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The *Purnawirawan* and Party Development in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, 1998–2014

M Faishal Aminuddin

**Abstract:** This study examines the role played by *purnawirawan* (retired military officers) in political party development in post-authoritarian Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. The role of *purnawirawan* remains a critical research gap in the literature on democratisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia, particularly in studies which focus on civilian–military relations. The article finds that *purnawirawan* have had a significant impact on the creation of a new type of party – one which combines military-centred leadership and civilian-controlled management. This new arrangement has enabled these former military officers to protect their interests. This study contributes to the existing literature on the impact of military reform on the increasing numbers of *purnawirawan* turning to civilian politics in order to maintain influence via electoral political contestation in the context of democratic transition.

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**Keywords:** Indonesia, *purnawirawan*, political party, democratisation, post-authoritarian, party development

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Introduction

After 1998, Indonesia underwent a transition to democracy. New political procedures were introduced, supporting democratic institutions were built, and cultural changes happened. Yet the nation still falls short of fulfilling the criteria of a consolidated democracy. In 2016 Indonesia was classified a “defective democracy” by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). In countries that have undergone a period of reform, traces of authoritarianism typically linger on – in Indonesia, there has been no exception. During the early part of its transition period (1998–2004), Indonesia made slow progress, particularly in establishing democratic institutions. This was due to the number of military figures who tried to restore the former centralised regime (Kingsbury 2005). Thus despite the decline in actual representation of the military in government branches after 1998, the military still managed to impede attempts at political reform (Crouch 2007, 2010; Honna 2003).

The share of military officers in cabinet posts fell from 14.8 per cent in 1998 to 9.8 per cent in 2004. In the legislative branch this share was 8.5 per cent from 1998 to 2004 and dropped to 3.1 per cent thereafter. In addition, the number of active duty military who were deployed to politics and served as provincial governors plummeted from 43.8 per cent during the New Order to 0 per cent in the period that followed (Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz 2012). On top of that, with its candidates failing to win elections, the military began losing its influence in local governance (Mietzner 2009). These factors weakened the military’s political influence in various state agencies. In 2004, immediately after the Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) was issued, the military returned to its initial role as a professional organisation.

*Purnawirawan* involvement and consolidation in politics gained momentum when Yudhoyono ran for president in 2004. It should be noted, however, that other notable *purnawirawan* from Suharto’s circle had also previously established political parties and participated in the 1999 gen-

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1 I would like to thank Aurel Croissant, John Sidel, and Marcus Mietzner for their valuable contributions to earlier drafts of this article.

2 Acquired from *Bertelsmann Transformation Index Country Report 2016*. The index measures a country’s democracy status according to five indicators: political and social integration, stability of democratic institutions, and political participation (Indonesia scored 7.0 on each); rule of law (6.3); and stateness (7.3). Indonesia had an overall score of 6.9 and was thus categorised as “limited.” Further details on this assessment can be found at <www.bti-project.org>.
eral election. One of these figures was General Hartono, who founded the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB). Others joined civilian-led political parties such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) and the Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar).

Although purnawirawan still have power, it is limited to individuals. Many have sought to maintain their ability to influence state policies through democratic procedures, while various notable purnawirawan have run as candidates in presidential, gubernatorial, and local government elections. Civilian politicians are well aware of this group’s interests and recognise their influence and networks; therefore, many have appointed purnawirawan to strategic positions in political parties. Purnawirawan are still able to use their networks, collaborate with purnawirawan counterparts as well as civilian politicians and businesspeople, and establish cartels – not only in the political arena but also in the economic arena. Some purnawirawan founded their own political parties in order to exist politically and compete in elections.

From 1998 to 2014, purnawirawan continued to play an important role in elections and political parties. During Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime (1966–1998), the military’s power was based not only on the strength of its institutions but also on its function as a supervisor of political parties. Under Suharto the military and its main political organisation, Golkar, became increasingly reliant on procedural elements as the basis of authority – a point that is indicative of the regime’s strength and its political legitimisation (Alagappa 1995: 53). After the collapse of the regime, the military retained a strong influence in politics. Rinakit (2005) reveals the significant effect military power has on democratisation, while Sebastian (2006) shows how a developing military doctrine linked the military institution to active-military sociocultural aspects, such as corps soul. Meanwhile, Mietzner (2009) reveals how the military’s attempts to intervene in the political arena can be linked to the relationship between Islam and military politics (Mietzner 2009). Ufen (2008) notes the impact of political streams (aliran) within the party system and how it was reconfigured by the military.

Overall, many studies have sought to understand the civil–military relationship, military politics, and the political parties themselves in Indonesia during the democratic transition and the consolidation periods. Important subjects include the influence of indigenous military officers on the political direction of the military (Chandra and Kammen 2002) and the reorganisation of the power of the political elite and the patri-
monial oligarchy (Hadiz 2003; Aspinall 2013; Webber 2006; Fukuoka 2013; Case 2007). Other studies have focused on political development, the cartelisation of parties, and democratic institutions undergoing change during the transition period (Ghoshal 2004; Slater 2004; Tan 2006; Ufen 2008; Liddle and Mujani 2009). King (2003) mentions three factors that may neutralise and control any hardliner faction – namely, modes of transition, extensive mass mobilisation driving the transition, and the success of moderate factions in the military. Even in the 1999 and 2004 elections, some of the support provided by political parties was still characterised by Islamic ideological streams (Ratnawati and Harris 2008). Furthermore, Ufen (2006) argues that stream aliran politics began losing political significance and started experiencing a dealignment when “presidentialised” parties emerged and authoritarianism within the party body grew. Meanwhile, the public’s perception of leadership and the issue of party identification were still more significant than other variables, such as religious orientation and political economy (Liddle and Mujani 2007).

Tan (2006) found that Indonesian parties and the party system revealed the strengths and weaknesses of legitimacy. The institutionalisation of parties was hindered by strong personal figures in the presidential election and the election of local government heads. Nevertheless, in terms of accountability, progress was made because the electoral system enabled voters to reward and punish parties and political leaders. In terms of party organisation, the Islamic-based Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) showed a higher degree of party cohesion than other Islamic or secular parties (Noor 2012). Having studied how political parties manage their activities, administration, and changes in membership at the local level, Fionna (2014) concludes that parties have different degrees of cohesion. There remains, however, a research gap in the literature as none of the above-mentioned studies explain the role of purnawirawan political actors, their connection with the military reform, or their influence in political parties.

Only two studies have looked at the role of purnawirawan. The first, by Terence Lee (2015), examines the role of retired high-ranking officers, especially of notable generals, who participated in presidential elections in Indonesia. Lee deems the retired generals to be strategic players in presidential elections but seemingly did not conduct extensive research on exactly what retired officers contributed to political parties or how their role impacted party development during democratisation. The second study, by Arie Soesilo (2013), seeks to identify sociological factors
that caused retired generals to enter the political stage. Soesilo notes that purnawirawan who participated in elections retained military characteristics (e.g. doctrine, discipline, and networking) aimed at serving the nation. Soesilo argues that purnawirawan hold personal idealistic motives rather than pragmatic ones and generally tend to support the process of democratic consolidation.

Based on the two aforementioned studies, the current paper seeks to answer two questions: First, how extensive was the role of purnawirawan in democratisation through their engagement in political parties? Second, what impact did their role have on the development of political parties? This case study was conducted in Indonesia and included the transition period from 1998 to 2004 and the consolidation period from 2004 to 2014. The analysis here was performed using a dataset consisting of a profile of purnawirawan. The data includes party affiliation and candidacy for both executive and legislative offices and was collected from official party documents, newspaper and magazine sources, and the accessible sources of military institutions. This study represents an attempt to understand the impact of military reform on the configuration of civil–military relations in post-New Order Indonesia and the dynamics of purnawirawan within political parties. It also seeks to explain the reorganisation of the political forces that generated new maps of fragmentation among political elites and in party development.

The remainder of this study consists of three parts. The first part explains military reform as a historical institutional factor that influenced the development of political parties during post-authoritarian democratisation. The second part presents the dataset used to illustrate the distribution and polarisation of purnawirawan in political parties. The data provide evidence that purnawirawan retained a strong interest in politics even after the military’s official control of politics had been abolished. The trend towards polarisation also indicates that networking among politicians with military backgrounds took place. The third part draws on the analysis to explain the development of political parties in post-New Order Indonesia, focusing on when purnawirawan established or joined political parties.

Military Reform and Party Development in Indonesia

Party development was shaped by historical factors, many of which were related to the underlying preconditions (e.g. the previous system, actors, and lingering effects of authoritarian legacy) of democratisation and
influenced by individuals or the institutional regime of the previous period. Ishiyama and Kennedy’s (2001) study of party development in the former Soviet Union notes that the major obstacle in the development process was the legacy of totalitarianism. Party development contains a unique blend of extra-parliamentary movements and elite-focused elements. The elite constellation could explain the model and form of party development, including the various problems that exist therein. Western democracies have produced a model of party development based on a reactive dialectic that involves interaction between parties and their roots in social, economic, and political spheres (Katz and Mair 1995). By contrast, in democratisation outside the Western tradition, party development is based on the retroactive dynamics of the legacy of authoritarianism.

Indonesian democratisation (1998–2004) encouraged purnawirawan to create new models of organisation that combined patterns of militarist leadership and civilian politicians’ institutionalisation of party constituents. The respective constituency bases included not only military and military family members but also those from different religious and professional backgrounds. Military leadership patterns were also reflected in these party organisations, with purnawirawan holding strategic leadership positions and varying degrees of authority to control the direction of party policy. Purnawirawan-controlled parties are not only surviving, they are thriving due to having national coverage, constituencies that extend beyond a particular base, and the authority to engage in extensive party institutionalisation.

There are two important historical factors that need to be taken into account when explaining the role of purnawirawan in political parties and party development more generally: (i) the reform of the military as an institution and (ii) reforms conducted within the military. These factors affected the distribution and polarisation of purnawirawan in political parties. Military reform was one of the mandates of the 1998 Reformasi movement. Although arguments regarding the implementation of this reform were varied, they reached similar conclusions — for example, the military doctrine of dual function (dwifungsi) did not change substantially between 1998 and 2004 (Honna 2003). However, some other scholars consider the internal military reforms to have been quite significant (Crouch 2010; Mietzner 2006).

There are two major types of military reform that I wish to emphasise here. The first is politically led military reform, which is guided by presidential decisions reached in agreement with Parliament. There were three presidential regimes during the democratic transition period, all of
which experienced different levels of progress and achievements in relation to their reforms. The second is militarily led military reform, guided by the armed forces commander-in-chief. Both types of reform produced fairly concrete results and three crucial achievements: (a) the withdrawal of military support for Golkar in 1998, (b) the withdrawal of military representatives, military factions, and police factions from Parliament, and (c) the institutionalisation of reform within the military through fundamental changes to military praetorian doctrine and the establishment of a professional military.

During the transition period (1998–2004), three presidential regimes made specific contributions to military reforms with their policies. Between 1998 and 1999 Habibie’s government reduced military power in Parliament and the civilian bureaucracy. For instance, in 1998 there were 75 high-ranking officers with privileged seats in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), but this number was reduced to 38 in 1999. Moreover, Law No. 3/1999 on the Composition and Positions of the People’s Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), the DPR, and the Regional Representative Bodies (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) reduced the number of military seats in the DPR (Honna 2003: 165). At the same time, MPR seats were also cut from 1,000 to 700 (500 DPR members, 135 functional group members, and 65 regional representatives) (Ufen 2002: 514).

In 2004 the armed forces headquarters accepted the political decision to withdraw all 1,047 of their members from the parliaments at different levels. The removed members had the option of returning to active military duty or resigning from the military. Not all chose to join a political party, as most of the parties only accommodated middle-ranked and senior officers. The process of withdrawal was controlled directly by military headquarters in Jakarta. On 28 June 2004 the commander-in-chief of the armed forces issued regulation STR/1064/2004, which ended the assignment of active military personnel to the national and local parliaments.

The military’s involvement in politics has officially been over since the Law on the TNI was passed in 2004. The military no longer has the ability to influence the formulation of policies or legislative processes in Parliament. Since the introduction of this legislation, military personnel have been prohibited from becoming members of a political party, being active in political contests or business activities, and being elected to the legislative or executive branches (Law 34/2004). Furthermore, initial reforms by the military establishment emphasised neutrality in local elections by banning TNI members from being nominated to participate in
these elections. In fact, according to regulation STR/222/2005, the military is not allowed to participate, facilitate, or use military resources to support a campaign or to provide any assistance to an ex-military candidate.

The military reforms implemented between 1998 and 2004 contained important changes that enforced military neutrality in politics. External reforms tended to push military personnel to leave politics, while internal reforms showed the institutionalisation of neutrality in military organisations. Armed forces were no longer able to support *purnawirawan*, who had previously held strategic positions in the military and were still concerned with maintaining their influence on politics. Furthermore, as an institution, party politics was not well established at the bottom level of party management. In terms of quality, political parties in Indonesia spend more time considering unresolved internal problems, the poor track record of parliamentary members, and the high rate of corruption than looking at ways to better develop their parties (Tomsa 2010). Tan (2002) discusses the impact of low party performance, noting that during the post-Suharto regime, antipathy towards political parties was commonplace due to widespread corruption. The impact of military reforms and the lack of accountability of political parties can be seen as an additional factor that caused *purnawirawan* to remain engaged in party politics.

**Distribution of Purnawirawan in Political Parties, 1998–2014**

According to data collected from 1998 to 2014, at least 388 *purnawirawan* entered political competitions and were distributed based on party affiliation (Dataset Military Retirees, 2014). Table 1 shows that 255 *purnawirawan* were active in political parties – 61 of whom ran as independent candidates in executive elections. Most were concentrated in the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) and the Hanura Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat), while the rest were scattered among various smaller parties that competed in the elections of 1999 and 2004. Numerous candidates from the navy were found in the Gerindra Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya), followed by the PKPB, the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI), and other smaller parties. The Golkar Party had more air force *purnawirawan* than any other branch. There were large numbers of police in the PDIP and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN).
The *purnawirawan* networks within party politics can be categorised into three main groups: (1) Suharto loyalists who founded the PKPI and the PKPB, (2) pro-reform ex-officers, divided between supporters of Golkar and the Democratic Party, and (3) ex-officers outside the socio-political support system and Suharto’s Golkar. They were incorporated into many new parties controlled by civilian politicians, like the PDIP.

**Table 1. Distribution of Purnawirawan in Political Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Rank</th>
<th>Democratic Party</th>
<th>Gerindra</th>
<th>Golkar</th>
<th>Hanura</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Nasdem</th>
<th>PAN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major general</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Inspector general</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear admiral</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>General (army and police)</td>
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<td>Vice admiral</td>
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<td>Senior commissioner</td>
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<td>Captain</td>
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<td>Commissioner general</td>
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<td>Adjunct senior commissioner</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
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</table>

Note: Not affiliated=38, Other party=34, > 5 FMOs=361, N=388. Source: Dataset on Indonesian Military Retirement in Politics, 1998–2014; calculated by author.

Although there are fewer *purnawirawan* than civilian politicians, relatively speaking they hold a greater number of strategic positions than their civilian counterparts – something that is yet to be analysed in the context of *purnawirawan* influence in party politics. In their respective parties *purnawirawan* held three important positions: (i) chairperson (*ketua umum*) of the party or advisory board, (ii) chairperson of the executive board (*dewan pimpinan pusat*), and (iii) head of the party bodies. Despite some differences, these three positions generally provided the holders with a significant amount of authority to move the wheels of the party organisation.

In the post-Reformasi period, *purnawirawan* established several major parties: the Democratic Party, Gerindra, Hanura, the PKPI, and the
PKPB. *Purnawirawan* used various high-level board positions to control the structures and daily decisions of these parties.

**Three Phases of Party Development**

During the period of democratic consolidation (2004–2014), the military practised neutrality in elections and broke off political relations with Golkar. This impacted the political influence of the armed forces, especially that of senior officers who had held strategic positions. Military politics that had previously been conducted behind closed doors in Parliament were now being channelled through other political outlets. Golkar, where various *purnawirawan* occupied positions during their active service, remained one such outlet. Golkar was a strategic option because the party’s vote was relatively stable despite some military factions in Suharto’s line – such as General (ret) Hartono – preferring to build a new party as a political vehicle. Furthermore, other Suharto loyalists, such as General (ret) Edi Sudrajat and General (ret) Try Sutrisno, were still using the PKPI to garner support from the military and their families. However, the party they founded failed to get a significant share of the vote in the 1999 and 2004 elections because of its limited constituency base, high degree of military leadership, control of the party by a *purnawirawan* elite, and lack of provisions to include civilian politicians in the party-building process.

In the context of party development, a new phenomenon saw parties not only being led by civilian politicians but also controlled by *purnawirawan*. This was due to the desire to instil military values into such parties’ organisation, and *purnawirawan* had the necessary experience. After 1998, Golkar became more open and started to allow military factions into the party, meaning its structure could not be dominated as it had been under the New Order regime. Civilian politicians managed the party from the central office, while *purnawirawan* – as a continuation of the military faction – were incorporated into the party structure. However, civilian control and military style were incompatible when it came to the party developing a platform and orientating itself politically during democratisation, which made Golkar more open and sensitive to demands.

Those who joined other parties played different roles. Overall, however, parties recruited *purnawirawan* as board members to provide assistance or meet with party experts to cover skills and technocratic gaps. Some *purnawirawan* were used to strengthen party organisation and intelligence strategies in elections.
Table 2. Party Development by the *Purnawirawan* in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Precondition** | Post-authoritarian condition with Reformasi movement  
  a. Abolition of dual function as a military doctrine  
  b. Termination of Golkar from military line | Democratic transition  
  a. Elimination of military representative position in Parliament  
  b. Passing of Law No. 34/2004 on TNI, establishing professional military | Democratisation settlement  
  a. Passing of law related to direct presidential election and electoral system  
  b. Establishment of Constitutional Court |
| **Purnawirawan Diaspora** | Build High-Militarist Party (HMP) | Join Civilian Party (CP) | Build Semi-Militarist Party (SMP) |
| **Purnawirawan Role in Party** | a. Founder  
  b. Chairman on executive board  
  c. Full domination of another board | a. Recruitment by ideological loyalty  
  b. Ordinary member on national board  
  c. Has partial control of executive board as general secretary | a. Recruitment for public office candidacy  
  b. Ordinary member on board  
  c. Partial control of executive board as vice chairman |
| **Survivability** | Failure  
  a. Traumatic factor with previous military regime  
  b. Electoral threshold 2.5% in national vote  
  c. Merger or regrouping with other party of same type | Survival  
  a. Engagement in party elites’ circulation  
  b. Success in public office candidacy | Success  
  a. Successful in election with total votes exceeding electoral threshold  
  b. Recruitment of moderate military figures  
  c. Introduction of civilian politician exponent in strategic position |
| **Survivability** | Failure  
  a. Traumatic factor with previous military regime  
  b. Electoral threshold 2.5% in national vote  
  c. Merger or regrouping with other party of same type | Survival  
  a. Engagement in party elites’ circulation  
  b. Success in public office candidacy | Success  
  a. Pressed by domination of civilian politicians  
  b. Expertise in defence and intelligence policy no longer needed by party |
| **Survivability** | Failure  
  a. Traumatic factor with previous military regime  
  b. Electoral threshold 2.5% in national vote  
  c. Merger or regrouping with other party of same type | Survival  
  a. Engagement in party elites’ circulation  
  b. Success in public office candidacy | Success  
  a. Moderate military figures considered as equivocal in their leadership  
  b. Combination of military discipline and popular democratic vision by civilian politicians |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>HMP: PKPB, PPN, PKPI, PDK; CP: PPP, Golkar, PBB, PAN, PKB, PDIP</td>
<td>SMP: Democrat, Hanura; CP: PDIP, Golkar</td>
<td>MP: Gerindra; CP: Nasdem</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Developed and compiled by author.

Most did not have the access required to mobilise the grassroots level, which was why *purnawirawan* joined civilian-controlled parties on an ad hoc basis. In none of the parties were *purnawirawan* given strategic or important positions on the national boards.

The above analysis of the distribution and trends from the dataset reveals that a fragmentation of *purnawirawan* occurred during the democratic transition period (1998–2004). There are three explanations for what caused the *purnawirawan* diaspora among political parties. First, military elites who were not incorporated into Golkar failed to retain military support during the period of democratic transition – especially after Akbar Tanjung was chosen over General Edi Sudrajat, the former commander of the TNI, as a candidate for Golkar chairperson in 1998. Under Akbar’s leadership, Golkar significantly reduced the influence of military exponents; though some *purnawirawan* still held strategic positions on the central board (Chrisnandi and Priamarizki 2014). Military-faction hardliners joined other parties, such as General (ret) Rudini, who became chairperson of the Mutual Assistance Families Association Party (Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong, MKGR) – one of the Golkar’s supporting political organisations (Van Dijk 1994). Other notable members, such as General (ret) Edi Sudrajat, established the PKPI, which was also joined by General (ret) Try Sutrisno.

Second, another faction of military exponents joined parties with which they shared (e.g. religious and nationalist) ideologies. Prominent figures of the nationalist faction – such as Major General (ret), Theo Sjafei, and Lieutenant General (ret) AM Hendropriyono – chose the PDIP. Lieutenant General (ret) Yunus Yosfiah and Major General (ret) Andi M. Ghalib joined the Islamist United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), while Major General (ret) Syamsudin and Major General (ret) Soewarno Adiwidjojo became members of the PAN. As part of the nationalist or Islamic military factions, these indi-
Individuals were already part of non-Golkar networks and had real political power. However, they were under the control of civilians and had no significant influence on party policy. The only advantages of their roles were party electoral success and parliamentary seats. In Parliament they made significant contributions to constitutional amendments and military reform by bridging political communication between the parties, Parliament, and the military. As Liddle (1996: 61) mentions, this was a legacy of the factionalisation of the armed forces during the New Order regime.

Third, *purnawirawan* who joined the presidential cabinet as military representatives were able to build their own political parties, which they organised while holding office. An example was Yudhoyono, who built the Democratic Party while serving as a minister in Megawati Sukarnoputri’s administration.

In the 2004 general election, some *purnawirawan*-founded parties were able to survive despite not securing a significant number of seats in Parliament. The Democratic Party gained 7.45 per cent of the vote in its debut campaign, the 2004 election. In 2009 Hanura received 3.77 per cent of the vote in its first election, while Gerindra received 4.46 per cent. Somewhat surprisingly, Hanura received slightly fewer votes in the 2014 election, while Gerindra secured the biggest share of votes by a *purnawirawan*-controlled party with 11.81 per cent. After realising that the party was highly electable, some *purnawirawan* left their parties and decided to join Gerindra. Another pull factor was the party’s leader, Prabowo Subianto, who was known for offering prestigious positions to *purnawirawan*. Gerindra was committed to recruiting new *purnawirawan* members and did not limit its recruitment to one branch of the armed forces or former military-academy classmates.

I use the term “civilian party” to distinguish between parties controlled by civilian politicians and those controlled by *purnawirawan*. Civilian-controlled parties had specific characteristics and primarily recruited *purnawirawan* to fill internal management positions. Meanwhile, *purnawirawan*-controlled parties consisted of highly militarist parties, semi-militarist parties, and militarist parties; all were based on military values, doctrine, and organisational models and were subject to authoritative centralised command. They also approached the family members of active military members and mobilised them during each election. In cases where *purnawirawan* party leaders and active military commanders were part of the

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3 See Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia <www.kpu.go.id> (18 August 2017).
same personal networks, these parties may have had direct relations with military organisations.

Mudde (1996) categorised militarist parties as being on the extreme right. This kind of party was prevalent during the interwar period when parties were usually primordially based – for example, the Kuomintang (Guomindang) in China (Radek 1932). The existence of extreme-right parties in democracies is strongly influenced by the political culture in a country, such as in Turkey (Dagi 2008) and Israel (Kimmerling 1993; Ben-Eliezer 1998). The vulnerability of regimes during political and military conflicts also contributes to the strengthening of militarism within political parties. In countries transitioning to democracy, however, militarism can be minimised to some degree by the presence of political actors who are capable of maintaining civilian control over politics. In situations where military actors have direct control over a political organisation, the inclusion of militarist values, doctrines, and organisations is more likely. In the Indonesian case the pivotal political actors were not active military but rather *purnawirawan* – a group that introduced the military mindset to political parties.

The democratisation period resulted in three phases of party development in which the *purnawirawan* played an important role (see Table 2). In phase I (1999–2004) *purnawirawan* established new highly militarist parties. However, none gained a significant amount of votes in the election. This was mainly due to the unfavourable political situation and strong public pressure emanating from the Reformasi movement. Another factor that affected the election was *purnawirawan* dominance at all levels of political parties’ central offices. Constituency bases were not widespread and only comprised military family members. Meanwhile, *purnawirawan* joining civilian-controlled parties found it easier to survive because their expertise made them valuable. In the period between 1998 and 2004 the PDIP heavily recruited members with military backgrounds, posting them to the parliamentary commission for defence and security.

In phase II the military’s role as a professional outfit under civilian control was confirmed, which was influenced by the military’s withdrawal from Parliament and the passing of Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI. *Purnawirawan* figures had learned from the failure of the highly militarist parties in the previous election and created a new party format which entailed substantial modifications to membership and party organisation. Before the 2004 and 2009 elections, the two main parties were the Democratic Party and Hanura (the original semi-militarist party). In those parties *purnawirawan* recruited civilian politicians to participate in the party establishment process. The combination of moderate military lead-
ership and the expansion of their constituency bases by civilian politicians saw these parties garner adequate support. Civilian politicians also had a proportionately larger share of seats on the executive board. In this phase *purnawirawan* who joined civilian-controlled parties no longer had strategic positions and their roles were significantly less influential. Their membership in parties like the PAN, the PKB, and the PPP declined sharply. They only survived in the PDIP and Golkar due to their relationship with the parties’ elites. Several *purnawirawan*-created parties also emerged during this phase, such as the Archipelago Republic Party (Partai Republika Nusantara, PRN) – which was established by Brigadier General (ret) Syarnubi and Brigadier General (ret) Husein Thaib – and the Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PDK), which was a political vehicle for lower-ranking *purnawirawan* who had previously held social and political functions in the TNI. Colonel (ret) Iyer Sudaryana was the PDK’s chairperson, while Colonel (ret) Bahar Mallarangan, Colonel (ret) Tasno HP, and Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Haryanto were all on the executive board (Lansford 2015). Neither the PRN nor the PDK saw their candidates elected to Parliament.

Phase III was marked by the establishment of Gerindra – a party which was attractive to *purnawirawan* and whose model of party organisation differed from those of the Democratic Party and Hanura. The main difference between Gerindra and its counterparts centred on the level of authority held by their respective boards of trustees. Both the Democratic Party and Hanura allocated board positions equally to *purnawirawan* and civilian politicians. Gerindra, however, gave full control of its board to *purnawirawan*, which were thus responsible for overseeing the implementation of party policy. Gerindra’s executive board, however, was predominantly filled by civilian politicians, with a few *purnawirawan* occupying lower positions. In the 2009 election Gerindra successfully passed the threshold and then opted to send only civilian politicians to the DPR. In the 2014 election the party’s vote share saw it go from being the lowest-ranked party to being the third-ranked party after the PDIP and Golkar.

Although Gerindra remains totally under the control of the advisory board, it is run by the executive board, which is dominated by civilian politicians. Between the 2007 and 2014 elections, Gerindra developed the new militarist-party model. The party passed an electoral threshold in the 2009 election and ensured it had representatives in Parliament. In the 2014 elections they won the third most votes behind PDIP and Golkar. In 2012 other semi-militarist parties (similar to Hanura) were established. These parties also had a large number of *purnawirawan* in their central
offices. One of these parties, the Nasdem Party (Nasional Demokrat), was founded by the former Golkar member, Surya Paloh, with the full support of General (ret) Endriartono Sutarto and Admiral (ret) Tedjo Edhi (The Jakarta Post 2014).

The Role of *Purnawirawan* in Party Development

The phases of party development discussed above resulted in the emergence of three types of political parties containing military-style organisation, military doctrines, and military networks. To examine the specific role and function of *purnawirawan* in party development and their contributions within their parties, I conduct an analysis of the PDIP and Golkar as representatives of the civilian party and compare them with the Democratic Party and Gerindra.

**Civilian Party: The PDIP and Golkar**

The PDIP and Golkar are the two major parties controlled by civilian politicians, even though Golkar was also formed during the New Order. Although the period of *purnawirawan* involvement varies, they can be described as loyal to their parties, especially in the PDIP. Theo Syafei was among those to serve as chairperson of the executive board and was also vice chairperson of the PDIP faction in the MPR from 1999 to 2004 (The Jakarta Post 1999). Another notable member who had close relations with the chairperson is General (ret) AM Hendropriyono. The civilian-controlled model in the PDIP was effective in selecting a *purnawirawan* network to occupy other strategic positions in the party’s central office. The selection of *purnawirawan* was carried out personally and centrally by the party chairperson. There did not appear to be any significant recruitment through ordinary channels or the party’s established personal network. This condition enabled the party’s civilian elite to maintain civilian supremacy in the party. In these parties, *purnawirawan* were strategically placed according to the party’s needs (e.g. access to networks, legislative and presidential election campaigns, etc.). Due to the difficulty in becoming part of the elite or party oligarchy, most *purnawirawan* saw the party as a political vehicle for getting nominated or winning elections.

*Purnawirawan* who did not occupy elite positions chose to accept leadership positions and other roles that enabled them to take advantage of party bodies, which had significant roles in organising the masses in their working areas as well as in the daily political structure of the execu-
tive board and party agency. In these roles, *purnawirawan* were responsible for empowering the party’s constituent base. To make coordination with the central office more efficient, the head of the party bodies also served as a party board member. Overall, it was not easy for low-level *purnawirawan* to achieve “mastery” of the party. They initially had to have a political investment in the party and then deal with influential civilian politicians in the long term.

The roles of *purnawirawan* newcomers in the PDIP are easier to trace. The first is a consultative role, which enables those within the party management at the central office to provide policy input to the chairperson. Theo Sjafei held such a role as chairperson of the Cadre and Organisation Division, which lays the foundations of the PDIP’s organising models. The second is a legislative role, which gives DPR members the opportunity to represent the DPR on the commissions concerned with defence and security, local government, and law and human rights. The PDIP placed a large number of *purnawirawan* in the DPR between 1999 and 2009.

The conditions in the PDIP differed greatly from those in Golkar, although the party was controlled by civilian politicians after 1998. The influence of *purnawirawan* in the party remained strong until 2005, but thereafter the civilian politicians from various party bodies and the political factions within led to the traditional role of the military in the party’s controlling body being replaced. Some military members, like Prabowo Subianto, only sat as members on the advisory board and had no authority to determine policies. The limited access to strategic positions resulted in significant levels of defection, especially to the Democratic Party.

In Golkar there was an unwritten convention that if the chairperson was a military member, the secretary general had to be a civilian and vice versa. This combination was used to maintain the support (i.e. votes) of military families (*Kompas* 2004). Although the leadership of Akbar Tanjung and Jusuf Kalla retained strategic places for the *purnawirawan* on the executive board, the presence of military members diminished. By the end, the positions of *purnawirawan* on the party board also came under increasing pressure from civilian politicians.

The traditional civilian–military combination in the Golkar leadership disappeared during Aburizal Bakrie’s stewardship in 2010. Notable *purnawirawan* – such as General (ret) Luhut Pandjaitan, Major General (ret) Albert Inkiriwang, and Major General (ret) Sugiono Kadarisman – were merely placed on boards and their influence within the party generally declined. Meanwhile, civilian politicians were more evenly split in the elite faction dominated by *purnawirawan*, and each civilian politician who
held a position in central office had a significant power base among the party’s supporters, party organs, and other supporting organisations. Unlike the PDIP, Golkar is not bound by an ideology. The party is relatively pragmatic, so purnawirawan can join and leave easily. Most purnawirawan sought nominations to public office, especially as members of Parliament. This pragmatism was evident following Golkar’s failure under Aburizal. Luhut Pandjaitan and Agus Widjojo got around 22 purnawirawan with the rank of general to declare their support for Widodo during the 2014 presidential election (Kompas 2014b); some even worked on Widodo and Jusuf Kalla’s successful campaign.

Purnawirawan had two types of role within Golkar. The first was a representative role for military exponents who, from 1998 to 2004, still overwhelmingly voted for Golkar. During this period, Akbar Tanjung – who became the party chairperson – put purnawirawan in strategic positions (central office, advisory board, and general secretary). The second was a discretionary role, which was exercised through parliamentary positions awarded to former members of the TNI and the police, who dominated the legislative process in the DPR. Having purnawirawan in these roles allowed Golkar to anticipate uneasy relations with military institutions.

Semi-Militarist Party: The Democratic Party

The Democratic Party was the product of the second phase of party development. It learned valuable lessons from the collapse of highly militarist parties, which were created during the 1998–2004 era. The Democratic Party established mutual relationships with civilians and cooperated with politicians, social activists, academics, businesspeople, and representatives of student organisations. During the preparation of the central office structure, civilian groups had the opportunity to nominate purnawirawan representatives for executive member positions within the party’s central office. This resulted in a high degree of civilian control over purnawirawan and impacted the balance of power within the organisation. This condition pushed the party to modify its core practice of strong military leadership and become more moderate. Under Colonel (ret) Hadi Utomo’s leadership from 2005 to 2010, purnawirawan controlled the advisory board but no longer dominated the party’s executive board (Democrat Party Structure List 2005–2010). This configuration made the party more open and able to accept democratic values and to affirm its commitment to achieving political objectives through constitutional mechanisms. The leadership combination of Hadi Utomo as chairperson and Marzuki Alie as general secretary greatly expanded the
party’s membership and culminated in success at the 2009 election. The involvement of *purnawirawan* proved critical, because military networks mobilised support for Yudhoyono’s campaign in 2009 – especially the Echo Team led by Marshal (ret) Djoko Suyanto (*Kompas* 2009).

The role of *purnawirawan* could be split into three functions. The first function was the role of party controller, which was executed through the position of party chief or general secretary. Although the party was seen as a solid political organisation internally, it remained sensitive to political changes in society because input from civilian politicians received serious attention. Moreover, civilian politicians had a strong bargaining position in the party. The second function was the distributional role, through which *purnawirawan* controlled the party, recruited new *purnawirawan* from their networks, and then launched them as candidates. The third function was the transformational role, which was used to instil the values of military organisation into the vision of the Democratic Party. However, this function was only effective during Hadi Utomo’s stewardship. Utomo expanded the network not only to include new political groups from across the political spectrum but also to previously established groups.

**Militarist Party: Gerindra Party**

Gerindra began creating its organisational structure with a view to winning a seat at the 2009 election. The advisory board was the highest authority in the party’s management structure. The executive board only implemented policies issued by the advisory board after gaining the mandate to run the party’s policy direction by the party congress. This was especially true after the extraordinary congress in September 2012, which created party policies that strengthened the position of the advisory board. The advisory board’s chairperson (Prabowo) and members consisted almost entirely of *purnawirawan* – among them was General (ret) Djoko Santoso, the former commander of the TNI. Meanwhile, the ranks of the executive board were largely controlled by civilian politicians and a small faction of *purnawirawan*, which included Vice Admiral (ret) Ferdinand Manengkei, a former member of the TNI/police parliamentary faction and a party body head, and Colonel (ret) Dalkijo as deputy general secretary.

Civilian politicians had no significant impact on the party’s major policies. The party’s management was mostly comprised of Prabowo loyalists in the army. The executive board had no control over the party bodies or party wings. Compared to the PDIP – in which the party bodies coordinated with party officials at each level – Gerindra was more
centralised. The party’s constitution confirmed that the bodies and party wings were established by the executive board to carry out certain tasks. As for the party wing, the member composition was determined by the central board leadership in charge of those wings (Gerindra Constitution Article 7). The patronage system was another significant factor within the party’s management structure, with a dominant leader meaning that the party was centrally managed; this created a party oligarchy that tended to ignore the principles of democracy.

Gerindra applied an organisational pattern that was similar to that of Golkar during the New Order. The highest authority was the chairperson of the advisory board, which is the supreme leadership council of the party according to the constitution. The advisory board has the authority to establish the constitutions of both the party and the party congress; to appoint the chairpersons of the executive board, the advisory board, and the board of experts; and to appoint cadres to public office until there is a recommended candidate for governor (Gerindra Constitution Article 19). Another party body is the party court (mahkamah partai), which is formed by the executive board. All personnel compositions for this court must be approved by the advisory board. *Purnawirawan* had a dominant role within the party structure during Prabowo’s tenure as chairperson. Lieutenant General (ret) Tohar Amin, the former commander of the presidential guard (*pasukan pengamanan presiden*), also occupied the strategic position of deputy chairperson of the executive board.

During the initial recruitment period until 2012, Prabowo preferred to recruit from the army, especially those who came from the special forces unit (*Kopassus*) and its primary combat unit (*Kostrad*). After the extraordinary congress of 2012, recruitment was conducted in a large-scale manner by including all military branches. Most *purnawirawan* who retired from military duty after 2004 were recruited as new party members. These included General (ret) Suharto, a former commander of the Marine Corps, and Admiral (ret) Mokhlas Sidik, former chief of the Eastern Fleet (*BeritaSatu* 2012) – both of whom were navy recruits who were placed on the advisory board. The expansion of the recruitment pool beyond the army made Gerindra a shelter to a large extent. The party also received a large number of defectors (particularly from military families) from other parties, such as the Democratic Party and Golkar.

*Purnawirawan* had two roles in Gerindra. The first was that of co-optation, whereby they dominated the party’s hierarchy structure and weakened the bargaining position of civilian politicians. The second was a distributional role, which was similar to that in the Democratic Party. After the 2014 election, *purnawirawan* began to be nominated as candi-
dates for the DPR legislature and for gubernatorial elections. The choice of *purnawirawan* for public office positions was a result of the party’s established system of distributing and arranging human resources. The distribution of public office nominations was followed by *purnawirawan* stewardship in party bodies, agencies, and party wings. Optimising the performance of the party through the party’s bodies and wings showed that Gerindra had the scope to extend and organise its constituency base to include many community groups.

The emergence of militarist parties during Indonesia’s democratisation after 1998 was influenced by the presence of the traditional leadership in the leader-centric parties, which survived by relying on the charisma of their leaders and had clear traditional constituencies – for example, the PDIP (nationalists) and the PKB (Sunni Muslims), both of which have a high degree of patronage. Mass parties that rely on charismatic leaders lack the capacity for good organisational management. Another factor that explains the emergence of militarist parties is the inclusion of *purnawirawan*, who brought the tradition of military organisation to party organisation. The combination of these two factors was present in various forms in each party. Militarist party models are also found in the Middle East (e.g. Lebanon’s Kataeb Party) and in Africa (e.g. South Africa’s ANC Party) (Lodge 2004). This type of party model generates loyal cadres. In the context of Indonesia’s democratisation, it is in high demand among emerging political parties and could easily be carried to extremes or lead to authoritarianism.

In the case of Indonesia, militarist party types have two characteristics specific to that country. First, party loyalty is built through political incentives. In the process of mobilising support for Yudhoyono during the presidential election, many *purnawirawan* were involved in the success team (*tim sukses*). They were given incentives, starting with being appointed to the central board. Most *purnawirawan* opted for a strategic position within a state enterprise or other state institutions (*Tempo* 2007). Second, militarist parties do not have clear social bases. Within such parties *purnawirawan* just carry out party programmes and promote them during elections. Militarist parties were organised to form a strategic sociopolitical and economic base without carefully screening their main support bases. The Democratic Party, for example, recruited from various interest groups, community organisations, professional organisations, and politicians and selected for its elite circle (*Tempo* 2008). The goal was to have an elite representative in various societal organisations. A practical consequence of this decision was that some members of the elite came from societal organisations and represented them within the party,
using their position as an opportunity to mobilise their organisation more easily.

The support of societal organisations was also achieved through party wings and by maximising control of the organs of special interest groups. For example, Gerindra created organs that could reach all existing social forces and also had direct contact with professional associations and religious organisations. This could be seen in its co-optation of the Indonesian Farmers Association, the largest farmers’ organisation in Indonesia. The party also benefited from co-opting other groups that had a large number of members in labour organisations. This process was more personalised in instances where the party elite exploited personal ties with leaders of labour groups (Kompas 2014a). Gerindra’s strategy was more effective than that adopted by the Democratic Party because Gerindra’s party wings and networks were well institutionalised. The votes it obtained from its socially and culturally broader constituency base contributed significantly to its strong electoral performance.

Conclusion

Democratic instruments enabled purnawirawan to join, set up, and manage political parties by incorporating militarist values and doctrines into party organisation. The existence of political channels for purnawirawan mitigated the risk of military-sponsored coups by providing retired military elites a route into politics. Their political participation within parties shows that, in the case of Indonesia, military reform can be accomplished through opening political channels for military retirees. However, the political parties that the purnawirawan founded had a high degree of militarism, which seriously impeded democratisation.

As this article has shown, purnawirawan proved to be a formidable political force: they had the ability to build political parties, manage internal conflicts, and win votes at elections. They also effectively exploited the vulnerability of civilian politicians, who had failed to build more accountable parties and properly manage internal conflicts. This study contributes to the discussion on how the success of democratic consolidation in post-authoritarian countries depends on civilian control of the military. The consolidation of civilian control became an essential prerequisite for the process of eliminating military influence in politics in Indonesia. Specifically, it enabled democratisation to run relatively safely without the threat of political conflicts escalating. Furthermore, purnawirawan were fully engaged in party development, contributing to its uniqueness. The thing that most stands out with regard to purnawirawan is
the flexibility they have exhibited in accepting and adapting to the political and social changes brought about by democratisation.

This study also contributes insights into the process of party development in new democracies. The phenomenon by which parties are established and survive elections cannot be separated from the role of political actors with military backgrounds and who had substantial control of politics during authoritarian periods. This occurrence contrasts with some related findings for Eastern Europe, which indicate that parties are driven by political actors and businesspeople. The main parties controlled by *purnawirawan* in Indonesia are managed by a strong element of militarism. Such parties tend to be vulnerable to becoming soft-authoritarian organisations. It is worth noting that militarist party models can be developed rapidly in order to influence democratisation and gain legislative seats.

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