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The Cart before the Horse: The Perils of State-Led Metropolisation in Russia

NADIR KINOSSIAN

Abstract
In sharp contrast to Soviet urban planning doctrines, which aimed to contain the growth of large cities, contemporary Russian planners do the opposite – promote urban growth by merging municipalities into “urban agglomerations”. While the economic effects of agglomeration and concentration have been studied extensively, the politics and policy of metropolitan government have attracted less attention, especially in non-Western contexts. Using the current debates on city-regionalism and metropolisation, this paper examines state-led metropolisation in Russia. It concludes: i) metropolisation in Russia is promoted by the federal government; ii) case studies of the Siberian cities Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk show that the emerging form of metropolitan governance is weak and unstable; iii) state-led metropolisation is problematic because accelerated growth of selected metropolitan areas can further exacerbate existing disparities within the already spatially polarised country.

Metropolisation; urban governance; city-regionalism; spatial planning, Russia

Zusammenfassung
Die Kutsche vor dem Pferd: Gefahren staatlich bestimmter Metropolisierung in Russland

Metropolisierung; Stadtverwaltung; Stadt-Regionalismus; Raumplanung; Russland
Introduction
Urban agglomerations, metropolitan regions, and “global city-regions” have attracted growing attention within the current debates in spatial science, economic analysis, and regional development studies (see Katz and Bradley 2015; Fujita and Thisse 2013; Moretti 2013). City-centric narratives of economic development praise large cities as centres of technological innovation, prosperity, and economic productivity (Glaeser 2011; Van Agtmael and Bakker 2016). Analysis of agglomeration economy informs regional development models and planning strategies, not least because large city-regions are viewed by policymakers as “engines” of national economies (Ahlqvist and Moisio 2014). Globalisation and the shift from the Keynesian state to the competitive state have transformed the traditional hierarchies of state spaces through “state-rescaling”, and prioritised territories that play a key role in the accumulation and exchange of capital (Brenner 2004).

In the post-socialist context, global urbanisation trends resonate with transitions to a market economy and with struggles to connect national economies with global flows of capital, goods, and people. The perceived need to position Russian cities within global ranks has led to a series of state-sponsored urban mega-projects, including the Maritime façade of St. Petersburg, the 2014 Sochi Olympics, and the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok – largely symbolic projects designed for external audiences (Golubchikov 2010; Müller 2011; Ortung and Zhemukhov 2014; Peterson et al. 2017; Trimbull 2014). To stimulate economic growth and structurally rebalance the Russian economy, the Russian Government introduced the idea of turning a selected number of cities into metropolitan regions. It is believed that new metropolitan regions (often created by “merging” several municipalities) would become new “engines” of growth for the national economy.

Using the current debates, this article searches for a more nuanced understanding of metropolisation by focusing on the political and policy dimensions of the process. The findings help explain the spatiality of the Russian state by addressing the following research question: How does metropolisation initiated by the federal government unfold locally? This question leads to the following sub-questions: What are (1) the origins and actors of metropolisation; (2) the local politico-institutional arrangements; and (3) the broader spatial implications of metropolisation policies?

This study presents two case studies from the Siberian cities of Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk, which were selected because they are representative of large Russian cities engaged in the process of forming closer links with their adjacent municipalities. Although both projects demonstrate very modest achievements, they offer insights into the politics of metropolisation and the role of actors in the policy-making process. The article employs various data sources, including nationwide planning documents, local plans and strategies, media sources, and census data to analyse the policy-making process and evaluate the implications of metropolisation in a country already experiencing high spatial polarisation. Meetings with local planners, government officials, and politicians during two visits to Krasnoyarsk in 2008 and 2009, and two visits to Novosibirsk (both in 2013) have contributed to the understanding of local conditions and political constellations.

The paper is organised as follows. The following section discusses the theoretical aspects of metropolisation, emphasising the political and policy aspects. Section 3 outlines the policy context of metropolisation. Section 4 uses the examples of Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk to illustrate the policy process leading towards metropolisation. The final section summarises the argument and draws conclusions.

Metropolisation through the Political Lens
Although the economic effects of agglomeration seem to occur “naturally”, metropolitan government and planning do not, as they entail annexation, shifting administrative borders, political bargaining between municipalities, coordination of urban services, and solving various planning- and budget-related issues (Herrschel and Newman 2002; Kantor et al. 2012; Walker 1987). These complex, conflict-ridden issues often escape researchers’ attention. City-regionalism remains an under-researched area, because it is often treated as “a technical ‘re-scaling the city’ issue” omitting the role of political actors (Morgan 2014, p. 298). Following Jonas and Ward (2007, p. 176), this article conceptualises city-regions “as the product of a particular set of economic, cultural, environmental and political projects, each with their own logics”. Examining how the alleged universal processes of the rise of metropolitan regions unfold through local actors and institutions in a non-Western context would contribute to the production of urban theory and better conceptualisation of urbanisation at the global scale.

Kinossian (2016) previously discussed the use of the term “urban agglomeration” (gorodskaya agglomeratsiya) within Russian urban planning discourse, to describe “a compact group of settlements, predominantly urban, combined in a complex, dynamic, and developing system with intense industrial, infrastructural, social, and economic links, the joint use of adjacent territories and resources” (MINRE- GION 2014, p. 2). In the Anglo-American literature, the terms metropolitan area, city-region, or metropolitan region are used to emphasise socio-economic interdependencies between the core city (or cities) and adjacent municipalities (Norris 2015; Phares 2009). The boundaries of such entities are defined through the concept of a ‘functional urban area’ (FUA) (Tosics 2011, p. 8). Both discourses refer to socio-economic links between settlements located within a certain geographical proximity. This paper, therefore, uses the term ‘metropolitan region’ to describe a system of settlements consisting of the core city (or cities) and adjacent municipalities.
This article conceptualises space as socially constructed, shaped by various actors, institutions, modes of governance, as well as social practices and discourses (PAsI 2009, 2010). Political geographers emphasise the need to put the economic logic of city-regionalism within its geopolitical context (Jonas 2012, 2013). It is argued, that the state plays a key role in formulating spatial strategies that promote city-regions as a prioritised scalar level. Such strategies are intrinsically political, involving the redistribution of resources and power across government tiers (Lang 2012, 2013). Metropolisation is therefore a complex process that involves policies, political actors, and discursive production of metropolitan regions (Lang and Török 2017).

Metropolisation in the Policy Context
In Russia, current policy initiatives to promote metropolitan regions stand in sharp contrast to the approaches used by Soviet planners, which aimed to limit the growth of large cities. This radical departure from the Soviet policies of containment appears puzzling when placed in the context of modern Russia’s demographic trends, but is less paradoxical when framed by the contemporary policy discourses on economic growth in Russia. The prevailing argument goes as follows: After the collapse of the USSR, Russia underwent deindustrialisation and lost much of its economic growth in Russia. The prevailing argument goes as follows: After the collapse of the USSR, Russia underwent deindustrialisation and lost much of its economy has become too dependent on natural resources. There is therefore an urgent need to reverse these trends, and lay out conditions for technological innovation and economic diversification (see Medvedev 2009; Putin 2012). It is important to scrutinise these statements and to understand their spatial implications.

Since 2006, the central government has worked towards developing a nationwide spatial planning strategy (see MINREGION 2006). These efforts have not yet resulted in a single document or a coherent policy framework, but have produced a number of ad hoc strategies and plans addressing various aspects of regional development (Kinossian 2013). For instance, the Concept for long-term socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation for 2020 names the largest urban agglomerations and large cities – regional capitals as areas of “accelerated economic growth” and “concentration of major financial and innovation resources” (Government of Russia 2008). The Strategy for innovation development of the Russian Federation for 2020 promotes industrial clusters as instruments of regional development because of their role in reducing transaction costs, promoting innovation; and providing firms with access to technological know-how, specialised services, and qualified labour (Government of Russia 2011). According to the deputy minister for regional development, the benefits of introducing planning for “urban agglomerations” include optimised transport, land-use, and infrastructure, as well as cutting costs, achieving economies of scale, and increasing the effectiveness of government (Gaevsky 2013). To summarise, the government introduced the idea of turning a selected number of cities into metropolitan regions that would realise economic benefits of concentration and agglomeration.

In 2013, the Ministry for Regional Development of Russia (2004–2014, hereafter Minregion) created a special working group for metropolitan regions, which started collecting bids from local actors (regional authorities and municipalities) to participate in Minregion’s ‘pilot project’ for metropolitan government. By July 2014, the working group received 17 bids, of which 16 were selected. The same year, Minregion was dissolved because many of its previous regional development tasks had been re-allocated to territory-specific government ministries (e.g., the Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East; and the Ministry of North Caucasus Affairs). Following Minregion’s dissolution, the working group was transferred to the Ministry for Economic Development, which now coordinates regional development.

Of the 16 pilot projects, 15 were initiated by regional authorities (governor’s office or regional government). Most of the metropolitan government initiatives are sponsored by regional authorities that fund the preparation of development plans, negotiate metropolitan deals with the municipalities, and negotiate the pilot project with the central government. Some mayors are reluctant to participate in the metropolitan governance initiative, fearing the loss of economic and political power, whereas those who expect to gain from the process are more enthusiastic (Starodubrovskaya et al. 2008, pp. 67–68). Considering the various interests and expectations on the mayors’ side, the role of the regional government as a power broker is crucial.

Once political consensus is reached regarding forming a metropolitan region, the mayors of the constitutive municipalities sign an agreement. For example, in the Novosibirsk metropolitan region, the mayors formed a coordination council to discuss various planning issues (Governor of Novosibirsk Region 2015). Decisions remain non-binding: all constitutive municipalities retain their boundaries and their political and budgetary sovereignty. Other regions have also created an executive agency to implement the council’s decisions and manage day-to-day tasks. The relationship between regional authorities and metropolitan governments remains a politically sensitive issue, as the former possess political and fiscal powers, while the latter still have the legal framing of a ‘pilot project’ awaiting legalisation by the central government.

Metropolisation as a Project

The Krasnoyarsk Metropolitan Region
Krasnoyarsk is a large industrial centre in Eastern Siberia, the capital of Krasnoyarsk Kray. The city’s economy is dominated by the Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Smelter, one of the largest aluminium producers in the world and part of RUSAL holding company. During the socialist period, several highly specialised industrial towns were built near Krasnoyarsk, including Sosnovoborsk.
(then home to the largest manufacturer of trailers in the USSR), and Zheleznogorsk was built to serve an underground armaments-manufacturing facility.

The prospects for planning for the Greater Krasnoyarsk metropolitan region were discussed during Soviet times, but it was not until 2007 that concrete steps were taken. Rossyyskaya Gazeta reported that regional officials and the city discussed a possible merger of the city with the adjacent municipalities. The population of Krasnoyarsk was almost one million people – a critical threshold in Russia, because cities of more than one million residents are eligible for special federal government funding for infrastructure development (MARMYSHEV 2007). Alexandr Khloponin, who governed the region from October 2002 to January 2010, became the main champion of the project. The motivation was to boost the regional economy by creating a strong urban centre that would be attractive for businesses, visitors, and skilled workers. In order to achieve these goals, cooperation between the city and the adjacent municipalities was needed to pool budgetary resources, coordinate infrastructure projects, prepare sites for development, and increase labour mobility.

In April 2008, Governor Khloponin and the mayors of seven adjacent municipal districts and towns agreed to participate in a joint investment project: Complex Development of Krasnoyarsk Agglomeration for 2020. The municipalities agreed to develop common urban infrastructures, integrate their transport and social services, and to coordinate residential and industrial development within the metropolitan region (OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF KRASNOYARSK KRAY 2008). According to this agreement, the Krasnoyarsk metropolitan region consists of the city of Krasnoyarsk, the industrial towns of Divnogorsk and Sosnovoborsk, and the municipal districts of Emel’yanovskiy, Manskiy, Sukhobuzimskiy, and Berezovskiy.

To support the agreement with ‘institutional muscle’, a special governing body – state Corporation Krasnoyarsk 2020 – was established in 2008 to manage economic development projects within the agglomeration. Later, the corporation changed its status to that of a commercial enterprise but its state ownership remained. The director of the corporation explained that, in addition to residential and infrastructure development, they are aiming to implement a number of mega-projects, including logistics centres, a free economic zone, an exhibition centre, a congress hall, and to eventually bid for the Expo 2020 (LAPIN 2008). The regional government also appointed a special 25-strong Commission for Complex Development of the Krasnoyarsk Agglomeration. The commission consisted mostly of regional bureaucrats (10) and the mayors and deputies of constituent municipalities (9). Only five members came from the non-government sector (Government of Krasnoyarsk Kray 2011).

It was expected that most of the planning work would be completed during 2008–2009, and that the implementation stage would start from 2010. A ‘planning package’ for the agglomeration comprised three key documents: 1) strategy for socio-economic development; 2) scheme for territorial planning; and 3) complex investment programme (OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF KRASNOYARSK KRAY 2009). Using lavish state funding, several large consultancies were tasked with making rapid progress in preparing development plans and strategies. In 2009, a Moscow-based consultancy, Multigroup, delivered a concept for territorial development of the metropolitan region, as requested by the regional governor. Working jointly with Strategy Partners, a Moscow-based consultancy, Corporation Krasnoyarsk-2020 prepared the strategy for socio-economic development of the Krasnoyarsk Metropolitan region. In early 2010, the Moscow-based Giprogor (which sub-contracted UK-based Arup) presented a comprehensive spatial development plan for the metropolitan region (GIPROGOR 2010).

By 2010 an impressive number of planning studies, development plans, and strategies were ready for the implementation stage. Nevertheless, the consequences of the global economic crisis for the metal-exporting region were severe. Another blow to the project was the resignation of Alexandr Khloponin as regional governor. The managing corporation gradually lost most of its state contracts, and in 2012 was closed down. Official sources commented that the corporation had fulfilled its mission, and that any further progress would be made by the municipalities located within the metropolitan area. Nevertheless, the new governor of the region has not demonstrated much support for the urban mega-project inherited from his predecessor. Although there may be economic rationale for the discontinuation of the agglomeration project, such a policy U-turn questions the ability of the regional government to plan and successfully implement long-term projects. A regional assembly deputy called the closure of the corporation a “failure of the regional government” (KAZACHENKO 2012).

The Novosibirsk Metropolitan Region

Novosibirsk is a large industrial and science centre in Western Siberia, and the capital of Novosibirsk Oblast. Despite the presence of heavy manufacturing plants and high-tech industries, none has a dominant position comparable to that of the aluminium sector at Krasnoyarsk.

Establishing the Novosibirsk metropolitan region was proposed by a business association Delovaya Rossiya (Business Russia) with the purpose of attracting investment and combining municipal resources in order to ensure that, in the face of growing competition, the city retained its position as the third-largest urban centre in Russia (DELOVAYA ROSSIYA 2007). Initially, the idea did not generate political momentum. It was not until a new governor, Vasilyi Yurchenko, took office in March 2011 that negotiations between the interested parties were initiated. As a result, in April 2012 the mayors of Novosibirsk, four nearby towns, and seven adjacent municipalities signed an agreement of intention to establish the Novosibirsk metropolitan region. Similarly to the Krasnoyarsk case, the Novosibirsk
The metropolitan region was formed on the principles of an association within which the participating municipalities retain their political ‘sovereignty’ and boundaries.

After signing the agreement, the governor described the metropolitan region as a mechanism for innovative regional development that would help coordinate economic, social, financial, and planning policies. The regional minister for construction stated that the metropolitan region will enhance economic efficiency, investment attractiveness, mobility, and will lead to growth of employment and reshaping of social infrastructure (REGNUM 2012). In 2012, the Ministry of Construction and Housing Services of Novosibirsk Oblast commissioned a Moscow-based planning consultancy Giprogor to prepare a planning concept for the metropolitan region. Throughout 2013 the project was completed with the assistance of local and international consultants.

Unlike the Krasnoyarsk case, the initiative to establish a metropolitan region in Novosibirsk secured political support at a much later stage. Initially, neither the city mayor nor the regional governor demonstrated significant involvement. It was not until the first studies were presented to the public in 2013 that both the mayor and the governor became increasingly interested in the project. In January 2014, after serving as mayor of Novosibirsk for almost 14 years, Vladimir Gorodetskiy resigned to become the vice-governor of Novosibirsk Oblast, in charge of the agglomeration affairs (RIA.Ru 2014a). In this new role he will govern the metropolitan region through the interim process until special governing bodies are formed, including the Agglomeration Council led by the regional governor and the executive arm, the Agglomeration Managing Company (RIA.Ru 2014b). In the same year, political life in Novosibirsk Oblast took an unexpected twist, as Governor Yurchenko was dismissed by President Putin after losing the president’s trust. In May 2014 the former governor faced criminal charges in relation to land sales to a private company; vice-governor Gorodetskiy was then promoted to governor of the region.

The implementation of the plans is contingent on securing sufficient financial resources, and the willingness of all stakeholders to reach a consensus. The chief architect of the city of Novosibirsk related that the implementation of any major infrastructural project is severely hampered by the lack of financial resources. For example, the construction of one bridge out of the proposed four would require up to half the city’s annual budget (2013). The deputy mayor of Novosibirsk municipal district (an adjacent municipal district that forms a “horseshoe” around the city) related that the district did not have much interaction with the city, except on issues of solid waste management, infrastructure development, and sewage treatment. Another problem mentioned was “the summer population”, which increases the number of district residents from regular its 120,000 to a peak of 600,000 during the summer months when city residents move to their summer homes. According to the official, there was no reason why the city should seek to annex the land to pursue development projects, because “the district could do things just as well.” The official opposed the idea of changing any boundaries, arguing that if the city needed to build anything on their land, the district authorities would allow the city to do so.

Discussion

The two cases demonstrate that metropolitan governance structures remain politically unstable: The actors involved have little motivation to share power unless compelled by a higher authority (e.g., the regional governor). This reluctance can substantially weaken, if not undermine, efforts to implement more effective planning for a metropolitan region. The Novosibirsk metropolitan region seemed to initially lack strong political support but was later supported by both the governor and mayor. The position of the governor is critical to ensuring coherence and the overarching governance of various administrative units and authorities that are essential for the metropolitan region. As the main focus of political strength, the governor can also become the main source of political weakness if support dwindles or the governor is dismissed for political or other reasons.

As in many similar cases elsewhere, political fragmentation poses a threat to creating an effective planning system, as the municipalities that would form the metropolitan region are reluctant to merge with the city or to surrender their powers. So far, the political process of metropolisation has proceeded rather reluctantly and lacks a real leader or active promoter, who will be required to solve the main problem of securing the support of various actors and stakeholders. The fact that both metropolitan regions were formed on the principle of non-binding association, within which all members retain full autonomy over their budgetary and decision-making authority, can make it difficult to reach consensus.

Russian regions act within an incoherent policy framework, with shifting political priorities, and experience severe budgetary constraints and dependency on federal funding. In the emerging political economy of space, cities seem to hold the most precarious position, because political and economic resources are increasingly concentrated in the centre. If metropolisation receives ear-marked funding, regions and cities will adjust their planning policies to better respond to federal government priorities in an attempt to tap into the streams of federal funds. Hence, the success or failure of the metropolisation project depends on funding and other material incentives offered by the central government under the discursively constructed ‘brand’ of metropolisation. However, these efforts may be in vain, as the centre can suddenly identify new priorities. The most recent examples include the allocation of government subsidies to Crimea following its de facto annexation. The government’s plans to develop Crimea as a showcase have led to the withdrawal of government funding from other regional projects, most notably a planned bridge across the River
It is claimed that metropolitanisation will improve economic productivity, facilitate innovation, and benefit the national economy as a whole. Nevertheless, in a highly centralised country such as Russia, regional development projects depend on state funding. Directing state funding towards metropolitan regions will have implications for less privileged regions. If metropolitan policies receive state funding, Russia will enter another stage of post-socialist territorial restructuring, characterised by a further split between the privileged urban core and the marginalised periphery, with a widening gap between a handful of prosperous urban centres and peripheralised territories.

**Conclusion**

This article analyses spatial planning in Russia and, specifically, recent plans to promote the growth of large cities and form “urban agglomerations”. These plans have been informed by city-centric narratives that praise large cities as centres of innovation and economic productivity. By introducing metropolitan regions ‘by decree’, Russian policy makers sought to match the productivity of leading cities in the West. Russian planners appear to employ a form of inverse logic when interpreting the correlation between urban size and high productivity and innovation: If innovation and productivity are facilitated by large urban centres, it is presumed that increasing the population will automatically ensure economic growth.

The article contributes to the current debates by attracting attention to the role of political actors and local politics involved in the production of space. Spatial transformations, rather than being ordered or predefined by scale, come about as a result of complex political processes that engage assemblages of actors. As the analysis of metropolitanisation projects implemented in Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk demonstrates, metropolisation was promoted by political actors and facilitated by consultancy firms that delivered examples of western ‘best practice’ to the Russian clients.

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Резюме
Надир Киносьян
Телега впереди лошади: проблемы государственной политики метрополизации в России
В остром контрасте с советским градостроительным доктринам, которые стремились сдерживать рост крупнейших городов, современные российские городские планировщики делают нечто противоположное: планируют рост городов путем слияния муниципалитетов в «городские агломерации». В то время как экономические эффекты агломерации и концентрации хорошо изучены, градостроительная политика и политические процессы внутри метрополитенского уровня городского управления изучены меньше, особенно за пределами западных стран. Опираясь на современные исследования городов-регионов и процессов метрополизации, данная статья исследует процессы метрополизации в России. Сделаны следующие выводы: 1) метрополизация поощряется федеральным правительством; 2) примеры сибирских городов Красноярска и Новосибирска показывают, что возникающие формы метрополитенского уровня управления пока слабы и неустойчивы; 3) государственная политика метрополизации не лишена проблем, так как ускоренный рост отдельных городов-регионов может привести к усилению имеющихся пространственных дисбалансов в уже поляризованной стране.

Метрополизация; городское управление; город-регион; пространственное планирование; Россия

Résumé
Nadir Kinossian
La charrue avant les bœufs: les périls de la métropolisation planifiée en Russie
À l’époque soviétique, les doctrines d’aménagement du territoire cherchaient à freiner la croissance des grandes villes. De nos jours, c’est exactement l’inverse: le regroupement des municipalités en «agglomérations urbaines» opéré par les urbanistes russes favorise au contraire leur expansion. Si les conséquences économiques de la concentration urbaine ont fait couler beaucoup d’encre, les politiques publiques en la matière ont suscité moins d’attention, surtout en dehors du monde occidental. En partant des débats actuels sur le régionalisme urbain et la métropolisation, le présent article examine la politique de métropolisation mise en place par l’État en Russie. Il en tire les conclusions suivantes: i) la métropolisation est encouragée par le gouvernement fédéral russe; ii) les études de cas portant sur les villes sibériennes de Krasnoïarsk et de Novossibirsk mettent en lumière la faiblesse et l’instabilité de la forme de gouvernance métropolitaine qui émerge actuellement; iii) la métropolisation planifiée par l’État est problématique dans la mesure où la croissance accélérée de certaines zones métropolitaines sélectionnées peut contribuer à exacerber les disparités existantes dans un pays déjà polarisé sur le plan géographique.

Métropolisation; gouvernance urbaine; régionalisme urbain; aménagement du territoire; Russie