Beyond humanitarianism - addressing the urban, self-settled refugees in Turkey
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Beyond humanitarianism –
Addressing the urban, self-settled refugees in Turkey

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Abbreviations

AFAD Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (Turkish: Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı)
COMCAD Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development
DGMM Directorate General of Migration Management
EU European Union
ILO International Labour Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
NGO Non-governmental organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
TL Turkish Lira
TP Temporary Protection
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP United Nations World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
Executive Summary

In this executive summary, we give a brief overview of the central themes derived from a review of the literature that structure this report.

The first part lays out the situation of self-settled refugees in Turkey in terms of socio-economic characteristics, current provision of education, health care and housing, as well as refugees’ access to work and livelihoods. The data in this report indicate that self-settled refugees in Turkey have less access to education, health care and housing than camp-settled refugees, but are probably slightly better off in terms of access to (restricted forms of) mobility and cultural, social and economic capital.

In the second part we discuss possible strategies for helping self-settled refugees integrate successfully into the host society’s economic and social systems. Drawing on case studies from countries in the Global South, we focus particularly on mechanisms that reinforce refugees’ own coping strategies and their use of resources in situations where state assistance is lacking.

Situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey

As we expected, we found that around 90% of Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey are self-settled, rather than resident in camps. While refugees are present in over 80 provinces across Turkey, the vast majority of them live in the south-eastern provinces. By now it is acknowledged by the Turkish government, other governments, and national and international civil society organizations that Syrian refugees are likely to reside in Turkey for a long time to come, as there is little hope for an end to the Syrian conflict in the near future.

Guaranteeing these refugees access to political, social, economic and cultural rights and services will be one of the most challenging issues in facilitating their successful adaptation to and participation in Turkish society, and their personal development as well. This task needs to be addressed by the Turkish government and the international community of states and civil society alike, because the Syrian refugees’ settlement in Turkey and/or their movements beyond Turkey are having global repercussions felt in many parts of the world.

Helping refugees to integrate into Turkish society means also struggling against increasing social inequalities within the Turkish population, as this may otherwise result in rising levels
of poverty and social unrest. In this regard the integration of Syrian refugees into the social, economic and political life and structures of Turkish society is best viewed as a long-term development issue, rather than as a humanitarian imperative.

Despite the great amounts of financial, logistical, legal and administrative resources dedicated mostly by the Turkish state and partly by international donors to the protection of Syrian refugees living on Turkish soil, most sources we consulted in this study acknowledge that to date, access to housing, education, health services and work opportunities for self-settled refugees is unsatisfactory. Most NGO reports we had access to describe the situation of self-settled refugees as troubling in political as well as humanitarian terms (Sanduvac, 2013, Erdogan and Üver, 2015, IGAM, 2013, Médecins sans Frontières, 2016). Furthermore, these reports highlight the general lack of attention devoted to self-settled refugees (as opposed to refugees residing in camps) by local, national, international and state agencies. While the Turkish state has started to respond on the national level with the creation of specialized institutions, regulations and provision of camps to manage the refugee influx, local administrations are struggling to adapt public policy to the immediate needs of the situation. The unexpected and sudden influx of great numbers of self-settled refugees in cities poses particular challenges for local governments.

In this respect the Syrian case is not different from other refugee crises around the world: The neglect which characterises the treatment of self-settled refugees by aid agencies, international organizations and host governments in the Global South has long been acknowledged and discussed by a number of researchers (Jacobson, 2001, Hovil, 2007, Mafleet, 2007).

However, the current situation in Turkey is virtually incomparable with that anywhere else in the world: With the exceptions of Pakistan and Iran, there are almost no other countries that have given refuge to such a great number of refugees in such a short time. There are four characteristics of the current refugee population in Turkey that are important to consider when seeking adequate solutions:

**The presence of families, women and large numbers of children and adolescents**

The majority of the Syrian population in Turkey is composed of families. The gender distribution is balanced. However, children, adolescents and women together represent approximately 70% of all refugees. Over 50% of the Syrian refugee population in Turkey is under 18 years old (AFAD, 2016). These demographic characteristics need to be taken into considera-
tion when designing policies, particularly with regard to the urgent need for stability in refugee livelihoods. At the moment, it is likely that families are still surviving in part on savings and assets they acquired before leaving Syria, and many of them are in search of jobs and employment opportunities.

Education is another crucial aspect requiring urgent attention in light of the high number of adolescents and children among the refugee flows. The Turkish government estimates that more than 450,000 Syrian children in Turkey are still without access to education.(UNICEF 2015)

As women and girls represent roughly half of the Syrian refugee population in Turkey, it is important to reassess the gender specific needs of women for access to economic participation in the labour market and the need for access to education for girls (AFAD, 2016). We could not find in the governmental, civil society and academic publications we had access to evidence for the planning of specific strategies that aim to increase refugee women's and girls' participation in Turkish economic and societal life. Even though we did not find any data on this, we believe that the educational and professional qualifications of women and girls are likely to be different from those of men and boys. This will have repercussions for the insertion of women and girls into the labour market and education systems, and will impact their gendered roles within the family and the job market. It is likely, for example, that – if not addressed – educational and professional disadvantages could further relegate women to the realm of reproductive tasks, thus diminishing their chances of participating actively in public life.

Livelihoods in an urban and regional development context

Syrian refugees in Turkey are currently living for the most part in urban environments outside camps, and there is some evidence to suggest that many of them come from urban environments too (AFAD, 2013). Therefore refugee’s access to social, cultural and economic rights is an issue affecting urban development, environment and planning policies in particular.

In addition, to address the social rights of Syrians in Turkey also means addressing questions of social development and livelihoods for all citizens in the area where refugees live. This means that the structural problems self-settled refugees face with regards to access to rights and services (such as informal employment, low wages and access to social services) affect parts of the host community as well. They can only be resolved satisfactorily through a holistic approach that takes account of Turkish host populations at the same time.
Even though refugees are currently present in over eighty different provinces in the country, they are particularly concentrated in urban contexts in the south-east of Turkey, as well as in Izmir and Istanbul. Access to social services and employment was already a pressing question in Turkey, with important regional deviations. The south-eastern provinces have been affected by structural economic and social inequalities for decades, long before the outbreak of the Syrian conflict (Cagaptay, 2014). If not addressed in an encompassing and sustainable way, the presence of large numbers of refugees in these areas therefore poses the threat of reinforcing existing problems. Thus there is a need to consider targeted and well-informed local and regional approaches to health care provision, education, housing and job creation in order to seek solutions.

In summary, local and regional approaches to urban development and planning that integrate the needs and resources of both host and refugee populations are needed. For this to be achieved, it is necessary to count on local and regional networks among governmental and private sectors, civil society organizations, and the refugees themselves. For this to happen, new alliances and flat structures of coordination would be beneficial, as well as joint planning mechanisms for the channelling of funds and human resources.

**Temporality, space and rights in Turkish migration policy**

Currently, the legal policy framework is based on Temporary Protection without the possibility of granting Syrians long-term or unlimited residency and citizenship rights. While there have been some political indications that this might change, at present it is unclear what form this change would take. These temporary frames of protection set the backdrop against which longer-term integration policies are likely to fail.

In order for self-settled refugees to become self-reliant members of Turkish society, no longer only “guests” but active participants in economic, social and cultural realms of life, they need to construct resilient social, economic or cultural ties with Turkish populations. Research has shown, however, that it is difficult for migrants to construct social, economic or cultural ties with host communities without the perspective of a shared future and without reference to a past that resonates in the present. (Stock, 2013, Suter, 2012)

Secondly, legal access to social and economic rights is currently tied to a refugee’s place of registration and residence. As most of them registered when they arrived in the border areas in the southeast, they can only access social services in these areas. This restricts their ability to move freely within the country to areas where they can develop their own resources for
access to social and economic rights. On the other hand, settlements close to the border may have the positive effect of facilitating refugees’ business opportunities through economic cross-border activities between Turkey and Syria.

Cagaptay (2014) shows, for example, that Turkish industry and service sector trade with Syria in the five south-eastern provinces significantly increased during the years of the conflict and contributed to the national economic development of the country. At the same time, it is likely that smuggling and informal markets have also increased. While this harms the Turkish economy in the medium term, it simultaneously serves as an important pillar in the livelihood strategies of many marginalised parts of the population whose income depends on their participation in informal sectors of the economy.

Governmental restrictions on the mobility of refugees may not actually impede mobility, but rather shape transnational activities in particular ways. It is quite possible that mobility restrictions for refugees may increase illegal economic activities across borders and foster tax evasion and smuggling. Being associated with these types of activities may actually be counterproductive for migrants’ attempts to establish productive social, economic and cultural ties with host and home populations in the long run. This may also have negative impacts on the role of Syrian refugees in future reconstruction efforts in Syria.

On the other hand, if the mobility of refugees across the border and within the country were managed differently, their presence in border areas could actually have positive impacts on transnational business opportunities and on business and industrial development on both sides of the border. In fact, in cases of successful settlement, migrants and refugees’ transnational ties have been shown to be very productive for all sorts of other purposes, not merely economic ones.

**Development and humanitarian work with refugees: Building on networks between hosts and guests**

The research points to a general lack of publicly available, coherent sectoral policy frameworks that would facilitate coordination between national and international non-state actors on the one hand and state actors on the other with regards to provision of services to refu-
gees outside camps. We could not identify guidelines or policy documents that make governance structures of aid for refugees outside camps in Turkey accessible and transparent.

Meanwhile, several authors mention that international aid activities are often hampered by difficult bureaucratic procedures despite the governments’ urgent request for additional financial support from the international community (Erdogan & Üver, 2015, Cagaptay, 2014). This lack of coordination and communication between agencies appears to lead both international and national organisations to favour ad-hoc solutions and short-term relief activities lacking longer-term strategies.

Up to now, there is little evidence in the literature to suggest that the government of Turkey or international organisations and international NGOs are devising and implementing long-term development and social programs in the fields of work, education, health or housing that could favour the successful integration of Syrian nationals into Turkish society. At the time of writing it appears that more than anything else, aid is restricted to humanitarian relief activities.

We have come across only sporadic evidence of initiatives engaged in capacity strengthening efforts for both refugee and host populations, or aimed at better community organising and cooperation between state and non-state actors. Such activities however, would not only increase the efficiency of aid, but also foster relations of solidarity and feelings of belonging within refugee and host communities. This is particularly important considering that some Syrians stay in the south-eastern provinces because they have family or business ties with that region. The region has been characterized for decades by commercial and cultural exchanges between the province of Aleppo in Syria and Turkish provinces in the southeast.

**Case studies**

The second part of the report gives a very short overview of policies for refugees’ local integration in countries of the Global South. It shows that even though self-settled refugees have been present in urban centres for a long time in many parts of the world (and particularly in the Global South), governments and the UNHCR have only recently started to develop specific policies addressing the needs of these groups. For a long time, international agencies and governments alike have favoured an encampment approach to refugee management close to the borders, seeking to impede uncontrolled movement of refugees to urban centres.

However, particularly in protracted refugee situations, the UNHCR increasingly argues that policies geared to facilitate the local integration of urban refugees into existing economic
structures and educational systems not only improve the context of cohabitation between hosts and refugees, but also facilitate successful repatriation and can help to decrease the amount of humanitarian assistance required. In sum, it is argued that local integration measures can contribute to more self-reliant refugee communities less dependent on state assistance. This is a policy discourse which accords refugees the responsibility ‘to help themselves’ and – in certain ways—sits awkwardly between a perspective stressing the responsibility of states to protect refugees’ human rights and one that focuses instead on refugees’ needs.

Experience with approaches to urban integration of refugees in countries like Uganda, Kenya, Mexico and Iran must be evaluated in view of the above mentioned policy discourses. With the exception of Iran, none of these four countries has hosted refugees numbering anything near the three million currently living in Turkey. What makes their examples interesting for comparison with Turkey is the fact that the governments in question did not rely on significant resources from international donors to implement measures facilitating refugees’ access to public services or income generation activities.

All four governments have been dealing with protracted refugee situations for a long time, involving large numbers of self-settled refugees in urban and rural areas. It is striking that some problems with the integration of long-term self-settled refugees are common to all cases. However, in order to keep this report short and concise, we will illustrate specific aspects of integration in the literature we reviewed with reference to the case in which the particular issue has been most salient.

The Iranian case study demonstrates important consequences for refugee communities of access to public schools for their children: The country’s long and contradictory history of both granting and denying Afghan refugee children access to quality education have left both positive and negative traces in refugees’ livelihoods and identities. The case study shows both the possibilities and the hurdles refugee children can experience with regards to access to education systems. The case also demonstrates how - in recent years - the UNHCR has justified the need to integrate Afghan children into the public school system in Iran as a measure supporting successful repatriations (even though this has only been achieved to a very limited extent in the Iranian case). In the Iranian example it becomes evident how refugees’ potential to collaborate and contribute to the establishment of educational services can be used when the state fails to provide these services. Refugee women, and mothers in particular, can play a significant role in this process.
The Ugandan case study provides a good example of the difficulties and opportunities that emerge while attempting to incorporate urban refugees into local economies. The study also demonstrates the need to find locally and regionally adapted strategies of intervention that take the needs of both host and refugee populations into consideration.

The Mexican case study is indicative of the fact that institutional networks and collaborations between local, regional and international agencies on issues related to urban planning, administration and development can have tangible impacts on the improvement of urban life and in specific neighbourhoods.

Last but not least, the Kenyan example exemplifies how transnational networks and the mobility of refugees can become a vital ingredient in refugee survival despite state neglect, and furthermore benefit local markets and economies.
1. Introduction

The on-going Syrian refugee crisis is a stark reminder of the global challenge of forced migration, with the number of people fleeing conflict and persecution globally standing at nearly 60 million – the highest number of people forced to flee their homes since World War II. The estimated global number of refugees of more than 20 million is at a 20-year high, affecting every region in the world. (UNHCR, 2015) The Syrian refugee crisis illustrates the many different ways in which people are pushed to leave their homes by a range of factors, from conflict and human rights violations to lack of economic opportunities and poverty. Responding to the situation of refugees is a collective responsibility of the entire international community because it is an urgent problem with multiple causes and local, regional and global effects: The situation of the 4 million+ registered Syrian refugees currently residing in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and North Africa challenges national, international non-governmental and governmental actors to devise new policies aimed at protecting refugees’ rights in a timely and effective manner.

All signs point to the fact that, if left unaddressed, the crisis in Syria – which has already left neighbouring countries staggering under the weight of burgeoning refugee populations – threatens to engulf wider and wider areas. The current situation in Europe, which has seen a relative increase in the number of people trying to enter over the last year, is just one example of this phenomenon. The urgent question is how to cope with the longer-term presence of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries of the Middle East: What kind of cooperation between local, national, trans- and international actors is necessary to ensure the human security and basic life chances of people who have experienced forced migration, people here termed refugee-migrants? What are the best practices in public policies to ensure that these refugee-migrants have a modicum of life chances in the labour market, the educational system and in housing?

Turkey is of particular importance in this respect. First and foremost, Turkey is one of the most important “transit” countries through which refugees and migrants are travelling on their way to Europe. As such, it has been of key importance in the development and implementation of the European Union’s Global Approach to Migration, which is characterized by a variety of measures aimed at securing European borders through agreements with countries lo-
icated on these borders, while at the same time claiming to improve migrants’ rights\(^2\) (Collet, 2007). Examination of Turkey’s collaboration with and reaction to European migration policies can provide important insights into the effects of European migration policies on migrants and on national citizens in neighbouring countries.

Secondly, Turkey is also one of the most important host countries for refugees located in the Global South. As such, the country exemplifies the ways and strategies developing countries and emergent economies may devise nationally to successfully cope with urban refugee influx and migration - particularly in the long term. These ways and strategies may or may not differ from those currently employed in traditional immigration destination countries in the Global North. They are also likely to differ from humanitarian approaches to refugee and migration management in the Global South, which are usually based on short-term relief aid instead of long-term development strategies.

2. Objectives

The entanglements of national and international security interests with the human rights of migrants displayed in today’s management of migration flows in Turkey constitute the context of this study. The question is how we can move beyond a purely humanitarian approach to disaster relief to address longer-term issues of Syrian refugees’ adaptation in neighbouring countries, Turkey in particular. The goal is to (1) inquire into the conditions necessary to ensure adequate participation of Syrian refugees in domains crucial for survival and life chances, such as employment, education and housing, and (2) suggest policy approaches to achieve the human security of Syrian refugees, beyond immediate disaster relief.

This study is a collaborative effort by the Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD) at Bielefeld University and Oxfam in Turkey. Its primary goal is to contribute to the development of policy guidelines to address the challenges facing Turkey as a transit and host country, while at the same time ensuring that the rights and dignity of people fleeing

their homes are recognized, promoted, respected and fulfilled - regardless of their current country of residence or/and their intended country of destination.

For this reason, the study hopes to bring together the available data on the situation of Syrian self-settled refugees in Turkey and the policy responses provided. The study has four specific objectives:

- **A summary of the available empirical data** on the situation of urban migrants and refugees in Turkey in terms of the humanitarian and developmental challenges they represent (e.g. housing, clothes & food, employment & access to money, health, education, social participation). This includes also an analysis of the available support structures for refugees and migrants in Turkey.

- **A brief overview of past and existing migration and refugee policies** in Turkey and of how they affect migration flows and settlement options. (This includes an analysis of the impact of both international, European and national policies on refugee and migrant rights in Turkey).

- **An overview of the role of state and non-state actors** (national and international organisations) in provision of both humanitarian and (social) development assistance to refugees and migrants in Turkey.

- **Case study examples of at least two other transit or migration countries in the Global South**, in order to show the policies employed to deal with great numbers of urban migrants and refugees.

3. Methods

This is a desk study of available reports and documents on migration and refugees in Turkey. We have based our findings on a review of reports and documents produced by academics, international organisations, NGOs and newspapers. We have accessed material mostly through local, national, regional and international organisations and their websites as well as academic personal contacts (see literature list in Annex). Due to quickly changing developments in Turkey with regards to forced migration from Syria and other countries, most of the relevant literature used in this report has been grey literature and/or only published through internet publications. Figures are to be treated with caution, because we have found very little statistically reliable information that is up to date. Similarly, we have found only a very limited amount of trustworthy information and qualitative studies on the living conditions of refugees - particularly with regards to those settled outside camp locations. Because of the scarcity of readily available, trustworthy written publications, we have cross-checked with experts working in the field to validate our preliminary findings. As no empirical material is
produced through such methodology, this study can only be a preliminary snapshot of the current situation in Turkey and does not claim to be comprehensive.

We have found surprisingly little information on socio-economic and demographic statistical data regarding self-settled Syrians in Turkey. Most of the information has been drawn from needs assessments and statistics produced by AFAD, DGMM, the UNHCR, Support for Life, CONCERN Worldwide and several other non-governmental organisations. While some of these sources are up to two years old, and do not account for the constantly changing composition of refugees in off-camp locations, we think they nevertheless provide a general picture of the characteristics of this refugee population. Furthermore, we have found little empirical information on refugees’ de facto access to employment, education and health systems. What appears evident, however, is that there are strong discrepancies between the legal framework regulating migrants and refugees’ access to services and the lived experiences of migrants and refugees.

We have analysed the data by qualitative content analysis. Particular emphasis has been placed on unearthing the assumptions and meanings that underlie conceptions of migrants’ human rights, humanitarian imperatives, and national citizenship discourse as they are articulated in policy proposals and intervention strategies of both state and non-state actors. However, as the grey literature we have consulted is mostly policy-orientated in nature, we did not find many explicit references in this field. These questions would have to be examined at a second stage of this research.

4. Description of the existing situation of migrants and refugees in Turkey

Although it is almost impossible to provide an exact numbers of camp and off-camp Syrian refugees in Turkey, we can rely on recent estimates from the UNHCR and governmental agencies like AFAD. According to recent figures from AFAD (2016), there are currently around 2.7 to 3 million Syrians resident in Turkey. Of those, it is estimated that around 90% live outside camps and only 10% inside the 26 refugee camps that have been built for this purpose since 2012 by the Turkish government. This means that the great majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey are actually best described as self-settled refugees in urban contexts. Refugees are not obliged to live in camps. They are free to choose if they want to stay in the camps or not. They are however required to register as refugees with the Turkish authorities.
Nevertheless, not all refugees do this. There are both registered and unregistered refugees among those living as self-settled refugees in cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Number of registered Syrian refugees</th>
<th>Total Number of registered Syrian refugees in camps</th>
<th>Total Number of registered Syrian refugees outside camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As of January 2014 (1)</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>213,952</td>
<td>363,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of March 2016 (2)</td>
<td>2,733,284</td>
<td>272,670</td>
<td>2,460,614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Estimated numbers of Syrian Refugees in Turkey (self-settled and in camps)
Source: Support to Life (2014: 1)

This table shows that in April 2014, 30% of all refugees were staying in camps (UNHCR, 2016b). By early 2016, there had been a significant shift towards self-settlement: 90% of all registered refugees were settled in cities in the south-east, outside the camps.³

4.1 Geographical distribution of refugees: An urban problem in the south-east of Turkey

The presence of refugees in Turkey is highly stratified regionally.⁴ However, a great number of refugees are actually living in urban and peri-urban areas in the south-eastern provinces of Turkey. Here, it is particularly Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Mardin which host great numbers of refugees. The refugees are mostly concentrated in the bigger cities in these provinces. Apart from the southeast, refugees are also concentrated in high numbers in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.

³ We are considering registered Syrian refugees. There are also self-settled refugees who have not registered as such with the Turkish authorities. Their number cannot be known. However, it is likely that this number is gradually decreasing because only registered refugees have free access to health and education systems. All non-registered refugees are necessarily self-settled, because all are registered upon arrival in a camp.

⁴ According to Turkish governmental data (AFAD 2016), refugees are present in 81 Turkish provinces.
Gaziantep has an export-driven economic base. Kilis has an agrarian economy and has traditionally been renowned for a thriving smuggling trade to and from Syria (Korkut, 2016, Cagaptay, 2014). Şanliurfa, by contrast, has an agro-commercial base, and Mardin positions itself as the hub of Turkish trade with Iraq. Hatay has a mixed economic base of industry, trade and agriculture (Cagaptay, 2014:8). It is likely that these cross-border economic activities are what make these cities attractive for Syrian refugees as a place of settlement.

**Top 10 - Number of Syrian Refugees under Temporary Protection in Turkish Provinces**

![Bar chart showing the number of Syrian refugees in Turkish provinces](image)

**Figure 1: Number of Syrian refugees under Temporary Protection in Turkish provinces**

Source: Our compilation, based on Ministry of Interior of Turkey (2016).

A number of refugees are concentrated in cities like Ankara and Izmir, and a significant number reside in Istanbul. It is likely that many of the estimated 80,000 Syrian businessmen in Turkey are among these. Some of them are also refugees, but have been able to establish themselves commercially (Erdogan and Üver, 2015). A recent ILO publication suggests that this population includes 60,000 Syrian nationals who have acquired regular work and residence permits in Turkey since 2011 and work mostly in the manufacturing and trade sectors (ILO, 2016).

It appears that only small numbers of refugees are located directly in the tourist areas along the coast (except in Izmir). When they are concentrated there, it is usually for short periods while awaiting the crossing to the Greek island. However, the tourist areas as well as Anka-
ra, Izmir and Istanbul are also the main locations for industrial and service-sector employment. In contrast, the southeast is characterized mainly by agricultural production.

Who moves across the country to other locations in Turkey after arrival, and who stays in the border provinces? This is a question we were not able to answer on the basis of the existing data. It is likely that some refugees come first to the border regions because of existing communal, economic, family and cultural ties. Others are likely to stay close to the borders because they hope to be able to maintain regular contact with families and friends and manage their possessions from there. It is also possible that many simply do not have the means to move further on into Turkey when they first arrive. The continuing concentration of refugees in these areas today could also be partly due to issues of registration (an issue we will go into in detail below in this report). Refugees are required to register in their first place of residence and can only access social services and work permits in the regions where they are registered.

In cities like Kilis, the Syrian population represents more than 50% of the total number of inhabitants. This produces particular stresses on host and refugee populations, especially with regards to access to social and basic services as well as employment and income-generating activities, in both cultural and political terms (Cagaptay, 2014).

Due to the high concentration of refugees in some areas of the southeast of Turkey, the state of access to housing, education, health services and work for self-settled refugees there is dire. Most NGO reports we had access to describe their situation as being of concern and note the general lack of attention these groups of refugees receive from national, international and state agencies. (IGAM, 2013, Durukan, 2015, Sanduvac, 2013, MSF, 2016)
4.2 Socio-economic and ethnic characteristics of refugees and host communities

We have found very little trustworthy recent information on the origin of Syrian refugees. In 2013, it appeared that many of them originated from bordering regions around Aleppo province and other towns and cities relatively close to the border with Turkey (AFAD, 2013). This may have changed in the past two years, but we found no data to support this assumption. Among the refugees are Sunni Muslims, Alawite Muslims, Syrian Christians and other ethnic, religious and political groups. (Korkut, 2016, Cagaptay, 2014) The Turkish population in the south-eastern provinces is also ethnically diverse: Ethnic Arabic, Alevi, Kurdish, and other minorities are represented (Cagaptay, 2014). However, we were unable to find information about the exact composition of the ethnic and religious make-up of the refugee population. Still, there is some evidence to suggest (AFAD, 2013, Korkut, 2016, Cagaptay, 2014) that
many of the Syrians in the south-eastern regions of Turkey have ethnic, family or business ties with the region which date from before the outbreak of the conflict in Syria.

A striking characteristic of Syrians in Turkey is their age: According to recent data from AFAD (2013, 2016), around 50% of all registered Syrian refugees in Turkey are under 19 years old. Erdogan and Üver (2015: 20) claims further that among children and adolescents there is a significant number of “unaccompanied minors”, in other words minors who have lost their parents or are travelling alone. In addition, the size of Syrian families appears to be particularly large: According to Data from AFAD (2013) and Concern Worldwide (Sanduvac, 2013), the average size varies between 5-11 family members.

The Distribution of Age and Gender for Registered Syrians Under Temporary Protection As of 14.04.2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MAN</th>
<th>WOMAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,463,126</td>
<td>1,286,607</td>
<td>2,749,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>187,259</td>
<td>174,673</td>
<td>361,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>197,647</td>
<td>189,047</td>
<td>386,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>151,706</td>
<td>138,817</td>
<td>290,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>172,477</td>
<td>143,092</td>
<td>315,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>181,156</td>
<td>143,128</td>
<td>324,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>148,679</td>
<td>115,786</td>
<td>264,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>121,566</td>
<td>97,163</td>
<td>218,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>87,190</td>
<td>74,391</td>
<td>161,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>60,188</td>
<td>56,753</td>
<td>116,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>48,524</td>
<td>44,698</td>
<td>93,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>37,872</td>
<td>36,594</td>
<td>74,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>25,609</td>
<td>25,754</td>
<td>51,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>17,809</td>
<td>18,372</td>
<td>36,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>11,585</td>
<td>11,940</td>
<td>23,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>6,293</td>
<td>7,256</td>
<td>13,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>3,868</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>8,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-84</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>2,635</td>
<td>4,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-89</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>2,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90+</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>1,076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Distribution of age and gender for registered Syrians in Turkey
Source: Ministry of Interior of Turkey (2016)

Another striking divergence from the socio-economic characteristics of other migration flows is gender distribution: Around half of all adult Syrian nationals in Turkey are female. This is astonishing when one considers that in Europe, refugee and migration movements from Syria and elsewhere are often thought to be dominated by single male migrants (Rodan, 2015),
who move first in order to secure refugee status and /or livelihoods before being joined later by family members. It would be interesting to discover by further research to what degree the movement of Syrian refugees as families is facilitated by pre-existing transnational ties between populations in Syria and the south-eastern provinces of Turkey. We did not find any evidence for this.

Thus it appears that women and children under 19 make up a grand total of 73-75% per cent of all Syrian refugees in Turkey.\(^5\) In real terms, the number of adult male registered Syrians in Turkey is about 748.907 persons. This is 27.4 % of the total population.

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\(^5\) According to recent data from the Turkish ministry of the Interior (see table next page), women and children make up around 73 % of all registered refugees in Turkey. However, if we add non-registered refugees to this figure, and take into consideration other data from AFAD and NGOs working with refugees, it appears that the percentage is slightly higher, being estimated as high as 75 %. 

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Figure 3: Age distribution in percent (August 2013)
Source: Our compilation, based on AFAD (2013:25).
With regards to camp and off-camp refugees, there appear to be further differences worth mentioning: The table on the previous page, based on AFAD data from 2013, suggests that off-camp refugees have a slightly higher monthly household income than camp refugees. This may indicate that refugees who still have some economic resources to support themselves will attempt to self-settle before they choose to live in camps. At the same time, it may also indicate that self-settled refugees have higher living costs than camp refugees. Refugees off-camp have to pay for their food, accommodation and often also for school fees and health care - particularly if they are not registered with the Turkish authorities. This is a situation we will attempt to analyse in greater detail below in the report with respect to migration policies.

The increased living costs of self-settled refugees may also explain why there is a significantly higher percentage of children not in school among the off-camp population, and why child labour is rampant. (Dorman, 2014, Support to life, 2014) It is also significant that according to AFAD data from 2013, 70% of the off-camp population is in search of jobs, and here both female and male members of the family are considered (AFAD, 2013). This could indicate that the pressure to work is higher for off-camp refugees, and it is therefore also likely that they are more often inclined to accept abusive, underpaid, dangerous, temporary and informal work arrangements when there is no alternative.

Figure 4: Household income: Monthly income in US$ of Syrian refugee households while in Turkey (August 2013)
Source: Our compilation, based on AFAD (2013:31).
In the AFAD (2013) survey we also see that educational qualifications of off-camp and camp refugees differ slightly. Self-settled refugees appear to represent a slightly higher percentage of educated people, although the majority has only primary or secondary education.

It is interesting to note at this stage that according to the same survey data from 2013, many Syrian refugees in Turkey come themselves from urban backgrounds (AFAD, 2013)\(^6\) and have probably only limited experience in agricultural sectors of employment. It would appear more likely that most of them previously worked in administrative or service sectors.\(^7\) It would be important to have data on this, because there is a tendency in current policy making in Turkey to seek to match work-seeking Syrian individuals to employment shortages in the agricultural sector of the south-eastern provinces (Erdogan and Üver, 2015). The demographic picture of Syrian refugees in Turkey makes clear that:

- We are talking about the needs and necessities of women and children in particular, as they represent the majority of the refugee population.
- We have to acknowledge that many refugees have urban backgrounds and probably work experience in service-and administrative work. They are therefore not likely to look for a future in agriculture-related jobs
- Off-camp populations are slightly better off than in-camp populations, suggesting that only the poorest of the poor will accept housing in camps. It appears that refugees will first attempt to get by as self-settled refugees, even if this means that access to social services, work and education will be more difficult.
- As average incomes of refugees outside camps are extremely low, they must be surviving on savings, assets, and monetary gifts (either from family elsewhere, Turkish relatives or other sources).
- Some of the off-camp refugee populations use their relative mobility to travel back and forth from Syria to Turkey. This border movement could be one of the reasons why these refugees prefer to stay close to the border with Syria. It would be interest-

\(^6\) According to Statistics from AFAD (2013), most of the Syrian refugees come from urban backgrounds. In addition, it is noted that only 17% of the total Syrian population was employed in the agricultural sector before the outbreak of conflict. Furthermore, over 70% of the refugee population is either female or under 18 years old. AFAD also found that in most off-camp households, women did not work regularly, but men did. They also found that off-camp households were slightly better off than camp households. It is therefore unlikely that male refugees from urban background had worked in low paid agricultural sectors before coming to Turkey. It is much more likely that most of them worked in the service sector before coming to Turkey.

\(^7\) This is also hinted at in the Concern Worldwide Assessment (Sanduvac, 2013: 18). Here it is stated that 19% of refugees had been unqualified workers in urban contexts before migrating (as masonry workers, temporary drivers, etc.), 18% were qualified workers like mechanics or tailors and 17% were employed in the private sectors or working for small scale businesses, 12% were self-employed and 8% were public employees. This indicates that in that assessment more than half of all questioned Syrian refugees had worked in urban environments before migrating.
ing to further explore linkages between the transnational activities of refugees and their places of settlement in Turkey.

- Refugee management is influenced by the context of the region in which it is situated, and problems play out differently in different provinces: Most affected by the influx of great numbers of refugees is the social and economic development of Turkey’s south-eastern provinces near the border with Syria. Here, the sudden pressure on existing resources exerts strain on the health and education system in particular, and local markets as well. It is important to develop regional approaches to solutions, instead of treating every region equally in the design and implementation of national policies.

4.3 Housing

Erdogan and Üver (2015) and others (Dorman, 2014, IGAM, 2013, Sanduvac, 2013) report that housing is particularly problematic for self-settled refugees. For the most part refugees occupy run-down houses and apartments on the outskirts of cities. According to reports we reviewed, there are serious problems with overcrowding in certain areas. This is because large families often live together in two-bedroom flats and houses. Overcrowding is negatively affecting public health conditions in particular, and therefore may in the long run also impact the Turkish population in the area. Refugees also complain about the high costs of basic services such as electricity and water and other utilities related to the rented accommodations they occupy. The high cost of these services puts a strain on refugees’ already tight budgets and therefore undermines their resilience (IGAM, 2013).

Many reports (ILO, 2015, Erdogan and Üver, 2015, IGAM 2013, Dorman, 2014, Sanduvac, 2013) indicate that rents have risen drastically in the border towns where great numbers of refugees have arrived. ILO (2015) states that currently, more than 50% of the population in Kilis, 25% of the population in Şanlıurfa, and 22.5% of the population in Gaziantep is made of Syrians.

4.4 Employment

AFAD survey data from 2013 suggests that over 70 % of self-settled refugees are looking for work or are already working in the informal sector in Turkey (AFAD, 2013). If we assume that this proportion of adult self-settled refugees is looking for jobs now, we can estimate that an average 950,000 refugees (men and women between 19-75 years) are looking for work. On top of this, refugees look for work in the place where they are currently registered. This
means that the provinces and cities in Turkey hosting the majority of refugees will be the most affected by increasing demands on the employment sector.

From January 2016 onwards, a new regulation came into effect which grants all Syrian refugees under temporary protection the right to work in Turkey. Until then, only a small minority of Syrians had an ordinary residency permit— as opposed to temporary protection status— and were therefore entitled to the same employment regulations as Turkish citizens. It is likely that these persons are working in higher skilled professions or have their own businesses; however, we have found no statistical information on employment regarding this group. We also know that trade between Turkey and Syria has increased (Erdogan and Üver, 2015), and that the number of Syrian businesses in Turkey is a factor in this increase. It is likely that these businesses are concentrated in sectors strongly related to the provision of humanitarian aid in Syria.

The majority of self-settled refugees, however, entered Turkey either as registered asylum seekers (before 2014), as refugees with Temporary Protection status (after 2014) or as non-registered refugees. We will go into these distinctions in the next section of this report, dedicated to policy. Until January 2016, non-registered migrants, registered asylum seekers, and those with Temporary Protection status were not allowed to work. However, reports from NGOs (IGAM, 2013, Sanduvac, 2013, Support for Life, 2014) as well as AFAD (2013) surveys suggest that these migrants did nevertheless work in informal work settings, mostly in the service sector. Activities included domestic work, selling and reselling of items, construction work, repair activities and small business ventures. Furthermore some refugees are employed in seasonal jobs in the agricultural sectors (IGAM, 2013, Support to life, 2014, Sanduvac, 2013: 6).

According to the NGO reports mentioned above, the refugees working in these sectors and under these conditions do not earn enough money to satisfy the most basic needs of their families, such as housing, electricity, water, food and clothing (IGAM, 2013, Support to life, 2014).

As a consequence of difficult labour market conditions and the high number of unaccompanied minors among the refugee population, child labour is a growing problem (Dorman, 2014, ILO 2015, UNICEF, 2015). In this respect, the arrival of refugees appears to have aggravated an already existing structural problem in the Turkish labour market: Child labour was an issue in Turkey long before the Syrian crisis, particularly in agricultural sectors such as hazelnut harvests (UNICEF, 2015).
In the informal sector, refugees are joining an estimated 30% of the Turkish host population also working without paying social security contributions. (Schneider, 2011). The unemployment rate in south-eastern Turkey, comprising the five Turkish border provinces and several others nearby, reached 14.5 per cent in 2013, the highest in Turkey’s seven geographic regions (Cagaptay, 2014).

Even before the arrival of Syrian refugees the informal sector was an important one in the host economy of the south-eastern provinces. Erdogan and Üver (2015) believe that in cities where the influx of great numbers of Syrians in need of work has been high, wages in the informal economy have gone down since the arrival of Syrian refugees. In his view, this has had the effect of driving local women out of low-paid, informal employment and fostered their replacement by Syrian males. Considering that 75% of Syrian refugees are women and children however, it is doubtful how far this theory goes to predict a generalizable trend for changes in the informal sector in Turkey.

It appears, however, that local business representatives and some academics fear that the continuing presence of high numbers of job seeking Syrians on the informal market in Turkey will have negative macro-economic effects. According to Cagaptay (2014), there is the further assumption that even a limited work permit policy for Syrian refugees could negatively affect unemployment rates in the regional job market. It is evident from the material we had access to that the business sector strongly favours an interventionist policy on the part of the government with regards to refugees’ employment options. This means that the business sector would favour solutions allowing refugees to seek employment only in certain professional sectors where there is a need for additional workforce (Erdogan and Üver, 2015). This is particularly the case with regard to seasonal labour shortages in agriculture and husbandry. On the other hand, the increasing levels of destitution among self-settled refugees appear to create a public view that considers it vital to foster opportunities for refugees to create their own independent livelihoods, rather than making them reliant on government support (ILO, 2015).

As mentioned earlier, in January 2016 the government of Turkey implemented a reform to labour regulations for Syrian refugees which responds to many of the demands from the business sector in Turkey. The regulation accords the right to work to all refugees with Temporary Protection status resident in Turkey for at least six months. However, this right to work is restricted to the province where migrants are registered and it appears that refugees are
not to count more than 10% of the workforce in a given sector of employment. The extent to which this regulation has been implemented and helped Syrian refugees to get access to legal employment under satisfactory working conditions remains to be seen.8

Another interesting aspect of the new regulation is the specific clause on agricultural work and husbandry. Local governors are allowed to ignore the 10% employment rule if they can demonstrate that agricultural or husbandry sectors seasonally require large numbers of workers to fulfil the demands of production. This means that governors are free to apply exceptions to the regulation in order to place Syrian workers more easily in agricultural and husbandry sectors. These sectors have been generally filled by migrants of Kurdish origin and/or people from the unskilled /lower income strata of the home population. They are unattractive for most other workers because of their low wages.

Refugees are furthermore strongly discouraged by the government from seeking legally legitimate jobs in the tourist industry. However, we know from earlier studies (Suter, 2012) that asylum seekers from African countries, for example, sometimes also find informal work in this sector, particularly in functions where they are not visible (kitchen, room service, etc.) or in areas where English language skills are necessary (sports coach, entertainment, etc.). Therefore, it is likely that despite legal restrictions, the tourism industry is also recruiting some Syrian self-settled refugees in the coastal areas and in big cities such as Istanbul.

ILO (2015) conducted a recent assessment of the labour and economic needs of Syrians in Turkey. They found that Syrians with regular work permits and residency permits are most likely to work in service, industry and agricultural enterprises. The assessment further notes that for those refugees with lower educational qualifications, (who are mostly present in border areas like Gaziantep) short-term training courses will be offered in areas such as making shoes, welding, copper hand craftsmanship, weaving, service personnel assistantship and web design.

In general, there is evidence to suggest that despite government efforts to restrict the work-related mobility of refugees within Turkey and their access to the labour market to specific sectors in which there is need for low-skilled and low-paid labour, it is likely that refugees will attempt to circumvent these regulations –either through increasingly seeking work in the in-

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8 We have not been able to obtain a copy of the law to check the details of this regulation.
formal sector or through movement to other areas of Turkey where industrial production, tourism industry or service sector work is easier to find.

Whether or not they will succeed in doing so, however, is rather a different matter. In the current context of high unemployment and slow job creation in Turkey, it is probable that Syrian refugees (particularly if they are low-skilled) will be forced into seasonal agricultural jobs and other low-paid sectors of employment in the local economy.

4.5 Education

In accordance with Turkish law and the International Convention on Migrant Workers and their Families (which Turkey ratified in 2014), all children in Turkey, regardless of their citizenship status, have free access to primary and secondary education (Bircan & Sunata, 2015).

By the end of 2015, there were an estimated 850,000 Syrian children in Turkey of school age (UNICEF, 2015). In November 2015, around 279,000 Syrian children were enrolled in schools and temporary education centres across the country. This represents a 30% increase from the previous year but is still low, because it means that only 30-32% of all Syrian school-aged children receive some form of formal or informal education while in Turkey. There are still about 450,000 Syrian children in Turkey out of school. (UNICEF, 2015).

The situation regarding education in off-camp locations is particularly worrying. In 2014, about 80 per cent of school-age (ages 6-17 years) Syrians were attending school in camps, while outside camps only 27 per cent of their peers were attending school in host communities (Dorman, 2014). There is no indication that this situation improved significantly during 2015. According to Dorman (2014: 10f), there are currently two different education pathways for school age Syrians living outside of camps:

“Syrians living outside of camps with residence permits are able to enrol in Turkish schools. Those without residence permits are also able to attend as guest students with permission of the school, but are not able to receive a diploma. (…), Syrians outside of camps without residence permits are able to attend Syrian schools operated in Arabic by different NGOs, individuals, and community organisations. These schools may or may not be officially recognized by the Ministry of Education. Under a Ministry of Education framework, organisations are able to provide education for Syrians using an adapted Syrian curriculum with Ministry of Education permission. The Ministry of Education works in cooperation with these organisations to monitor the schools and provide facilities, such as land for school buildings or pre-fabricated schools. Syrians may teach in these schools, but only as volunteers, and may not receive salaries, only ‘incentives.’ Despite cooperation with the Ministry of Education, students attending
these schools are not able to receive a diploma or proof of school completion. Further, while only those schools operating under the framework are legal, there are many other schools operating outside of this framework and Ministry control.”

It has been difficult to learn exactly what has been done up to this point to build new infrastructure and strengthen the capacities of existing schools and learning environments. UNICEF has built seven schools and temporary education centres entirely for Syrian children. It has further renovated 201 schools and provided learning materials for children, and financial incentives for 8700 Syrian volunteer teachers (UNICEF, 2015). The Turkish Ministry of National Education agreed to increase rates for teachers to 600 Turkish Lira per month in camps and 900 TL in host communities. Funding for teachers incentives was a top priority for UNICEF and will continue to be a priority in 2016. Volunteer Syrian teachers are critical to the continued learning and wellbeing of Syrian refugee children, and financial incentives are important so that they are able to meet their basic needs and remain motivated.

In order to reach children who have been out of school for a long period of time, UNICEF is also providing programs with life skills and informal educational opportunities. This means that children are taught essential skills, which are adapted from but not tied to the normal school curriculum. This is particularly an option for children who have been out of education for a longer period of time and/or need to work. Nevertheless, serious challenges remain and education is recognized as a key field to be developed in terms of social assistance to refugees. According to the UNHCR and UNICEF, capacity strengthening activities of the implementing partners in this sector need to be strengthened first. Without this, it is unlikely that activities can be up-scaled in such a way as to effectively address the needs of children who are out of school.

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan of 2015/16 which has been drawn up by UNHCR and the Turkish government to manage the refugee crisis, acknowledges the need for increased international and national cooperation with Turkish authorities in order to improve the educational opportunities of refugee children (UNHCR, 2015). In recognition of the immense needs in the educational sector, UNICEF has launched a campaign called “No Lost Generation Initiative” which aims to achieve better education possibilities for Syrian children in Turkey and neighbouring countries. A number of both formal and informal education programs will be implemented through non-governmental and governmental partners, including digital self-learn programs.

However, according to Dorman (2014), there is a general lack of policy and policy frameworks for the integration of Syrian refugees into the Turkish educational system (either through their participation in Turkish schools or enrolment in Syrian run schools). This also means that existing facilities and schools remain largely unmonitored and no consistent quality standards exist, nor can efforts to compensate for this lack be made.
According to several reports, the main obstacles to successful integration into the Turkish school system outside the camps are registration issues and lack of information about opportunities to send children to school, language, the needs of families for extra income through child labour, and the limited capacity of existing institutions unequipped for a rapid influx of additional pupils. (Dorman, 2014, UNHCR, 2015, Support for life, 2014: 15)

According to Dorman (2014), who interviewed parents and educational organisations, both sides give different reasons for not sending children to school. Whereas international organisations and NGOs appeared to suggest that registration issues are a major reason why Syrian parents do not send their children to Syrian or Turkish schools, parents appeared to mention other reasons.

For many parents, the reasons were primarily related to the absence of Syrian schools in the area where they lived, overcrowded schools, the need for their children to work, and the poor quality of the education offered in the schools. Only around 10% of the surveyed parents considered registration issues as an important reason.

Perhaps in response to concerns related to the quality of education in Turkish schools, some Syrian teachers have begun to open private schools for Syrian children. In these, children are taught in Arabic and in English. However, these schools are actually only affordable for better-off families (IGAM, 2013).

It is particularly children between 12-18 years of age who experience the most difficulties in continuing or successfully finishing their education. It appears that this has also to do with language difficulties and the reconversion of existing qualifications. It is extremely difficult for them to find ways of achieving higher education certificates or professional training (Dorman, 2014, Support for Life, 2014, Sanduvac, 2013).

Although the Turkish government is supposedly addressing the educational needs of secondary school students as a priority issue (Bircan & Sunata, 2015) we have found little information on activities developed to improve secondary school access for Syrian refugees. We know that the government provided funding for 1000 university places for Syrian students
every year (Cagaptay, 2014). However, it is difficult to know how many Syrian refugees were actually enrolled in Turkish universities each year through this fee waiver program.  

In summary, the information we were able to gather indicates that the Turkish government as well as international organisations are not investing primarily in the integration of Syrian children into existing Turkish education systems but rather focus on establishing a parallel system that works in accordance with the Syrian educational curriculum and functions in Arabic. Furthermore, efforts to educate Syrian children have been concentrated in camps, and not extended sufficiently to Syrian populations outside camps. This probably has to do with the fact that it is particularly difficult to establish a parallel, well-functioning educational system for so many children outside camp structures. The system now in place is insufficiently funded and not integrated into sectoral educational policies on the regional and national levels. Also, the neglect with regards to children in need of secondary education and professional training is even greater. To date, these sectors have been almost completely unaddressed by the Turkish government and national and international civil society organisations.

We have not been able to establish which NGOs (national and international) are working in the field of formal and informal education, nor do we know which types of policies they support in relation to Syrian children’s integration into the Turkish education system. However, in terms of successful and long-term integration, this is one of the sectors most in need of attention from policy makers and funders in future.

The education sector is strongly linked to refugees’ right to work, and the fact that many children are not going to school is in part linked to the problem of child labour increasing in those families whose financial resources are scarce.

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9 According to the newspaper Today’s Zaman, 3th July 2015, the total number of Syrian students at Turkish Universities reached 4597 in the 2014/2015 academic year. In 2011/12 their total number reached only 608. However, we do not know how many students are currently supported through a fee waiver programme by the Turkish state and how many of them are registered as refugees and how many as ordinary residents.
4.6 Health

According to the new asylum regulations from 2014, all Syrian refugees who are registered under Temporary Protection or as registered asylum seekers have free access to the services of the Turkish state-financed health system. This means that they have access to free health care in the primary, secondary and tertiary services. They are therefore entitled to visit health centres, state hospitals and even private hospitals for services not available in state funded institutions. For medication, refugees are required to pay a contribution of 20% to the costs.

In practice, however, there are several obstacles making refugees' access to the health care system difficult. One is related to the reluctance of pharmacies to provide refugees with medication, because of on-going delays in reimbursement payments to pharmacies by the Turkish state and confusions regarding how much of the costs refugees are obliged to pay. Another problem exists around issues of peoples’ administrative status. Those Syrians who are registered as Turkish residents and not as refugees are not eligible for free health care services. Instead, they are required to pay for their own private health insurance. In order to check the eligibility of refugees, hospitals and medical services are required to check refugees’ administrative status. This poses more problems still, as those refugees who entered the country before 2014 have different ID numbers from those who registered afterwards. These ID numbers are rarely supported by the technical software used in the health system. Refugees often therefore experience problems when seeking health services (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2015: 129).

While we found some information on refugees’ access to health care in the camps, there is almost no information on the quality of health care outside the camps and on how the arrival of refugees has impacted the quality of health services in Turkey overall. The reports we consulted suggest, however, that the services in the south-eastern provinces are experiencing overcrowding and long waiting periods (Sanduvac, 2013).

WHO (201) has assisted the Turkish government in the implementation of vaccination campaigns, nutrition and mother and child programs. To our knowledge, the interagency health assessments conducted to date to assess specific health care needs are restricted to camp populations. It is worthwhile mentioning in this respect that WHO has assisted the Turkish
government in the management of health services for refugees particularly in aspects related to public health issues\textsuperscript{10}. However, it is not clear if the government is receiving any international assistance with regards to improving and ensuring the general health coverage of the population.

There is particular concern over access to mental health and specialized psychosocial services for refugees living outside camps. Even though the WHO and the government of Turkey (2015) acknowledge that this is an area where assistance is urgently needed, it is not clear to what degree the government health services are responding to this need. In theory, free health care coverage for registered “Temporary Protection” beneficiaries also extends to mental health services provided by public health care institutions. However, we do not know if and how the mental health needs of Syrian refugees have affected the accessibility and quality of mental health facilities and structures currently available through the public health care system.

It appears that language barriers further complicate access to medical services for Syrian refugees. Medical appointments are usually made through a telephone call-line, which is in Turkish. To date there is only one international NGO (Danish Refugee Council) that runs a hotline with translation facilities for medical appointments. No general government-owned service is in place (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2015: 129).

These examples indicate that formally granted access to the public health system is particularly difficult in practice for self-settled refugees. Whereas health care in the camps is apparently working relatively well, the presence of large numbers of refugees in the border towns is risking of affecting the quality and accessibility of health services for both refugee and host populations in those areas.

\textsuperscript{10} Mostly vaccination and maternal health, as well as epidemiological prevention programmes.
5. Past and current policies towards refugees and migrants in Turkey and their effects on the settlement and movement options of migrants

There is a general tendency in international organisations’ and state documents to acknowledge the fact that the Syrian refugees are going to be present on Turkish soil for a long period of time and that durable solutions for their future are therefore needed.\(^{11}\)

However, there are few designed, planned or implemented concrete activities directly geared towards achieving this aim. This is particularly so in relation to the situation of self-settled refugees.\(^{12}\)

However, in the political discourse Syrian refugees as well as other non-European displaced persons are still considered “guests” by the Turkish administration and partly also by the Turkish population. Thus, they are perceived as a temporary presence, expected to leave the country to be repatriated when the conflict ends (Kaya, 2016, Icduygu, 2015, Korkut, 2016).

This fact is also evident in the type of policies and strategies the government and international organisations develop to support refugees. Most of the policies and implementing strategies are tailored to address refugee’s needs through established structures and within the context of camps or through short-term humanitarian activities. This situation is affecting the situation of self-settled refugees in particular, who represent 90% of the current Syrian refugee population in Turkey. Korkut (2016: 7) argues that this way of dealing with the crisis is a deliberate strategy pursued by the Turkish government because it allows the state to adopt a pragmatic approach to humanitarian assistance. This helps the government demonstrate its power as humanitarian player without considering a need to grant citizenship rights

\(^{11}\) This is stated in the Regional Refugee Resilience plan and in several communications of both UNHCR and other international agencies. Even the Turkish government has acknowledged this fact. For example, just recently a statement by Director General of the Ministry of Labor & Social Security Nurcan Ovider appeared on the webpage of the International Labor Organization, in which she acknowledged that Turkey is no longer a transition but a destination country for Syrian refugees and therefore needs a draft law defining the conditions for the employment of foreigners in Turkey. www.ilo.org/ankara/news/WCMS_440085/lang--en/index.htm [accessed 13.03.16]

\(^{12}\) I am referring particularly to the activities planned and spelled out in the 3R Plan designed by the UNHCR in collaboration with the Turkish government, which can be regarded as the most important coordination tool to date setting out specific goals and activities regarding the design, implementation and monitoring of aid for Syrian refugees in Turkey.
to foreigners - particularly not to those who could be regarded as a security threat by the Turkish government because of their ethnic, religious or political background. In research with representatives of policy makers at different levels in Turkey, Korkut found that Turkish humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees is selective, “welcoming” predominantly “those whose backgrounds are religiously, ethnically and politically acceptable to the Islamist AKP ideology” in government. He argues that self-settled refugees particularly may not be counted among refugees favoured by the government if they belong to the socially constructed group of “Alawite oppressors” (Korkut, op.cit.), meaning followers of or persons considered sympathetic to the Assad regime.

He also reminds us that the Turkish state’s selective treatment of refugees affects refugees of other nationalities as well.

In the next section of this report we give a brief summary of past and current policies towards refugees and migrants in Turkey in order to draw out the effects they have on settlement and mobility options for migrants in and from Turkey.

5.1 Open Door policies and ways of limiting further arrivals: border surveillance

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the Turkish government has allowed refugees from Syria into the country at designated points – with or without legal identification documents (Bildinger et al. 2015:96). However, border crossings are constantly monitored, and entry points opened or closed depending on changes in the perceived security situation on the ground. These temporary border crossings also affect the transport of humanitarian and other aid material from Turkey into Syria.

According to Icduygu (2015: 7), it appears furthermore that Turkish border officials monitor incoming refugees in order to prevent entry of particular ethnic, national, religious or ideological groups as well as to restrict the number of entries in general. In this context, it should not be forgotten that Turkey has been and still is an important transit country for many migrants and refugees from other countries in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast and Central Asia on their way to Europe (Suter, 2012).

Policies to control entry of different populations at Turkish borders have been in place for a long time and – even though an open door policy is advocated publicly for Syrian nationals - it is likely that Turkish border officials are still actively attempting to limit entry of asylum
seekers and refugees from various backgrounds to Turkey (Korkut, 2016). During the siege of Aleppo in early 2016, for example, the Turkish government closed its borders temporarily to Syrian refugees, due to alleged security reasons.

5.2 Old and new legislations

Turkish migration policies have long been restricted to a handful of legislative texts that lay out the modalities regarding entries, exits and residence permissions for foreigners without dealing specifically with asylum or labour rights. Furthermore, these legislations have not often been revised. This indicates that migration and refugees have not been a political priority in the country for quite some time. Until the early 1990s, for example, Turkish laws in this regard dated from 1934 (settlement law) and the signing of the Geneva Convention from 1951.

Only when Turkey began serious negotiations with the EU about possible membership or accession status did migration policy begin to become a more important issue on the political agenda (Suter, 2012). In 1994 the first Asylum Regulation was introduced, followed by a new settlement law in 2006. In the midst of the incipient crisis in Syria in 2011, the Turkish government was in the process of reforming its laws and legislatives regarding migration to bring them in line with EU “standards” and policy frameworks (Icduygu, 2015: 5). This process had been on-going since 1990. It meant above all the introduction of mechanisms to grant refugees in Turkey access to social rights while at the same time increasing Turkey’s capacities to secure its external borders and avoid unauthorized migration towards Europe (Erdogan and Üver, 2015: 9, Suter, 2012).

Despite these reforms, some of the most characteristic features of earlier Turkish migration policy have been left in place. The fact that regular migration and settlement options are mostly restricted to people of “Turkish descent and culture” is one of them. This proviso is defined in the 2006 Settlement law and was also established in the 1934 settlement law. Furthermore, Turkey is one of the few countries maintaining a clause on geographical restriction within the 1951 Geneva Convention. This means that only asylum seekers from European countries can register as refugees in Turkey. All other asylum seekers from Non-European countries could only register in Turkey to await their resettlement to third countries (Icduygu, 2015: 5). According to Suter (2012), the geographical limitation clause remains one of the most important challenges to the harmonization processes taking place according to EU migration policies.
In April 2014, a new law, the “Law on Foreigners and International Protection”, was introduced. This law was particularly tailored to the challenges presented by the increasing numbers of Syrian refugees arriving on Turkish soil, and was in line with Turkish efforts to streamline domestic legislation in accord with EU legislation as part of the pre-accession requirements to the European Union - one of Turkey’s key policy goals.

In a way, the law addresses the challenges imposed by Turkey’s insistence on the geographical limitation clause in the Geneva Convention, introducing and refining the status of “Temporary Protection” for Syrian refugees on Turkish soil.

The law established that Syrian refugees would register under the status of Temporary Protection. This meant that Syrians were no longer entitled to apply for resettlement in a third country but had to register with the Turkish authorities as “temporarily protected” individuals in order to benefit from humanitarian or other assistance.

5.3 Temporary Protection: What is it?

Temporary Protection (TP) is a policy response to large-scale refugee influxes not considered at the time the Geneva Convention was established. First applied on a European-wide level in the early 1990s as a response to the Balkan crisis, it was then formally established as a policy measure through an EU Directive on Temporary Protection in 2001. Today, the EU defines Temporary Protection as follows:

“Temporary Protection is an exceptional measure to provide displaced persons from non-EU countries and unable to return to their country of origin, with immediate and Temporary Protection. It applies in particular when there is a risk that the standard asylum system is struggling to cope with demand stemming from a mass influx which risks having a negative impact on the processing of claims.” (European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs)\(^\text{13}\)

In the case of Turkey, Temporary Protection was introduced in the new Law on Foreigners, effective since 2015, particularly in consideration of the mass influx of Syrian nationals who could not have applied for asylum in Turkey anyway by virtue of the geographical limitation clause, but would have applied via registration with the UNHCR in Turkey for international protection and, consequently, for resettlement in a third country.

Asylum petitions to the UNHCR in Turkey have increased very rapidly since 2007, even before the Syrian crisis began (Suter, 2012). Shepherd (2006) and Suter (2012), for example, provide in-depth ethnographic studies of the difficult economic and social situation of asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia in Turkey before the Syrian war. These studies show that the asylum system was overloaded even before Syrian refugees began to enter Turkey, meaning that asylum-seekers were basically condemned to a life in illegality. According to Suter (2012) and Shepherd (2006), asylum-seekers from Africa and Asia, for example, faced very restricted access to the employment market and had to rely on social support from non-governmental agencies to access social services. They lived in deplorable housing conditions or even in shelters provided by churches and non-governmental organisations.

The new law therefore provided a means to prevent the high number of asylum applications to European countries expected from Syrian nationals by guaranteeing them a de facto refugee status in Turkey through the status of Temporary Protection. This status, however, does not involve long-term commitments to the refugees on the part of the Turkish state: in terms of their right to protection, Turkey’s obligations to Syrian refugees theoretically cease when the conflict in Syria ends.

Icduygu, (2015: 9) believes that the legal status of Temporary Protection became clearer through the new legislation, and it is expected that the law will create an effective, legally established system providing Syrian refugees with satisfactory and humanitarian assistance. This is because – in contrast to earlier pieces of legislation - the new regulation:

- sets out specific provisions for registration and documentation procedures;
- provides refugees with the right to lawful stay in the country until safe return conditions are established in Syria;
- regulates the Temporary Protection identification document and the issuing of biometric identity cards;
- grants access to social benefits and services such as health and education as a right;
- grants restricted entry to the labour market, as persons can apply for a work permit in certain sectors, professions or geographic areas.

The law includes a non-refoulement provision, ensuring that refugees with Temporary Protection status will not be returned to a country where they are in danger. The law also contains explicit provision for dealing with unaccompanied minors, including the proviso that children younger than 16 must be kept in suitable accommodation with adult relatives or a foster family. Finally, it includes articles defining and creating a procedure to handle stateless persons (Kilberg, 2014).
In these aspects, the new law is a positive development compared with the 1994 Asylum laws, which did not grant asylum seekers access to education, health care or employment rights. However, as we have seen in previous sections of this report, there is evidence to suggest that in many cases, the provisions of the law are not implemented in practice – at least not yet.\textsuperscript{14}

Secondly, the law on Temporary Protection is applied mostly to Syrians, leaving out refugees from other nationalities in Turkey, who do not benefit from the same status and therefore have only restricted access to social and labour rights in Turkey (Korkut, 2016).

It should be mentioned that Turkey also hosts large numbers of migrants and refugees from countries other than Syria who have no recognised status at all. The table below gives an indication of the great variety of origin countries of these refugees and migrants. It is possible that some of them have attempted to apply for asylum in Turkey in hopes of being resettled in Europe. However, it is also possible that many of them are not filing asylum claims because they hope to continue their migration process to Europe, either as refugees or migrants.

\textsuperscript{14} The Law became effective in April 2015, and the newly created Directorate General for Migration only took over from AFAD recently. To date, AFAD is still heavily involved in refugee management issues.
5.4 The status jungle for Syrian refugees

There are now four different administrative status regulations by which Syrian nationals can be present in Turkey: International Protection Asylum Seekers, Temporary Protection Refugees, ordinary residents in Turkey (either as workers or students) and dependents of ordinary residents. It is likely that refugees arriving before 2014 applied for asylum and awaited resettlement in a third country. These refugees are therefore registered under the status of “international protection” asylum seekers, not as refugees under Temporary Protection. (Some of these asylum seekers have in fact already been resettled by the UNHCR).

All Syrians arriving in camps after 2014 (when the new law was introduced) were automatically registered under Temporary Protection status. Those living unregistered off-campus had the chance to register under Temporary Protection as well. In contrast to “international protection” asylum seekers, refugees under Temporary Protection were not eligible for resettlement in a third country, because the geographical restriction clause did not apply to Temporary Protection beneficiaries in Turkey.

Other Syrian nationals have been able to apply for an ordinary residency permit in Turkey upon arrival. This is possible for those persons in possession of valid identification documents who cross the Turkish border through a registered border point. Upon arrival they are
then able to apply for a residency permit in Turkey, if they pay the necessary fees, obtain a policy with a private health insurance company and/or are in a possession of a Turkish work contract in their name. These Syrian nationals are not counted as refugees or asylum seekers but simply as foreign residents in Turkey.

Some refugees stay in Turkey without registering at all with Turkish authorities. Among them are those not in the possession of legal identification documents, or those who crossed unauthorized border points and/or did not want to apply for Temporary Protection or ordinary residency in Turkey.

As stated earlier, the Temporary Protection status entitles refugees to a range of services and rights, but it also prevents them from applying for resettlement as refugees to a third (European) country and/or applying for asylum in a European country if they plan to move further on. This is one of the reasons why some refugees avoid registration and prefer living undocumented in off-camp situations. It is also likely that some among the undocumented refugees who, belonging to certain ethnic, religious or political groups, fear disadvantages upon their return to Syria if they have been registered as refugees in Turkey.

5.5 Effects of policies on the settlement and mobility options of migrants

Currently, there are six different kinds of residency permits that may be available to Syrians if they register not as refugees but as ordinary residents. The ordinary residency permit has many advantages, for it grants access to a series of civil and economic rights refugees currently do not enjoy.

Any foreigner who has resided in Turkey for eight years without significant interruption can apply for a permanent resident permit, which includes a permanent work permit. However, Syrians with Temporary Protection status may not apply. Foreigners who have worked in Turkey for six years uninterruptedly can obtain an indefinite work permit in Turkey, which simultaneously serves as a residence permit. Work permits can now serve in the place of residency permits, but must be sought within 30 days of arrival and prior to commencement

15 There are residency permits for students, workers, dependents, and people who have been resident in Turkey for a period of time, etc. All could theoretically apply to Syrians also, if they are not registered as refugees through the Turkish authorities.
of work. The latter option, however, is not really an option for refugees from Syria who have fled civil war.

In any event, this regulation applies only to those Syrians who entered Turkey with a valid passport and registered upon arrival as an ordinary resident. As we know, this is generally only possible for better-off Syrians who can afford to pay the fees required for the residency permit, private health insurance, and several other requirements tied to the permit. Furthermore, only Syrians having entered Turkey before the new law on Foreigners went into effect in 2015 may obtain residency permits. Every Syrian having entered Turkey later on was automatically registered under a Temporary Protection status.

In general, Syrians are treated as refugees (fleeing conflict) and are therefore accorded the status of Temporary Protection. This status does not grant them settlement and citizenship rights in Turkey for an unrestricted period of time. However, it does grant them (in theory) access to education, health care and employment - albeit with certain restrictions. Due to the current strain on resources in the education and health care systems unable to cope with the sudden influx of three million people however, it has not to date been possible in practice for all Syrian refugees under Temporary Protection measures to enjoy these rights.

The foregoing illustrates that the current legislation on Temporary Protection does not provide Syrians with a longer-term perspective of settlement in Turkey. The legislation does not contemplate adequate measures to promote long-term employment, and neglects issues related to the recognition of educational or professional qualifications and regulations regarding access to decent housing. Secondly, the law on TP restricts refugees’ residence to the provinces where they first registered. This restricts peoples’ mobility within the country and may further contribute to concentrations of refugees in particular regions.

The policy measures related to Temporary Protection status are therefore not promising for a human rights orientated policy change in immigration politics in Turkey and a move away from security oriented approaches, as Kanat & Ustun state (2015: 29). While recognizing and responding to refugees’ humanitarian and short-term needs, the status of Temporary Protection does not move away from restricting refugees’ longer-term opportunities for active participation in economic, political, social and cultural life in Turkey in many crucial areas. (Korkut 2016). Through Temporary Protection status, rights are granted to Syrian refugees on a temporary basis, and this hampers long-term settlement options for Syrian nationals in Turkey.

Given the current state of the law, one can foresee that those refugees with the means to travel further will attempt to do so, in order to seek better livelihoods for themselves and their children. Those without economic means to travel on will stay in Turkey. However, it is likely
that they will remain in poverty and marginalization, and often be confined to the border prov-
inces.

Even if the conflict in Syria should soon cease, it is to be expected that reconstruction efforts will take years. Syrians wishing to return to their homeland will need financial capital to begin anew. It is probable that those Syrians in Turkey who had to rely on informal jobs and help from relatives and friends and did not enjoy high levels of education will not have the means to set up a new life back in Syria and may have no choice but to stay in Turkey.

6. State and non-state actors involved in humanitarian and developmental activities for refugees and migrants

6.1 Finances

To date Turkey has assumed the bulk share of costs related to humanitarian and long-term assistance to Syrian refugees on its soil. While the UNHCR has assumed 3% of the costs, the Turkish Government has paid 97% through its own budget (Icduygu, 2015: 5), according to AFAD a staggering US $7.5 billion through October 2015 (Erdogan and Üver, 2015: 9).
Expenditures made for Syrians in Turkey in the Period April 2011-October 2015

Figure 6: Expenditures made for Syrians in Turkey in US$ in the Period April 2011-October 2015
Source: Our compilation, based on Erdogan and Üver (2015: 40)

Erdogan and Üver (2015) provide a list of the different institutions that have dedicated parts of their budget to the Syrian refugees. According to this list, 19 Ministries in Turkey have dedicated between 7,500,000 million and 1 billion Turkish Lira each year since 2011 to activities aimed at Syrian Refugees. However, we were not able to find a breakdown of the activities and projects financed by each ministry and government institution.

This shows that a great variety of Turkish government agencies and ministries are involved in the provision of services to Syrian refugees, and that it is likely that this money has been dedicated solely to refugees in camps. By contrast, the UNHCR and other international organisations have spent their funds primarily on camp management. The current resilience plan shows that this will continue to be a priority in future.

The Syrian refugee issue has mobilized an uncountable number of organisations working in Turkey, but it appears to us that this has often occurred in the absence of clear procedures of coordination and decision-making structures among the various bodies. It is highly likely that this is hindering the effective implementation and also the design of adequate policies to ad-
dress the various issues related to migrants’ access to social rights in Turkey. In what follows, we will give a short overview of the range of actors and their interrelationships:

6.2 Turkish governmental institutions

Until 2014, the provision of services to refugees by the Turkish government was primarily channelled through AFAD, the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. However, when it became obvious that the presence of Syrian refugees required longer-term solutions in collaboration with a diversity of ministries and other governmental and non-governmental institutions, the government created the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) during the process of establishing the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in April 2013. The DGMM reports to the Ministry of the Interior and has become the focal point for all activities related to migration management.

Still, AFAD and DGMM manage and coordinate a great range of activities on the national and regional levels in collaboration with diverse ministries, international organisations and national and international NGOs. According to Korkut (2016), the DGMM has not yet replaced AFAD as the main coordinating agency for delivery of aid to Syrian Refugees. He argues that this indicates that treatment of Syrian refugee questions is still dealt with primarily in terms of disaster response and humanitarian relief, rather than as a development and social policy issue with long-term strategies.

However, according to the financial breakdown of ministry expenses, the Ministries of Health, Education, Family and Social Policies, Labour and Social Security have been increasingly involved in activities geared towards Syrians. According to Erdogan and Uver (2015: 26), the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development have also collaborated in the process.

On the regional, provincial and municipal level, it is particularly governors, district governors and municipalities who have played the crucial role in the implementation of activities and services for Syrian refugees - particularly those in the south-eastern regions of Turkey. It should not be forgotten that the issue of social services for Syrian refugees affects government resources and local community structures primarily in the south-eastern provinces. It is therefore best regarded as a regional development issue, rather than a purely national affair. Erdogan and Üver (2015) therefore believe that further legal and administrative regulations are required to facilitate the work of local governments, allowing them to act with a certain
independence from centralized institutions and policy measures in adapting solutions to specific conditions at the local level.

Erdogan and Üver (2015:27) suggests that management of clear, strategic decision-making has been hampered within those Turkish government institutions involved in handling refugee issues. The authors believe that new administrative structures are needed to limit the influence of the Ministry of the Interior and its own security interests in the design and implementation of integration policies. In their view, the DGMM should become part of a new, independent ministry of Social Policies and Integration.

6.3 International Organisations

As mentioned above, a great variety of international organisations are also involved in the Syrian refugee issue. Among them are the UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, OCHA, WFP and IOM. The World Bank and the ILO have also been actively involved in the process. However, in this literature review, it was particularly difficult to understand the ways in which international organisations divide tasks and sectors of intervention among themselves. While it is known that the UNHCR is supposed to assist in humanitarian aid measures, and the UNDP in longer-term integration measures, for example, it was unclear to what degree UNICEF, which is significantly involved in the education of Syrian children, coordinates its efforts with both agencies. Neither is it entirely clear how OCHA and UNHCR are coordinating their activities, and we did not find any documents that spelled this out in a concrete way.

Even though it is clear that UN institutions have played a continuous role in efforts to regulate and supervise programs and activities, as well as providing support in international fundraising efforts, Erdogan and Üver (2015: 27) asserts that the Turkish government has avoided close cooperation with international organisations due to security concerns, and instead has focused on its collaboration with national institutions. The fact that international organisations have had only limited influence in refugee management is also due to their limited financial contributions to the overall costs.

Erdogan and Üver (2015: 33) finds that the Turkish government may even have rejected additional financial resources from EU or UN funds due to the high bureaucratic justification processes attached to their utilization. These are deemed to be particularly unhelpful in situations where a speedy response is needed.
6.4 National and international NGOs

Within the time available to us we have found very little information on the activities of local and international NGOs in Turkey, and this is definitely an area that requires further attention. To date, NGOs and international organisations have in theory preferred to work with off-camp refugees because of the bureaucratic demands involved in being granted access to camps. In theory, self-settled refugees should be able to receive additional support from national and international civil society organisations in cases where the state is having difficulty granting access to services. However, in practice, the assistance provided for self-settled refugees by international organisations and NGOs appears to be rather limited.

State institutions depend heavily on collaboration with non-state actors to reach off-camp populations and self-settled refugees because, unlike refugees in camps, self-settled refugees are scattered across cities and regions. However, the Turkish government does not actively encourage international NGOs to work with refugees directly, and instead favours collaboration with national-partner NGOs. Cagaptay (2014:31) argues that the “Turkish government seems especially uncomfortable with NGOs having non-Islamic, quasi-religious affiliations”. This again is evident in the restrictions imposed on work permits for international NGOs seeking to work with Syrian refugees. (IGAM 2013)

According to the sources we had access to, this suggests that local organisations in Turkey are struggling with the tasks at hand. Local organisations are often small, and their structural capacities insufficient for large-scale programs and activities. IGAM (2015) further states that Turkish NGOs involved in refugee development and humanitarian aid are largely excluded from the national, regional and local humanitarian support coordination mechanisms existing between NGOs and international organisations. This is astonishing, considering that they are currently the organisations that do the most work with off-camp refugees.

Nevertheless, there appear to exist local, Turkish coordination platforms in several border towns in the south-eastern provinces, including local NGOs and bureaucratic government structures on provincial and local levels. These platforms also act as fundraising mechanisms and organize the distribution of humanitarian aid in Syria. Funding is collected mostly through contributions from local business communities and some small international NGOs.

The report by IGAM (2013:14-15) found that most national NGOs working for and with self-settled refugees in Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep and Kilis are faith-based NGOs. It is likely that the situation in other areas in the Southeast is similar. Rights-based NGOs also exist, but spe-
cialize more in monitoring, reporting and awareness-raising activities as opposed to actual humanitarian or developmental support programs (Cilga, 2016). The IGAM researchers also found out that the role of international NGOs is often restricted solely to provision of emergency aid (distribution of food, materials, etc.), and often consists in the channelling of funds to Turkish partner organisations working actively on the ground. Big international NGOs such as Doctors without Borders, Save the Children, Catholic Relief services and Concern Worldwide are working in this manner.

Some international NGOs have obtained permission to work directly with off-campus refugees in the border towns in Turkey, and from there also provide humanitarian aid to Syrians still in Syria. Others operate without legal permits, mostly also in the field of humanitarian relief aid. IGAM (2013) states that some 80 international NGOs are operating in border areas through local representatives, but as of 2014 only 18 international NGOs had working permits. There is some contradictory information available in varying sources concerning the number of organisations, their registration status and their field of activity. This is definitely an area requiring further research, but it points to the fact that collaboration between national, international NGOs, local governments and international organisations is not as well-coordinated as it could be. The evidence reviewed also suggests that the activities NGOs organize for self-settled refugees are still predominantly in the field of emergency relief and humanitarian aid.

According to a graph elaborated by Melih Cilga (2016), most activities undertaken by national, Turkish NGOs in Gaziantep, Kilis, and Sanliurfa are in the nature of housing and food support, cultural and artistic activities, health care support and educational support. It appears that project activities are mostly centred on humanitarian relief activities.

6.5 Community organisation: Transnational communities and host-refugee relations

According to Içduygu (2015:11) and Kokut (2016), the general attitude of Turkish civil society toward Syrians is slowly changing. Whereas feelings toward Syrians were generally positive until 2013, this has changed in the course of the past two years, largely because it is now clear that many Syrians will stay in Turkey for a long time or even settle in the country permanently. The Turkish population grows increasingly worried that the Syrian presence may strain economic and social resources within communities (Erdogan and Üver, 2015, Korkut, 2016).
As Turkish NGOs and civil society organisations have to date organized the bulk of social assistance programs for off-camp refugees in the cities, it is vital that these organisations be strengthened and supported in their efforts, not only by providing help to Syrian refugees but also by designing programs and activities which involve the Turkish population at risk of being marginalized and excluded from social services and rights.

It might be particularly interesting to promote cooperation between Turkish and Syrian community representatives in cities like Gaziantep and Kilis, where the economy is heavily based on kinship relations between both communities in the borderlands of both states (Korkut, 2016).

Such cooperation appears to be particularly beneficial for development of activities in the areas of education, housing and work: These are vital areas helping families and individuals to maintain an independent livelihood resilient to outside shocks. At the same time, greater levels of self-reliance on the part of refugees will help to prevent their long-term dependence on state support.

We have found little indication in the literature pointing to efforts by Syrian refugees to organize community relations and social services, by themselves or in concert with Turkish host communities. However, IGAM (2013: 21) mentions briefly that there are NGOs run by Syrian nationals that are geared to support refugees in Turkey, particularly in the border provinces. They reportedly specialize particularly in “women’s issues”.

We have also found little indication of support structures in Turkey that are upheld or organized through Syrian communities in Europe or other countries. However, there is indication that Syrians are organizing their own schooling system coordinated with the Syrian, not the Turkish school curriculum. Several private schools have been established by Syrians for Syrians on Turkish soil.

There was also little evidence of collaboration between Syrian self-help groups and local NGOs, international NGO’s, or international organisations. Even though there exist several coordination mechanisms designed to improve cooperation and coordination between service providers on the local, regional and national levels, and to enhance the exchange of information between state and non-state actors as well, there is no evidence that refugees themselves are directly represented in these organisations through their own organisational structures.

Furthermore, we have not found evidence for resource flows to Turkey from Syrians living in other European countries, or Syrians maintaining trade and travel between Syria and Turkey.
However, it is likely that some families, particularly those living in self-settled conditions, receive financial support from family members overseas and/or provide funds for Syrians still in Syria.

7. Discussions and perspectives on local integration of urban self-settled refugees and conditions for successful integration policies: Review of the literature

Before looking at the situation of self-settled refugees in other countries in more detail, it will be useful to briefly discuss the current debates on local integration of refugees.

To start with, it is useful to remember that the Geneva Convention builds on the premise that ideally, refugees should be resettled in the country of asylum on a long-term basis, with the same rights guarantees as ordinary residents and citizens of that country (Jacobsen, 2001). This comes close to the ideal form of local integration, because refugees are then indistinguishable in rights and opportunities from ordinary citizens. However, this has rarely been the case in states of the Global South (Jacobsen, 2001, Mayfleet, 2007, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012), and in Europe also, recognized refugees rarely enjoy exactly the same rights as citizens.

It appears particularly difficult for governments in the Global South to guarantee refugees’ and host populations’ access to basic rights and services at comparable standards. This situation becomes aggravated in the protracted refugee crises common in many countries close to long-term conflict areas.16

However, this problem is not limited to the Global South. It has in the past affected mass movements of forcibly displaced populations in Europe also. One significant example is the case of Bosnians who fled the country during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in

16 The UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as: “one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance” (UNHCR, 2004)
the 1990s. Such a large and sudden movement of people was unforeseen and had therefore not been considered by the 1951 Geneva Convention. As a collective response to this event, European states jointly introduced a ‘Temporary Protection Policy’. Many of the displaced did not qualify for refugee status as strictly defined in the 1951 Geneva Convention; however, compelling humanitarian reasons forbade sending them back (Koser/Black 1999: 522). Therefore, regular evaluation of the need for protection on an individual basis was suspended (Valenta/Strabac 2013: 11).

Refugee reception under a Temporary Protection regime, whereby each of the receiving states had its own national regulations without requirement of long-term state commitments of integration, was then seen as a solution to the humanitarian crisis (Dimova 2006: 2). At first this policy did not involve any encouragement for refugees to permanently settle in the reception country. Those seeking refuge were rather expected to leave the host state and return to their origin country as soon as the conflict was over. In order to discourage refugees from settling permanently, the status of Temporary Protection often came with restrictions on access to the labour market and internal mobility in the host country. However, refugees have usually been guaranteed access to public education and health services. Most of the receiving countries gradually changed this protection status and granted permanent residence rights (Koser/Black: 1999: 524). These countries considered local integration a solution preferable to repatriation (id., 534). This opened up paths to the recognition of de facto integration in the realms of employment, education etc. (Koser/Black 1999). Only countries like Germany and Switzerland retained harsh regulations. Especially Germany - as the recipient of the largest number of Bosnian refugees - required them to leave the country as soon as the war ended, and denied them access to the labour market and to education (Valenta/Strabac 2013: 11). This particularly affected integration and the development of livelihoods by those refugees who were later granted permanent protection because of political developments in their home countries. (Valenta/Ramet 2011: 3f).

In developing countries, the UNHCR and many governments as well have long favoured an encampment approach to refugee management - even in the case of mass population movements. Often, camps were erected in rural areas, usually close to state borders. This was done in order to avoid at all costs the free movement of refugees to cities and urban

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17 It was first applied to Bosnian refugees and later to refugees from Kosovo (Koser/Black 1999: 533).
18 Temporary Protection regimes have been developed and implemented in most European states (all then 15 EU member states as well as Switzerland, Norway, Croatia and Slovenia (Koser/Black 1999: 522).
centres (Mayfleet, 2007). This strategy became increasingly unsatisfactory in cases where prolonged political crises impeded the return of refugees. It fostered the emergence of protracted refugee situations in many countries in the Global South. When large-scale camps persist over decades, they become more and more difficult to manage. Overcrowding and insufficient levels of assistance in all areas are common when refugees continue to arrive and remain in the same structures over long periods of time without being able to leave them (sometimes referred to as “warehousing” of refugees.)

This situation can lead to decisions on the part of refugees to avoid registration and live as “de facto” refugees in self-settled conditions - foregoing any assistance from state or international agencies they would legally be entitled to. Many of these (sometimes unregistered) refugees then gradually move on to urban centres where they expect to find greater livelihood opportunities. Even though the presence of refugees in urban centres has long been a reality in many parts of the world, local integration through self-settlement has not been a preferred policy option for solving such problems. Instead, the preferred policy of the UNHCR and host governments has been repatriation or resettlement in third countries as the sole viable and durable solution.

This situation has changed only gradually in recent years (Omata, 2013, Easton-Calabria, 2016). The cases of especially Uganda, Belize and Mexico are often mentioned as successful examples in this regard (Fielding, 2005). Some academics have argued that the policy shift toward recognizing local integration as a durable solution is mostly due to cost-benefit considerations: self-reliant and economically integrated refugees may be less dependent on expensive humanitarian aid from host governments and international agencies (Hunter, 2009, Hovil, 2007.). Since 2009, the UNHCR has revised its policy on urban refugees (UNHCR 2009,) accordingly. The refugee agency acknowledged that urban areas are a legitimate space for refugees and stated the importance of maximizing the protection space available to urban refugees, as well as the organizations supporting them (Guterres, 2010).

However, the UNHCR continues to face tensions with regard to policies of refugee self-reliance particularly in countries where refugees are denied the right to work and the right to free movement. What stands out in almost all the academic papers reviewed in this context is the consistent emphasis that without rights to work and freedom of movement, local integration activities are likely to fail because most refugees will rely on some form of mobility in order to seek income-generating activities that will help them access services like health and education without significant assistance from the state. (Easton-Calabria, 2016, Horst, 2006, Jacobsen, 2001, Betts & Omata, 2015, Hovil, 2007)
The UNHCR portrays the right to work for refugees as part of a general livelihoods provision strategy. However, some argue that this discourse is not aimed primarily at fostering the long-term integration of refugees into host states but rather serves to support arguments regarding how successful repatriation can be achieved. Repatriation policies appeal to host countries that fear refugees with skills and jobs may be tempted to stay in exile, taking up scarce jobs there (Easton-Calabria, 2016: 5).

Despite recognizing serious challenges on political, social and economic fronts, academics working on protracted refugee situations in the South have generally more positive views on the potential of local integration policies. They particularly stress the benefits that national and regional administrations may reap from refugee communities economically integrated into local markets (Omata, 2015, Hovil, 2007). However, they also point to conditions that have to be guaranteed in order to make local integration policies successful. Jacobsen (2001), for example, summarizes these conditions as follows: The circumstances under which local integration should occur must be acceptable to the host government. Integration initiatives must aim to promote the human security and livelihoods of everyone living in the host area - not only those of the refugees. Furthermore, repatriation must become a component of assisted local integration. For Jacobsen it is clear that integrated refugees may not want to repatriate permanently, but various forms of movement between the sending and host country are a significant characteristic of protracted situations, and these cyclical and periodic return movements should be incorporated into local integration policy. Based on our review of the literature we can identify the following factors concerning successful local integration in terms of economic participation in the host country and the creation of sustainable livelihoods:

**Factors favouring economic integration:**

- **Mapping of institutions, markets and capital available for refugees in the areas of concern.** The planning of interventions has to be adapted to the local and regional

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19 It should be noted that many of the arguments for local integration presented above specifically view refugees as economic actors. The perceived gains and losses they represent for the host country are evaluated primarily through reference to economic capital or economic theories of development. It is also implicit in such a view that through access to economic rights and economic participation in the host country, access to other rights becomes possible also. It is, however, possible to discuss the benefits of local integration through a variety of other theoretical perspectives. For example, it is also necessary to discuss refugee integration in terms of cultural or social development theories. However, I have not in the time available been able to find relevant literature in this field used by policy makers or academics with regard to the justification of specific policies for self-settled refugees. This perhaps indicates that economic-centered frames of reference dominate local integration and refugee debates in general.
market context in which they take place. There can be no one blueprint for successful integration mechanisms. Therefore, local and regional market studies and appraisals are needed before specific livelihood projects are designed and implemented.

- **Right to work.** Refugees have to be granted permission to enter local markets and employment legally. In countries where informal markets prevail, refugees must be granted access to these employment opportunities that is similar to the access of host populations, without threat of legal prosecution.

- **Right to movement and free choice of settlement.** It is often mentioned that restrictions on refugees’ movement and free choice of settlement are counterproductive. In order for refugees to build sustainable livelihoods they need to be able to move around, be transnationally active, and settle in urban areas.

- **Access to capital and markets** for both host and refugee populations needs to be improved. This involves access to bank accounts, loans, micro-credits, micro-finance and opportunities for selling and buying products in local and regional markets.

- **Gender-sensitive livelihood strategies** have to be designed that take account of the gender-specific needs of women and men in the labour market and the social context in which they find themselves. Women refugees often (particularly if they are the household head) have different training needs, different skills and less access to economic capital than men, while they retain particular responsibility for the education and upbringing of children and the care of the elderly.

**Factors influencing the access of refugees to political, social and cultural rights:**

- **Provision of education and health care facilities (including mental health care) at limited financial cost** as well as opportunities to obtain qualifications and gain recognition of qualifications obtained abroad. Access to these services should be similar to that of the host population. In order that such services not be overburdened, international donors should provide financial help, as it is recognized that it is often impossible for developing economies to bear these costs.

- **Access to education and health care within existing public services** rather than through the creation of parallel structures.

- **Increased networks and mechanisms for collaboration** between private sectors, refugee organizations, civil society organizations and host population neighbourhoods, municipalities, local authorities and national governments. Only if the concerns of host populations and refugees as well as local governments are taken into consideration can integration in urban areas succeed (Omata, 2012).

- **Increased participation of refugee-led organizations** in the design of assistance and development programs, particularly because of the need to strengthen the capacity of refugees to help themselves through transnational ties (Easton-Calabria, 2015).

In the following case studies we review some of these factors with specific emphasis on the key factors that may positively influence local integration of self-settled urban refugees in different contexts.
8. Case Studies

8.1 Rationale for choosing the case studies

Experiences with governmental approaches to urban integration of refugees in emerging economies like Uganda, Kenya, Mexico and Iran, which we will document later in the report, must be evaluated in the light of the above-mentioned policy discourses. What makes the examples interesting for comparison with Turkey is that – like Turkey - the governments in question did not rely on significant resources from international donors to implement measures facilitating refugees’ access to public services or income generation activities.

It is clear that the situation in Turkey is only in part comparable to protracted refugee crises in developing countries. On the one hand, the policy applied to refugee management in Turkey clearly resembles European refugee policies (particularly regarding the status of Temporary Protection for refugees from Syria and legal provisions for their access to social assistance, education, health and income generation activities). But on the other hand, the large number of refugees, and their de facto limited access to income generation activities and social services outside camp structures, resembles large-scale protracted refugee crises in the developing world. This situation is compounded by the fact that large numbers of Syrian refugees appear to be currently settled in economically and socially depressed areas where they represent a significant additional burden on already overextended social services and economic environments.

Several case studies have been chosen in order to review various aspects of the integration of urban refugees. Although none of the countries we reviewed deals with as high a number of refugees as Turkey does, all of them have long dealt with protracted refugee situations involving large numbers of self-settled refugees in urban and rural areas. It is striking that some problems with the integration of long-term self-settled refugees are common to all cases. However, in order to keep this report short and concise, we will illustrate specific aspects of integration with reference to each case where this particular issue has been especially salient in the literature we reviewed.

Uganda has been included into the case study selection because of its proclaimed success with refugee self-reliance strategies in the field of sustainable livelihoods - which have recently targeted urban refugees also (Jacobsen, 2001, Fielding, 2005, Hovil, 2007, Mayer, 2006, Easton-Calabria, 2015). These strategies were designed with technical support from the UNHCR and implemented mostly by the Ugandan Government. The process was ac-
accompanied by legal changes in the migration and refugee settlement framework of the country.

Kenya is a particularly interesting case study because it demonstrates how Somali communities have succeeded in carving out livelihood opportunities, mostly through the maintenance and expansion of transnational and interethnic ties across several host and receiving countries in the region. Even though this process has not been actively supported by the Kenyan government, it has proven successful in increasing refugees’ wellbeing in cities like Nairobi. (Cambpell, 2006, Horst, 2006)

Mexico has been chosen because it is – like Turkey - an emerging economy as well as a transit country and end-destination for large numbers of Central American migrants who have for decades been settling in various parts of Mexico. Although many of these people have no recognized refugee status, they nevertheless constitute additional challenges for city infrastructures and community life that need to be managed. While Mexico has a history of apparently successful integration policies in rural areas (Fielding, 2005), there has in recent years been a trend of increasing numbers of refugees and migrants coming to urban centres also.

Last but not least, we will concentrate on the education policies of Iran with regards to Afghan refugees. Iran has been characterized as one of the countries in the region hosting large numbers of Afghan refugees, mostly without receiving additional financial assistance from foreign countries or the UNHCR. Despite this lack of international aid, Iran has long managed to guarantee Afghan children access to the public education system. The positive effects of these policies became noticeable particularly after these regulations were amended in 2005, making it more difficult for Afghan children to enrol in the public school system.

8.2 Uganda: Sustainable livelihoods in the city

Uganda is cited repeatedly as one of the few countries with very tolerant legislations regarding self-settled refugees (Jacobsen, 2001, Fielding, 2005). However, according to Hovil (2007) it should not be forgotten that the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the UNHCR have long favoured the encampment of refugees in Uganda - even though this was disguised as an approach termed “local settlement”, whereby refugees were allocated a plot of land in certain areas close to the Sudanese border. Hovil (2007:600) further argues that local settlements in reality meant nothing other than camps, because refugees were confined to these local settlements and had no opportunity to access assistance outside them.
The local settlement approach was operationalized beginning in 1999 with the self-reliance strategy (SRS) that was part of the UNHCR’s wider Development Assistance to Refugees approach (DAR) in Uganda, a component of the Convention Plus Initiative. The strategy was introduced as a developmental response to refugee management intended to integrate assistance to both refugees and their hosts. Its main objective was to allow refugees to become self-sufficient (Hovil, 2007:600). The strategy consisted of humanitarian aid (food and non-food item distributions) in addition to the provision of a plot of land for agricultural purposes. However, according to Hovil (2007) this strategy never really helped refugees to achieve full self-sufficiency, simply because the agricultural output was not enough to make refugees independent of food aid. (When food aid was slowly phased out, refugees began to overstretch the use of land, which in turn diminished harvest returns in the following year). Hovil (2007:608) believes that because of this, many refugees decided not to register as refugees in the camps and preferred to stay undocumented. This allowed them to settle where they wanted, and also to more easily seek employment outside the agricultural sector. As a consequence, many moved into the cities to find work in the informal sector (Hovil, 2007:608).

In a second initiative, the GoU introduced new legislative measures in 2010 granting refugees access to the right to work and to freedom of movement (Easton-Calabria, 2015). In collaboration with the UNHCR and the World Bank, the GoU developed the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategic framework. The focus of this policy was to find developmental solutions for refugees and host populations by integrating refugees’ needs and assistance projects into existing institutional structures, as well as by capitalizing on their inclusion in national development plans (Easton-Calabria, 2015:2). It was an interesting initiative because it appeared to integrate refugee assistance with public policies designed to address also the challenges that the host population faced. Added to the Access-to-land initiative, this strategy included activities to foster comprehensive healthcare, government sponsored livelihood training and access to education.

Particularly interesting for the case of Turkey are the activities undertaken by the government of Uganda and the UNHCR to increase refugees self-reliance in cities through the facilitation of livelihood training. The UNHCR in Uganda spent considerable effort in the implementation of skills training. Easton-Calabria (2015) has only recently evaluated their success. The study finds that it was only partially successful, because refugees who benefited from the training later had only limited opportunities to set up businesses and sell products to potential clients. Easton-Calabria (2015) therefore recommends that in order to assist refugees in the securing of sustainable livelihoods it is equally crucial to guarantee refugees access to capital and markets in addition to legal permission to work.
He therefore recommends that agencies willing to engage in livelihood assistance programs invest in the implementation of baseline economic and market assessments beforehand.

In Kampala (Uganda’s capital), for example, refugees faced particular difficulties in accessing capital and markets: Due to a new law put into place by Kampala’s local authorities, refugees were not authorized to sell their products on the street. As many of them did not have the capital necessary to rent out shops or workshop spaces, street vending was the only viable way to start a business with little start-up investment. Even in instances where humanitarian organizations offered to rent stalls and workshops for refugees in authorized areas, the ventures were not successful because the shops and workshops were located in areas that potential clients did not frequent. Another issue affecting the success of business ventures was refugees’ lack of access to micro-credit finance and/or bank loans (Easton-Calabria, 2015).

Other studies show that - despite adverse conditions - some refugees were able to compensate for these shortcomings through networks with local host populations (Omata, 2012) that lent them land or capital and/or act as clients for products, and transnational networks with ethnic communities abroad and other refugee populations in settlements.

GoU long feared that great numbers of refugees would actually constitute a burden for the national economy (Omata, 2015) by negatively affecting the saturation of markets, the development of prices and the growth of the informal economy, which would entail loss of tax revenue for the government. However, Omata (2012, 2015) and Hovil (2007) appear to suggest that this was not necessarily the case, and that refugees have also proven to be successful entrepreneurs in Uganda. Hovil (2007) shows that refugees are most of the time extremely resourceful when looking for income generation opportunities outside settlements. Hovil (2007) found that self-settled refugees were mostly able to live as well or as badly as the local host population without being dependent on outside help, and were definitely better off than camp populations.

Omata found that the majority of self-settled urban refugees in Uganda are active in the informal sector. Many of them work as street vendors or entrepreneurs. The most successful were those who had access to national and international networks of business partners, ethnic communities and capital-providers both in Uganda and abroad. Refugees used networks within the private sector in Uganda to expand their business ventures, and interacted with refugees in settlements in various forms of trade relations as well (Betts & Omata, 2015). Hovil (2007) found that refugees often started work on agricultural land that was given to them by Ugandan hosts free of charge and were later able to work with the capital they earned to diversify their livelihood income opportunities.
These examples show that even in the absence of capital and markets, some refugees compensate for these shortcomings through networks with local host populations and transnational networks with ethnic communities abroad and other refugee populations in settlements. The right of refugees to move and choose their place of residence freely, and formal access to working rights, are crucial in order to develop and maintain these networks. Mobility is therefore crucial for refugees’ livelihood security, particularly where the state is unable to provide them with additional capital or access to markets.

It furthermore appears that skills training may be a complementary incentive for refugees and may help to improve their success in the business market. However, these activities may only be successful in places where access to markets and capital for the relevant activities is guaranteed and where intensive market baseline studies have been conducted beforehand. Only then can skills be successfully matched to existing needs in the labour market.

The example of Uganda also shows that livelihood support strategies in rural areas had only very limited success. This was partly due to the fact that agencies underestimated the needs of land and other inputs in constructing sustainable livelihoods on the basis of agricultural activities. Furthermore, it is likely that these types of activities are only possible in areas where agricultural land resources and water are available.

### 8.3 Kenya: The importance of transnational networks for local integration

Kenya is a country hosting a great number of Somali refugees. The refugee camps Dadaab and Kakuma in the north-western part of the country are the largest and oldest refugee camps in existence. However, due to the longstanding conflict in Somalia and the dim chances of repatriation or voluntary return, many Somalis have left the camps in search of a better future in cities like Nairobi. The Global Urban Policy of the UNHCR (2009) with regards to self-settled urban refugees is based largely on the agency’s experience over the years with Somali refugees in Nairobi and other urban centres in Kenya (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012). Somalis in Nairobi are not formally granted the right to work, nor are they able to freely choose their place of residence. However, even though they are required to register regularly in the camps to maintain their status as refugees, many are actually living outside the camps in greater urban centres (mostly Nairobi) where they have developed thriving business activities (Campbell, 2006).

Most refugees in Nairobi live in Eastleigh, a densely populated low-income neighbourhood where an informal economy is flourishing. It is often referred to as “little Mogadishu” because
it is dominated by Somali and other African refugees and immigrants. Eastleigh has been transformed from a residential area into an important commercial centre of the Eastlands area, very much due to Somali businessmen’s activities. Many Asian businesses have been forced out the area in the process (Campbell, 2006).

Campbell (2006) further demonstrates that economic globalization and transnationalism are central to the discussions concerning urban refugee economic survival - at least with reference to Somalis in Kenya. She argues that the transnational nature of the economic activities that sustain urban refugee communities are actually similar to the structures of transnational corporation (TNCs) which capitalize on differentials of advantage created by state boundaries - the main difference being that refugee communities operate at the grassroots level and usually outside the formal marketplace. (op.cit.: 397)

Interesting in her analysis is the fact that Somali refugees seem to have substituted their lack of formal access to capital with bank loans and micro-credits from transnational ethnic or family connections. It appears that many Somali businesses in Eastleigh were set up with capital refugees were able to access through relatives and business partners in other African countries, in Europe or in the States.

As many Somali refugees already relied heavily on help from family relations and ethnic ties to survive in difficult situations in Somalia, there appears to be a strong moral value attached to solidarity and mutual self-help within the Somali community, which is activated in situations of crisis (Horst, 2003). It appears that Somalis were able to use these mutual solidarity structures even across country borders to substitute them for the assistance and recognition lacking from the Kenyan government and host populations in urban centres like Nairobi.

The case of Kenya demonstrates how refugees are able to carve out livelihood opportunities in cities despite a relative neglect on the part of state authorities and even outright reluctance to integrate them into city life. Significant here however, is that it appears that successful refugees are the ones with business skills. Little mention is made of the fate of those with limited transnational ties and limited business skills.

Considering the situation in Turkey, it would be interesting to find out to what degree Syrian refugees are actually building their livelihood strategies on transnational ties to Syria and relatives already resettled in other countries in Europe, the Middle East or elsewhere. Considering that a sizable number of Syrians will be resettled to European countries in the near future (if the current policy proposals come into effect), it is likely that they will contribute to support their families and perhaps even maintain business relationships with refugees and Turkish host populations back in the provinces where they settled in Turkey.
8.4 Institutional collaboration on the local level in Mexico

Mexico hosts a negligible number of urban refugees compared with Turkey, and even Uganda and Kenya.\(^{20}\) However, the country has a long history as a country of asylum and is an important transit-country for many South and Central American migrants on their way to the United States of America. Mexico hosts in its urban centres a great number of undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and migrant workers who often live in precarious conditions (UNHCR, 2006). In this regard it presents great similarities with the Turkish case, because apart from the registered Syrian refugees under Temporary Protection, there are great numbers of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers from a wide range of countries who reside in Turkish cities (AFAD, 2016).

Mexico (and Mexico city) is part of the “Solidary cities” (Ciudades Solidarias) program, which was created as part of the Mexico Plan of Action (2004) in order to support the integration and self-sufficiency of urban refugees and migrants in Latin American cities. The program seeks to achieve this aim by fostering collaborations and networks between government, local administrations, city councils and NGOs and the private sector in various Latin American cities (ACNUR 2016).

Through the program a series of projects were implemented on the local level in different cities across countries in Latin America. These activities were integrated into the already existing initiatives on the national level in areas such as micro-credit, vocational capacity building, and generation of employment. In this way, the program sought to incorporate refugees’ concerns into public policies and national programs through the signing of cooperation agreements between local administrations and the UNHCR. In this way the activities aimed to foster context-relevant, local solutions within the framework of national and international action plans and public policies. The agreements were binding and had to be respected even if the composition of local councils and other governance structures changed.\(^{21}\) This helped

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\(^{20}\) According to the statistical yearbook of the UNHCR (2005), Mexico hosted 3390 Refugees and Asylum seekers in 2005. However, this does not include the high numbers of irregular migrants living in cities, of which many would possibly be eligible for refugee status were they to apply for asylum.

\(^{21}\) According to Paspalanova (2009), agreements facilitating local integration and access to basic services were established in Mexico City, but at the time of her writing, others were planned in Quintana Roo and the Province Estado de Mexico. Furthermore, there were 10 agreements with mental health professionals to guarantee access to mental health services in native languages and accessible pric-
to guarantee the longer-term implementation of activities and ensured the commitment of the local actors involved (Varoli, 2015, Paspalanova, 2009).

The program is interesting because the initiative demonstrates that access to social and economic rights for refugees and migrants in cities is also influenced by the nature of collaborations on the institutional level. The program attempts to respond to one of the biggest challenges – also a major opportunity – for successful integration of refugees in urban areas: The development of ways of working with the existing institutional framework of municipal and civil society organizations. It builds on the understanding that activities contributing to migrants’ successful integration into city life require local-regional-national and international network linkages between institutions. These networks can then help to channel additional funding to local administrations directly and connect the funding to concrete public policies already in place for vulnerable host populations.

While focusing on practical implementation and real time solutions, the strong focus on the allocation of additional resources to local, regional and international actors also risks diverting international funds away from national development plans and public policies implemented by central governments. This poses the danger that democratically elected authorities may be effectively side-lined in the design and implementation of integration policies for refugees.

Limitations of time did not allow us to delve deeper into this program, particularly because it was difficult to retrieve detailed information about its implementation in Mexico and beyond. We have found no evaluation reports and no documents detailing the number of activities, financial resources and the impact of the program on the lives of beneficiaries. However, preliminary conclusions drawn by participants in a seminar conducted by the UNHCR in Mexico (Murillo Gonzales, 2007) regarding integration measures for refugees, 22 for example, found the following:

1. Public policies geared towards the local integration of refugees should consider adequately not only legal aspects but also socio-economic aspects, particularly in relation to access to public services, fundamental rights, access to work and income generating activities.

es. In terms of housing, various agreements were established with guesthouses to achieve accessible rent prices for refugees or even rent waivers for vulnerable groups. .

22 The seminar report mentions the Cuidades Solidarias program as one of the important activities implemented to foster the integration of urban migrants and refugees.
2. These initiatives must benefit not only refugees but the local population as well.
3. In the operationalization of public policies, different entities and state institutions, international agencies, civil society organizations and beneficiaries should be involved.
4. Governments should consider exempting or diminishing the costs of registrations, documentations, regularizations and other administrative fees that refugees and impoverished community members face.
5. Public policies should be designed with the beneficiaries’ socio-economic profile in mind. In this context, the UNHCR (2009) also mentions that studies which seek to identify the characteristics of the refugee population are needed in order to facilitate the design of specific integration policies in Mexico City through the Cuidades Solidarias program.

We find that the program Ciudades Solidarias, and the other initiatives on the regional level as well, are an interesting approach to integration efforts aimed simultaneously at improving both host and refugee populations’ access to rights and services. It is also interesting that countries attempt to collaborate in local integration efforts for urban refugees over a wide geographical region spanning several countries. Considering the regional action plan designed for Turkey, Jordan and Iraq by the UNHCR, it would be interesting to see if a partial implementation of a program similar to the Solidarian cities program could also be envisaged, building on regional sharing of experiences and direct channelling of funds to municipalities in the areas of concern and aimed in particular at increasing livelihood opportunities in cities, education opportunities and access to health care facilities for refugees and host populations in the region.

We also found that UNHCR appears to have played a significant role in the promotion of activities aiming to increase local integration of refugees in Mexican cities in a wide range of areas. The UNHCR conducted an assessment of refugees’ characteristics and perceptions of integration that provides interesting perspectives on refugees’ own perception of integration (Paspalanova, 2012). The agency has also been active in collaborating with local organizations to initiate sensitivity programs with the population in order to combat xenophobia and discrimination of refugees. Sensitivity programs were also initiated with civil servants, particularly in the local offices of state agencies in charge of education, health and work related services. The agency has been active in the development of income-generative projects with state owned enterprises. Microcredit programs were also put into practice through the help of ACNUR. By doing this, the UNHCR has set incentives for local integration and helped to channel international funds toward these activities.
8.5 Education in Iran

Iran is an interesting case study as it has been hosting a very considerable number of Afghan refugees for many decades. During the past 20 years, Iran has hosted the largest refugee population in the world.

With outbreak of war in 1979, many Afghan refugees arrived in the neighbouring countries Pakistan and Iran. Refugees (mostly Afghani and Iraqi) who sought safe haven in Iran peaked at 4.5 million in 1991–92 (UNHCR, 1999, Country profile: Islamic Republic of Iran: 1, quoted in Hoodfar, 2007: 291). Despite the voluntary return of hundreds of thousands of Afghan and Iraqi refugees to their countries of origin since roughly 1995, the Islamic Republic of Iran remains host to one of the world’s largest and longstanding refugee populations. Today, it is estimated that there are around 3 million Afghan refugees in Iran, one million of which are officially registered as such with the Iranian administration while the rest, estimated at 1.5-2 million people, reside as irregular migrants in the country. Around 3% of the refugees are living in camps, and the remaining 97 % are living in urban and semi-urban areas (UNHCR, 2015, Koepke, 2011).

Like Turkey, Iran has managed the refugee influx for the most part independently and without significant outside help from international donors for the past three decades (Koepke, 2011). This is also the case for refugees' integration into the system of public education.

According to Hoodfar (2007:267), refugees arriving in Iran in the 1970s and 1980s found themselves in the midst of an on-going, intense national campaign for universal education, particularly regarding the education of girls. This also meant that Afghan refugee children had guaranteed access to the state-funded education system in Iran. They were fully integrated into the Iranian curriculum and were taught in Farsi. Refugees were also granted access to health care and employment (Koepke, 2011:2, HRW, 2013:62).

However, by the mid-1990s Iran had begun to devise policies to force Afghan refugees to repatriate (Bialcyk, 2008:21). Iran did not then issue new refugee identifications and made it illegal for undocumented refugees to hold employment, access education, health care or government subsidies (HRW, 2013: 62). Since 2000, the government has conducted frequent and sequential registration exercises (Koepke, 2011:3), but by 2001 the number of undocumented refugees had rocketed to almost a million, representing about 75% of all the Afghans in Iran (Hoodfar, 2004). The Iranian government also attempted to discourage Afghan refugees from working in the informal economy, in order to encourage their voluntary
repatriation to Afghanistan. As part of its strategy to force the Afghan refugees out, the government banned schools (all of which are publicly-funded and state-controlled) from accepting children of undocumented Afghan refugees and those whose refugee identification cards were issued for a different city (Hoodfar, 2007). The results of this strategy were soon evident: by 1998 it was estimated that only a third of Afghan children in Iran were enrolled in Iranian public schools (Adelkhah, F & Olszewska, Z. 2007).

Until around 2005 Afghan refugees could at least join Iranian or Afghan-run private schools, which also admitted undocumented Afghans. However, the latter were not approved by the Iranian government but registered only with the Afghan embassy in Teheran. From 2006 on, however, Afghan children had to face the payment of basic school fees in order to be admitted, and Afghan–run schools were closed and undocumented Afghan children generally prohibited from enrolling (Koepke, 2011:4). This meant that from then on, Afghan children not registered as refugees have effectively been barred from Iranian schools.

Since then, Afghan parents (and particularly mothers) of undocumented children have begun to find ways to guarantee the education of their children by running a parallel system of education which built on the Iranian education system and was organized entirely in Farsi (HRW, 2013: 63, Hoodfar, 2007).

These schools are uneven in terms of quality, particularly because they are dependant on the financial resources which parents are able to mobilize (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 1999). Despite these financial struggles and the difficulties these schools face, Hoodfar (2007) has documented certain positive aspects of these alternative schools also: She shows how mothers and fathers were able to mobilize financial capital, infrastructure and personnel, very often also by relying on Iranians, in order to set up alternative, private-run schools which accepted mainly irregular migrant children. The schools appeared to function in very democratic ways, giving refugees the opportunity to contribute to the design of the schools, the content of the curriculum and the financing of the services.

Hoodfar (2007) argues that because of the hostile environment for Afghan children’s education in Iran, the next ten years saw the creation of an educational movement by Afghan women: “Realizing the seriousness of the legal limitations it faced, the Afghan community soon engaged in a collective, if somewhat diffuse effort toward self-supported and self-directed Afghan schools. Initially this involved setting up home-based schools on a neighbourhood basis, mostly in isolation from one another. However, through word of mouth and because of the similar conditions faced in all the Afghan neighbourhoods, the number of
schools increased rapidly, with hundreds of them being set up in a relatively short time in the late 1990s” (Hoodfar, 2007: 270).

Iran’s policy regarding the education of Afghan children has been characterized by constantly changing and contradictory state policies. Whereas all Afghan children had free access to the school system during the 80’s and early 90’s, the following years were characterized by bans and obstacles for refugees seeking education. In 2009, for example, President Ahmadinejad reportedly issued a decree permitting all Afghan children access to primary and secondary public schools once they had registered as refugees with the authorities. However, Human Rights Watch was unable to obtain a copy of this decree, and in 2010 the Afghan embassy in Teheran reported that Afghans were once again banned from public schools (HRW, 2013). We also found newspaper articles claiming that in 2015 Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei ordered that all Afghan children in Iran should be permitted schooling regardless of their residency status, but we did not find any evidence to support the claim that this was implemented by changed regulations on the state level (Karami, 2015).

According to figures from the UNHCR (2015), there were around 345406 Afghan and Iraqi children enrolled in Iran’s primary and secondary schools in 2015. However, according to a newspaper report from Al Monitor (2015) there are approximately an additional 500000 Afghan children not attending school because of their lack of status. These are actually figures similar to those for Turkey. At the moment, the estimated number of Syrian children and adolescents of school age should be around between 700000-800000 people, of which only around half are being schooled today. One of the most important impacts of the contradictory and often hostile educational policies toward Afghans has been the increasing alienation and identity confusion that many young Afghans who grew up in Iran feel (Hoofar, 2007). Hoafar (2007) quotes one of her 17-year-old respondents reflecting on his experiences in Iranian schools: ‘We were reminded every day in a hundred ways that we did not belong and we were not wanted. It did not matter how well we did in school and how friendly and accommodating we were to our fellow students’ (288).

The case study demonstrates two different points of potential interest for the situation in Turkey. On the one hand, the successful integration of large numbers of refugee children in existing educational systems in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates that it is logistically and pedagogically possible to achieve this - even in emerging economies - despite language and cultural differences. We were not able to find information on the financial costs of this effort, however.
Secondly, the case study demonstrates the importance of education for refugees who are likely to stay in the country for decades, due to its significance for successful integration and identity formation. The example demonstrates also that refugees (and particularly mothers) can be meaningfully integrated into decision-making processes and participatory processes in the design and implementation of schooling projects, because they have strong motivation to do so. This hints also to the potential which education can have with respect to the transformation of traditional gender roles. It shows how refugees themselves – and here particularly female refugees - can actively participate in the improvement of access to public services like education in the host country. There is a chance to carve out particularly useful collaborations between local parents and refugee children’s parents that may work also to prevent xenophobic tendencies from becoming intractable.

The situation of Afghans in Iran today also demonstrates that education is indeed a means to foster and favour repatriation. To instead deprive refugee children of the possibility of formal education is likely to make their economic and social dependence on the host state even greater in the long run.

This case study also exemplifies how the right of education can be justified on different levels and for different uses: While the Afghan mothers did probably regard education as a means of local integration, the UNHCR maintains that education for Afghan children (registered as refugees or not) is an important element which can help achieve successful and sustainable repatriation to Afghanistan. The government of Iran has intermittently portrayed the right to education as connected to the duty of being a good Muslim, which was likely one of the reasons for investing heavily in the education of Afghan children.

Particularly relevant for Turkey is the fact that Afghan children were successfully integrated into the existing public school system, and taught together with Afghan children. No parallel education system was necessary or desired (not even by the refugee population.) This also helped to overcome language barriers that currently hamper the successful integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

9. Conclusion

This report has given only an incomplete and general overview of the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey with regards to their access to social and economic rights. By drawing on
examples from other countries, we have tried to show how states, international agencies and local organizations have attempted to tackle similar problems in other circumstances.

Throughout this review we became aware that the subject of long-term solutions for the successful integration of refugees into host communities is an issue which has not been accorded much academic or policy attention until now – whether in Turkey or in other countries. There are a variety of reasons for this, but it is mostly due to the view that the long-term goal of refugee management should be repatriation. Nevertheless, due to the increasing instances of protracted refugee situations in many parts of the world, long-term integration of refugees into host communities is slowly becoming an international policy concern as well as a field of academic research. It is important to develop more in-depth theoretical approaches in order to understand the relationships between the legal aspects of migration policies, humanitarian aid, development and the ability of refugees to settle successfully in host countries. This would also help to provide policy recommendations for the current situation in Turkey. In order to do this, it would be particularly fruitful to compare in more depth existing experiences with integration efforts of refugees in long-term protected refugee situations.

In the Turkish case, it is particularly the access of refugees to livelihoods and education that appears to be an urgent issue to be tackled with a longer-term view. For this to be done successfully, development of specific local and regional development plans to be implemented through the collaboration of private and state actors, civil society and state administrations is needed. However, in order to do this, it is also important to adapt asylum and migration legislation as well as the structures of participation for civil society actors.

The international community of states can play an important role in assisting the Turkish state in the great financial challenges it faces because of the refugee influx. However, local and international civil society organizations and bilateral state collaboration can also support Turkish efforts in a range of other areas which relate to the design and implementation of policy change. Drawing on the case studies we reviewed, we would like to conclude this report by pointing out some aspects that may be of particular importance for both state and non-state actors in tackling these challenges.

**Social services: Education and health**

The Iranian case study shows that the integration of refugee children into existing educational systems is beneficial for both children and the host society, and preferable to the establishment of parallel educational structures for refugee children.
The costs of additional infrastructure to support the continuing functioning of existing educational systems (for example, the building of additional classrooms) constitutes a significant financial burden for the Turkish state which could be alleviated through help from international donors. Infrastructural needs are relatively easy to plan and to calculate in financial terms.

However, the most difficult challenges are the required changes in current education policies, so that they can be adapted to the new pedagogical and logistical circumstances of the situation. Specific Turkish language classes, training for teachers and teaching assistants, recruitment of Syrian teachers for specific introductory classes, for example, are all measures which need to be designed, implemented and coordinated in line with the available local resources and structures at hand.

This is where international actors (both state and non-state actors) and further research can play an important role. There is a need to identify best practices in other countries, for example. Our review also points to the potential for exploration of experiences in other countries systematically through academic research.

In this report we have been virtually unable to include any information on the impact of refugee inflows on the Turkish health system. However, it is an important field where further enquiry is urgently needed and comparative studies with other countries could be developed.

**Asylum and migration policy**

The case studies from Kenya and Uganda both show that refugees’ chances of successful integration hinge to a great extent on their access to movement and settlement rights. Settlement rights here include those rights which do not only regulate their access to labour markets in their economic and professional range, but also their access to capital and land, their right to maintain and be part of existing political, professional, economic, cultural and social networks in the host society, and their chances of finding a place to stay.

But by the same token the case studies show that restricting refugees’ access to movement within and across state borders can also impact negatively on their ability to use and increase their own social and economic resources. Refugees’ rights to mobility have to be adapted to allow for transnational mobility and activity, as these are crucial for part of the refugees’ economic and social stability. Case studies on Kenya and Uganda, but also on African asylum seekers in Turkey (Suter, 2012), suggest that transnational resources are the ones refugees are likely to draw on in situations of crisis, and therefore need to be supported.
There is currently very little information available on the social networks of Syrian refugees in Turkey. In order to find out which policies are likely to help them best, it is necessary to investigate the links that refugees maintain with each other across different cities and provinces, as well as with families and friends, business partners and organizations back in Syria and in other European countries. This would help to assess to what degree these networks and links are helping refugees to increase their own social and economic resources for stabilizing their livelihoods in Turkey.

There have been recent discussions in Turkey (mostly initiated by the government) around the possibility of granting full citizenship to Syrian refugees. (Gottschlich, 2016). It is important to follow developments in these policy initiatives and to find out in how far they would affect refugees’ mobility and settlement options in Turkey positively or negatively. It is likely that Turkish citizenship could be a means to protect refugees’ rights, but at the same time also a tool to prevent them from being transnationally active in both Turkey and Syria. Furthermore, it may put refugees in the situation of having to take political sides with either the Turkish or the Syrian state. This is particularly the case if double citizenship will not be allowed. Meanwhile, there are also other options which could be discussed in order to assure the integration of refugees into the Turkish state. One would be to grant them ordinary refugee status and asylum in Turkey.

**Economic policies and livelihoods**

The economic resilience of refugees and their families will be an important question to be tackled by both civil society organisations and the Turkish government. Who can assist refugees in helping themselves to improve their economic resources?

The case studies of Uganda and Kenya furthermore show how refugees are dependent on access to markets and capital in order to build secure livelihoods in their host countries. Provision of capital and skills-training go hand in hand with carefully drafted regulations facilitating access to markets for those refugees with few economic resources and professional qualifications. Due to the relatively high unemployment rate in the formal service and industrial sector in Turkey, it is likely that refugees are attempting to find work through self-employment in business activities in the informal sector. Rather than clamping down on these efforts, it is necessary that civil society actors and state administrations attempt to adapt current regulations to delegalize these activities in ways which protect the formal economy while at the same time helping refugees and local populations to widen existing business opportunities.
Agricultural work appears to already be one of the sectors in which many refugees work. However, it is necessary to be attentive to working conditions in these sectors, as there are indications that here and in other low-paid sectors child labour is rampant and working conditions likely to lead to exploitation rather than secure livelihoods.

In order to develop feasible activities in these sectors, thorough market assessments in the areas of the highest presence of refugees would be required, as well as an assessment of the means for refugees to access credit and capital. This could be complemented through assessments of refugees’ professional backgrounds and their formal and informal employment skills.

In the long term, it is likely that the Turkish labour market will need wide-reaching reforms in order to be able to absorb labour surplus. The development of future strategies for job creation is an enormous task for the Turkish government which civil society organisations have to press for. In a globalised economy, job creation in Turkey is also dependent on its position within the international economy and on its relation to the EU.

**Participation, institutional networking and the role of civil society**

There is a role for civil society actors in finding and implementing long-term solutions for refugees in host countries. Refugees themselves also should and can play an important role in these processes; however, this is often neglected in policy making, or limited to consultative measures. All the case studies presented here show that successful integration only works through the help of the host population and through networks between refugees and hosts. Civil society actors are important for building and developing these networks because they can provide the information necessary for assessment of the most pressing needs and match them against the existing resources within the communities they represent.

The Iranian case study demonstrates how refugees themselves can also be important in building up community structures that help in successful integration efforts.

The Mexican case study shows that local administrations and civil society organizations can build links which help in the practical implementation of activities tailored to the needs on the ground, by building on local strengths and existing networks in the process.

In the case of Turkey, it is necessary to develop regulations and coordination mechanisms which allow greater cooperation between private sectors, civil society organizations and local administrations as well as international organizations in order to develop decentralized planning and execution of activities. For that to happen, there must be more qualitative research
into mapping and analysing links and activities between organizations, coordination mechanisms and planning tools. This research should build upon the viewpoints of civil society actors, and in particular on Turkish as well as Syrian communities living in the areas most affected by refugee influx.

There appear to be interesting and innovative practices which are in the process of developing in the field of institutional cooperation between municipalities, civil society organisations and regional or provincial government institutions in many Turkish provinces when it comes to refugee activities. It would be interesting to document and build upon these good practices in the future.


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