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What Really Happened: Party Competition in the January and September 2015 Parliamentary Elections

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Abstract

In this paper we analyse the axes of political competition using the electoral results of the parliamentary elections of 2015 (January and September). The analysis is based on the constituencies' data. For the analysis we use the method of correspondence analysis for each election, using as cases the constituencies and as variables the political parties. Through this approach the geographical pattern of vote and the axes of political competition are realized. Furthermore, using the data from the election surveys we get the attitudes for a number of social and demographic variables connected with the reported vote (or the vote intention) for each party. From a comparative perspective, the similarities and dissimilarities were given. For the analysis we use a two-step procedure, computing firstly, via multivariate correspondence analysis, principal axes and loadings, and, secondly, through cluster analysis, attitudes are grouped in clusters.

Keywords: party competition, Greek parliamentary elections, polarization, fragmentation



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1. Introduction

The fiscal crisis in Europe was considered by many a consequence of the fiscal crisis in the United States of America that initially was caused by the failure of citizens to pay their loans. The decrease of the GDP in Greece by about 25%¹ from 2009 to 2014, together with a reduction in government spending, caused a significant increase in the Public Debt / GDP ratio. In addition to that, the growing unemployment rate in most countries of the Euro zone, lead to a considerable decrease of private spending and an increase in private debt.

Distrust towards incumbent governments seemed inevitable. The two major parties that interchanged in the government over the previous years received most of the citizens' disappointment. In many cases, decisions of the previous period were questioned. Some of the reasons that lead to the financial collapse were the increase in public spending (such as the cost of the Olympic Games that were held in Athens in 2004), the alleged corruption in every aspect of public life, the private & public partnerships, the clientelistic practices, (i.e. hiring of excessive number of public servants), and the inability of the state to collect revenues from taxpayers.

2. The Crisis: Parties² and People

The objective of this paper is not to study the economic indices or to reveal similarities and differences with the financial crisis at the United States of America in the thirties. Despite the common characteristics of these crises, the party system in European countries was affected in a different way. According to both Teperoglou & Tsatsanis (2014) and Verney (2014), the fiscal crisis in Greece caused the fragmentation of the party system and the emergence of parties that pledge the return to a previous status-quo. For a big part of the public opinion, the fiscal crisis is considered a result of irresponsible practices of the political personnel or improper handling of state affairs. The basic subject put under investigation in this article is the attitude of the electorate.

The economic crisis in Greece has quite complex -and lengthy to analyze- roots. The first hypothesis is the retreat of the "left-right" antagonism, as is was illustrated by the continuous interchange of the two major parties (PASOK and Nea Dimokratia) in office (1974-1981 Nea Dimokratia, 1981-1989 PASOK, 1990-1993 Nea Dimokratia, 1993-2004 PASOK, 2004-2009 Nea Dimokratia, 2009-2011 PASOK). This "left-right" antithesis gradually evolved as a "government-opposition" antithesis, without any ideological terms. The second hypothesis pertains to the perception of the crisis from the political personnel. For the major part of the electorate, the economic crisis has its roots to the diachronic biased decisions and clientelistic structures of the State formation itself, which proves accurate what Anthopoulos (2007) states

¹ "Hellenic Statistical Authority: Gross Domestic Product", Hellenic Statistical Authority, accessed August 3, 2016, <http://bit.ly/2aS6TiH>

² List of Abbreviations: SYRIZA (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ): "Coalition of the Radical Left" is the post-communist leftist radical party, ND (ΝΔ): "New Democracy" is the conservative party, LS-XA (ΛΣ-XA): "Popular Association-Golden Dawn" is the ultra-right party, PASOK-DP (ΠΑΣΟΚ-ΔΠ): "Panhellenic Socialistic Movement-Democratic Deployment" is the coalition of socialist and left democrats, DIMAR or DHMAR (ΔΗΜΑΡ): "Democratic Left" is the left democrats, KKE (ΚΚΕ): "Greek Communist Party", POTAMI (ΠΟΤΑΜΙ): The River" is a liberal-left party, ANEL (ΑΝΕΛ): "Independent Greeks" is a populist right party, EK: "Center Union" is a centrist party, KIDISO or KINHMA (ΚΙΔΗΣΟ): "Movement of Socialist and Democrats" is the party of the former Greek prime minister G. Papandreou who withdrew from PASOK (Panhellenic Socialistic Movement) before January 2015 parliamentary elections and LE (ΛΕ): "Popular Unity" is a party formed on August 2015 by twenty five parliamentarians formerly affiliated to the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), as a reaction to Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras handling of the Greek bailout agreement of 2015.

in his work. In Greece party preference is close connected to the exchange vote for favours, so the Greek party system considered as clientelistic Charalampis (1989). Consequently, the second hypothesis consists of the assumption that the economic crisis is actually a crisis of the quality of Democracy, which does not pertain to the economy but to the characteristics of governance. In addition to that, the attention of citizens is moved away from welfare issues towards issues that pertain to the quality of Democracy. This hypothesis would explain the fragmentation of the party system in Greece - despite the conciliation attempts of PASOK, Nea Dimokratia and LAOS, that led firstly to the formation of a broad coalition government in November 2011, under Loukas Papadimos³ and secondly to a coalition government of Nea Dimokratia, PASOK, and DIMAR in June 2012, under Nea Dimokratia's party leader Antonis Samaras (with DIMAR retreating its supports a year later). These conciliation attempts could be considered as a quest of a new equilibrium, based on new axes of antithesis.

3. Data and Methods

Data

We have used the raw data for the study of the 2015 parliamentary elections and the data from HelpMeVote VAA for parliamentary elections 2015A (January) and 2015B (September). The raw data of the national election study (Greece 2015, July) have been harmonized under the COST Action "True European Voter" and were integrated by using a common prototype from the TEV data codebook. Continuous variables were recoded into ordinal scale variables. Any observations that included at least one missing value in any variable were not considered for the analysis. For each study we recoded each variable used in the analysis into a set of binary variables, creating for each variable a new binary variable for each value. By this transformation we assign a new binary variable to each attitude (i.e. a value of the initial variable). We use 1008 observations for Greece 2015 survey.

Correspondence Analysis

The analysis for each election is implemented through the use of two-way cross tabulation, contingency tables, and correspondence analysis by using the pioneer program "M.A.D." [Méthodes de l'Analyse des Données], developed by Prof. Dimitrios Karapistolis (2010). In "M.A.D." [Méthodes de l'Analyse des Données], Prof. Karapistolis has integrated and implemented digitally an abundance of methods created manually by the distinguished mathematician Jean-Paul Benzécri.

For the analysis of the results, in order to describe the axes of electoral competition, we used the method of correspondence analysis developed by Jean-Paul Benzécri (1992). We put the geographical districts as lines and the parties as columns. The data refer to the results of each party (or party coalition) at each district. For the sake of the analysis, the rest of the parties were coded in a group as "other".

Multivariate Correspondence Analysis

In order to identify specific attitudes of the population and form clusters that showcase the same attitude, we used the elections study of 2015. The 0-1 matrices were analyzed using the method of multivariate correspondence analysis. Through this analysis, specific axes emerged, describing the data in less dimensions. Consequently, data were analyzed using hierarchical cluster analysis in order to form homogenous groups of attitudes connected with party preference. The party-attitude interconnection

³ A distinguished technocrat that served formerly as Governor of the Bank of Greece (1994-2002) and as Vice President of the European Central Bank (2002-2010).

outlines the party audience and probably party's policies connected (or not connected) to the population group that has this attitude.

4. Parliamentary Election Results

In addition to the two methods mentioned above, we used the actual parliamentary election results in Greece, using electoral constituencies as cases.

a. 2012 Parliamentary Elections

The two elections of 2012 in Greece supposed to initiate an earthquake for the party system in Greece. This was mentioned by several scholars. In the GPSG election MAY and JUNE 2012 pamphlets, edited by R. Gerodimos we mentioned:

"A new political landscape

And suddenly before us is the great explosion in our party system! As happens in other countries in transition where parties are born and parties explode and create small factions. The two axes that determined the choice of the electorate were (a) the established "Left-Right" axis and (b) the question of governance. The pole of the Right as a whole kept its electoral influence constant at 40% with approximately 15% (i.e. nearly 40% of its power) transferred to the populist right and the far right. The Left, including the Greens and the Liberals, maintained its power as a whole, but the collapse of PASOK reinforced the populist wing while liberals paid the price of no collaboration. Thus, a new landscape is forming in the Greek political system. The parties should consider the building of a majority with specific partners (as in the cases of Italy or France). This search must be done with pre-election pledges and programmatic elements in mind; not with promises of employment or with the aim of settling various issues. Until we move on from the model of the catch-all party, it is likely that we will experience a difficult situation. In order for that transition to happen, the political parties should change. They should boost their internal functions by mobilising their members at the stages of policy development and candidate selection. They should also consider proposing realistic policies and not unrealistic wishes that aim to please all. However, we are essentially in difficulty because of the weakness of governance platform configuration. The clientelistic phenomenon is not affected. The uncritical acceptance of claims, mostly unrealistic, promises to everyone and everything that characterizes the version of populist forces SYRIZA and the Independent Greeks created the same expectations that are usually created by individual mediation. In this sense, ND and PASOK fell into the same trap that they themselves set up. But what could be done now? After four out of the seven parliamentary parties (i.e. the Communist Party, Independent Greeks, the Golden Dawn and SYRIZA) excluded themselves from a possible coalition government, and while DIM.AR. thinks that the possibility of the next election should block the formation of government as parties compete with each other, there is the perceived inability to form a government. There is also the opportunity for anyone to propose the dissolution of individuality (which apparently is not convincing as the largest party got almost 19%) or to form an advance government proposal gathering more forces. The mere repetition of the elections will, of course, not produce a viable solution. The political parties should either change the electoral law or form poles or coalitions (rather than parties). Until that happens, we will be monitoring the impossible solution that we voted for. As for coming back to the pre-2009 state of affairs...."⁴

"The 40 days of confinement should not be wasted

The result of the May 6th election has proven to be unmanageable for Greece's political parties. Stunned by the low vote shares and unexpected results of "one use" parties and the "one time" vote, they failed to form a government based on that result. Almost 48% (summing New Democracy, PASOK, Democratic Left and

⁴ "GPSG ELECTION MAY 2012 PAMPHLET," GPSG, <http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/GPSG-Election-2012.pdf>

liberal parties) wanted the country to proceed in the direction of changes in the bailout agreement and ensure the progress of the country in the Eurozone. The embarrassing result made them proceed with a subsequent election as the possibility of forming a coalition government is something foreign to the Greek political tradition. The May 6th result was a shaking for all. Almost one third of people voted the forces of populism. We had elections in 40 days, with Independent Greeks losing 3%, the Communist Party 4% and the share of those who voted for parties that did not pass the 3% parliamentary threshold declining from 19% to just 6%. Thus, ND and SYRIZA took about another 10% each. Is the situation manageable? Political parties have finally become adults. I have to note that the formation of government is a separate issue to the negotiation of the memorandum with our partners. Most people decided to vote that we must remain in the negotiations and try for the best. In this national objective both the government and the opposition have a distinct role. Like in other countries –e.g. Cyprus- where political leaders have to deal with existential questions beyond domestic politics, so must our political parties rise above their circumstances and offer each of their part in this national effort. That means that the new government must take into account that the result requires consultation without bitterness. The opposition should also understand that 27% is no majority and that respecting the will of citizens is the primary element of democracy. The phenomenon of one-use-party and the one time vote will punish anyone who does not respect the will of the majority. At last the country must be stabilized to overcome “childhood” illnesses - to proceed with reforms. Theoretically, everyone wants to have an effective mechanism for collecting taxes before discussing the highest tax rate. The 40 days of confinement should not be wasted. Tomorrow, the parties have to overcome themselves. Neither is easy or very likely.”⁵

b. Parliamentary Elections of January 2015 (2015A)

Is the economy stupid?

For the January parliamentary elections in Greece we conclude:⁶ “Of the three main axes of political and electoral competition, the oldest one, the left-right axis, is the least important. How could it be? Greek citizens, who feel that they are over-taxed and under-serviced, believe they should pay fewer taxes and receive better quality public services. In other words, while they suffer the ills of both systems (socialist high taxes and liberalist low public services), they demand the systems’ beneficial sides (socialist high quality services and liberalist low taxes). They ask for public universities, free of charge postgraduate studies, vigorous health care system, and public infrastructures without suffering high taxes. Since all parties promise such policy, the competition along the left-right axis is not important. This appears as an obvious contradiction, but in fact it is not: Being aware that such policy is impossible, the citizens do not ask for equal treatment for all, but only for themselves or their social class or group. Thus we end up with a clientelistic party system that favours the demands of some social groups, but not all, as they are incapable to honour their promises after they come on power. Apart from that, left-wing parties received 57% of the votes (previously 52%) while the right-wing parties 47% (previously 52%).

The competition along the axis of social policies “liberal-authoritarian” is of greater significance, but despite parties’ polarization it does not affect the outcome of the elections. Most of the parties promise a liberal policy but they implement an authoritarian one! Every citizen respects the social and individual rights of the other, as long as it does not heart them personally!

The data analysis of a sample of half a million citizens collected with the use of the VAA helpmevote.gr reveal as more important the competition along the axis of governance. The one pole of the axis expresses a peculiar egalitarian populism which asks for national isolationism. This is expressed with

⁵ “GPSG ELECTION JUNE 2012 PAMPHLET,” GPSG, <http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/GPSG-Election-June-2012-Pamphlet.pdf>

⁶ Chadjipadelis, T. in GPSG ELECTION 2015 PAMPHLETS,” GPSG, <http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GPSG-Pamphlet-4-January-2015.pdf> (2015):32

statements as “it would be better if we had a national currency”, “the ordinary people are better than the politicians”, “the parties don’t care about us”, and “it is legal for us to do whatever is right for us”. The opposite pole of the axis expresses a European political spirit of cooperation. Without generally being in agreement with political parties’ views, voters for SYRIZA, KKE, LS-XA, AN. EL and ANTARSYA concentrate on the pole of national isolationism, while the European cooperation pole concentrates the voters from ND, PASOK, POTAMI, DHMAR and KINHMA. This was indeed the main issue of the elections: a peculiar egalitarian national isolationism without ideological background, against an equally non-ideological pluralistic European perspective. In this framework, the people voted for the parties not for their manifestos, which they do not trust, but for their so called “hidden agenda”.

Since the electoral system is designed to support a one-party government, it is very difficult for a coalition government to arise out of it; another reason is the multifarious (almost contradictory) nature of the ideologies that coexist inside each of the poles. The fragmented party system tries to balance between a rock and a hard place, as the party system consists of parties that in the best case scenario show no will to cooperate, while in the worst case scenario resort to blackmailing tactics.

In the previous elections (2012) the European perspective parties got some 53% of the votes, while the parties of egalitarian nationalism got 47%. Today (2015) the situation is reversed: they received 47% and 53% of the votes respectively. So, is the economy stupid? Definitely yes! But according to “votes for favours” the exchange model becomes “selfish economics”.”

c. Parliamentary Elections 2015 September (2015B)

Is the economy stupid? – It’s about the same!

As we mentioned in GSPG Pamphlet 5 for the September 2015 parliamentary elections in Greece⁷ the situation remains fairly the same. For the September elections we mentioned: “Of the three main axes of political and electoral competition, the oldest one, the left-right axis, is the least important. How could it be? Greek citizens, who feel that they are over-taxed and under-serviced, believe they should pay fewer taxes and receive better quality public services. In other words, while they suffer the ills of both systems (socialist high taxes and liberalist low public services), they demand the systems’ beneficial sides (socialist high quality services and liberalist low taxes). They ask for public universities, free of charge postgraduate studies, vigorous health care system, and public infrastructures without suffering high taxes. Since all parties promise such policy, the competition along the left-right axis is not important. This appears as an obvious contradiction, but in fact it is not: Being aware that such policy is impossible, the citizens do not ask for equal treatment for all, but only for themselves or their social class or group. Thus we end up with a clientelistic party system that favours the demands of some social groups, but not all, as they are incapable to honour their promises after they come on power. Apart from that, left-wing parties received 53% of the votes (previously 53%) while the right-wing parties 47% (previously 47%). Is about the same....

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The data analysis of a sample of half a million citizens collected with the use of the VAA helpmevote.gr for the previous elections (i.e. January 2015) reveal as more important the competition along

⁷ Chadjipadelis, T. in GSPG ELECTION 2015 PAMPHLETS,” GSPG, <http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/GPSG-Pamphlet-5-September-2015.pdf> (2015):15

the axis of governance. The one pole of the axis expresses a peculiar egalitarian populism which asks for national isolationism. This is expressed with statements as “it would be better if we had a national currency”, “the ordinary people are better than the politicians”, “the parties don’t care about us”, and “it is legal for us to do whatever is right for us”. The opposite pole of the axis expresses a European political spirit of cooperation. Without generally being in agreement with political parties’ views, voters for SYRIZA, KKE, LS-XA, AN. EL and ANTARSYA concentrate on the pole of national isolationism, while the European cooperation pole concentrates the voters from ND, PASOK, POTAMI, DHMAR and KINHMA. This was indeed the main issue of the elections: a peculiar egalitarian national isolationism without ideological background, against an equally non-ideological pluralistic European perspective. In this framework, the people voted for the parties not for their manifestos, which they do not trust, but for their so called “hidden agenda”.

Since the electoral system is designed to support a one-party government, it is very difficult for a coalition government to arise out of it; another reason is the multifarious (almost contradictory) nature of the ideologies that coexist inside each of the poles. The fragmented party system tries to balance between a rock and a hard place, as the party system consists of parties that in the best case scenario show no will to cooperate, while in the worst case scenario resort to blackmailing tactics.

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What was the case for parliamentary elections of September 2015? In this elections voted seven out of the eight who had voted in January 2015. That is a sever increase (12%) in abstention. Also the election results show that there is no statistically significant difference in increase of abstention in the constituencies. As for the parties:

SYRIZA showing relative decrease of 14% (or 7% if the LAE votes added), ND shows a decrease of 11%, and also shows the Communist Party. The decrease for these three is similar to the decrease for turnout. The LS-XA party admirably lost only 2%. He got only 8000 votes less. POTAMI and ANEL suffered the pressure of the two largest parties and lost 40% and 30% respectively of their power. PASOK (together with DIMAR) had increased by 7% (or lost 40% if their forces are added and the KIDISO).

5. Votes and Share of Votes

Analyzing the results we begin by considering the share of the votes for the parties, votes and seats they gained and talking about participation and abstention. In the following table the results for the three last parliamentary elections in Greece are given. SYRIZA (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ) is the post-communist leftist radical party emerged from the collapse of the party system in Greece, ND (ΝΔ) is the conservative party, LS-XA (ΛΣ-ΧΑ) is the ultra-right party also emerged from party system collapse, PASOK-DP (ΠΑΣΟΚ-ΔΠ) is the coalition of socialist and left democrats, DIMAR (ΔΗΜΑΡ) is the left democrats, KKE (ΚΚΕ) is the Greek communist party, POTAMI (ΠΟΤΑΜΙ: the river) is a liberal-left party, ANEL (ΑΝΕΛ: independent Greeks) is a populist right party and EK (center union) is a centrist party. For each party that gained seats at least in one of the three elections (2012 June, 2015 January, 2015 September) (and also for abstention and participation) we compute the relative difference between the consecutive elections of 2015. Also the data for KIDISO (ΚΙΔΗΣΟ: movement of socialist and democrats, the party of the former Greek prime minister G. Papandreou) and LE (ΛΕ: Popular Unity, a party formed by Popular Unity was founded on August 2015 by

twenty five parliamentarians formerly affiliated to the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), as a reaction to Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras handling of the Greek bailout agreement of 2015.

In parliamentary elections of January 2015 the same number of citizens as in the parliamentary elections of June 2012 were take part (circa 6,3 million) SYRIZA gained 600 thousand votes, ND lost 100 thousand, LS-XA lost about 40 thousand, KKE gained 60 thousand votes, ANEL get 170 thousand less, PASOK also get 470 thousand votes and DIMAR lost 350 thousand. The new parties (POTAMI and KIDISO) gained 370 thousand and 150 thousand respectively. At all there was a shift of at least 1.1 million voters, i.e., at least 17% of the electorate changed view. This, of course, is not accurate estimation because there are transitions between parties. It is the input-output balance.

TABLE 1: votes and seats for the parliamentary elections (2012B, 2015A, 2015B), votes difference (2015B-2015A), relative difference for each party

Total Variance Explained

| Component | Initial Eigenvalues | | | Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings | | | Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings | | |
|-----------|---------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % |
| 1 | 2,751 | 39,299 | 39,299 | 2,751 | 39,299 | 39,299 | 2,403 | 34,332 | 34,332 |
| 2 | 1,297 | 18,527 | 57,826 | 1,297 | 18,527 | 57,826 | 1,380 | 19,721 | 54,053 |
| 3 | 1,115 | 15,922 | 73,747 | 1,115 | 15,922 | 73,747 | 1,379 | 19,695 | 73,747 |
| 4 | ,693 | 9,895 | 83,642 | | | | | | |
| 5 | ,462 | 6,598 | 90,240 | | | | | | |
| 6 | ,348 | 4,970 | 95,210 | | | | | | |
| 7 | ,335 | 4,790 | 100,000 | | | | | | |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

In parliamentary elections of September 2015 voted some three quarters of a million voters less. SYRIZA gets 320 thousand votes less, ND 190 thousand votes less, POTAMI lost 150 thousand votes, LS-XA lost 9 thousand votes, KKE 36 thousand, ANEL lost 93 thousand votes. PASOK and EK get 22 thousand and 76 thousand more respectively. There were a shift of at least 0,85 million voters. I.e. 13% of the electorate changed view. The majority of them choose not to vote. As before, of course, this is not accurate estimation because there are transitions between parties. It is the input-output balance.

Computing two measures of proportionality (Gallagher Index και X-square prob)⁸ we get a value of 9.63 (January 2015) and 9.42 (September 2015) for Gallagher index και 0.025 X-square prob for both elections. According to both indices there is a distance from proportionality. We recall that the Greek electoral system is a mixed system where 250 seats distributed to parties pass a 3% threshold and 50 seats are given to the party that gains the relative majority of the votes.

⁸ See in Grofman, B. and R. Taagepera, (2003)

Does a new party landscape emerge? If we compute parties share according to the classical polarization {Left-Right} and the new one {Cosmopolitanism - Communitarianism}^{9,10} were the second antithesis refers to parties positions towards EU and IMF involvement dividing parties in pro-memorandum and against-memorandum parties we see that the change in {Left-Right} balance from 2009 till 2015B is practically zero (**Diagram 1**) while the ratio between Cosmopolitanism and Communitariasm changed from 85/13 to 39/58 in the same period (**Diagram 2**). Computations were made using the actual electoral results¹¹




Diagram 1.
Change between party shares according Left-Right partition




Diagram 2.
Change between party shares according Cosmopolitanism-Isolationism partition

⁹ See in Zürn, Michael, (2014).

¹⁰ See also in Miller, W.E. (1991).

¹¹ "National election results", Ministry of interior, <http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/NationalElections/Results/> (in Greek)

If we describe the political and electoral competition by using the traditional Left-Right antithesis the balance is practically zero. The parties that belong to the left spectra get some 70 thousand votes more between 2012 and 2015A.

The competition along the axis of social policies “liberal-authoritarian” is of greater significance, but despite parties’ polarization it does not affect the outcome of the elections. The parties of the liberal pole get only 6 thousand votes more between 2012 and 2015A.

But if we refer to the question of governance the two alternatives according to position towards EU and IMF and their involvement. Parties for the national isolation proposition gained some 700 thousand votes between 2012 and January 2015.

6. Hellenic National Electoral Study 2015

But how the above reflected people’s behaviour? The data of the post-election survey conducted in the period 6-7 / 2015 as post-election for January 2015, but practically realized as pre-election survey for September 2015, on a sample of 1,000 citizens using the WebSurvey method were analysed by the method of factor analysis. Using the data of citizen’s responses on their position towards the parties (Party_Sympathy) we get three axes that explain a cumulative percentage of 73.7% of the total variability (**Table 2**).

Table 2. SPSS output for Factor analysis of the Component and variance explained

Total Variance Explained

| Component | Initial Eigenvalues | | | Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings | | | Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings | | |
|-----------|---------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % | Total | % of Variance | Cumulative % |
| 1 | 2,751 | 39,299 | 39,299 | 2,751 | 39,299 | 39,299 | 2,403 | 34,332 | 34,332 |
| 2 | 1,297 | 18,527 | 57,826 | 1,297 | 18,527 | 57,826 | 1,380 | 19,721 | 54,053 |
| 3 | 1,115 | 15,922 | 73,747 | 1,115 | 15,922 | 73,747 | 1,379 | 19,695 | 73,747 |
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| 7 | ,335 | 4,790 | 100,000 | | | | | | |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study for the Greek Parliamentary elections of January 2015. The recruitment process lasted from June 12 until July 16. There were two rotating shifts, with each shift to have three operators and one supervisor. Each operator had a page with the script, one computer, one telephone device, a headset and a copy of the questionnaire in printed form as a backup in case of a system’s crash or a power outage. Each operator had an Excel list with telephone numbers created by an RDD procedure. The operator had to dial the list of numbers and follow a specific script, asking the respondents to provide their email address in case they were interested in participating in a political web survey conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

Some people did not answer their phone during the recruitment phase or they were not able to talk at the exact moment but they were interested in participating in the survey. These people were recalled during the next shift. As mentioned above telephone was the contact mode of the survey; however, as for the mode of questionnaire completion a mixed-mode survey design was preferred combining web (CAWI) and telephone interviews (CATI). The Web was the main mode of the survey and the telephone interview was used as an auxiliary method for the respondents who do not have internet access or email account. For instance, a very limited number of Greek people in the 65+ age group use web tools and most of them have no or limited access to the Internet. These people were encouraged to answer the questionnaire through a telephone interview.¹²

In the following table (**Table 3**) the coefficients for the variables for the three main components (factors) are given. The first axis pertains to the electoral competition of the “anti-memorandum” parties {SYRIZA, ANEL, KKE, LS-XA} against the pro-European parties {ND, PASOK, POTAMI}. Thus, this axis, that explains the major element of the competition, signifies the question of governance, which consequently is the major dimension of the analysis.

The second axis pertains to the competition of the communist party with the other “anti-memorandum” parties. The third axis pertains to the “left-right” rivalry between the “left” parties [KKE, SYRIZA, PASOK] and the “right” parties [ND, LS-XA]. It is worth mentioned that ANEL it is on the “left” side of the spectra. Most likely it refers to the ideological characteristics of these parties.

Table 3. SPSS output. Rotated Component Matrix

Rotated Component Matrix^a

| | Component | | |
|------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Party Sympathy: SYRIZA | -,441 | ,362 | ,616 |
| Party Sympathy: ND | ,801 | -,042 | -,182 |
| Party Sympathy: LS-XA | ,051 | ,874 | -,182 |
| Party Sympathy: POTAMI | ,859 | -,120 | -,060 |
| Party Sympathy: KKE | ,147 | -,164 | ,829 |
| Party Sympathy: ANEL | -,316 | ,665 | ,464 |
| Party Sympathy: PASOK | ,840 | -,025 | ,160 |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

¹² Andreadis et all. Web based surveys - Greek Election 2015: ELNES-2015a. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2015-11-10. <http://doi.org/10.3886/E51483V3>

The display of the two-dimensional plane (**Diagram 3**) it is on a flat plane and it is not possible to transcribe all the inter-profile information onto such a display. A measure of the completeness of the summary is given by adding the percentages indicated on each axis: $39.3\%+18.5\%=57.8\%$. Two groups are present. The one is formed by {ANEL} and {SYRIZA} and the other by {ND}, {PASOK} and {POTAMI}. The party {LS-XA} is closer to the first group while KKE is separated from both groups.




Diagram 3.
Principal plane for the party sympathy analysis

By computing the factor scores for each case (i.e. respondents) and plotting factor scores according to reported vote to previous elections it is clear that the electorate is divided in two groups. The first consists from voters of {SYRIZA, ANEL, KKE and LS-XA} while the second from voters of {ND, POTAMI and PASOK}. Probably this division reflects also the results of the July 2015 referendum in Greece. In the following diagram (**Diagram 4**) the BOX-PLOT for each group according to reported vote is given for factor scores for the first factor.




Diagram 4.
BOX-PLOT for factor scores for first axis

7. Electoral Results Analysis: The Axes of Electoral Competition

2015_A

At the parliamentary elections of January 2015, seven (or party coalitions) won seats at the parliament¹³. For the analysis of the results, in order to describe the axes of electoral competition, we used the method of correspondence analysis. We put the geographical districts as lines and parties as columns. The data refer to the results of each party (or party coalition) at each district. For the sake of the analysis, the rest of the parties were coded in a group as "other".

From the analysis, we accrued two major axes: the first one explains 49.50% of the total inertia and the second 19.90% of the total inertia. The third axis explains 13.4% of the total inertia; the fourth axis explains 9.10% of the total inertia.

The first axis pertains to the electoral competition of the two major government parties [ND, PASOK] against the party of SYRIZA. Thus, this axis, which explains the major element of the electoral competition, signifies the question of governance, which consequently is the major dimension of the analysis.

¹³ "January 2015 election results", Ministry of Interior, <http://bit.ly/2auSgT6> (in Greek)

The second axis pertains to the electoral competition of the socialist party the communist party and the ultra-right party of LS-XA. It could be characterized as the axis of pro- and against-European orientation. SYRIZA is closer to PASOK.

The third axis pertains to the rivalry between the orthodox communist parties [KKE] and the party [POTAMI]. Most likely it refers to the ideological characteristics of these parties.

The fourth axis pertains to the rivalry between the parties of ANEL and LS-XA against the party of POTAMI.

In sum, the first main antithesis (first axis, 49.50% inertia) pertains to the antithesis of the two major government parties [ND, PASOK] against the party of SYRIZA that represents different governance proposals. The second main antithesis (second axis, 19.90% inertia) pertains to the "European-orientation" rivalry.

In the table below (**Table 4**), one can see the coordinates of each of the first four axes, the correlation of each point with every axis (aka. the quality of its projection), and its contribution to the formulation of the axis (percentage per thousand: %). The points that have the higher contribution, contribute more the formation of that axis.

Table 4. Greece 2015A: Correspondence Analysis Results, Correlations and Contributions for each axis

| IND | #G1 | COR | CTR | #G2 | COR | CTR | #G3 | COR | CTR | #G4 | COR | CTR |
|---------------|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|
| SYRIZA | -75 | 412 | 157 | -78 | 443 | 236 | -13 | 11 | 9 | 34 | 87 | 92 |
| ND | 108 | 610 | 262 | 66 | 234 | 140 | 28 | 43 | 36 | -30 | 44 | 51 |
| LS-XA | 76 | 138 | 33 | 92 | 205 | 68 | -80 | 151 | 68 | 57 | 79 | 51 |
| PASOK | 200 | 414 | 202 | -192 | 377 | 257 | 96 | 96 | 89 | -2 | 0 | 1 |
| POTAMI | -294 | 460 | 281 | 129 | 90 | 77 | 272 | 397 | 460 | -79 | 32 | 54 |
| KKE | -90 | 90 | 36 | -15 | 2 | 2 | -182 | 370 | 278 | -214 | 511 | 553 |
| ANEL | -69 | 131 | 14 | 41 | 47 | 8 | -64 | 113 | 22 | 48 | 66 | 19 |
| EK | -71 | 41 | 14 | 235 | 461 | 212 | -86 | 61 | 38 | 154 | 200 | 179 |

In the following diagram (**Diagram 5**) (primary factorial plane of 1st and 2nd axis), where 68,8% of the total information is provided, we see clearly the clusters of {ND, PASOK}, {KKE-ANEL}, {SYRIZA, POTAMI} and {LS-XA} as they formed by an hierarchical clustering method based on axis loadings. The cluster of {ND, PASOK} refers to the governance proposition and to the pro-European orientation, {LS-XA} and {KKE, ANEL} refer to the anti-European orientation and {SYRIZA, POTAMI} refers to the antithesis to the previous government.

The view of the parties and citizens

The data analysis of a sample of half a million citizens collected with the use of the VAA helpmevote.gr for the previous elections¹⁴ reveal as more important the competition along the axis of governance. The one pole of the axis expresses a peculiar egalitarian populism which asks for national isolationism. This is expressed with statements as "it would be better if we had a national currency", "the

¹⁴ Andreadis, Ioannis and Theodore Chatzipadelis, "Web based surveys - Greek Election 2015: HelpMeVote2015." Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2015-02-14. <http://doi.org/10.3886/E29805V2>

ordinary people are better than the politicians", "the parties don't care about us", and "it is legal for us to do whatever is right for us". The opposite pole of the axis expresses a European political spirit of cooperation. Without generally being in agreement with political parties' views, voters for SYRIZA, KKE, LS-XA, AN. EL and ANTARSYA concentrate on the pole of national isolationism, while the European cooperation pole concentrates the voters from ND, PASOK, POTAMI, DHMAR and KINHMA. This was indeed the main issue of the elections: a peculiar egalitarian national isolationism without ideological background, against an equally non-ideological pluralistic European perspective. In this framework, the people voted for the parties not for their manifestos, which they do not trust, but for their so called "hidden agenda".




Diagram 5.
First plane diagram

In the following diagram (**Diagram 6**) we give parties and voters position according to their responses to HelpMeVote VAA application (intention to vote [2015], vote [2012]). Parties' position computed according to experts answers.

The first axis pertains to the rivalry between the two governance alternatives while the second to the liberal-authoritarian. Parties are more polarized than the mean voter. There is no statistically significant difference for the voters for every party. The main polarization between {ND} and {SYRIZA} and the secondary antithesis between {ND}-(KKE, ANTARSIA) is practically uncorrelated with the antithesis {PASOK, KINIMA, DIMAR, POTAMI}-{ANEL-LS-XA}.




Diagram 6.
Schematic representation of parties and voters position according to PCA results

2015_B

At the parliamentary elections of September 2015, eight parties (or party coalitions) won seats at the parliament¹⁵. For the analysis of the results, in order to describe the axes of electoral competition, we used the method of correspondence analysis. We put the geographical districts as lines and parties as columns. The data refer to the results of each party (or party coalition) at each district. For the sake of the analysis, the rest of the parties were coded in a group as “other”.

From the analysis, we accrued two major axes: the first one explains 33.60% of the total inertia and the second 24% of the total inertia. The third axis explains 17.7% of the total inertia; the fourth axis explains 12.30% of the total inertia.

The first axis pertains to the electoral competition of the two former government parties [ND, PASOK] against the party of SYRIZA. Thus, this axis, which explains the major element of the electoral competition, signifies the question of governance, which consequently is the major dimension of the analysis.

The second axis pertains to the electoral competition of the socialist party and the party of SYRIZA to the conservative party and the party of EK. It refers to the “left-right” rivalry and includes the ideological characteristics of the parties that form it.

¹⁵ “September 2015 election results”, Ministry of Interior, <http://bit.ly/2b1RsE3> (in greek)

The third axis pertains to the rivalry between the orthodox communist parties [KKE] and the party [POTAMI]. Most likely it refers to the ideological characteristics of these parties.

The fourth axis pertains to the rivalry between the parties of KKE against the party of EK.

In sum, the first main antithesis (first axis, 33.60% inertia) pertains to the antithesis of the two former government parties [ND, PASOK] against the party of SYRIZA that represents different governance proposals. The second main antithesis (second axis, 24% inertia) pertains to the "left-right" rivalry.

Table 5. Greece 2015B: Correspondence Analysis Results, Correlations and Contributions for each axis

| IND | #G1 | COR | CTR | #G2 | COR | CTR | #G3 | COR | CTR | #G4 | COR | CTR |
|---------------|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|
| SYRIZA | -75 | 412 | 157 | -78 | 443 | 236 | -13 | 11 | 9 | 34 | 87 | 92 |
| ND | 108 | 610 | 262 | 66 | 234 | 140 | 28 | 43 | 36 | -30 | 44 | 51 |
| LS-XA | 76 | 138 | 33 | 92 | 205 | 68 | -80 | 151 | 68 | 57 | 79 | 51 |
| PASOK | 200 | 414 | 202 | -192 | 377 | 257 | 96 | 96 | 89 | -2 | 0 | 1 |
| POTAMI | -294 | 460 | 281 | 129 | 90 | 77 | 272 | 397 | 460 | -79 | 32 | 54 |
| KKE | -90 | 90 | 36 | -15 | 2 | 2 | -182 | 370 | 278 | -214 | 511 | 553 |
| ANEL | -69 | 131 | 14 | 41 | 47 | 8 | -64 | 113 | 22 | 48 | 66 | 19 |
| EK | -71 | 41 | 14 | 235 | 461 | 212 | -86 | 61 | 38 | 154 | 200 | 179 |

In **Table 5** one can see the coordinates of each of the first four axes, the correlation of each point with every axis (aka. the quality of its projection), and its contribution to the formulation of the axis (percentage per thousand: %). The points that have the higher contribution, contribute more the formation of that axis.

In the following diagram (**Diagram 7**) (primary factorial plane of 1st and 2nd axis), where 57,6% of the total information is provided, we see clearly the clusters of {ND, PASOK}, {SYRIZA} as they formed by an hierarchical clustering method based on axis loadings. The cluster of {ND, PASOK} refers to the alternative to {SYRIZA} governance proposition.

The view of parties and citizens

For nine parties participating in the elections of 2015B we encode their positions on 34 questions that reflect the dimensions of political competition. The questions used in the voting advice application HelpMeVote realized by the laboratory of applied political research of the school of Political Sciences for the parliamentary elections of September 2015. Questions have emerged from previous research to reflect the three main polarization axes of electoral and political competition ({Left-Right} [economical dimension], {Authoritarian-Liberalism} [social dimension] {Pro-European- Anti-European} [orientation dimension]). Analyzing the data by MDS (Multidimensional Scaling) we can check if the selected questions define a polarization along each axis and also if in the given period polarizations are visible. The variables (34 questions) are measured in a 5-point ordinal scale (from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)).




Diagram 7.
Principal plane

The 34 questions used, are on <http://helpmevote.gr> page. The analysis gives the following two components (see **Table 6** and **Diagram 8**):

Table 6. Coordinates

| | Final Coordinates | | |
|-------|-------------------|-----------|-------|
| | Party | Dimension | |
| Label | | 1 | 2 |
| VAR1 | SYRIZA | .242 | -.520 |
| VAR2 | ND | -.630 | .136 |
| VAR3 | LS-XA | .488 | .704 |
| VAR4 | POTAMI | -.759 | -.194 |
| VAR5 | KKE | .722 | -.147 |
| VAR6 | ANEL | .076 | .465 |
| VAR7 | PASOK-DP | -.571 | -.148 |
| VAR8 | LAE | .747 | -.364 |
| VAR9 | EK | -.315 | .067 |

Diagram 8.
Plot of points (parties)

From the analysis, we accrued two major axes. The first axis pertains to the electoral competition of the two former government parties [ND, PASOK] and the party {POTAMI} against the parties [SYRIZA, KKE, LAE]. The second axis pertains to the electoral competition of the socialist party [PASOK], the conservative party [ND] and the party [POTAMI] to the ultra-right party [LS-XA] and the right-wing party [ANEL]. If we rotate the axes, the horizontal one reflects the [ND]-[SYRIZA] antithesis and the vertical one the [PASOK, POTAMI]-[ANEL, LS-XA] antithesis.

Thus, the horizontal axis, which explains the major element of the electoral competition, signifies the question of governance, which consequently is the major dimension of the analysis and the vertical refers to the "left-right" rivalry and includes the ideological characteristics of the parties that form it.

Using the same method (multidimensional scaling: MDS) for the cases (34 questions) we describe the polarization along the axes according to the issues in order to express the differentiation caused by the questions (issues). In the following diagram (**Diagram 9**) the derived groups of questions along the two axes are given.




Diagram 9.
Plot of points (questions)

Along the horizontal axis the main antithesis is expressed due to the two groups HA and HB given in the following table (**Table 7**). Thus the main antithesis (Cosmopolitanism-Communitarianism) –expressed also in the referendum, is described.

Table 7. HB (communitarianism) & HA (cosmopolitanism)

| HB | Anti-European, weak left |
|-----|--|
| q21 | The economy of Greece would have been better if we had our own currency instead of Euro. |
| q31 | We have every right to cancel the debt without consulting anyone else |
| q39 | The probability of GRexit should not be considered as a disaster |
| q40 | Banks and utilities must be under public control. |
| q91 | Parliamentary democracy is not sufficient to address the current problems of Greek society |
| q30 | With the Memoranda we accumulate debts without any visible benefits. |
| q81 | Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment |
| q89 | In some cases a dictatorship may be preferable to democracy |
| q84 | People can be better represented by a citizen than by an experienced politician |

| HA | Pro-European, Right |
|-----|--|
| q96 | There must be schools of excellence in which students are introduced after tests and not by lottery. |
| q93 | The decision to hold the referendum was wrong. |
| q33 | There should be legislation to limit protests |
| q20 | It is better for Greece to be in the European Union rather than outside. |
| q8 | The reduction of corporate taxes would have a positive impact on the development of the economy. |
| q16 | The national health system can become more efficient through partial privatization. |
| q22 | The decision power of the European Parliament should be increased on all matters of internal and foreign policy. |
| q95 | The main objective should be to reduce taxes |
| q97 | Unemployment will decrease faster if you put more emphasis on strengthening the private rather than the protection of the public sector. |
| q88 | The Memorandum has not caused the economic crisis; the economic crisis has resulted in the Memorandum |
| q15 | It must be possible to operate non-governmental, non-profit institutions of higher education. |
| q5 | We should have more flexible forms of work in order to combat unemployment. |
| q92 | The unification of Europe must go further. |
| q29 | We ought to have done many of the changes provisioned in the Memoranda on our own long ago. |
| q28 | Memoranda of Understanding with the Troika were necessary to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece. |

The second antithesis along the vertical axis (groups VA & VB) is expressed by issues reflecting {Authoritarian-Libertarian} polarization. In the table below (**Table 8**) the questions for each group are given.

Table 8. VB (authoritarianism) & VA (liberalism)

| VA | Authoritarian |
|-----|--|
| q79 | Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law. |
| q13 | The requirements for asylum and citizenship must be tightened. |
| q78 | Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of [country] |
| q2 | The police should use stricter enforcement measures to protect the property of citizens. |
| q89 | In some cases a dictatorship may be preferable to democracy |
| q7 | Defense spending should not be reduced to avoid becoming a vulnerable country. |

| VB | Libertarian |
|-----|--|
| q85 | Immigrants are good for [country's] economy. |
| q14 | The existence of multiculturalism in Greece is a positive phenomenon. |
| q86 | The right for temporary leaves from prison is more important than the risk of escape |
| q87 | Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion. |
| q19 | The church and the state should be completely separated. |

The data analysis of a sample of 60,000 citizens collected with the use of the VAA helpmevote.gr for the elections of September 2015 reveal as more important the competition along the axis of governance. The one pole of the axis expresses a peculiar egalitarian populism which asks for national isolationism. This is expressed with statements as “it would be better if we had a national currency”, “the ordinary people are better than the politicians”, “the parties don’t care about us”, and “it is legal for us to do whatever is right for us”. The opposite pole of the axis expresses a European political spirit of cooperation. Without generally being in agreement with political parties’ views, voters for SYRIZA, KKE, LS-XA, AN. EL and LAE concentrate on the pole of national isolationism, while the European cooperation pole concentrates the voters from ND, PASOK and POTAMI. This was indeed the main issue of the elections: a peculiar egalitarian national isolationism without ideological background, against an equally non-ideological pluralistic European perspective. In this framework, the people voted for the parties not for their manifestos, which they do not trust, but for their so called “hidden agenda”. Indeed analyzing by PCA (Principal Component analysis) people’s responses we get an antithesis along the first axis (explains 17,5% of total variation) between voters of {SYRIZA, ANEL, LS-XA, LAE, KKE, Other, Don’t know} and voters of {ND, PASOK-DP, POTAMI} and along the second axis (explains 14,5% of total variation) between voters of {ND, LS-XA, ANEL} and voters {SYRIZA, PASOK-DP, KKE, LAE, POTAMI, Abstention}. The first axis express the question of governance while the second is formed mainly due to {Left-Right} polarization.

8. The Estimation of Transition between Parties and the Question of Abstention

The comparative observation of results of the two consecutive parliamentary elections it is not enough to estimate these transition flows. One of the methods to estimate the transition rates is the use of EXIT POLLS in order to estimate through the 2-way contingency table of the reported vote in previous election and current elections. In Greece there is a consortium of five research companies conducting an EXIT POLL to whom we refer. It is worth noticing that it is impossible, using the aforementioned

contingency table, to estimate the flows from political parties to abstention. Therefore, an accurate estimation is due mainly through VTR algorithm described in details in <http://www.polres.gr/en/vtr>.

We suppose that the election results are known for a district and the precincts from which the district is consisted off. Suppose that political parties 1, 2, ..., r run for the first election, (e1) and collected $f=(f_1, f_2, \dots, f_r)$ of the votes correspondingly and parties 1, 2, ..., c run for the second election (e2) and collected $s=(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_c)$ of the votes correspondingly.

The quantities f_1, f_2, \dots, f_r and s_1, s_2, \dots, s_c are known and we wish to estimate the values of p_{ij} for $i=1, 2, \dots, r$ and $j=1, 2, \dots, c$ where p_{ij} is the voter transition rate from political party i to political party j. For the scope of this paper, the phrase voter transition rate should include both defection rates from one party to another part and loyalty rates, i.e. the voter transition rate from political party i to political party j is the loyalty rate if party i of the first election is the same with party j of the second election. We should also note that f_i, s_j may be available as absolute or relative values.¹⁶

In the following table (**Table 9**) the flows from every political party to the two main government propositions according to EXIT POLL¹⁷ data are given. Proposition 1 refers mainly to the two government parties (ND, PASOK), while proposition 2 refers to the opposition parties that formed the so called anti-memorandum block (SYRIZA, ANEL, LS-XA, KKE).

Table 9. Flows from reported vote in parliamentary elections 2012 to reported vote in elections 2015A (January).
Row percentages

| | Proposition 1 | Proposition 2 | Other |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------|
| ND | 71.2% | 23.9% | 4.9% |
| SYRIZA | 6.9% | 89.1% | 4.1% |
| PASOK | 51.0% | 44.4% | 4.7% |
| ANEL | 15.0% | 73.9% | 11.1% |
| LS-XA | 10.5% | 85.5% | 4.0% |
| DIMAR | 47.0% | 43.9% | 9.1% |
| KKE | 4.8% | 33.9% | 61.3% |
| DRASI | 70.0% | 20.0% | 10.0% |
| LAOS | 17.0% | 36.2% | 46.8% |
| GREENS | 45.5% | 43.9% | 10.6% |
| OTHER | 21.9% | 47.9% | 30.2% |
| BLANK/INVALID | 16.5% | 35.9% | 47.6% |
| Didn't vote | 23.4% | 55.6% | 21.0% |
| No answer | 20.8% | 33.5% | 45.7% |

As we can see there is a clear cut between voters of ND and DRASI (a liberal party) and voters of SYRIZA, ANEL, LS-XA and other parties, while voters of PASOK and DIMAR are equally divided between the two propositions.

¹⁶ Andreadis, I. and Chadjipadelis, T. (2009).

¹⁷ "Exit poll January 2015 elections", Metron Analysis, <http://bit.ly/2aSmK0C>

By implying VTR algorithm, using as units of analysis the municipality we get the following estimates for the transition flows (rows: vote in election 2012, columns: vote in elections 2015A).

Table 10. Transitions according to VTR

| | ND15 | SYR15 | PAS15 | LS15 | KKE15 | POT15 | ANE15 | AL15 | AKL15 |
|-------|--------------|--------------|-------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------|-------|
| PAS12 | 1.4% | 58.3% | 22.4% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 14.5% | 0.9% |
| ND12 | 83.5% | 3.9% | 3.3% | 2.3% | 0.2% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 3.1% | 0.3% |
| KKE12 | 2.4% | 3.7% | 1.3% | 0.2% | 85.9% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 1.8% | 0.3% |
| SYR12 | 0.7% | 91.8% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 2.2% | 0.3% | 0.7% | 3.2% | 0.3% |
| LS12 | 4.6% | 6.5% | 2.5% | 66.8% | 1.3% | 0.7% | 1.3% | 6.6% | 7.0% |
| DIM12 | 6.3% | 13.2% | 1.3% | 0.4% | 4.2% | 60.6% | 2.4% | 5.2% | 3.9% |
| ANE12 | 9.6% | 8.6% | 3.1% | 6.0% | 2.2% | 6.0% | 47.2% | 12.4% | 2.8% |
| AL12 | 9.5% | 5.4% | 2.4% | 3.7% | 3.3% | 17.4% | 4.5% | 49.4% | 1.9% |
| AKL12 | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 93.1% |

As we can see the shift towards SYRIZA was caused mainly due to the high transition rate from PASOK to SYRIZA.

2015B

Considering the corresponding table (**Table 11**) of the analysis of the EXIT POLL¹⁸ for the parliamentary elections of 2015B (September 2015) we get two blocks. The one (in the upper right corner) is referring to parties of the so called anti-memorandum block (revive after July 2015 referendum) and the other one (in the middle) is referring to the parties of the so called European-orientation parties. Summing up party loyalty (i.e. the percentage of citizens voting the same party in the two consecutive elections) we get a rough estimate of 75%.

Table 11. Exit poll results: flows from 2015A position to 2015B position (%row)

| | SYRIZA15B | LAE15B | ANEL15B | KKE15B | LS-XA15B | ND15B | POTAMI15B | PASOK-DP15B | EK15B |
|-------------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|----------|-------|-----------|-------------|-------|
| SYRIZA15A | 71.4% | 5.3% | 2.1% | 2.4% | 2.0% | 6.5% | 1.0% | 1.7% | 2.3% |
| ANEL15A | 14.0% | 2.7% | 41.4% | 1.6% | 5.4% | 12.9% | 3.2% | 1.6% | 9.1% |
| KKE15A | 7.5% | .7% | | 81.1% | 1.8% | 3.9% | .7% | 1.1% | .4% |
| LS-XA15A | 3.2% | 1.4% | .4% | .4% | 78.1% | 9.2% | .4% | .7% | 3.5% |
| ND15A | 3.8% | .2% | 1.0% | .1% | 1.6% | 86.4% | 1.8% | 1.2% | 1.4% |
| POTAMI15A | 17.3% | .8% | 1.6% | 1.2% | .4% | 14.9% | 51.8% | 4.8% | 3.2% |
| PASOK-DP15A | 12.0% | .3% | | | .3% | 7.8% | 1.3% | 73.1% | 2.3% |

¹⁸ "Exit poll September 2015", Metron Analysis, <http://bit.ly/2aSnAL3>

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-------|--|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| KIDISO15A | 29.4% | | | 2.9% | | 11.8% | 11.8% | 41.2% | |
| DIMAR15A | 23.5% | | 5.9% | | | 11.8% | 5.9% | 17.6% | 5.9% |
| EK15A | 9.6% | | 2.4% | | 2.4% | 8.4% | 1.2% | | 62.7% |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|
| TELIA15A | 17.1% | | 4.9% | 4.9% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 7.3% | 4.9% | 19.5% |
| LAOS15A | 15.8% | 5.3% | 10.5% | | 10.5% | 26.3% | | | 10.5% |
| ANTARSIA15A | 10.3% | 15.4% | | 12.8% | | | | 2.6% | 5.1% |
| OTHER15A | 9.5% | | | | 2.4% | 11.9% | 2.4% | 7.1% | 4.8% |
| BL/INV15A | 10.3% | 1.1% | | 2.3% | | 11.5% | 3.4% | 1.1% | 1.1% |
| D.V. | 28.8% | 3.9% | 3.9% | 3.0% | 4.3% | 27.0% | 8.2% | 2.6% | 4.7% |
| N.A | 11.4% | 1.5% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 4.5% | 10.9% | 3.0% | 1.0% | 2.5% |
| TOTAL | 34.2% | 2.8% | 2.9% | 5.5% | 5.9% | 26.8% | 4.0% | 5.9% | 3.5% |

As we mention before it is impossible to estimate flows towards abstention using EXIT POLL data. Cause to the increase of abstention by roughly three quarter of a million voters it is a crucial question to estimate transition rates to abstention. In order to use VTR algorithm we check if there is a significant statistical difference in relative difference of vote share for every variable (vote). In the table below (Table 12) we give estimates for the mean value and standard deviation for every parameter (%total votes, %blank/invalid, %valid votes, %SYRIZA, %ND, %LS-XA, %PASOK-DP, %POTAMI, %KKE, %ANEL, %EK, %OTHER). There is clear evidence that the data come from a normal distribution (for every parameter).

Table 12. Mean and Std estimates

| | mean | Std |
|----------|---------|--------|
| VOT | -10.80% | 2.81% |
| BL/INV | -4.70% | 13.14% |
| VALID | -11% | 2.72% |
| | | |
| SYRIZA | -13% | 7.17% |
| ND | -11.30% | 6.11% |
| LS-XA | 5.30% | 12.47% |
| PASOK-DP | 13.10% | 22.79% |
| POTAMI | -41.40% | 11.82% |
| KKE | 6.90% | 6.88% |
| ANEL | 26.80% | 16.01% |
| EK | 95% | 32.84% |
| OTHER | -10% | 22.16% |

The VTR estimates for the transition flows are given in the following table (**Table 13**). From the results we can see that there is stability in the party system in Greece with the exception of the flows to

abstention from SYRIZA, ANEL, LS-XA and POTAMI. Flows from SYRIZA to abstention were balanced mainly due to flows to SYRIZA from several parties.

Table 13. Flows from 2015A position toy 2015B position. VTR estimates. (%row)

| | SYRIZA15B | BD15B | LS-XA15B | PASOK-DP15B | POTAMI15B | KKE15B | ANEL15B | EK15B | LAE15B | ABS15B |
|-------------|-----------|-------|----------|-------------|-----------|--------|---------|-------|--------|--------|
| SYRIZA15A | 73% | 2% | 0% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 3% | 15% |
| ND15A | 7% | 81% | 2% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 2% | 0% | 4% |
| LS-XA15A | 2% | 2% | 78% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 13% |
| PASOK-DP15A | 14% | 5% | 5% | 57% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 6% |
| POTAMI15A | 6% | 6% | 1% | 3% | 50% | 0% | 2% | 3% | 5% | 14% |
| KKE15A | 2% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 80% | 1% | 0% | 6% | 6% |
| ANEL15A | 8% | 3% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 41% | 1% | 4% | 33% |
| EK15A | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 96% | 0% | 1% |

Finally to study the effect of the referendum we present two contingency tables (**Table 14** and **Table 15**) from the EXIT POLL results. In Table 14 the profile for every party is given. For example we can see that for SYRIZA 81% of SYRIZA voters (September 2015) vote NO in the referendum. In **Table 15** the profile for every choice in referendum. For example 52% of NO voters in referendum vote for SYRIZA in September 2015. There is evidence that there is a clear cut according to country's orientation towards memorandum negotiations with EU and IMF. The voters are divided in two main segments. The one is formed from voters of NO who voted for {SYRIZA, LAE, ANEL, LS-XA, EK} and the other is formed from voters of YES who voted for {ND, PASOK-DP, POTAMI}. Finally we should notice that there is no meaning cross-tabulating vote January 2015 and referendum vote, cause absentee voters are non presents in EXIT POLL.

Table 14. Party shares accoding referendum vote (row %)

| | NO | YES | BL/INV | DV | NA |
|-------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|------|
| SYRIZA15B | 81.0% | 11.4% | .9% | 5.4% | 1.3% |
| LAE15B | 86.5% | 7.7% | .6% | 4.5% | .6% |
| ANEL15B | 77.4% | 12.2% | .6% | 8.5% | 1.2% |
| LS-XA15B | 73.8% | 15.1% | 1.8% | 5.7% | 3.6% |
| KKE15B | 69.4% | 5.7% | 15.9% | 8.3% | .6% |
| ANTARSIA15B | 83.6% | 6.6% | 1.6% | 8.2% | |
| | | | | | |
| EK15B | 58.4% | 22.3% | 6.1% | 10.2% | 3.0% |
| | | | | | |
| ND15B | 15.8% | 72.6% | 1.1% | 8.8% | 1.6% |

| | | | | | |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| PASOK-DP15B | 20.2% | 66.3% | 2.4% | 8.1% | 3.0% |
| POTAMI15B | 23.0% | 64.6% | 2.7% | 8.0% | 1.8% |
| | | | | | |
| BLANK | 58.9% | 11.1% | 13.3% | 14.4% | 2.2% |
| INVALID | 49.1% | 18.9% | 13.2% | 13.2% | 5.7% |
| NA | 27.6% | 22.1% | 8.0% | 15.3% | 27.0% |
| TOTAL | 53.3% | 33.8% | 2.8% | 7.8% | 2.4% |

Table 15. Party shares according referendum vote (column %)

| | NO | YES | BL/INV | DV | NA | T |
|-------------|-------|--------------|--------|-------|-------|--------------|
| SYRIZA15B | 52.0% | 11.5% | 10.8% | 23.9% | 18.2% | 34.2% |
| LAE15B | 4.5% | .6% | .6% | 1.6% | .7% | 2.8% |
| ANEL15B | 4.2% | 1.0% | .6% | 3.2% | 1.5% | 2.9% |
| LS-XA15B | 8.1% | 2.6% | 3.8% | 4.3% | 8.8% | 5.9% |
| KKE15B | 7.2% | .9% | 31.8% | 5.9% | 1.5% | 5.5% |
| ANTARSIA15B | 1.7% | .2% | .6% | 1.1% | | 1.1% |
| | | | | | | |
| EK15B | 3.8% | 2.3% | 7.6% | 4.5% | 4.4% | 3.5% |
| | | | | | | |
| ND15B | 8.0% | 57.6% | 10.8% | 30.5% | 18.2% | 26.8% |
| PASOK-DP15B | 2.2% | 11.5% | 5.1% | 6.1% | 7.3% | 5.9% |
| POTAMI15B | 1.7% | 7.6% | 3.8% | 4.1% | 2.9% | 4.0% |
| | | | | | | |
| BLANK | 1.8% | .5% | 7.6% | 3.0% | 1.5% | 1.6% |
| INVALID | .9% | .5% | 4.5% | 1.6% | 2.2% | .9% |
| NA | 1.5% | 1.9% | 8.3% | 5.7% | 32.1% | 2.9% |

9. Summary-discussion

The two elections of 2012 in Greece supposed to initiate an earthquake for the party system in Greece. The result of the May 6th election has proven to be unmanageable for Greece's political parties. Stunned by the low vote shares and unexpected results of "one use" parties and the "one time" vote, they failed to form a government based on that result. Almost 48% (summing New Democracy, PASOK, Democratic Left and liberal parties) wanted the country to proceed in the direction of changes in the bailout agreement and ensure the progress of the country in the Eurozone. The embarrassing result made them proceed with a subsequent election as the possibility of forming a coalition government is something foreign to the Greek political tradition. The May 6th result was a shaking for all. Almost one third of people voted the forces of populism.

As for 2015 elections, concerning the three axes of the political competition the analysis shows that the polarization along {left-right} axis, is the least important. Apart from that, left-wing parties received in

election 2015A 57% of the votes (previously 52%) while the right-wing parties received 47% (previously 52%).

The competition along the axis of social policies “liberal-authoritarian” is of greater significance in 2015A, but despite parties’ polarization it does not affect the outcome of the elections.

In the previous elections (2012) the European perspective parties got some 53% of the votes, while the parties of egalitarian nationalism got 47%. In 2015 the situation was reversed: they received 47% and 53% of the votes respectively. So, is the economy stupid? Definitely yes! But according to “votes for favors” the exchange model becomes “selfish economics”.

Roughly the same holds for 2015B parliamentary elections in Greece. Left- wing parties received 53% of the votes while the right-wing parties 47%.

Most of the parties promise a liberal policy but they implement an authoritarian one! Every citizen respects the social and individual rights of the other, as long as it does not heart them personally! So as before, the competition along the axis of social policies “liberal-authoritarian, despite parties’ polarization it does not affect the outcome of the elections.

The data analysis of a sample of half a million citizens collected with the use of the VAA helpmevote.gr prior to the elections of 2015A, reveal as more important the competition along the axis of governance. The one pole of the axis expresses a peculiar egalitarian populism which asks for national isolationism. Without generally being in agreement with political parties’ views, voters for SYRIZA, KKE, LS-XA, AN.EL and ANTARSYA concentrate on the pole of national isolationism, while the European cooperation pole concentrates the voters from ND, PASOK, POTAMI, DHMAR and KINHMA. This was indeed the main issue of the elections: a peculiar egalitarian national isolationism without ideological background, against an equally non-ideological pluralistic European perspective.

In parliamentary elections of January 2015 the same number of citizens as in the parliamentary elections of June 2012 took part (circa 6,3 million). SYRIZA gained 600 thousand votes, ND lost 100 thousand, LS-XA lost about 40 thousand, KKE gained 60 thousand votes, ANEL get 170 thousand less, PASOK also get 470 thousand votes and DIMAR lost 350 thousand. The new parties (POTAMI and KIDISO) gained 370 thousand and 150 thousand respectively. At all there were a shift of at least 1,1 million voters. I.e. at least 17% of the electorate changed view. This of course is not accurate estimation because there are transitions between parties. It is the input-output balance.

In parliamentary elections of September 2015 voted some three quarters of a million voters less. SYRIZA gets 320 thousand votes less, ND 190 thousand votes less, POTAMI lost 150 thousand votes, LS-XA lost 9 thousand votes, KKE 36 thousand, ANEL lost 93 thousand votes. PASOK and EK get 22 thousand and 76 thousand more respectively. There were a shift of at least 0,85 million voters. I.e. 13% of the electorate changed view. The majority of them choose not to vote. As before, of course, this is not accurate estimation because there are transitions between parties. It is the input-output balance.

Does a new party landscape emerge? If we compute parties share according to the classical polarization {Left-Right} and the new one {Cosmopolitanism - Communitarianism}, were the second antithesis refers to parties positions towards EU and IMF involvement, dividing parties in pro-memorandum and against-memorandum parties we see that the change in {Left-Right} balance from 2009 till 2015B is practically zero while the ratio between Cosmopolitanism and Communitariasm changed from 85/13 to 39/58 in the same period (Diagram 2).

If we describe the political and electoral competition by using the traditional Left-Right antithesis the balance is practically zero. The parties that belong to the left spectra get some 70 thousand votes more between 2012 and 2015A.

The competition along the axis of social policies “liberal-authoritarian” is of greater significance, but despite parties’ polarization it does not affect the outcome of the elections. The parties of the liberal pole get only 6 thousand votes more between 2012 and 2015A.

But if we refer to the question of governance we see that parties for the national isolation proposition gained some 700 thousand votes between 2012 and January 2015. The two alternatives refer to parties’ position towards EU and IMF and their involvement.

From a comparative perspective using the method of correspondence analysis for the elections from 2009 till 2015b we get for each axis of political competition the following:

The question of governance explains 61.5%, 57.7%, 49.5%, 46.1%, 49.9% and 33.6% of the total variation for the elections of 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2014 (European), 2015a, 2015b respectively. So although it is the main factor affecting the outcome it is of decreasing importance. The antithesis along left-right axis explains 27.5%, 8.7%, 12.1%, 15.4%, 0% and 24% respectively. After a period of decreasing it is in 2015B of the same importance as it was in 2009. For the two parliamentary elections in 2012 the government-opposition polarization was the second significant factor. Finally the {anti-memorandum, post-memorandum} antithesis expressed as the question of country’s orientation toward E.U. or as {communitarism-cosmopolitanism} in the frame of normative theory expressed 23.6%, 18.9% for 2014 and 2015a elections while it is included in the main antithesis for 2015b elections. The analysis of the voter study data (in between the two elections of 2015) for the party sympathy variables shows that the axis, that explains the major element of the competition, signifies the question of governance, which consequently is the major dimension of the analysis.

By computing the factor scores for each case (i.e. respondents) and plotting factor scores according to reported vote in previous elections it is clear that the electorate is divided in two groups. The first consists from voters of {SYRIZA, ANEL, KKE and LS-XA} while the second from voters of {ND, POTAMI and PASOK}. Probably this division reflects also the results of the July 2015 referendum in Greece.

Using also the HelpMeVote VAA data for parliamentary elections of September 2015, we accrued two major axes for the antithesis of the parties. The first axis pertains to the electoral competition of the two former government parties [ND, PASOK] and the party {POTAMI} against the parties [SYRIZA, KKE, LAE]. The second axis pertains to the electoral competition of the socialist party [PASOK], the conservative party [ND] and the party [POTAMI] to the ultra-right party [LS-XA] and the right-wing party [ANEL]. If we rotate the axes, the horizontal one reflects the [ND]-[SYRIZA] antithesis and the vertical one the [PASOK, POTAMI]-[ANEL, LS-XA] antithesis.

Thus, the horizontal axis, which explains the major element of the electoral competition, signifies the question of governance, which consequently is the major dimension of the analysis and the vertical refers to the “left-right” rivalry and includes the ideological characteristics of the parties that form it.

Using the same method (multidimensional scaling: MDS) for the cases (34 questions) we describe the polarization along the axes according to the issues in order to express the differentiation caused by the questions (issues). In the aforementioned Diagram 7 the derived groups of questions along the two axes are given.

Considering the analysis of the EXIT POLL data for the parliamentary elections of 2015B (September 2015) we get two blocks. The one is referring to parties of the so called anti-memorandum block (revive after July 2015 referendum) and the other one is referring to the parties of the so called European-orientation parties. Summing up party loyalty (i.e. the percentage of citizens voting the same party in the two consecutive elections) we get a rough estimate of 75%.

As we mention before it is impossible to estimate flows towards abstention using EXIT POLL data. Cause to the decrease of turnout by roughly three quarter of a million voters, to estimate the transition rates to abstention it is a crucial question.

The VTR estimates for the transition flows are given in Table 13 above. From the results we can see that there is stability in the party system in Greece with the exception of the flows to abstention from SYRIZA, ANEL, LS-XA and POTAMI. Flows from SYRIZA to abstention were balanced mainly due to flows to SYRIZA from several parties.

Finally to study the effect of the referendum we present two contingency tables (**Table 14** and **Table 15**) from the EXIT POLL results. There is evidence that there is a clear cut according to country's orientation towards memorandum negotiations with EU and IMF. The voters are divided in two main segments. The one is formed from voters of NO who voted for {SYRIZA, LAE, ANEL, LS-XA, EK} and the other is formed from voters of YES who voted for {ND, PASOK-DP, POTAMI}.

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