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Denomination and Number of Children: The Case of Rural Baden, 18th/19th Century

Rolf Gehrmann *

Abstract: »Konfession und Kinderzahl auf dem Lande: Das ländliche Baden im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert«. In historical demography, the impact of the religious factor on fertility is mentioned from time to time, but for Germany evidence is contradictory and often not significant. Until now, studies have led to the conclusion that regional, local and social factors provide sufficient explanations for the differences observed. This initial hypothesis is tested here for three Upper Rhine villages with a mixed population of Catholics and Protestants, for which micro-data from the so-called Ortssippenbücher (village genealogies) exist. Thanks to it, the geographical factor can be excluded as a source of diversity, and the nature of the social structure in the villages helps to distinguish between religious and social factors. The results oblige us to rethink the connection between social factors, the structure of communication, and the formation of confessional identity. Never before has such an early and consequent limitation of family size been observed in Germany as is the case here for Lutherans in the northern Ortenau. On the other hand, the number of children of Catholics was extremely high. This is true for the two main social categories. Denomination was obviously so strong a factor of identity that for centuries completely different modes of reproduction could coexist in the same village. Such a contrast was not just a local phenomenon, but probably of fundamental importance for the entire Upper Rhine valley. Finally, the results of our study open the perspective of an enlargement of Max Weber’s theory on Protestantism to the domain of demographics.

Keywords: Protestantism, birth control, Baden, Enlightenment, Max Weber.

1. Introduction

In the homeland of the Reformation, historical demography has dealt with denominational differences in fertility since it restarted in the 1970s. In those years the Mainz group did pioneering work under the guidance of Walter Rödel, who died in 2009, when his projects had already come to a standstill. The abandonment of research in this field is all the more regrettable as the problems related to this subject are far from being resolved. This alone would

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be a sufficient reason to rejoin the international research, as is documented by the book edited by Derosas and van Poppel (2006). It must be noted that these authors deplore a lack of historical research on denomination as a factor of behavior too. Thus it can be said that, although the issue is not really new, it is in no way obsolete and far from having been discussed exhaustively.

What kind of acquirements can serve as a base for a new start? Houdaille (1970), in a study on Remmesweiler in the Sarre, was the first to point out that there was fertility control in both denominational groups in the first half of the 19th century, but that afterwards the number of children of the Catholic population rose again. For the towns and villages of the Middle Rhine, which were scrutinized by other studies, results were inconsistent and even sometimes poorly documented or not significant. In the region of Berg, on the east bank of the Rhine, and in three small towns of the Hunsrück area, there were at best small differences between denominations (Saunders 1995; Höning 1998). This was not so for Oppenheim, but there the number of cases was small (122 Protestant and 35 Catholic families) and the Lutheran households were twice as wealthy as the Catholic ones (Zschunke 1984). Jäger (2001) explains the lower age at marriage, and associated to this a lower fertility of Duisburg Protestants giving a similar reason, i.e. their higher social status. In Alzey social differences were even exclusively determining (Heller-Karneth 1996). Exceptionally well documented is the situation in Calvinist Essenheim. In this village near Mainz Protestants were wealthier, too. They married earlier and had fewer children. On the basis of very few data for that period, Rettinger supposed that the observed differences in behavior set in at the end of the 17th century, which means at the same time as in Zurich (Pfister 1985; Rettinger 2002, 369). It must be noted that the Protestants whose behavior was conspicuous were always Calvinists. Apparently, in the 18th century Lutherans did not care more about family planning than Catholics did.

There are several reasons to pay more attention to the Upper Rhine valley here. One of them is that Max Weber was stimulated to some of his arguments about Protestant ethics by Offenbacher’s (1900) research on the inequalities of assets in that area, another one is that for the Ortenau in central Baden there is exceptional material composed by local genealogists. And finally, scholars from France, Canada and the United States have carried out some preliminary inquiries, which are very useful for our purposes. Thus it is possible to make comparisons with Alsace, which was separated from Baden by a political, but at that time not a linguistic or cultural border. This is why Wahl (1980) treats the two regions in the same context.

Weber ignored the demographic impact of denomination on sexual behavior. When he treats the asceticism of Protestants, he just mentions their principle of “chastity even within marriage, in the sense of exclusion of desire and the limitation of morally authorized sexual intercourse to the rational purpose of procreation” (Weber 2014, 725 – transl. R.G.). From this, one cannot de-
duce that the "purpose of procreation" – children – was subject to human rationality and thus could be regulated. It is a subject of controversy whether something like this was part of the early Calvinist doctrine. Perrenoud (1974) detects in Calvin’s writings a first step towards the separation of sexuality and procreation, and he opposes the Wertrationalität (value-rational action) of the Catholics to the Zweckrationalität (purpose-rational action) of the Protestants. For Pfister (1985) there is a connection between the asceticism within marriage promoted by Calvinism as well as by French Jansenism, and birth control. Their basic attitude meant that Calvinists could possibly have become more easily favorable to the option of a family planning aimed at a certain target number of children. As such there would not have been a contradiction between such behavior and the Protestant appraisal of marriage.

The extension to this demographic dimension, which, as mentioned, was not in Weber’s focus, was a central concern of a professorial dissertation at Metz university. On the basis of published statistics of the late 19th and the early 20th century Wahl (1980) examined the structure of fertility and concluded that there were strong similarities between Baden and Alsace and at the same time huge differences between Catholics and Protestants. In that region Protestants meant Lutherans, unified in Baden since 1821 with the Calvinists of northern Baden to one Protestant church. In his research Wahl refers to a demographic study from before 1945 (Schubnell 1941). For Alsace, Wahl’s book was followed by a deeper going study based on family reconstitution and a large diversity of qualitative sources (McQuillan 1999).

In his overview of the results of the analysis of the demographic data drawn from the so-called Ortsippenbücher, Knodel (1988) again dealt with the Baden part of the Upper Rhine valley. Unfortunately he neglected denomination, as he chose only purely Catholic villages for his data set. However from the beginning of his research, he had noticed an early fertility decline in two villages (Gehrmann 1979). This intriguing feature motivated Benz (1999) to perform a thorough study on three Catholic villages (Grafenhausen, Kappel and Rust, see Fig. 1) in order to get an answer to the question of whether secularization as one of the parameters measured in the European Fertility Project (Coale 1986) was responsible for the speedy acceptance of practices of family planning. In this respect his results were negative. According to him, local-specific mentalities, developed out of conditions of property and historical circumstances, were determining factors. Family planning began first in places where peasants had learnt to defend their property (Benz 1999, 253). The

1 In the framework of the European Fertility Project denominational differences were not a subject of inquiry, and the basic data were just statistics at the level of Regierungsbezirke. That is why Knodel (1974) could not go beyond the observation that Jews had the lowest fertility, Catholics the highest, and Protestant were in between. In the same order fertility decline started.
“morcellement hypothesis”, well-known since the days of Le Play, found confirmation in his study. The behavior of the small Jewish population of the Ortenau has also been scrutinized (Goldstein 1984), but up to date the strong Protestant minority has been totally neglected. Yet there are several indications that they played a key role in the process of fertility decline in Upper Baden.

The preceding overview of the essential results of local studies suggests that even in cases where denomination is considered to be important, social structure was more important than the religious background. At least the former occulted the latter to such an extent that the differences cannot be attributed unequivocally to some religious core. This is true for the 18th century and a large part of the 19th too and thus for the whole period covered by our study.

The fertility decline, which began at the end of the 19th century, is another subject. Then the socioeconomic background was no longer decisive for the observed differences – this at least is what affirms Schellekens (2006, 77). The major conclusions for this period are that religion mainly became effective when, firstly, the appropriate channels and communities of communication existed (Goldscheider 2006; Lynch 2006; McQuillan 1999; Neven 2003), and secondly, when it was possible to execute control, i.e. to a far higher degree in the countryside than in towns (Kok 2006). In addition to the first assumption Benz (1999) concludes with regard to Central Baden that is was more important to which village one belonged than to which political group or religious tendency.

As to the question of how to measure the onset of fertility decline, it is generally accepted that “stopping” is the only reliable evidence for it. In family reconstitutions it is easily detected by the age at last birth of those women who lived in wedlock until their 45th birthday. For some years there has been a shift in research to “spacing” as another kind of birth control in pre-industrial societies (Dribe, Scalone 2010; v. Bavel, Kok 2010). As far as Germany is concerned, the Berlin data base has already been used for a comparative study on this subject (Gehrmann 2007), with evidence for spacing, particularly in Calvinist populations which also practiced to some degree stopping. In order to detect birth control in the Ortenau, it was necessary to collect more data. This was done for three villages of the Lahrer Ried, in which the structure of peasant property was similar between Catholics and Protestants (Wahl 1980, 365-73). The two groups were also present at all social levels. In this way it was possible to eliminate the influence of ecological or regional factors, and to separate the denominational from the social. The robust measure of the age at the last birth makes it possible to detect birth control with a high degree of reliability without at the same time having to present technical details that are of little interest to non-demographers. An even clearer measure is the number of children or the number of sons or daughters, and this is what interested the families in question most of all. Thus, in contrast to sophisticated measures of modern demographers, these numbers are intelligible for everyone, which means that they were
so for contemporaries, too. In order to compare the number of births correctly, however, only a certain type of couples can be selected from the data set. In a certain way, they constitute an ideal: unions issued from first marriages of both of the partners and not broken before the menopause. Nevertheless they are representative, since there is no reason that their fertility was different from that of the broken unions until the death of one of the partners.

2. The Data

Figure 1: Map of the Ortenau Region

The three villages selected here (Dundenheim, Ichenheim and Schutterzell, see Fig. 1) are situated to the south-west of the town of Offenburg and not far from Strasbourg, the former capital of the diocese of the same name. In 1624, the year of reference of the Westphalian Peace, the fourteen parishes of the condominium Lahr-Mahlberg were considered as purely Protestant (Vierordt 1856, 537). The partition of the condominium in 1629 was carried out by the mar-grave with the intention to make at least a part of the area Catholic again, by hindering Protestants from practicing their religion as well as by regulating
immigration. This was also true for the three villages studied here, and eventually Catholics were in the majority in the Baden part of the seigneury of Mahlberg to which they belonged. They always had Catholic priests. On the other hand, Protestants were in the situation of a discriminated diaspora until the second half of the 18th century. Although the presence of Protestant pastoral care was not assured (only in the distant village of Kippenheim was a simultaneum authorized), a great number of the old families stayed allegiant to the Lutheran confession. In 1721 they even addressed a printed letter to the Protestant estates of the Reich, from which it is clear that especially the poorer part of the population had converted (Vierordt 1856, 242). It was only in 1765 that Ichenheim with its filial church in Dundenheim obtained a pastor again, and so did Kürzell with its filial Schutterzell. In 1771 the government passed over to the Protestant dynasty of Baden-Durlach, which pursued a tolerant religious policy.

This fate of the Protestants explains why there was no continuous registration of vital events in the Lutheran parishes until 1750, and why only from the cohort 1770 coverage of data is sufficiently dense for a subdivision into decades. 1849 is the last year of marriage represented in the data set. All statistics are taken from a selection of nuclear families out of the Ortssippenbücher (Köbele and Scheer 1977; Köbele and Bläsi 1978; Köbele, Scheer and Ell 1982), which are available in print. If not mentioned otherwise, the ideal type of completed families will be analyzed. They numbered 403 between 1750 and 1849. 240 of them were Protestants, 161 Catholics, and two mixed couples. Only for twelve families is any information about the occupational status of the father missing. In order to rule out a possible under-registration of infant mortality, the data were submitted to a biometrical analysis. It shows no difference between Catholics and Protestants, not even in breastfeeding habits. Only the consideration of deaths as stillbirths varied, as expected. That is why declared stillbirths (Protestants 2.2%, Catholics 1.7%) are included into infant mortality. Finally it was only slightly higher in Catholic families (25.1%) than in Protestant families (24.4%).

3. The Level and the Evolution of Marital Fertility

In the three bi-denominational villages all indices of marital fertility were significantly different between Protestants and Catholics. The Total Marital Fertility Rate of Catholics resembled a model of natural fertility (Coale 1986, 12), with a value of nearly 9. In the Lutheran population, it was lower than 6, which is an estimated $I_0$ of 0.537. Such a low level is inconceivable without a deliberate reduction of fertility, as for example in France 1880/81 (Mombert 1929, 309). This amazing discrepancy had its counterpart in the number of births in
the complete families as defined above. In the average Catholic mothers bore 2.8 more children than Protestants, which means 7.4 in contrast to 4.6.

The distribution of births is also remarkable. Protestants showed a more homogeneous behavior, with a plain majority of 60% of the families having between two and five children. Only a minority of 10.4% came close to the “natural” average of seven children, another 10% outstripped it. Not so for Catholics. There the dispersion was larger and by this more natural. Most frequent were families with nine births (15.5%), followed by families with five or with seven births. In contrast to Protestants, there were no one-child-families.

Figure 2: Number of Births in Complete Families

Was the difference in fertility due to stopping or spacing? Whereas stopping is considered as a modern kind of family planning, spacing is attributed to the demographic Ancient Regime (Gehrmann 2007, Dribe and Scalone 2010, van Bavel and Kok 2010). Against this background the differences in the age at last birth in the three bi-denominational villages of the Ortenau must be called spectacular: not less than five years! Protestant couples had their last child when the mother was only 34.5 years old, in contrast to the 39.6 years for Catholics. Such a distinctive pattern could not be expected, since infant and child mortality was quite similar. That means that fertility was disconnected from mortality. Furthermore: spacing existed too, but birth intervals were not particularly long for a region where breastfeeding was the rule. The mean value for all Protestant families was 31.0 months.

One cannot understand the demographic system of an area without looking at the female age at marriage. For the Ortenau it does not provide an explanation for the observed differences, however. The 679 spinsters who married a
bachelor were comparatively young. Protestant women were 22.6 years old and thus one and a half years younger than Catholics. Men were 3.4 years older in both cases. Obviously, as in the southern part of the Ortenau (Benz 1999, 143), marriage did not depend on heritage. In the three villages the precarious situation of young couples must have been an even stronger incentive to avoid too many offspring. For Catholics, such incentives were checked. For the rest, demographic indices were more or less equal. The duration of marriage was 30.5 and 30 years, and mortality was similar in child and in adult age groups. Thus living conditions can be called similar.

**Figure 3: Female Age at Marriage and Age at Last Birth in Complete Families**

The observed differences in marital fertility were systematic (Fig. 3), although narrowing towards the end. In the Catholic population the age at last birth declined until the cohort 1830, which means until last births around the crisis year 1848. The number of births fell even steeper, to a minimum of fewer than seven births in the cohorts 1810-1839. It can be supposed that in the years after 1816, which were particularly difficult in South-Western Germany, spacing occurred. Protestants did not show a similar downward movement, but they continued having significantly fewer children (Fig. 4). It must be concluded that in the absence of stopping on a wider scale in the group of the Catholics, the observed decline of fertility was due to a variety of less effective methods, although the aims might have been similar.
Towards the end of the period under observation, fertility, and with it the age at last birth moved upwards again, in a certain analogy to what Houdaille (1970) has found for Remmesweiler. Such an evolution was not rare in the second half of the 19th century. The temporary convergence established then may have been the reason why in later aggregated statistics differences between the denominations do not appear clearly. The conditions represented in them cannot be considered as old and permanent, and in no way similar to those of the 18th century.

4. Denomination or Social Conditions?

It seems likely that the social status, which was in most cases higher for Protestants in mixed regions had a strong negative impact on their fertility. At least it is often impossible to prove that denomination was really responsible for the differences observed, and not the social factor. Against this background the results from the bi-denominational villages are particularly instructive. First of all the size of the families did not follow the traditional order observed generally. As a rule in peasant families women’s age at marriage was low and therefore farmers had most children, much more than the lower classes (Schlumbohm 1992). Not so in the three Ortenau villages, where a situation existed which could be found elsewhere only at the beginning of the fertility decline. Not farmers but day laborers had most children (7 children). Craftsmen hold the second place (6.5 children). Only then, far behind, came farmers with 5.4 births. For further studies craftsmen, day laborers and the small group of
other professions can be merged, since the differences between these groups were not significant. By this procedure we get a dichotomous setting, opposing farmers (233 families, 60%) to the rest (156 families, 40%).

Landless families or couples without an important farm activity had 1.3 more children than farmers (Tab. 1). With that the effect of the social structure was less than half as strong as the impact of religion, which created a difference of 2.7 births. Within the group of Catholics peasants had more offspring – as was generally expected for that time. The situation in the group of Protestants, however, was anything but normal. Peasants had only 4.7 children. Given the mortality in the second half of the 18th century, that meant a maximum of three children surviving into adulthood. Such a limited progeny provided better chances to maintain the social status of the parents.

Table 1: Female Age at Marriage and Births by Denomination and Occupation (Complete Marriages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at Marriage</th>
<th>Births</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>cath.</td>
<td>luth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

As expected from the results from the Middle Rhine, the social profiles of the two parts of the population differed clearly. 80% of the Protestants were farmers, but only 30% of the Catholics. Does this mean that the differential fertility was after all a matter of social status and not of denomination? A simple confrontation of the mean values by a t-test suffices to refute this hypothesis. Within a denominational group the social difference is not significant. Quite the contrary is true for the differences within the same social group. For farmers as well as for non-farmers the values of the two denominations were so distant from each other that the test of significance shows three zeros behind the decimal point. According to this the probability that denomination correlated with a different behavior was near to 100%.

In the case of the age at marriage there was no contrast between Catholics and Protestants. Farmers always chose younger brides than men from other professions. This at first glance trivial fact is actually an important assertion. It implies that the lower age at marriage of Protestants cannot be explained by some specific conception of wedlock, as is sometimes claimed, but was simply a consequence of the greater number of farmers among them.

Is it possible that the higher social status of Protestants was a result of family planning, offering better opportunities to their offspring to escape from downward mobility? If this was the case, then the earlier differences in wealth must have been smaller than the later. Benz (1999, 172) denies such an evolution with respect to the population of Grafenhausen and points out that birth control was not a preventive, but a defensive reaction of a comparably homo-
geneous peasant middle class. And in the three bi-denominational villages social structure apparently stayed relatively constant, Protestants being better off than Catholics from the beginning. This can be concluded from an argument used by the Protestants in order to illustrate their discrimination: although they were the wealthier part of the population, they had been disadvantaged systemically as to attribution of public functions (leaflet of the Protestants of the seigneurie of Mahlberg addressed to the Protestant estates of the Holy Roman Empire in 1721, treating the “insupportable compulsion of conscience and hard persecution” (Vierordt 1856, 247). With nearly the same words the 1799 declaration about religion in the Palatine part of Baden abolished this discrimination (Vierordt 1856, 368). In the Ortenau villages which had come under the rule of Baden-Baden, the social discrepancy may have resulted from a conversion of poorer families, who gave in easier to pressure. At least this was the general impression (Vierordt 1856, 242). Immigrants were also in their great majority Catholics. These facts are scattered and can only give hints, but they do not indicate any evolution in the sense of an increased poverty of the Catholic population due to their larger number of children in comparison to Protestants.

Except for the age at marriage, all demographic measures in the three villages of the Northern Ortenau show that not the affiliation to an occupational or social group, but to denomination determined the behavior in matters of procreation. This is not an argument against the “morcellement hypothesis”. It is still of some heuristic value, although it does not apply to the lower classes, where it must be replaced by an emulation hypothesis. As to the evaluation of more general tendencies, the comparison with the three Catholic villages scrutinized by Benz (1999) is particularly helpful. The population of Grafenhausen, characterized by the presence of a class of “solid proprietors”, succeeded in reducing the number of offspring to 4.7 in the cohort 1825/49, in spite of a relatively high (38.5 years) age at last birth (Benz 1999, 98). This number was equal to the one that has been observed for the Protestant farmers north of them. But in Grafenhausen the Malthusian check of a high age at marriage worked complementarily. Such a mechanism was absent among Catholics in the Northern Ortenau (Tab. 1). Here the assumption is justified that a local cohesion surpassing the limits between denomination existed. On the other hand the age at last birth diminished only slightly in both parts of the Ortenau. Obviously Catholicism had the effect of “impeding the spread of information and practices” (Benz 1999, 252), and the cohabitation with Protestants in the same village did not contribute to removing it. In comparison it seems that for Protestants these obstacles did not exist.
5. Discussion

Given the scarcity of comparable material, it would be hazardous to attempt to give a comprehensive answer to the question about the conditions under which denominational diversity had consequences on fertility. Nevertheless, some issues can be discussed, keeping in mind Max Weber’s general remarks about Protestantism.

1) When did family planning begin?
2) Did contemporary authors notice the relatively small dimensions of families?
3) How representative are our results for Baden?
4) Is it possible to generalize the observed differences between denominations?
5) How can the results be interpreted in view of Weber’s theses?

(1) When did family planning begin? For the reasons already mentioned, the data of the three bi-denominational villages do not go back beyond the 1770s. However it is possible to complete them by results from other villages of the Ortenau with similar birth intervals, allowing the conclusion that they followed the same pattern of fertility. For two Protestant parishes the density of the data however is sufficient from the late 17th century on – the nearby Altenhein, which shared the same territorial history until 1629, but then stayed under Protestant rule, and the smaller Meissenheim. Completed studies of the families up to the cohort 1740, plus a sample for the cohorts 1750 and 1760 reveal an impressive continuity when considered together with the three Protestant populations studied before (Fig. 3 and Tab. 2). According to this, “stopping” was introduced at the latest in the couples marrying in the 1730s. This means that it became effective in the 1740s and was perhaps even influenced by the difficulties of that decade. Besides the outbreaks of a crisis (1740/41), the general growth of the population at that time may also have exerted an influence. A more visible effect of the underlying demographic pressure was growing emigration.

On the family level, the low mean age at marriage was probably a permanent incentive to limit the number of children. That problem was not new, however, but rather a result of a custom that may have been a response to a higher mortality and losses of population in former times and thus an adaptation which had turned into a regional pattern hard to change thereafter. At the latest in the 1720s the brides of the two villages were as young (22.4 years) as those of the three Protestant populations observed before. Starting from a number of children that was already relatively small for early marriages, perhaps due to spacing, the number was further reduced by a manifest “stopping” from the cohort 1730 onwards. It went down from 6.4 (cohorts 1680-1720) to 5.0 (cohorts 1730-1760). This was a sensitive, though not a radical change. On the contrary, the lowering of the age at last birth must be called revolutionary. It
reached a level beneath the values computed for the Zurich bourgeoisie, which until now have rightly been considered as exceptional (Pfister 1985, 94). Already before the cohort 1730 there were some similarities, so that there might have been “stopping” in some families before the 1740s. All in all there is a coherent trend of evolution. There is no evidence, however, that such practices were common before 1700 (as asserts Rettinger 2002).

Table 2: Age at last Birth and Number of Children in Complete Families in Altenheim and Meissenheim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohorts (by Decades)</th>
<th>1660-</th>
<th>1680-</th>
<th>1710</th>
<th>1720</th>
<th>1730</th>
<th>1740</th>
<th>1750</th>
<th>1760</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thus the enlargement of the field of observation leads to the conclusion that the behavior of the Protestant population was not determined by their special situation of being a minority in a Catholic environment. Although the behavior began two generations earlier than in the villages of the nearby Alsace which have been examined by McQuillan (1999, 115), it did not go back so far that a link to the era of the Reformation can be supposed. Nor could it have been an innovation imported from the other side of the Rhine. But if, in combination with religion, the regional specificities were decisive, how large was the region in question? Were there similar patterns in the rest of the Ortenau, the Middle Rhine part of Baden or even in the whole territory of the Duchy?

(2) Did contemporary authors notice the relatively small dimensions of families? It is in the nature of things that in contemporary sources only sporadic hints on the subject of birth control can be found. When at the end of the 19th century the clergy carried out a survey on the sexual and moral conditions of the rural Protestants (Kappes 1896), the editor preferred to draw cautious conclusions, affirming that in principle a so called two-children-system did not exist, not even in the Oberland, to which our Ortenau belonged. Just one attentive observer reported that the rich peasants of his parish in general had only two or three children in order to keep their wealth together (Kappes 1896, 652). But already long before this inquiry the Hanauerland, bordering on the Ortenau, had the reputation of being a country with a low human fertility. Schaible, a physician who was familiar with the region, wrote in the middle of the century that there were few children in most of the villages, especially among the wealthier families, who had only one, two or three offspring. Furthermore he added that public opinion saw behind this bad state of affairs an indecent cause ("unsittliche Grundlage", Schaible 1855, 196), as he called it. Going back still further, one meets with a remark made by the Baden physiocrat Schlettwein from the year 1785. It refers to the surroundings of Badenweiler in Southern Baden, where farms were big and people were wealthy, but the birth rate was
relatively low (30). He thought that it would be interesting to analyze the origins of this phenomenon (Schlettwein 1785, 473). It must be added that the seigneurie of Badenweiler was Protestant – and that our research is the first attempt to explain strange demographic values noticed in Baden more than two hundred years ago.

(3) How representative are our results for Baden? The facts gathered in our local study seem to be fairly representative, at least for the Ortenau. As mentioned before, the first evidence are the birth intervals which can be computed from twelve other village genealogies of the Berlin Data Base. Not only the northern (Altenheim, Meissenheim), but also the southern (Nonnenweier, Wittenweier) Protestant villages show similar values (Tab. 3). Whereas, due to the lack of data for parents, “stopping” cannot be proved, fertility limitation by “spacing” is evident. It was already practiced after the first birth. Again the contrast to the Catholic population is pronounced. In the three bi-denominational villages however the Catholic population behaved as in Grafenhausen and Herbolzheim, where Knodel discovered an early fertility decline (see above, Fig. 4). By studying the Protestants of the Ortenau, we have learnt that it was not as extraordinary as it at first seemed. A possible explanation for this temporary convergence may be that it happened when in both denominations rational tendencies prevailed. On the Catholic side it took the shape of wessenbergianism, named after a notorious Baden prelate whose conception of religion was very influential for several decades. It was certainly more the general spirit of the times than its theological expression that touched villagers, but at least it can be said that a strict obedience did not prevail. Otherwise the fasting months with its abstinence would have had an influence on the monthly distribution of conceptions. On the Protestant side the Church authorities complained until the 1880s that the effects of the sermon in the 18th century was still present in the countryside, and that it was not probable that in the future the population would renounce rationalism as priest did (cit. Kuhlemann 2001, 113). Obviously rationalism in religious affairs was more popular and did last longer, and we can add that it was easier to justify with respect to domestic life which was not so strictly submitted to articles of faith as it was for Catholics. It is worth mentioning, because in South-Western Germany it cannot be taken for granted that Pietism did not find its way into the mentality (Schaible 1855, 189).

Table 3: Mean Birth Intervals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 villages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Southern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all intervals</td>
<td>33,6</td>
<td>33,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interval births 1-2</td>
<td>31,5</td>
<td>30,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n Families</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>1704</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results being representative for a certain part of Central Baden, is this also true for the whole duchy? Probably not, but because of a lack of appropriate
data the picture is unclear and it is difficult to limit the geographical extension of representativeness. Only from the middle of the 19th century can regional birth rates be generated from published statistics, and they are not broken down by denominations. These data do not show anomalies for the Ortenau, a region which was even characterized by a relatively high natality later. As far as the irreversible fertility decline is concerned, the data for Baden lead to the conclusion that in the beginning (in 1890) there were no differences between denominations. Thus the decline happened a generation later than in Alsace (Wahl 1980, 111-2). Offenbacher (1900, 9) even found a faster population growth among the Protestants of the duchy. Wahl (1980, 115), however, found on the local level, in this case for Ichenheim, that in each decade Catholic natality was higher. Moreover, the Protestant part of the population of the three bi-denominational villages decreased since the first published census of 1825 (Wahl 1980, 319).

We must be aware that the crude birth rate is not the appropriate measure for our purposes. For the same reason computing of regressions leads to a dead end. It shows us only that in the period 1852-1855 natality did not correlate with the percentage of Protestant in the administrative districts.

Instead of suitable correlations data provide geographical patterns that are superposed on to the denominational variety. Thus, with the exception of Karlsruhe, the districts of the northern central Baden circumscription (Mittelrheinkreis) show a high birth rate, whereas it was low in the southern parts. In the Protestant region of Hanauerland, mentioned earlier, it was even strikingly low (district of Kork). But this was also true for all Catholic districts from Achen to Haslach. South of Freiburg the birth rate decreased even further. In the opposite direction, in northern Baden, it tended to be higher. These parts of Baden are characterized as more closely bonded to the church (Kuhlemann 2001, 95). They were, intriguingly from the demographic point of view, often former Calvinist regions. Similarities on the regional level do not mean, however, that living in the same village was more important than sharing a common political or religious orientation, as Benz said (1999). On the contrary, we learnt that the proximity of two religious groups tended to reinforce their opposition. Often this led to open conflicts. Our sources do not allow such an affirmation for the three villages, but elsewhere quarrels were nothing out of the ordinary. Especially the simultaneum – the parallel use of the same church – was a source of dispute (Wahl 1980, Muller, Vogler 1983).

(4) Is it possible to generalize the observed differences between denominations? What makes the villages studied here so remarkable is that similar cases of such an early “stopping” have been found only in the Mainz area (Rettinger 2002). No other family reconstitution, however, has shown such a low age at last birth in a Lutheran population (fig. 5). This feature is generally considered as a Calvinist one, as well as the longest birth intervals, although with regional differences. On the opposite side we find the Catholic population, where no
signs of a general reduction of fertility existed – with some exceptions nevertheless (Knodel 1988, Benz 1999). Lutherans, for their part, were the most heterogeneous population, it is as if Kertzer had especially aimed his conclusion at them: “What it meant, for example, to be Protestant differed greatly depending not only on denomination, and even subdenomination, but on time and place.” (Kertzer 2006, 261).

**Figure 5**: Age at Marriage and Stopping, 1750-1850 (x-axis: Age at Marriage, y-axis: Age at Last Birth)

As we said initially, the target number of children determined the behavior of the parents, when they began an active family planning. The ranking in Tab. 4 makes it evident how close the Lutheran Herrenberg, impregnated by Pietism, was to Catholic regions of Southern Germany, where the chances of survival for the children were the smallest. Despite a cruel reduction in the number of children becoming adults, these populations were nevertheless far from the model of three surviving children which prevailed in the Lutheran Ortenau.

**Table 4**: Number of Children in Complete Families, 1750-1850

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Ortenau villages, cath.</th>
<th>7,5</th>
<th>Saarland, luth.</th>
<th>6,7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herrenberg, luth.</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>East Frisia, luth.</td>
<td>6,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria, cath.</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>Schwalm, calv.</td>
<td>5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartum, luth.</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>Saarland, calv.</td>
<td>5,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldeck, luth.</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>East Frisia, calv.</td>
<td>5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland, cath.</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>3 Ortenau villages, luth.</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most instructive for our purposes is, without doubt, the comparison with Alsace. In this French province the demographic values were clearly different between Catholics and Protestants too, but the age at last birth declined later, from 38.9 years for Protestant marriages concluded 1750-89 to 36.3 years for the cohort 1836-60 (McQuillan 1999, 115). Furthermore social differences can hardly be detected. On both sides of the Rhine the interval between the first and the second birth was half a year shorter among Catholics, and Lutherans married earlier. Thus it can be said that in spite of some variations, at least in the 19th century the geographic proximity was accompanied by similar behavior patterns and the border was of no importance for them.

(5) How can the results be interpreted in view of Weber’s theses? As has been mentioned, the “modèle démographique wéberien” (Perrenoud 1974) is not a model developed by Weber himself, but an attempt at applying some of his assumptions to demography by translating them into supposed dispositions within wedlock. Such dispositions could become effective as rational actions in order to facilitate the maintenance of the social status or the advancement of the offspring, provided the chances of survival of the children were sufficiently high. In this case it would mean an enhancement of material perspectives. A discussion of theological positions towards birth control would be beyond the scope of our study, but it seems clear that Protestants considered sexual relations within marriage as part of their private life and where the church should not interfere. Consequently there were fewer obstacles for a rational behavior. So far the prevailing opinion on this subject.

A major problem is to transfer these theses on Calvinists to theses on Lutherans, problematic not only because of their diversity. For Weber Pietists are ascetic Protestants like Calvinists (Riesebrod 2005, 39), whereas he presents the orthodox Lutheranism as fatalistic and less innovative (Weber 1996, 46). Indeed the term asceticism is ambiguous and in our context highly problematic. It applies neither to the early marriages in the three villages of the Ortenau nor to the part of prenuptial conceptions, which was nearly the same among Protestants (13.3%) and Catholics (15.0%). As far as family planning is concerned, Pietists in particular showed a traditional behavior. Pietist pastors did not hesitate to incriminate practices through which the number of offspring was shortened by calling them sinful capriciousness (“in sündlicher Willkür”, Schnabel 1937, 396). It is not surprising that the dwellers of the village studied by Medick (2004) were extremely fertile. Thus Weber’s classification cannot provide an adequate theoretical framework for our findings, at least before the fertility decline of the end of the 19th century and outside the urban middle and upper classes (Gehrmann 2000, 258).

We do not know what tendency dominated in the sermons of the Protestant pastors of the Ortenau. We can just note that rationalism was strong in the 18th century (Kuhlemann 2001, 113), that dogmatic currents did not prevail in Baden, and that the union of the two Protestant denominations in 1821 did not
encounter resistance, contrary to the situation in Prussia. The enforcement of individualism and the higher esteem of living in marriage were common in both Protestant denominations, and finally the reduction and disappearance of the individual confession guaranteed more latitude to Lutherans than to Catholics, already in the 18th century. As we have seen, the resulting behaviors were collective rather than individual ones, but the effort which was necessary, given the techniques available for the prevention of conception, was an individual one anyway.

These observations and reflections lead to the conclusion that the affiliation to a particular Protestant denomination was less important than the dissociation from Catholicism. In matters of identity religion stayed essential, not only for personal conduct, but also for the cohesion of groups (Kuhlemann 2001, 112). Wahl found the opposition between the two denominations in the upper Rhine valley so profound that he called them “plutôt deux groupes ethniques, c’est-à-dire deux ensembles humains possédant une homogénéité certaine du point de vue socio-culturel”2 (Wahl 1980, 1262). Even if one does not share this point of view: it underlines the dimension of the problem.

Although his classification of Protestants was not helpful with respect to the demographic features encountered, Weber’s general characterization of Protestantism can be used to explain the underlying mental dispositions. As we have seen, pressure towards a rational reorientation of behavior came from the young age at marriage and the growing population, and the motivation came from the concern as to the future perspectives of offspring. But there had to be confidence too in the improved general conditions which resulted in a growing life expectancy. The latter had probably reached the lowest level in the long 17th century, with pestilence and wars continuing into the reign of Louis XIV, or at the very least it was compromised by high risks. From the 1740s to the turn of the 19th century life expectancy rose by nearly seven years, with an interruption in the first Coalition Wars (Imhof 1990, 446). By their behavior the Baden Protestant peasants manifested, and this in line with the spirit of the time, optimism and a certain confidence in evolution.

The conditions outlined here were not confined to the upper Rhine valley. But was this also true for the conclusions people drew consciously or unconsciously? What was behind the allusion to the abstinence of Thuringian peasants, for example (Möser 1943, 10-60)? More statistics based on the sources of the 18th century must be generated in order to get a more precise idea of the changes which took place in a demographic old regime that is still too often presented as static. This would also be of interest for cultural history.

“Secularization” is a catchphrase that one is tempted to use in this context. Unfortunately it has not proved to be determinant, at least in the Ortenau, says

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2 “rather two ethnic groups, i.e. two sets of humans who, from a socio-cultural point of view, were definitely homogenous"
And the fact that denomination was not always a perfect indicator does not make things easier. “Solid proprietors with a history of successful innovation displayed the greatest control over their lives, through family limitation on the one hand and through political independence on the other.” (Benz 1999, 253). This description, a perfect characterization of Protestant attitudes, is coined to the Catholic inhabitants of Grafenhausen. This fact urges us to exercise caution. It must be mentioned, however, that our results relativize the importance of the family limitation in only one southern Ortenau village in the second fourth of the 19th century stressed by Benz. Beginning earlier and reaching much farther, the change of behavior among Protestants was of quite a different quality, even if the number of surviving children was, in the end, not smaller than in some regions with traditional Malthusian forms of fertility control. They represent thus a modern purpose-rational behavior which is no longer bound to collective customs, but to the pursuit of individual interests. This was the base of the economic behavior also observed by Weber.

In the Ortenau a higher life expectancy did not provide the comparative advantages for the following generation, as suggested Perrenoud (1974). The advantage was rather an economic one, by a reduction of downward mobility and a greater probability of the conservation of property. In the so-called Lahrer Ried, where our three villages lie, it was perhaps not an accident that Catholics were finally more numerous among wage earners (Wahl 1980, 448-50). Had there not been the convergence of behaviors mentioned earlier (Fig. 3), the effect would have been even more visible, when traditional methods of limiting the population growth by spacing and a higher age at marriage did not suffice any more.

With this outlook upon the turn of the 20th century, we rejoin the starting point of this article. Offenbacher’s and Weber’s observations as to the wealth of Protestants and Catholics in Baden apply also to former times, and the behavior of preceding generations probably contributed to the differences. Beyond its purely socioeconomic implications, our demographic subject also reveals a cultural dimension: the expression of self-determination in the domain of family and sexuality – self-determination which was not accessible for every denominational group to the same degree.

References


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