Moving from Integration to Participation? Notes on the Interrelationship between Communal and Associative Relationships
Faist, Thomas; Ulbricht, Christian

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Nutzungsbedingungen:
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this document must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.
Moving from Integration to Participation?

Notes on the Interrelationship between Communal and Associative Relationships
The COMCAD Working Paper Series is intended to aid the rapid distribution of work in progress, research findings and special lectures by researchers and associates of COMCAD. Papers aim to stimulate discussion among the worldwide community of scholars, policymakers and practitioners. They are distributed free of charge in PDF format via the COMCAD website.

The COMCAD Working Papers is a work-in-progress online series. Each paper receives only limited review. The opinions expressed in the papers are solely those of the author/s who retain the copyright. Comments on individual Working Papers are welcomed, and should be directed to the author/s.

University of Bielefeld
Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD)
Postfach 100131
D-33501 Bielefeld
Homepage: http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/tdrc/ag_comcad/
1. Introduction

It has become fashionable to reject the term “integration” in favour of “participation”, for example by the initiative “Demokratie statt Integration”\(^1\) (Democracy not Integration) within the contours of a “post-migration society”. However, this substitution of one term in favour of another is short-sighted as well as detrimental to academic and socio-political discussion. The replacement of one term with another may be justified as a discourse strategy of “critical intervention” (Laclau 2005), but it is important to keep in mind that “integration” highlights certain aspects of social reality that “participation” does not address. Whereas “integration” refers to communal relationships (Vergemeinschaftung), underpinned by characteristic feelings of belongingness and the setting of boundaries (also including the dichotomous conceptualisation of people as either in-group members or outsiders), talk of “participation” refers to the facet of associative relationships (Vergesellschaftung), for example in the instrumental consideration of utility by means of contracts in markets; common interests expressed by organisations; or in exercising civil, political, social and cultural rights and responsibilities.\(^2\)

Consequently, the participation discussion addresses aspects of contractual, legal and interest-based involvement that are viewed as particularly desirable in order to participate in society.

Nowadays, one might be inclined to recognise an inversion in the polarity of community and society. After all, the ideal typical construction as envisaged by Ferdinand Tönnies continues to have considerable traction in current academic and public discussion. Over one hundred years ago classical social theorists were wary of the spread of society and deeply lamented the loss of community. Key terms referring to this process include alienation (Marx), anomie (Durkheim), the mass (Simmel) and disenchantment (Weber). Taking a closer look at today’s academic participation debates, the impression arises that few contributors lament the disso-

---


olution of community in the form of large political collectives such as nations; but there is a greater attachment to communities based on family and faith ties. Being communally related in the context of the nation as an exclusive belonging is no longer considered up to date for a large number of observers. Should one nevertheless choose to position oneself within the “iron-clad framework of belongingness” (Nassehi 1997), one will be confronted with significant consequences relevant to inequality. Along these lines, empirical studies have confirmed that negative attributions based on ethnicity have a considerable socio-cultural impact, for instance in discrimination in access to the labour market (Diehl/Friedrich/Hall 2009; Seibert/Hupka-Brunner/Imdorf 2009). Keeping this in mind, it is understandable that contributors to the debate attempt to conceptualise the “boundaries of community” (Plessner 2002). This implies that the current German participation debate can be interpreted as an attempt to respond to everyday encounters with the “shadows of modernity” (Wimmer 2002) with a flight into the society.

This context increases the risk that this dualistic conception of participation and integration, or community and society, also creeps into academic debates, but this time with reversed polarity. Drawing on essential concepts of classical social thought provides a framework for capturing new social developments, explaining existing relations and mapping out potential scopes for enquiry. This is a clear direction for future research in German migration studies that goes beyond alleviating the lack of linkages to established positions in the sociology of citizenship (Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008). We doubt that it is possible for current developments in the context of migration to be captured through simplistic manoeuvres such as substituting one term for another or creating new terms. These measures neglect to explicitly address the interrelationship between community and society, glossing over one important question in particular – how do processes of forming community relationships affect the conditions and opportunities for participation, in other words associative relationships? The fact that an answer to this question is being sought after has become clearer than ever. Empirical phenomena such as the dualism of migration vs. mobility are forcing the issue (Faist 2013). It seems as if the multitude of reports claiming that migration poses a threat to German cultural and national identity are largely uninfluenced by discourses surrounding the demographically desirable migration of highly qualified individuals (Eder/Rauer/Schmidtke 2004). This begs the question of why highly mobile and qualified people are almost exclusively regarded with reference to the logic of a functionally differentiated society (do they/don’t they contribute to the economy), while the idea of the migrant worker is framed in the logic of segmentally differentiated nation states (integrated/not integrated) (Luhmann 1995, 275f.). Observations like these raise further questions, for instance: which of the boundaries resulting from community formation lead to a distinction between mobile workers vs. migrant wor-
kers? What implications does this distinction have for migrants' access to their rights in regards to the labour market and in applying for citizenship in particular and for social participation in general? This line of enquiry fundamentally and specifically addresses problems such as the ways in which nation states are currently framing their choice of migrants through legitimated discourse and how belongingness is negotiated in public spaces (Brubaker 1995; Joppke 2005; Tebble 2006; Adamson/Triadafilopoulos/Zolberg 2011).

It is not possible to do these developments justice by focusing either on participation or on the ethnicising and culturising perspective of the integration paradigm. When talking about integration, even sociologists confuse integration as a “concept of practice” with integration as a “concept of analysis”. Integration as a concept of practice is highly questionable. In this case, we agree with the post-colonial and post-structuralist criticism that the term has, in the past, been instrumentalised in academic and political contexts for drawing boundaries, thereby excluding the “other”, while preserving the perceived homogeneity of the in-group (Karakayali 2008; Hess 2013). Especially in European history over the last centuries, national semantics have served racist social closure. Integration as a concept of analysis, on the other hand, is a term that remains open in the fields of theories of society and sociological theories. However, we are not necessarily arguing in favour of the retention of the term “integration” as it is. Even when the term is used in a highly abstract way, such as in Parsons’ work,3 it is inextricably connected to national community and society and hardly does justice to the transnational reality of our life-world.

However, this critique of integration as a concept of practice and even the critique of integration as a concept of analysis should not be understood to imply that the social aspect described by the term has become obsolete. Especially a sociologically informed analysis with a critical intention ought to address two fundamental questions throughout. The first question pertains to associative relationships, asking how participation in society is possible. The second question refers to communal relationships, asking what holds specific groups together and what effects they produce by boundary formation with respect to participation and, consequently, inequality. Both questions address the problem of how social order can be perceived and possible ascriptions and perceptions of belongingness and participation are

---

3 In Luhmann’s systems theory, on the other hand, the term is no longer used. Luhmann’s work prioritises the differentiation of systems with respect to their environments over the inclusion of individual parts into a unified whole. Interestingly, this leads to an oversight of the processes of boundary formation within systems as well as the role that these processes play in regards to inequality.
mutually interdependent. Furthermore, the processes underlying the formation of communal relationships are important for participation. These observations do not yet constitute a particular model of belongingness and communal relationships. They also include reference to processes of boundary formation and inequality, which merit further investigation. Overall, one should aim to analytically separate the dimensions of associative relationships and communal relationships. This way, one can name processes of boundary formation as well as general processes of social closure, particularly in the context of migration. Hence, any critical examination of the dominating concept of integration in academia, society and politics must proceed from an analytical separation of the dimensions of associative relationships and communal relationships. Only then does it become possible to sufficiently conceptualise and do justice to the fundamentally important interaction between these two dimensions.

After all, participation requires a socio-moral basis in order to provide resources through state regulation or redistribution (Walzer 2006; Kaufmann 2009). Furthermore, theories of democracy imply that solidarity amongst citizens has been and continues to be a necessary precondition for a functional political community (Offe/Preuss 1991). This raises the question of how political community constitutes itself under present circumstances. In this regard, one should not underestimate the importance of norms and values, even in a highly individualised society disintegrating into subsystems.

In the first part of our analysis, we will discuss the meaning of the concept of integration within the academic sociological debate (concept of analysis). We will also examine the critique of the concept in political practice (concept of practice). This will involve looking at the discussion of post-migration critique as well as attempts to involve processes of communal relationship formation. These will be discussed with reference to systems theory and contemporary theories of integration. Our preliminary conclusion is that none of these approaches do justice to the fundamental issue of how communal relationships and associative relationships mutually influence each other, particularly how communal relationships act as a precondition for associative relationships. In the second part of our analysis, we argue that it is important to re-establish the relationship between belongingness and participation, that is associative and communal relationships. Using the concept of citizenship, we will illustrate how perceptions and interpretations of belongingness (communal relationships) and participation (associative relationships) work to construct membership. This will illustrate that belongingness in political practice is especially linked with processes of culturalisation which should be analysed against the backdrop of the nexus between heterogeneity and inequality. We conclude by recommending that the analysis of communal and associative relationships be extrapolated beyond the borders of the nation state. A dichotomous conception of “inside” and “outside” will not be able to rise to this challenge.
2. Integration and its Critics

The aim of post-migration critique is to establish a new ordering of knowledge within German migration research under the heading of “autonomy of migration”. Autonomy of migration is conceptualised as a research approach, “which examines migration-specific fields and forms of conflict” (Karakayali 2008, 258). This critique incorporates, amongst other things, the “liberal paradox” (Hollifield 1992), which contrasts the openness of national borders in the economic sense with the closure of national borders in the political sense. Furthermore, the conception of an autonomous field of migration, which transverses the logics of the state and the economy, addresses another important research question. The “autonomy of migration” is confronting a problem similar to the one of the transnationalisation perspective. Both share the core question of how social order can be negotiated outside the framework of the nation state and world societal norms (Amelina 2013). In this case, the category used to analyse social order is given by an element of post-migration society known as hybrid identity (Foroutan 2013). This diffuse concept aims to deconstruct an essentialist understanding of culture. However, post-migration critique neither contributes to the question of the opening and closing of nation states, nor does it revive the flagging discussion of hybridness. For the former to take effect, it would have to be clear which new insights into the functional logic of boundary formation by nation states are available. For the latter to come to fruition, it must be established to what extent post-migration critique reaches beyond truly innovative concepts such as “translation” as put forth by Salman Rushdie (Rushdie 1995).

One aspect of post-migration critique that has the potential to advance the debate is that it seamlessly links with post-colonial perspectives that aim to venture beyond Eurocentric knowledge systems. Methodologically, both classical migration research and even the transnational approach have been characterised by the conception of space as a container. 4 Both perspectives are said to be characterised by a “methodological nationalism”, which conceptually excludes identities that transcend national boundaries. Furthermore, it has been posited that an “imperative to integrate” dominates German migration research (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007, 8). This evidences an overwhelming focus on identities that interestingly overshadow heterogeneities such as class and fit neatly into left-wing paradigms of

4 The extent to which this criticism can be applied to the transnational research perspective remains to be seen. After all, this approach popularised the concept of “methodological nationalism” in the 1990s (summarised in Wimmer/Glick-Schiller 2003) and the construct continues to be investigated predominantly from a transnational perspective (Amelina/Faist 2012).
multiculturalism emphasising anti-racism as a political stance. What remains to be clarified is how to conceptualise the cultural process whereby migrants themselves make sense of their situation. In this case, stabilising the contingent character of culture is delegated to the level of the individual, who themself is shaped by given cultures. Through categorisation along a continuum of hybridity we can find out where an individual could be embedded into different contexts but not, however, find out how and when the potential for taking action comes into effect. Even with terms such as “new Germans” (Bota/Khuê/Özlem 2013) it is not clear how this perspective can distance itself from methodological nationalism. Hence, statements like the following assume the role of unexamined postulates, “We are part of this society. We are different. Therefore, our differences are also a part of this German society” (Bota/Khuê/Özlem 2013, 155).

Such a concept of hybrid identity in a post-migration society unequivocally abandons the notion that the whole individual is accepted into their host culture. This approach thereby represents a further development of previous approaches building on a historical perspective and arguing from a vantage point based on normative values. Recalling debates on integration/disintegration as well as on inclusion/exclusion from the mid-1990s (Heitmeyer 1997; Friedrichs/Jagodzinski 1999), it becomes apparent that the concept of the post-migration society should not be targeted with the same criticism as Wilhelm Heitmeyer's disintegration theory: “Disintegration, in this sense, is not a pathological deviation from a successful process of forming associative relationships, rather, the result of inclusion relations that themselves are to be viewed as a reaction to the reconfiguration of primary societal differentiation” (Nassehi 1997, 190). This implies that disintegration is a default condition and that, in the light of contingent opportunities for communication, integration necessitates explanation. From the communication theory perspective of a functionally differentiated society, exclusion can practically be seen as a precondition for the inclusion of individuals. The functionally differentiated society expels individuals from society, only to partially re-include them in the logic of subsystems. People are included into the social system in that they are communicatively addressed by the relevant overarching differentiators (for example, paying into/not paying into the economic system) and are excluded when the discrepancy between information and communication renders them invisible. This implies that an individual is no longer required to subjugate themselves to one single entity, such as a binding and normative set of values as outlined by Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons for example. Indeed, from this point of view, morals are a necessary vehicle for integration; however only for archaic and pre-modern societies. This “old European” idea becomes obsolete when considering equivalent functional systems whose unity originates exclusively from the differences between them.
While proponents of the post-migration perspective do not state this explicitly, it can be interpreted as attempting to take seriously the (theoretical) consequences of a functionally differentiated society. It is the demand derived from the postulate underpinning modern society that anyone who participates in a society should be guaranteed access to all of its functions (Bohn 2008). The concept of hybrid identity makes reference to a tendency not to address difference and foreignness in an attempt to overcome them. Attributes that are not related to function are irrelevant to accessing functional systems, for instance ethnicity, race or gender, and require further explanation. This outlook in particular characterises sociological research, which must then investigate the question of “which societal mechanisms lead to the differentiation of populations in modern societies divorced along ethnic-culture lines and why is there room in our society for these supposedly pre-modern types of collective communal relationships, which stand in opposition to structural individualism” (Nassehi 1997, 190).

By expressing that the whole individual is not being integrated into society, post-migration critique appears to be very up to date. Post-migration critique has come close to the insights gained by system theoretical differentiation theories. This raises the question of whether the critique has the capacity to follow the terminology of these system theoretical differentiation theories while simultaneously possessing the normative conviction that a sound understanding of social inequality can help in transforming it. By posing this question, one ventures into contested territory. Instead of trying to do away with social inequality, system theoretical differentiation theory aims to describe societal processes of differentiation using the terms inclusion/exclusion.

Attempts to reconcile theories of social inequality with system theoretical differentiation theories in order to identify and overcome deficits are rare. What remains is Luhmann’s assertion that he questions the primacy of functional differentiation replacing it with the overarching categories of inclusion and exclusion (Luhmann 1996). The validity of the codes associated with the functional systems is becoming increasingly dependent on location (Schroer 2010, 300). This means that the dimension of space (in a social sense) gains importance as a category. However, the terms inclusion/exclusion are not very helpful in understanding how access to social space is organised; they signify only that one may find oneself inside or not.

It is universally acknowledged that space becomes important when discussing resources that are bound to particular social spaces. The most important socio-geographical space is without doubt the modern nation state. Drawing on a variety of theoretical traditions, we know that the nation state is a symbolic community that encompasses subjective feelings of commonality as well as a legal-political community based on citizenship (amongst others: Anderson 1983; Calhoun 1993; Peters 1993; Gellner 2008).
Proponents of systems theory acknowledge these conditions by emphasising that addressing individuals communicatively is rooted just as deeply in norms and semantics as the use of function-specific binary coding (Stichweh 2009, 36). By formulating this point of view, Stichweh takes this argument even further than Michael Bommes, who “merely” emphasises the role of the political functional system. In order to foster loyalty and the power for decision-making, the political system includes individuals as a whole and categorises them unambiguously according to one nation state. When accessing national resources, for instance the welfare state, belonging to one nation state rather than another can constitute a “threshold of inequality” (Bommes 1999, 147). This idea can be expressed more pointedly by asserting that for liberal-democratic nation states a valid passport is the entry ticket to the functionally differentiated society.

This claim only addresses the one side of the coin, disregarding that associative relationships are fundamentally dependent on communal relationships within nation states, for instance in regards to the conception of a national identity. Stichweh’s systems theory however does not answer the question of how such semantics and norms affect inclusion and exclusion. Richard Münch, with reference to Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger (Hondrich/Koch-Arzberger 1992), already accused the systems perspective on integration theory of failing to address ethnicity, nationality and nationalism (Münch 1995, 65). In this regard, on the question of inclusion and exclusion in modern societies we are “not further, just later” (“nicht weiter, sondern nur später”) (Nietzsche).

Using the concept of autonomy of migration, “critical migration research” proposes a methodological focus on the possibilities for action available to migration actors and institutions. For this purpose, critical migration research invokes Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Particular emphasis is placed on the way in which numerous institutions aim to make mobility governable, whereby mobility is foremost understood as mobility of work, and the integration of migrants through categorisation, for instance by territorialising the nation state (see in particular Hess and Karakayali in “Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007”). With regards to integration, the consistent argument is that works which draw on classical migration research thoughtlessly lean on the dominant knowledge system and operate within that framework. Consequently, these works reproduce dominant knowledge systems as well as relations of inequality. However, critical migration research falls short in at least two ways. Firstly, by truncatedly drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, critical migration research loses sight of the manifold countervailing power formations on the part of migrants, particularly against state institutions. In this sense, the autonomy of migration is understood as a governmental perspective rather than the independence of migrants. But this is inadequate, because migrants, even irregular or illegal migrants, can be highly self-sufficient, resistant
and autonomous agents towards border and integration regimes (see for instance Barron et al. 2011). Secondly, conducting a sort of intellectual exorcism is not really helpful. While the critique of “integration” in the interest of problematising a dominant knowledge system is understandable, abolishing the term does not solve the issues and questions associated with it. In this context, we assume that the term “integration” primarily refers to processes of communal relationship formation within academic and partially within political debate.

Surprisingly, integration and its critics are united by the implicit assumption that society can be conceptualised as a unified, if not relatively homogenous body. This applies equally to critics of multiculturalism as well as post-migration and post-colonial theorists. Prominent political figures such as David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel have been some of multiculturalism’s most vocal critics in recent years. At the Deutschlandtag (party conference) of the Junge Union (Young Conservatives) in 2010, Angela Merkel succinctly stated: “The multicultural approach has failed, it has failed completely!” The essence of post-migration critique comes across in the following assertion: “We live in an immigrant society. This means that we need to stop talking about integration when we address the social relations that govern how we live together. Integration means that people who work, have children, grow old and die in this country have a code of conduct forced upon them before they are even part of society on equal terms. Democracy is not a golf club. Democracy means that all people have the right to figure out together and for themselves how they wish to live together. The notion of integration is an enemy to democracy” (Netzwerk Kritische Migrationsforschung).

While these – superficially seen – very disparate critiques of the practice of integration implicitly celebrate homogeneity, other voices do not even attempt a differentiated engagement with integration. The Expert Council on Migration, for instance, merges the terms integration and participation by talking about “… integration as an empirical measure of participation in central aspects of social life” (Sachverständigenrat Migration 2012, 17). At this point, we provisionally establish that the image of homogeneity explicitly formulated in public critiques of multiculturalism and, interestingly, implied in post-migration research is outdated due to the increased diversification of migration and society.

Post-migration and post-colonial critique do not seem to show an awareness of the evolution of classical theories of integration in the past decades, which has been characterised by a

---

5 www.demokratie-statt-integration.krinet.org
movement away from emphasising cultural homogeneity. Starting from the classical assimilation theories as formulated by the Chicago School (and partially earlier, see e.g. Kivisto 2005) this is a long road via multiculturalism, newer assimilation theories and ending with concepts of diversity. All of these theories and perspectives are characterised by their attention to the connection between associative and communal relationships. The adaptation of migrants to a culturally homogenous majority society, a process that usually spans several generations, plays an important role in assimilation theories developed within the Chicago School framework up until the 1960s (Park 1928; Gordon 1964). At the crux of these theories is the incorporation or subordination of migrants into or within an existing dominant social structure or culture, even if, according to Park, processes of adaptation can move in the opposite direction. The implicit assumptions of the model are obvious: the integration of migrants is more or less a unilinear process of adaptation to the host society. Newer theories of assimilation question the existence of a fixed cultural core of the majority society and shift the focus to processes of boundary formation between migrants and members of majority social groups (Alba/Nee 2003). Assimilation or integration exists when boundaries disintegrate, when minority group members overstep boundaries or when new minorities face exclusion in the sense of socio-cultural closure. This showcases a strong turn towards social constructivism in contemporary theories of assimilation.

The political theory of multiculturalism remains far removed from these social constructivist contributions. Essentially, multiculturalism is a normative strain of theory which having been mediated by the discussions on the rights of national minorities in the 1980s and 1990s was applied as well to immigrant minorities. A central assumption and one of the most significant demands of multiculturalism as a social theory and political practice is that only the recognition of all cultures as equally valid is a solid foundation for effective social participation (Kymlicka 1995). Critiques of multiculturalism often address the idea that validating minority cultures encourages the suppression of dissidence within these groups; with regards to national minorities, Québec is often cited as an example (Barry 1991). It is important to be clear on the fundamental assumption underlying these ideas: recognising the rights of ethnic and national minorities enables and encourages communal relationships within the nation state; associative relationships become a precondition for communal relationships.

The more recent concept of diversity management shifts away from demanding equal rights and cultural recognition and simply frames individuals as carriers of collective cultural characteristics (for instance linguistic ability), which are considered to positively affect efficiency (in the private sector) as well as the provision of services (in the public sector). Cultural diversity within organisations, the competencies of migrants and the programmes geared towards them are framed as a cultural resource, which effectively links cultural validation and
social participation with the principles underpinning a society of organisations and enterprises. At the crux of diversity management seems to lie the idea that resources governed by communal relationships – as is expressed in the habitus of mobile individuals – encourage processes of associative relationship formation, especially with respect to market forces. However, an over-eager positive normalisation of diversity threatens to gloss over processes that generate inequality and discrimination. In this regard, the sociological concept of heterogeneity could be helpful in determining how these are linked with inequalities (Faist 2010).

When comparing different conceptions of integration it becomes apparent that communal and associative relationships are frequently the focus of analysis, for instance in older theories of assimilation that postulate the acculturation of migrants in regards to language and work ethic as a precondition for participation in social fields such as school, work and politics. Similarly, multiculturalism proposes the validation of cultural practices as a precondition for participation in all functional systems and social fields. Concepts of diversity also indulge in a kind of methodological holism, even if, unlike in multiculturalism, this breaks down collectives into individuals as carriers of cultural competences. Newer theories of assimilation are more sociologically adequate, since they emphasise the social constitution of boundaries between majority and minority groups. This practice pays tribute to older social constructivist and social anthropologist traditions (Barth 1969), which have recently been revived (Wimmer 2008). The social mechanisms behind the transformation of culturally coded differences (heterogeneity) into inequalities have been neglected in past analyses.

3. The Climbing Team of Communal and Associative Relationships – Explored through the Example of Citizenship

The debate on the reform of citizenship laws that has been taking place in Germany since the 1990s shows how important it is to examine the interplay between communal and associative relationships and to clarify which theoretical or socio-political outcomes are present. Citizenship as the idea and practice of full membership in a unified political body on the basis of an equal legal status is an ideal concept for determining the interrelationship between associative and communal relationships. Equal democratic participation based on affiliations with imaginary, and in the sense of the Thomas theorem also real, communities may be hindered by a variety of inequalities originating from processes associated with civil society, the market and the family. At the same time, the outward social closure associated with citizenship in nation states constitutes a moment in which inequality is generated. The interplay of communal and associative relationships can be illustrated on one hand by the example of the
functional logic of the welfare state constituted within a nation state. On the other hand, this interaction can be observed in the political conflicts surrounding citizenship reforms in the Federal Republic of Germany since the late 1990s. However, one must initially define the institution of citizenship more precisely.

International migration raises the problem of citizenship as fully fledged membership. After crossing national borders and settling down, migrants tend to occupy the status of “foreigner”. The possible path to full membership and with it to citizenship refers to questions of the possibility and realisation of social, political, economic and cultural participation that must be considered with respect to the (un)equal distribution of material and symbolic goods. Citizenship is generally conceptualised as a status of full membership in a state, but also in a city or in a supranational sense (citizenship of the European Union). It is a central expression of equality norms amongst citizens.

We can distinguish between two dimensions of citizenship: legally belonging to a unified political body such as a state (citizenship) constitutes one dimension, while the other is defined as normative. With regards to the second dimension, citizenship is a highly contested political term. Citizenship as fully-fledged membership bestows equal rights and responsibilities and therefore encompasses three elements of equality. Firstly, equal political freedom, that is democratic participation, for instance in elections. Secondly, equal rights and responsibilities for all members, that is diverse civil, political and even cultural rights and responsibilities, for instance the right to a fair trial, the right to vote, the right to a social safety net and the right to maintain one’s native language. Thirdly, belonging to a collective of equal citizens. This collective constitutes a unified political body, for instance a nation, a city or even a supranational collective like Europe. Whereas the second dimension of citizenship emphasises associative relationships over rights and responsibilities, the third dimension focuses on belongingness and therefore communal relationships as the central foundation for granting and recognising rights and carrying out responsibilities. Especially within nation states it is the legally justified differences between citizens and non-citizens that crop up as a consequence of international migration, manifesting as inequalities in terms of rights and responsibilities of the established versus those of the newcomers or minorities. For instance, only citizens generally enjoy full voting rights and have full access to all social services.

Historians, political philosophers and social scientists from North America and Europe have offered the following narrative of citizenship and migration in the past decades: citizenship works “outwards” as a mechanism of social closure of the nation state and it works “inwards” as a mechanism of integration. However, a frequent normative demand in this context is that this social closure be suspended on the “inside”, at least towards foreign residents and settled migrants, so that they are not treated unequally without justification (Walzer 2006).
all, these people pay taxes, are educated in the same system and are our neighbours.

Citizenship is important, because it emphasises the underlying principle of equality formulated as the “right to have rights” (Arendt 1981). Only citizens are protected from state powers such as deportation. An interesting development of this concept appears in the form of Agamben’s (Agamben 2002) use of the term “homo sacer”, which refers not only to the scandal of statelessness, but also to those situations in which individuals are deprived of the autonomy needed to make long-term decisions. This evokes images of refugees who cross the Mediterranean in decrepit boats from North Africa to Southern Europe and have little scope for action in dealings with traffickers or state agencies in reception centres. Rating statuses as unequal – for instance citizen vs. resident non-citizen or even newcomer – only makes sense against the backdrop of equality norms. The refugees arriving on the small Italian island of Lampedusa and recently in many other locations make “our” citizenship rights visible by shedding light on their absence in the internment camps.

The German citizenship law reform of 2000, hailed by its proponents of as an act of modernisation, may constitute a success story within the aforementioned narrative. The reform introduced, for example limited *jus soli* rights, which attribute citizenship and citizenship rights on the basis of the country-of-birth principle (Faist 2007). According to the law, children born in Germany to foreign nationals who have lived in the country for at least eight years are (also) German citizens. The citizenship law reform in 1999 of the SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen coalition augmented the “right of blood” (*jus sanguinis*) model of citizenship, which had been the primary means of acquiring German citizenship, with provisions for “right of soil” (*jus soli*) citizenship, that in European comparison are very wide reaching. Additionally, the required duration of residence for obtaining citizenship was shortened to eight years. Dual nationality was not expected to become the normal case, but further provisions were made for a number of exceptions. Children born to foreign nationals in Germany were required by the reform to choose between German nationality and that of their parents between the ages of 18 and 23. This is known as the *Optionspflicht* (duty to decide).

Proponents of *jus soli* and of the acceptance of dual nationality base their central arguments for simplifying the process of conferring citizenship on different variants of creating political

---

6 However, this narrative only takes one component of migration and integration into consideration – namely those individuals who settle down as permanent residents. What happens to those who stay for shorter periods of time, be they students, workers on fixed-term contracts, seasonal workers, individuals with mobile lifestyles or expatriates such as managers and diplomats? Temporary residence is not a new phenomenon, even though mass media often cultivates the image that we have only recently entered an age of migration.
and social equality by means of associative relationships on a basis of legal equality. The SPD, the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, the PDS and some in the FDP all consider political inclusion on the basis of attaining citizenship on the one hand as a precondition for successful integration and on the other hand they also see this type of political inclusion as a question of equal rights and the creation of legal as well as social equality. The specific arguments for equality were related to various points of comparison. For instance, it is put forth that compared to German citizens immigrants have a legitimate claim on the basis of attaining citizenship to the same scope of civil, social and especially political rights in the host country as a precondition for equal access to equal life chances. Making immigrants equal by means of citizenship rights was also said to have the suspected effect of combating racist attitudes by removing the institutional basis for the discriminating differentiation between foreigners and Germans. Furthermore, it has been postulated that attaining citizenship fosters feelings of equal belongingness as well as identification with German society amongst immigrants. The attainment of citizenship is also often viewed as a necessary way of balancing the rights and responsibilities of immigrants, sometimes inviting references to the slogan of the American Revolutionary War “no taxation without representation”. This slogan implies that those who have been fulfilling their responsibilities for a long by paying taxes and social insurance contributions are legitimately entitled to the full scope of the corresponding rights. With respect to the fundamental entitlement to German citizenship of ethnic German east European settlers, it was deemed necessary to establish equal treatment for long-time resident migrant workers by tolerating dual nationality. This argument for equal treatment also plays a role in the relationship between non-citizens from countries within the European Union and non-EU citizens. According to the ruling of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on the right to vote for foreigners, non-EU citizens can only exercise the same municipal-level voting rights as non-German EU citizens after becoming German citizens. Arguments in favour of the debated reforms which were based on Germany’s collective identity drew to different extents on to the belated acknowledgement of Germany as an immigration country and on its commonly accepted pro-European stance, which needed to be reflected in reformed German citizenship legislation so that the liberal developments occurring in other European states could take hold in Germany as well.

Opponents to the controversial elements of German citizenship law reform tended to identify the term integration with loyalty. Whereas proponents of the reform were of the opinion that the political loyalty of immigrants results from political inclusion on the basis of equal rights, the opponents viewed political loyalty as a consequence of comprehensive societal integration. According to the stance of the CDU/CSU, retained until the present day, the attainment of citizenship in itself is not a means of integration; rather, citizenship should be granted once
palpably successful integration has taken place. Participation in public institutions and membership of groupings in civil society were framed as associative relationships in this case. This implies that the regulations governing naturalisation must be based on reliable criteria that suggest a move towards successful communal relationships. These measures are intended to prevent the naturalisation of individuals who have not developed a true connection with Germany and are reluctant to form one due to a desire to eventually return to their country of origin. Furthermore, accepting dual nationality, even with respect to migrants who intend to stay in Germany in the long term, is considered detrimental to integration, because, it is said, this frees them from making the necessary independent efforts to integrate. In this narrative, integration has near exclusively been framed as a task for the immigrants: as their individual willingness, effort and accomplishment.

With respect to democratic legitimacy, the CDU/CSU defended a position held since the controversy concerning voting rights for foreigners in the early 1990s. This position predominantly emphasises the civil responsibilities that individuals must fulfil if they wish to enjoy the full scope of democratic participation. Following this logic, the acceptance of dual nationality would lead to the privileging of immigrants, who would be able to enjoy corresponding rights conferred by two different citizenships, which would be rejected by the majority of the German population.

The CDU/CSU position was characterised in two ways by a “communitarian” view rather than the vestiges of unenlightened ethno-cultural ignorance. On one hand, this view is based on the right of sovereign nation states, as recognised by international law, to autonomously determine the criteria for entry to and membership of the state. On the other hand, this view emphasises the conviction that social participation does not emerge as a result of legislation and politics alone. Rather, it depends on social resources such as self-organisation and solidarity within the framework of what is frequently referred to as civil society; in other words, participation relates closely to aspects of communal relationships. In this sense, people who are in the process of applying for German citizenship are expected to have already developed certain civil competencies that allow them to live as self-sufficiently as possible. By the way, on the basis of explicit assertions, there is hardly any evidence for an intention to foster cultural assimilation in the sense of adaptation to specific practices and ways of life. Rather, the issue is the skills of a self-sufficient citizen who is expected to have adequate educational as well as professional qualifications or the individual motivation and competencies to acquire them. It is also expected that this citizen will have social networks so that they will only require state support under exceptional circumstances. This understanding of the relation between associative and communal relationships corresponds to recognisable elements of traditionally conservative as well as economically liberal positions. These positions advocate
narrowing the scope of state responsibility down to international and domestic security as well as delegating numerous functions of the state to the private sector and initiatives in civil society.

Finally, the divergent positions of these two political camps showcase two fundamentally different understandings of political legitimacy. For the SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and the PDS democratic legitimacy was essentially a question of input: the quality of the political process is fundamentally based on the widest possible inclusion and democratic participation of those governed by its laws. The CDU/CSU on the other hand obviously favour an understanding of legitimacy that focuses on the efficacy or the output of state regulation. The effectiveness of the state within the framework of its core functions appears here as the central aspect in generating political support from the state and the government. These institutions are, in turn, predominantly accountable to the autochthonous majority society.

The illustrative example of dual nationality clarifies the interplay of communal and associative relationships. The SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and the PDS favoured the argument that equal rights are first necessary to equip individuals to be able to prepare themselves for the demands of a differentiated society and thereby to participate in it. The CDU/CSU argued that social participation is linked to certain preconditions. In Germany, these socio-moral preconditions of citizenship are discussed using the metaconcept of integration. Depending on one’s political orientation, citizenship and the rights associated with it are then either conceptualised as a precondition for integration or as the crowning moment completing the process of integration. In the latter case, citizenship is a reward for the individual achievement of the migrant. Both positions, which were clearly expressed, for instance during the Bundestag debates on dual nationality in the late 1990s, accept the discourse of equality within nation states: those who see citizenship as a means of enabling membership emphasise equality of opportunity, while those who define citizenship as the crowning moment of the integration process focus on the idea that equality first has to be earned. The more diffuse the concept of social integration (the nation) is, the harsher the imperative for migrants to get a move on and integrate and the slimmer the chances of “multicultural” citizenship. Interestingly, integration generally relates only to migrant workers and refugees, while the highly qualified are not considered to be migrants at all. The latter group is referred to not through the paradigm of integration, but rather as human capital which enhances economic competition (Faist/Ulbricht 2014). Further research needs to show whether the highly qualified with their status as self-sufficient citizens represent the new legitimate type of communal relationships. In this regard, being individualised in a way that conforms to the market bestows belongingness to the symbolic community of Germany.
In this view, the supposedly backwards traditional forms of communal relationships practiced by migrants are the cause of segregation and exclusion from social participation. This is underpinned by the assumption that less privileged migrants must be shown the basic tenets of liberal-democratic culture\(^7\) and need to be liberated from the traditional ties of their culture of origin. Again, community appears here as a characteristic of pre-modern society. This conception simply overlooks that aspects of communal relationships via national belonging predominantly serve the self-confirmation of the majority society, as has been shown in the public political discussion on the reform of citizenship law in Germany. This should not be taken to support the argument that communal relationships are “only” an element of symbolic politics. Rather, fundamental concepts such as those underlying socio-political interventions are affected. Educational policy constitutes a significant example in this regard. In current debates, the requirements of social participation are being expressed as follows: the preschool and school system should also be the foundation for the children of migrant workers so that they too have realistic opportunities in the job market (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration 2013; Kuhnhenne et al. 2012). A clear signal is sent by the situation that in the past three decades two to three times as many young people with a “migration background” as without have been unable to find apprenticeships, often have not attained a school-leaving qualification (Hauptschulabschluss) and are overrepresented in schools for pupils with special educational needs. This raises the question of how young people with a “migration background” can acquire the skills they need to participate in the job market. Any measures to further this goal must be underpinned with solid financing and follow the principle of educational foresight rather than compensatory aftercare by means of social welfare programmes. Without a clear grounding in a collective “us” – especially on a national level – political coalitions that challenge the alliance of interests benefiting older generations, which currently dominate the discourse, are unthinkable. In this regard, accomplishing the task of integrating the autochthonous population into a multi-ethnic social reality is vital for any progress towards equality of participation for migrants and their children. However, new types of communal relationships in majority groups will not necessarily lead to conflict-free dealings with migration, even though they are appropriate to a culturally heterogeneous society and function as a socio-moral basis for increased participation.

\(^7\) However, a populist version of this relationship says that in contrast with the “German” underclass, “Arabs and Turks” are not suited for this, as for example in Thilo Sarrazin’s polemic book (2010).
4. Inescapable Culturalisation

In this context, the “de-culturalisation” of the debate on integration as aspired to by the post-migration perspective would be a dangerous illusion. Especially because boundary formation between groups promotes competition for resources, status and power, the struggle for participation opportunities remains ubiquitous. Some approaches in inequality research emphasise that the competition for scarce resources in particular leads to the formation of boundaries between groups as a by-product of social closure, opportunity hoarding, exploitation and other mechanisms relating to inequality (Tilly 1998). The categorical inequalities produced by this process (Massey 2007) often take the form of dichotomies such as black/white, man/woman or migrant/non-migrant. As long as there is competition for valuable material and symbolic goods, processes of boundary formation follow cultural heterogeneities. We need to take into account that (cultural) differences alone do not necessarily imply social inequality or result in exclusionary processes of communal relationship formation. There are plenty of examples: such as that religious differences in Europe – for instance Protestantism and Catholicism as different Christian denominations – are no longer a basis for exclusion, social closure or exploitation; or that in recent times religion has become a characteristic of social segregation. The latter can be observed in the behaviour of dominant population groups in Western Europe towards “Muslim” immigrants (Foner/Alba 2008).

With regards to migrants, not only are aspects of the distribution of material resource relevant, that is differences and similarities between migrants and non-migrants in important life spheres, but also aspects of the perception and consequently the boundaries between categories, such as groups. Two patterns of social segregation are particularly important here: the shifting and the blurring of boundaries. In regards to Germany, data from the ALLBUS (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften, German General Social Survey) suggest that there were significant changes in the boundaries between migrant groups and the majority group (“German Germans”) between 1996 and 2006. Firstly, a boundary shift becomes apparent: the majority group has clearly acknowledged the belongingness of certain migrant groups (Italians, Spanish, Greeks). These groups are now considered to be part of the majority population. However, attitudes to some other categories have not changed and in some cases there has been an increase in (perceived) differences, for instance with respect to “Muslims”. Secondly, the blurring of boundaries with respect to certain categories can also be observed between 1996 and 2006, for instance in the majority population’s increasing support for the demand that people born in Germany should have the right to citizenship. Alongside other factors, social class determines how members of various ethnic groups are judged. Semi-experimental studies investigating recruitment behaviour in the job market show that discrimination is considerably rarer when the subject’s interaction partner is
regarded as an equal in terms of social status. Socioeconomic position and command of the
majority group’s language are strong predictors in these scenarios (Fincke 2009).

Social inequalities are addressed in papers on social segregation (for instance Wimmer
2008), but they are usually discussed as part of a particular characteristic of heterogeneity –
namely ethnicity – and are not distinguished from other characteristics that might offer a ba-
sis for inequality, but do not in themselves constitute inequality. Religion is an example of
this: while the different Christian denominations in Europe have acted as markers of social
class in the past centuries (see, for instance, the differences between Protestants and Ca-
tholics), in the early 21st century this is no longer the case. Nowadays in public debates as
well as in research, the cultural differences between Christians and Muslims are predomi-
nantly framed as signs of social differences along the lines of class and status.

This raises the question of whether and to what extent the culturalisation of the competition
for resources erodes the socio-moral foundations of the social state, for instance through the
recurrent claim that migrants are a burden on the welfare state since they are among the net
recipients. Does migration lead to a de-nationalisation of solidarity? This would be a histori-
cally new phenomenon insofar as welfare states are a historically new phenomenon of the
past 150 years. At first glance, it appears that for OECD countries there is a statistically signi-
ficant relationship between high ethnic heterogeneity – which is also promoted by internatio-
nal migration – and relatively low social security quotas (Alesina/Glaeser/Sacerdote 2001).
However, more comprehensive research shows that other factors contribute far more signifi-
cantly to social security quotas, for instance decentralisation and the type of welfare state
(Mau 2004). Furthermore, detailed empirical studies indicate that highly multicultural policies
do not lead to a loss of trust in the political system or to lower social security quotas (Kym-
llicka/Banting 2011). However, the potential for politicisation that exists due to the weak corre-
lation between support for the welfare state and proportion of “foreigners” cannot be over-
looked. The current monetary, fiscal and economic crisis provides fertile ground for wide
reaching populism that emphasises cultural difference – be it the Front National in France or
Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, just to name a few pertinent political examples.

5. Outlook

As we have tried to show, processes of communal relationship formation are ambivalent,
function as a socio-moral basis for wide-ranging social integration on a national level (for
instance resources for the welfare state, just participation for migrants and their children) and
are also elements of culturalisation or boundary formation along cultural lines. These dual
consequences, that is communal relationships as a basis for the welfare state and even de-
mocracy on one hand and the inescapable culturalisation of resource conflicts on the other, provide a fundamental starting point for substantial analyses, particularly with respect to the question of participation of migrants and non-migrants. Consensus and conflict over resources, recognition and power cannot be sufficiently understood without referring to the question of belonging with respect to migrants and non-migrants. This speaks against frivolously discarding the term integration in favour of participation.

We see the challenges for migration research elsewhere. Migration does indeed constitute a strategically important research area, which enables the observation of transformations in processes of communal and associative relationship formation. For instance we demonstrated how public debates on belongingness, especially through the example of citizenship, can be informative with respect to processes of communal relationship formation as a basis for processes of associative relationship formation. This is also valid for forms of participation in functional systems outside the political field, for instance in education, the economy, law and religion. Here it becomes clear, returning again to citizenship with the example of dual nationality, that a nation state as a frame of reference is eminently important, but not sufficient. Rather, the example of dual nationality is a genuinely transnational phenomenon encompassing inter-state and life-world elements. Hence, it is no surprise that there is an observable convergence between two trajectories of expectation in public debates on migration, namely between “a transnational trajectory of expectation looking towards the future and a nation state trajectory looking towards the past” (Rauer 2013, 80, own translation).

Newer research on citizenship raises the question to what extent the communal relationships in western nation states have ceased to run along the boundary between ethnic versus republican understandings of nation (Gerdes/Faist 2006). The de-legitimisation of the ethnicity argument does not necessarily cause the normative basis for citizenship in Germany to vanish, though this seems to be what the current participation discussion suggests. Rather, it can be interpreted as a sign of a change in which other integration norms come to the fore. This begs the question: which ones? In a manner similar to the way in which the spirit of capitalism must adapt to the current demands of the motivational and binding forces of capitalism (Boltanski/Chiapello 2005), the normative dimension of citizenship is also subject to change. A theory or empirical model reconstructing the change in the normative basis has not yet been developed, but some theoretical work is beginning to move in that direction, for instance work on “identity liberalism” (Tebble 2006). This shows how liberal western nation states turn democratically legitimisable integration into citizenship. The legitimate selection of immigrants thereby moves away from public, openly group-based discrimination towards an individual-based understanding of integration (Joppke 2005) with special recourse to human capital. The individual bears the full burden and responsibility for social cohesion. A good
society can be achieved through the productivity of the individual and their active willingness to integrate. The Blue Card Initiative (Soysal 2012) illustrate that this norm is predominantly represented by highly qualified immigrants. Joppke expresses this concisely: “The liberal state is only for liberal people” (2010, 140).

Our thesis therefore states that even in a liberal nation state that guarantees and ensures the rights and responsibilities of its citizens associative relationships depend on the symbolic imputation of community. This type of communal relationship has indeed fundamentally changed in Germany. The debates concerning the reform of citizenship law in the year 2000 illustrate this pertinently. In these debates an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation was relinquished in favour of one that is informed by republicanism but extends the communitarianism found in republicanism with individualisation demands. Neither the cultural integration debate nor the current discussion on participation are capable of capturing this type of change.

On the contrary, the discussion on participation has the unintended consequence of promoting change. Demands for participation contain anti-discriminatory expectations, which must themselves search for legitimate forms of exclusion, because communities need boundaries. The self-sufficient individual drives communal relationships, whereby new processes of selection and exclusion are set into motion.

This change carries risks for boundary formation and the construction of national identity. One aspect of the fluctuating boundaries of national identity is the generalisation of values, which refers to an increased attention to norms such as “liberal values”. The abstraction level of norms is becoming higher and higher. The more differentiated a society is, the more abstract are the norms of integration. Currently, the most abstract level of the generalisation of values is constituted by human rights. While public debates on political membership focus on liberal values, debates on religion – particularly those pertaining to migrants’ organisations – use arguments that emphasise religious freedom as a human right. Similar arguments are found in international law, for instance the right to citizenship as a human right. If we cannot shake the thought that in some respects there is a progressive generalisation of values which does not necessarily proceed in a linear fashion but is very bumpy and potentially reversible (Moyn 2010), this would have far reaching consequences for the determination of national identity. If the process of the generalisation of values and the ensuing extension of the boundaries of the concept of nation are taken for granted, the process of boundary formation becomes nigh impossible without finding new dividing lines beyond human rights.

A more further reaching and fundamental question is posed by processes of associative and communal relationship formation beyond the frame of the nation state, namely of how parti-
icipation is determined for those who are outside the orbit of belongingness through citizenship, but who cannot be excluded through social closure. After all, as a result of globalisation processes within societies in nation states the “other” is always already one of “us”. An interesting question is how far the valence of equality norms reaches beyond state borders. For one thing, it is certain that projections of equality are not, in principle, limited to the constraints of the nation state and do not have to appear in the form of equal citizenship or human rights. They can also refer to different aspects, for instance shedding light on circumstance in countries of origin. Amongst other factors, inequalities in living conditions between different countries form the backdrop to migration. At the same time, norms of equality can tell us which inequalities are legitimate within a community of solidarity and which ones are legitimate outside of it. Citizenship is one of the most important mechanisms for legitimising equality amongst citizens as well as inequalities with respect to “others”.
References


Bota, Alice / Khuê, Pham / Özlem, Topçu (2013) „Neue Deutsche“. In: Özkan Ezli (Hg.): *Das neue Deutschland. Von Migration und Vielfalt*. Konstanz, 154–156.


Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (Hg.) (1997) *Was hält die Gesellschaft zusammen?* Frankfurt am Main.


