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New Concerns, More Cooperation? How Non-Traditional Security Issues Affect Sino–Indian Relations

Sebastian BIBA

China and India are not just the world’s two most populous countries – since the turn of the millennium, they have also become two juggernauts driving much of the economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. Many believe the two countries are poised to become two of the leading players in the international arena in the future, possibly even doing away with Western predominance. However, while the two neighbours share multiple identities as great civilisations, developing countries, emerging economies, rising powers, and independent poles in a multipolar world, China and India have not been on particularly good terms with each other during most of the period since India’s independence from the British Empire in 1947 and the foundation of the People’s Republic of China two years later. In fact, after a brief phase of “purported friendship and ideological congruence around anti-imperialist foreign policy objectives” (Malone and Mukherjee 2010: 138) in the early 1950s, the relationship deteriorated sharply, resulting in a short border war in 1962. Ever since then, bilateral relations have been marked by uncertainty and occasional antagonism. During the Cold War, India aligned itself more closely with the Soviet Union, which itself had split from China within the international communist movement. Meanwhile, China developed ever-closer ties with Pakistan, the other half of the former British Raj, against which India has fought several wars. A rapprochement between China and India beginning during the Deng Xiaoping era from 1978 remained uneasy, due, for instance, to further border skirmishes in the 1980s and Indian nuclear tests in 1998. Today, and certainly as a result of past experience, the two countries still face unresolved territorial disputes, suspicions over each other’s military build-up and strategic intent, and growing rivalries with regard to regional influence and great-power relations. These difficulties are the most well-known aspect of Sino–Indian relations; they are rooted in so-called “traditional security” (TS) problems, consisting primarily of interstate military threats.
However, there is another aspect of the Sino–Indian security relationship, one that is less known but not necessarily less important, and that revolves around the notion of “non-traditional security” (NTS). In contrast to TS concerns, NTS problems are no longer military in nature and comprise a set of very diverse issue areas ranging, for example, from water and climate change to energy and finance to piracy and terrorism. This volume of the *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* explores some of those NTS issues that have more recently become increasingly significant in and for Sino–Indian relations. The overarching question driving the entire volume is rather straightforward: Do the rather new NTS issues echo the overall relatively grim picture and maybe even aggravate the tensions prevalent in the TS context of Sino–Indian relations, or do they instead open up avenues for enhanced cooperation between the two sides — cooperation which might even help alleviate some of the protracted TS problems and thus improve overall relations? In pursuing this question, this volume goes beyond purely bilateral dynamics. Much of the potential for conflict or cooperation between China and India in the NTS realm is increasingly taking place on the regional and global multilateral levels. This is also reflected in the individual contributions. The objective of this introductory article is threefold: First, it provides a conceptual umbrella for the contributions of this issue and some background on the field of NTS research; second, it gives an overview of some of the NTS issues that have been particularly relevant for Sino–Indian relations but are not covered by the individual contributions to this issue; and, third, it brings together the findings of the individual articles and formulates a few all-encompassing observations.

The remainder of this article is organised as follows: The next section expands on conceptual matters, discussing what exactly NTS is and how it can be delimited from TS. In doing so, this section also delves into the critical question of why, theoretically speaking, the existence of NTS problems between China and India could prove to be a means of sparking more cooperation between them. I then briefly introduce the major TS concerns and some of the NTS concerns prevalent in Sino–Indian relations. While the focus of this volume is on NTS issues, TS and NTS concerns are linked, as will become obvious; one cannot analyse NTS issues in a vacuum. Subsequently, a brief summary of each of the four contributions in this issue is pro-
vided. The final section carves out the commonalities of the individual articles’ key findings and draws a few additional conclusions.

Traditional and Non-Traditional Security: A Conceptual Overview

Any discussion of the differentiation between TS and NTS should probably start with a few remarks on the underlying core concept of security. What is security? As a matter of fact, this question already lies at the heart of all the conceptual ambiguities surrounding the term security and its derivative ideas. This is because “security is essentially contested” (Smith 2005: 27) and

there is, in short, no neutral place to stand to pronounce on the meaning of the concept of security, all definitions are theory-dependent, and all definitions reflect normative commitments. (Smith 2005: 28)

At the same time, however, it can also be argued that the meaning of security has become contested only during, and because of, the very developments and processes which have led scholars to speak today of different kinds of security such as TS and NTS.

Against this backdrop, we can describe how security used to be defined, and what is meant by what is now commonly referred to as TS. In its simplest form, and grounded in realist thinking, security used to be the absence, or at least the alleviation, of threats, with threats being possible developments that could be harmful if they were to occur someday in the future (see, for example, Williams 2008: 5). Two additional things were critical, though, with regard to this rather abstract understanding of security: First, the only threats recognised as such were military in nature. Accordingly, Bellamy has provided a well-known definition of security that labels it “a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur” (Bellamy 1981: 102). Second, and in correspondence with Bellamy’s war-based definition of security, military threats originated only from states and targeted other states. Military threats were then regarded as harmful to a state when they impinged on its survival or at least its physical safety – that is, when they encroached on its sovereignty or territorial integrity (Seidelmann 2011: 107–108). In sum, the old, or traditional, notion of
security was, and still is, framed in terms of national security, pivoting on state-to-state interactions on the one hand and military threats on the other.

Meanwhile, it was exactly these two pillars of this rather narrow conceptualisation of national security – military-centrism and state-centrism – that contained the seeds of critique of the TS concept and spurred its contested evolution. Two developments are particularly noteworthy – namely, (1) the broadening and (2) the deepening of the meaning of security (see, for example, Smith 2005: 29). Broadening refers to a position which has sought to expand the concept of security areas beyond the military dimension. The empirical origin of those conceptual considerations is linked to the rise in the West of economic and environmental agendas during the 1970s and 1980s. While the former were triggered by the oil shocks in 1973 and in 1979, which showed the West how vulnerable their economies were to interruptions in foreign energy supplies, the latter were finally brought to full attention by the Brundtland Report in 1987, which highlighted concerns of global ecological deterioration. In Asia, Japan coined the term “comprehensive security” in 1978 as a new policy framework and a pragmatic response to the problems of an increasingly complex international environment. The doctrine of comprehensive security embraced different functional areas of security (e.g. economic, military, and political) and defined security policy in terms of its various levels: domestic, bilateral, regional, and global (Dewitt 1994: 2–3). In the academic literature, security-related developments in the changing policy environment of the 1980s were first taken up in a comprehensive manner by Barry Buzan in his seminal 1983 book *People, States, and Fear*. The key move made by Buzan in his book was to broaden the security agenda by adding four additional sectors to the traditional military one. The new sectors were the political, economic, societal, and ecological security sectors.

Deepening implies opening up the issue of who the referent objects of security are, leading to a discussion of actors other than the state. Most prominent in terms of deepening the meaning of security in the aftermath of the Cold War was perhaps the emergence of the concept of human security, which shifted the reference object from the state to the individual. The human security concept rose to prominence in the debates following the United Nations Development Programme’s *Human Development Report 1994*. The report outlined
seven areas of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP 1994: 24–25). It also identified six main threats to human security: unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism (UNDP 1994: 34). In general, the shift away from the state as the referent object of security – a move which has been promoted throughout the more critical security studies literature – has to be seen as the questioning of the state’s image as a security provider for its people and, simultaneously, the acknowledgement of the possibility that the state can also be a source of insecurity for its own people (see, for example, Jones 1995: 310).

An excellent summary of the controversial debates about today’s “extended” concept of security comes from Rothschild and deserves to be quoted in full:

The extension takes four main forms. In the first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the second, it is extended from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. In the third operation, the concept of security is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different entities (such as individuals, nations, and “systems”) cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, therefore, from military, to political, economic, social, environmental, or “human” security. In the fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these “concepts of security”) is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to non-governmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market. (Rothschild 1995: 55)

What does all this tell us about the exact meaning of NTS, though? Is it simply that NTS is everything that TS is not? If that is the case, how can NTS be linked to and delimited from notions such as com-
prehensive security and human security? In Asia at least, “there is now a growing trend to highlight any security concern that is non-military in nature […] under the label of NTS” (Caballero-Anthony 2008: 508). On the one hand, this is exactly what opponents of an extended security concept have long feared and criticised. In the opinion of those critics, if the concept of security includes any threat, this not only dilutes the concern surrounding military threats, but also decreases the analytical utility of the concept so that it ultimately becomes meaningless (Seidelmann 2011). On the other hand, however, proponents of the concept of NTS have maintained that the appropriation of the security label for concerns other than military ones has been a significant development, in that security framing is seen as an effective way to bring attention to these NTS challenges, convey urgency, and command governmental resources to address them (Caballero-Anthony 2008: 509). Besides, the proponents highlight that NTS threats are proving to be more severe and more likely to cause more harm to a larger number of people than traditional threats of interstate wars and armed conflicts (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013: 1).

To help with the conceptualisation of NTS, the Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia has defined NTS issues as those that

challenge the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime. (Cited in Caballero-Anthony 2008: 510)

This definition provides a helpful indication of where to locate the notion of NTS among its related concepts. One way could be to regard NTS as a subset of comprehensive security that characteristically and primarily requires non-military responses to address security threats (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013: 5). However, comprehensive security has never dissociated itself from the state as the sole referent object of security, whereas the above definition of NTS speaks of peoples and states as possible referent objects. In fact, this is part of the reason why the concept of comprehensive security lost currency in Asia in the course of the 1990s (Caballero-Anthony 2008: 509). Another way of locating NTS could be to argue that while human security draws attention to a number of insecurities faced by individ-
uals and communities, NTS could in fact be the broader umbrella under which emerging threats facing states, individuals, and communities, all as objects of security, can be brought (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013: 5). In any case, the two key aspects in the definition of NTS are certainly as follows: First, the concept of NTS is fully in line with the broadening of the security concept, while it, significantly, basically excludes the military dimension (whereby issues such as terrorism and piracy certainly represent a conceptual grey area). Second, the concept of NTS also corresponds with the deepening of the meaning of security, while it is, in this regard, not so rigid as to reject the state as one of the possible referent objects. This is a particularly important finding when it comes to the Asian context, where the way countries’ governments view NTS has in fact remained largely state-centric.

Apart from their non-military nature, NTS problems share a few other essential characteristics: NTS threats tend to be (1) transnational in scope, (2) difficult to prevent, and (3) resistant to national solutions (Caballero-Anthony 2009: 310). They are also often interwoven and mutually influential. To be sure, however, the extent to which these common characteristics really reflect the features of every single NTS concern also depends on the question of what issues actually fall into the category of NTS. Consensus on an “objective” list of NTS issues has yet to be reached, though, as NTS issues are generally contextually defined (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013: 5). Therefore, the group of potential NTS concerns is not only very large, but also quite diverse. The issues listed in the above-cited definition of NTS clearly indicate this. As a result, some of the more specific features of two different NTS issues may vary from each other to a considerable extent.

Nevertheless, identifying a few common features is valuable in that it helps to further delimit NTS problems from TS concerns: Military TS problems are straightforwardly state-to-state – that is, international in terms of scope. From the perspective of one particular state, TS problems can therefore be prevented – for example, through deterrence – or they can be solved unilaterally, through military means. The more military power a state can accumulate, the more secure it will be. NTS concerns, in contrast, are commonly transnational in scope. That is to say, they are neither purely domestic nor purely interstate. Rather, they may emerge locally and then travel
across national borders. Moreover, due to their non-military and instead sociopolitical, socio-economic, or environmental nature, NTS issues are usually much harder to prevent than TS threats. Instead of preventative measures, they usually require mitigation and adaptation measures. Last, because of their transnational scope, NTS concerns cannot generally be resolved in a unilateral fashion. Rather, tackling NTS problems effectively requires cooperation, often in a regional and multilateral manner. Additionally, as NTS problems are non-military in nature, the solutions likewise tend to be non-military (apart from humanitarian aspects of military support) (also see Table 1).

Table 1. Comparison of Key Features of Traditional and Non-Traditional Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Security</th>
<th>Non-Traditional Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical foundations</td>
<td>Realism (and liberalism)</td>
<td>Critical approaches (e.g. Copenhagen School and Welsh School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of threat</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Non-military (e.g. sociopolitical, socio-economic, and environmental)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent object</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Community (may include states) and individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentive (What’s to gain/lose?)</td>
<td>Survival and physical safety of the state</td>
<td>See TS plus human survival, well-being, and dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Possible (e.g. deterrence)</td>
<td>Difficult; mitigation and adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution</td>
<td>Diplomatic and military; does not require cooperation</td>
<td>Non-military; requires cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This last point about the requirement for cooperation in order to solve NTS threats is a fundamental one, also with regard to the objective of this volume and its individual contributions. It is this point which lays the theoretical-conceptual foundation for arguing that states that share common NTS concerns tend to transform those concerns into a catalyst for new forms of cooperation between them, when then possibly even spill over into more traditional security
problems which are usually associated with an increased potential for conflict. In fact, similar arguments about NTS have been made in the Asian context several times. For example, Caballero-Anthony has contended that

as NTS issues increasingly define states’ security agendas, the emergence of new cooperative mechanisms and the recalibration of existing institutions to address these challenges are pushing regional actors for deeper institutional commitments, including the adoption of more rules-based regimes, to ensure more effective implementation of regional measures and to enhance security cooperation in East Asia. (Caballero-Anthony 2009: 307)

In a similar vein, Caballero-Anthony and Cook have emphasised, since many of [the NTS] challenges are transnational, states tend to draw closer and establish institutional and procedural arrangements to respond to what are often complex security challenges. As a consequence, there is a noticeable trend among state and non-state actors [in East Asia] to turn to regional and multilevel relationships as a preferred framework to respond to trans-border and non-traditional security problems. (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013: 2)

Even concerning the very tricky international relations context in Northeast Asia, featuring various complex security relations between the key players of China, Japan, and the two Koreas, Cui has held that

NTS cooperation has already emerged as an important element in Northeast Asian regional cooperation since the mid-1990s. In the processes some new norms, institutions and patterns of behaviour are starting to appear, gradually altering its character and promoting the emergence of a collective identity that is conducive to regional integration. (Cui 2013: 869)

The question is whether similar trends can also be witnessed between China and India. Before looking into this matter, however, it is useful to call to mind what TS problems exist in the Sino–Indian relationship.
Traditional Security Problems in Sino–Indian Relations – A Brief Outline

It is conspicuous that observers of Sino–Indian relations unanimously come to the conclusion that the bilateral relationship between these two rising powers has, at its core, been plagued by mutual suspicion and a lack of trust. The root cause of this – and here again, there is hardly any disagreement – has been the long-standing border dispute between China and India in the Himalayas. While a Line of Actual Control (LAC) demarcates an effective border, in the disputed western border sector this line runs along the southern part of the Aksai Chin region, which is controlled by China but claimed by India. In addition to these approximately 38,000 square kilometres in Aksai Chin, Pakistan ceded some 5,000 square kilometres of Indian-claimed territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China under the so-called China–Pakistan “Boundary Agreement” of 1963. Conversely, in the disputed eastern sector, the LAC runs along the northern part of the Indian state Arunachal Pradesh, which is not recognised by China, as Beijing itself claims some 90,000 square kilometres of Indian territory in this area (Global Security 2016). The LAC was informally delineated after the 1962 Sino–Indian border war and then officially accepted in a bilateral agreement in 1993. However, the LAC remains ill-defined due to different perceptions of the demarcation, and the countries have yet to agree on an official boundary (Southerland, Koch-Weser, and Zhang 2014: 3). Ever since 1962, the border areas between China and India have witnessed repeated low-level confrontations such as military standoffs and temporary border crossings. This has happened alongside various cautious attempts at border management and confidence building. A primary reason that a final solution has not yet been reached seems to be related to the intractability of the issue, which has only strengthened fundamental mutual distrust. Also, domestic politics, including heightened nationalism and rabble-rousing media coverage on both sides, has prevented either side from making any concessions (Global Security 2016). In fact, both China and India seem to be hardening their positions along the border, as both sides have of late ramped up their infrastructure projects in border regions (Bajpaee 2015: 112).

What is more, the unresolved border issue relates to two other thorns in Sino–Indian relations – namely, Tibet and Pakistan. Tibet,
to begin with, has actually been a factor in the China–India relation-
ship since even before the 1962 border war. Following China’s occu-
pation of Tibet in the early 1950s and the escape of the 14th Dalai
Lama, Tibet’s political and spiritual leader, from Tibet to India in
1959 to avoid Beijing’s crackdown on a popular armed revolt against
Chinese rule in Lhasa, the Tibet issue has repeatedly created tensions
between India and China. For one thing, China fears India could take
advantage of the presence of the Dalai Lama and the large Tibetan
refugee population in India and try to foment unrest in Tibet. In
addition, the future successor of the 81-year-old Dalai Lama has the
potential to complicate China–India relations. This is because while
the Dalai Lama has suggested that he might nominate his successor
and that he might not even have one, the Chinese side has maintained
that only Beijing has the power to select the Dalai Lama. Additionally,
Beijing is concerned that the death of the 14th Dalai Lama might
pave the way for the rise of a new generation of more radical Tibetan
leaders who will embrace less conciliatory positions towards the Chi-
inese government. Together with the rekindled instability in ethnically
Tibetan areas since 2008, all of this has impelled China to reaffirm its
sovereignty over the Tibet Autonomous Region and to adopt a more
rigorous position regarding its claim to Arunachal Pradesh (Bajpaee
2015: 113; Southerland, Koch-Weser, and Zhang 2014: 8).

Pakistan has also constituted a long-time irritant in Sino–Indian
relations. With regard to the border dispute, this is reflected in the
fact that Chinese infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kash-
mir indicate the implicit Chinese acceptance of Pakistan’s claim to the
territory, which is disputed with India. This interpretation was con-
solidated by the conclusion of an agreement in April 2015 to launch
the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, parts of which also run
through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Bajpaee 2015: 113). However,
this is not the only problem Pakistan represents for the China–India
relationship. Speaking more generally, India’s bitter rivalry with Paki-
stan has long rendered China’s coincident all-weather friendship with
Pakistan, which began in the 1950s, a source of tension between Chi-
na and India. While China and Pakistan’s bilateral relationship serves
each country as a means of strategic and military balancing against
India, China’s strong ties with Pakistan speak to Indian fears that
China is seeking to encircle India. India is particularly worried about
China’s support for Pakistan’s military through arms sales and tech-
nology transfers. China is not only Pakistan’s top source of arms imports in general, it also seems to have played a crucial role in Pakistan’s attainment of nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles in particular (Southerland, Koch-Weser, and Zhang 2014: 7).

Some of the dynamics involved in Chinese–Indian–Pakistani triangular relations are also emblematic of another overarching issue in the China–India relationship – apart from the border dispute and the related concerns. This issue could be summarised as emerging-great-power rivalry and geostrategic competition, taking place primarily on the regional level. One key expression of this trend is the fact that both sides have established a growing presence along each other’s peripheries. China has in recent years continuously strengthened its economic and political ties with several of India’s direct neighbours, such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. This has resulted in India’s perception that it is being increasingly encircled by China. However, India has likewise reached out to and deepened its relationships with Vietnam and Japan, both of which are China’s traditional regional adversaries. In addition, India has for strategic reasons tilted closer to the United States in order to balance China’s rise, thereby striking a nerve in Beijing (Bajpae 2015: 117).

Generally speaking, China and India’s vying for regional influence can be witnessed in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. The most prominent arena, however, where Sino–Indian regional competition has played out so far is probably the maritime domain covering the Indo-Pacific region. The region provides sea trade routes connecting Africa and the Middle East with South Asia and the broader Asian continent to the east and is home to a number of the world’s most important strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. In order to protect their overseas interests so as to maintain economic growth at home and increase national power, both China and India have accelerated the expansion of their navies and enhanced their naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific region. On the one hand, while India sees itself as the natural predominant power in the Indian Ocean, China is regarded by many Indians to be setting up a so-called “String of Pearls” in India’s immediate coastal neighbourhood, which implies that Beijing has sought to secure ports or places where its military forces could set up naval facilities or, at the very least, refuelling and repair stations. On the other hand, as part of its Act East Policy, India has more
recently dispatched vessels to the disputed waters in the South China Sea and supported US calls for freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes, thereby rattling China’s cage (Albert 2016).

In sum, then, the Sino–Indian relationship is fraught with several intractable security problems featuring TS characteristics. These problems hold high potential for conflict between China and India and have made bilateral relations not only complicated, but also volatile.

Non-Traditional Security in Sino–Indian Relations – A Selection of Issues

Just as Sino–Indian relations continue to be troubled by several protracted TS problems with a high potential for conflict, the relationship between the two countries is also increasingly characterised by a host of common NTS issues. These might promote enhanced Sino–Indian cooperation and thus potentially help overcome mutual distrust, thereby having a positive effect on the long-standing TS threats. The contributions to this volume delve into NTS matters such as economic and financial issues, piracy, and religion in the form of Buddhism (see also the next section). The following selection of NTS concerns in Sino–Indian relations therefore focuses on a few noteworthy issue areas not tackled specifically by the individual articles of this volume. These are the water–food–energy nexus, climate change, and terrorism.

To begin with, water, food and energy resources cannot be separated from each other, as freshwater resources are essential for producing food and energy, while energy is needed to move, distribute, and treat water as well as to grow food. This is what has in recent years been described as a nexus between these resources (WEF 2011). However, the declining availability of freshwater resources is of grave concern for both China and India. In the period from 1962 to 2014, the yearly amount of total renewable water resources in China and India has decreased from 4,175 and 4,083 cubic metres per person to 2,018 and 1,458 cubic metres per person, respectively (FAO 2016). As a result, China has already come quite close to the official United Nations threshold for “water stress,” which stands at 1,700 cubic metres per inhabitant annually, while India has even dropped below it. However, such figures still hide the real extent of water shortages
in both countries. Together, China and India are home to 37 per cent of the world’s population but have less than 11 per cent of global freshwater resources at their disposal (Chellaney 2011: 4). The Chinese government has classified nearly half of its 600 largest cities as being short of water. The annual urban freshwater shortage is estimated at 5–6 billion cubic metres, while irrigated areas are experiencing shortages of 30–35 billion cubic metres per year. Meanwhile, water use in China has been surging, with urban and industrial demand growing at respective annual rates of 10.1 and 5.4 per cent. On top of that, more than 75 per cent of the river water running through urban areas is considered unsuitable for drinking or fishing, and approximately 30 per cent of the river water throughout the country is deemed to be unfit for use in agriculture or industry (Biba 2016: 54). Similarly, in India, 22 of the 32 major cities face daily water shortages, with gaps between demand and supply reaching up to 70 per cent (Times of India 2013). Additionally, an alarming 80 per cent of India’s surface water is polluted (Times of India 2015). Both China and India are also extracting groundwater much more quickly than it can be replenished, China by 25 per cent and India by 56 per cent (WEF 2011: 9).

What is more, while water availability in China and India has decreased sharply, the food demand in the two countries has risen enormously, resulting in even greater demand for water resources. It takes about 10 times more water to raise a kilogram of beef than to grow a kilogram of rice or wheat, and China’s meat consumption has increased fourfold since the 1980s and is anticipated to double again by 2030. India’s grain demand is projected to total between 382 and over 450 million tons by 2050; the current demand only amounts to 234 million tons (Biba 2016: 56). Meanwhile, China and India regard self-sufficiency in grain production, together with affordable rice or wheat for their large populations, as a strategic priority in order to guarantee social and political stability domestically. Today, China and India alone produce and consume approximately half of the world’s entire rice supply (Chellaney 2011: 34). As a result, and also because of largely inefficient irrigation practices, an incredible 91 per cent of India’s water withdrawal is for agriculture. In China, this figure stands at above 70 per cent (Chellaney 2011: 200).

The picture has hardly been different with regard to energy. China’s total primary energy consumption has more than quadrupled
since 1980, and India’s has more than doubled since 1990. According to projections, the two countries will account for approximately half of global energy demand growth up to 2040. Against this backdrop, and given both countries’ current dependence on oil imports, it seems natural that both countries should be seeking to diversify their energy mixes, especially by raising the percentage of renewable energy resources in their portfolios. One key component in this regard is hydropower development. China has set the goal of producing at least 15 per cent of its overall energy from renewables, mostly hydropower, by 2020. In 2010, it ranked number one worldwide in terms of its share of hydroelectricity consumption, at some 21 per cent. In 2012, hydropower accounted for 22 per cent of China’s installed electricity capacity. Likewise, India has also sought to increase its hydropower potential, only 29 per cent of which is currently developed. India was the seventh-largest producer globally of hydroelectric power in 2012, and hydropower is the second-largest source of electricity in the country (Biba 2016: 55).

While both China and India thus exhibit very similar domestic trends regarding the supply of and demand for their water, food, and energy resources, the question is still what makes these trends an element of their bilateral relationship. Two related things make this link rather plain: First, water is the gossamer in the nexus with food and energy, playing a key role. Second, China and India share several rivers, including major watercourses such as the Brahmaputra, Indus, and Sutlej. China’s and India’s fates are therefore tied together to some extent when it comes to fresh water. However, in all of their shared rivers, China is upstream and India downstream, which thereby creates an asymmetric relationship. To a large extent, this constellation explains why India has a relatively high water dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of incoming water to total renewable water resources) of approximately 30 per cent, with most of the water flowing into the country from China (Biba 2014: 24). Meanwhile, the Brahmaputra alone, as the most important shared river between China and India, accounts for 29 per cent of the total run-off of India’s rivers, and of India’s total hydropower potential, roughly 44 per cent lies in the Brahmaputra basin (Biba 2014: 37). All of this illustrates nicely that water resources – and with them food and energy resources – are a prime NTS concern in Sino–Indian relations.
Any consideration of decreasing water resources is not far removed from issues of climate change. As a matter of fact, climate change has been identified as one of the critical global trends impacting, often adversely, the water–food–energy nexus (SEI 2011). For the China–India dyad, climate change plays a considerable role in two regards: The first is the global theatre. China and India are, respectively, the world’s largest and third-largest greenhouse gas emitters. This implies that all necessary global efforts for climate change mitigation cannot succeed without the positive contribution of both China and India. However, under the current international climate change regime, the Kyoto Protocol, China and India have been in the group of so-called “Annex II Countries” (i.e. developing countries), which are exempt from any legally binding obligations to reduce emissions (Wu 2012: 827–828). This has long resulted in international pressure on China and India to accept legally binding reduction targets. Very recently, both countries signed and ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement, the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol which is meant to govern emission reductions from 2020 on. The second way climate change plays a role is in terms of the regional theatre. Here, the issue mainly revolves around climate change on the “Third Pole” (i.e. the Himalayas), which covers parts of both China and India. Because of its extremely high elevation, this region is warming faster and earlier than the surrounding lowlands. Over the last three decades, the average temperature on the plateau has increased by 1 degree Celsius, and predictions show a likely further rise of 2.0 to 2.6 degrees Celsius by 2050 (Morton 2011: 121). The consequences for the countries in the region, including China and India, will be dire. Estimates have suggested that one-third of Himalayan glaciers could be gone by 2050, and two-thirds by 2100. However, the gigantic glaciers on the Third Pole feed rivers which collectively supply most of the water for China and India’s large populations. Over the short to medium term, higher temperatures will increase flooding in the rainy seasons and reduce water in the dry seasons. Eventually, water shortages are likely to occur on a massive scale (Biba 2016: 57). Morton has suggested, in summary, that

the retreat of the glaciers [in the Himalayas] is likely to have dramatic adverse effects on biodiversity, people and livelihoods in East, South, and Southeast Asia, with long-term implications for water, food and energy security. […] Glacial melt also triggers a
higher incidence of natural disasters – landslides, flooding and glacial-lake outbursts – that can, in turn, lead to internal displacement and the destruction of critical infrastructure. (Morton 2011: 123–124)

A final NTS issue, which is also a critical part of bilateral relations between China and India, is terrorism. Just as China and India are both faced with the negative implications of climate change, neither country is immune to terrorism. On the one hand, both countries are grappling with the issue of domestic terrorism. For China, this primarily relates to the fight against “terrorism intended for separatism” (Hao and Liu 2012: 208) in its western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In particular, the Chinese government has accused the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) of being responsible for repeated violent terrorist incidents, carried out in hopes of gaining independence from Beijing (Hao and Liu 2012). In India, the picture has been more complex, with different kinds of terrorist movements being active at different times and in different places (SATP 2016a). Recently, though, secessionist terrorism in the Jammu and Kashmir regions has been seen as the most prominent threat (SATP 2016b). Also, this kind of terrorism has often been said to be sponsored by the Pakistani state, including the latest terrorist attack on 19 September this year (Huffington Post 2016). Consequently, on the other hand, there is the issue of inter- or transnational terrorism. This variant is also what makes terrorism a common NTS concern for China and India. More precisely, it is the fear in both countries that domestic terrorism could establish links to, and gain strength from, regional and global terrorist networks in order to jointly destabilise China’s and India’s peripheries. Several neighbouring countries of China and India, especially Pakistan, Afghanistan, and some Central Asian republics, suffer from grave political instabilities and are home to various radical Islamic groupings with close cultural and ideological ties to terrorist movements in China and India. China, for instance, has previously claimed that ETIM maintains relations with Al-Qaeda. Beijing’s plans to revive the ancient Silk Road across Eurasia, through the dangerous territories of its western neighbours, will only expose China to more risk, as a suicide attack in August this year on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, demonstrated (Beech 2016).

The question of how much China and India have actually lived up to the potential for enhanced cooperation inherent in all these
common NTS concerns is answered below, following a summary of
the individual contributions to this volume, the findings of which are
also incorporated into the final analysis.

Summary of Individual Contributions

Each article in this volume provides a fascinating and (largely) empir-
ical case study of one or more of the specific NTS concerns affecting
the Sino–Indian relationship at the regional or global level, either
bilaterally or multilaterally. As NTS issues in China–India relations
tend to be under-researched, each contribution brings to light new
and exciting facets of this important dyad. While their methodological
and conceptual approaches may differ, all articles in this volume ana-
lyse the question of whether NTS concerns have led to heightened
competition or, rather, have driven increased cooperation between
China and India. The following brief summaries of the individual
contributions capture some elements of this question, but in no way
do justice to the actual empirical and analytical richness of each article.

In his contribution, Jingdong Yuan explores the economics–
security nexus in China–India relations and asks, among other things,
how and to what extent economic interdependence has had a positive
effect on security and, thus, been conducive to improving overall
bilateral relations. His findings paint a highly ambiguous picture. On
the one hand, bilateral trade ties have grown substantially since the
1980s, with much more potential for further growth. On the other
hand, though, India complains about the permanent and worsening
trade deficit with China as well as about the composition of traded
goods, whereby India largely exports raw materials and imports mostly
manufactured items. Additionally, the bilateral investment level
remains low, often due to market access restrictions. Similar ambigui-
ties exist on the multilateral level vis-à-vis the subregional economic
cooperation through the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Eco-
nomic Corridor (BCIM-EC). On the one hand, if the BCIM-EC
could eventually gain more momentum, it would most certainly allow
the four countries to exploit and benefit from the existing comple-
mentarity in their respective natural endowments – especially in ener-
gy, transport, and trade. On the other hand, however, India fears
China’s likely domination of the mechanism. Moreover, such con-
cerns have been aggravated by suspicions over Beijing’s grand Mari-
time Silk Road plans, which have sometimes been interpreted in New Delhi as the economic variant of China’s String of Pearls scheme. Recognising these complexities, Yuan concludes that possible win-win scenarios based on economic interdependence have yet to materialise, while economic ties between China and India remain as competitive as they are complementary. As a key reason for this dichotomous economic relationship, Yuan sees strategic mistrust nurtured by thorny TS issues such as the unresolved border dispute.

In Asif Farooq and Andrew Cooper’s article, the focus on NTS in Sino-Indian relations is often more implicit, with considerations about financial security resonating mostly in the background. The primary objective of the piece is to elaborate on China’s and India’s respective approaches to the G20 and BRICS, and to thereby assess the countries’ commonalities and the extent to which they pursue competitive behaviour in these two multilateral fora on the transregional (BRICS) and global (G20) levels. Whereas one might assume that this bigger frame would contain bilateral rivalry between China and India, Farooq and Cooper’s findings suggest that in reality things are more complicated. In the case of the New Development Bank, both China and India have tried to gain the upper hand and put the other side on the defence by making proposals that would further their own political interests, thus indicating a combination of hedging and status-seeking behaviour. Furthermore, while India has been circumspect in stimulating any shift within BRICS towards a greater security orientation, China has embraced some initiatives towards an NTS agenda beyond financial security, especially by linking the economic agenda driven by BRICS and the security agenda (including energy and terrorism) driven by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). When it comes to the G20, the different Chinese and Indian priorities are likewise pronounced. Whereas China has turned into a much more active and adaptive player, India has remained in catch-up mode, with its focus on a backward-looking agenda privileging the United Nations and a development model emphasising solidarity between India and the Global South. As a result, according to Farooq and Cooper, there is a lack of any meaningful mutual cooperation between China and India in influencing the G20.

Olivia Gippner’s article returns to the Asian regional theatre and examines questions of maritime security in the Indian Ocean and its major sea lanes through the prism of anti-piracy cooperation between
China and India. More precisely, Gippner poses the question of whether the Gulf of Aden and the broader Indian Ocean, where pirate activities threaten vital shipping routes for both China and India, will emerge as an area of cooperation or competition between Beijing and New Delhi. Conceptually, the article frames anti-piracy activities as a low-risk NTS issue on which collective action can create a platform for confidence-building measures in great-power relations. The idea behind such measures is that more interaction, during which countries expose their naval capabilities in a cooperative manner, increases transparency and thus promotes trust and confidence between the two adversaries. With regard to the success of this idea, however, the article arrives at the conclusion that anti-piracy efforts have in effect functioned as a platform for both cooperation and competition between China and India. On the one hand, joint training exercises and both countries’ participation in multilateral mechanisms (together with NATO and the European Union) have symbolised a certain rapprochement between Beijing and New Delhi. On the other hand, however, India continues to feel threatened by the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. Put differently, anti-piracy cooperation involving Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean is perceived by India as an invasion of its area of dominance. Anti-piracy cooperation therefore concomitantly amplifies Indian concerns over a Chinese encirclement strategy. Consequently, according to the article, there remain obvious limits to what could be a win-win situation.

Last but not least, David Scott turns our attention to a frequently underestimated NTS concern – namely, religion. More specifically, Scott’s piece dissects the role currently played by Buddhism as a public/cultural diplomacy tool for both China and India to conduct bilateral relations with each other as well as to increase their respective soft-power resources in their bilateral relations with third countries. Scott’s findings are very straightforward, and yet ambiguous. Buddhism has, to some extent, served as a bridge in the Sino–Indian relationship. For both countries, Buddhism constitutes an important source of nation branding, as India can claim to be the birthplace of Buddhism, while China has long had the biggest number of Buddhist adherents. In their bilateral relationship, Buddhism is used to emphasise the historical cultural linkages between the two countries; the religion’s peaceful character has been invoked by officials on both
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sides as a model for the contemporary relationship. However, Buddhism has actually engendered greater competition between China and India. Divisions are particularly deep over Tibetan Buddhism. Here, Buddhism affects the moral legitimacy and ongoing insecurity of China’s political control over Tibet, as China remains hypersensitive to foreign influence because of worries that its security grip on Tibetan Buddhism might be weakened. Moreover, competitive features are also noticeable in Sino–Indian conduct with third countries, as both China and India have resorted to Buddhism in order to influence countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. According to Scott, the historical geocultural setting of Chinese-shaped Buddhism versus Indian-shaped Buddhism echoes the present geopolitics of regional competition between Beijing and New Delhi.

Overall Findings

As Cui has argued,

in a region where historical animosities remain high, NTS issues can avoid sensitive areas and find common ground for cooperation that traditional security approaches would be unable to envisage. Thus against a background of longstanding and deep-rooted distrust and sensitivities in traditional security areas, by identifying a functional area of cooperation NTS provide[s] an important desecuritising mechanism to reduce and calm regional tensions arising from history and territorial disputes. (Cui 2013: 886)

However, this assessment seems to not apply to the case of Sino–Indian relations. As the four individual articles in this volume have maintained, each shared NTS issue under analysis certainly has the potential for enhanced cooperation between China and India. Also, the articles have found that some of this potential has in effect been transformed into actual cooperative behaviour between both sides. At the same time, though, the individual contributions agree that the competitive features of the various NTS areas scrutinised in this volume have been prevalent and essentially more significant than the cooperative elements.

What is more, if we return to the other NTS concerns outlined previously in this introduction, the account of the water–food–energy nexus, climate change, and terrorism, though it must remain superficial at this point, seems to corroborate the findings in the four indi-
vidual articles. Water was identified above as the gossamer in the water–food–energy nexus. However, it is above all the field of joint water-resources management where China and India have made the least progress to date. The cooperation on this front has been modest. For example, both sides have in the past inked and renewed memoranda of understanding on the sharing of hydrological data on some of their major shared rivers. Moreover, in 2006, a bilateral expert-level mechanism was established, and has since been a platform to discuss issues such as data provision and emergency management vis-à-vis the transboundary rivers (Ho 2016: 190). But China and India have not made any headway on more sensitive issues of joint water-resources management, particularly water allocation. This situation has led two contributors (one Indian, one Chinese) to a recently edited book on current Sino–Indian relations to reach the following sobering conclusions: “water has emerged as a contentious issue between India and China” (Sinha 2016: 167) and

the lack of a comprehensive framework between China and India
for managing their shared water resources is a source of instability
in Sino-Indian relations. (Ho 2016: 182)

It goes without saying that at least to some extent the China–India water rivalry has also negatively affected cooperation on food production and renewable energy. In particular, large-scale dam building in major shared river basins has resulted in food-versus-energy tensions (Biba 2016: 59–61).

China and India’s water rivalry has furthermore had an adverse impact on the joint fight against climate change in the Himalayas. As climate change in the Himalayas is particularly linked to glacial melting, there is increasing uncertainty about the future regional water system. This, however, seems to have aggravated zero-sum thinking on water, rather than having attenuated it (Wirsing, Stoll, and Jasparro 2013: 42). At the international level, to be sure, both sides certainly have a record of cooperation on climate change that is more decent than in most other NTS areas. Nevertheless, as Bajpaee has argued,

notwithstanding the Joint Statement on Climate Change that was concluded between China and India in May 2015, there is a growing divergence between China and India on climate policies […]. The fact that both countries are at different stages of development has prompted this divergence of climate policies. (Bajpaee 2015: 111)
On the issue of counterterrorism, China and India have held an annual dialogue since 2002. While this dialogue did not yield any tangible results for many years, some progress was made on Afghanistan in connection with the drawdown of Western forces in 2014. Both Beijing and New Delhi have emphasised the need for peace and stability in Afghanistan in order to contain the spread of Islamic terrorism in the region. Both sides have also agreed that a regional counterterrorism approach, through the SCO, is necessary. However, the obstacles to such cooperation between China and India remain high. As Pant (2013) has stated, the road to stability in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan, and China has few incentives to challenge the Pakistani security establishment’s traditional adversarial mindset vis-à-vis India.

As a result, the overall picture regarding shared NTS concerns between China and India to a large extent echoes the situation in the TS realm: competition is pronounced and conflict possible, while cooperation can hardly leave its mark in any considerable and sustained way. This is true not only for the purely bilateral relationship between Beijing and New Delhi, but also in multilateral venues including subregional organisations such as the SCO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as well as broader fora such as BRICS and the G20: “the China-India polygonal engagement […] is a statement of strategic opposition and rivalry rather than any pretence at real multilateral collaboration” (Panda 2013: 670). For the time being at least, the findings of this volume therefore also preclude hopes that NTS might have a noticeable positive effect on the protracted TS issues plaguing China–India relations.

When we speculate on the reasons for the failure of NTS problems to spur (markedly) enhanced cooperation and mitigate TS tensions in the Sino–Indian dyad, the specific and very close linkage between TS and NTS issues as far as relations between Beijing and New Delhi are concerned comes to mind. More precisely, what can be witnessed in all empirical analyses, and what has also been implicit in the individual articles, is a kind of “overlay” of TS threats over (most) NTS concerns in China–India relations. For example, water-resources management, including hydropower development, in shared transboundary river basins is overlaid by the unresolved boundary issues; the shared Buddhist culture is overlaid by existing territorial
disputes in connection with Tibet as well as by great-power rivalries in third countries; joint anti-terrorism efforts are overlaid by the complex and divisive “Pakistan factor,” with further links to nuclear proliferation issues; and cooperative anti-piracy initiatives are overlaid by simmering geostrategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. As regards economic issues, the fact that trade and investment are hugely imbalanced underpins images of rivalry and competition in the TS sector as well as general perceptions of mistrust. As TS threats obviously continue to carry much more weight in Sino-Indian relations than do NTS problems, it seems that the former stifle cooperation on the latter. NTS therefore needs to be delinked from TS. This would mean that NTS concerns could, as a first step, better live up to their undoubted potential of promoting enhanced and more sustained cooperation between China and India and, as a second step, possibly even contribute to building trust between both sides. This, in turn, would be conducive to reducing the two countries’ long-standing TS problems. In practice, however, such a delinking process appears difficult to implement for the time being.

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