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Mavrozacharakis, Emmanouil; Tzagkarakis, Stylianos Ioannis

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The impact of “anti-political” parties after the restoration of democracy in Greece and the challenge of confronting the crisis

Emmanouil Mavrozacharakis, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Crete, Researcher of the Centre for Human Rights (KEADIK)
Stylianos Ioannis Tzagkarakis, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Crete, Researcher of the Centre for Human Rights (KEADIK)

Abstract

There have been almost 40 years after the restoration of democracy in Greece and a peculiar prosperity, which was consciously cultivated by the leaders of political and economic elites, was promoted before the onset of the financial crisis. However, from the beginning of the financial recession, the temporal illusions have been revealed and the need of a complete transformation of the financial policies has been expressed, while a significant transformation of the entire political culture has started. Parties such as SYRIZA, Independent Greeks(ANEL) and Golden Dawn took advantage of the growing social discontent by propagating themselves as exponents of ordinary people and of their concerns or their fears, as the expression of resistance against an avoidable sellout of public values. However, crisis has exposed a number of successive truths which were elaborately hiding in the underbelly of the detaining political and socioeconomic system. These truths were exteriorized once it became clear that the foundations on which the Greek society was based after the restoration of democracy, were weak and insufficient to lead country towards a modern future.

Key Words: political change, crisis, Greece, populism
Introduction

There is wide literature about the “political change” (μεταπολίτευση-metapolitefsi) in Greece after 1974 and the restoration of democracy, but a few are wondering about its main characteristics. Within a very condensed approach we try to define this political change as the transition from a long period of entrenched parliamentarism, which resulted in a brutal dictatorship, to a modern constitutional democracy. In other words, it is the obvious transition towards a European system of guaranteed rights and freedoms and respectively, of a structured charter of obligations. Actually, it is the transition from “Balkan provincialism” to a modern but limited Europeanization. In philosophical terms, it can be assumed as the transition from regime’s obscurantism, from arbitrary insolence of power and uncontrolled state authoritarianism, to a free revolutionary period.

Besides the political freedom and the introduction of the concepts in “popular power” and the welfare state in politics, this political-regime change was associated with the rapid expansion of social prosperity and unbridled consumerism. Relatively, Kondylis (2015: 2-3) refers to the prevalence of a parasitic consumerism “indifferent to the long-term national implications, especially with regard to the country’s independence and national decision autonomy”. Kondylis uses the term “parasitic consumerism” to characterize the weakness of Greece “to produce everything that it consumes without having sufficient restraint - and dignity - so as not to consume more than can produce and in order to consume, it parasitize in two directions: internally, by mortgaging the future resources, turning them into current repayments, and externally, by borrowing large amounts of money not for future –fruitful- investments, but in order to pay these vast quantities of consumed products, which were mainly imported” (Kondylis, 2015: 3). This position, as reasonable as it may seem, is actually simplistic as long as it ignores a whole range of material needs which had to be covered after the restoration of democracy. Among others, after the political change in Greece social inequality and poverty were drastically reduced as well as the overall welfare of the society was significantly increased (Mitrakos&Tsakloglou, 2012: 33-35; 40-43; 55). This development was necessary not only as a way to establish decent living conditions but
also as a part of the convergence procedure with the rest of the European Union. Significantly, despite the huge reduction of inequality and poverty that occurred after the political change, Greece continues to encounter higher inequality and poverty levels, and lower social justice levels than most of the European Union countries (Mitrakos & Tsakloglou, 2012:56; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Moreover, the new regime marked rapid changes in the political field. In any case, the democratization of the country is related to the period of “change” from 1981 onwards in the sense the “change” of the 1980s which delivered a strong societal need: to overcome the hegemony which was established in the foundations of anti-communism domination.

The negative effects of the “change” are well known; we tend to ignore though, the consequences of a possible “non-Change” (Prevelakis, 2016).

The aim of this paper is to draw some basic arguments about the period after the restoration of democracy in Greece, the peculiarities and the ways the dominant parties have implemented policies under the influence of populism. The current coalition government is an explicit example of an “anti-political” party which basically aims at the gain and the preservation of governmental power through populism which finally seems not to benefit the public but only specific interests.

The main achievements of the political change of 1974

Fact is that the new regime as well as previous phases of the Greek political history, integrated and generated varying structural “Greek pathologies” which derive their origin from the Turkish occupation. Despite this, however, the social, political and economic achievements of this period contributed to the adjustment of the country to modern international and European standards after a long phase of obscurantism and authoritarianism. Even if someone can criticize the new regime, no one should deny the positive aspects. Such positive aspects of the new regime with which the country should be reconnected are a) the establishment of the National Health System, b) the introduction of labor and family law, c) the process of democratization of public institutions and of the army, d) the introduction of the transparent procedures for
hiring in the public sector (ASEP) and of Citizens’ ServiceCentres (KEP), e) the establishment of welfare institutions, f) the creation of modern infrastructure but with disproportionate costs, g) the computerization of the public services, h) a relatively fair redistribution of income and opportunities, i) regional convergence, and j) decentralization and investments in education and innovation. All the above mentioned crucial aspects should not be underestimated.

In July 1974 the public rule was reinstated in Greece. As Cheliotis & Xenakis (2016: 15) underlines “the new rightist interim government led by Constantine Karamanlis introduced a set of liberalisation measures, most notably the decriminalisation of communist parties that had been outlawed in the country since 1947. Other measures in this vein included the closure of the worst prison camps, the release of all remaining political prisoners, the pardoning of political crimes committed against the junta, the restoration of citizenship to all opponents of the dictatorship, and the removal of orders denying or limiting the right of individuals to travel abroad. The following governmental period of Andreas Papandreou and the left-wing PASOK government (1981-1989)“marks the point at which official efforts to confront the legacy of authoritarianism in the country not only targeted the attitudes, policies and practices embodied by the dictatorship of 1967–1974 but were extended to address illiberalism over the post-Civil War era in its entirety. Just as, for example, pension rights were restored in 1985 to civil servants who had been dismissed during the junta for political reasons, so in 1989 criminal convictions were annulled for offences relating either to participation in the Civil War on the side of the Left or to leftist anti-state activities between the end of the Civil War and the fall of the dictatorship in July 1974” (Cheliotis & Xenakis, 2016: 18-19).

Lyrintzis (2005: 242) also notes that the “Metapolitefsi” in Greece in its first phase is characterized by the effort of political parties to keep substantial political, structural and ideological distances from the pre-dictatorship party system, in order to introduce a substantive renewal of the political scene. At the social and economic level, the first democratic Government of the right–wing ND, under circumstances of political radicalism, has adopted an economic programme of “radical liberalism” which was an effort to combine economic stability and social cohesion, expanded the role of the state in economy, as it introduced nationalization of private companies and of the
banking system (Lavdas, 2005: 308). On the other side, the PASOK Government of 1981, as Crescenzi (2012: 151; 242-262) suggests, had introduced a classical Keynesian economic policy with basic aims to increase the real wages of workers and pensioners, in order to decrease the economic and social inequalities, and to control the prices of the basic goods and public services. As Garcia & Karakatsanis (2006: 130) notes, “with the accession of power of Greece’s first socialist government, it was acknowledged that universal social service provision should be a governmental target. While the achievement of full social citizenship is still unrealised in Greece and, with the possible exception of health care provision throughout Southern Europe, we clearly indicate the importance firstly of democratization and secondly of partisan ideology in moving the Southern European welfare state to more universalistic models of welfare provision”.

Concerning the European issue, PASOK did neglect his first anti-European positions as it had supported the European perspective of the country and justified this choice with technocratic criteria, with arguments that presented the cost from exiting the EEC, as higher than the cost from staying as a full member. After the rise to power there was a clear distinction of PASOK’s political orientation towards the EEC. (Kazakos, 2010: 334-5). The political concept of Andreas Papandreou’s party focused on the achievement of advantages for the Greek economy through partial hard negotiations on the terms of the Greek agreement to enter the EEC (Tassis, 2015: 44).

**Some irrefutable truths**

Despite the numerous democratic and social reforms introduced in the “Metapolitefsi” (regime change) period, from 1974 until 2010, it turns out that the current economic crisis has totally reversed the political landscape as a consequence of the existed discrepancies. Specifically, the political and party system was totally eclipsed with the legitimate category that for a long period it had cultivated a cliental state with high corruption levels instead of preparing the country for the Europeanisation process. Indeed, crisis has exposed a number of successive truths which were elaborately hiding in the underbelly of the detaining political and socioeconomic system (Mavrozacharakis, 2015). These truths were externalized once it became clear that the
foundations of the new regime on which the Greek society was formed, were weak and not sufficient to guide the country’s process towards a modern future.

The first obvious truth that is not assimilated by the existing political system, is that an economy with weak productive base and hence with foreign trade deficit, produces continuous financial problems instead of creating sufficient job vacancies. The second truth is that the Greek political system is being reproduced for itself and not with the civil society. It is therefore a self-reporting system with embedded entropy mechanisms, i.e. self-destructive mechanisms. The third truth is that the state should not become a key employer in the context of a capitalist economy, let alone if it is not supplied with the required performance conditions as well as egalitarianism and fairness. Ultimately, as Lavdas (2013) aptly indicates, there is a fundamental deficit of modern Greek pragmatism, which actually comprise a significant obstacle to any rational attempt to recast the Greek state.

The “anti-political stateness”

The political forces, instead of trying to resolve the abovementioned urgent problems and peculiarities that deplore Greece, avoided to be placed in the axis of the real truths and remained exclusively locked under the dilemma “memorandum versus anti-memorandum”. Unfortunately, the enlightened, progressive and democratic forces in Greece have failed to reunite the country with those productive aspects of the new regime which is stagnant, as a result of clientelism and fruitless “anti-political” stateness. The anti-political stateness is related to what Amir Abedi (2004) indicates as “anti-political Establishments Parties”, which fulfil the following criteria (2004: 11):

• A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy and political system issues,
• A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that comprise the political establishment,
A party that asserts that there is a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all parties either in government or in opposition are essentially the same.

The anti-political stateness is interwoven with the specific character of the modern Greek state which does not manage to promote the collective interest, but enhances self-interest patrons, trade unions’ interests and cliental relations. The Greek state after 1974 is used by multifaceted cartel parties, naturally as themain tool for electoral victory. Even political parties such as PASOK, which in its origin had the characteristics of a mass party that according to Abedi (2004: 89-90) is distinguished by a broad and socially cohesive organized membership base, specific internal party processes and a statute authorities map, have totally been changed. Such parties had the character of a movement with successful demands on social and political rights and finally, were characterized by an intense process of transformation and alienation of their original character to take the form of an inclusive party and lately a cartel party. The inclusive party is now characterized by heterogeneity of its electoral base with electoral success becoming its main objective. Unlike mass parties, which focus on a socially homogeneous audience, the inclusive ones appeal to a diverse electorate on the basis of modern communicative methods. Currently, the ideological differentiation passes into the background. Greek political parties formed patronage networks in the whole spectrum of society and did not function as intermediary civil society restraints but as mediators of specific interests and expectations of their clientele, transferring and representing segmented and specific requests within society (Ferrera, 2010). To the extent that vested political parties functioned more as mechanisms of state clientele representation, they gradually lost their organized basis and their number of active members has rapidly decreased (Matsaganis, 2011).

The abovementioned situation led these parties to a complete focus on the state as a supplier of the necessary resources. As Abedi indicates (2004: 90), the need for resources and the deficit of large ideological and political conflicts turned the survival objective into the sole aim of incumbent parties. This common objective boosted the creation of a cartel which supplied its members with the necessary means for survival, while ensure that potential risks are limited. The invasion of incumbent parties in state
power and the imposition of their survival over institutions’ function, not only secured the necessary resources, which vested parties perpetuated their survival, but also enhanced the ability of incumbent parties to resist facing challenges posed by emerging radical political formations of the left and the right of the political spectrum. Under these conditions, as stated by Katz and Mair (1992: 16), the state was transformed into an institutionalized structure that supports only the “networked” and the “insiders” and excludes those who have not crept into the inner of such network (outsiders) (Ferrera, 1996; 2010; Moreno, 2000; Perez-Diaz and Rodriguez, 1994). In other words, these parties lost their mediatory function with civil society and were digested by the state.

Especially in countries with great tradition in cliental distribution of privileges, such as Greece, cartel parties have found lucrative ground. The onset of the economic crisis decreased significantly the public funds, which had catalytic role for the enhancement of the traditional cartel parties and consequently, their position in power was challenged by a new inclusive coalition which was formed under the aegis of the left SYRIZA.

Therefore, the total presence of political parties can be regarded as “anti-political” as long as there is a problematic relationship with the collective well-being and the public interest. This means that the political parties in Greece did not serve the “common”, in the Aristotelian sense, namely the policy for the benefit of the society. At the core of party actions was the aim of the reproduction in power through the state rather than the public interest that determines the general concept of policy. For Aristotle, the coordinated society can be achieved through policy that promotes the common good. In this sense, the policy reduces individual harnesses and fragmented interests that endanger the social body and aims to maintain state normality and continuity (Brunkhorst, 1992). In modern societies the proper state is not possible to be established through a homogeneous community of virtue, as Aristotle introduced it, but through a community of law (rule of law) among unknown citizens. Political justice is achieved through the separation of those elements which are positive for everyone under eternal conditions and those that are positive for a specific group of people at a particular juncture. In other words, in modern democracies, justice and its promotion through respective institutions and relationships that are based on it, under
conditions of autonomy of a conscious person, override the subjective and individualized parameters (Rawls, 1993).

Regarding the subjective dimension in Greece, it turns out that the concept of rational citizen who promotes the cooperation with fellow citizens under commonly accepted conditions, has never been cultivated. According to Rawls, rational citizens are “willing to propose and abide by mutually agreed rules, provided that others will do the same; and will respect these rules even if this means that they have to sacrifice their personal interests. Rational citizens want to belong to a society where political power is legally used” (Wenar, 2010). However, in Greece the political system suppressed the real political, economic and financial imperatives, which, even in latent form, became an existential danger to the country. Generally, the state in Greece historically embodies only superficially the concept of financial rationality and the balance of public expenditure and revenues, while rule parties represented emphatically the essence of offering more benefits, - rather unequally and not based on needs assessment - in order to obtain citizens’ trust (Ferrera, 2010; Matsaganis, 2011).

In conclusion, these 40 years after the restoration of democracy in Greece, citizens lived in a sham prosperity founded on imaginary obsessions, consciously cultivated by the leaders of political and economic elite. However, since the beginning of the financial crisis, the temporal illusions and the need to change the whole political and economic system, became the main priorities which enabled enormous changes of the established political culture. In the beginning of the crisis the social democratic PASOK lifted the burden of fiscal adjustment. In 2010 PASOK took over the responsibility to implement austerity measures through memoranda of understanding with the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund, in order to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece. With the subsequent electoral collapse of PASOK, the right-wing New Democracy - along with PASOK - continued from 2012 the implementation of austerity measures, which led to their electoral defeat in 2015. Parties such as SYRIZA, Independent Greeks (ANEL) and Golden Dawn took advantage of the growing social discontent propaganda to become the main exponents of ordinary people and of their concerns and fears, by expressing the resistance against avoidable oversell of popular values.
The replacement of “anti-political” parties by an “anti-political” populism

Specifically, SYRIZA emerged to power through a combination of circumstances which abruptly and without intermediary interval adjusting period, entrapped Greece in a sovereign debt crisis. The origins of the crisis are in policies that previous governments implemented, which were arbitrarily addicted to irrational redistribution without the establishment of a vigorous welfare state with efficient services and significant results in social inequality reduction through the promotion of social cohesion. Therefore, the economic crisis management, which is a tough and demanding task, changed the founding values of several political groups in Greece.

Definitively, the rise to power of SYRIZA overturned the conditions which were used in order to maintain the traditional bourgeois parties in power. From 2008 onwards, the sudden elimination of those terms and conditions which reproduced the established cliental consent after the restoration of democracy in Greece, amid broad distribution of benefit and privileges, gradually led to a populist radicalization of the masses under the auspices of the left SYRIZA (Mavrozacharakis, Tzagkarakis, Kamekis, 2013). The main keynote address of SYRIZA, which was the world “hope”, can be characterized as “anti-political” in the sense that it was based on the versatility and on a high degree of ideological ambiguity. Therefore, there were no direct real class placements and external commitments. This fact is obviously contrary to the “left political verbosity” of SYRIZA which considers the “Greek people” as a single collective alliance against specific financial policies and international obligations of Greece. With anti-political way, namely by a methodology which is deeply contrary to the public good, SYRIZA cultivated to Greek people a deep feeling of aversion towards political elites, the European Union, the German government and the employers in general.

In the midst of the economic crisis, populism and its respective multipliers increased dramatically. The pressure of unemployment, the new poverty, rage against politicians and the fear for social and economic collapse, offered more than ever,
lucrative ground for a policy that worked with simplistic slogans fueling aggressive feelings, prejudices and resentments. However, over time, in the case of the SYRIZA, leftist self-determination was reversed into a peculiar mixture of “right, capitulated or even neoliberal left”, which reveals a huge gap between promises and implementation (Munchau, 2015; Kotroyannos, 2016).

On the one hand, the rise of the left in power was a result of the structural problems and economic weaknesses of the Greek state and the inability of the previous governments to promote the necessary reforms in order to establish a modern rule of law and an effective state with universal, efficient welfare state and fiscal tolerated social services. On the other hand, the imposed austerity programs from the European institutions and the International Monetary Fund (troika) are also responsible as long as they did not let fiscal space for the promotion of social cohesion. The current contrast between financial authoritarianism and social achievements preservation comprises the continuation of a dangerous approach which considers the citizen mainly as a “customer”. Therefore, in this conflict there are neither visible boundaries nor clear dividing lines since the implemented austerity policies are defended both by right-wing and left/center-left-wing parties.

SYRIZA, instead of analyzing the current situation with caution and realism, in order to propose long-term responses to the difficult circumstances, was either trapped in the search for ways of the new memorandum management or was assimilated by a fruitless intolerant logic. Apparently, this happened because the political tradition expressed by the new government of the left, is derived equally from the past activities and does not represent anything really “new”. Therefore, the first dangerous and sensational alternative responses to the crisis, were followed by the usual manner of maintaining the power even by implementing anti-social and unrealistic measures, such as massive tax increases.

**Basic directions of a progressive response to the crisis**

After 1974, Greece has entered in a period of political stability, establishment of rule of law and economic progress (Sotiropoulos, 2014). At the same time, Greece has started implementing its European integration process, because it was realized, by the
main internal political actors and by the main international allies of the country, that the smooth functioning of the parliamentary system, institutional modernization, economic growth as well as the country’s defensive fortification and positioning in the international system would be beneficial if served with Greece becoming a full member of the EEC (Sotiropoulos, 2014).

In this sense, those arguments pertaining exclusively the period of the political change in Greece after 1974, as the only cause for the current social and economic discrepancies are one-sided and misleading. This kind of argumentation attaches to the post-junta period the current problems of the Greek economy and thus, of the current crisis. The basic argument is that the large public sector and the hindering of the private sector led the Greek economy to bankruptcy (Skaperdas, 2011). In other words, according to some scholars such as Alogoskoufis (2012), the roots of today’s bankruptcy are related to policies that prevailed during the dictatorship and implemented the first decade after the restoration of democracy. Especially the period of the PASOK in government (1981-1989), is associated with a rapid shift in the policy mix and an increase of public deficits and debt. Public deficit was raised due to the increase of social benefits from the Andreas Papandreou government and efforts to support the weak parts of the Greek capital (e.g. support firms in economic difficulties) (Pappas, 2010). But at the same time, tax revenues remain almost constant, thereby increasing the public debt from 30% in 1981 to 80% of GDP in 1989 (Matziorinis, 1993). Definitely, the increase in social spending enlarges the “state”, but from the period of the political change until today the level is lower than the average of European countries (Matsaganis, 2013: 17). Currently, the most rapid decline which was recorded for Greece, was the social spending – to – GDP ratio which fell by almost 2 percentage points since its peak in 2012 (OECD, 2014: 2). Considering the indicator which correlates public spending to GDP, this ratio, was about 46% during the 1980s and was less stable than the average of the EEC countries, which at that time was 49.5%. This trend continued in subsequent years, although the predominance of austerity policies reduced the ratio to 48% in the EU (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2014).

Furthermore, during the period after the restoration of democracy in Greece, the expenditure on salaries of civil servants / GDP, does not exceed 11%, when in Europe
it fluctuates between 11 and 12%, showing that theories for redundant civil servants with overpaid is stale. Finally, an element that should be considered, is that the expenditure on military supplies / GDP in the period 1974-1989 in Greece is 2.3% higher than the European average, which considered over a period of 16 years, it is actually translated into a burden of public debt for almost 40% (Chrysogelos, 2010). That means, if the country spends the same proportion as the other European countries for its defense, the public debt in 1990 instead of 80% of GDP would have been about 40%!

However, the main reason for the increase of the debt must be inquired in the revenue gap. If there is a common point in fiscal policy from the dictatorship until 2009, it is the overall low level of taxes and particularly the increased tax evasion of affluent income groups and companies. Currently the tax evasion in Greece amounts from 12% to 15% of annual economic output. This means 40 to 45 billion Euros a year. If tax authorities could even catch the half of tax evasion, the Greek economic problem of the public sector would have been solved (Merten, 2012: 26). Therefore, there is a sense of truth in the argument that Andreas Papandreou’s policies, “promoted a program of imprudent economic expansion based on the manipulation of the state and its resources without creating a stable tax basis able to fund such a policy” (Pappas, 2010). Nevertheless, the other claim that the period of Andreas Papandreou’s government is “backing a large and expansive, albeit not necessarily strong, state that geared towards patronage politics that promotes not collective national welfare, but provide jobs and social benefits to selected individuals, mostly PASOK’s supporters” (Pappas, 2010), is only relatively true. Although public sector was increased considerably, its services also expended but in a peculiar way and not under needs assessment procedures. Unnecessary increase of the personnel in the public sector was often the result of the pressure by interest groups and this historical structural deficit of the Greek state reveal “bureaucratic inertia, lack of policy innovation, clientelist commitments, and legislative deadlocks have largely prevented the crisis from becoming also a window of opportunity” (Lavdas, 2015: 3).

Especially, the left wing SYRIZA has emerged to power through a combination of circumstances which suddenly and without mediating adaptation period, caged Greece in a sovereign debt crisis. A significant reason for the emergence of this crisis, was
the irresponsible and irrational mix of policies that major parties implemented after the restoration of democracy which created a large but ineffective public sector that was not capable to resolve social problems and provide social cohesion. The coalition government between SYRIZA and ANEL behaves regularly as an “opposition front” that grows out through a strong denunciation of the implemented policies of the past. Currently, the challenge of economic crisis management affected the values of almost all the political areas in Greece. With the rise of SYRIZA in power the conditions which maintained the traditional bourgeois parties in power were finally overturned. From 2008 onwards, the sudden elimination of those terms and conditions which reproduced the established cliental consensus of modern democracy in Greece, amid a broad distribution of benefits, privileges and powers, gradually led to a populist radicalization of the masses under the auspices of the left SYRIZA, which also expanded populism as this is one of the basic features of an “anti-political” party. This is the exact continuation of the populism tradition in Greek politics, which has generated the majority of the factors which contributed to the current multidimensional crisis.

Generally, contemporary populism in Greece transformed a part of the society to an irrational mass which lacks orientation, while awakened expectations that are not feasible in budgetary terms. This happened because the populist parties in Greece targeted their propaganda during economic crisis to those sections of the population who have lost much of their prosperity and social security by the crisis. Under these circumstances, a primitive nationalism was unfolded and many Greeks adopted an illusion of resistance against a nonexistent occupier. A parallel result of this kind of nationalism was the intensification of hostility against Europe. Greece came close to the collapse of its European identity and SYRIZA had a great responsibility as long as, at a time of social contradictions sharpening, it cultivated with semblance a social narcissism under its populist strategy.

The party of the left took advantage of the social divisions and conflicts that emerged during the crisis and tried to attract both social groups with high education and training index that were marginalized and those with less education and training. Though conflicting groups were put both under the umbrella of SYRIZA in an attempt to construct a new political situation, the left never answered the central
question of an alternative strategy if the renegotiation of austerity fails. Under these circumstances, the active political-ideological turn (U-TURN) of the ruling party was inevitable and as a result, it signed the agreement for the implementation of a third Memorandum. This was a total defeat of the leftist ideologies on “debt relief”, “debt colony” and the cancellation and renegotiation of the Memorandum. In other words, the left in Greece won the elections but it was ideologically defeated. This is the price for its establishment in power with a populist and unrealistic propaganda.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that Greece needs a new productive system and in this context, a new political system, which produces goods and ideas that will be connected with a strategic framework, which increase employment and generally the social conditions. A meaningful progressive response to the crisis is not unilateral and obsessive, it should promote the necessary reforms but always maintain a certain level of social cohesion and not dissolve social cohesion to supposedly increase competitiveness. A progressive response to the crisis should not hesitate but put the core European countries and particularly Germany, in front of their responsibilities. It should not be underestimated that Germany had offered to South European countries, for a specific time, extended loans and had promoted lending with attractive rates and favorable repayment terms. In fact, Germany has created inflation to other countries while it kept its own inflation in low levels through low wages. This fact, combined with the enormous public and private spending on innovation, was actually its competitive advantage. In that period in Greece the real challenge was the promotion of modernization and reforms. Twenty years later, the challenge has not even slightly changed and is high time to implement the necessary changes without neoliberal or leftist obsessions.

If there is no real democratic and social shift in Greece, the group of voters who prefer electoral populism and especially the extreme right, will enormously increase. Moreover, these voters are at least “losers, unfinished consumers” (Bauman, 2010). This means that they do not prefer the abolition of the current society and the establishment of another but eventually claim to participate in it as full consumers, i.e. citizens of a capitalist consumerist society.
Based on Bauman’s argument (2009), it turns out that people in post-modern societies are only considered useful if they operate as integrated consumers. Consumption is actually the individual’s contribution to a market economy. An “unfinished consumer” has entrenched social status and is considered useless because his position is utterly hopeless. Modern societies react cynically to poor people, who are unable to function as active consumers, converging in some way to a tendency for their disappearance from their apparent bourgeois façade. It is no coincidence that the poor are expelled from the west urban centers. This trend explains why the modern welfare state is unable to protect the unemployed and especially the long-term unemployed, considering that these people are no longer useful and only affect the taxpayers. The political consensus around the core features of the welfare state that takes care of the vulnerable and needy, gradually becomes finite. Only nostalgia remains alive. But nostalgia generates protest and centrifugal tendencies.

The active solidarist proletariat has become a social layer of permanent precarity (the precariat), which supports dubious political directions (Standing, 2011). This shift is logically inevitable in the sense that the existing political forces that manage the power are possessed by the same fiscal obsession. According to Bauman (2009; 2010), the reduction of social spending is an objective of both the right and the (center) left policy. Regardless of the party which is in power, the objective is the same just because they believe that according to the conventional economy they do not comprise financial advantages. In conjunction with the political behavior of impoverished social groups, populism is supported by relegation fears which occupy an increasing part of the middle socio-economic groups within the thorough process of modernization and globalization. A progressive reaction to these problems should consider all the above mentioned and implement a policy which will be concentrated both at financial stability and social cohesion promotion while not repeating the same catastrophic “anti-political” - populist practices have diminished the prospects for sustainable societal development.

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