates but also Ministers of Integration. The revised Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy place emphasis on not only immigrants' adaptation to the written and unwritten rules of the host society but also the *bilateral processes of citizens' adaptation*. Immigration is defined as 'a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States' [1, p. 160]. This thesis — which is raising concerns from a number of states because of the vagueness of the 'limits of mutual transformation' — is being endlessly recited by European politicians and experts.

Overall, Muslim immigration is a tangle of contradictions. Regardless of the selected model, the descendants of immigrants stay within Muslim circles, preserve their Islamic identity, cultural traditions, and family ties, and create a parallel society consisting of ethnicity-based immigrant communities. Against the background of a decline in the native population, the growing numbers of Muslim diasporas encourage some authors to declare a 'global Islamic counter-offensive'. They associate the process with demographic, civilizational, and political pressures and consider it a threat to the social stability and national identity of Western European countries.

In most Baltic region states, the fertility rate in the Muslim population is well above replacement level. At the same time, the rate of natural increase in the native population is either neutral or negative. In terms of the fertility rate, 'islamised' Sweden has outstripped Finland, where the fertility rate exceeded the mortality rate in some years. Of course, shifts in Sweden's demographic situation owe to the country's spectacular socioeconomic performance. However, the contribution of Muslim multi-child families cannot be denied.

The native population's concerns about the potential dissolution of the major ethnic group are not easily coupled with the propagated ideas of multiculturalism and tolerance [7; 17—19; 28]. The increasing radicalisation of societies in the Baltic region states — as well as across Western Europe — is a reaction to the strengthening of the Muslim community. Anti-immigrant sentiments might result in an interdenominational conflict. Such a conflict may even redraw the administrative maps of states.

Germany's anti-Islamic movement *Pegida* (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* — Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) is largely affected by the extreme right and populist forces. The movement takes advantage of the citizens' reaction to increasing immigrant flows from the Middle East to organise thousands-strong rallies for 'our culture' and against 'religious fanaticism' and 'religious wars on German soil', etc. [33].

Finland is often quoted as an example of a country with best social adaptation practices, which include support for numerous Islamic traditions — opening Halal stores, reserving special hours for Muslim women to use public pools, providing female doctors at hospitals' maternity units, publishing Islamic literature, etc. However, the campaign to limit the openness of Suomi to Muslim migrants is developing. In 2015, there were several rallies boasting slogans such as 'Islam will destroy us' and 'Close the borders'.

Authors sharing the ideas of cultural pluralism and 'liberal egalitarian and libertarian multiculturalism' [7; 17; 24; 31] are sometimes inclined to exaggerate immigrants' abilities to integrate into the societies of such countries as Sweden or Denmark — which are considered the most humane when it comes to immigrants. Alas, the prejudice against Islam and Muslims is growing in these countries. Only 2 — 3 % of Nordic respondents have a positive attitude to Islam, whereas 60 %, polls suggest, have an extremely negative one. In both countries, there are parties taking advantage of the anti-immigrant sentiments and declaring that migrants from the Middle East are not only a heavy burden on taxpayers but also a threat to national cultures.

Today, one of the most misused headline clichés in mass media reads as follows: Europeanisation of migrants or Islamisation of Europeans?

Possible Muslim integration scenarios. The authors of this article believe that there are several predictable scenarios of Muslim integration (re-integration) in Western Europe, particularly, in the Baltic Sea states. In view of the cultural and historical landscape or the mental structure of the Baltic region's population, these scenarios are not plausible 'as is'. They are mere examples or templates that have a certain regional identity. Superimposed, they will result in antagonism and confrontations.

The imitation scenario is the most popular integration model across the EU's five largest economies — Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain. As was the case in the mentioned countries, enormous sums spent on different assimilation programmes did not yield adequate results because of overly formalised approaches and the corruption element of the models. In this case, adaptation problems are not solved and goals are not attained. Material resources are used to repair possible damages.

Confrontation scenario. This model has been employed surreptitiously by the Netherlands and Denmark. Whereas Latvia and Estonia pursue an open stateless person policy towards the Russian-speaking population, the Netherlands act more subtly. In the past ten years, the Netherlands have suffered reputational damages within the EU and Denmark has incurred eco-

conomic losses — Muslims across the world are boycotting goods from these countries. Muslims are refraining from services provided by companies with even an indirect affiliation with Denmark and the Netherlands. The principal goal of a confrontation scenario is the physical expulsion of the primarily Muslim population through creating unbearable and even impossible living conditions.

The *Singapore scenario* is one of the most progressive adaptation and integration models. The system was created out of hopelessness and it is a product of Singapore's internal conflicts. Thus, it cannot be considered a long-term or universal solution. In Singapore, there are strict settlement rules for different ethnic and religious groups. The compliance with these rules is closely controlled by the state. For instance, more than 25 % of Malaysians or more than 13 % of Indians may not settle within one residential quarter. However, there are positive elements too. As soon as the proportion of Muslims living within a quarter reaches 20—25 %, a mosque is built there at public expense and it immediately becomes the property of the community. Moreover, the state recognises religious civil status acts and Shariah court rulings on inheritance issues, etc. Article 152 of the Constitution of Singapore forbids missionary work among religious minorities. This scenario contradicts the basic European values — freedom of choice, freedom of travel and residence, and privacy rights.

The *Palestinian scenario* seems to be the most plausible in view of the immigrants' conscious rejection of adaptation and integration. In effect, this means the ghettoisation of cities and urban agglomerations with a significant proportion of Muslim population. This happened in the *Gaza Strip*. Another possibility is the emergence of spacious reservations akin to the West Bank. In the aftermath of the Chechen war, after the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria had been established, the Russian Federation rejected the Palestinian scenario. When the situation had improved, Russia spared no effort to integrate Chechnya and its people into the Russian Federation.

All the relevant parties will benefit if the Baltic region states come up with a different scenario and find a unique way to integrate and adapt their Muslim population.

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To cite this article:

Gladkiy Yu. N., Gladkiy I. Yu., Eidemiller K. Yu. 2017, Islamic Diffusion in the Baltics: The Fruit of European Multiculturalism, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 9, no. 3, p. 30—44. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2017-3-3.