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Magdalena Bayer
Doing Both Class and Culture?
Multiculturalism in Light of the Transnational Social Question

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Abstract

What is the role of multiculturalism in the incorporation of immigrants in contemporary Western societies in the face of both market liberalization and (right-wing and) anti-immigrant populism? In order to answer this question, this analysis sketches the emergence of politics around culture in general and multiculturalism more specifically. It also outlines the triad of master processes driving the politics around multiculturalism. This triad consists of market liberalization, securitization and the rights revolution—with oppositions between market liberalization vs. social rights in the economic realm and securitization vs. multicultural rights in the cultural realm. Given this background, the analysis proceeds in greater detail to discuss the antinomies between securitization and cultural rights. The analysis develops a typology of migrants as ‘wanted’ (economically) and/or ‘welcome’ (culturally), which leads to four modes of immigrant inequalities and insertion: incorporation, discrimination, tolerance and exclusion. The analysis concludes with reflections on the increasing significance of cultural and status politics without, however, implying the disappearance of class politics. The two are rather intertwined in that doing class co-structures the ways of doing culture.

Keywords: Multiculturalism; nation; market liberalization; human rights; securitization

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“Supposing that what is at any rate believed to be the 'truth' really is true, and the meaning of all culture is the reduction of the beast of prey 'man' to a tame and civilized animal, a domestic animal, then one would undoubtedly have to regard all those instincts of reaction and ressentiment through whose aid the noble races and their ideals were finally confounded and overthrown as the actual instruments of culture; which is not to say that the bearers of these instincts themselves represent culture. Rather is the reverse not merely probable—no! today it is palpable! These bearers of the oppressive instincts that thirst for reprisal, the descendants of every kind of European and non-European slavery, and especially of the entire pre-Aryan populace—they represent the regression of mankind! These 'instruments of culture' are a disgrace to man and rather an accusation and counterargument against 'culture' in general!” — Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, 42

1. Introduction

For decades, the assimilation perspective has reigned supreme in immigration research on countries in Europe, North America and Australia. Beginning in the 1980s, however, in parallel with the decline of class politics, a new form of status politics has entered the domain of immigration policy and research: multiculturalism. In other words, the politics of similarity favoured by assimilation has been replaced or at least complemented by a politics of difference advanced by multiculturalist thinking. Multiculturalism is characterized by two central thoughts. First, rights to one’s own culture are part of what has been called the rights revolution in that it is a legal expression of individualization as well as of the rights of minority groups as such to live and preserve their own culture. Group rights in particular, such as authoritative collective representation of a group in the public sphere, have been politically contentious, such as representation of the traditions, culture and religion of immigrant categories in curricula and state institutions; immigrant group interests represented in elective councils, advisory bodies or corporatist arrangements; special representation rights in public organisations such as political parties; representation of immigrants in state institutions such as the police. Second, multiculturalism has been essentially a national paradigm. It claims that the recognition of cultural identities of immigrants would contribute to national cohesion and unity by bequeathing recognition upon group cultures (see also Kivisto 2002 for a comparative overview of multicultural policies).

In this light, multiculturalism is both a politics of culture and a politics of status in Max Weber’s sense. Cultural heterogeneities seem to have replaced class as the major axes around which the politics of inequalities – and thus also immigrant incorporation – revolve (on mod-
els of incorporation, see Morawska 2009). This implies the increasing political salience of heterogeneities such as ethnicity, religion, nationalism, gender and sexual orientation (Hechter 2004) in the politics of immigrant incorporation. In Western Europe, cultural heterogeneities have been increasingly at the center of public debate on migration, inequalities and integration. Religion in particular, and cultural heterogeneities in general, make for an ideal focus for meta-issue politics (Faist and Ulbricht 2015). This means that not all ‘others’ are perceived in the same way.

Multiculturalism has thus figured in the debates and conflicts around the importance of heterogeneities in two ways. First, cultural heterogeneities seem to occupy a more prominent place than class in debates on immigrant incorporation – a sort of real-world cultural turn. Nonetheless, the relationship between class and culture needs to be analysed more closely because they may not be mutually exclusive modes. For example, market liberalization – which sees migrants mainly as human capital – has led to a stronger divide between high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants. But it is above all low-skilled migrants whose fit for cultural incorporation has been cast in doubt by anti-immigrant voices. Second, while multiculturalism can be interpreted as part of the (individual) “rights revolution” (Sunstein 1993; see also Moyn 2010), with an extension to group rights, it is counteracted by politics striving for cultural homogeneity on the national level, expressed by the politics of securitization, including anti-immigrant populism. These tendencies conceive of migrants as a threat to physical, ontological and social security. Securitization can be defined by bureaucratic decisions and practices that create a sense of insecurity and unease. It is “an attempt at insecuritization of daily life by the security professionals and an increase in the strengths of police potential for action” (Bigo 2001: 111).

The question posed here is: What is the role of multiculturalism in the incorporation of immigrants in contemporary Western societies in the face of both market liberalization and (right-wing and) anti-immigrant populism? In other words, given the three master processes or immigration triad of market liberalization, securitization and the human rights revolution, how are migrants cast as bearers of rights, and of cultural rights in particular?

The claim put forward is that this triad, namely the perspectives and policies regarding migrants as human capital and the perception of migrants as a severe threat to security on the one hand, and the insistence that migrants are bearers of (human) rights as social but above all as cultural rights on the other hand, is driving the politics of inequalities and thus integration in immigration states. The role played by individual rights, interestingly enough, is ambiguous: the rights revolution drives marketization and at the same time often serves as a counter-movement against securitization. This is relevant because not all multicultural rights are collective; some are also individual. It should be clear that the perception of migrants –
individually or collectively – as bearers of human capital or as a threat is a social construction, as are the view that migrants are bearers of human rights and the multicultural responses to this view. Within this social construction, one might ask how immigrants achieve the status of “things,” of realities relevant for the perception and politics of inequalities. The crucial conundrum concerns the mechanisms in politics by which these social constructions work to categorize groups and (re)produce inequalities in the context of incorporation. Social and cultural rights differ: While most policies of multiculturalism require state intervention, they do not depend heavily on redistribution via tax resources (income redistribution)—affirmative action being but one example.

The two aspects of class and culture are intricately related in that there are always two sides to immigrant integration, namely an economic one (wanted) and a socio-cultural one (welcome). Integration or incorporation of immigrants is only one option (wanted and welcome), the others are: discrimination (wanted but not welcome); toleration (not wanted but somehow welcome); and segregation (neither wanted nor welcome). Multiculturalism concerns the ‘welcome’ aspect of adaptation, yet cannot be analyzed independently of the ‘wanted’ aspect; the latter is deeply political-economic and sets certain parameters for the politics around multiculturalism. In other words, in order to gauge the politics of multiculturalism and their impact on incorporation, we need to take a broad view, looking not only at cultural heterogeneities, such as ethnicity or religion but also at fundamental political-economic changes, from the perspective of Karl Polanyi (2001) who considered human life as a “fictitious commodity.”

These issues are part of the social question, namely the perception of inequalities as being unfair and unjust. The social question concerns not just rising inequalities within Western capitalist democracies but also the contentious politics around them. Cross-border migration is also a transnational (i.e. cross-border) social question. In a reversal from the late 19th century, it seems that it is not class that primarily determines one’s position in the global income hierarchy but place of birth or residence. Therefore, given the change from class (understood in the Marxian sense as owners of the means of production vs. workers) to location as a prime determinant of income, migration appears to be a rational response to the spatial asymmetry of (income) inequalities (Milanovic 2011). It is a prime example of how exit – cross-border migration – constitutes one of four major ways to address global inequalities, the other three being investment in human capital, economic growth and welfare state institutions. Cross-border or international migration is central to the transnational social question because it seems, at first sight, that exit trumps voice. However, voice is present as part of the migration process (Pedraza 2013), often at a later stage.
The first part of this article sketches the emergence of politics around culture in general and multiculturalism more specifically. It also outlines the triad of master processes driving the politics around multiculturalism. This triad consists of market liberalization, securitization and the rights revolution, with oppositions between market liberalization vs. social rights in the economic realm and securitization vs. multicultural rights in the cultural realm. The second part then discusses in greater detail the antinomies between securitization and cultural rights. The analysis develops a typology of migrants as 'wanted' (economically) and/or 'welcome' (culturally), which leads to four modes of immigrant inequalities and insertion: incorporation, discrimination, tolerance and exclusion. The analysis concludes with reflections on the increasing significance of cultural and status politics without implying the disappearance of class politics. The two are rather intertwined in that doing class pre-structures the ways of doing culture.

2. The Transnational Social Question and Multiculturalism as Status Politics

Since the mid-20th century, there seems to have been a rise in political conflict between groups defined on the basis of status (Stände), that is, religion, ethnicity, nationalism, gender or sexual orientation. Nonetheless, it would be shortsighted to speak of (doing) class simply being substituted by (doing) culture. It is rather the interaction between the two or perhaps even their intersection that matters. The relative waning of class politics (understood as the politics around the ability to dispose differentially of various forms of capital – financial, cultural, social; see Van Hear 2014) has not meant a decline in political contention. Rather, there appears to have been a rise in political conflict between groups defined on the basis of status (e.g., Hechter 2004). This development is also reflected in the case of cross-border migration: The politicized heterogeneities involved have been changing over time, as expressed in the changing semantics around immigrants. In Europe, they went from ‘worker’ (class) in the 1960s to ‘nationality’ (in its double meaning as a legal aspect of citizenship but also culture) in the 1980s, and further to ‘religion’ (culture) from the late 1990s onward. From the vantage point of the dominant societal groups (‘us’), not all ‘others’ are perceived in the same way. Here, the notion of ‘significant other’ is relevant (Mead 1967). We can identify two classes of ‘generalised’ others who act as interpretative points for the self – immediate groups, which are more threatening to self-identity, and abstract social classes or subgroups. The former category is often signified by cultural characteristics with respect to which boundaries are drawn, e.g. certain kinds of immigrants, such as Muslims (religion) in Europe or
Mexicans (language) in the United States (Zolberg and Woon 1999). Nonetheless, it is important to consider the intersectional component of class and culture, and more specifically the confluence of market liberalization and securitization. For immigrants from certain countries of origin (North Africa, Turkey) there is an overlap of socio-economic disadvantage with religion (Islam), although not all immigrants from the Middle East fall into the category of low-skilled or disadvantaged. Status politics rests on the same foundations as class politics, that is, the (near) impermeability of boundaries (Wimmer 2013), the organizational capacity of cultural groups and the salience of cultural consciousness. All three factors are part of multicultural politics. Relevant boundaries of status in Western immigration nowadays most often run along ethnicity and religion.

The context in which this shift from class to status politics has occurred has been propitious for boundary politics along cultural heterogeneities, such as religion and language. The key economic shift since the 1970s has been the subjection of all forms of production to criteria of rationality and profitability, through the abolition of national regulatory mechanisms such as quotas, tariffs, labour practices, national ownership rules and the opening to global competition in investment and trade. A national “competition state” has emerged (Cerny 1997). This tendency, which intensifies capital accumulation, is sometimes called neoliberalism, whose outcome have been policies and ideological tenets aimed at reducing state expenditures and state regulation more generally, and decreasing overall market regulation, e.g. by privatization of traffic, communication, energy, etc. sectors, and infrastructure as a whole. A common feature with respect to cross-border traffic has been the growing demand for docile and sometimes cheaper migrant labour, combined with the construction of a subordinate status for migrant workers to ensure that they take jobs rejected by nationals of the destination countries. For those industries not relocating abroad this in turn has increased the demand for labour migration. Services, construction and agriculture are among the sectors affected.

More recently, key aspects of a seminal transformation have been the loss of state legitimacy, protectionist tendencies in the wake of the post-2007 economic crisis and increasing income inequalities and unequal life chances. It seems that there is no ‘left’ alternative; only the populist right offers simple answers to issues such as economic protection and cultural homogeneity. This development is not a short-term tendency but a longer-term development dating to the 1970s, since the “golden years” of the Keynesian welfare state are over and since hegemonic wars have proved detrimental to those instigating them (Wallerstein et al. 2013). It is within these developments of late capitalism that market liberalization and securitization but also the rights revolution have emerged as drivers of the integration not only of immigrants but political units overall.
These changes have been politically relevant for discourses and contention around (im)migration. In an era of low economic growth in the West (below global GDP growth rates, and much below those of BRIC countries such as China and India), Europe, in particular, has seen an expansion of austerity politics. One of the politically relevant factors contributing to discontent among voters has been the perception that politics and politicians are too weak to direct economic life – very much unlike the Keynesian era. This insight can also be applied to immigration as a complex political arena. The main element is simplification: Migration is constituted as an overarching meta-issue related to the “illth” (Ruskin 1921) – as opposed to the wealth – of capitalism, for example in unemployment, housing scarcities, but also threats to non-material goods, such as (national) identity, whose homogeneity is perceived to be endangered by increasing cultural heterogeneities in the wake of immigration (Faist 1994; see also Edelman 1964).

In order to proceed with an analysis of class-based and culture-based politics of incorporation, we can distinguish the master social processes in the economic and cultural realms (Figure 1). In the economic realm, a tension exists between market liberalization via a flexible workforce on the one hand, vs. (de-)commodification via social rights on the other hand. In essence, this means the juxtaposition of migrants as human capital vs. migrants as rights bearers. In terms of the state, we could say that it is the competition state of market or economic liberalism vs. the (national) welfare state which is predicated on social rights for its members. Social rights in the welfare state are nowadays often conceived of as human rights. For example, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conceives of labour and social rights as human rights (Kott and Droux 2013). Many social rights are available not only to citizens but also to long-term residents with a secure residence status (for more fine-grained distinctions, see, e.g., Sainsbury 2006). These rights serve to favour de-commodification (income independent from labour) but above all favour regulated commodification, that is, work is regulated and immigrant workers tend to have access to (certain) social rights. This development has been part of the rights revolution. Market liberalization and individual (social) rights go together to a certain degree. For example, anti-discrimination policies help to mobilize what economists have called human capital of individuals belonging to groups, such as women and racialized minorities, excluded until a couple of decades ago from certain segments of the formal labour market. The issue raised by cross-border migration is that social rights as human rights limit profit-seeking capital and – crucial for the transnational social question - are applicable not just to citizens but also to non-citizen residents. The latter are often able to access some or many social rights. In sum, individual rights go along with market liberalization in that they strengthen the autonomy of the individual worker with respect to discrimination. Yet market liberalization also challenges human rights, for
example, when migrants work in substandard conditions (e.g. 3D jobs: dirty, dangerous, difficult jobs, and precarious positions; see also Standing 2011: chapter 4).

As to the second realm, the cultural, it is the tension between securitization vs. multiculturalism and diversity policies which looms large. This is not about social but cultural rights: In other words, migrants are perceived either as a threat in the frames of securitization, or, from a multicultural point of view, as a beacon of diversity, sometimes even with the potential to revitalize ageing and culturally homogeneous societies. The master process of securitization refers, first, to issues of external and internal security (borders) and, second, to the welfare state. One of the results of closure toward the outside world and exclusion of non-members is thus called 'welfare chauvinism.' The perception of migration as a threat is often based on the assumption that of ethnoc-national homogeneity is a worthwhile goal. One of the most important contemporary expressions of such culturalization, including racialization, in Europe has been right-wing xenophobic populism. Anti-immigration feelings among the dominant population’s electorates have been fostered and exploited by parties mobilising tensions related to growing inequalities. Overall, populism is related not only to migration but also to economic depression and the loss of state legitimacy. In this frame, populist parties exploit xenophobic sentiments. They also favour other nationalist-protectionist policies, such as reintroduction of national currency (Kriesi et al. 2006).

Figure 1 Social Categorizations in the Economic and Cultural Realms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Master Processes</th>
<th>Political Realm</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic (wanted)</strong></td>
<td>Market liberalization: <em>migrants as human capital</em></td>
<td>(De-)Commodification via social rights: <em>migrants as rights bearers</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition state</td>
<td>Welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural (welcome)</strong></td>
<td>Securitization: <em>migrants as a risk or even threat</em></td>
<td>Multiculturalism via cultural rights: <em>migrants as a beacon of pluralism (cf. diversity management)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial state: external and internal security; welfare state: &amp; cultural homogeneity</td>
<td>Plural-democratic state</td>
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</table>

Multiculturalism can be seen as a set of policies to which securitization responded but also as a set of policies which partly counteracts securitization. Multiculturalism, which developed
as a consequence of policies originally directed at racialised minorities and national minorities (e.g. Australia and Canada, Kymlicka 1995), is based on the idea that cultural rights give immigrant minorities a chance to compete on equal terms, assuming that cultural rights are a sign of group recognition. Populist responses to multiculturalism include, among other things, allegations that rights to religious self-organization and representation in the public sphere would ultimately end up with Islam soon dominating the European scene. One of its latest expressions has been the PEGIDA movement in Germany: “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident.” Nonetheless, multicultural demands also counteract populist rhetoric by inducing governments to negotiate and, perhaps even more to the point, disciplining Islamic organizations so that they fit into the religious registrar of nationally specific arrangements between religious communities and state institutions – as happened in France, Sweden or Germany (see also O’Brien 2016).

The two sets of processes, namely market liberalization and securitization, are intricately interrelated. While the former provides for class-based distinctions, the latter, in its various guises, works to exclude certain categories based on control of borders, and to culturalize certain class segments in the case of migration – who are then perceived as a threat to resources and identities. Here, the focus is on the second aspect of securitization, namely culturalization. Often, though not exclusively, it has been the lower-class segments among immigrants which have been culturalized since the 1970s, e.g. it is claimed that they do not integrate and are still ‘backward’ (e.g., on sexuality and Islam, see Mepschen et al. 2010). This should not be taken to mean that only low-class migrants are culturalized. Just take, for example, German migrants in Switzerland, most of whom would be classified as high-skilled. In this case, it is ethnicity viz. nationality (Germanness) which is perceived as threatening.

In sum, market liberalization serves as a basis for class distinctions, or at least reinforces them, while securitization plays upon class distinctions in the effort to culturalize them. Over the past few decades, the grounds for legitimation of inequalities have shifted. It is not outright racism which takes ascriptive traits as a point of departure – though that process continues – but also the alleged cultural dispositions of immigrants or the lack thereof. An important trope is that migrants are not liberal, i.e. allegedly do not master the tenets of modernity (Triadafilopoulos et al. 2011).

Given this background, it is possible that market liberalization has also contributed to the decline of a rights-based approach and the rise of a resource-based approach. With specific regard to multiculturalism, we have seen a shift in policies from group rights to individual resources which can be tapped for enterprises, especially in the private sector. What is called ‘diversity management’ is essentially a move from rights for collectives and individuals to
corporate policies aimed at mustering what were previously considered individual, private resources, such as language competencies and cultural insider knowledge of the country of origin. In this way, multiculturalism is pushed back by “liberal nationalism” (Levey 2001). Incidentally, this has had implications for the transnational realm as well. For example, the World Bank has for years propagated a resource-based approach to link migration to development in casting migrants as development agents of their countries of origin through financial remittances (Faist 2010).

Market liberalization and securitization are also linked to countervailing processes through the concept of rights. In the economic realm, it is above all social rights which act as a corrective to excessive commodification of labour, providing for redistribution and regulation. The idea of rights is also present in the cultural realm, providing for recognition: Cultural rights are meant to provide recognition to groups hitherto excluded from public life, especially but not only in the political arena. The master processes of market liberalization and securitization on the one hand and the rights revolution on the other hand are connected to different strands of statehood. The first set of master processes connects market liberalization to the competition state and welfare state; the second set of master processes of securitization to the territorial state and to the (culturally) pluralist and democratic state (Figure 1).

This triad of interlocking master processes provides for a political dynamic which is driving the politics of inequalities and incorporation. A rights-based perspective constantly pushes norms of equality to the forefront with respect to inequalities arising from commodification and social protection, but also political participation and non-recognition; hence the perpetual politicization of perceived inequalities in immigration contexts. The perspective matters: Whereas norms of equality derived from human rights are mainly mustered by those supporting the cause of migrants, those who fear migrants as competitors and unwelcome intruders seek to uphold citizenship rights exclusively for the dominant national group.

In this triad, it is the national welfare state which plays an inherently ambiguous role. On the one hand, it is a corrective to market liberalization – and sometimes, perhaps, in opposition to it – by enabling citizens and (permanent) resident migrants through provision of a modicum of social rights. On the other hand, it is an institution which is exclusive vis-à-vis migrants from a national point of view: only full members have all rights. Furthermore, migration restrictions and limitations on rights for migrants are sometimes legitimised with the idea that meaningful redistribution and regulation of social provisions can only occur in a nationally bounded unit and not across the whole world (see also Walzer 1983: 65). The welfare state thus embodies the national state principle, ensuring equalities among citizens in bounded political communities but also upholding fundamental inequalities between citizens and non-
citizens, especially those abroad, and, to a certain extent, also non-citizens in the territory of the national welfare state.

Here, the assumption is that the master processes of market liberalization, securitization and mobilization of social and cultural rights as human rights, which have affected all countries in Europe and North America (and beyond), are dealt with in nationally specific ways, signaling a trend toward both liberalized access and more strongly enforced incorporation policies. The latter are also accompanied by strong forms of culturalization toward certain immigrant categories. Since the master processes refer to both exclusionary and inclusionary societal processes, for both migrants and non-migrants in immigration countries, it is necessary to detail the mechanisms and practices associated with the triad (Figure 2). These mechanisms and practices are discussed in the following section with respect to securitization on the one hand and multiculturalism on the other. This analysis is predicated on the finding that class and culture are closely connected—for example, by class influencing which groups are seen as a threat and are hence culturalized (Faist 2014). For example, there is evidence to suggest that high-skilled migrants are not seen as being in need of incorporation. They are accorded attributes such as modernity and individual autonomy. This stands in contrast to certain categories of low-skilled migrants who are considered backward and in need of modernization (Faist 2013).

**Figure 2 Exclusionary and Inclusionary Processes: Mechanisms and Practices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Mechanisms (Examples)</th>
<th>Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market liberalization (want-ed) → individualization – competition state vs. de-commodification – social rights, welfare state</td>
<td>Ranking &amp; hierarchies, exploitation vs. equal human (social) rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securitization (welcome) → Culturalization - welfare state vs. multiculturalism → cultural rights</td>
<td>Ascription / social closure; claims-making vs. cultural recognition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Securitization: Migration as a Threat – Doing Monolithic Culture

While market liberalization runs the risk of consolidating or even augmenting social inequalities through uneven outcomes with respect to financial, human and social capital, securitization rests on different foundations. Securitization is a discursive move to construct an intersubjective understanding that holds something as an existential threat and calls for exceptional measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization refers to the overall process of turning a policy issue such as drug trafficking or international migration into a security issue. The term concerns a perception of a threat to the ability of a nationally bound society to maintain and reproduce itself. Threats perceived in the context of immigration may be physical and material – such as job competition with migrants – but also identity-based – such as the fear of ‘overforeignization’ by distant cultures.

What is driving the contention around cultural heterogeneity and places it at the forefront of the politics of immigration is the antinomy of difference in multiculturalism on the one hand and of similarity or even sameness in securitization on the other. It is important to note that this antinomy goes much beyond the idea of similarity in assimilation in that securitization easily turns into xenophobia.

Historically, national states have used immigration as a tool in fostering a particular national identity (Zolberg 2006), and incorporation policies and debates have served to answer the question ‘who are we?’ This part of migration politics is mainly based on ascriptive heterogeneities. Securitization has emerged in the field of international relations and international politics, which, even before 9/11, has begun to highlight more fundamental concerns about ‘new’ security issues. Such issues comprise very different phenomena ranging from international terrorism or ethno-national strife to environmental degradation, food and energy scarcities, drug trafficking, population growth, illegal migration, and organized crime to “disintegration” or “non-integration” of immigrants. All of these are discussed as having a transnational aspect. It is thus not surprising that the post-Cold War period has seen efforts to view international migration not only as an important regional and geo-strategic dynamic with potentially crucial effects upon states and their security but also as a threat to the very fabric of national societies, namely national identity. Consider the increasing securitization of citizenship (Macklin 2014) and public concern about the compatibility of Muslim immigrants with liberal values post-9/11 (Foner and Simon 2015). Media and political discourse give rise to different perceptions of society, which divide people in dominant or non-dominant categories. One of the results is the emergence of conceptions and stereotypes of migrant groups conforming to or violating values – seeing certain groups, for example, as criminal, promiscuous or lazy (Staerklé 2009).
The categorizations relevant for the social question inherent in securitization can be distinguished in two ways, first, with respect to border security and, second, with respect to challenges internal to the welfare state. The first aspect concerns security in the classical form of national security. The territorially organized nation-state treats migrants, especially in the context of admission, as objects of strict application of standards of security. This goes as far as advancing the limits of control internally as well as externally for embassies and consulates outside the nation-state territory, the latter constituting a sort of “remote control” (Zolberg 2006: 11). The second set of processes revolves around individual worth and collective social security. It concerns the complex interplay of two essential questions for national welfare states, namely ‘who should benefit?’ and ‘who are we?.’ The two questions are intricately related in that norms of reciprocity and solidarity in welfare states essentially depend upon who is included in the collective ‘we’ (Faist 1995). It is often cast as a matter of redistribution although the welfare state is largely paid for by the middle class, which is at the same time its main beneficiary (Wilensky 1974). Therefore, it matters very much who is counted to be among ‘us,’ the welfare collective. And there is mounting evidence that the non-material identity threat is especially resonant with disenchanted middle-class voters (e.g., Geiges et al. 2015). There is a strong link between membership and a sense of belonging and access to rights, a link exploited by right-wing and extremist parties to win over middle class voters. Yet this sort of boundary construction is by no means limited to right-wing populist parties. For example, after 9/11, many countries started to implement more assimilatory elements like language and citizenship tests, integration courses and citizenship ceremonies (Vink 2012).

Increasing securitization of migration and, above all, the emergence of populist politics has resulted in a cultural politics of homogenizing groups as ethnic or national groups, both migrants and so-called natives. This is the necessary condition for migration to serve as a meta-issue, which links all sorts of socio-economic and political ills, for example, unemployment, housing shortages and terrorism, to cross-border movement. Populism’s meta-issue promotion is mainly aimed at eroding the trust of citizens in the political elite and renewing a sense of national homogeneity. It is also closely connected to the rights revolution in that populism is a response to the transformation of the welfare state – We find, for example, increasing welfare chauvinism and xenophobia across Europe (Minkenberg 2000). This kind of populist politics is the ideal vehicle for meta-issues because it constitutes an anti-system and anti-elite movement with a plebiscitarian bent (Mény and Surel 2002). Typical issues raised in populist politics include taxes, crime, social justice, migration – and the intersection of all of these constitutes migration as a meta-issue. All of this means a re-nationalization of the welfare state, and the constitution of national belonging and homogeneity as a non-divisible
good. And it is through the cultural-populist politics of migration that boundaries are estab-
lished along ethnicity and religion as, for example, in the case of Turks and Muslims; and
have blurred, for instance, in the case of Spaniards and Italians in Germany over the past 40
years (Faist 2010).

It would be premature to reduce populist politics to anti-immigration. Nonetheless, cross-
border migration is an ideal field. Populism brings together the dimensions of doing class and
doing culture. It not only promises to reduce or even terminate immigration but also to restore
the welfare state to the deserving citizens. It is part of a comprehensive movement aiming to
re-nationalize the national (welfare) state. In other words, its appeal is also based on the idea
that national homogeneity is a public good which would be diluted by ethnic and cultural plu-
ralism. Notions of plurality and multiculturalism are seen as typical elite phenomena (Hilson
2008). The principal origin of contention and conflicts is the perception that the ‘other’ is not
part of the ‘us’ as a ‘community of solidarity’ upon which national welfare states are built.
Welfare state redistribution then becomes a game of ‘us’ vs. ‘them.’

To shed light on the consequences of the politics around cultural diversity and homogeneity,
it is helpful to look at the desirability of certain immigrant groups for economic purposes
(‘wanted’) and their acceptance as socio-cultural actors (‘welcome’). In other words, the eco-
nomic field is oriented along criteria of desirability for market processes, whereas the cultural
field divides along criteria of belonging. This distinction goes back to Aristide Zolberg who
observed that guestworkers in 1960s Europe were “wanted but not welcome” (Zolberg 1987).
In this way we arrive at the following table which gives four options: incorporation, discrimina-
tion, exclusion and tolerance (Figure 3).

Figure 3 The Social Question: wanted and/or welcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wanted (economic demand)</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welcome (socio-cultural recognition)</td>
<td>Incorporation (1) (e.g. high skilled, “modern” labour migrants) → Full social protection</td>
<td>Tolerance (4) (e.g. “deserving” asylum seekers) → Basic social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Discrimination (2) (e.g. “backward” labour migrants in Europe) → Full social protection</td>
<td>Exclusion (3) (e.g. “undeserving” irregular migrants &amp; asylum seekers) → Emergency social protection; mostly informal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among the ‘wanted,’ there is the distinction between one category which is welcome and the other which is not. Both categories enjoy more or less full social protection in the respective welfare states. Those who are wanted and welcome around Europe and North America currently fall into the category of incorporation (1), that is, the expectation by the majority society is that people in this category adapt to the immigration country without any problems. Among them are currently the so-called high skilled.

Those often called labour migrants are wanted but not necessarily welcome. They are exposed to discrimination in the cultural realm (2). Interestingly, in this category, low status with respect to social class and cultural discrimination sometimes go together, as in the case of the descendants of those classified as the children of former guestworkers of Muslim background. They are those whose labour at some time was in demand but whose fit for full membership has been in doubt. Many of the issues around culture are projected upon people and groups in this category.

The distinction between (1) and (2) is not only class-based but exposes the double standards applied by groups in the majority population to immigrants. This becomes obvious when we seek to answer the question: Who is the perfectly integrated German/French/British/Dutch etc. citizen? Following Umberto Eco (2000), the integrated or incorporated person is the conformist – and not the one who exclusively cherishes national ideals. In a transnational age, the most perfectly integrated person may be the one who attends yoga classes in the morning, orders sushi for lunch and watches US-American TV series at night. This is also why parents in many a European country make sure that their children learn English as early as possible, beginning even in kindergarten. Certainly, they do not rely solely on knowledge of the ‘national’ language. Yet these are exactly the categories of persons who demand of the children of immigrants to take the respective immigration country’s language, values and traditions very seriously. Whoever presupposes deep knowledge of Dante Alighieri, Thomas Mann and James Joyce excludes all those who are more versed in the Qur’an or the Upanishads.

There is also the category of those who are neither wanted economically nor welcome culturally; this category is exclusion (3). Among these we find the irregular migrants who do not have legally sanctioned access to the institutions of the civil and the welfare state, and where access, such as emergency hospital treatment, carries the risk of expulsion. The last category is usually not wanted for economic reasons but is nonetheless sometimes welcome. The case is thus one of toleration (4). An example of a group in this category would be asylum
seekers whose claims are seen as legitimate—refugees from war-torn regions such as Syria and Iraq in some European countries in 2015 as opposed those originating from Afghanistan. The latter’s chances to be recognized as legitimate refugees were much lower. Categories 2 (discrimination) and 3 (exclusion) are usually portrayed as constituting a severe social problem of sorts.

The categorizations just painted in broad strokes reflect the social mechanisms which are at work: incorporation, discrimination, exclusion and tolerance. The boundaries along such categories are not necessarily impermeable when seen in a longer-term perspective. The blurring of racial, ethnic and religious boundaries is enforced by a human rights discourse that stigmatizes group-level exclusion, but implicitly may sanction individual-level exclusion based on criteria such as language and human capital. For example, the selection of immigrants is not based nowadays on obvious cultural criteria, such as ethnicity, as in the ethnic quotas of US immigration legislation from the 1920s to the 1960s. Nonetheless, those making dualistic distinctions tend to engage in generalizations, so that heterogeneities like human capital are ascribed to groups. In a nutshell, instead of past exclusion based on ethnic origin (Joppke 2005), contemporary practices have come to focus much more on economic competitiveness and cultural modernity.

4. Struggling for Equalities through Multiculturalism – Doing Culture in the Plural

Inequalities and equalities need to be seen in tandem. Multicultural claims-making and corresponding public policies have been part of the rights revolution, although they sometimes date back much earlier — to take an example, the special rights afforded to national minorities such as Danes and Sorbs in Germany, the Sami in Finland, Norway and Sweden, or Germans in Denmark. Multicultural policies include such matters as official affirmation of multiculturalism, multicultural content in school curricula, exemptions from dress codes, tolerance of dual citizenship, funding of immigrant organizations, support of bilingual and mother-tongue instruction and affirmative action for immigrant groups. One of the most contested fields and a prime arena of multiculturalism with respect to migration in Europe has been religion. It has been in this field that claims-making by migrant associations and the responses by the dominant groups have been most visible and contentious. The rights revolution has clearly gone beyond the classic triad of civil, political and social rights and is part of the debates around cultural recognition, including rights for groups and thus their recognition with respect to cultural differences. There is what one could call a multicultural puzzle: Despite
the public perception of a backlash and retreat from immigrant multiculturalism, multicultural policies, by and large, have not receded in Europe across the board but have persisted and, in many cases, continue to expand (Banting and Kymlicka 2012; Bloemraad 2011).

There is initial evidence that multicultural policies favour more equal participation of migrants in immigration states. This is an important finding because this enabling function of multicultural policies may improve the socio-economic position of the categories covered by such policies, mostly national minorities and indigenous people, but also, by extension, immigrant minorities (Bloemraad 2011). Empirical evidence comes from the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP). The MCP measures public recognition of and support for immigrant categories in the respective immigration countries. The measures include: official affirmation of multiculturalism, multicultural content in school curricula, exemptions from dress codes, toleration of dual citizenship, funding of immigrant organizations, support of bilingual and mother-tongue instruction, and the existence of an affirmative action policy for immigrant groups (see also British Council 2005). Note that the MCP thus does not focus on group rights but on individual rights and support of migrant organizations. In the first decade of the 21st century, the highest overall scores on the MCP were achieved by Canada, Sweden and Australia, while the lowest were recorded in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland (Trolly 2011). Zeroing in on political participation, it stands to reason that rank in the MCP makes a difference (see also Winter 2010). For example, the percentage of working-age immigrants living in the country for at least ten years that had adopted citizenship in 2007 amounted to 89% in Canada vs. 37% in Germany and 35% in Switzerland. This finding suggests that full political incorporation in the political system differs vastly, most probably with differential chances to participate in electoral politics. Also, when considering less conventional forms of political participation, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, etc., immigrant-origin categories in countries with higher MCP scores are more likely to engage in non-violent political activities than those in more officially mono-cultural societies. All of this is to suggest that multicultural policies, despite their obvious drawbacks such as the ossification of migrant cultures or limits to freedom of expression within groups that benefit (Barry 2001), can fulfill some sort of enabling functions which are conducive to claims-making with respect to both social and cultural rights.

Multicultural politics also makes a difference for protests which were historically often class-based but nowadays occur along ethnic lines (see also Bassel 2014). When it comes to mobilization of irregular migrants for better working conditions in the first decade of the 21st century in London, for example, such demonstrations were organized in collaboration with local NGOs or ethnic minority communities (Chimienti 2011). This is important because such
collaboration expressed grievances of not only minority workers but also small segments of the majority population. In the UK, such ethnic NGOs are strong because of positive action viz. affirmative action policies. In contrast, mobilization of irregular migrants in Paris was much higher, but coalitions with local partners from the dominant group were much less prevalent. Both instances of mobilization in London and Paris stand in stark contrast to Copenhagen, where no protests have occurred whatsoever because of very restrictive policies toward irregular migrants, suggesting the extreme precariousness of this migrant category.

Successful challenges to the view of migrants solely as a material or cultural threat would involve de-categorization, such as seeing the migrant as an individual. Another, typically multicultural mechanism, is re-categorization, that is, seeing the migrant as member of a specific group (Hewstone and Swart 2011). The multicultural counter-movement to securitization is in some sense an equality-producing re-categorization and thus contributes to incorporation of migrants. Re-categorizing, over the past two decades in Europe, has meant seeing certain migrant groups as religious instead of class or ethnic categories, is also a potential de-hierarchization of religious order. In Germany, for example, large religious communities, such as the Catholic and the Protestant Church, have historically been party to the agreement between state and church (Konkordat). Those religious denominations who are acknowledged public players are either religious communities or even corporations of public law. This characteristic applies to Christian churches and the Jewish Community. All of them have far-reaching rights in the socio-economic sphere, akin to unions and employer associations in the field of employment regulation. The latter regulate the setting of wages and working conditions through sector-wide labour contracts relatively autonomously. Religious associations recognized as corporations of public law are entitled to the collection of taxes by the state from registered believers, representation on the boards of public mass media and the extension of religious instruction in public schools. Islam in France constitutes yet another example. True to a laïcist and centralist regime of governing religion, Muslim organizations have emerged as nationally centralized institutions. Yet instead of upgrading Muslim religious organizations to the level of established religious communities, there could also be a collective downgrading. In Sweden, for example, the Lutheran church lost its privilege as a church representing the state, whereas newcomer associations have been elevated to the status of other communities (for an overview, see Koenig 2007).

Re-categorization as a general social mechanism certainly is very much connected to claims-making of immigrants. Two classic examples are unionization and the setting up of political organizations to achieve political empowerment. The mechanism of de-hierarchization is particularly important because it reminds us that debates on multiculturalism need to look at
how both economic redistribution and cultural recognition are connected to participation in political decision-making. Mobilization around religion, religious freedom and representation in public life is a prominent current example of efforts at de-hierarchization on the part of certain immigrant groups. At the same time, it is important to consider the overlap of socio-economically disadvantaged categories of immigrants (e.g. from Turkey and North Africa) with religion (Islam). In this way, the class dimension clearly co-structures the perception of Islam in Europe not simply as culturally distinct but also as related to inferior social position(s).

While religious differences and social distance matter in most countries, the institutional channels for dealing with such heterogeneities differ. For example, the corporatist German system sets high hurdles for access of Muslim organizations in public policy, whereas the British system does not require such an elaborate institutional inclusion process. There is no doubt that the speed of incorporation of religious communities has been much faster in the Anglo-Saxon world where the formal-institutional separation of church and state provide for quicker accommodation than in corporatist continental systems. Yet, note that even in countries with relatively high hurdles to overcome, such as Germany, there has been a slow and gradual transition from Staatskirchenrecht (state-church law) to Religionsverfassungsrecht (constitutional law on religion) (Krech 2011). This tendency signals a gradual retreat from tight legal state-church linkages.

This countervailing mechanism of re-categorization with the potential for de-hierarchization leads directly to the duality of mechanisms producing equalities and inequalities with implications for incorporation. In essence, de-hierarchization usually has been paralleled by essentialization of religious difference and identity politics. The Deutsche Islamkonferenz (DIK) is a convenient lens through which one may analyze de-hierarchization through the incorporation of religious organizations (cf. Modood 2007. Obviously, the inclusion of Muslim organizations refers not only to the legal-political inclusion of Islamic groups and organizations into the corporatist system, which has been an ongoing concern for state and religious associations and established churches alike. Through the DIK, religion is co-constituted as the main axis of immigrant integration politics and policy. The DIK can be considered as a sort of boot camp to train representatives of Islamic organizations to be part of Germany’s corporatist political system. It serves as way to not only confirm that “Islam belongs to Germany” (pronouncement by leading politicians of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) over the past years) but to suggest that its organizational tenets should be compatible with German conditions, at least from the perspective of the federal government (Tezcan 2012). The focus on Islam in the context of a specific corporatist mode of religious institutionalization denotes an entire
population of persons, namely those who (allegedly) are Muslims (on other European cases, see Laurence 2006). As a result, in public debates the individuals in question are not Muslims who have a religious identity in addition to their class, gender or ethnic identity. Rather, their entire collective identity is defined by religious belonging. It is thus well worth studying the actual effects of specific interfaces such as the DIK. There seems to be an interesting confluence of equality-producing re-categorization of religious communities on the one hand, and a further essentialization of religious identities on the other. The question would be whether members of the category in question withdraw their commitment from other boundaries, for example those defined along class or national lines, as they focus increasingly on allegiance to the boundary defined in religious terms.

Instead of recognizing certain heterogeneities, such as religion, as constitutive of representation of particular groups in public life, de-hierarchization aims to get rid of heterogeneities as a basis for exclusion. In essence, it is an effort to make sure that heterogeneities such as religious belonging or practice should not matter for life chances. Efforts at re-categorization in general and de-hierarchization in particular are sometimes pushed forward by the dominant groups. A crucial example is the term ‘Persons with a Migration Background’ (PMB) in Germany, which is meant to replace the term ‘foreigners.’ PMBs are defined by the Federal Statistical Office as persons who have immigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949; foreign citizens born in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); and all German citizens born in the FRG with at least one parent who either immigrated to the FRG after 1949 or was born in Germany as a foreign citizen. PMB is a composite category, not one that respondents can self-identify with. As a close empirical analysis of parliamentary debates on education between the years 2006 and 2013 indicates, the speakers tended to construct PMB as a ‘homogenized social category’ which conflated language, class and belonging (Elrick and Schwartzman 2015: 1539). In short, there are definite limits to efforts to re-categorize. This is so because the very social construction of subordinate categories of migrants is often imposed by the dominant groups through political debates (in mass media). In this way, group boundaries are created and reinforced, albeit in different ways.

5. Conclusion: The Increasing Significance of Culture and Status

Market liberalization, securitization and the rights revolution including the push for multicultural recognition via individual and collective rights form a triad which provide for the dynamics of the politics of (in)equalities and incorporation. The future of this dynamic arrangement is highly uncertain. What can be observed is a trend toward a depoliticized interpretation of heterogeneities in European public spheres. Multicultural group rights, in particular, have
been contentious and have been criticized as divisive. The rights-based nature of multiculturalism provides the cornerstone of the “backlash against multiculturalism” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). What we have seen is a displacement of multicultural language for a semantic of diversity or even super-diversity. It is worth noting that diversity management is not rights-based (Faist 2010) but takes the resources of migrants – such as language and intercultural skills – to help organizations either to compete more successfully in markets (private institutions) or serve their clients (public institutions) better. Diversity, at least in the private sector, mobilizes the ‘private’ resources of minority individuals and looks for their most efficient allocation for profit- and rent-seeking. It is easily compatible with the human capital approach though it is broader in scope and is not limited to employment-related skills. It is somewhat different in the public sector, where organizations – in the domain of policing but also in the education and health sectors – seek more adequate ways of provisioning services. Nonetheless, what we find is a seminal shift from a rights-based to a resource-based approach in dealing with cultural difference.

While a partial de-politicization of cultural heterogeneities through diversity management may help to achieve partial equalities in organizations, multicultural policies are inextricably linked to national projects. After all, such policies are meant to foster national integration and the social integration of immigrants as minorities into national life. From all we know these policies are therefore likely to remain as the main target of securitizing and xenophobic efforts. The jury is still out on whether and to what extent multicultural policies are able to survive. While the rhetorical criticism of multiculturalism is ever mounting (e.g., Wolfe and Klausen 1997), really existing multicultural policies are not reversed to the same extent. Quite the contrary. The political struggle is ongoing.

Migration is a crucial lens to explore today’s transnational social question. While mobilization along axes such as class continues, a seminal shift toward cultural and status heterogeneities and mobilization has occurred. This has not simply led to a displacement of class by status and cultural politics. After all, class politics is also built along cultural boundaries, such as working class culture, or bourgeois culture (or more fine-grained distinctions by Pierre Bourdieu, see Swartz 2013). Nonetheless, the heterogeneities which are politicized in the contemporary period have somewhat shifted: cultural heterogeneities now stand at the forefront of debate and contention. Given the finding of this analysis that doing class is inextricably linked to doing culture, one should not speak of the declining significance of class but rather of the increasing significance of culture and status politics.
References


