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Europe and the Mediterranean
Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together

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EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY WORKING PAPERS

POLYXENI ADAM-VELENI, MURAT ÇIZAKÇA, VERA COSTANTINI,
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EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
TALKING, LEARNING, WORKING, AND LIVING TOGETHER
4
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Papers (Part 2)
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This volume contains six papers given at the 3rd Europe and the Mediterranean conference, organized by the Maecenata Foundation, the Governance Center Middle East | North Africa / Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform, and the Regional Government of Crete in Heraklion, Crete, in April 2017, made possible by the Goelet Foundation of New York City. The conference report and two additional papers are published in: Costa Carras, Sarrah Kassem, Udo Steinbach: Europe and the Mediterranean – Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together 3, EBU No. 17, Berlin: Maecenata Stiftung 2017.¹ Further papers will be published in EBU No. 19. A list of the conference delegates can be found on page 55.

Remember for the Future – The Mediterranean as a Memory Space

by Ferdinand Richard

Bearing in mind that we are in Greece, I would like to put my thoughts under the auspices of two Greek words, “politiki”, which means politics, and “politismos”, which means civilisation. I find this semantic similarity a good frame for my intervention.

Our very rich debates over the last two days have provided me with some valid starting points.

Let me point out a few of them:

1. We are facing nothing less than the reinvention of a shared political space by refusing the dictatorship of nationalisms.

2. We realize that the core clash in politics nowadays, not only in the Mediterranean area, but all over the world, is about falsifying history.

3. We must consider extended time, refuse to be dictated to by immediate urges, and search for long term multiple level solutions. This part of the world bears ample witness to the fact that quick solutions today may well result in long-lasting problems in the future.

4. We acknowledge that the notion of a common ground is large, transversal, holistic, and flexible. It entails a constant up-hill battle.

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2 Ferdinand Richard is the current president of the Roberto Cimetta Fund and attended the conference in this capacity. The Roberto Cimetta Fund is a civil society initiative, launched by arts and culture professionals more than 10 years ago, in order to support the mobility of artists and cultural activists between Europe, the Arab world and the Middle East. The members of its board and panel of experts come from all parts of this area. The Fund has awarded more than 1500 travel grants over a 10-year period. In the past two years, a second programme, called Tamteen, has provided financial support to sustain 20 local teams of artists in the Arab World and the Middle East (including Yemen, Iraq, etc.). The Fund’s latest programme, Fil Manfa, aims at supporting three shelters/co-working spaces for approx. 40 artists/cultural operators in exile, in the neighbourhood of conflicts (Kurdistan, Beirut, Istanbul).
5. We are concerned with multiple spaces overlapping each other, and not always fitting the classic diplomatic neo-colonial approach of the so-called Mediterranean space.

Based on this debate, and coming from the front line, I will try and express my thoughts about three long term trends: economic, political, and individual.

The economic trends show a dramatic evolution; some of these trends merit more attention.

1. Multilateral soft content industries will gradually replace heavy vertical industries. Large investment funds will progressively invest in these content industries, which may become the n°1 global assets over the next 50 years, when fossil energy will probably have disappeared. Providence Equity Fund, with almost 50 billion US-Dollars to invest in global content industries (among others, Warner is in their portfolio), is one of the many examples of these manoeuvres. These massive global players are already investigating the area we are looking at.

2. Paradoxically however, interactive and agile networks of smaller knowledge industries will concentrate on sustainable industries beside what I call the gigantic military-industrial commercial empires. These smaller enterprises will facilitate intercultural dialogue.

3. By its nature, mass consumption, of which mass tourism is one of the most visible manifestations in the Mediterranean area, in its aim to be efficient, is set on isolating the diverse categories of consumers / individuals as much as possible, up to an unhuman level. It is also a direct threat to intercultural dialogue.

4. The need to organise transgenerational dialogue is coming back as a natural urgent obligation.

5. The notion of ethical capitalism, immediately placed at the intersection of secularism and religion, remains marginal when facing the notion of maximised profits. Considering current global economic negotiations, it also still
remains largely an intellectual speculation. The absence of ethics in econ-
omy has an impact on the religious issue, including the most violent con-
licts.

6. Who are the guards of our ethics? The legitimate desire for intercultural di-
alogue forces us to reconsider the regulation of wild capitalism. Is ultraliber-
alism a genuine image of freedom?

As for politics, some new developments should be stressed, instead of clinging
to the usual clichés.

1. Cultural zones of influence are gradually replacing national borders, for bet-
ter or for worse.

2. While retaining an old-fashioned block-against-block strategy, traditional
competition between nations is being replaced by an instrumentalisation of
cultural differences, the so-called ‘clash of civilisations’, which in fact is
only a new layer of make-up on the face of nationalism.

3. After the collapse of the former colonial empires in this part of the world,
some regional and religious powers, e.g. Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Israel, are attempting to fill the empty chairs, strengthen and build their own
empires and gain influence – not to speak of the never-ending pressure from
Russia, the US and the EU. Do these powers really consider intercultural
dialogue as an essential tool for peace? Do they consider peace their main
objective, or is expansion their first priority?

4. Asia has always shown a particular interest in Africa and the Mediterranean
area. The centre of the world which moved from the Mediterranean to the
Atlantic, is now moving to the centre of the Pacific. Are the people in the
Mediterranean area showing enough interest in Asia? Is the Marco Polo
spirit belonging to the past?

5. Is the Euro-Arab space interested in the rest of the world? Or is it too self-
centred on its own problems and its heritage? Does this area understand that
the rest of the world is looking at it as a more-or-less single entity?
6. Is this area interested in comparing itself with the other European ‘mare nostrum’, the Baltic Sea?

Let me turn to the sphere of the individual. As we all know, no change can happen without the commitment of individuals, citizens, inhabitants.

1. What we acknowledge today is not the withdrawal of the European idea, it is the painful beginning of a long-expected and positive transformation, including the re-definition of the international relations of anyone of us – the single individuals living in Europe, including the re-balancing of yet another north / south unfair deal, the one which is internal, between southern and northern Europe, which is also affecting, through a domino effect, the European relations with the MENA region.

2. Physical and virtual mobility, peer-to-peer transversality and universalism, must not lead to a one-way journey. Peer-to-peer may be considered an expression of democracy only if it respects the principles of fair trade.

3. Golden triangles (Amsterdam / Paris / London) are the geographical bases of the empire. They assemble all the tools of power. They act as magnets on youth. Brain drain is their worst effect. It deprives local communities of their expensive investment in education. It keeps young creative people from participating in the development and reconstruction of their regions and communities. In the long term, this will keep fuelling the unbalanced situation, and its consequences: europhobia and xenophobia.

4. Local development is at the base of fair relationships, and the individual is the engine of this development. Mobility is all about local development, not about people living in airports. It is about sharing with your friends at home the benefits of your journey.

Teams from Barcelona and Glasgow Universities have recently conducted and are still conducting some highly important research on hybridisation, integration and /assimilation. The project is called ‘Cultural Base’. The project aims at finding answers to some age-old questions: ‘Who is integrating whom?’,

3 See [http://culturalbase.eu](http://culturalbase.eu) for details
‘Who is assimilating whom?’, ‘What level of hybridisation is compatible with Cultural Diversity?’

I believe that with the help of technology the world will become an organic network of multiple peripheries. Peripheries must become centres again, especially in the Euro-Arab area. And whatever happens, the Europe of the young, including those of immigrant origin, is coming. The global union of youth is at work. All over the world, in a permanent move, it is creating a common language – whether of good or bad quality, we cannot say, since it is linked to political dynamics.

I do not speak exactly the same French as my father did, and my grandchildren do not speak French like I do. Culture is on a constant move. In one hundred years from now, what will remain of our present nations, of our current languages? Will heritage be part of nostalgia, or the fuel for the future?

My conclusion is a quote from the Universal Declaration on the Human Rights\(^4\), which, being article 1, is generic to all other articles of this document, which has been ratified by most of the world’s nations.

\[
\text{All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.}
\]
\[
\text{They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act}
\]
\[
\text{towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.}
\]

What does it mean to be equal in dignity? It means there is no dominant culture.

\(^4\) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly Resolution 217 A)
Colonization – The First European Development

by Polyxeni Adam-Veleni

The borderline from the 8th to the 7th century BC marked by three very important events which determined the course of Western civilization and greatly affect our lives today. The first was the invention of the Greek alphabet, the first phonetic alphabet in Europe where then came the Latin alphabet and the rest of European countries. The Greek alphabet emerged by adding vowels according to the Phoenician alphabet. The Greeks had close relations with the Phoenicians as early as the 12th century and taught them the art of navigation in the Mediterranean. Phoenicians and Greeks: two seafaring peoples who left their marks on the Mediterranean routes. Their presence affected the fate of many other peoples and opened roads of trade and culture. The Phoenicians, with an older seafaring tradition, were the pioneers. They tamed the sea and taught the Greeks the way to master it. Soon, the Greeks became their main antagonistics in their maritime enterprises. They use this knowledge for several centuries to create a huge wave of colonization, much larger and ambitious than what we had tried their incomplete knowledge in the 12th century BC.

The third important achievement was the invention of trading not with exchanging products but buying goods with precious metals. First with iron spits at the end of the 8th century and immediately after the first coins, so it became much easier the transactions. The forerunners of the coinage were the iron obeloi found at the Heraion of Argos. Their established use as a coin attributed to Pheidon King of Argos probably dates from the end of the 8th century. In the middle of the 7th century, or just after the first coins from electro, a special alloy of silver and gold were struck in Ionia at Lydia. Without doubt the subsequent development of coinage is due to that admirable capacity of the ancient Greek spirit.

The Greeks at the end of the 8th century and early 7th have three very strong “weapons” to expand their territory. Common Greek alphabet with which they can have better communication between them, coinage which are easier for the
transactions and good knowledge of navigation. The narrow limits of the continental body, the aegean and ionian islands and the coast of Asia Minor is not enough for them: in the next two centuries, they will seek new fertile lands and new productive resources. The adventure of the second period of Greek colonization starts. Creating a colony of a city state was not simple matter. Most often this expedition had been preceded by several trips to find a suitable place and to reach to the proper conditions to create a colony. When it was to find a colony was never in a hurry. Usually they calculated everything down to the smallest detail. In which place, what region in Mediterranean coast, close to whom and what commercial benefits would have been, were their basic notions. Could they easily sell their products? Were local products that could trade them in their motherland? Existed available land for cultivation? And if so, could cultivate it without any local conflicts? These were fundamental questions that concerned them for long before deciding the establishment of the colony. But let us better see the procedure for founding a colony.

It is indisputable that the foundation of a colony was a momentous event for a city-state in Mainland or Island Greece. Usually, it was the natural outcome of previous exploratory voyages in search of wealth-generating resources or the result of trading transactions between the mother-city (metropolis) and a distant land. The reasons for founding a colony varied: political, economic, social, demographic and so on. The phenomenon of founding colonies became more widespread and systematic during the 8th century BC, when the Greeks succeeded in building better ships, capable of navigating in remote and inhospitable seas. Concurrently, the close contact between Greeks and Phoenicians and the growing competitiveness between the two seafaring peoples began to create the preconditions, and frequently the necessity, for more permanent residence in a far-off place. With their ships, the Greeks succeeded in taming the fiercest seas, anchoring in sheltered harbours at the outposts of the Mediterranean Sea, the Euxine Pontos and the African coasts, and creating new cities, many of which continued in existence for over three thousand years and are still lively today. In most cases the foundation of a colony was prepared in advance, by establishing small installations or by operating local trading posts (emporia) in the territory earmarked for colonisation, several years before the final settling there of
a population from the metropolis. However, the ties of a city state with its colony did not cease with its foundation. The metropolis continued to show interest in the colony and to exercise influence on it. Thus, the successful foundation of the city-colony was of multiple significance for the metropolis, which usually took care to maintain its political, economic and social ties with the newly-founded daughter city. Information on the foundation of cities-colonies is drawn from the textual sources. However, these do not record sufficient details on the way in which the colonisation took place. Undoubtedly, this would be determined each time by different parameters related to the administrative organisation, the importance and the economic prosperity of the metropolis, as well as the conditions characteristic of the new land. Practical matters had to be solved, ranging from how the site for colonisation and the group of pioneer colonists would be chosen to how the public and private buildings in the new city would be constructed. It was the metropolis that had a supportive function with regard to economic, demographic and administrative issues, which is the reason why it sought, even if the colony it founded became powerful after some time, to have a say in its domestic affairs, so as to reap benefits from its colony’s prosperity. The appointed leader of the colonising mission, who was also considered founder of the city, was the oikistes.

The oikistai were eminent figures in the society of a metropolis. Many cities honoured in perpetuity their oikistai, erecting heroa or imposing tomb monuments and worshipping them with offerings and religious rites. The metropolis ceded to the oikistes absolute authority; he was autokrator, which meant that everyone who participated in the creation of a colonial city was obliged to obey his orders without objection. The ceding of this absolute authority to one person, the oikistes, seems quite reasonable, given that the host of people the metropolis decided to send to colonise a place was often motley, sometimes even coming from different city-states. Thus, only as autokrator could the oikistes cope with all the difficulties and issues that arose in the course of the venture. Other colonists, always men, were appointed to support the principal oikistes, as well as specialists who contributed to the laying out and the initial organisation of the colony. Although the sources are rather vague on the matter, it seems logical to assume that this group was dispatched as an
advance reconnaissance party, preceding the rest of the potential inhabitants of a colony, in order to seek out the place, locate the most promising site and organise the life of the colony. The population of women, children and more elderly persons followed. The view that only men were involved in the colonisation and that they then married women from the local population does not seem to apply, except for some cases, as the sources preserve testimonies of priestesses who were moved to the colony after its foundation or of women who sped to be reunited with their husbands, together with the rest of the family, as soon as the settlement process had been completed.

The principal oikistes and the other colonists were accompanied by geonomoi, who played a decisive role in selecting the site for building the city and in allocating the land, as the successful foundation of the city depended primarily on its correct and precise measurement. Consequently, the foundation of the colony was related directly to the measurement and the distribution of land. After the main task of mapping the area where the various buildings of the colony were to be constructed, the architects played a significant role, defining the spaces intended for the public edifices, the necropoleis and the sanctuaries, and then designing the civic complexes and the private residences. With regard to the spatial planning of the sanctuaries, special attention was paid to delimiting the lots of agricultural land in their vicinity, from the leasing of which the expenses of the upkeep of the temenos were covered. Thus, if the oikistes was responsible for selecting the site, the geonomoi were responsible for measuring the land and allotting it justly to the colonists and the architects were entrusted with the spatial planning of the city’s functions and the design of its public and private buildings. In some cities, where this process was not followed and no architects were employed, as for example in Akragas, problems, which are noted in some of the sources, arose in their orderly functioning. The simplest method of dividing up the land was into parallel zones, which, in their turn, could be easily allocated in smaller parts. Plots of equal size were the lots both in the cities and the rural territories, while, as one may assume from their name in the sources, kleroior meri, the parcels of land were distributed by drawing lots (klerose). The question whether the distribution of lots was made on the basis of the principle of
equal share preoccupied at various times philosophers, such as Plato and, primarily, Aristotle. Despite doubts expressed at times on the fairness of this system of dividing and distributing the ground, the parcelling of the land into parallel zones, which ranged in size from 4 to 10 hectares, depending on the configuration of the terrain, was kept throughout antiquity.

The place of settlement was usually coastal and at low altitude. The colonists preferred to design the new cities-colonies on peninsulas, even if the ground space was limited. More rarely, they chose sites further inshore, in sheltered bays, or on plains in the hinterland, always on condition that there was easy and direct access to the coast. Proximity to the sea was the first and essential prerequisite, as in most cases, this was the main reason for founding each colony. If the ground at the chosen point was also slightly elevated, this was undoubtedly an important advantage, but it was not the decisive parameter for selecting the site. Otherwise, the city-colony was laid out on completely flat ground. The choice of laying out on flat ground and not on steep or high slopes was also a main difference from the sites that had been chosen for the metropoleis in Geometric and Archaic Times. The size of the colonial cities varied and usually exceeded that of their metropoleis, which in the meantime had already expanded. An average-size colony covered about 80 hectares but there were also larger cities of up to 200 hectares. In this mean area, some 4,000 to 5,000 houses could be arranged, which corresponded to an average population ranging from 30,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. Of course, during their early years, the colonies had small populations of 200 to 1,000 persons and their demographic increase was gradual. The primary concern of each oikistes was to set the boundaries of the city by raising a strong fortification before anything else. The city walls followed the lie of the land and their construction was adapted accordingly. Intra muros, all the colonies were planned in parallel zones, between which building insulae were created. The width of the parallel zones varied from 29 to 35 metres. Depending on the availability of space, the zones ran in the same or in a different direction. Frequently, as in the case of Selinous for instance, the direction of these zones was determined by two hills. The vertical streets, which defined the length of the building insulae, were usually arranged at fixed intervals so that the insulae were of the same size. However, the scheme followed in each
case was different, because it was dependent on the space available each time. In accordance with the standards of the city-state, as these were first formulated in the Archaic Period and evolved in the Classical Period, the new city founded as a colony ought to have administrative autarky in the land in which it was established. Despite the fact that the concept of the city state must have existed from Classical Times onward, its urban model of function was formulated much earlier. Thus, for the orderly functioning of a city-state, a series of constant parameters was imposed: living space enclosed by fortification walls, laying out of a regular urban plan, temples and temene for the practice of worship, agora, theatre, gymnasium and private houses, sufficient area for cemeteries and land for cultivation (chora).

In the colonies, as in the metropoleis, the spatial planning of the public functions of each city was of decisive significance. The nucleus of public life was the agora, where the official buildings of the administration stood, such as the prytaneion, the bouleuterion, some urban sanctuaries, public fountains and exedrae, the theatre and whatever else concerned the urban daily life of the citizens. The shops, private or public, depending on the merchandise, were also there or close by. The agora was usually situated in a position that ensured direct access to the harbour installations, for easier loading and unloading of cargoes. Sometimes the workshops producing various goods were arranged on the fringe of the agora or directly outside its walls and close to the seaward accesses. In some cities, such as Metapontion, which spread between two rivers and had abundant fertile land for cultivation, between the city and the fields, where scattered farmsteads were located, there was an intervening zone extra muros, 1,300 metres wide that was intended for the gardens and the necropolis. The agora was usually surrounded by a system of horizontal and vertical street axes that also defined the building insulae with the private houses around it. Sometimes, a wide central street passed through its main axis. The earliest example of an organised agora of a colony is that at Megara Hyblaia in the second half of the 7th century BC, where the agora occupies a triangular space between streets running in different directions. In other cases, such as Akragas, which seems to have been one of the few cities planned without the input of an architect, the agora was simply an open space adjacent to the city walls. The houses ranged in size from 156 to 256
square metres. They were usually provided with a rectangular pastas (chamber) and an open internal courtyard, while one part of them was two-storeyed to accommodate the quarters for the women and children. As the houses underwent many alterations over the years, it is difficult to discern their plan at the time of the colony’s foundation or whether they were initially single-space dwellings, as were the early houses at Megara Hyblaia in the 7th century BC, which imitated in size and plan the known houses in the metropoleis of the same period. Later, the inhabitants of Megara Hyblaia enlarged their houses and, with the addition of collateral buildings, created a kind of internal courtyard. Due to the successive changes in family properties, which in the following generations may have involved the sharing of the same plot among siblings, it is difficult to determine exactly the way in which plots were divided. In most cases, the plots were protected on the street side by high yard walls. Usually the colonists preferred to build rooms in the north part of the plot and, in front of these, they constructed a semi-outdoor space (portico) or a half-roofed chamber (pastas), serving the needs of household chores, raising children and everyday living, which offered protection from the heat and the sun in the summer and was warmer in the winter. The creation of so many new settlements–colonies in various parts of the Mediterranean basin and the Black Sea (the Euxine Pontos) surely contributed the most to defining the parameters, systematising the methods, codifying the needs and programming conscientiously all the prerequisites for the ideally correct organisation of a settlement. It could be argued that the fact that the Greeks “were forced” to build all these hundreds of new “urban” centres, under different conditions each time, enriched their thinking about the needs of a city, was linked directly with the philosophical principles and theories of their time and led them to even more “scientific” applications and implementations of their urban planning and architectural designs. In other words, with the foundation of so many urban settlements everywhere, the know-how of urban planning and construction of the period developed to a remarkable degree. It is not at all improbable that the famous “Hippodamean” system is owed to this accumulative evolutionary experience: devised by the great architect from Miletos, Hippodamus, this was considered as expressing, in the most realistic and applied manner, the basic principles of democracy.
As has been done, I hope, obviously, the creation of a colony in any part of the Mediterranean was a major factor in the development of the region. On the one hand, the local residents could sell their products and their productions, on the other, the colonists brought new consumer goods to the places that established the colonies. The acceptance of the establishment of a colony was not always peaceful. Several are the situations that the local residents have seen hostile to the presence of the colonists. However, even then, in the competition created, benefits have emerged. Most of the times, however, colonists saw the benefits of having a colony in their neighbourhood. After all, the settlers did not kill the locals to prevail. Instead, they were trying through diplomatic, negotiation and spiritual processes to disseminate the achievements of Greek civilization and to integrate within the newly established city those of the locals who wanted to join. Every city, apart from its walls, had a market where democratic decisions were taken all the decisions about the administration and all the commercial transactions took place. An essential component of everyday public life was the theatre, which was the most frequent place to gather for entertainment as well as for entertainment with the ancient Greek meaning i.e. for the education and the treatment of the soul. The Greek colonies in the Mediterranean do not know if they can easily be counted. Surely, they reach a much larger number than the one that has been identified and excavated to date. With a rough estimate far exceeds the number of 500 across the Mediterranean basin, but also on the Black Sea coast. Many of them are living settlements and cities to this day. These colonies were also the first bodies of culture and development across Europe. Through them, the habit of trading in currencies, traveling ideas, scientific and artistic achievements, and all sorts of goods from one end of Europe to the other spread. They have formed the foundation stone and model for basic principles of organization of cities and of democracy-based regimes for most of the later states of the Old Continent.

With this in 2014 at the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki we organized with the sponsorship of Alpha Bank, which also has one of the largest and most valued collections of coins in the world.

The exhibition “The Europe of Greece: Colonies and coins from the Alpha Bank Collection” focused on Greek colonies of antiquity that are not located in Greek
territory but today belong to modern European states. The principal criterion for choosing the colonies presented were the coins of the Alpha Bank Numismatic Collection. In addition, and in order to give a fuller picture of certain representative colonies from countries of Southern Europe and the Black Sea, a small number of finds that largely define the identity of the colony was selected. At many of these ancient sites, there is continuity of life to this day, a further factor that defined the final choice. In some modern settlements or cities, influences or remains of the once flourishing Greek colony are still apparent in various aspects of their public and private life.

Beyond the objects exhibits the exhibition and the accompanying catalogue aim to include in a panoramic overview almost all the Greek colonies in the Mediterranean and the Black Seas, through maps and abundant educational material kindly provided by the excavators / authors of the texts and the entries. In this way, the huge dispersion (diaspora) of Greeks to the ends of the then-known world becomes immediately apparent. The exhibition was constructed in two units in each gallery. The introductory unit in the first gallery outlines the role of the sea as vital force of Hellenic civilisation, the main myths, the epics and the emblematic heroes invented of basis of maritime adventures. The first unit in the same gallery, entitled “Colonisation: Adventure and Challenge. Identity and Nostos”, spotlights various facets of the phenomenon of colonisation, the historical, social and economic framework that secured the suitable conditions and, primarily, its correlation with the emergence of the city-state.

In the second gallery, the unit “New Homelands from the Euxine Pontos to the Pillars of Heracles” deals with the geographical spread of the colonisation phenomenon from south Italy, Southern France, Spain, the Illyrian Coasts and the Euxine Pontos. Thirty-nine colonies are presented, the most representative of the regions. Each colony is a separate microcosm and its own particular characteristics and coinage are determined. Special weight is attached to the Greek alphabet and its dissemination, the adoption of new crops, the unification through coinage, the prevailing of Greek habits in daily life, such as the symposium, the cults and the theatre.
The next unit in the second gallery entitled “The Greeks and the Others” is devoted to the relations that developed between the Greeks and the neighbouring peoples in the regions where colonies were founded. Through this coexistence influences were generated, new cultural traits were introduced and therefore, cohabitation became possible, despite whatever differences and differentiations. Special mention is made of the Greeks relations with the seafarers and potential rivals, i.e. the Phoenicians, the Celts of Western and Eastern Europe and the Scythians of the Black Sea.
Commercial Roots

by Vera Costantini

In one of his articles, Carlo Dionisotti analyzed the literary topos of war in the East during the Renaissance. The eminent historian of Italian literature argued that limiting analysis to Venice would lead the interpretation to the core of the question, since the majority of literary examples on the topic were written and published in early-modern Venice. Understandably, its geographic location and its economic interests eastward led the Republic of Saint Mark, more than any other Italian or European state of the time to being deeply concerned by the perspective of a military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. Should we shift the analysis from this Renaissance literary topos to the topic of the session I have the honour to open (European commercial roots), Venice may still legitimately retain a central role.

In the tumultuous aftermath of the fall of the Roman Empire, when the areas in Europe excluded by the monetary economy were expanding, the newly founded Republic of Venice boasted its maritime and commercial eastward mission, displaying an attachment to the Byzantine world and eventual affinities with any other political entity on the eastern Mediterranean. In 1082, commercial privileges were granted by Emperor Alexios I Komnenos to the Venetian merchants in return for naval aid against the Normans. When possible, and in open opposition to the pontifical directives to fight “infidels” and “heretics”, the Venetian leading class did not refrain from establishing intense economic partnerships with the Byzantine and Muslim Orients. As stated by Fernand Braudel in “Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme”, exchange must be mutual: in the case of early Venetians, wood and slaves, coming from not-yet-Christianised populations such as the Slavs and Anglo-Saxon tribes, were the essential means of getting gold and silver from the Muslims, with which to buy from Constantinople the luxury wares in demand in the West. “Their ready access to supplies of timber stimulated Venetian shipbuilding”, writes Frederick Lane. “Then, having their own ships and having acquired, through the sale of slaves to the Muslims, precious metal to use as capital, the Venetians took into their own
hands more and more of the trade between their lagoons and the imperial capital, Constantinople”.

According to economic historians, the model of pre-modern Europe was characterised by a constant struggle between dominant stagnation, depending on the structural limits of the agricultural sector, and marginal dynamism, represented by forces of growth, which might be structured in what Emmanuel Wallerstein called “feudal business economies”. The economic model of the Republic of Venice developed according to an integration between agricultural and timber supplies, industrial specialisation, investment and foreign trade. Since the pre-modern economic system is also defined as the “wood civilisation”, due to the importance of wood as fuel and as a raw material for construction industries, the relative availability of timber from the Cansiglio and Cadore forests largely contributed to turning the Venetian model of development into a success story. Frederick Lane, again, writes that “[i]t was Venice’s superior supplies of timber which initially formed the basis for a division of labour between the people of the lagoons and distant Mediterranean shores more productive of wine, oil, and wheat”.

Therefore, the first argument I would like to shed light upon is the fact that, as we learn from the Venetian case study, international maritime trade started in the middle ages not as a separate entity from mainstream rural economies, but as an attempt to integrate capital formation and mutual exchange in a coherent development model in which the availability and redistribution of energy resources (slaves, food and timber) played a relevant role.

Since limited demographical growth occurred and slavery was generally confined to domestic services or highly specialized industrial production, as in the Mameluk sultanates, up to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the migration of energy-saving technologies from China and Central Asia to Europe led to an incomparable plus-value to the trade routes developed by the Venetians, among others. Active both in the south-eastern Mediterranean and on the Black Sea, the Venetians traded in partnership with Syrian and Egyptian merchants and in close contact with the Turkic peoples who preceded and accompanied the emergence of Ottoman power. The Ponto-Caspian region, which Fernand Braudel
indicates as one of the frontiers of the Mediterranean, was an area of intense cultural and technological mediation. Up until the end of the fourteenth century, the Genoese owned Caffa, in Crimea, whereas the Venetians were in Tana, at the outlet of the Don River, turning the Black Sea into a region of intense commercial investment. Constantinople itself had become less important, though remaining crucial as a way station to the ports of the Black Sea. These, in turn, led to the Caspian region and from there, through the steppes, eastward to China, or southward to Tabriz, Persia and the spice bank India. Hence, the centuries-long relationship between Ottomans and Venetians had been preceded by two centuries of acquaintance with “other Turks”, a wide spectrum of Turkic groups such as the Uzbeks and Çagatays, who by then had turned Muslim, though opposed to qızılbaş Safavid Persia. The Codex Cumanicus, a thirteenth-century trilingual glossary with words and idiomatic expressions in vernacular, Kipçak and Persian is still conserved in Venice’s Marciana library. The Republic of Venice experienced its Golden Age and established the main structures of its trade with the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean from the year 1000 up to the end of the thirteenth century, in a period when European civilisation was finally ready and more importantly eager to acquire technological knowledge from the Far East.

A group of comparative historians from Stanford University have argued that the “great divergence”, a concept introduced in 2004 by Kenneth Pomeranz to describe the gap between eighteenth-century industrial Britain and the rest of the world, should be applied retrospectively to a first, medieval phase, called “the first great divergence”, defining the technological gap between China and Europe. Here comes the second argument I would like to highlight: certainly, a commercial network is a closed chain where purchases are determined by sales and vice versa: “l’échange se boucle sur lui-même”, writes Fernand Braudel. Nevertheless, like all events, medieval Mediterranean trade also took place in a specific context; the latter was the still unsettled result of profound economic and social changes which had occurred at the end of the classical period. I believe that the peculiarly transitional pattern of the pre-modern era provided the Venetian economic action with a role of relevant cultural importance in the making of what would become modern European civilisation.
Indeed, migration of technologies played, and somehow still plays, an important role in economic development and it is surely no coincidence that archaeological remains of one of the most ancient wheels in the Italian peninsula, a tide-mill, were discovered in the lagoon of Chioggia. Evidence of tide-mills were also found in ninth-century Venetian monastic settlements, such as the Franciscan monastery currently housing the State Archives. Investing in sophisticated and expensive technologies such as mills remained a peculiar feature of Venetian economic expansion. In a wheat-producing region like sixteenth-century Ottoman Morea, Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent bestowed *timars*, normally reserved as compensation for military service, to Venetian merchants, with the aim of co-financing the construction of mills. Similar events took place in Bosnia in the same period. Since *timars* were often collected in kind, basically the Sultan ceded a share of the harvest to Venetian wheat merchants in exchange for free infrastructural machinery, to the benefit of both traders and local inhabitants. This example allows me to introduce a third argument: the construction of a trade network implied the knowledge of rural landscapes and structures, leading to a regional specialisation potentially improving local profits and therefore living conditions. “Il y a circuit”, writes Fernand Braudel, implying that all the parties involved, although eventually unequal partners, found it convenient to come to terms with foreign investors.

In order to illustrate more clearly this third argument, let’s look at this picture. It was taken from the top of Lekuresit Fortress, in Southern Albania / Northern Epirus. This fortress was built by the Ottomans in the mid-sixteenth century with the aim of controlling the movements of the Venetians from the shores of Corfu, at the extreme right of the picture, to Butrinto, located southward on the Albanian coast. Today an amazing archaeological site, in the sixteenth century Butrinto, was still subject to Venetian rule: formed around a natural coastal lake, it was the perfect location for fishing enclosures, which were called *talyani* in Byzantine Greek (and *mahi dalyan* in Ottoman). The French historian Maurice Aymard states that the Adriatic Sea could be controlled from its north-western extremity to its south-eastern mouth. His interpretation is confirmed by the Venetian strategy to install colonies on the eastern rather than the western shore of the sea, in a long chain stretching from Istria to Southern Albania, occasionally
interrupted by Ottoman dominions. This strategic concern worked in tandem with the economic interest in its regional resources: salt works and fish enclosures. The first, with the aim of developing international trade, the second, destined for regional sale and consumption. Ruling Corfu alone would have resulted in isolating the Venetians, who were more interested in establishing a regional system of exploitation, including other Ionian islands as well as a portion of the mainland, however small it might be. Somehow, the south-eastern Adriatic had to be a projection of the north-western model, represented by Venice, its lagoon rich in resources, and its hinterland. In other words, it had to reflect the same pattern of anthropisation of the environment, characterised by a resource-optimising interaction between humans and nature. As a consequence, Venetian rule contributed to shaping the landscapes of the Mediterranean. History is never a matter of origins, argues Marc Bloch, and I am not attributing to the Venetians the invention of fish enclosures, terrace farming, or salt works. Obviously, these had all been established techniques since the classical period. What I would like to state is that from the late middle ages up until the eve of modernity, when the Byzantine Empire had disappeared and the Genoese had retired from practising active trade, the Venetians and their counterpart, the Ottomans, became the two main Mediterranean institutional entities, and, since the main topic is commercial roots, in spite or maybe because of their profound differences, they were the two principal players on the Mediterranean trade stage. After all, as I mentioned earlier, it is the principle of reciprocity, not of identity, that counts between trade partners.

Ottoman conquests in the Mediterranean paved the way for the establishment of imperial administration in areas formerly dominated by the Byzantines, Genoese, Mameluks, and Venetians. Generally, Ottoman rule did not result in structural changes in the management of rural landscapes. Moreover, former rulers were seldom the first foreign community to be accepted in the newly acquired territory. This had been the case of early Ottoman Cyprus, devastated by the recent war, where a community of Venetian traders from Aleppo settled soon after the peace treaty was signed in 1573. If structural changes occurred in the economic system, it was seldom in spite of and not due to Ottoman rule, as happened in Cyprus, where sugar quickly decayed due to the competition of the
New World plantations and certainly not due to the direct intervention of the central government. Ottoman documents from the Topkapi kitchens witness the presence of Cypriot sugar in the imperial court as early as in the first half of the sixteenth century and there would have been no reason to stop the production once the island had become an Ottoman province. The end of Cypriot sugar production after the 1571 conquest was due to the fact that in the 1580s and early 1590s the Ottoman markets had officially opened to the English and Dutch traders, who soon radically modified the consumption patterns of eastern Mediterranean society. Sugar, in particular, whose production costs had dropped since the introduction of cane plantations in the Caribbean, rapidly became a commodity of mass consumption, whereas in the past it was strictly reserved to élites and certainly not wasted as a sweetener.

As Ruggiero Romano remarked, it was not the Mediterranean space in itself that had lost centrality in the eyes of the new leading economies, on the contrary: up to the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman space adequately suited the needs of English, Dutch and later French economic expansion. The institution of free ports proved functional to the interests of nations wishing to have the easiest and evidently cheapest access to raw materials necessary to feed their growing industrialisation process. Livorno and Izmir, previously marginal realities in the respective institutional frameworks, in the seventeenth century underwent a stunning demographic growth, due to the strategic importance of their free ports for the Levant Company. The Mediterranean remained and still is of central importance for the world economy. It was rather the capacity of the Mediterranean actors to determine their own choices and destinies to be progressively undermined by the flow of foreign capital and by the political pressures exercised by foreign nations.

The seventeenth-century Mediterranean starts being a contradictory space: a high intensity of investments and an increased flow of capitals corresponded to Mediterranean States and Empires having increasing difficulty in coping with industrial competition, as well as administrative and military tasks. A century known for structural economic crisis, the 1600s were at the same time years of metamorphic transformation, conceived as philosophical argument and icono-
graphic theme. After all, crises do incubate change. A specter was haunting Eu-
rope – the specter of newness. New food commodities were being introduced to
the Europeans’ consumption basket; *The New Science*, though fiercely opposed
by the Catholic Church, was demolishing the scholastic interpretation of the
universe as well as its very perception of the social role of culture and intellec-
tuals; new alliances were being promoted and new wars led to unprecedented
scenarios in and beyond the Mediterranean.

The historiography of seventeenth-century Ottoman and Venetian relationships
has focused on the twenty-year war of Candia, when the Republic, though ulti-
mately losing the conflict, inaugurated a period of vigorous military actions,
such as the block of the Dardanelles, and, later, the re-conquest of Morea. Due
to the war, trade under the Venetian flag had to be formally interrupted.

Certainly, the war of Candia was a traumatic event in the history of Venice.
Nevertheless, I would like to step back to a few decades earlier: from the 1573
peace agreement until the actual conflict of Candia broke out, merchants from
the Ottoman Empire and Venetian subjects experienced a particularly fruitful
period of commercial and economic cooperation. In correlation to the Venetian
attempt to internationalise the Adriatic space, Ottoman Bosnia became the sce-
nario of an extraordinary season of exchange and investment. The project of the
*Scala di Spalato* (the Split free-port project, also known as “the new port”),
consisting in the duty-free passage to or from Venice, fulfilled the need to renew
the Republic’s commercial policy though leaving untouched the traditionally
mercantilist trait of the capital economy (basically, duties were paid only once,
in Venice).

I would like to stress this last issue in particular, partly because it is my current
research topic, and partly because it shows that even in difficult economic times
a state can find a way to adapt to new circumstances coherently with its own
development. Across the many centuries of its existence, the history of the Re-
public of Venice still reminds us Mediterraneans to be aware of the resources
of our lands, to ensure that exchanges taking place in and among our countries
are truly mutual, not to fall into identity traps or even more elusive clashes of
civilisation.
Whoever is asked what he thinks about the Mediterranean as a memory space will immediately answer laconically with a question: Ah, Braudel? During and shortly after the Second World War, Fernand Braudel actually created the classic narrative of the Mediterranean: the Mediterranean as the cradle of civilization and a space for constant exchange of goods, people and ideas. Even today – notwithstanding a potential risk to be used as a pretext for power politics – this story is still a good story, and it is also of use to all who wish to redefine the Euro-Mediterranean area as an area of multilateral action and joint responsibility, with a shared history, a shared heritage as well as a shared development and a common future. The aim of this redefinition should be the consolidation of the area as a geopolitical entity of a new kind. This is a political task. A successful policy in this direction requires, in addition to leadership, ideas and reliability, to be aware of two basic conditions:

1. the lasting sustainable, now intensifying densification of reciprocal relations in the Euro-Mediterranean area, creating new dynamic spatial entities, notwithstanding existing political boundaries;

2. the need of imagination, that is the need of a ‘meaning’, which can be created by facts, but even more by pictures and narratives.

Fernand Braudel has also expressed his opinion with regard to the spatial extent of the Euro-Mediterranean area. The epochal migration across the Mediterranean has opened our eyes to us. It reminded us of what we should have known for a long time, namely that not only Europe and the Southern as well as the Eastern Mediterranean belong to this area, but also Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa. Braudel has known this from the beginning: In the third volume of his famous and most influential work “La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II” (1949) he refers to this as the Grande Méditerranée,

the “Great Mediterranean”, which includes not only the countries bordering the Mediterranean, but also Transalpine Western and Northern Europe, the Eastern Mashriq and North Africa down to the Sahel zone. One can call this the ‘Wider Euro-Mediterranean Area’ or the ‘Euro-Afro-Mediterranean Area’ extending – as some like to say – “from the Niger to the North Cape, from Dublin to Damascus”.  

Politics is human work, and human work depends on a set of meanings. A useful archive of such meanings is the history of ideas as well as the history of law. The history teaches us that there is not one ‘meaning of the sea’ but there are many meanings. In this paper, I shall limit myself to the European history and to the history of international public law. In order to arrange the variety of meanings I shall discuss the ‘meaning of the sea’ in three pairs of opposites:

1. Territoriality versus ‘maritime thinking’,
2. Civilizing regulation versus break and innovation,
3. Traditional territorial state power versus maritime functional organization.

Let me point out that I am speaking here of poles, not of antinomies. In each individual case, in each situation, the ‘meaning’ lies somewhere in between the poles. Because this conference is not just about remembrance but also about the future, I will try to find, in between the poles, the meaning which could serve as a guide for the future. The sea, what can it teach us through its meanings?

I come to the first polarity:

**1. Territoriality versus ‘maritime thinking’**

In 1993 Michel Mollat du Jourdin has published a beautiful book about Europe and its relationship with the sea. In this book, he stresses the “strong maritime

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6 This is the motto of the Stiftung Wissensraum Europa-Mittelmeer (WEM) (Foundation Euro-Mediterranean Knowledge Space/ WEM), Stuttgart and Heidelberg. The author is president of this foundation (www.wissensraum-mittelmeer.org).

bond” of Europe. For him land and sea belong together. Linking Europe’s relationship with the sea to the Euro-Afro-Mediterranean area, he returns to Braudel’s concept of the Grande Méditerranée. Like Braudel he treats the great, south-facing peninsulas of Europe, namely Spain, Italy, Greece, as the “first actors of history.” For him they are “roads towards Africa”. Reversely, so Mollat Du Jourdin, the Southern Mediterranean is closely linked to the transalpine central and northern Europe. In Venice and Genoa, the Mediterranean Sea reaches out to the foot of the Alps. From there, the most important trade routes went and still go to the north, to the ports of the Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Trade routes create a network of mobility across Europe, which also covers the southern and eastern Mediterranean and reaches into the Sub-Saharan zone. Goods, technology and people were and still are on the way on these transcontinental Euro-Afro-Mediterranean routes.

Today the intricate unity of the Euro-Afro-Mediterranean area results from the factors economy and technology, politics, migration, security, as well as from a partly common history, a partly common cultural heritage, a partly common education. It is a complex unity. For Braudel, too, the Mediterranean is an “intersection of different worlds”. For him, a characteristic feature of the Mediterranean is the linkage of the disparate. With many other historical examples, he mentions the crews of Moorish pirate ships from the ports of North Africa manned by Europeans, former Christians. These Arab-Berber ships came all the way to the North Sea and Iceland. According to Braudel, the ‘Great Mediterranean’ requires imagination to be understood as a unity. The difficult unity of this area does not only involve common developments and common interests, it also includes conflicts. Maritime openness meets territorial strictness.


9 Mollat Du Jourdin, see note 6., 27.

A lot of imagination is needed to understand the massive migration across the Mediterranean Sea with its cruel negative implications as an element of a common Euro-Afro-Mediterranean space. The sad images of African migrants at sea, do not show them clearly that there are hard limitations between South and North? Yes, there are many, but these images are also signs of a current historical turn. States and societies in Europe, in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean as well as in Africa will see themselves compelled to abandon a purely continental, purely territorial view, characterized by clearly defined areas and linear boundaries. Instead, they will learn to think maritime, ‘maritime’ understood in a metaphorical sense. Their thinking, acting, planning will no longer stay based exclusively on territories and fixed borders. Without abandoning state order – that is to say a monopoly on the use of force and legal protection – they will develop a new model for living-together, inspired and shaped by ‘maritime’ thinking. It will be like shipping on the high seas, characterized by an almost unlimited mobility, high density of relations, close mutual dependencies, shared knowledge, shared responsibility for safety and law, persistent dynamism through constantly redefining the own position in relation to other navigators as well as the firm land. ‘Maritime’ acting and thinking corresponds to the structural model of ‘functional space’. A functional space is formed by a dense, dynamic and complex web of relationships, not by territorial demarcation. The term is used by geographers and economists. I am trying to adapt it to a multilateral collaborative geopolicy, cooperating with colleagues like Yamina Bettahar, participant at this conference.

A new, ‘maritime’ thinking, is it desirable, is it necessary? Let us take a glance at the European history of ideas. In the early 18th century the Neapolitan scholar Giambattista Vico presented a great cultural theory. Part of his philosophical-
historical work, his remarkable *Scienza Nuova*, is a history of culture.\(^{13}\) In this historical work Vico lets start cultural development with the commitment of people to the sea and to seafaring. For this Mediterranean thinker, the sea was a decisive factor in the creation of law, of development, enlightenment, and even secularization. The archaic peoples of the interior are seen by Vico as isolated, inaccessible, xenophobic. He speaks of an “inlandish” mentality. From this ‘inlandish’, territorially fixed mentality – in contrast to a mind marked by the sea – derives a spiritual and intellectual limitation, “because they [the archaic peoples] in the darkness of their closeness, without intercourse with other peoples, did not see the true light of the times”.\(^{14}\) For Vico the city of Alexandria was an outstanding place of philosophy and science. He emphasizes that it was “founded by the sea”, “connecting African acumen and ingenuity with Greek delicacy”.\(^{15}\)

But that is enough on the topic of territoriality and ‘maritime thinking’ right now. Now let us turn to the two other polarities marking ‘the meaning of the sea’. At first: ‘Civilizing regulation versus break and innovation.’ After that: ‘Traditional territorial state power versus maritime functional organization’.

2. Civilizing regulation versus break and innovation

We call ‘civilization’ the firm, sanctioned order controlling the living-together of individuals, groups and societies, characterized by calculability and suppression of acting predominantly driven by instincts. At this point we do not speak of one particular civilization among others – for this we prefer the term ‘culture’ – but of a specific ‘civilized’ form of social and individual living which is universally valid.

In terms of civilization, the sea is a particularly interesting space. This space is fluid in the literal and in the transposed sense. The liquid, the incalculable is only imperfectly contained by the legal principle of the “freedom of the high


\(^{14}\) Vico, see note 11, paragraph 83.

\(^{15}\) Vico, see note 11, paragraph 46.
seas” and by the definition of “territorial waters”, that means the three to twelve-mile zone. Both concepts are civilizing regulations. Both stand for the civilizational dimension of the sea. However, the high seas are a space of high contingency. Much is possible there, because not every situation is legally regulated. Michel Foucault, the French cultural philosopher, has called certain places ‘heterotopias’ or ‘heterotopes’. That is to say, ‘counter-places’ or ‘counter-spaces’, where the considerations, the calculations of everyday life are little or nothing. These are places which also escape the usual social judgings and valuations. That is why they represent a challenge for other places and spaces. Not infrequently, they are at the same time places of remembrance where bad things have happened, massacres, violence. Foucault argues that heterotopes are often related to transitions, upheavals, to an unexpected change which is understood as a danger. So, the Mediterranean Sea and its shores should not be seen stereotypically and exclusively as the ‘cradle of civilization’. It can also be seen as a counter-place calling into question civilization in the sense of social order and calculable living-together.

The sea offers numerous natural, historical and current examples of this. There are huge storms that have destroyed entire fleets. There are the pirates. There are the interventions of foreign powers coming across the sea. There are flight and unregulated migration across the Mediterranean Sea. Aggression, flight and migration across the sea are old phenomena. So, they have got a mythical character in antiquity. Let us think of the flight of the Phoenician queen Dido to North Africa, Jason’s robbery of the Golden Fleece, the maritime assault on Troy, the flight of the Trojan Aeneas to Italy, which, however, finally led to the founding of Rome, which became a mighty agent of civilization.

At sea, how can civilization arise there? Certainly by means of state agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982/1994) or by the transfer of territorial style action to the sea, such as the confinement of large parts of the Mediterranean Sea, which was once attempted by Spain and Portugal, partly also by England. But all this is very unstable. More important for the making and safeguarding of civilization is the fine network of functional
relations, which arises across and over the sea forming tight meshes. With regard to the Mediterranean one has to mention the following links: trade, mobility and migration, the exchange of ideas and concepts in culture, business and politics – all this now massively promoted by IT – furthermore, political interactions and conflicts, ecological problems as well as cooperation. These are important potentials of civilization.

However, there remain very serious challenges. The Mediterranean Sea remains dangerous. So, can a lack of civilizing regulations lead – seemingly paradoxically – to new innovative political, social, cultural, legal orders? There are reasons to be optimistic. These reasons are partly timeless. Let us listen to a thinker of the European Middle Ages, more precisely, of the ninth century, Johannes Scottus Eriugena. Eriugena lived at the court of a Franconian king, a descendant of Charlemagne. He was born in Ireland and was deeply influenced by the Mediterranean spirit of Greek antiquity. For him, the sea is not just a source of knowledge and inventiveness as Giambattista Vico said 900 years later, for Eriugena, even more dynamic, it is at sea, that reason can freely unfold itself.¹⁶

There is yet another argument for optimism: the importance of the sea for imagination. Vico thought to have discovered the origins of the ancient myths in the real experiences made by people at sea and on sea coasts. The Winged Horse of the myth of Perseus may serve as an example. For Vico this horse is the mythical transformation of a pirate ship with inflated sails. So, the bull of Minos is, likewise, the mythical transformation of an ancient pirate ship with a spur and Mediterranean rigging with horny Latin sails. The labyrinth of Minos is the mythical image of the confusing Aegean island world. Vico refers to a “poetical geography” of the sea.¹⁷ Often it is fantasy, imagination, which draws people out to the sea and to distant coasts. A ‘poetical’ geography, an inspired political cultural geography, is it still possible today? What about the creation of a Euro-Afro-Mediterranean area, redefined as a functional space of common development, shared prosperity, inspired by the overwhelming epochal experiences of

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¹⁶ Mollat Du Jourdin, see note 6, 63
¹⁷ Vico, see note 11, paragraph 741 (“poetical geography”), see also 634-636.
people at and around the Mediterranean Sea in our current times? A new awareness may emerge from these experiences. New awareness then allows and creates new solutions.

The sea, understood as a heterotope, has two sides: On the one hand the lack or the breaking of laws and civilizing rules, yes even destruction, on the other side new orders. Vico calls King Minos of Crete the “first lawmaker of the pagan peoples and the first corsair in the Aegean”.18 The flight of Aeneas from the burning Troy finally led to the founding of Rome and a new world order.

I come now to the third polarity:

3. Traditional territorial state power versus maritime functional organization

Civilization should find its form in law, also in the law regulating the relationship between states. This law is called international public law. The sea is of great importance for the development and safeguarding of this law. From the beginning of our historical memory, the Mediterranean was a high-risk zone, but it was not lawless. The maritime law owes itself to maritime trade, also to the millennium-old Mediterranean trade, understood as free exchange of goods which had to be protected by rules and sanctions. The Law of the Sea, in turn, is one of the roots of international public law. The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (from 1982 and 1994)19 is based on the principle of the “freedom of the high seas” (article 87) designating the states as responsible actors. The Convention specifies in article 87 (1): “The high seas are open to all states, whether coastal or land-locked”. The freedom of the high seas according to the Convention covers many freedoms, from the freedom of navigation to the freedom of fishing and scientific research, and even the freedom to “construct artificial islands”.

On the one hand, the principle of the Free Sea, the Mare Liberum, goes back to centuries of efforts to prevent the unrestrained rule and violence of states at sea,

driven by traditional territorial thinking. The principle of the *Mare Liberum* is aimed at the states which, according to the principle of the ‘Closed Sea’, the *Mare Clausum*, wanted to divide up the sea amongst themselves. These states wanted to transfer rules of territorial law to the sea. However, this has never worked. On the other hand, the principle of the freedom of the high seas, since antiquity, is aimed at the pirates. The pirates embody the total negation of every state order. They represent all potentials of maritime seafaring, which are directed against state order. State power built up not least through the fight against piracy. This fight requires great resources, complex organization and the ability to create formal alliances. Attacks on the freedom of the high seas must be “repressed” by all states in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 100 (et seq.): “Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy”: “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” This is a very modern multilateral concept of security. Security this way is not to be guaranteed by one powerful actor, for example a world power, but by a multitude of actors communicating and taking on specific functional tasks.

Sea power is something fundamentally different from land power. Land power aims at mastering territories, sea power aims at the control of connections. The founder of the classical doctrine of naval power is the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. In 1890, he published his famous book “The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1660-1783”. For Mahan a large-scale trading network as well as naval bases are the “pillars” of naval power. As a basic “condition” for naval power Mahan regards maritime thinking, penetrating the entire attitude to life. For Mahan, maritime thinking is a specific mentality rather than a particular policy. Part of this mentality is the renunciation of power over coherent territories, the renouncement of clearly defined linear boundaries as well as the comprehensive regulation of social life in a dominated territory. Part of this mentality is also the ability to think in categories of movement and changing constellations as well as the interest to gain power not over land, but over the brains,

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to create “colonies”, ‘colonies’ in the sense of interested and friendly groups as political social foothold, human capital at disposal, while always maintaining the aim to control the exchange of goods, people and ideas.

4. What should we do?

Thomas Hobbes, the political thinker at the time of the European religious wars in the 17th century, is the father of the ‘Leviathan’. Using this monster from the Bible he describes the modern secular state in Europe. According to Hobbes the central task of this state is peace enforcement and peace keeping in large coherent territories. The state has to keep the opposing social forces or parties under control, in particular the parties which legitimate themselves through religion. The sea, however, which cannot be controlled totally, was perceived by Hobbes as a threat, a threat to the peace which has to be created and maintained by the state (or the states).

Even today many people perceive the sea, especially the Mediterranean Sea, as a potential threat. Classical piracy is no longer present there. But there are other challenges: There are violent interventions by larger and smaller states which do not adhere to operating civilizational standards, states which act ruthlessly, disregarding the rules of international law. Furthermore, there are cruel actions by extremists who do not obey any law that can be accepted by all. And there is finally the massive unregulated, mostly illegal migration, organized by private entrepreneurs acting on a large scale. All this is coming at a time when state order, not only in Europe, but also in the Maghreb and in the Eastern Mediterranean is at risk or has even gone. All this is endangering also peace: peace between groups of different forms of life, different religions, different ethnicities, different prosperity. The Leviathan is losing power. Whom or what could we put on his place?

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a new legal system was introduced in Europe: On the land a public law, which subjected all members of a society to a common legal system, at sea an international public law, in the form of the ‘freedom of the high seas’. Today, too, there is a need of designing new orders
fitting to our world. The new orders should connect the safety of territorial organization with maritime flexibility, state order with functionality, territoriarity with mobility, regulation with innovation.

Let us return to the Mediterranean: the Mediterranean – sea and land – was and is a meaningful heterotope, meaningful, because proceeding from this heterotope the world can be re-examined.²¹ The sea is a heterotope of movement. They were men of the Mediterranean, who travelled to distant continents: Pytheas of Massalia, Marco Polo, Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci, the Portuguese navigators. Other men, from the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea or from Al-Andalus, have to be added: Hanno the Navigator from Carthage, Ibn Jubayr from Valencia (Balansyya), Ibn Battuta from Tangier, al-Idrisi from Ceuta, Ibn Khaldun from Tunis and many others. As mentioned above, the sea, according to the Carolingian thinker Eriugena of the ninth century, is a place where reason can freely unfold. The old maps, however, the mythical stories of charming islands show: The sea is also a heterotope of imagination, of the dream to start to a new order. In the Mediterranean, understood as the Grande Méditerranée, the “Great Mediterranean”, this order should be – notwithstanding other ties and loyalties – the Euro-Afro-Mediterranean Area as a political, economic and even cultural entity of a new kind, an area of common prosperity, free mobility regulated by law, shared security, to sum up: a functional space “from the Niger to the North Cape, from Dublin to Damascus”.


²² The author does not consider this scenario to be totally utopistic. Individual elements have already been proposed by renowned think-tanks such as EuroMeSco, the Euro-Mediterranean Study commission (see note 9). There are also state initiatives being on their way, such as the EU’s Southern Neighborhood Policy, the Africa-EU Partnership or the program Compact with Africa. Cooperation in a true spirit of togetherness and belonging would enhance the value of these initiatives.
Politics and Religion in the Mediterranean: A Historical Approach

By Murat Çizakça

Christianity and Islam, the two religions dominating both shores of the Mediterranean, have always had a problematic symbiosis, sometimes mutually advantageous, sometimes hostile. This symbiosis was characterized by cross-cultural borrowing of ideas and institutions. Looking at this process, first, from the perspective of religious principles, we note a remarkable borrowing of ideas during the early sixteenth century, the era of reformation in Europe. Probably as an outcome of this borrowing, Islam and Protestantism ended up having the following ideas in common: justification through faith, priesthood of the believer, primacy of the scripture and iconoclasm.

Martin Luther had said that the tower experience occurred when he was studying the Bible, more specifically, Romans 1:17. But we also know that he had read the Qur’an and even wrote the preface to the so-called Bibliander Qur’an. So, we have here a very interesting mystery, was he influenced by the Qur’an and yet, naturally, never acknowledged it?

Moreover, if the two religions have these important principles in common, why is there so much hostility that we observe today? It is well-known that in the same period Ottomans provided crucial help to Protestant England and Holland in their struggles against Catholic Spain. Most historians argue that this was just sixteenth century Realpolitik. But, could it be that Muslim Ottomans, in addition to the Realpolitik perspective, might also have considered Lutheranism a “better” form of Christianity? In view of the common principles between the two religions just mentioned, this is certainly a possibility.

As for the institutions, Medieval Muslims developed three major institutions which, Europeans borrowed:

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1. Business partnerships. The *commenda* partnership, known in the Islamic world as *mudaraba* or *Qirad*, was most probably borrowed during the tenth century by Italian merchants. The borrowing of this partnership and its incorporation into the *Lex Mercatoria* paved the way to the thirteenth century European commercial revolution. This particular partnership, so essential for financing an entrepreneur, was learnt by Italian merchants doing business in the Middle East. It then became a mercantile custom among them and was eventually incorporated into the various compilations of *Lex Mercatoria*, which facilitated the diffusion of *mudaraba* in Europe, where it came to be known as *commenda*. It is generally agreed that *commenda* was the most important business partnership of medieval Europe.24 Actually, medieval Europe was not the furthest limit of *mudaraba*’s geographical expansion. It was also observed in Central and South-East Asia, the Ming Dynasty China and even in fourteenth-fifteenth century Japan.25 Remarkably, this Eastward diffusion helped the Dutch when they reached the Indonesian archipelago for the first time. Reporting back home, servants of the Dutch East India Company, VOC, wrote that they found it very easy to do business with the “natives” since they knew and practiced *commenda*.26 In short, the Islamic


25 On the expansion to Central and South-East Asia see; M. Cizakca, Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 18-21. The expansion to China and Japan was explained to me by David Faure, Francois Gipouloux, Billy K. L. So and Deng Kent, during the Paris (EHESS) conference on November 29-30, 2013 sponsored by (CNRS), Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme and the Pôle de Recherche et d’Enseignement Supérieur HéSam.I am grateful to all these colleagues. The Chinese mudaraba/commenda differed from the usual European one in that the passive partner was the Chinese state, which financed the ships. This was, however, similar to the original Middle Eastern mudaraba, where tax revenues from provinces were transferred to the center in the form of mudaraba, i.e., the state, again, was the passive partner and the tax collector or the governor of the province, the active agent.

mudaraba had become a common link facilitating trade between the Europeans and the Muslims of the Malay world at the edge of the Pacific Ocean.27

2. The Law of maritime trade.28 International trade would not have been possible without a sophisticated maritime law. A well-known French historian Daniel Panzac has shown that this institution was also provided by Muslims. This originally Islamic law of maritime trade was transferred to Europe, again, through various compilations. The three most important compilations were made during the eleventh-twelfth centuries. These were the Maritime Laws of Rhodes, Oleron and the Consolato del Mare. Thanks to Panzac’s work, it is now definitively established that the first one, previously considered to be a derivative of the Roman-Byzantine digests, was in fact based on Al-Mudawwana al-Kubra by Sahnun Ibn Sa’id al Tanukhi (d. 854). It was commented upon by Ibn Rushd (known in the West as Averroes d. 1117) and drafted in Sicily or Southern Italy, both Muslim territories during the ninth to eleventh centuries. The second was authored by the Court of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem in order to harmonize trade relations between the occidental and oriental Christians as well as Muslims. This compilation was brought to Europe partly by Eleanor of Aquitaine and partly by her son Richard the Lionheart. The contents of the Oleron compilation are identical to the Muslim laws of the ninth to tenth centuries. Finally, the Consolato del Mare was written in Spain. The document originates in the Muslim Middle Eastern texts of the eighth to ninth centuries and was later brought to Andalusia. It was translated during the reign of King Alphonse in thirteenth century Castille as part of the great works of translation from Arabic.

27 Professor Meilink-Roelofsz had suggested that Malay peoples might have learnt the commenda partnership from the Portuguese. This view is no longer acceptable. Thanks to Fang’s work, we now know that Undang-undang Melaka, a compilation of Islamic maritime law of Malacca was initiated by Sultan Muhammad Shah (1424-44) and completed during the reign of Sultan Muzaffar Shah (1445-58), some 40 years before the Portuguese ever set foot in the Indian Ocean. See, Liaw Yock Fang, Undang-Undang Melaka (The Laws of Melaka), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 38.

3. There is strong evidence that waqf too was borrowed by the Europeans. Thus, important institutions of education and health, the two most crucial elements of human capital, were created in Europe after the Islamic pattern.²⁹ But borrowing was not one-sided. Muslims too borrowed ideas and institutions from the West:

1. Foremost among these with the most dramatic consequences was nationalism, which destroyed the traditional political set up of the Middle East. Nationalism first split and then reduced multinational and multi-denomina-
tional empires into warring states, a process still affecting the region. The idea was invented by the Europeans, particularly the French, during the eighteenth century. It was then used in order to destroy the multinational Ottoman and Austria-Hungarian empires. But then, like a monster, it re-
turned onto its creators and having destroyed Europe twice during the twen-
tieth century, it now seems to be re-emerging, like a vicious phoenix, from its ashes in Europe. This is despite the proclamations of Mitterrand and Kohl: “le nationalisme c’est la Guerre” and “Nationalismus bedeutet Krieg”. It is precisely for these historical reasons that Macron’s recent election victory in France is so important.

2. Technology. This was obviously positive and does not need further explana-
tion.

3. Secularism (radical French secularism undermined the traditional Islamic secularism and led to still ongoing conflicts between the secularists and con-
servatives in many Muslim countries)³⁰

4. Socialism was also disastrous and led to complete economic failure in sev-
eral Islamic countries.

²⁹ Monica Gaudiosi, “The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in Eng-
³⁰ Secularism in the sense of freedom of worship constitutes a cardinal principle in the Qur’an. Consider the following verses: “To You be your religion and to me mine” (109:9); “If it had been thy Lord’s will, they would all have believed, all who are on earth! Will though then compel mankind against their will to be-
lieve?” (10:99); “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (2:256).
5. Republicanism. Not accompanied by democracy, republicanism often slid into dictatorship.

At this point we can ask the following: Why was institutional borrowing from East to West so beneficial to the borrower (Europe), while the West to East borrowing (to the Islamic world) so destructive? Could it be that while the medieval East to West borrowing was done by individuals, primarily merchants, from the bottom up, modern West to East borrowing was mostly imposed by either the colonial powers or the indigenous modernist elites from top to bottom? There cannot be a straightforward answer to this question as there are important exceptions. After all, not every post-colonial republic slid into dictatorship. Consider, for instance, the case of India – the most populous democracy in the world.

Is the answer then hidden in details or are there deeper and more complex reasons? A more concrete explanation might be found in the deliberate nineteenth century destruction of the waqf system by the European colonial powers.\(^\text{31}\) Waqfs were the Islamic civil society institutions par excellence and their destruction eliminated any potential that might have existed for democracy in the Islamic world.

It is also remarkable that whereas the West reversed its policy and began to support charitable foundations in the twentieth century, Muslim modernists remained hostile to waqfs.

There is also a very real danger of regress: while India is regressing in secularism, Turkey is regressing in democracy.

What about the post-colonial Islamic world? In general, colonial powers were replaced by indigenous dictators often supported by Western powers. Thus, strengthened and with only a few exceptions, even the Arab spring failed to get rid of these dictators. One thing is very clear, as long as these dictatorships survive, there is no hope for the Islamic world. Muslims must create a new political order. But what kind of a political order? The first thing to remember in this

context is that the Qur’an does not prescribe a political system. It therefore grants considerable freedom to design a system that Muslims can develop in response to the demands of the era they live in. While doing this, they can be inspired by the classical teachings of their religion.

Islamic world needs to design new state structures incorporating its own traditional values and true western achievements such as democracy, rule of law and freedoms. Reinterpreting the Maqasid (purposes of Islamic jurisprudence) is an important first step. According to Al-Shatibi and Gazali, two great medieval Muslim thinkers, there are five major purposes of Islamic jurisprudence:

1. Protection of the mind
2. Protection of religion
3. Protection of property
4. Protection of the self
5. Protection of the future generations

These purposes have been traditionally interpreted mainly as the duty of a Muslim. But Ibn Khaldun considers protecting them is actually the duty of the state. This is because, he argues, failure to protect them leads to injustice and injustice can only be committed by persons who have authority and power and therefore “cannot be touched”. Put differently, if any of these purposes is violated by an ordinary individual, he can be punished and the violation can be effectively stopped. But if the violator is the ruler then injustice happens. It is therefore the duty of the state, rather than the individual, to protect these purposes. For, the harm that can be done by an individual pale beside the harm that can be affected by the state.

If we follow Ibn Khaldun and consider these purposes as the duty of the state, a remarkable re-interpretation becomes possible and they are then transformed into the following universal values:

1. Freedom of thought and expression
2. Freedom of worship for all (We might call this Islamic secularism)

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3. Full property rights for all
4. Human rights

Provision of health and education for the future generation through a combination of voluntary (the waqfs) and state efforts.\textsuperscript{33}

In short, it is possible to redesign the modern Islamic state with these objectives. Not only Islamic law does not constitute any impediment, on the contrary, it demands that a modern Islamic state fulfils these duties. It is also clear that dictatorships are incapable of pursuing these goals. So, clearly, the political system of a modern Islamic state must be secular and democratic.

But we must be aware that Islamic secularism is not the same as the French \textit{laicité}. It is rather freedom of worship for all. This is not theoretical, there is definitive historical evidence that it was applied by most Islamic states, particularly by the Ottoman Empire, which developed its much-admired \textit{millet} system for this purpose. But \textit{millet} system was not a genuine Ottoman invention, it was rather an institutionalization of an idea enshrined in the various verses of the Qur’an.\textsuperscript{34}

As for democracy, this is also implied by the Qur’an which ordains Muslims to consult. The most efficient method of consulting the masses is democracy with its parliament and periodic elections.

Finally, the economy of such a state should be based upon ethical capitalism. This is not just an argument, it is a historical fact. Indeed, ethical capitalism was the economic system applied in medieval Islam that enabled Muslims to achieve huge wealth.\textsuperscript{35}

The modern Islamic state should modernize the historical institutions of this capitalism. All of this, in my opinion, should be the agenda for Muslims in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. What really matters is that these values and institutions are by no


\textsuperscript{34} 109:6; 10:99; 2:256

\textsuperscript{35} For a detailed analysis of why the medieval Islamic economy was an early form of capitalism see: Murat Çizakça, \textit{Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution and the Future} (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011).
means impeded by Islam, on the contrary, Islam demands that they should be firmly established and applied.

Finally, while doing so, it is essential that the European experience and know-how should be seriously taken into consideration. This experience and know-how developed by the Europeans are priceless – they have been learnt at the cost of hundreds of millions of Europeans’ lives over the centuries.

I refer here particularly to the rule of law, democracy and its sub-institutions: parliament, separation of powers, independent judiciary and checks and balances.

European Union, itself, provides a priceless lesson. While European nationalism has been so destructive for the Middle East, another Western invention, federalism, provides the antidote for it. In short, cross-cultural borrowing of institutions should continue on the condition that what is borrowed is in harmony with the culture, needs and traditions of the borrower. This is supported by research demonstrating that institutional borrowing succeeds only under such conditions.\textsuperscript{36}

The Destruction of the Common Ground

By Umut Koldaş

Introduction

This paper aims to provide an overall analysis of the root causes and dynamics of destruction of the common ground in the Mediterranean which prevents an enduring cooperation in the regions.

As the multilevel and multidimensional in-depth analysis of the destruction of the ground in the Mediterranean necessitates a systematic analysis and a detailed assessment of the factors and dynamics at various levels of analysis and sectors, this presentation mainly aims to put forward the general framework to trigger further interdisciplinary discussions.

Within this framework, the destruction of the common ground will be discussed by referring to the root causes of the destruction of the common ground, reasons for the continuity of the destruction, and the prospects for a change from destruction to reconstruction of the Mediterranean as a common memory space.

Root Causes of the Destruction of the Common Ground

Difficulties in constructing a common ground in the Mediterranean mainly derive from unfulfilled basic needs in certain segments of the region, clash of interests and priorities, misguided perceptions about clash of values and value systems, lack of institutionalized and functional structure of cooperation and dialogue (i.e. failure of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue) and economic benefits of continuation of a destroyed common ground for some actors who benefit from the existing status quo.

Security is one of the unfulfilled needs of the individuals and the communities in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea have not been transformed into a sea of peace and cooperation around which a security community would coordinate their joint efforts towards achieving common security goals and priorities. It rather remained as a security complex where competing / conflicting security priorities interests have suppressed the common ones.
Neither regional cooperation efforts such as Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue nor the revolutionary movements within the context of Arab Spring resulted in a structural change and problem-solving prescriptions towards fulfilling the basic security needs of people in the Mediterranean.

In terms of military security, the Mediterranean was characterized by lingering disputes as well as civil wars and wide-spread terrorism all around the region. In this respect, military security architecture of the Mediterranean seems to be characterized by the short-term military alliances and quick shifts in military priorities of the Mediterranean societies in line with the changing security agenda. Lack of necessary functioning security structures and instruments for multilateral and multi-level management of regional security and inefficiency of European and other regional security structures (i.e. WEU, OSCE, NATO, Arab League) in providing the region with sustainable security push all relevant actors to focus on their own self-fulfilling military security actions rather than cooperating with their neighbours. Differences between the security cultures of the Mediterranean countries and dissimilarities of their security priorities further complicates the possibility of constructing a common ground to fulfil the security needs all societies in the Mediterranean region.

In terms of fulfilling political needs, the Mediterranean societies failed to establish a common ground for nurturing an all-inclusive regional political culture based on co-existence of various patterns of political orientations. Misguided attempts to establish a Mediterranean union or national malpractices of exported political systems caused constant political instability and uncertainty in certain sub-regions of the Mediterranean.

Outwardly irreconcilable differences in the political priorities and interests of various political regimes in different parts of the Mediterranean left the region with a scattered regional political framework with mostly disharmonious sub-regional, national and local political structures/systems.

Bilateral / regional conflicts were instrumentalized by the domestic political actors and national political regimes as the tools of regime-consolidation in domestic politics. In this respect, in certain parts of the region, destroying the common ground outside a country or a locality served to consolidate a national
and/or sub-national common ground inside that particular entity while harming regional harmony. Therefore, political authorities in some of the Mediterranean countries tried to increase their domestic political power through fueling the foreign animosities/conflicts as well as instrumentalizing national populist discourses against the foreigners in the region. Inability of Mediterranean political actors to develop a coherent ideational background of Mediterranean common values and tangible mechanisms to materialize a common Mediterranean political culture left the radical movements and populist actors room for maneuver in the political sphere. Institutionalization of animosities on political grounds—in the body of radical populist/extremist political parties in the North and radical extremist (even violent) groups in the South and East—further beclouded the prospects for constructing a common regional value-system and political culture.

In economic terms, there have been numerous initiatives in order to establish common economic cooperation among the Mediterranean societies throughout the history. Most recent examples of these initiatives have been preferential trade agreements between European Economic Community and the Southern Mediterranean countries in 1969, the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972, 5+5 Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue created in 1990, The Euro-Mediterranean and the Barcelona Process of 1995 efforts towards creation of Euro-Mediterranean free-trade economic zone, the Agadir Free Trade Agreement among some of the Southern Mediterranean countries of 2004 and plans towards establishing Union for the Mediterranean of 2008.

Nevertheless, these initiatives could neither prevent deepening of the economic developmental gap between the North and South nor have they fulfilled the economic promises given to the people of Mediterranean with regard to elimination of regional and sub-regional inequalities. In fact, absence of a well-designed and an efficient institutional structure to coordinate relations among the Mediterranean economies left the people of region with unfulfilled economic needs and unmaterialized ideals rather than bringing a more equitable structural transformation.
Failure of such initiatives also caused confidence crises, investment problems, exploding unemployment and stagnant economies particularly in the South Mediterranean particularly after 2008 economic crisis. This situation was further exacerbated by political instability and structural deconstruction of the political regimes following the Arab Spring. The civil wars, terrorist attacks and other types of military confrontations led emergence of economies of conflict, which did not allow construction of a smooth functioning regional economic cooperation. As a result, the economy appeared as an area of competition and protection rather than cooperation in the years of regional neoliberal restructuring. In this respect, it is not clear yet whether even the newly found energy sources in the Mediterranean will be a catalyst for solution the conflicts or will they create new conflicts among the Mediterranean countries.

In societal terms, the main question about establishing a common ground is to maintain harmonious coexistence of the different cultures and identities in the Mediterranean. Existence of various religious, linguistic and ethnic groups is supposed to be richness of the region. Differences among these group of people however, is exploited by the conflict driven entities in order to achieve certain political objectives. Benefiting politically from discourses of inter-ethnic, inter-religious and/or inter-cultural otherization and xenophobia some radical movements fuel the conflicts among the peoples of the Mediterranean. Therefore, differences in cultures have been instrumentalized as reference points for intra-regional conflicts rather than being considered as richness of the region to construct a basis for a solid cultural common ground. Rising discourse on clashes of cultural values and polarized identities ingenerate protectionist nationalism and xenophobic populism, which make construction of a cultural common ground more difficult. Another dynamic which further postpones building of a cultural common ground is the internalization/banalization of identity driven intra-regional conflicts by the sides of the conflicts as well as by the local, regional and global actors. Continuation of daily life routines and practices within the context of these conflicts (such as Cyprus Conflict or Arab-Israeli Conflict) allow the peoples of Mediterranean to get used to live with the conflict (like a tumour in the body where you know it is there but you get along with it). Such an adaptation conflict also brings about de-prioritization of lingering conflicts
in the international, regional and local agenda unless it evolves into actual clashes.

Destruction of common grounds in cultural terms does not only occur among the individuals but also in the spatial domains of Mediterranean. Destruction of the spatial common grounds takes place mainly through historical deconstruction (i.e. renaming the villages, reorganizing the space) and an ahistorical reconstruction of the identity of space by erasing the symbols of coexistence or replacing them with the new ones and banal reproduction of new meanings of the space on daily basis by decontextualizing it from its historical background. Decontextualizing the spatial history of the villages in Cyprus or Arab-Israeli Conflict are the most obvious examples of such reconstruction. The checkpoints in Israel and Cyprus, on the other hand, continue to serve as the means for banal reproduction of dividedness. In fact, the pragmatic use of the spatial dividedness by the sides of the conflict in their daily lives further cements banal reproduction of a destroyed common ground. As the people adapt themselves to the division and explore the daily benefits / advantages of spatial dividedness, this results in false-conscious acceptance and continuous reproduction of dividedness.

**Unfulfilled Promises: Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and Mediterranean Union**

As mentioned above inability to establish necessary institutions and generate effective policies at regional level to cope with the problems of the Mediterranean, prevents to materialize systematic efforts against destruction of the common grounds.

Regional initiatives of institutionalization such as Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and Mediterranean Union failed to fulfil their promises to the peoples of the Mediterranean. In the case of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and Mediterranean Union the main promise was freedom from military, economic, political, societal and environmental insecurity and end of fear. This promise, as well as the security needs of the people, has never been fulfilled.

Mediterranean Union or Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue remained as idle elite projects which did not fulfil the very basic tangible and intangible needs of the
people. They turned into simply top to bottom projects which were not very well known to general public and thus were not internalized by the people on the street. People of the Mediterranean could not simply understand how being “Mediterranean” or sharing the common values would solve their problems. In this respect, while the “Mediterranean-ness” offered the Mediterranean people unfulfilled promises, its opponent ideologies pledged to fulfil their needs not only on the physical world but also in the spiritual one (i.e. Jihadism).

**Unfulfilled Promises: Arab Spring**

The needs were misperceived and misread by the political and intellectual elite both in the region and the world consciously or unconsciously within the context of Arab upheavals that took place after 2011. Arab Spring was an opportunity to create a Mediterranean solidarity for the transformation but it was not used. It resulted in the re-imprisonment of the people in the new authoritarian structure. In fact, it was also a case of misreading or de-contextualizing the needs of the people.

Mohammed Bouazisi, the street vendor in Tunisia did not burn himself for the democratic values or for Mediterranean Unity (or Victory of Islam or for any other so called higher common values). He burned himself because his and his beloveds’ basic needs of being human were not fulfilled. It was not only the material needs but also the needs related to the human dignity (the way how he was treated by the authorities).

Arab Spring could have been the beginning of so-called structural transformation in the Mediterranean authoritarian regimes. However, it lacked a very well-structured Euro-Mediterranean solidarity. Being Mediterranean did not help the regimes in transformation to fulfil the needs of the societies.

Unfinished transformations resulted in replacement of the authoritarian regimes with new authoritarian regimes or entities. The promises of Arab Spring for democracy, welfare and accountability has been overturned country after country: Today we have new forms of authoritarianism in Egypt, civil war and authoritarian Jihadism in Syria, chaos in Libya, and terrorism all over the Mediterranean.
Thousands of people with unfulfilled material and spiritual needs have left their homes to join the radical movements, in the middle of the social protests over rising unemployment, corruption, prominent terrorist attacks and lingering insurgency in their countries. This, once again showed us that we cannot simply speak about the values to people whose basic material and spiritual needs were not fulfilled.

However, we can and should talk about these common values while fulfilling these needs. If the people can see that being Mediterranean and sharing the same values solve their problems and fulfil their needs, then it would be much easier to internalize these values.

**Unfulfilled Promises: Refugee Crisis**

Recent refugee crisis has been another test case for the solidarity of “Mediterranean-ness”, which most of the Mediterranean societies failed to provide support their region-mates in fulfilling their very basic needs for survival.

In this picture, one cannot simply convince the people about the sincerity of Mediterranean solidarity, unity or commonalities while closing the doors for the forcefully displaced people and avoiding to fulfil the basic needs of the Mediterranean people from Syria and other conflict-torn Mediterranean countries.

We need to emphasize the Mediterranean commonalities, common values while solving the very basic problems of the people with showing respect to their dignity rather than seeing this help as a self-satisfactory process in domestic, regional and international arena.

**As a Conclusion: Future of the Mediterranean from an age of uncertainty to ???**

Mediterranean can be considered as a centre, a bridge or crossroads that unify or integrate the people. It can well serve as a frontier, a wall or a buffer zone that divide them.

Today we have to deal with very serious challenges to establish a Mediterranean common ground such as deepening of the processes of otherization; rise of new
wave of populism based on nationalist (even racist)-protectionism; continuing grieves of the people of the region dues to civil wars, forced displacements; lingering disputes; terrorism; violent populism, and xenophobia.

People of the Mediterranean and the world should decide on what direction will they choice to move forward. The choice will be between establishing effective mechanisms to fulfil the needs of the Mediterranean people and a self-fulfilling hypocrisy that would turn ideals of Mediterranean solidarity and union into empty promises reflected in the fancy speeches of regional and global political leaders.
Remember for the Future – The Mediterranean as a Memory Space: Delegates’ List

Dr. Polyxeni Adam-Veleni (Director of Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki, Greece)

Dana Alakhras (Lazord Foundation Fellowship Program, Jordan)

Stavros Arnaoutakis (Governor of Crete, Greece)

Dr. Hind Arroub (Fulbright senior lecturer and scholar based at Fordham University-New York, USA)

Prof. Dr. Yamina Bettahar (Prof. Dr. in Sociology & History of Sciences / Université de Lorraine & MSH Lorraine, France)

Costa Carras (Vice President, Europa Nostra, Greece)

Giusy Checola (PhD candidate at University Paris 8 Vincennes Saint-Denis, France)

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Nelly Corbel (Vice President of the Board, Lazord Foundation, France/Egypt)

Dr. Vera Costantini (Assistant Professor of Turkish Studies and Economic History at the "Ca' Foscari" University of Venice, Italy)

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Dimitrios P. Droutsas (Former Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Greece)

Ellada Evangelou (Researcher / Community Worker in Culture – University of Cyprus, Cyprus)

Nada Farah (Project Manager at Ettijahat – Independent Culture, Lebanon)

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John Goelet (Farmer / Entrepreneur, USA)

Prof. Dr. Sahar Hamouda (Director, Alexandria and Mediterranean Research Center, Bibliotheca Alexandrina / Professor, Department of English Language and Literature, Alexandria University, Egypt)

Dr. Eleftherios Ikonomou (Former Director of the Foundation for Hellenic Culture for the German Speaking Countries of Europe, Germany)

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Anna Manice (Co-Founder and President, Lazord Foundation, USA)

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Prof. Dr. Bernd Thum (Professor Emeritus, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) / Foundation Euro-Mediterranean Knowledge Space (WEM), Germany)

Ohoud Wafi (Host Researcher at CEDEJ (Centre d’Études et de Documentation Economiques, Juridiques et Sociales), Egypt)
Nr. 8  Das Europäische Stiftungsstatut
Perspektiven auf die Einführung einer Europäischen Stiftungsform
Maecenata Institut (Hrsg.)

Nr. 9  Eine Union für das 21. Jahrhundert
Wie Europa in gute Verfassung kommt
Wolfgang Schäuble

Nr. 10  How Political Mobilization Can Still Work on Substantive Issues
Insights from the Scottish Referendum
Jan Eichhorn, Götz Harald Frommholz

Nr. 11  Europe and the Mediterranean 1
Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together
Udo Steinbach, Rupert Graf Strachwitz, Piero Antonio Rumignani (Eds.)

Nr. 12  Europe and the Mediterranean 2
Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together
Udo Steinbach, Rupert Graf Strachwitz, Piero Antonio Rumignani (Eds.)

Nr. 13  No Brexit
Why Britain Belongs in the European Union
Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Nr. 14  „Mehr kulturelles Selbstbewusstsein wagen!”
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A Conference on Civil Society and Europe’s Political Culture
A. Domaradzka, N. Kavelashvili, E. Markus, P. Sälhoff, M. Skóra

Nr. 16  Was machen wir mit Europa?
Gedanken zum großen europäischen Projekt nach dem Brexit-Votum
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Nr. 17  Europe and the Mediterranean 3
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Nr. 18  Europe and the Mediterranean 4
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