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Henrike Knappe

Budrich
UniPress



Doing Democracy Differently

Political Practices and
Transnational Civil Society



This book is the revised version of a dissertation thesis handed in at
Leuphana University Lüneburg.

Henrike Knappe

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Abbreviations

CCC	Clean Clothes Campaign
CCS	Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage
CEE	Central-and Eastern Europe
C&A	Clemens and August Brenninkmeijer
CS	Civil society
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
GMO	Genetically modified organism
FoE	Friends of the Earth
FoEE	Friends of the Earth Europe
FoEI	Friends of the Earth International
H&M	Hennes & Mauritz
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IR	International Relations
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SMO	Social movement organization
UN	United Nations
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Introduction

The transnational¹ realm is composed of many different individual and collective actors such as complex international bureaucracies, national government representatives, social movement coalitions and multinational corporations, which are connected through more or less formalized relations and a myriad of interactions, practices and dynamics. This configuration of the transnational space evolved over recent decades. The growing number of intergovernmental forums and transnational networks, which often consist of representatives from national executive organs and mainly unelected private actors (Chilton 1995; Dingwerth 2006; Tallberg et al. 2008) marks a disempowerment of national parliaments and an empowerment of executive authorities, who are sitting together as ministers, prime ministers or presidents at the negotiation tables (see e.g. Zürn 2002). At the same time, civil society organizations have built transnational coalitions, increased their influence as voices in global discourses as well as in formal hearings of international organizations and consequently managed to diversify and strengthen their relationships in the transnational arena. In this space of multi-faceted transnational relations, a democratic “system” is hardly imaginable. However, democratic theorists and International Relations (IR) scholars attempted to approach transnational democracy as a normative concept as well as an empirical study field. While normative concepts focus on the institutional architecture of a possible democratic system (Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998; Bohman 2007), empirical research mainly concentrates on the transnational civil society which is supposed to democratize the governance of international organizations and the transnational sphere more generally (see Beisheim 2001, Scholte 2007, Friedrich 2008, Beauzamy 2010, Macdonald and Macdonald 2010, Steffek et al. 2010, Hahn and Holzscheiter 2013).

Global governance scholars have already claimed that the different institutional preconditions of the global order demand a distinct institutional architecture of global democracy (MacDonald and Macdonald 2010). Nation state democratic institutions could not democratically control the multiple forms of public power of different state and non-state actors (ibid.). While democratic

1 The term “transnational” refers to “interactions that cross national boundaries at levels other than sovereign-to-sovereign”, whereas the term “international” is used to describe interactions between sovereign nation states. As a more general term “global” refers to any “transborder interactions that include (approximately) the entire world system” (Hale and Held 2011: 4-5).

institutions work in centralized and hierarchically organized nation state contexts, transnational relations are characterized by complex and overlapping spheres of influence and power. An institution-oriented democratic theory is thus hardly applicable in the context of transnational relations. *Practices and processes* rather than institutions form the sphere of transnational relations. Thus, this study attempts to shift the perspective from institutional ideas of democratic legitimation to a practice-oriented approach to democracy and thus contributes to the debate about the democratic legitimation of transnational civil society in global governance and new forms of democratic practice in transnational relations.

The aim of this study is to explore political practices inside transnational civil society networks and to investigate the potential of a transnational democracy in one of the main areas of transnational relations, namely civil society networks. Civil society coalitions and networks as one group of main actors in the transnational sphere, act in an unclear and fluid sphere with many “formally-constituted political bodies such as the United Nations” that are either opponents or collaboration partners of civil society organizations (Dryzek 1999: 45). As civil society actors have the potential to democratize transnational relations and at the same time need to be critically scrutinized from a normative democratic perspective, this study attempts to deepen the understanding of the chances and problems of a transnational democracy brought in by civil society actors.

Transnational Civil Society

Civil society shall be defined in empirical terms and divided into social movement organizations (SMOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Social movements are investigated as a phenomenon since the 1970's, whereas non-governmental organizations and research about them has emerged only in the 1990's, with the growing internationalization and institutionalization of social movements. Both types of organizations are members in the two transnational civil society networks that will be examined in this study. While social movement groups are seen as more grass-roots oriented and less institutionalized, non-governmental organizations are also called the “tamed” social movement groups (Kaldor 2003) because they are much more professionalized and institutionalized and often focus on lobby activities rather than on public protest (Della Porta and Caiani 2009). Different typologies of social movements were developed based on the assumptions that social movements are historical phenomena, and as such, they cannot be generalized in abstract terms without considering their historical contexts and developments. Furthermore, social movements are structured phenomena, which can be situ-

ated between an “amorphous ad-hoc collective” (Raschke 1985: 17) and a highly formalized organization. In criticizing the rationalist explanation of social movement mobilization recent studies show that cultural aspects and explanations from social psychology are also relevant for the mobilizing potential of “newest social movements” (Day 2005; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Jasper 2007). Those characteristics already point to the peculiar practice of civil society, which is very contextualized, dynamic and embedded in diverse cultures and social environments. *Transnational* civil society organizations are often seen as the crucial mediators for transnational mobilization (Knappe and Lang 2014); they connect different public spheres and combine different local interests (Smith 2001:99). Transnational civil society networks are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). Since the 1980’s NGOs have been interacting with each other in ever more networked and dense settings. Networks gave a more structured context in transnational relations. These networks are also understood as communicative structures and political spaces, where actors negotiate about the meanings of their “joint enterprise” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 3). During the past two decades, transnational civil society actors have started to receive much more attention, contacts and influence in decision-making processes. The traditional role of civil society as a third sector between market and state, which organizes citizens’ interests and provides a space for public engagement, is no longer the only role of civil society. Members of transnational NGOs or SMOs have partly inherited the responsibilities of elected representatives in traditional democratic settings: they represent a certain constituency, campaign for their norms and interests, try to formulate and condense interests of their constituency, and finally sit at the decision-making table in order to decide public matters within a certain range. Many democratic theorists reacted to this development in conceptualizing new forms of democratic governance and political representation (Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998; Bohman 2007).

While transnational NGOs and SMOs are often seen as *per se* democratic, there are recent studies which show that civil society organizations do not always represent their constituency adequately (Hahn and Holzscheiter 2013) or do not even claim to be accountable to the beneficiaries of their political engagement (Steffek et al. 2010). Furthermore, it is criticized that transnational NGO campaigners “have drawn disproportionately from middle-aged adults, professional and propertied classes, men, Northern countries, whites, Christian heritages and urban dwellers.” (Scholte 2002: 296)

Now, with illiteracy rates in some parts of the world exceeding 80 percent, with Internet access virtually nonexistent in others, and with language skills, economic knowledge, and political education distributed extremely unevenly across the globe, realizing transparency and democracy in a meaningful

normative sense is indeed a far-fetched dream. And what is more, hardly any global democracy activists are working to turn this particular dream into reality. (Dingwerth and Hanrieder 2010: 94)

Although transnational civil society seems to have a significant impact in the setting of rules and the promotion of norms, they often lack democratic legitimacy, e.g. the approval of beneficiaries. The normative claims made in this literature are that civil society actors from *different* backgrounds should participate equally in international institutions and transnational forums (Bendell 2006; Scholte 2007). Scholte argues that “If civil society is to make its full contribution to enabling public participation in global governance, then full recognition – and effective negotiation- of the world’s cultural diversity is required.” (Scholte 2002: 297). Equal participation is especially crucial in relation to inclusion of underrepresented groups and the accessibility of formation of opinions and decision-making for the general membership as well, and not only the active elite (Anheier and Themudo 2002). In a study on the participation patterns of *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and *Amnesty International* in Great Britain, Jordan and Maloney (1997) state that the *de facto* decision-making in those campaign organizations can be at best termed ‘anticipatory oligarchy’². Few very active members decide on behalf of the rest of the members anticipating their wishes and what is popular enough to gain support. Those democratic shortcomings in civil society networks become particularly apparent in the unequal participation of the different members and activists. Social inequalities for example are often rather reproduced than countered in civil society networks (Roth 2001; Tallberg et al. 2008; Beauzamy 2010). This leads among other things to the fact that global civil society engagement rests on a very narrow cultural base (Scholte 2002). This observed asymmetry in the transnational civil society is particularly virulent in the context of the global North-South divide and most often explained by the lack of capacities, such as financial resources, as well as language barriers and the campaigning focus on an affluent (Western) audience which is rather inclined to donate (Roth 2001). Particularly NGOs which are concerned with development and social change in the developing world are criticized for being disproportionately based in Western Europe and the US. This affects also the framing of topics and problems which differs between Northern and Southern NGOs, especially in issue areas such as human rights, gender politics or biodiversity issues. If there is no mobilizing potential in the Western world there will be no campaign about a certain topic (Roth 2001: 43). Furthermore, it is criticized that Northern NGOs pick Southern NGOs as coalition partners according to a suitable topic for donors and public attention and often it is not realistic that

2 This term refers to the “iron law of oligarchization” conceptualized by Robert Michels (1989).

Southern NGOs are able to avail themselves of transnational networks and get prominent according to the urgency or relevance of the issue. Due to its heterogeneity transnational civil society is easy to get co-opted in particular by donors who fund selected projects or organizations (Fisher 1997). Thus, there is a strong criticism of the observed asymmetry mainly between Northern and Southern groups in transnational civil society networks. This inequality is mostly criticized with regard to the outreach dimensions of transnational civil society, for example public campaigning priorities or lobby activities in specific international organizations.

Democratic Practices in the Transnational Realm

Departing from this state of debate, the present study identifies a theoretical and an empirical research gap. First, the theoretical conceptualization of democratic legitimation inside transnational civil society networks has been neglected in the literature on democracy beyond the nation state as well as in the broad NGO-literature. While an overall institutional framework for transnational democracy seems problematic due to the instable structural contexts of transnational relations, the examination of practices on a meso-level between individual action and overall structure can give better insights on how democracy can develop in temporary, fluid and complex transnational networks. Such networks neither function like nation states nor like a multilateral international system. They are conceptually grasped as self-organized fora of communication, interaction and decision-making between “interdependent but operationally autonomous actors” (Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 9). Thus, these network structures are best examined in the light of process- and practice oriented approaches to democratic theory, which has not been done so far to a great extent. These approaches can be found in concepts of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and more recently even in representative theory. In this context, *democracy* is broadly defined as “empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions” (Warren 2006: 386). The conceptual question of transnational democracy in network contexts is relevant, but under-theorized and will therefore be a major element in this study. The theoretical interest in transnational network democracy is inspired by the debate on how transnational democracy, with its specific characteristics, could be envisioned (Held 1995, 2003; Keohane 2003; Dryzek 2006) and how already existing transnational relationships between different types of actors can be evaluated in terms of their democratic quality (Friedrich 2008; Tallberg et al. 2008; Näsström 2010; Dingwerth et al. 2011). In order to analytically grasp transnational network democracy, the concept of practice is introduced and used as an analytical frame to detect democracy that is practiced

rather than institutionalized in transnational civil society networks. Practices shall be defined as shared courses of action that are co-constituted by actors and structure and can be modified by the agency of the actors (Giddens 1984). Substantive and routinized practices are not only empirically better observable in transnational civil society than institutionalized settings, they are at the same time an interesting and innovative conceptual perspective for normative democratic theory and the question of how to think of democracy in transnational relations. Thus, this study attempts to conceptualize democratic practice within the theoretical framework of the three strands of democratic theory (participatory, representative, and deliberative democracy) through the lens of practice theory.

Second, this study wants to fill an empirical research gap and open the black box of the most growing type of actors in global politics, namely transnational civil society networks. Although there are single studies of social movements observing the specific democratic practices of activists (Polletta 2002, 2006) and a huge strand of literature that refers to the outward dimension of transnational civil society (see e.g. Roth 2001, Scholte 2002, Tallberg et al. 2008; Beauzamy 2010, Dingwerth and Hanrieder 2010), the coalition building and participation *within* transnational civil society networks in view of democratic norms is under-researched. The empirical research interest of this study targets transnational civil society networks' capabilities and potentials of democratic coordination in order to function as democratically legitimate actors in global politics. If they organized democratically internally, they can serve as an external control layer for international institutions and nation states by representing the underrepresented in the global system. Transnational activism and protest has been organized in network-like structures since it came into being (Tarrow 2006). Specifically the transnational civil society networks examined in this case study are very concerned with democratic procedures and principles. Thus, the practices of democracy that have emerged in these non-state network settings present an interesting and needed field of research to be examined. Empirical research thus far has focused on the democratic legitimation of transnational civil society with standards that conceptualize legitimation as external control that runs vertically either between civil society actors and international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) (upwards), or between civil society actors and their constituency, namely the affected groups of individuals (downwards) (Steffek et al. 2010; Tallberg and Uhlin 2011). However, this research perspective neglects the internal and horizontal democratic legitimation that is at least equally important for transnational democracy. If transnational civil society networks function as external democratic control layers for international organizations or states, they should be themselves democratically legitimized. Otherwise, opaque and possibly corrupted inter-

ests could be the basis for a supposedly democratic legitimization of global politics.

Starting from these research gaps in a theoretical and empirical context, this study is structured in a threefold division: At first, the theoretical conceptualization of democracy as practice is done by combining practice theory with democratic concepts of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy. This first part is guided by the question of how democracy as practice can be theoretically conceptualized in transnational civil society networks. In a second step, the empirical analysis focuses on political practices in transnational civil society networks, thus opening the black box “civil society network” and exploring how participation, representation and deliberation practices form inside such networks. In a last step, the insights of the first two parts of the book are synthesized in a discussion targeting the question, in how far the reconstructed political practices are done in a democratic way.

The two cases of transnational civil society networks, namely Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), examined in this research study were chosen because they share the most common characteristics of transnational civil society networks and their relative power in global politics: Both are organized as networks of semi-autonomous member groups in different countries and have communicative power³ through global campaigns as well as influence on international institutions or multinational companies⁴. The member groups are independent organizations that also campaign in other contexts. Both networks claim to be grass-roots democratic. Despite their shared characteristics of transnational civil society networks, the two cases differ in their goals, internal relationships, targets, strategy and collective identity and thus provide a certain range of transnational civil society networks. The qualitative semi-structured interviews with activists of the two transnational civil society networks in Europe were analyzed and interpreted with a reconstructive method of text interpretation.

3 Following Habermas' (1996) conceptualization of communicative power, many constructivist IR-scholars claim that NGOs can exert communicative power in convincing more powerful actors (most often states) to “change their minds” (Risse 2000: 19).

4 FoE has consultative status in different UN bodies; CCC successfully pressures many different companies to implement a code of conduct in bilateral negotiations. Besides this, both networks lead public campaigns that are widely taken up by the media. A detailed description of the influence and action repertoire of both networks is to be found in the case chapters (5.1 & 5.2).

Structure of the Book

The following part I of this book delineates the conceptual foundations of this study. After a general overview of the key concepts relevant for studying democratic practice in transnational civil society, relevant approaches of practice theory are outlined in order to conceptualize democracy as practice (chap.1). Practice theory can bridge the gap between normative democratic theory and empirical reality of transnational civil society networks. The two following chapters (chap. 2 and 3) review the relevant literature on participatory and deliberative democracy and democratic representation respectively. These two chapters are organized in two parts: (1) a general overview and discussion of relevant concepts and (2) a discussion on the applicability of these approaches to the context of transnational civil society networks.

Part II of this book is divided into four chapters. Chapter 4 outlines the methodology and research design of the empirical study. Chapter 5 is devoted to the exploration of the political practice in the two cases of Clean Clothes Campaign and Friends of the Earth. After the analytical heuristics for exploring the political practice of participation, representation and deliberation are presented, the cases are generally introduced (chapters 5.1 and 5.2). The results of the reconstructive qualitative analysis are then presented in chapter 5.3. After this descriptive part of the analysis, the critical discussion of the political practices is done in chapter 6. This chapter links back to the theoretical considerations of the first part of this book and thus combines normative democratic theory and the empirical results in a fruitful discussion about the democratic norms in political practices in transnational civil society networks. This book ends with general conclusions about the usefulness of the practice approach for transnational democracy and the implications of the findings for research on transnational civil society networks.

Part I

Conceptual Foundations of Democratic Practice in Transnational Civil Society Networks

For a long time democracy was not a relevant topic for IR. The international system was viewed as mainly consisting of nation states, which acted under conditions of anarchy through power threats (realist perspective) or negotiations (rational-institutionalist perspective). This empirical reality has changed in the last 20 years and so has the IR-research expanded scholarly interest into fields such as the role of norms during the constructivist turn in IR (Jepperson et al. 1996; Checkel 1998; Risse 1999) and democracy (Held 1995; Bienen et al. 1998; Archibugi 2004).

In the field of global governance many scholars applied normative democratic theory, which was originally conceptualized for nation state contexts. Bexell et al. (2010) speak in this regard of the “trichotomy of representative democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy” (Bexell et al. 2010: 83), which defines the three main strands of democratic theory. Taking these three main models of democratic theory into account, the first part of this book is concerned with the examination of concepts and approaches within these three strands of democratic theory and the development of a concept of democratic practice in transnational civil society networks. Since such transnational civil society networks are more loosely bound together, less hierarchically structured and not limited by clearly defined boundaries compared to nation states, normative democratic theory that is conceptualized for the context of hierarchically structured, sovereign nation states is not suitable. As a result, normative democratic theory that is concerned with democracy in spheres beside the state, for example in civil society associations (Hirst 1994), in the work place (Pateman 1970; Bachrach and Botwinick 1992) or even in private spheres such as the family (Phillips 1991) is of specific value for this study. Similarly, more recent theories in the field of representation that aim at conceptualizing representation without the formal institution of elections and focus more on horizontal control of representatives (Castiglione and Warren 2006) or on the performative variants of representation (Saward 2010) are suitable for this study due to their broader horizon of possible forms of representation. Deliberative democracy’s procedural conceptualization of

democracy furthers an understanding of democracy that is not aggregative and is thus not that tightly bound to clearly defined electorates. Deliberative democracy was by some theorists specifically conceptualized for the context of transnational relations as well as network governance (Dryzek 1999, 2006, 2007; Esmark 2007) and can therefore be clearly linked to this study's research subject of transnational civil society networks. However, difficulties remain in overcoming the boundaries between normative democracy and practical, empirically observable democracy in these networks. Therefore, the practice lens serves as a conceptual bridge between normative democratic theory and empirical observability. Before turning to this practice perspective, I will first briefly review the debate about democracy in international theory and afterwards discuss the specific relationship between civil society and democracy in IR.

Drawing on different schools of democratic theory, scholars conceptualized various approaches of a transnational democracy. McGrew identifies four different conceptual strands: (1) liberal internationalism, (2) radical pluralist democracy, (3) cosmopolitan democracy and (4) deliberative democracy (McGrew 2004). As the designation of liberal institutionalism and radical pluralist democracy already suggest, the concepts draw from already existing theoretical strands, namely liberal democratic theory and radical democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy is a rather eclectic and ambitious approach, which makes use of different elements of democratic theory, whereas deliberative democracy is a rather recent theoretical strand that is concerned with the discursive forms of democratic legitimation (*ibid.*). Transnational civil society plays an important role in each of the concepts of transnational democracy.

Liberal internationalism, above all conceptualized by Robert Keohane, envisions transnational democracy as a pluralized and transparent international system with multilateral institutions held accountable by states and NGOs (Keohane 2003). In general, liberal theorists see transnational democracy as a reconstruction of liberal democracy in nation states, without elections. Thus, instead of parties, civil society actors are engaging in democratizing the international system: "In place of parties competing for votes, a vibrant transnational civil society channels its demands to the decision makers whilst in turn, also making them accountable for their actions. Accordingly, 'accountability will be enhanced not only by chains of official responsibility but by the requirement of transparency.'" (McGrew 2004: 4). However, liberal internationalism is limited to the Western world and a state-centric perspective insofar as it is concerned mainly with "institutional tinkering" in order to enhance transparency and accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis national governments (*ibid.*). To the contrary, radical pluralist democracy as a bottom-up theory of democratization mainly works through the critical social movements, "which challenge the authority of states and international struc-

tures as well as the hegemony of particular (liberal) conceptions of the ‘political’” (McGrew 2004: 5). Stemming from theories of participatory democracy, particularly radical democracy, the rejection of concepts such as sovereignty and the rule of law are critical points in this approach (ibid.). Radical pluralist democracy doesn’t envision real democracy in nation states’ governance of international politics, but rather in the self-governance of communities (ibid.). The ideas of radical democracy are also a relevant part of participatory democracy and will thus be outlined more extensively in the respective chapter. Theorists of deliberative democracy also do not aim at reforming the global polity. They envision a democratization of existing “governance”. Therefore, deliberative democracy goes beyond the liberal vision of institutional reform of global governance and also the cosmopolitan idea of a democratic institution (McGrew 2004: 8). Deliberative democracy is defined as “an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members” (Cohen 1997: 67). This procedural approach to democracy differs to the more institutional concepts of transnational democracy and will be outlined in further detail in the respective chapter. Cosmopolitan democracy attempts to reconcile different approaches to democracy and centers on the “effective democratic governance within, between and across states” (McGrew 2004: 6). David Held as one of the main theorists behind this concept argues on the basis of the constitutionalist argument that the political order should be based on a rule of law and constitutional rights guarantee the appropriate participation of affected individuals in decision-making (Dingwerth et al. 2011: 51). Following this argumentation, the principle of autonomy is a corner stone of cosmopolitan democracy. Held states that individual autonomy is characterized as “the capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self-determining. It involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different possible courses of action in private as well as in public life.” (Held 2006: 263). Held’s concept of democracy is thus based on the notion that democracy’s function is to further the aim of individual and collective autonomy (Dingwerth and Blauburger 2011: 51).

The principle of autonomy can also be transferred to the state level, where autonomy erodes due to globalization processes (Archibugi 2004: 439). Held distinguishes state autonomy from state sovereignty. Sovereignty is defined by him as “the political authority within a community which has the right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern directly” (Held 2006: 295). Autonomy in contrast is defined as “the actual power a nation state possesses to articulate and achieve policy goals independently” (ibid.). While sovereignty defines the entitlement to rule over a territory, autonomy defines the freedom of the state to democratic decision-making without international and transnational constraints (ibid.). In this regard, autonomy, thought of as individual, collective and state

autonomy is the major principle of justification for democracy. If governance modes guarantee or enable the conduct of collective autonomy in the form of collective participation, they can be seen as democratically legitimate (Friedrich 2013: 41). As Held states: "In a world intensifying regional and global relations, with marked overlapping 'communities of fate', the principle of autonomy requires entrenchment in regional and global networks as well as in national and local polities" (Held 2006: 308). Although cosmopolitan democracy focuses on the international state system, advocates of this approach argue that the system of international democracy among states should be embedded in transnational associations and communities (McGrew 2004: 6). This is necessary because the principle of autonomy causes a congruency problem in global politics: the ones who take decisions are not necessarily the same that are affected by the decisions. Affected communities can be communities that span across state borders, so-called "overlapping communities of fate" (Held 1995: 136) or they can be entirely global. Thus, stakeholder's communities do not necessarily fit in state borders (Archibugi 2004: 443). While many environmental causes affect all individuals globally, communities of fate can be identified for example as the workers of different countries affected by human rights abuses in the global garment industry. As a result of this effect of transnational affected communities, advocates of cosmopolitan democracy assume that "[g]lobalization engenders new social movements engaged with issues that affect other individuals and communities, even when these are geographically and culturally very distant from their own political community." (Archibugi 2004: 439) Thus, autonomy is a central point of reference for the study of transnational civil society networks and their democratic practice.

Furthermore, all democratic theorists concerned with transnational affairs and global governance must take a stand on the question of the demos in transnational democracy: "Who is the people?". Who belongs to this group is difficult to define even in nation states where individuals are categorized in citizens, residents, migrants or refugees. This resonates with the congruency problem (Zürn 2004). Political decisions are not always legitimized by the people who are affected by them. People in nation states are more and more "other-determined"; they are subject to rules made by institutions, governance bodies and agencies that they cannot control anymore (Näsström 2011). The concurrence of the people as source and subject of democratic legitimacy is not prevalent in transnational relations. Transnational democracy is not divided in geographic terms, but in issue areas. This is mirrored in democracy concepts that emphasize the representation principle of the all-affected. All affected individuals and groups of a specific political decision constitute the people that should have a say in this particular policy issue. The all-affected principle suggests a solution for the boundary problems in transnational

democracy (Näsström 2011). It seems plausible, that not every individual on this planet needs to be represented in a certain political decision, but only those that are directly affected by a decision. However, how can be defined who will be affected and who will make this definition? If there is a decision to be made about the operating times of nuclear power plants worldwide, who knows who will be to what degree affected by the next nuclear catastrophe? Besides the difficulty of drawing lines between affected and not affected people, there is another problem with the all-affected principle: "It runs the risk of making future political boundaries into enclaves of sheer self-interest in so far as they would be based in separate stakes rather than equal rights." (Näsström 2011: 124). Thus, the direct representation of concrete groups of individuals is hardly practicable in transnational relations. Therefore either a discursive, subjectless mode of representation (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008) or the implementation of indirect accountability through proxies (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2013) is suggested.

While autonomy and affectedness as democratic concepts are central for transnational civil society, the definition of civil society as such and its relation to democracy is an important point of departure for this study. Civil society is often defined according to its boundaries⁵: it is a sphere apart from the state and, by some theorists also distinguished from the market economy (Arato and Cohen 1999). Civil society is a term that is strongly connected to Western liberal democracies and in this context understood as associational life that is voluntary and pluralistic: "Civil society organizations [...] are neither mandated nor run by state institutions, but spring from the everyday lives and activities of communities of interest." (Young 2000: 158). While the state (as well as the economy) functions systematically; it follows certain system imperatives and brings together disparate people, places and goals mediated through authorized power or money, civil society's focus rather lies on free organization and discursive reasoning (ibid.). The classic role of civil society associations is that of "schools of democracy" (Tocqueville and Mayer 1835 [1985]) based on the reasoning that a democracy without democrats is difficult to maintain (Chambers and Kopstein 2006: 369–70). The expectation in this regard is that civil society associations are places of learning democratic citizenship. Another role of civil society that refers back to the discursive mode of communication in the sphere of civil society (Young 2000) is that of civil society as creator of a public sphere. Through its associational character, civil society can institutionalize societal problems that spring from the private lives of citizens and can make them heard in a public sphere:

5 Liberals emphasize the negative definition of civil society's boundaries to the state as rights-based. The rule of law should limit the state's influence on civil society and thus guarantee the freedom of association (Chambers & Kopstein 2006: 364–66).

Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres. These “discursive designs” have an egalitarian, open form of organization that mirrors essential features of the kind of communication around which they crystallize and to which they lend continuity and permanence. [...] All the same, they do form the organizational substratum of the general public of citizens. More or less emerging from the private sphere, this public is made of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations for their social interests and experiences and who want to have an influence on institutionalized opinion- and will-formation. (Habermas 1996: 367)

This definition also points to a problematic aspect of the term civil society, namely its hidden normativity. Civil society is regarded as good. The main argument is that “a robust, strong and vibrant civil society strengthens and enhances liberal democracy” (Chambers and Kopstein 2001: 837). This ideal of civil society is often criticized as overlooking the “bad” civil society, which fulfils all criteria of voluntary and pluralistic associations that further the civic virtues of their members, but promote hate, bigotry or violence (Chambers 2006: 373). Tightly connected to this question whether civil society associations are always promoting just causes, act in a public interest or at least do not threaten other groups in society, is the question that is raised more often in the debate about transnational civil society: Is civil society contributing to a strong democracy, and more specifically: Can civil society remedy the democratic deficit in global governance?

Since the late 1990’s transnational NGOs and SMOs as actors in a global civil society have become an ambivalent research object in political sociology and IR. Main perspectives focus on the development and dynamics of transnational activism (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2006), the roles and structures of transnational activism (Smith and Wiest 2005), the participation of transnational NGOs in international institutions’ policy making and their influence on international institutions (Friedrich 2008; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010) and the transnationalization of national and local protests (Della Porta et al. 1999; Rucht 1999; Della Porta and Caiani 2009). Transnational NGOs and SMOs are “governing” their networks independently from the classic arenas of IR-democracy, the international organizations, and at the same time they are extensively interacting with traditional loci of democracy such as state agencies and international organizations. Furthermore, NGOs and SMOs have gotten much more influence and capacity. They are partly taking over state functions and /or international organizations’ services. Those developments make civil society networks crucial actors in international relations. Most of the transna-

tional civil society organizations advocate rights, ideas and norms that often concern minorities and unprivileged groups in society, but the targets of their claims, protests and lobby politics are international organizations and national governments (Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 2002). For this reason transnational civil society actors are often seen as mediators or the “transmission belt” (Steffek and Nanz 2008) between citizens and international organizations. With this normative conceptualization of civil society actors it can be asked how inclusive, transparent and participatory international organizations are (Beisheim 2001; Friedrich 2008; Tallberg and Uhlin 2011).

While European democratic theory is very much concerned with the design of democratic institutions, some sociologists and ethnographers in the United States have started to investigate democracy as a practice in social movements. These scholars want to show that democracy cannot only be analyzed in terms of institutions and structures, but also in the ways that activists create democracy while participating in some kind of civic action (Polletta 2002; Blee 2012). This empirical perspective on democracy as a practice, which evolves, develops and changes through collective actions of participating actors, is very valuable for the context of the barely institutionalized, fluid contexts of transnational civil society networks. Therefore, the practice lens on democracy will be further outlined in the next chapter.

1 Practice Theory: a New Perspective on Transnational Politics and Democracy

A conceptualization of democracy as practice helps to identify democracy through regular and repeated practices within networks. The context (network), the study object (civil society) and the theoretical framework (transnational democracy) of this study are defined by process-orientation and the interplay of agent and structure. The contribution of practice theory to this study is two-fold: (1) Practice theory can broaden analytical perspective and thus help uncover democratic practice in the transnational realm. (2) Practice theory offers a conceptual account of norms *in-practice* that can contribute to a fruitful rethinking of democratic norms and how to define, describe and evaluate them. I shall argue in this chapter for the value of practice theory for studying democracy in transnational relations along these two lines. The combination of normative democratic theory and practice theory comes not without tensions. The challenge to normatively grasp practices necessitates a reflection on the concepts of normativity and norms, which will also be achieved in this following chapter.

Democratic practice will be defined alongside the concept of social practice. Practices are shared courses of action that are co-constituted by actors as well as structures and can be modified by the agency of the actors (Giddens 1984). On a macro-level, people produce and reproduce society through social practice (Bourdieu 1977). This lens on democracy provides the opportunity to see democracy as a procedural category that is not solely bound by democratic institutions. Neither the institutional structure nor the actors alone create democracy in networks. Both, structures and actions co-constitute each other in the practices of transnational civil society networks. Therefore, the translation of democracy from nation states to networks is done through the conceptualization of democracy as practice. In transnational civil society networks, democracy is more likely to be practiced in informal routines between actors. Since these practices can further stabilize internal relationships in the networks, practices have the potential to create democracy without a priori established institutions.

The “practice turn” recently developed in different disciplines such as philosophy, cultural theory, history, sociology, and anthropology, as well as in science and technology studies (Schatzki et al. 2005: 1), moved current thinking beyond the dualism of structure and action and linked the analysis of micro- and macro phenomena. Given the diversity of disciplinary approach-

es, it does not come as a surprise that the account and conceptualizations of practice vary and cannot be summarized in one theory of practice. The shift in the understanding of social ontology is one of the main contributions of social theorists to the practice turn. Practice theorists understand the social as “a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices, centrally organized around shared practical understandings. [...] Actions, for instance, are embedded in practices, just as individuals are constituted within them.” (Schatzki et al. 2005: 3). This understanding of the social builds a contrast to concepts that focus on individuals, actions, language, lifeworld, institutions, roles or structures as the main defining dimensions of the social. Practice theorists claim that all these phenomena can only be understood through the analysis of practices (Schatzki et al. 2005: 3).

Studying practice in IR creates a broader spectrum of opportunities to explore and interpret world politics “beyond traditional levels and units of analysis” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 5) and hence practice theory is seen as a promising chance for a dialog between the different schools in IR. IR-scholars see the study of international practices as a way to “spell out the many faces of world politics [...] as part of “doing” in and on the world.” (ibid. 2011: 3). According to Adler and Pouliot, practices are competent, patterned performances that rest on background knowledge and weave together “*the discursive and material worlds*” (ibid. 2011: 7–8).

First, being more concerned with the *agency* of the actor than structural or systemic analytical approaches; and second, emphasizing the *context* and the *collective quality of actions* more than action-centered analyses; (international) practice theory perfectly serves the exploration of practices, rules and routines hidden behind formal institutions and well-written mission statements in world politics. This applies also to transnational NGO-networks, whose campaigners, secretariats and international coordinators master the rhetoric and demands of global campaigning but still must navigate through the muddy waters of informal, opaque and fluid transnational relations. This day-to-day practice behind mission statements and campaign strategies is the space where interactions with members and coalition partners evolve, in campaign meetings and communicative exchanges. These micro-politics of transnational civil society networks are on the one hand configured by the goals and tactics of campaign strategies and the overall values of mission statements and, on the other, dynamically configured and invented by the involved persons. Bourdieu (1977) called this the “grammar of practices”, implicit rules and regulations that evolve out of formal structures and subjective interpretation. In civil society networks, many such rules refer to democracy as an overarching principle. These rules thus regulate access, transparency and inclusion in the network and thus define the proceedings of democracy. Due to the characteristics of civil society networks, those rules are much more open for interpre-

tation and modification *through practice*, in contrast to a nation state where formal voting rights are relatively clear cut and not subject to constant change and interpretation. It is quite clear that, for example, formal authorization mechanisms of representatives are not in place in transnational civil society networks. However, there are substantive authorization *practices* that might not be formally legalized, but collectively shared by different network actors. Thus, my argument is that democratic practice can possibly evolve even when democratic institutions are absent. Practice theory thus contributes to a better understanding of democracy in transnational civil society networks.

As in many other national civil society organizations, the transnational civil society organizations of this case study committed themselves to certain democratic standards, such as participatory consensus building⁶, installing deliberation procedures before major decisions are made, or fairly representing all the different groups and values in the networks⁷. Unlike in many organizations that operate only on a national level, the transnational civil society networks in this study have very autonomous national member organizations with their own campaigns. Although those explicit and implicit democratic norms are a point of reference in such civil society contexts, Blee (2012) speaks of activists *making* democracy. Polletta grounds this reasoning in the character of social movement groups. *Grass-roots civil society organizations, or social movement groups*, are often not very formalized or institutionalized. In social movement organizations, decision-making is rather informal, decentralized, consensus-oriented, deliberative and experimental (Polletta 2002: 209). The transnational space even reinforces this tendency towards informality and decentralization. The organization as transnational civil society *network* is not set up for permanent institutionalization: networks as structural organizing principles are always changing rules and structures (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 212). They are fluid formations that depend on the actions taken by involved actors. Thus, democratic practice in transnational civil society networks seems to be a case of *changing, making* and *reconfiguring* instead of an institutionalization of democratic norms.

In the following sections of this chapter, I discuss what practice theory has to say about rules, norms and their relation to the knowledge and agency of actors in practices, in order to arrive at an understanding of democratic practice in transnational civil society networks.

6 <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

7 <http://www.foei.org/about-foei/organisation> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

1.1 Defining and Changing Rules “as we go along”

Practice theory explores many different aspects of the social. In view of democratic practice, the role of rules within practice theory becomes crucial. Rules can follow different logics; one of them is the compliance with specific values. Those are the rules which are relevant in the context of democratic systems. Democratic elections follow specific rules that are deduced from democratic values. In order to speak of democratic practice, we thus have to clarify how democratic rules are part of political practices, i.e. how political practices become democratic practices. Thus, the following paragraphs will outline practice theory with an emphasis on the relation between rules and practices.

A Game with Hidden Rules: the Beginnings of Practice Theory

The roots of practice theory can be found in Wittgenstein's theory of language games in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), Garfinkel's *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) and Giddens' *Theory of Structuration* (1984). Wittgenstein is seen as having developed the conceptual “backbone” of practice theory. He stated that regular action can never be determined by explicit rules exclusively, because even the most explicit rule can never cover every possible instance. Therefore, actors need background knowledge on how to handle certain situations. Rules need to be interpreted by actors (Wittgenstein 2011 [1953]); (Schulz-Schaeffer 2010: 321). Through this interactive process between an actor's interpretation and the systematic rule, practices emerge. Wittgenstein states, in his theory of language games, how little the act of speaking is influenced by general rules because the forms of language use are so manifold, and speaking as such is part of an activity: “How many forms of sentences do exist? For instance claim, question and order? – There are *countless* forms: countless different sorts of all that what we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this variety is nothing solid, nothing eternally given; rather new types of language, new language games, how we could call it, evolve and others become outdated and are forgotten. [...] The word “*language game*” should emphasize here that *speaking* the language is part of an activity, or a form of life. (Wittgenstein 2011 [1953]:26, author's own translation, italics in the original)⁸.

8 Original quote: „Wieviele Arten der Sätze gibt es aber? Etwa Behauptung, Frage und Befehl? – Es gibt *unzählige* solcher Arten: unzählige verschiedene Arten der Verwendung alles dessen, was wir “Zeichen”, “Worte”, “Sätze”, nennen. Und diese Mannigfaltigkeit ist nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes; sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andre veralten und werden verges-

According to Wittgenstein, practices are co-produced by systematic rules and actors who interpret situations and rules with their own background knowledge and experience. In this, rules are not only sufficiently vague and thus open for interpretation in practice, they do not even need to exist when practice begins. Could it not also be the case that we play and “make up the rules as we go along” (ibid: 68), Wittgenstein asks. Besides the interpreting rules that already exist, the actors who practice, who *play*, language games can define rules while practicing. Rules can emerge and crystallize out of the practice itself. Thus, rules are not only interpreted through actors in language games, they can also be invented in the process of *doing*, of performing a ‘game’. Translating this to the practice of politics, the possible spectrum of discussing democratic legitimation opens up. Beyond the schematic evaluation of the compliance of a certain democratic rule, it can be explored if and in how far democratic rules are applied, modified, invented “as we go along”.

Harold Garfinkel’s perspective on social rules that are implicit, “that are just in our heads” emphasizes the background expectancies of everyday life (Garfinkel 1967: 37). With his crisis experiments, he showed that a slight change of socially appropriate action can be extremely irritating to others, although those rules are not explicitly agreed on (ibid.). He underlines the stability and persistence of social rules rather than the openness for change. The deep bewilderment that he evoked with his experiments, on the side of the ‘victim’ and the experimenters alike, was even stronger when the involved persons believed the hidden rules to be unchangeable social facts constituting a moral order. Normalizing efforts were a common reaction (ibid.).

Familiar scenes of everyday activities, treated by members⁹ as the ‘natural facts of life’, are massive facts of the members’ daily existence both as a real world and as the product of activities in a real world. They furnish the ‘fix’, the ‘this is it’ to which the waking state returns one, and are the points of departure and return for every modification of the world of daily life that is achieved in play, dreaming, trance, theater, scientific theorizing, or high ceremony. (Garfinkel 1967: 35)

Garfinkel states three things in the above quote: (1) the hidden expectations, the informal rules of every day interaction are stable configurations. There is a certain quality to social rules that makes them appear as ‘facts’ to actors. (2) Those rules are not merely viewed as given, they are seen as products of actors’ actions in the ‘real world’. In this, actors are contributing to the emergence of those rules. (3) Modifications of the common grounds of social practice take place in unconscious, habitual actions. In this, Garfinkel agrees on the

sen. [...] Das Wort „*Sprachspiel*“ soll hier hervorheben, daß das *Sprechen* der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform.“ (Wittgenstein 2011 [1953]:26)

9 Garfinkel refers to ‘members’ as members of a society (Garfinkel 1967: 35).

interpretative quality of rules and the necessity of background knowledge to maneuver daily practice. However, he suggests some restrictions to the possibilities of changing rules “as we go along”.

Wittgenstein and Garfinkel both oppose the idea that rules are external to practice and exist a priori. Both emphasize the hidden knowledge that actors use to interact with each other. While Wittgenstein and Garfinkel’s theories rest on micro-level interactions, Bourdieu and Giddens’ accounts of practice reach into the broader configuration of societies.

Knowledge, Agency and Rules

Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Anthony Giddens (1984) built theories of practices that attempt to explain society by reconciling micro-and macro-level explanations. Whereas Bourdieu sees practices as preconscious habits, reproducing rather static groups and distinctions in society, Giddens ascribes to individuals the ability to reflect and change practices, and therefore change the structures and rules of society. Practice as social action is, according to Bourdieu, an action by which actors produce and reproduce social, cultural and economic realities¹⁰. As a result, practice as an individual behavior becomes part of larger social developments (Münch 2004; Bourdieu 1977). The practice theory of Bourdieu thus combines subjectivist and objectivist sociological approaches. Bourdieu distinguishes practices from any formal rule-enforced action and thus situates practices in the informal, implicit context of rituals and habits (Bourdieu 1977: 16-18). Nevertheless, according to Bourdieu, there is a “grammar of practices” that accompanies every practice and controls the functionality of practices. This grammar can consist of spontaneous “theorizing” by actors about their own actions and the actions of others. However, these secondary explanations of actors “only reinforce the structures by providing them with a particular form of ‘rationalization’” (ibid: 29). Furthermore, Bourdieu does not think that the agency of actors, meaning the ability to steer the way and direction of practices, is a main characteristic of practices: “If agents are possessed by their habitus more than they possess it, this is because it acts within them as the organizing principle of their actions, and because this *modus operandi*, informing all thought and action (including the thought of action) reveals itself only in the *modus operatum*.”(ibid: 18).

10 Bourdieu developed his understanding of social practice after observing the Algerian Kabyls and their daily household practices, concluding that diverse practices were partly ambiguous in relationship to greater structures. Those social practices made sense for the individual actor, but not necessarily for the objectivist system. Bourdieu reconstructed the self-concepts of actors instead of looking at general and systematic rules of interaction.

Practices make sense to individual actors, but are not intentionally steered by them.

IR scholars have found Bourdieu's concept of *the field* very instructive in explaining the transnational space (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 25). Bourdieu's conception of fields as "social configurations structured along relations of power, objects of struggle and taken for granted rules" (ibid: 24) focuses on the hierarchies in such fields through unequal resources (capital), and the options of actors to improve their stakes in the game through learning background knowledge and other rather non-material skills, which Bourdieu also frames as capital (cultural and social capital), and thus opens up new perspectives for IR-scholars to explore and understand power struggles and relations in the transnational space (ibid.).

The reproduction of society through shared practices and the reconciliation of subjectivist and objectivist social theory are two aspects that are common in Bourdieu's and Giddens' practice theories. Anthony Giddens conceptualized a "grand" theory, the theory of structuration (Giddens 1984), as a way to reconcile objectivist and subjectivist social theory. Social practices in Giddens' theory of structuration are neither individual subjective choices of action nor structurally steered behavior. Giddens argues that society can neither be explained by investigating isolated individual micro phenomena nor by identifying a detached structure (ibid.). Social practices are not without context and rules, but they are changeable by the agents¹¹ who conduct social practices.

According to Giddens, the primacy of either the individual subject or the institutional object needs to be dissolved into a theory of structuration, which argues that the central focus of social research should neither be on the experience of the individual agent nor on the coerciveness of society's structure, but on the social practices regulated by time and space. Social practices as shared courses of action are co-constituted by actors and structure, and can be modified by the agency of the actors (Giddens 1984: 2–5). Agents are able to change everyday actions, because structural rules are often not explicit and only become present while acting (ibid.). The agent necessarily needs to know the rules of a certain practice in order to take part in it or potentially modify the practice. Rules are, according to Giddens, "techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices" (Giddens 1984: 21). Thus, rules are aspects of practices. They can be explic-

11 In general, I use the term actor as a neutral term, defining individual and collective actors. Giddens frames the term *agent* in opposition to *actor*, which, as he states, is part of subjectivist theories of action and thus implies certain attributes. The agent, in contrast to the actor, is not an abstract subject, but somebody who participates in practices and changes the course of practices (Münch 2004: 477-78). When referring to Giddens' theory of structuration, I will adopt the term *agent*.

itly formulated or be implicit (ibid.). Rules are not necessarily codified in an extensive rule book, but they are techniques and procedures that are closely linked to the conduct of the practice.

The continuity of social practice assumes reflexivity of the agent. At the same time such reflexivity is only possible through continuous practices, which are understood as a process. Thus, reflexivity of the agent is not only self-consciousness, but implies a permanent control of action of oneself and others. The assumption behind this is that individuals act with specific motivations, but such motivations might not be consciously known by individuals and cannot be understood isolated from time and space (Giddens 1984: 6–7). It is a practical consciousness, in which we can find tacit knowledge about routinized practices (Giddens 1984: 61). However, the dividing line between practical and discursive consciousness is permeable. Since action is, in contrast to behavior, understood as intentional, acting is in a direct relationship to the individual, who acts. There might be unintended consequences and circumstances that “let individuals act” in a certain way, but in the end it is the agent who has the transformative capacity to “make a difference (Giddens 1984: 14–15). While not negating the power of structures, Giddens wants to oppose the objectivist notion of structures as “forces in nature”:

Many interesting cases for social analysis centre upon the margins of what can count as action – where the power of the individual is confined by a range of specifiable circumstances. But it is of the first importance to recognize that circumstances of social constraint in which individuals ‘have no choice’ are not to be equated with the dissolution of action as such. To ‘have no choice’ does not mean that action has been replaced by reaction (Giddens 1984: 15).

According to Giddens, analyzing the structuration of social systems means analyzing how those systems are produced and reproduced by interactions. Such systems are based on consciously carried out practices of situated agents, who refer to different rules and resources in different contexts (ibid: 25). The knowledgeable ability of actors in practices plays an important role in his theory. “The knowledgeable ability incorporated in the practical activities which make up the bulk of daily life is a constitutive feature (together with power) of the social world. What is known about the social world by its constituent actors is not separate from their world, as in the case of knowledge of events or objects in nature.” (Giddens 1984: 90). Knowledge of actors is thus situated in social contexts and should be interpreted in this regard.

The aim of reconciling of objectivist and subjectivist approaches let Bourdieu and Giddens turn to practices as a middle phenomenon between broader structure and isolated actions. Collective practices that are closely connected to the incorporated knowledge of actors are defining much of the social world. Giddens, however, asserts that the agency of the agent gives them

the options to change and invent practice. This brings us to the micro-aspects of practice theory, which are of specific interest in recent debates.

Practices are, according to Reckwitz (2003), the smallest unit of the social. Practices are nothing more than body movements¹² and are often characterized by persons dealing with “things”, an interaction between people and artefacts. These interactions are based on practical understanding and implicit knowledge. Knowledge is incorporated and materialized in practices. Thus, practices are always knowledge-based actions (Reckwitz 2003: 290–291). Reckwitz concludes that social practices can be understood as a combination of knowledge-dependent behavioral routines. Practices as such consist of routinized motions and actions of the body. A practice becomes social when it is a collective practice and is intersubjectively understandable, thus becoming a “skillful performance” that can be interpreted by others (ibid.). Reckwitz’s practice theory emphasizes the implicitness of knowledge. While acting, criteria are used to establish meaning for other persons and things in order to take appropriate actions. Thus, this knowledge is practical and not preceding a social practice. One aim of practice theory in this regard is to reconstruct this practical knowledge, which is comprised of three elements: knowledge as interpretive understanding, methodical knowledge and motivational-emotional knowledge (ibid: 290–92).

However, the idea of implicit knowledge about generalizable rules is doubted by some theorists (Turner 2005). The “tacit rule book” (ibid.) does not necessarily exist. Turner states that, analogous to Wittgenstein, there are so many possible situations, context-dependent specific rules and expectations on how to behave that it becomes impossible to know all those rules. There are rules, but people interpret them either according to their own purposes (*How are actors pursuing their interests through the interpretation of certain rules?*) or with the aim of “optimizing harmony” with others (*How are actors able to share practices and reach a mutual intelligibility?*) (Turner 2005: 124) Furthermore, Turner states that, especially in the field of politics, *explicit* rules are what make practices “hang together”:

The explicit rather than the tacit parts of politics, the vocabulary of appraisal, the body of political and historical discussion, and explicitly formulated beliefs of various kinds, do the work of making practices hang together. A practice such as scientific discovery, build around training that is oriented to

12 Much literature on the more recent “Practice Turn” puts an emphasis on the bodily expression of practices (Reckwitz 2003). The practice theories conceptualized by current theorists such as Schatzki et al. (2005), Reckwitz (2003) and others emphasize the object, the non-human artifact as an important part of social practices as a nexus of routines, which sometimes enable certain practices. An example mentioned by Reckwitz (2003) is the invention of letterpress printing and the following newly created practices to use books.

enabling a person to participate in discussions involving highly specialized terms and employing common apparatus, may in some respects be more like arithmetic, [...] And explicit discussion, not the training base, pulls the practice in new directions and toward new goals and experiences. (ibid: 127)

Thus, how practices “hang together”, meaning how they possibly form a macro-structure, is not necessarily dependent upon the implicit knowledge base of actors, but rather on the actors’ interpretations of implicit rules as well as their interactions with others, or on explicit rules themselves. Still, the relationship between macro- and micro level in practice theory remains a complex interplay of interpretations, contexts and occurrences, as Jeff Coulter (2005) notes. Practices can reaffirm and instantiate “relevant macro-phenomena” (Coulter 2005: 34) as persons conducting practices can, for example, act as spokespersons and representatives of specific institutions. However, this occurs only under specific circumstances according to specific rules. A person is of course not always the carrier of an institution. For example, the staff person does not always speak on behalf of the bank, but always when she or he is in a professional meeting with clients (Coulter 2005: 34–36). Thus, macro-social phenomena can be observed in daily practices, which are shared by a group of people; for example, officers or craftsmen. They conduct practices in their role of belonging to a group and thus have, in this regard, similar intentions. Although practices are individual actions, there are rough patterns that can be translated into macro-categories of practices (Barnes 2005).

Practice theory suggests that there is no unidirectional determination of actions, either by structures or by actors. The complex interplay of structural factors and agents’ choices results in an ongoing process of inventing, interpreting, reproducing and modifying rules for practice. In the following, I want to look at the relationship between norms and practices. While rules can be understood as any kind of (functional) regulation, the norms that I am concerned with are specific rules or organizing principles (Wiener 2014) that refer to ideas and virtues that are valued as ‘good’ or ‘right’, i.e. human rights or *democracy*.

1.2 Practicing Norms

There is a certain tension between the character of norms and the concepts of practices. *Norms* are often understood as static, external from identities and individuals’ actions, structuring action or giving orientation for action and proclaiming universal validity (human rights). *Practices* are an expression of the intertwining nature of persons and their social and physical environments, the modification of rules in process, and the implicitness of knowledge.

Norms identify desirable states, while practice theory knows no states, but rather fluid processes that can be at best tracked for a while. In short, normative theory and practice theory might not go well together.

However, I claim that practices can also be normatively interpreted – for example, as *democratic*. My argument unfolds as follows: I will first clarify how norms are conventionally conceptualized, and how these definitions are recently challenged by approaches that were developed in critical examination of social constructivist theory, namely Antje Wiener’s theory of contested norms in IR, and Judith Butler’s discussion of the performative reproduction of norms in gender theory. After that, I want to discuss Rahel Jaeggi’s argumentation for a normative critique of forms of life. Wiener emphasizes more generally the contextual quality of norms and their potential to be contested. This is crucial for understanding democratic norms in the context of transnational relations and their dynamic nature, contested by actors and developments. Butler contributes to a clarification on the role of the actors. She asserts that norms are part of practices that actors can change over time. Butler’s argument makes clear, in addition to Wiener’s theory of contestation, that norms live from repeated practices, but can be steered in different directions by actors. Jaeggi’s critique of forms of life helps to clarify the role of normative theory for the account of practice, in that she points us to the normative dimension of norms and how a normative account of practice can be possible.

Social constructivism brought norms research to international relations. Early constructivists introduced norms as a behavior-structuring phenomenon. Based on sociological institutionalism, the logic of appropriateness conceptualizes norms as standards for ‘normal’, appropriate behavior. States and other actors in international relations not only follow power (realism) or interests (liberalism), but also norms that they assume to define common guidelines of appropriate behavior (March and Olsen 2008). This already reveals the character of such norms: they pre-structure the behavior of actors in order to normalize it, bring it into a state of what is assumed normal. Although early social constructivists saw norms as being constructed, they assumed that norms were constituted once and were hardly contested thereafter (Wendt 1992: 68); (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999: 826). This one-directional quality of norms was challenged by critical regime theorists and critical constructivists, who claimed that norms have a cognitive quality next to their habitual quality. Actors work with norms instead of just being habitually steered by norms they assume define appropriate behavior. Actors thus have the potential to contest norms in every stage of norm generation, be it the constituting, referring or implementing phase of norms. This makes norms a much more complex phenomenon and contextualizes their validity (Wiener 2014: 26-30). In this way, Wiener claims that norms research should not focus on compliance with norms (as in conventional social constructivism in IR), but on contesting

norms. The *practice* of norms comes into focus. Norms gain a dual quality in that they structure *and* are constructed through practice. Wiener conceptualizes the contestation of norms as a norm-generative practice, which can be a “legitimacy enhancing practice in the global realm” (Wiener 2014: 45). Diverse actors in the transnational arena should be able to contest norms, and thus norms become contestable by practice.

The way norms can be worked with in practice was also laid out by Judith Butler (2004). She describes, in her essay on David Reimer, who was, after a doctor’s fault, surgically transformed into and raised as a girl, the inherent normativity of (gender) practice. His story, tragically ending in suicide, questions general assumptions of both (gender) essentialism as well as social constructivism. David, raised as Brenda, felt very early that she rather wanted to play with and like boys, while Brenda’s psychiatrists assumed that gender is constructed and purely defined by how a child is raised. Brenda was supervised closely by doctors and psychiatrists and began to understand that there was a norm (femininity) that she failed to live up to (Butler 2004: 69). She experienced that norm to be externally given by the expectation of psychiatrists and her social environment. However, Butler doubts this external character of the norm, and sees the norm being inherent in Brenda’s practices of ‘freakishness’ (ibid). In this, Brenda reproduced the norms that are supposed to be normal in his daily practice of not liking dolls or girls’ clothes, and playing with trucks instead (ibid: 70). Brenda strongly defined herself through the opposition of supposedly female preferences, which might beg the question: is it *unfeminine* to dislike dolls? Would other little girls be brought to a psychiatrist if they refused to play with dolls? Thus, Butler concludes that norms are inscribed in practice and vice versa; practice reproduces or potentially modifies norms:

When one performance of gender is considered real and another false, or when one presentation of gender is considered authentic, and another fake, then we can conclude that a certain ontology of gender is conditioning these judgments, an ontology (an account of what gender *is*) that is also put into crisis by the performance of gender in such a way that these judgments are undermined or become impossible to make. (ibid: 214)

Butler’s concept of practice is embedded in a critique against essentialist and prediscursive identities (the “I”). She asserts that there are massive social norms that affect a person’s gender identity. However, those norms do not *determine* what it ‘is’ to be female or male, i.e. resulting in the signification of a certain identity. Confirming gendered norms is, according to Butler, rather a recursive practice:

[...] signification is *not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition* that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the

production of substantializing effects. In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; “agency”, then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition. (Butler 2002: 198).

The actor is able to modify repeated practices and therefore change supposedly ‘natural’ norms. For exploring the relationship between norms, rules and practices, Butler’s critical examination of identity contributes the insight that norms are not something that determines identity or the practice of identity *a priori*. There is no stable set of attitudes at point in time *x*. Butler’s idea is rather that identities form in the constant repetition and reproduction of certain norms. How a man has to sit (legs not crossed) is such a gendered norm, which is reproduced constantly, but which can also quite easily be modified in daily practice.

Having focused on norms from an analytical perspective, I now turn to the normative dimension of norms. Beyond the questions of what norms do and how they interact with persons, practices and structures, there are normative questions about which norms are ‘good’ and *should* be practiced. We have seen in Butler’s analysis that normative questions already accompany such descriptions of the character of gendered norms, and how actors can circumvent and eventually change them. Consequently I will point out, with Jaeggi (2014), that descriptive analysis and normative evaluation cannot be separated that easily. Similar to gender norms, in each account of democratic norms, there is a certain hidden normativity. These – of course diversely interpreted and contested – democratic norms need to be scrutinized in order to be able to speak about *democratic* practice. Therefore, the normative dimension of practice is relevant. The conceptualization of democracy *as* practice can now open up new questions of what democratic norms mean *in* practice. How are they translated into actions? How good are they for involved persons and organizations? And, of course, when does a practice qualify as democratic (for involved persons)? In this complex interplay of practice and norms, it seems like the normative standpoint as such needs to be modified, too. As Lisa Disch (2015) argues, theorists could shift their perspective to the “citizen standpoint” as an internal standpoint from which evaluation and critique can be articulated. This might be a solution to the normativity trap, in which liberal theories are stuck, as Jaeggi points out.

Jaeggi’s argument is an argument against the liberal neutrality towards the private sphere, which Rawls coined in his theory of justice as fairness. The state should not judge private forms of life in pluralist societies, in order to do justice to the forms of life (Jaeggi 2014: 31). Jaeggi refers to *forms of life* as inert bundles of social practices (ibid: 94). It should be possible to normatively criticize forms of life. Her argument is also an argument against Habermas’ division of morals and ethics, in which he put forward the intuitive separation of a universal moral of “the right” (*das Richtige*) which *can* be normatively

judged, and the plural ethics of different forms and groups in society (ideas of “the good” life), which are not to be judged. While the *moral* refers to universal and basic norms that every member in a society must respect, according to Habermas, ethics are particular ideas of a good or successful life. Those should not be of public matter. However, Jaeggi asks if this “ethical abstention” (Habermas: 1983) is not too pragmatic a solution for the struggles of pluralist societies. How do we decide between morals and ethics? While the cruel torture of a person must be considered wrong, disconcerting education or marriage practices are ethical particularities (Jaeggi citing Habermas 2014: 37). If parents beat their children, is this an ethical particularity of specific milieus in society or morally ‘wrong’, because the dignity of persons is violated? Refraining from articulating such conflicts is what Jaeggi calls the avoidance strategy of liberal theory. Why should these questions not remain in the private sphere? Jaeggi argues that the state already regulates many supposedly private forms of life in how it supports technology, infrastructure and education. All these public measures influence social practices in the so-called private sphere. Forms of life are always politically instituted and dependent on public institutions. The choice for specific values in the institutional frame of the liberal state is always already made (ibid: 40). The neutrality of liberals is a “self-misunderstanding” (ibid.). The division between moral and ethical matters is in itself context dependent and thus naturalizes liberal values. Alternatives are invisible. In this way, liberal theory fails in its own norm of autonomy and anti-paternalism in the choice and organization of forms of life – neutral abstention does not enable people to build their lives autonomously; rather, it conceals the powers that determine it (ibid: 47). Furthermore, liberal theory does not acknowledge the dynamics of forms of life and thus essentializes them. Because of this, those bundles of social practices are not fully recognized in their meaning for individuals and their normative claims (ibid: 51). Furthermore, social practices such as habits already normatively prefigure peoples’ life choices and actions.

There is a deep inscription of norms in the forms of life. The description of a form of life, for example *family*, already implies certain norms that are part of the practices conducted *in* and *as* family (ibid: 143). Do family practices correspond with the term family? The spontaneous expression: “This is not a family anymore!” already defines the norms entailed in the practice of being a family, namely as being a loving, mutually supportive community. Similar to practice theorists, Jaeggi argues that besides the explicit norms, there are implicit norms in practices. This makes the sole identification of social practices already normative. A form of life, such as the family, which is identified as itself, is already normatively coined. The evaluation of the family as being a *very caring family* or just a *good-enough family* is not necessarily needed in order to make a normative statement about the associated practice (ibid: 151).

Ontologically, but also epistemically speaking, practices and norms are not separable: the analysis of social practices is already intertwined with its critique. We should be able to 'see' the repressive character of a practice in order to normatively evaluate it (ibid: 55). Jaeggi argues for a normative critique of forms of life not as something that is externally done by 'judges' (be it philosophers or politicians) and then implemented in restrictive laws. Critique is meant as public discussion of debatable forms of life and the possibility of an emancipatory transformation of such practices (ibid: 53).

Concluding from the practice accounts outlined above, practice theory first helps to explore transnational civil society networks and their specific characteristics – or, as Antje Wiener has put it: “transnational arenas’ [...] are constructed through practice and can, therefore be reconstructed with reference to practice by empirical research. That is, they emerge through the enactment of normative structures of meaning-in-use” (Wiener 2014: 30). Thus, practice theory can enable the exploration of the dynamic and often fluid transnational civil society networks with their specific forms of politics. Second, practice theory accounts of norms and normativity can usefully guide the critical discussion of democratic practice, where static criteria for democratic quality fail to address the peculiarities of the transnational realm.

1.3 Political Practice and Democratic Norms

Turning to the political space, we need to specify what political practices are and what the specific character of *democratic* norms is. Similar to social life, norms and practices are intertwined in political life, too. Nullmeier et al. (2003) understands practices in politics as (a) interactions and (b) communications – below the level of institutions – that create and structure the political space. Whereas communication is understood as the basic term for all kinds of social action, interaction is communication between present actors (face-to-face communication). In addition, political practices can be more or less complex in terms of how many actors, communication forms and media are involved or how many sub-practices are subsumed¹³ (Nullmeier et al. 2003: 18).

Democratic practice necessarily entails a normative understanding of implicit and explicit rules. While rules in social and political practices can mainly have a functional character, rules in democratic practices refer to shared normative ideas of how democratic certain practices *should* be. Democracy is based on moral ideas of equality and liberty. These broader values are translated into specific democratic norms or organizing principles such as balance

13 Nullmeier et al. (2003) cite *political intrigue* as one form of a very complex political practice that contains several single political practices.

of power, voting rights, and so on. In the practices that I study, the organizing principles are these kinds of norms, which are brought to life by practices, embed in routines and at the same time configure how practices evolve and change. These norms are contextual in that they are, for example, interpreted differently in specific models of democracy or in various countries or even cities (Wiener 2014).

Democracy in its most abstract version is a set of different norms. The broadest definition of an “empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions”(Warren 2006: 386) sets the parameter for any specific type of democracy. This means that participatory democrats may apply this norm to participatory processes and as a justification of participatory democracy, which could best facilitate the conduct of the democratic norm. Similarly, deliberative democrats and representative democrats argue for their respective types of democracy. While participatory democracy on the hand and representative democracy on the other are sometimes used as oppositional concepts, practices of participation and representation can stand side by side and complement each other. Based on the assumption that there are specific participatory, deliberative and representative democratic norms, which follow the broadest definition of democracy named above, those norms can be divided into several specific *rules*¹⁴.

Actors have learned tacit and explicit rules in order to perform (Turner 2005: 120). Furthermore, the learning of these rules can increase the ability of actors to conduct practices and can enable actors to position themselves towards rules and practices, i.e. go around rules, reinterpret rules (Nullmeier 2008) or disapprove/approve of practices or their underlying rules. In how far actors can position themselves in a practice highly depends on their knowledge base about the broader structure (the network), the institutions (e.g. general assemblies) and the practices (e.g. decision-making). This knowledge is framed very broadly. Giddens calls it “accurate or valid awareness” or “practical consciousness” (Giddens 1984: 90) it has a mainly practical connotation, being incorporated into practices. “Practical consciousness consists of knowing the rules and the tactics whereby daily social life is constituted and reconstituted across space and time” (ibid.).

This positioning of actors in practices in turn can modify these practices and consequently their rules. If actors are reluctant to perform a certain practice or to follow the rules of this practice (for example, monthly reporting to their local constituency), the practice will change. Eventually, positionings of actors through practices can lead to a re-interpretation or circumvention of the norms inherent in a practice. The revision and dissolution of the tension

14 Here, I follow the path of process-oriented democracy. Traditional democratic theorists would argue for the translation of principles into structure and/or resources.

between an idealist and ambitious norm set (e.g. participatory democracy) and the necessities of functioning daily routines can be successful through re-interpretation and/or circumvention of norms. However, a permanent and consequent re-interpretation or circumvention can also lead to an abolishment of the respective norm (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff 2010: 21). Actors justify their actions with reference to explicit norms or “practice” implicit norms:

If one adopts this idea of an implicit, process-oriented dimension of normativity, a typology of explicit sources of normativity has to be complemented by a conception of political practices as performative actualizations of implicit norms. A two-dimensional conception of the normativity of political practices has to address the relation between sources agents explicitly refer to when justifying their actions or proposed decision options and the implicit normative force that becomes apparent in what they actually do, the norms they observe and perpetuate in their actual engagement in political practices, like for example in different types of decision-making practices. (ibid: 361–62)

Actors in transnational civil societies, for example, can refer to explicit norms of democratic coordination and decision-making and at the same time perpetuate the implicit norms they observe in other interactions, or perform in their own daily routines. In transnational civil society organizations as such, individual members, coordinators and campaigners subscribe to and modify (possibly even circumvent) explicit references to and implicit understandings of democratic norms. Norms have a dual quality; as Wiener (2014) puts it, they are structuring *and* constructed.

A practice-theoretical approach to democracy stands in stark contrast to the traditional concepts of democracy, which emphasize the institutional character of democracy. The institutional architecture of democratic systems guarantees certain democratic norms, such as checks and balances, minority protection or equal voting rights. This institutional account of democracy has a long tradition. The social contract as an institutionalization of the relationship between rulers and ruled is a corner stone of the justification of legitimacy of the democratic government, according to Rousseau (1762). This kind of institutionalized relationship was further developed in the federalist papers by Madison, Hamilton and Jay (1787/88), used in the drafting of a constitution for the United States of America. In contrast to Rousseau, the federalist paper authors conceptualized a democratic theory that is based on pluralism and not on the identity of ruler and ruled. Due to the necessity of drafting a constitution for a large mass society, they emphasized representation as a main element. J.S. Mill later argued for a representative government with an institutionalized system of pluralist voting (1861). These foundations of modern democratic theory show the traditional rootedness of democracy in institutions. However, some accounts of democracy that have been drafted since the mid-20th century, try to conceptualize a more process- and practice-ori-

ented approach to democracy in order to overcome the drawbacks of traditional representative democracy, such as voting fatigue, political ignorance or inequality in formal participation: Process-and practice-oriented democratic theory can be divided into three main strands of literature: (1) literature on participatory democracy, dating back to Athenian direct democracy, revived in the 1960s by Pateman, Hirst and others; (2) the more recent literature of representative claims-making (Saward 2010) and discursive and deliberative representation (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008, Urbinati 2000) and (3) the large strand of literature dealing with deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996, Cohen 1997, Goodin 2003). Practice-and process-oriented approaches to democracy do not lack institutional features at all. They rather emphasize the practice quality of democracy in its adaptability, interpretative character and contextual nature.

In order to identify democracy in transnational civil society networks, the abstract ideas of democracy should be disentangled from the institutionalist idea of the democratic state. Two sets of ideas are the baseline for the normative logic of democracy. At first, the moral equality of each individual in collective rule is important "...because each individual life is an end in itself, collective decisions ought to recognize, respect, and benefit individual's interests and values equally, insofar as possible." (Warren 2006: 385). The second set of ideas relates to the boundaries of democratic rule and the definition of "the people". The normative claim for democracy is the "empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions" (Warren 2006: 386).

As Saward stated, "One of the defining features of democracy may well be its restlessness, dynamism and comparative openness to new ideas" (Saward 2000: 3). The re-discussion and reframing of traditional democratic theoretical concepts in the light of changed contexts is of theoretical interest of this study. While transnational networks are not always seen as a favorable place for democracy because of the lack of institutionalization, the practice lens can help to locate democracy under different conditions than those of the liberal nation state. Consequently, the two subsequent chapters of part I will discuss process-oriented democratic theories that are not that tightly bound to nation state institutions. Participatory democracy, the debate on deliberative democracy as well as current approaches of representative democracy are first outlined and then discussed in terms of their use for the empirical context of transnational civil society networks respectively.

2 Participatory and Deliberative Democracy: From Equality Norms to Argumentative Rationalities

Theories of participatory and deliberative democracy are closely related to each other, although not necessarily linked in every strand of theory building. While participatory democracy has its roots in the Greek polis and even in its modern interpretation starts in the 1970's, deliberative democracy is a quite recent but very prominent theory in the family of normative democratic theories. Main assumptions of deliberative democracy build on the works of participatory democrats, and since the debate on participatory democracy has stalled in recent decades, deliberative democracy can be seen as the successor of participatory democracy. However, deliberative democrats have of course shifted the focus from the wider spheres of politics and society to the concrete processes of will-formation and decision-making. In that, they also argued against participatory understandings of democracy and emphasized the epistemic quality of structured (small) group discussions. This chapter starts with participatory democracy's ground work and main ideas and then follows the different traces of deliberative democracy that evolved partly out of the critical engagement with participatory democratic theories.

2.1 Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy comprises many very different concepts, ranging from the direct democracy in the Athenian Polis to recent approaches of "democracy in the making" in social movement groups. All these concepts, however, share the strong emphasis on equality and the tight connection between equality and freedom. The tight connection of participation, equality and freedom is of specific relevance here. This assumed interdependency between these three norms is the normative basis of participatory democracy. Building on this normative basis, theorists attempted to relate participatory democracy to existing democracies, either in opposition to it or in an integrative approach.

2.1.1 Equality and Popular Sovereignty

Many participatory democrats argue for an equal society which should be an end in itself. This should be reached through equalized participation in politics, which gives citizens the freedom to discuss and decide upon their matters freely. This line of argumentation is as old as the city states in ancient Greece. The Athenian Polis in Ancient Greece is seen as the origin of democracy, a direct and participatory democracy in a city-republic. The political ideals were “equality among citizens, liberty, respect for the law and justice” (Held 2006:13); all these ideals inspired modern democratic theory. In the Athenian Polis, citizens could engage directly in state affairs; the demos had supreme authority in legislative and judicial functions. Citizens were supposed to subordinate their private lives under public affairs and the common good (Held 2006: 14). Private and public life were intertwined, and every citizen should live “in their own way” (ibid.). Not only the citizens’ ‘duty’ to participate in political life is expressed in the following quote of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, but also a reference to the increased quality of decisions after thorough debate, which is a core argument of deliberation theory as well:

Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics – this is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all. We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions: for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated. (Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, pp. 147, as cited by Held 2006: 14)

Equalizing political participation was a main objective of the selection of representatives. The selection of officials by lot in order to avoid a selection according to wealth, education or birth was seen as very democratic. It gave the less wealthy, who are strongest in numbers, the main weight in the political system. Elections were seen as a rather unequal instrument since they favor the well-known and usually richer citizens (Cartledge 2006). Thus, freedom and equality were linked because the freedom to rule and being ruled in turn could only be established if there is an equal share in the capacity to rule, meaning that participation was financially compensated and there were equal chances to hold offices (ibid.):

Thus understood, equality is the practical basis of liberty. It is also the moral basis of liberty, for the belief that people should have an equal share of ruling justifies the first criterion of liberty (‘ruling and being ruled in turn’). While this strong commitment to equality might conflict (as many, including Aristotle, have argued) with liberty as measured in the second criterion (‘living

as one chooses'), democrats hold that there must be some limits to choice if one citizen's freedom is not to interfere unjustly with another's. (Held 2006: 16–17).

This emphasis on liberty understood as ruling and being ruled in turn marks a core understanding of participatory democracy, while the liberal understanding of liberty as “living as one chooses” is often said to conflict with participatory democracy and broad participation. Although the ancient Greek city state democracy was very exclusive in terms of formal citizen rights, it is seen as *the* model of democracy, which lays the foundation for the ideal of an inclusive and participatory democracy. However, the Athenian democracy had only around 30,000–45,000 citizens (Held 2006: 12). Because of the exclusion of women, slaves and immigrants, only a small number of inhabitants counted as full citizens. The adaptation of the classical democracy of Athens to modern democracy thus faces problems of scale, complexity and degrees of political heterogeneity (ibid.).

Besides the Athenian city state democracy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's account of popular sovereignty is often cited as the groundwork for participatory democracy. He conceptualized popular sovereignty as inalienable, indivisible, infallible, absolute and not to be delegated (Rousseau 1762, Schmidt 2008: 83). In his theory of republicanism, Rousseau argued against representative government as an unjust governmental theory that alienates people and justifies constant and irrevocable representation (ibid.). On the contrary, he saw the executive government as a servant to the people who are active citizens directly involved in the legislation: “In Rousseau's account, the idea of self-rule is posited as an end in itself; a political order offering opportunities for participation in the arrangement of public affairs should not just be a state, but rather the formation of *a type of society*: a society in which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens (...)” (Held 2006: 45).

These ideas of democracy as well as the justification of democracy as an end in itself were taken up by current participatory democrats as Benjamin Barber, who alleges that representative democracy and participatory democracy cannot go together (Barber 1984). Critics of the liberal representative “thin” democracy revived his line of argumentation again in the 1960's/70's. The demand for more citizen participation arose from the insight in the deficiencies of modern democracy (Dahl 1971), the normative claims for more equality in state democracy as well as in other parts of social life (Pateman 1970, Phillips 1993), and the recognition of civic virtues, as well as the assumption that democratic institutions can foster and broaden the moral and cognitive capacities of reasoning in citizens (Goodin 2003). Ideas of participatory democracy were developed in social movement contexts and are often seen as the normative foundation of social movements when taking a critical stance toward the “thin” democracy of representative governments. These in-

ventions of participatory practice can be observed in the so-called new social movements in the 1960's and 1970's as well as for example in the Occupy movement, where new practices of equalized discussion and decision-making were invented and tested. Therefore, the consideration of participatory democracy is inevitable in the context of the study of transnational civil society. However, many participatory democrats started with the critical examination of democracy in the state context. Carole Pateman, as one of the first modern theorists of participatory democracy, argued that citizens can learn from participating in democratic processes to think and act more democratically and less egoistically. Based on this assumption, all kinds of other societal spheres where people interact with each other should be democratized, for example the work place and the economy (Pateman 1970). The expansion of participatory democracy to areas of the workplace, family and schools is demanded by participatory democrats to different degrees. A rather integrative account of participatory democracy is that of Peter Bachrach (1967) who sees increasing participation as complementary to a representative democracy. This is rejected by more radical participatory democrats such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) or Benjamin Barber (1984). Thus, it can be said that there is a continual range of differing views within participatory democracy from a more integrative approach to a radical account of participatory democracy that opposes the representative democratic system.

2.1.2 The Triad of Participation, Equality and Freedom

Participatory democracy is praised for its developmental effects: "Participatory deliberation yields citizens who are more knowledgeable, public spirited, better able to see the connections between their own interests and those of others, and more willing to reevaluate their own interests." (Polletta 2002: 11). The main arguments for the strengthening of participatory democracy are (1) that the authority structures of institutions are interrelated with the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals, and (2) that the major function of participatory democracy is to educate (Pateman 1970: 27, citing Rousseau 1762). Participatory democrats thus see a potential in citizens who can develop skills, capacities and virtue under the conditions of a strengthened participatory inclusion of citizens into decision-making processes. In turn, this means that very authoritative state structures prohibit citizens from making use of their "psychological qualities and attitudes". Consequently, citizens are forced to remain passive in such a minimal democratic polity.

In her book about participation and democracy, Carole Pateman (1970) investigates the relationships between work place contexts and the sense of a political efficacy. She demonstrates through many studies, above all the one by Almond and Verba (1963) that there is a clear relationship between the sense

of political efficacy and actual political participation. People who are involved on the local level in non-governmental activities and people who have a high socio-economic status have a sense of political efficacy. Taking the finding that people, who are locally engaged feel more interested and capable to participate in national politics seriously lets Pateman, as many other participatory democratic theorists, conclude that a “democratic character” can be learned (Pateman 1970: 53). While studying the impact of work place situations, she finds that workers who have more room for individual problem-solving and exercise their skills have much higher self-esteem and feel more capable to be involved in political matters. In contrast, workers who are treated as subordinates in a strictly hierarchical authority structure do not have this sense of political efficacy and feel like powerless subordinates in the political system as well as in their workplace (Pateman 1970: 50–52). Those two lines of reasoning argue that the political apathy of the majority of people is not an unchangeable fact, but that the “psychological qualities (the sense of political efficacy) required for participation at the national level” (Pateman 1970: 50) can be developed and fostered by the participation in non-governmental authority structures and the democratization of the work place (*ibid.*).

In critically examining elitist democratic theory, Bachrach (1967) comes to a similar diagnosis. The elitist concept of democracy, which Pateman calls contemporary democratic theory, is founded on the assumption that a majority of people in society are not interested in engaging in politics and are furthermore not capable of making reasonable decisions. The potential participation of those masses poses a threat to democracy. Bachrach describes how democratic theorists shifted their focus from corrupt elites and authoritarian despots in the 18th and 19th century as hindering the development of democracy, to the people or the “ordinary man” who in the western industrial societies was suspected to threaten political freedom (Bachrach 1967: 46). Studies observed that the working class is more authoritarian in its habits and social behavior; because members of the working class are socially isolated and do not participate in public life. Advocates of elitist democratic theory see this evidence as an unchangeable fact and therefore propose to avoid broad participation. In contrast, participatory democrats see the apathy of wide parts of the population as something that can be changed on an individual basis. Being a democratic citizen can be learned by participation. This self-transformation thesis (Warren 1993) is a central element of participatory democracy. Furthermore, Bachrach criticizes that democracy is seen by elitist democrats as a “political method” without any normative claims. This deprives democracy from any goal it could have. According to Bachrach and other participatory democrats, a democracy’s goal should be the self-development of its citizens (Bachrach 1967: 118–119). In this context, advocates of a “thin democracy” would pose the question, if a democracy needs all people to participate in po-

litical decision-making or if it is not enough that a few are active. Pateman would answer that this form of contemporary liberal democracy that we find in western liberal states is not a real democracy in the original sense of democracy as a government for and *by* the people (Pateman 1970: 104).

However, the claim for broader citizen participation, understood as a democratization of democracy, is far from being an uncontested issue. A more descriptive and “value free” contemporary democratic theory strongly opposes the idea of a wide participation of entire populations in nation states. Democratic theorists such as Dahl (1971) or Sartori (1997) feared the danger of destabilization and potentially totalitarian rule when all people are actively participating in a political system. Other political scientists in the 1970’s were concerned about the “involvement of an increasing proportion of the population in political activity [...] the development of new groups and of new consciousness on the part of old groups, including youth, regional and ethnic minorities” and their expansion of tactics and goals (Crozier et al. 1975: 163). This would, as they argued, lead to an overload and consequential weakening of the democratic state. Besides the overloading of state agencies, critics argue that there are other downsides of participation: (1) an inclusive participation cannot be realized, because different social groups participate to different degrees; (2) citizens lack skills and competencies to make informed decisions; (3) citizen participation has in general little impact on political decisions; (4) enhancing citizen participation is not an efficient mode of governance; and (5) effectiveness of citizen participation is limited by scale, and thus transferability from smaller to bigger units is limited (Smith 2009: 14–20). Furthermore, political sociologists claim that wider spheres of the population, especially the lower classes, are not interested in participating in politics (Verba et al. 1995). Verba et al. call that a participatory distortion: Only the well-off, well-educated and well informed become active in politics: “(...) the voices that speak loudly articulate a different set of messages about the state of the public, its needs and its preferences from those that would be sent by those who are inactive. Were everyone equally active, or were activists drawn at random from across the population, an unbiased set of communications would emerge” (ibid: 11). In sum, criticism of participatory democracy raises two main points: the effectiveness problem and the equality problem. First, broader participation does not only weaken the effectiveness of government (overload of input); it is also in itself not supposed to be politically effective. There is not much political impact when citizens become active, as critics of participatory instruments argue. Secondly, in terms of the equality problem, more participation, assuming that citizens’ attitudes towards politics are unchangeable, would only lead to more participation from the well-off who are the ones with time and capacities. The latter point will be subsequently elaborated.

The relationship between participation and equality is a crucial point of debate between liberal theorists favoring representative democracy and participatory democratic theorists. While liberal democrats argue that more participation reinforces inequalities in society, participatory democrats argue that equality and participation are mutually reinforcing. Participatory democrats agree that more participation initially generates inequality among participants – only the eloquent ones with more spare time etc. will participate. However, at the macro-level and in the long run the democratization of e.g. the work place will contribute to more equality in society as a whole. This will in turn motivate more subordinate members of the participant group (e.g. the workers' movement) to demand their rights within the group (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992) From a normative standpoint, Macpherson (1977) argues in favor of participatory democracy because it is normatively desirable that societies are more equal. He also admits that a sheer increase of participation does not cure inequality, but that "It is only that low participation and social inequity are so bound up with each other that a more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system" (Macpherson 1977: 94). However, he identifies a major dilemma in making political systems more participatory. Two prerequisites have to be met before participatory democracy can work: (1) the image of the citizen as a consumer must be replaced, and (2) social and economic inequality must be reduced in society (Macpherson 1977: 100). Thus, participatory democracy is obviously stuck in a vicious cycle: it could make societies more equal, but before this can happen, societies must have transformed into more equal societies in order to enable all citizens to participate. Macpherson identifies three loopholes in this vicious cycle. At first, he notices that more and more people doubt or rethink the cost-benefit-ratio and the virtues of expansion and more and more identify the costs of expansion such as air, water and earth pollution. This could be a first step away from a thin market-embedded democracy. Secondly, there is an increasing awareness of the costs of political apathy and in turn the awareness of participation's political efficacy. Neighborhood activity is increasing as well as movements for more democracy at the workplace. Finally, there is growing doubt about corporate capitalism to meet consumer expectations in the long run (Macpherson 1977: 103–04). These developments are, according to Macpherson, gateways to more participatory and consequently equal societies from the bottom-up. Now, more than 35 years later, Macpherson's normative hopes in participatory democracy have not materialized. Since the loopholes for participatory democracy still exist, and neither the consumption logic of citizens nor the social and economic inequality in society has been significantly reduced, it might need to be rethought if participatory democracy grows only from a bottom-up initiative or if participatory democracy needs structural change.

Such structural change could have been in Nancy Fraser's (2003) mind, when she discussed with Axel Honneth (2003) the relationship between inequality and recognition. Referring to the above outlined dilemma of inequality and participation, she argues that recognition and the lack thereof should not be seen as something personal, subjective or even psychological, but as an institutional structure, a *norm of participatory equal opportunities* (Fraser 2003: 46–48). Whereas Nancy Fraser identifies the different types of new social movements as the ones that fight the battle for recognition and symbolize the “others” in society, namely those who do not fit in the norm of the white, heterosexual, middle class man, Honneth counters that those new social movement groups are already recognized and visible in society. They have already won recognition, left the shadows of the public sphere, and produced exclusion and inequality themselves (Honneth 2003). Although Bachrach and Botwinick as well as Macpherson are conceptualizing the relationship between participation and equality in the framework of broader societies, they argue that equality can also be gained through participatory democracy within social movement groups or civil society organizations. Whereas Bachrach states that participatory democracy can also maintain equality within specific social movements, Macpherson alleges that the development within civil society can lead to more opportunities for practicing participatory democracy and therefore increasing equality in broader society (Macpherson 1977, Bachrach and Botwinick 1992).

Anne Phillips argues for participatory democracy as a solution for inequalities in society by using Rousseau's argument that no citizen can be free if society is unequal. In this view, inequality undermines freedom and consent. As long as one man is rich enough to make another one his servant, and as long as another is so poor that he has to submit, they cannot be considered equally independent (Phillips 1991: 15). Thus, if inequality persists, democracy in its normative connotation is not possible. The critical perspective on structural inequalities in modern democracies is a very valuable contribution of feminist political theory to participatory democracy. Feminist political theorists stress the systematic and historical subordination of groups in democracies. Although feminist *democratic* theory is quite a new strand of literature, which exists since the mid-1990's, renowned feminist political theorists such as Carole Pateman, Anne Phillips and Iris Marion Young brought concepts of equal representation and groups rights in democracy into the debate on equality and freedom in democracies (Phillips 1993; Young 2000; Holland-Cunz 2008). The reason for inequality in democracies from a feminist perspective is clearly rooted in the male concept of citizenship, which is (falsely) perceived as a universal citizenship concept. Feminist political theorists argue that the concept of the individual citizen in liberal democracy is not gender-neutral. There is

a specific and not gender-neutral understanding of the individual in liberal democratic theory based on market relations. Individuals in a democracy are proprietors of their own persons, as Macpherson has argued, and thus the freedom of citizens merely depends on their freedom from any contractual relationship with others. The wage workers can freely enter a contract to allow others to use their capacity as workers (Phillips 1991: 31). However, women historically have not formed consented contracts with others. The one contract they primarily agreed to was a marriage contract in which they were to “hand over their body to another” (Phillips 1991: 35). This kind of contract could not be compared to work contracts, which are entered freely. The individual who is able to consent as such is a male category because the male and female perspectives on freedom and possession differ. Therefore, the concept of citizenship is not universal. The image of a free individual possessing his own person and handing it over to someone else in a contractual relationship cannot be compared to marriage contracts¹⁵. Therefore, Phillips states that “[t]he notions of consent and freedom that underlie liberal philosophy are grounded in the experience of the male.” (ibid.). Participatory democrats and feminist political theorists share a similar critique of liberal democracy. The strict division of public and private sphere and its implication on political equality are criticized by participatory democrats as well as feminists. Both argue for more participation because it does not make sense to have universal suffrage when main decisions about supposedly private matters such as employment, housing and education are left to an un-elected administration (Phillips 1991: 38–39). Similar to feminist critiques, the developmental argument of participatory democracy also targets the division of private and public spheres. Democratic practices are learned in the private sphere of family, work or schools and thus it is not a logical step for many women to engage in democracy on the national level where those matters are not negotiated and decided (ibid.).

More theoretically, the feminist focus on division between public and private has made the question of *where* democracy should be practiced a central, inescapable concern.[...] Diversity, difference, differences, seem to be emerging as central preoccupations in a feminist perspective on democracy. If this is so, they point to active discussion and participation as the key. (italics in the original, Phillips 1991: 41).

While the representative state democracy is criticized for being exclusive and for marginalizing women e.g. in parliamentary representation, participatory

15 Phillips also points to rape trials and the negotiation of what counts as consent of women. Here, she argues, it becomes clear that a woman’s consent (and disagreement respectively) is not valued or even taken seriously under the contract of marriage (Phillips 1991: 35).

forms of democracy are much better received in feminist discourse. First, such forms were concretely practiced in the old and new women's movements. Second, they leave room for diverse participation forms, a diversity of voices and the democratization of all spheres of life, including the private sphere¹⁶ (Holland-Cunz 2008: 533): "Those who have been previously subordinated, marginalized or silenced need the security of a guaranteed voice and in the transitional period to a full and equal citizenship, democracies must act to redress the imbalance that centuries of oppression have wrought." (Phillips 1991: 7). This normative claim of democracy, as formulated by Anne Phillips in her feminist account of participatory democracy, conceptualizes and identifies inequality as a structural, complex and historical phenomenon that cannot just be solved by giving all citizens the same political rights as in liberal democracy. Opening up institutions to citizen participation does not cure the problem of inequality. Difference theorists, such as Anne Phillips, emphasize the logic of presence: the interests of those who are not present in specific meetings will most likely not be considered (Phillips 1996). Consequently, difference theorists argue that it is particularly necessary to test if institutions motivate people from marginalized groups to participate. Thus, the feminist perspective on democracy highlights the necessity of participatory forms and elements of democracy in order to contribute to a more equalized democratic system, not only in terms of gender equality, but also with respect to equality for any groups that are subordinated in society. Feminist authors in particular raise the question *where* democracy should be practiced and learned. Furthermore, feminist democratic theory critically investigates the understanding of allegedly universal norms of democracy. In how far these rules can produce inequalities is outlined by feminist theorists such as Phillips and Young. Men and women must be treated differently in order to be equal. Broadening this thesis to other groups in society, the normative claim of participatory democracy for a wider inclusion is a demand for pro-active and group context sensitive participation practices. The question that feminist political theorists pose in relation to gender categories, namely what structures and ideas inherent in democratic institutions favor a specific circle of people over another (for example men over women), is relevant in relation to other social categories as well and the intersection of them.

Laclau and Mouffe's concept of radical democracy considers the plurality and diversity of citizens' concepts as relevant without trying to find essentialist categories of groups that merely reflect diversity such as in a liberal con-

16 The liberal dualism of public and private sphere is a main field of contestation in feminist theory. Whereas the private sphere as the sphere of difference is mostly attributed to women, the public domain is in those classical accounts a male sphere. This was and is extensively criticized and reformulated by feminists.

cept of citizens. In this, radical democrats question fundamental assumptions of liberal theory such as the concept of the individual citizen as the central point of reference for any democratic legitimization. Thus, citizen identities are considered diverse and overlapping, which is especially relevant in transnational network settings: "Citizenship is not just one identity among others, as it is in liberalism, nor is it the dominant identity that overrides all others, as it is in civic republicanism. Instead, it is an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent, while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of the individual liberty" (Mouffe 1997: 84). Thus, radical democracy suggests a systematic change in conceptualizing democracy. Besides the emphasis on pluralism, which is shared by liberal concepts of democracy, radical democracy takes a critical stance towards the belief in the "nature" of politics. Laclau and Mouffe argue that there is always an alternative way to practice politics; there is no determination in "how things are done". Hegemonies and antagonisms for example are created and reproduced, but they are not necessarily fixed (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001).

What we wish to point out is that politics as a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations cannot be located at a determinate level of the social, as the problem of the political is the problem of the institution of the social, that is, of the definition and articulation of social relations in a field criss-crossed with antagonisms. (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001: 153).

Mouffe refers to Wittgenstein's "grammar of conduct" as the constituting principles of democracy that guide democratic practice (Mouffe 1997: 85). The common good coincides with this grammar of conduct, according to Mouffe (*ibid.*). However, since these principles can be interpreted differently, there must be some sort of exclusion; a radical inclusive democracy is impossible (*ibid.*). This perspective gives room to think about citizenship and participation outside the common demarcation lines of modern liberal democratic theory. This does not only support the practice or practical aspect of democracy, Sørensen and Torfing (2005) used the same perspective to conceptualize democratic quality in governance networks, which is conducive to the understanding of transnational civil society networks, too.

Although it seems that participatory democracy often stands in opposition to liberal representative democracy, there are approaches that attempt to integrate participatory elements into existing democratic systems. Associative democracy puts an emphasis on secondary associations in civil society to complement the common participation repertoire in representative democracy. While Cohen and Rogers (1992) rather favor a governance model of associative democracy that implies state regulation of group representation (Cohen and Rogers 1992: 425), the associationalism put forward by Hirst

(1994) criticizes the “centralized and sovereign state with radical federalist and pluralist ideas advanced as a substitute” (Hirst 1994: 15). While Cohen and Rogers’ approach clearly underlines the dangers of free group representation for democratic norms such as egalitarian participation, Hirst’s emphasis is on voluntarism and self-governance of secondary associations. Thus, according to Hirst, political organization should be restructured so that voluntary self-governing associations “gradually and progressively become the primary means of democratic governance of economic and social affairs” (Hirst 1994: 20). The state gives up some functions to private agencies, not in the liberal understanding of privatization and laissez-faire politics, but as a means to pluralize society. These private agencies are accountable to “those for whom the service or activity is provided” (Hirst 1994: 22). Contrary to the conceptualization of the state in liberal democratic theory, the state here is the secondary institution, whereas civil society takes over social and public functions and thus becomes the primary institution¹⁷ in society: “Self-governing civil society thus becomes the primary feature of society.” (Hirst 1994: 26).

A more recent approach to participatory democracy, which is similarly envisioned as a reform of state and society, is conceptualized by Fung and Wright (2003) who have systematized the observations of participatory projects ranging from participatory budgeting to deliberation forums and mini-publics or citizen juries (Fung and Wright 2003; Smith 2009). These concepts aim at a more concrete application of participatory or deliberative norms. Fung and Wright’s reformist concept “Empowered Participatory Governance” seeks to broaden the practical orientation of deliberation and wants to do justice to the importance of bottom-up civic engagement and secondary associations for a vivid democracy. Furthermore, they argue for a broader discovering and imagining of (participatory) institutions (Fung and Wright 2003: 16–17). The

17 Overall, government shifts from being a service provider to a means of protecting citizens’ rights and of ensuring that social services are provided adequately (*ibid.*). Another principle of political organization according to associationalism is that deliberation and reflection complement elections and majority decision. There should be a constant information flow between governors and the governed. In representative governments, governors seek consent and cooperation of the governed (Hirst 1994: 20) and therefore influence the quality and scale of decision-making, which Hirst identifies as the main problem of representative government (*ibid.*). His concept of democracy as communication is very close to neo-corporatist concepts of social governance, which define the quality of decision-making by the interaction between governing agencies and the agencies organizing the activities being governed (Hirst 1994: 35). This can also be critical when the state is creating voluntary organizations that are highly dependent on the state and quite weak in their potential of critical reflection. According to Hirst, this problem can be solved by creating more organizations from below and having more regional organizations (Hirst 1994: 39). This would pluralize civil society even more. In addition, regional organizations further the devolution of state functions.

design of Empowered Participatory Governance is built on three fundamental ideas: (1) devolution: The power to conceptualize tasks should be delegated to local units; (2) centralized supervision and coordination: Local units should not be purely autonomous; accountability should be linked to superordinate bodies (Fung and Wright 2003: 20–21); and (3) state-centered, not voluntaristic participatory governance: The participatory model does not see social movement actors influencing state institutions from the outside, but remaking official institutions themselves along participatory norms. Therefore, Fung and Wright (2003) argue that this approach is even more radical than other concepts of participatory democracy because it institutionalizes a permanent participation instead of temporary activities of typical social movement mobilization (ibid: 22).

2.2 Deliberative Democracy

Deliberation theory has grown into a broad strand of literature that is discussed in different research areas of social sciences and linguistics. Deliberation theory can be divided into two broad theoretical strands: (1) the epistemic conceptualization of deliberation as a more sensible and enlightened form of decision-making and the (2) conceptual theorizing on deliberation as a way to democratize democracy, i.e. democratizing the collective will-formation of citizens (see Olsen and Trenz 2011). This second strand in particular takes up arguments of participatory democracy.

The epistemic version of deliberative democracy considers deliberation as a cognitive process – bent on finding just solutions and agreements about the common good. Deliberation’s epistemic value rests on the imperative to find the right decision. In contrast, the participatory version of deliberative democracy highlights the active involvement and empowerment of citizens in collective will formation as a necessary condition for the creation of democratic legitimacy. Deliberation has thus primarily a moral value, driven as it is by the imperative to allow for equal participation of all. (Olsen and Trenz 2011: 2).

Democratic deliberation, as Chambers (2009) calls the version of deliberation theory which is more interested in the epistemic perspective on deliberative decision-making, is much more focused on the outcome of deliberation and defines “deliberation in terms of choosing a course of action under noncoercive and discursive conditions” (Chambers 2009: 334). In contrast, deliberative democracy, as the second more participatory version of deliberation, is concerned with the process instead of the outcome of deliberation, and ad-

ditionally focuses more on the society as a whole instead of selected discrete deliberations among few (ibid.).

Deliberative democracy developed out of a criticism of contemporary representative democracy, where voters see elections as consumer choices that only concern them personally and do not take those “others”, the whole society, into consideration when making voting choices. This produces an instrumental rationality that guides democratic decisions, which is not conducive to democracy as such (Held 2006: 238). Deliberationists argue that it cannot be just about pooling information and exchanging views; democracy must be about reasoning about views and testing arguments in order to make rational and enlightened decisions. Furthermore, the elected politicians in representative democracies seem disentangled from their voters (Held 2006). This remoteness of politics was also a diagnosis that participatory democrats made. Citizens should be more engaged in political decision-making and through this be able to make reasonable decisions. Deliberative democracy’s premise is the force of reason-giving in collective decision-making processes (Eriksen and Fossum 2011). Thus, deliberative democracy emphasizes the process that precedes democratic collective decision-making. Deliberation is needed to enhance the quality of decisions by avoiding the consideration of spontaneous preferences and rather by developing reflective preferences. With reference to Habermas, deliberationists argue that rationality cannot be separated from justification to others (ibid.). Furthermore, deliberation as the formation of individuals’ will is seen as the primary source for democratic legitimacy instead of the mere aggregated will of individuals (Held 2006: 233). In other words, deliberative democracy makes two distinct claims: (1) Deliberative democracy argues that through the process of deliberation, i.e. the process of reason-giving and listening to the arguments of others, a political decision can be more rational and enlightened (Offe and Preuß 1991). (2) Deliberationists argue that deliberation has a developmental participatory effect. Citizens develop more sophisticated political views and make more democratic decisions considering other perspectives (Fishkin 2009: 54). This second part of the chapter outlines these two strands of argumentation in deliberation theory, namely the epistemic reasoning of the more enlightened decisions through deliberation and the participatory reasoning of citizen transformation (Warren 1993) through deliberation.

2.2.1 The Epistemic Perspective on Deliberation

The distinct epistemic quality of deliberation is mainly based on the systematization of different types of action by Jürgen Habermas (1981) on the one hand, and Jon Elster’s (1998) distinction between arguing and bargaining on the other hand. Habermas’ distinction between strategic and communicative

action, which he outlined in the Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1981) is defined on the basis of the criteria of action orientation (Saretzki 2009). Whether an action is oriented to success or to understanding defines if a social action is strategic or communicative respectively (Habermas 1981: 256–57).

Reaching understanding is conceptualized by Habermas as reaching an agreement, which cannot be imposed by one party only, but has a rational basis. In his linguistic conceptualization, Habermas asserts that successful communicative action takes place when the other (person) agrees to a given speech act (Habermas 1981: 286–87). Habermas further differentiated communicative action into weak and strong communicative action by introducing a third action orientation, the orientation to reach consensus. Reaching consensus is conceptualized as strong communicative action, whereas reaching understanding is a weak communicative action (Saretzki 2009: 156; citing Habermas 1999: 121–134). Habermas' distinction between strategic and communicative action is complemented by a distinction of Jon Elster (1998), who defines his categories of bargaining and arguing, in contrast to Habermas, on the basis of a rational choice assumption (Saretzki 1996). While bargaining is meant, when persons negotiate with each other having their own preferences in mind, arguing means the communication between two or more parties, which are ready to be convinced and do not consequently follow their own interests, but aim at finding true answers (Elster 1998). He further claims that deliberation becomes more probable when it is public because publicness constrains negotiation. Publicness keeps people from negotiating for their own selfish interests (imperfection constraint). Furthermore, in order to be convincing, people's arguments should be in line with what they said in the past (consistency constraint): "Once a speaker has adopted an impartial argument because it corresponds to his interest or prejudice, he will be seen as opportunistic if he deviates from it when it ceases to serve his needs" (Elster 1998: 104). Finally, public deliberation produces a plausibility constraint to deliberators in that they cannot make hypocritical statements that are not convincing to others (Elster 1998: 105).

However, Elster's differentiation between bargaining and arguing is not one between equal terms, Saretzki argues. Elster rather assumes that bargaining is the 'natural' way of communication, whereas one has to be forced (by external condition or by oneself) into arguing (Saretzki 1996: 24). This normative bias of rational choice can be falsified by many examples of bargaining situations, in which starting points of actors are changed and the actors become oriented toward a common good (in contrast to individual preferences) (ibid: 25–26). Similarly, it can be argued against the differentiation between arguing as a public discussion and bargaining as a confidential communication; since also arguing processes can be conducted secretly e.g. dissident's

deliberating (ibid: 29). Thus, it can be concluded that the defining categories of arguing and bargaining such as orientations, themes, contexts and collectives are “contingent on the respective mode of communication” (Saretzki 1996: 32, author’s own translation). Saretzki suggests “a narrow ‘modal’ definition of the two modes of communications” (Saretzki 2009: 165, author’s own translation) that distinguishes arguing and bargaining on the dimensions of the functional reference, the basic structure and the process. Whereas the function of arguing is to solve cognitive problems, bargaining is used to solve distributive problems. From this evolves the basic structure, which is triadic in deliberation and dyadic in negotiation. In order to solve cognitive problems, arguing needs the reference to a third party, a criterion for true or right, in front of which arguments are exchanged. This also influences the process dimension. Arguing is reflexive, whereas bargaining is sequential (Saretzki 1996: 34-35).

Seyla Benhabib (1996) further differentiated the basic principles of discourse ethics. She argued that deliberation procedures themselves should be guided by general norms, which are outlined in the discourse model of ethics. The participation in deliberation should be governed by equality and symmetry. All should have the same chance to raise issues and arguments. Furthermore everyone should have the right to question the assigned topics of deliberation, i.e. the agenda. And finally, everyone should have the right to raise reflexive arguments about the rules of procedure as such (Benhabib 1996: 70). Following this argumentation, deliberation theorists have argued, that decisions that are taken after deliberation are better decisions because participants in deliberation have developed more reflective preferences. These reflective preferences are:

- more *empathetic* with the plight of others;
- more *considered*, and hence both better informed and more stable; and
- more *far-reaching* in both time and space, taking fuller account of distant periods, distant peoples and different interests. (Goodin 2003: 7).

Similarly, Offe and Preuss define the aim of every democratic decision as being rational and enlightened: A political will is rational or enlightened if it meets three criteria: (1) fact-regarding, (2) future-regarding and (3) other-regarding. (Offe and Preuss 1991: 156–57). This rational and enlightened decision-making is to be learned in deliberation. This concept assumes also that people do not have fixed preferences, but that they can “learn” what their preferences are in discussing matters with others:

The major contention of deliberative democrats is to bid farewell to any notion of fixed preferences and to replace them with a learning process in and through which people come to terms with the range of issues they need to understand in order to hold a sound and reasonable political judgment. (Held 2006: 233)

This normative anticipation that democratic deliberation leads to better decisions through a learning process of the involved participants of deliberation is based on the epistemic aim of deliberation to solve cognitive problems, as Saretzki (1996) pointed out. Those better decisions should be grounded in universal and valid norms instead of particularistic interests. This refraining from one's own egoistic interests and the "inclusion of the other" (Habermas et al. 2002) is possible through deliberation. Habermas stated that impartial judgment can only result from a principle that forces "all affected to adopt the perspectives of *all others* in the balancing of interests" (Habermas 1992: 65). Thus, every valid norm must be preceded by a compelled role-taking of all affected. Habermas formulates this universalization principle as a principle of argumentation, which functions as a necessary presupposition for any practical discourse to be in place (Habermas 1992: 66, 93). In defining the bridging principle between particular observations and generalizable hypotheses in practical discourse¹⁸, Habermas formulates an extended universalization principle, which goes beyond Kant's categorical imperative and is not solely based on a formalistic account of the universal validity of norms. Habermas pointed out in his discourse ethics that "[o]nly those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse." (Habermas 1992: 66).

Besides the relationship between preferences, learning and valid norms, there are two other epistemological questions that emerge in the discussion of deliberative democracy: (1) Does deliberative democracy prioritize rational reasoning over emotional storytelling or can reasonable decisions also be found by different forms of citizen input? (2) Which kind of knowledge counts? Is there expert knowledge as the only form of valuable knowledge, or can local lay knowledge be brought forward by locals from bottom-up? Those two epistemological questions already point to participatory claims. If the emotional and affective voices are not taken into account, inequalities may be produced, as already outlined, in favor of the well-educated, elaborate discussants. Similarly, if local knowledge is not taken into account, the diversity of different forms and qualities of knowledge is missed out.

Polletta (2006) argues that storytelling is a very important correction factor in supposedly universal rational deliberation. Although affective and subjective storytelling seems not to contribute to more considered reasoning, and the demand to argue a case in the light of the needs of others, there is a function of storytelling to deliberation that influences the rest of the group rather than the storyteller:

18 Habermas names the principle of induction as the bridging principle in empirical sciences. In philosophy, he states, the suggested moral principles as the bridging principle always refer to Kant's categorical imperative (Habermas 1992: 63).

When members of disadvantaged groups recount their experiences of particular policies, they expose the disparate impacts of supposedly neutral policies and invite in their fellow deliberators an empathetic understanding of their distinctive needs and priorities. Far from simply asserting personal experience as the basis for policy, such stories serve to reveal the false universality of existing standards – and may open the way to construct more truly universal standards. (Polletta 2006: 83)

Thus, storytelling can give way to an even more considered account of a specific matter. By introducing storytelling as a complementary concept to rational reasoning, the epistemic process of finding “rational and enlightened” (Offe and Preuss 1991) decisions is not impeded but can be complemented and thus improved.

The question of the value of local lay knowledge has a normative as well as a functional dimension. The inclusion of local or lay knowledge into deliberation processes is desirable under the notion of participatory inclusion. As already indicated, the knowledge and perspectives of local persons and groups is often unheard and therefore must be given a voice in order to fulfil the normative standards of an inclusive democratic decision-making (Phillips 1993). Equally important is the functional dimension of local knowledge. As Saretzki (1997) points out, expert knowledge comes up against limiting factors: (1) The specialized knowledge of ‘facts’ that experts can provide is not enough to solve problems in society. In order to do that, a normative evaluation against any kind of values or norms must be conducted. Otherwise, it cannot be estimated whether a social or political problematic issue needs to be solved or not. (2) Expert knowledge is in most cases too systematic and abstract in order to diagnose context-dependent problems. Systematic expert knowledge needs to be contextualized in order to be applicable to concrete local political problems. (3) Scientific expertise is disciplinary expertise, which can hardly capture the complexities of political problems. Thus, scientific expertise is in need of an interdisciplinary integration of knowledge. (4) There is no certain scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is inherently hypothetical, uncertain and incomplete. Thus, all allegedly certain expert knowledge has epistemic limitations and must be complemented and insured (Saretzki 1997: 181–83). Thus, emotional storytelling and local lay knowledge can be very important complements of deliberation processes and must be taken into account when thinking about the epistemic ends of deliberation. They fulfil the role to include knowledge and perspectives that are otherwise easily overlooked by expert deliberation.

Summarizing the epistemic dimension of deliberation, it can be concluded that deliberationists base their reasoning about good decisions for cognitive problems on a process-oriented dimension. As Habermas (1981) pointed out, it is not enough to set a formalistic universal principle that for-

mally everyone could agree on a norm. Habermas' universalization principle must be *practiced* in discourse (1981). Thus, as he further outlines there must be a practical role-taking of other perspectives by all participants in deliberation. Only this kind of practical discourse can result in the decision about valid norms (ibid.). This kind of decision-making underlines very emphatically the practice-dimension in the claim for deliberative decision-making. Thus, when adopting these basic assumptions in deliberation of transnational civil society networks, the focus should be rather on the action orientation of involved participants in deliberation and the practices of role-taking and "inclusion of the other" than on formal institutional settings of deliberation.

2.2.2 The Participatory Claims of Deliberative Democracy

Translating discourse theory into the context of mass societies and nation state democracy, Habermas (1996) defined popular sovereignty as procedural and subjectless. While republican democratic theorists claimed that people are the bearers of sovereignty "that in principle cannot be delegated" (Habermas 1996: 301), liberals stated that political authority can be exercised by "means of elections and voting" (ibid.). Habermas suggested a third version of democracy in mass societies:

By contrast, the discourse theory of democracy corresponds to the image of a decentered society, albeit a society in which the political public sphere has been differentiated as an arena for the perception, identification, and treatment of problems affecting the whole of society. Once one gives up the philosophy of the subject, one needs neither to concentrate sovereignty concretely in the people nor to banish it in anonymous constitutional structures and powers. The "self" of the self-organizing legal community disappears in the subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption of being reasonable. This is not to denounce the intuition connected with the idea of popular sovereignty but to interpret it intersubjectively. (Habermas 1996: 301)

Deliberative democracy in its participatory connotation is defined as "political mechanisms and social practices which facilitate the discovery of good arguments, sound justification of action and, where possible, generalizable interest" (Dryzek 1990, as cited by Held 2006: 246). The procedural notion of deliberative democracy and the definition as "practices and mechanisms" by Dryzek (1990) makes deliberative democracy adaptable to a practice-oriented examination of democracy in transnational civil society networks. This specific conceptualization of deliberative democracy is further specified by many theorists. Goodin (2003) argues in this regard to take the input-dimension of democracy more seriously. Input is recognized as having an impact, but only in relation to the output. In liberal democratic theory, preferenc-

es are assumed to be fixed. The question how they develop is neglected. To the contrary, Goodin argues that inputs themselves can be lesser or more democratic (Goodin 2003: 10). This refers back to the distinction between different kinds of discussion, whether participants bargain or argue, or whether they act instrumentally or truth-seeking. Furthermore, deliberationists criticize that the mere aggregation of votes in liberal representative democracies does not consider the questions of how and why people come to vote. Empirical studies assess the socio-psychological determinants of voting choices, but do not target the “normative concerns of democratic theory” (Goodin 2003: 11), being the reasoning of individuals and their “internal reflective concomitants of democratic political discussions” (ibid.). These are important questions when thinking about the inclusion of the “mute”, the ones that are officially excluded from voting, the homeless and foreigners for example. Also other groups that will be affected by political decisions such as future generations or non-humans (animals, eco-systems) are excluded from the simple vote. Imagining oneself in the place of somebody or some group that is not able to vote is better possible in a deliberation process than without any deliberation, Goodin argues (ibid: 14): “Premise matter, not just conclusions. Democrats trying genuinely to respond to one another need to ask not merely *what* people want, but *why*. What they are asking, through that further question, is not for some psycho-social explanation but rather for people’s self-conscious rationales.” (Goodin 2003: 13).

These are main reasons for deliberationists to argue for deliberative democracy as a form of democracy that can overcome the downsides and excluding effects of liberal representative democracy. However, deliberative democracy is distinct from participatory democracy in some regards. Deliberationists doubt that participatory democracy can be realized in large scale complex societies. The “fiction of a general deliberative assembly” is not pursued by deliberation theorists. Concepts of deliberation for example by Seyla Benhabib (1996) rather envision a “plurality of modes of associations” as the spaces where deliberation takes place (Benhabib 1996: 74):

It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations that an anonymous “public conversation” results. It is central to the model of deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere of mutually interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, contestation, and argumentation (original in italics, Benhabib 1996: 73–74).

Furthermore, deliberation theorists argue in contrast to participatory democrats that the decision-making in small communities needs not necessarily to be very democratic. To the contrary, those homogenous groups can be very susceptible to “conformity, intolerance and the personalization of politics” (Held 2006: 236). The mere increase of participation is no guarantee for

more equal participation. Direct popular participation *per se* is not automatically democratizing political processes. Thus, deliberationists are cautious in seeing themselves fully as another version of participatory democracy (Held 2006: 237).

There are many deliberation experiments with citizens that strive to enhance participation in political decision-making. At first, deliberative polls and deliberation days are practiced as deliberation among citizens that constitute a microcosmic sample of the population (Fishkin 2009). In drawing them by lot, those deliberation models combine two distinct norms: equality and deliberation. Everyone has the same chance to be in and can be replaced equally by anyone else. In those polls and deliberation days, it was observed that people changed their minds after they knew more about certain political matters (Held 2006: 252). A critical point is how those enlightened decisions can be communicated to the wider public, which could have “recommending force” in a way that the public would be confronted with suggestions that might be their own if “they knew and thought more about the issues” (Fishkin and Luskin 2005: 185).

Deliberative Democracy is seen as targeting the micro-aspect of democratic theory, namely the citizens’ competence to deliberate, “the quality of the citizens’ thought and action” (Offe 2003: 297). Offe states that deliberative democracy might be a better solution in more and more pluralist and heterogeneous societies than republican and liberal theories of democracy. However, he states that the practice of deliberative democracy is far from easily implemented. The requirements for citizens are very high and deliberative democracy only works if everybody participates (*ibid.*). However, he sees the supportive background context “for cultivating democratic citizenship competence” (Offe 2003: 319) in associations with open membership criteria and a discursive formation of consensus (in contrast to authoritative decision-making). Held (2006) sees these associations not unambiguously as favorable for deliberation. Rather, he states that civil society contexts can be both, hindering and nurturing deliberation: “There must be a shift in democratic theory from an exclusive focus on macro-political institutions to an examination of the various diverse contexts of civil society, some of which hinder and some of which nurture deliberation and debate.” (Held 2006: 234). These “contexts of civil society” are investigated in the present study. In adopting a micro-political perspective on deliberation it can be assessed in how far the specific civil society contexts of transnational networks hinder or further deliberation processes and the competencies of its participants. This is insofar interesting, as deliberationists argued that pluralist network-like contexts seem to be favorable for deliberation, but on the other hand the homogenous character of civil society organizations, that are part of these networks seem to rather hinder equalized deliberation.

Deliberative democracy is suggested as an alternative to the aggregation of individual preferences. Deliberation legitimizes decision-making insofar as new information is imparted through deliberation, thus the individuals' often conflicting wishes and views are ordered through the process of exchanging views with a group of people and the provision of new information. This implies the assumption that people do not have fixed preferences but rather an unordered set of wishes and views. Benhabib calls the assumption that individuals have an „ordered set of coherent preferences“ a methodological fiction of economic models of political theory (Benhabib 1996: 71). Furthermore the act of articulating own opinions in front of others forces individuals to think about how their views could be convincing to others as well: “Reasoning from the standpoint of all involved not only forces a certain coherence upon one’s views but also forces one to adopt a standpoint that Hannah Arendt, following Kant, had called the ‘enlarged mentality’ “(Benhabib 1996: 72).

However, the orientation towards consensus poses problems with the liberal assumption of individual autonomy and value pluralism and it is also criticized by difference theorists. Iris M. Young (2000) sees the principle of impartiality, which says that decisions should be impartial, i.e. that they should be agreeable by literally everyone, as a utopian vision and furthermore a principle which suppresses diversity. The vision of *the one* good decision is misleading, she argues (Young 2000: 43–44). Furthermore, she says that nobody can set aside her or his particular preference, which is why impartiality is a false reduction of multiple viewpoints. She suggests a politics of inclusion as an ideal of a heterogeneous public (ibid.). Furthermore, deliberation is criticized for privileging particular types of contribution such as dispassionate and disembodied reason-giving over other types such as narratives, and thus perpetuating the dominance of citizens with “higher“ communication skills (Young 2000: 38–39). Carole Gould’s definition of deliberative democracy relativizes the need for consensus in that she states that deliberative democracy means that differences are brought into the public space and are revised under discussion, either purely consensual in the end or differences are seen as contingent, both assume a generality of difference (Gould 1996: 143). This definition reflects difference as an important and general condition of deliberative democracy.

Pluralism in the political process is justified, because it “features multiple centers of power, counters authoritarianism, and provides the basic grist for political debate” (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2012: 635). An argument which is shared with participatory democrats is that political disagreement is conducive to developing competent individuals, who know the reasoning for their positions (ibid.). If pluralism is a basic value of democracy, that should not be overcome, the question is how consensus can be reached without compromising the one or other position. Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) conceptualized

the meta-consensus as a way to solve this dilemma: “deliberation should produce agreement on the domain of relevant reasons or considerations (involving both beliefs and values) that ought to be taken into account, and on the character of the choices to be made, but it does not require agreement on the veracity of particular beliefs, or ranking of values, still less unanimity on what should be done.” (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007: 4). Furthermore, on the basis of meta-consensus, a second outcome of deliberation can be reached:

Intersubjective rationality results from deliberative procedure in which both agreement and disagreement are possible, but are constrained by a condition of consistency regarding the reasons that produce a particular decision. An intersubjectively rational situation emerges when individuals who agree on preferences also concur on the relevant reasons, and vice versa for disagreement (ibid.).

Similarly, Fung and Wright (2003) imagine a more pragmatic version of decision-making through deliberation: Citizens do not necessarily need to find neither consensus nor do they need to be altruistic in their positions and arguments. For a reasonable deliberation it is enough, if citizens can find reasons that they can accept in collective actions (Fung and Wright 2003: 17). This relativization of the consensus-orientation, which questions the Habermasian understanding of citizens who learn to include “the other” in their own preferences and arrive at *the* one valid norm, is taking into account the diverse group constellations that occur also in transnational civil society networks. The participatory notions of deliberative democracy already point to the parallels between participatory and deliberative democracy and

2.3 The Prospects of Participatory and Deliberative Democracy for Transnational Civil Society Networks

Participatory and deliberative democracy share many similar traits as outlined in the previous parts of this chapter. However, they also differ in many regards. The main difference can be seen in the level of conceptualization: While participatory democrats often focus on society and politics as a whole system and thus suggest concepts that envision a transformation of society as such, deliberative democrats focus on concrete processes of debate and thus often limit their concepts to the levels of will-formation and decision-making on a micro-level. In the following, two aspects of both theories will be outlined that open up the link to transnational civil society networks. Participatory democracy in civil society is a strand of literature that studies the practices of participatory democracy in SMOs and NGOs and thus is a useful bridge between theory and empirical study. Deliberative democracy is prominently

applied in International Relations scholarship. Thus, this strand of research will shed light on the connection between normative democratic theory and transnational relations.

Participatory Democracy inside Civil Society Organizations

Civil society organizations do not necessarily provide favorable circumstances for participatory democracy, as Warren (2001) reflects. In general, two characteristics of civil society organizations and their networks tend to counteract a participatory will formation: (1) The voluntary character of civil society organizations “and the ease of exit will mean that they will be relatively homogenous, self-selecting for values and lifestyles. In these cases, non-reflexive ideological or religious identities may reinforce one another, and attempts to critique and discourse may be regarded as unwelcome challenges to the solidarity of the group” (Warren 2001: 227). (2) Many civil society organizations are action-oriented, and their communication will thus focus on strategic concerns rather than critique and discourse (ibid.). Overall, Warren argues that civil societies’ internal organization is not conducive for participatory democracy. In further differentiating between different types of civil society organizations, Warren (2001) identifies a negative relationship between these inner and the outer dimensions, namely the two democratic dimensions of civil society. He states that those organizations that emphasize internal deliberation and thus the furthering of individual autonomy inside the group or organization (internal dimension) can potentially be less successful in articulating a strong public voice, which would further the political autonomy of the organization and their constituency (outer dimension) (Warren 2001: 79). Vice versa, it is plausible that organizations, which are very successful in giving a public voice to subordinate interests, might not be that eager on deliberating inside the organization. Inside deliberation can make claims very intricate, complex or even diffuse, whereas giving a public voice means communicating efficiently and understandably to the public.

Whereas many grass-roots civil society organizations, especially the ones that are part of the two networks examined in this study, are deeply committed to participatory democracy, their interpretation and rules of those processes vary depending on the social relationships within the groups as well as with others (Polletta 2002: 4). For example, the circumstance that activists see each other as colleagues, business partners, family members or friends deliberately affects the interactions within groups and creates rules on how to raise issues or find a consensus (ibid.). Overall, the role of friendship and trust seems to be ambivalent for participatory democracy in social movement groups. Friendship and more specifically trust among participants is the basis

for participatory democracy, but friendship can also undermine participatory norms by its tendency towards exclusivity, deference, conflict avoidance and “antipathy to the rules that might have made for more accountability” (Polletta 2002: 222). Thus, social movement groups have to invent new practices of cooperation that include democratic accountability and thus mitigate the undemocratic implications of close friendships (*ibid.*).

In her study of different American social movements, Polletta argues against the conventional thesis that participatory democracy is valuable but not practical because it is inefficient, time-consuming and not goal-oriented. In contrast, she argues that many social movement groups adopt participatory democratic procedures out of strategic reasons and not ideological ones, as it is usually assumed:

It is in some ways a very different version of participatory democracy than that current in the 1960's. No one believes any longer that decisions can always be made by strict consensus. Activists are more comfortable with rules, less hostile to power, and more attuned to the inequalities concealed in informal relations. As a mode of deliberation, participatory democracy incorporates elements of representative democracy; as an organizational form, it incorporates elements of bureaucracy. (Polletta 2002: 202–203)

Groups that operate in uncertain conditions and do not have much access to power could benefit from participatory decision-making (Polletta 2002: 2), which “gives members a stake in the organization and responsibility for its fate.” Further, she argues, “[i]nformality encourages affectively rich relations, and the organization’s egalitarian structure makes for mutual respect and, thence, solidarity.” (Polletta 2002: 210). Decision-makers learn to avoid pursuing one true answer, but try to explore several possibilities to find collective answers (*ibid.*). This leads to participants who are more tolerant of differences and “better able to engage in moral discourse and judgment” (Warren 1993: 209), described as the self-transformation thesis by Warren (1993). In addition to these benefits, there is also a very motivational recruitment factor in participatory democracy in movement groups. Open discussions and the equally serious evaluations of all ideas and proposals can make participants sense that the whole process of decision-making is worthwhile because nobody will be left out, leading to decisions with which everyone could agree. Still, those kinds of benefits are “most obvious in conditions where people have had few prior opportunities for political leadership” (Polletta 2002: 212). In stable groups with constant funding, the benefits of participatory democracy might not be that evident (*ibid.*) and the shift toward goal-orientation might be even more popular.

The emphasis on participatory democracy also changes over time. As Blee (2012) found out, in her study on micro-dynamics in social movement groups in Pittsburgh, social movement groups gain coherence by forgetting that they

disagreed in earlier discussion and subsequently just see their decisions as inevitable (Blee 2012). This goes along with a habitualization of once installed mechanisms: “early cultural dynamics can undermine the democratizing potential of activism as grass-roots groups fall into routines that erode their imagination and engagement” (Blee 2012: 138). Thus, the starting phase of a group formation is in so far very crucial as it can go two ways. First, it can either set the standards for participatory democracy, which can be recalled later, Second, cultural dynamics can lead to a tendency toward convention, such as always recruiting similar members, gaining information from familiar sources and limiting the possibilities of talking to each other (Blee 2012: 138). The latter of course diminishes the potential for participatory democracy within social movement groups. However, the first possibility of setting standards is not self-enforcing. As mentioned earlier, groups can simply forget the initial deliberation about their principles and instead emphasize loyalty and stability in the group instead of sustaining participatory democratic norms. Still, Blee states that some groups in her study “were able to escape paths of diminishing possibility through self-conscious efforts” (Blee 2012: 139). They brought ideas back on the table, reminded each other of earlier discussions and ideas they had not followed, remained explicit about why which decisions were made, designed strategies to stay open for input of new members, encouraged others to voice their concerns, and discussed about alternative actions and made ideas explicit (ibid.). Although this seems like an exhausting exercise, it allows groups to remain thriving and democratic. Overall, Blee concludes that “[g]rassroots activism can only strengthen democracy when it nurtures a broad sense of possibility.” (Blee 2012: 140). In addition, Polletta sees the causes for a decrease in participatory democracy in movement groups not only in the difficulties of staying with participatory norms, but also in the differing demands of social movements, the features of political discourse and broader cultural conceptions (Polletta 2002: 217).

In sum, participatory democracy in civil society organizations is very much dependent on contextual factors and on how activists can sustain norms over time and resist tendencies of habitualization and accommodation to close social relations. Finally, it can be questioned whether participatory democracy is effective in internally diverse, complex and resource-dependent groups (Polletta 2002: 221) or even networks. Also, the argument about the potential risks of too much resemblance, proximity and routine inside civil society organizations contributes to the analysis of the empirical case study insofar as it suggests an explanation why actors and organizations in networks choose to practice coordination and organization in a participatory way and why these practices develop over time.

Deliberative Democracy in International Relations

Since the end of the cold war, norms played an increasingly important role in IR research. In this regard, deliberative concepts have not only been used to assess democratic innovations such as deliberative polls but also to evaluate the democratic quality of European institutions (see e.g. Smith 2009, Friedrich 2013). The European Union is a distinct place to study deliberation in contrast to international politics. As Neyer points out, the EU is neither anarchically nor hierarchically governed, but is situated gradually in-between. Neyer calls this governance form heterarchy (Neyer 2003). The status of EU governance in-between vertical and horizontal coordination, as well as centralization and decentralization “requires an inclusive and cooperative mode of interaction” (Neyer 2003: 690). This can be also proven by empirical evidence: “political interaction in the EU relies very much on deliberation” (ibid.). IR and EU scholars adopted the idea of deliberative democracy in which civil society plays an important part in fostering deliberative democracy. Neyer argues the case specifically for the ability of civil society to attract public attention (Neyer 2003: 695), where European or transnational media hardly exist. As argued before, this publicity may force actors into a deliberative mode. In his widely received account of communicative action and the persuasive power of norms in the field of international human rights politics, Thomas Risse (2000) made the claim that the three modes of action cannot be seen as mutual exclusive but as intermingling and turning over in different phases of international politics. He distinguishes between the classic rational choice account of the logic of consequentialism, a rule-based action following the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998) and the logic of arguing (Elster 1998). This logic of arguing was equated with the logic of communicative action, as theorized by Habermas (1981). In this he and others wanted to empirically investigate the existence of arguing in the field of IR.

Risse-Kappen et al. (1999) translated the logic of communicative action into an empirical model, the spiral model, which builds on the conceptualization of the boomerang model by Keck and Sikkink (1998) in the work on transnational advocacy coalitions. In the spiral model, they investigate the communication phases in international human rights politics (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). The authors state that NGOs which can successfully gain attention in an international public can effectively force states to comply with human rights norms. This is not only because autocratic state leaders are easily convinced of the plausibility of human rights norms, but because at a certain point they get trapped in a rhetoric dead end. Having done “cheap talk” for a while can provoke other states and international organizations to demand consequences. Then, the international reputation, a very costly good, is at stake (Risse et al. 2002). However, Müller (Müller 2007) stated that this research

program which aims at making Habermas' theory of communicative action fruitful for the empirical analysis of global politics must fail in that the actual actor orientations that supposedly change after sequences of speech acts cannot be examined by social scientific research. Since these are "intramental" processes, they cannot be studied by social sciences (Müller 2007: 214). Thus, this approach has been criticized in that it fails to reasonably connect theoretical conceptualization and empirical analysis:

[...] the restructuring of a research design that shifts the focus of attention to the structural and institutional context of communication does not provide an answer to the question how we are to conceptualize and describe the deliberations that go on within these contexts [...] What goes on in processes of communication becomes something like a black box again, if we focus our analysis primarily on the topics and contexts of deliberation. (Saretzki 2009: 172).

Based on this normative turn in IR and the assumption that civil society actors can play an influential role in democratizing international politics through normative argumentation, a second strand of literature evolved. This one has been concerned with questions of "the democratizing potential inherent in civil society participation in the institutions of global and European governance" (Steffek and Nanz 2008: 3). In concretely operationalizing the democratic quality of existing deliberative arrangements in global politics, the role of civil society actors as a "transmission belt" between international organizations, the global citizenry and the public sphere (Steffek and Nanz 2008: 8-9) was to be examined. By operationalizing the norms of deliberation into four indicators of democratic quality, namely access to deliberation, transparency and access to information, responsiveness to stakeholder concerns and inclusion of all voices; this research program investigated qualitatively the democratizing influence of civil society participation on European and global governance. As one of the findings suggests, civil society participation in practice is highly dependent on the policy field and the willingness of political decision-makers to include civil society's voice in policy-making¹⁹ (Friedrich 2008). Still, a general trend of opening up of international institutions can be observed also in quantitative terms (Tallberg et al. 2013).

Although deliberative democracy as a concept of procedural democracy mainly focuses on the will-formation process prior to decision-making and

19 In considering the heterogeneous interests at stake at the EU level, compared to the relative homogeneity of the nation state context, Friedrich (2009) suggests a model of deliberative participation in order to fruitfully operationalize normative democratic theory beyond the nation state. This model combines elements of associative and deliberative democracy in order to combine associative participation of civil society as democratizing agents and discursive justification under the conditions of heterogeneity (Friedrich 2009: 198-99).

the quality of decisions taken, deliberation is also applied as a discursive control mechanism that secures accountability of representatives in spheres where representatives cannot be held formally accountable by elections. The concept of discursive representation that is suggested as a way out of the problematic question of who is entitled to hold the decision-makers accountable in fluid spheres such as networks, shifts the point of reference for democratic legitimacy from the individual to the discourse (Dryzek 1994; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). A clearly defined demos is at the core of democratic theory. If such demos cannot be identified, Dryzek and Niemeyer suggests to make a shift towards a subjectless discursive representation, following Habermas' concept of "subjectless forms communication" (Habermas 1996: 136), in ensuring "that a network is not dominated by a single discourse whose terms are accepted uncritically by all involved actors in a way that marginalizes other discourses that could claim relevance" (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008: 13).

2.4 Conclusions

Participatory democrats with their very different perspectives and backgrounds have in common that they clearly challenge the liberal notions and assumptions of representative democracy. Participatory democrats began with challenging the idea of fixed individual interests and static notions of citizen behavior. Instead, they proposed ideas of social learning and self-transformation (Pateman 1970, Warren 1993). Pointing toward the importance of equality in society, MacPherson (1977) and others argued for systematic change. Feminists in the field of democratic theory further emphasized the universality trap of liberal democracy and underlined the importance of diversity and empowered inclusion (Phillips 1991, Young 2000, Holland-Cunz 2008). On a more general note, radical democrats questioned the idea of group identities as something naturally given and thus opened up a space for considering participation against the background of shifting, overlapping and diverse citizenry (Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001).

Those outlooks on democracy are fruitful for the study of transnational civil society and their democratic practice out of three reasons. First, democracy in transnational civil society networks spans across state borders. Therefore, the foundations of liberal representative democracy, such as the guaranty of citizens' rights for a well-defined citizenry, are challenged. It becomes more and more difficult to grant "citizens' rights" to a diverse and temporary number of "citizens" who are members of organizations in a fluid transnational network. In addition, there is no state-like institution that has the power to control this guarantee. Thus, democracy in transnational civil

society networks must be conceptualized first and foremost as a process-oriented rather than as institution-oriented democracy. This process dimension is inherent in the participatory approaches of democratic theory.

Second, the main assumption that every citizen is capable of learning and practicing participatory democracy and that participatory democracy leads to better and more long-lasting decisions is reflected and adapted in the participation practices within transnational grass-roots NGO coalition networks. These participation practices are different from domestic state democracy's representative governments and are therefore rather related to normative participatory democratic theory. Civil society as a sphere outside the state is a suggested place to practice democracy by many, if not all participatory democrats. Theorists of associative democracy (Cohen and Rogers 1992; Hirst 1994) in particular refer to the importance of civil society for democratizing democracy.

Third, in the civil society networks included in this study, it can be empirically observed how far democracy expands. For example, those networks are not only civil society coalitions; they also serve as work places for the people employed in different NGOs. It is worthwhile to explore in how far democratic procedures diffuse from the network into working routines at the local level or if there is a sharp dividing line between the transnational network collaboration and the workplace settings "at home".

The conceptualization of deliberative democracy shares the same assumptions about educational prospects as participatory democracy. Deliberationists see democratic norms fulfilled if decisions are taken on the grounds of the reasonable weighing of all possible arguments and preferences (Held 2006). Deliberation over matters of public relevance forces actors to reason generally and argue in favor of a common purpose. In deliberative settings, hidden particularistic interests between certain decisions are exposed, and the perspectives of others need to be included to come to any kind of consensus. Although consensus is hard to reach, and moral disagreement will not be "solved" by deliberation, involved actors can find "significant points of convergence between one's own understandings and those of citizens whose positions, [...], one must reject" (Held 2006: 243, citing Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 85).

Deliberative democracy is the one theoretical concept that is most widely applied in IR and transnational democracy. The appeal of deliberative democracy can be found in the procedural, subjectless notion (see Habermas 1996), that overcomes aggregative forms of democracy that are so tightly bound to the nation state. Deliberative democracy does not only provide the chance to really conceptualize a democratic form that is translatable to global politics, it is also in its normative claim more ambitious than any aggregative form of democracy. Besides the similarly high claims of deliberative democracy as of

participatory democracy in terms of an alleviation of the participatory democratic quality of decision-making, deliberation is also said to produce better, i.e. more rational and enlightened decisions (see Goodin 2003). This epistemic dimension of deliberation counters also the critics of participatory democracy, who state that too broad participation of allegedly uninformed citizens is not conducive for a stable political system (see Crozier et al. 1975).

3 Representation and Democracy: Performing Control and Accountability

During the long history of democracy, representation as a main principle of democracy emerged because of two reasons: to cope with the ever growing number of individuals belonging to the *demos* and, partly as a consequence of the former, the growing mistrust of political philosophers towards the capacity and motivation of the majority of individuals to govern directly (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 10–11).

Representation is thought of as making someone or something present that is not literally present (Pitkin 1967: 8). Traditionally, representation is conceptualized as a dyadic relationship between the representative and the represented or constituency. This chapter will discuss the formal establishment of, as well as the actions taken within that relationship from different theoretical perspectives. The chapter begins with the roots of representation theory: Thomas Hobbes first described representation as a rational, not religious legitimation for authority, followed by John Stuart Mill, who can be seen as the founding father of democratic representative governments. While there were other democratic theorists beside Mill, he specifically saw representation as a central anchor of democracy. The second part of this chapter will outline the varieties of representation and their different normative implications. Some approaches of representation entail very high normative claims in respect to democratic equality, whereas other approaches are rather concerned with the functioning of a representative system as such. Hanna Pitkin (1967) provided a classic and comprehensive theoretical foundation of the concept of representation. Her definition and review of political representation theory is cited in many, if not most of the studies of political representation. Thus, Pitkin's work will be outlined during the course of the following chapter. The third part of the chapter is focused on the peculiarities of representation in civil society contexts that are not controlled by elections. Here, we find different forms of representation and different conditions and necessities for representation practices. These theoretical approaches will function as the baseline for an analytical heuristic of representation practices in transnational civil society networks. However, first, it is necessary to understand the origin of representation and its different forms and normative claims in order to analytically grasp representation practices in new contexts.

3.1 Authors, Personations and Organs

Thomas Hobbes thought democracy was a weak form of government; only a strong authority could establish peace and protect society from a “war of all against all” (Hobbes 1996 [1651]). While Hobbes clearly dismissed the idea of *democratic* government, he is one of the first theorists, who thought about representative authority as an alternative to the theological justification of authority. In his secular conception of political authority, his idea was constitutive for modern theorists of representative government (Runciman 2009: 15). In very abstract terms, Hobbes spoke about the constituency, making itself the “author” of representative’s actions and thus “owning” the actions of the representative (Pitkin 1967: 15). The authorization of the representative’s actions, in Hobbes’ case the sovereign, is not limited by specific requirements. Once authorized, the sovereign has unlimited and binding authority. Thus, the people, who authorize the sovereign, must “own” whatever the sovereign is doing. That means that they take full responsibility for any action of the sovereign and must obey every decision taken by the sovereign. The sovereign neither has to respond to any demands by their constituency, nor is there any control over the sovereign (Pitkin 1967). Representation as personation, as wearing a mask of the represented, is hardly conceivable as a representation of the “multitude” of individuals who live in a state. Therefore Hobbes conceptualizes the state or the commonwealth as something distinct from the individual persons that live in the state. Although Hobbes based his rational account of political authority on individuals, he saw problems in conceptualizing the representative relationship as an individual relationship. In order to prevent the Hobbesian state from being fragmented and destabilized by the diversity of people who are represented, he conceptualized representation as representing the people as if they were one person. Although the individual persons authorized the sovereign and “own” their actions, the commonwealth becomes a unitary actor. Nevertheless, the obligations of this representative relationship rested upon the individuals (Runciman 2009: 15–22). This refers to a crucial point in democratic representation theory: the problem of representing diversity. While Hobbes is not concerned about the democratic quality of representation, classic and contemporary democratic theorists are. The question of how to be responsive to the multitude of individuals whom a representative represents becomes even more relevant in an ever more globalizing world. Thus, the transnational sphere is specifically affected by the problem of representing diversity.

What Hobbes thought of as authorship, is a central point in classic and contemporary democratic representation theory, namely the authorization of representatives. Authorization describes a formalistic aspect of representa-

tion. It means that “a representative is someone who has been authorized to act.” (Pitkin 1967: 38). This view largely favors the representative. Her/his rights have been enlarged and s/he has only a few responsibilities. In contrast, the represented have acquired new responsibilities and given up some rights (Pitkin 1967: 399). The contrary concept is accountability, which will be outlined later in this chapter. Authorization theories can be split into the theory of *Organschaft*²⁰ and the theory of democratic representative government. Both theories oppose each other in the way they conceptualize authorization. *Organschaft* theorists argue that the way representatives are selected is irrelevant²¹; rather, they see representatives as organs or parts of the state apparatus. *Organschaft* theorists conceptualized an organic political theory, namely “the idea that (some) groups of people are (like) living organisms” (Pitkin 1967: 40). *Organschaft* theorists are interested in questions of sovereignty and legal status of government agents. They think that “all government officials, all organs of the state, are representatives, and representation is necessary in any complex society.” (Pitkin 1967: 40). Thus, *Organschaft* representation can be seen as the first conceptualization of unelected representatives. Since actors in civil society networks are also often unelected representatives, this is an interesting proposal in order to understand authorization of representatives as an ongoing process of fitting in like an organ in an organism. In contrast to *Organschaft* theorists, theorists of democratic representative government are very much interested in the way representatives are authorized through elections. In representative democracy, elections are the main mechanisms of authorization. Authorized representation in representative democracy is commonly defined as the “acting with the consent of someone else” (Pitkin 1967: 43). This means that the right to act in a certain way is conditional upon another who has “expressed the wish that he should act” in a certain way and that the “represented must at least share in responsibility for the actions taken” (ibid.). The problem that arises from this definition is that it does not include a timely limitation of representation. In other word, authority is not given for a limited period of time. Nothing in the meaning of representation in representative democracy could justify this, although no one would really accept a lifetime dictatorship as representative democracy. Authorization means to authorize a representative beforehand, but not to hold the representative accountable after the legislation period. As noted already above, representation through the authorization perspective derives from the need for action.

20 One of the better known *Organschaft* theorists is Max Weber (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*) (see Weber (2005))

21 “The manner of their selection is irrelevant so long as they become organs of the group. Elected representatives are no different in status here than those chosen in some other way.” (Pitkin 1967: 41)

Representatives must and should take actions for their constituency, and thus, they need to be authorized so that their actions are legitimized. This is different from other concepts of descriptive representation, which argue that representation is linked to government control and not government action. Those concepts will be explored later in this chapter.

John Stuart Mill, one of the main advocates of democratic representative government, preferred a government that consists of the “instructed few”. He saw expert guidance as complementary to the “popular government” of the representative assembly. Mill (1972 [1861]) wanted to constrain the danger of the “tyranny of the majority” by delegating government functions to skillful and wise experts. The executive government should not be alone in possessing a certain degree of expertise; the electorate should also be knowledgeable in order to vote competently. Mill suggested “plural voting”: citizens with specific competences or intellect (“mental superiority”) should have more than one vote. This should improve the quality of political will formation as well as the political government. Although this is a very elitist argument, it uncovers a critical aspect of the functioning of democracy: Democracy needs competent, informed citizens (Mill 1971 [1861]; Pateman 1989). Mill saw this as a main function of democracy that needs to be improved: the education of the citizens in order to become politically mature individuals who can competently engage and participate in the process of will-formation and elections (Pateman 1989: 31–35). Mill’s “true democracy” is a political system with proportional representation and adequate minority protection (Mill 1971 [1861]; Schmidt 2008). In this way, Mill is a liberal proportionalist with the idea of an ideal democracy as direct democracy. In this sense proportionalists see democracy only as a substitute for the ideal of direct democracy: “the modern form of democracy (...) [is] a machinery necessitated by modern civilization and requirements of life to make democratic government possible” (Pitkin 1967: 86).

In sum, the basic idea of representation as a mechanism of authorization rests on the assumption that either democratic control of the representative would weaken the government’s ability to rule effectively, as Hobbes saw it, or that authorization of expert representatives is a way to avoid a “tyranny of the majority” and to reflect the “ideal” form of democracy, direct democracy, in a way that proportional representation of citizens can be guaranteed. These initial ideas of representation are influenced by the image of very powerful representatives who only need to be legitimized through an initial election. Procedural democratic control is neither a necessary condition for legitimation nor is it of any help to a good government. This kind of representation was further developed by modern representation theorists who saw more need for a more far-reaching democratic control of representatives.

3.2 Democratic Norms and Forms of Representation

The variants of representation that were developed out of the normative claim of legitimacy of representatives constitute a further development in the thinking about representation and democracy. This legitimacy is either derived from a high equality of representation through the resemblance between representatives and represented (descriptive representation) or through “talented” and experienced representatives who further the discourse with their constituency and bring in new ideas. Besides this controversy over the tasks of a representative, there is a parallel controversy over the representative’s liberty. Democratic legitimation of the representative can be either reached by controlling the representative through a delegate model, i.e. the constituency gives the representative a mandate to act in a certain way, or the representative is democratically legitimized on the basis of trust. This trusteeship model involves less control and more knowledge on the part of representatives about their constituency. It is very common in civil society contexts where control mechanisms are often hardly feasible. These different forms of representation and their normative implications are indicative for the forms of representation that are possible in contexts of transnational civil society networks.

Representation as Description

Descriptive representation means standing for the represented by resemblance (Pitkin 1967: 61). Pitkin distinguishes descriptive “standing for” from substantive “acting for”, which overall means speaking for, acting for and looking after the interests of the groups one represents (Pitkin 1967: 116). According to descriptive representation as “standing for”, a democratic assembly of representatives should be a microcosm of society. It is therefore more important how a parliament is composed than what it actually does. According to descriptive representation theory, representative bodies have a different role than in substantive representation. Descriptive representatives do not act; they control the government that acts and takes decisions. Therefore, an accurate resemblance of the people is more important than the actions taken by the representatives. Representation thus means sharing one group’s attributes²². The general reasoning behind descriptive representation is that there should be an equal representation of all groups in society and, from a critical

22 When we think of political candidates who campaign for their own election, they often try to resemble their voters. However, this is an ideal typical presentation of a group (for example in displaying ideal family values) and not a representation understood as the “identity of characteristics” (Pitkin 1967: 78).

perspective on liberal democratic theory, a distinct representation of underprivileged groups (Phillips 1996; Young 2000). According to Young's critical approach of a politics of difference, underprivileged groups must be present in decision-making institutions for three main reasons. First, there might be a history of exclusion that affects members of those groups in that they refuse to participate actively; consequently, descriptive representation could be motivating for them. Second, some groups have dominated the discourse for a long time; this might affect how issues are prioritized, discussed and decided, and this "way of doing things" can be seen as something neutral or universal. Lastly, the special representation of marginalized groups brings in the "situated knowledge" of those groups, which is often unheard or not known. All those arguments for descriptive representation or a variation of it, group representation, aim at the drawback of political inequality and injustice (Young 2000: 144–45).

In trying to reach a common identity between representative and represented, representative institutions first and foremost should function as suppliers of information about their constituencies. The more accurate the information about the constituency is, the better representatives can descriptively represent their constituencies. This is necessary in order to be representative in a descriptive sense. Pitkin distinguishes between descriptive representatives as (1) a map, meaning an inanimate object that perfectly mirrors the interests of the people; (2) painter, describing this representation as providing accurate information; or (3) an accurate copy, meaning that elected representatives do "what the whole nation would have done" (Pitkin 1967: 84). This third definition of descriptive representatives is at the core of understanding democratic representative government. The logic behind this is radically democratic. It frames direct democracy as the ideal type of democracy or the desirable norm. Thus, representative democracy must strive to resemble direct democracy as much as possible in copying society as perfectly as possible (Pitkin 1967: 86).

Two main arguments against descriptive representation can be identified as follows: (1) There is no room for descriptive representatives to take initiatives, promote new ideas and discuss matters. Thus, descriptive representatives merely mirror the interests of their constituencies, but remain passive entities without agency (Pitkin 1967: 60–92). (2) Descriptive representatives may be less talented to take political action than representatives who were elected and already have experience in politics. It is also assumed that elected representatives are more willing and skilled to take over the position because they have already won the competition about votes. Taking these arguments into account, Mansbridge suggests a modified form of descriptive representation. The criticized descriptive representation, which she calls *microcosmic* representation, is the pure form of descriptive representation, where the par-

liament is supposed to be a microcosm of society. As a solution, Mansbridge suggests a selective form of descriptive representation. Here, representatives are selected by group characteristics and are not randomly selected (Mansbridge 1999: 629). Thus, there is a selection process that creates a group of descriptive representatives who are willing and skilled to take over the responsibility of a representative. Still, the general question remains: Is it necessary that groups must be represented by members of their groups in order to reach democratic representation? And how could we define which groups are relevant enough to be represented? The number of possible groups is infinite. Mansbridge concludes that only those groups should be included that are concerned with the decision to be taken, meaning all groups that contribute (new) relevant aspects to the decision (Mansbridge 1999: 635). However, who decides about the affectedness of a group? When thinking about group representation, there are further issues about the ambiguity of group belongings and group identities, which complicate descriptive representation in the sense that every individual naturally belongs to many groups and that groups themselves are not that unitary as they are assumed to be in, as some reasoning about descriptive representation might suggest (Phillips 1996).

Suzanne Dovi (2009) introduced a new argument about descriptive representation and states that it is not enough to always include as many groups as possible. In order to equally balance representation, one has to track who is replaced by whom. It is necessary to exclude privileged groups in order to allow for a better representation of *all* affected groups. She states that if democrats are strategic about inclusion, they also have to be strategic about exclusion in order to represent historically disadvantaged groups equally: "After all, in a context where you have a white majority, a simple increase in the number of Latino representatives will not necessarily change the policy representation of Latinos since the number of Latinos could be increasing at the expense of black representatives." (Dovi 2009: 17).

The discussion about descriptive representation is concentrated very much on formalistic access of underprivileged groups into decision-making forums. In this way, descriptive representation is a very normative debate, which focuses on the ideal composition of representatives and their formal group membership rather than on the action of representation or the representative relationship as such. This formal "right to presence", which is articulated in descriptive representation, can hardly be guaranteed in transnational civil society networks. It should be a worthwhile concern, given the diversity of network members, but the implementation of this right can only be thought of in an informal and mitigated way. It would also be important to guarantee this diversity in such networks because if new ideas and campaigns would not be picked up by representatives and represented alike, the networks would stand still. Thus, the criticism of descriptive representation must equally be

taken into account when adapting representation to the context of transnational civil society networks.

The Representative's Freedom

How free should representatives be in the practice of representing constituencies? This is a controversy between mandate and independency theorists, which is a discussion about the *degree* of independence of representatives. Whereas mandate theorists claim that the wishes of the represented should be the yardstick for any action of representatives, the independency theorists argue that a representative's judgment is the only relevant criterion for taking decisions (Pitkin 1967: 165). The metaphor that mandate theorists use to describe mandated representatives is the megaphone as a device to make the voice of the constituency a little louder and bring it into parliament. Delegate representatives only act on explicit instruction of their constituency. The reasoning behind this is that there is not one national interest that can be anticipated by the representative, but there are many local interests that overall build the national interest. In contrast, independency theorists see the representative rather as a free agent or trustee. Once representatives are elected, they are completely independent in their actions (Pitkin 1967: 146–47). This trusteeship model is a relationship that involves trust and obligations on both sides (ibid: 128). Here, the powers of government are seen as a property that representatives must administer for the benefit of others like fiduciaries do. In general, representatives are quite remote from the represented, and there is no consultancy at all. Because representatives are seen as the experts, they “know[...] better” and do not need advice in finding the best solution of the represented. (ibid: 136). Independency theorists say that a constituency is not a single unit with ready-made opinions and wills. The representative cannot just mirror already existing opinions. Even if that was possible, there would not be room for activities of the legislature such as “the formulating of issues, the deliberation, the compromise on which decisions should be based” (Pitkin 1967: 147). The representative would be merely a technical device of the constituency without the opportunity to bring in new ideas and discuss matters.

The question of the freedom of representatives is, as already indicated, also a matter of the definition of the represented. Whom or what is the representative supposed to represent? According to liberal theorists, the act of representation means representing people and their own individual interests, in contrast to representation of a national interest or the common good. Interests are defined as pluralistic, as opposed to the idea of the one national interest, connected or attached to people, subjective and “likely to conflict with

the welfare of the nation”²³ (Pitkin 1967: 191–92). This notion of representation is in line with the delegate or mandate model of representation. Burke’s trusteeship model, which he calls “virtual representation” (Burke 1774), justifies representation on different grounds. He sees interests, unlike Liberals, as unconnected to people. Those unconnected interests are seen as having an „objective, impersonal, unattached reality” (Pitkin 1967: 168). From this definition, Burke concludes that there are morally “right” answers for the government. There is the one national interest, which is why representatives do not need to be responsive to a constituency (Burke 1774). They do not even need to be elected because they know what is right in the end. Thus, he sees representation as an elite caring for others and the parliament as a deliberative assembly of the *one* nation and not an assembly of ambassadors of different and diverging interests: “[...] government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment and not of inclination” (Burke 1774) Burke suggests virtual representation as an alternative to actual representation i.e. elective representation.

Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them. This is virtual representation. [...] The people may err in their choice; but common interest and common sentiment are rarely mistaken. (Burke 1792)

Neither the trusteeship concept nor the mandate or delegate concepts are automatically and directly linked to *democratic* representation. Trusteeship, as conceptualized by Burke as “virtual” representation, depends on representatives who act with wisdom at best, but without the consent of their constituency (ibid.). In contrast, delegates as pure mirrors of the represented can lack the ability to actively deliberate and moderate political processes and decisions. Thus, neither concept in its pure form is useful for thinking about democratic representation. Therefore, theorists started to combine elements of both approaches and thought about accountability as one mechanism to ensure democracy in representation. The assumption is here that representation is socially constructed and can develop very differently into diverse and rather lose forms of representational practices. The concept of representation is ambiguous insofar as that there are different understandings about the relational aspects of representation or the objects of representation (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 8). Therefore, many current concepts of representation ar-

23 Utilitarians argued even further, namely that it is impossible to represent someone else, because people are only able to follow their own interests. The task of representative government is to preserve the status quo, assure stability and wait until time gives way to reason over selfish interests among the people (Pitkin 1967: 196).

gue that the distinction between the trusteeship and the delegate model does not capture the complexities of political representation (Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2011). There is also a shift away from conceptualizing representation in terms a principal-agent relationship to conceptualizing representation in regard to questions of decision-making (Rehfeld 2011: 2).

Jane Mansbridge solves the problem of complexity in stating that there is not one good form of representation, but that there is a system of different representations. Mansbridge introduces different normative criteria in order to evaluate those forms of representation. She suggests that representation is systemic and not dyadic, that it is plural and not singular, and that representation should be based on deliberative rather than aggregative criteria. The forms of representation are categorized as anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogate representation (Mansbridge 2003: 515–16). *Anticipatory representation* is understood as a relationship that is based on the anticipation, among representatives, of a future election outcome. Representatives assume that voters will vote retrospectively and thus will take their decision in line with what representatives have done during the past legislation period. Since a later event (the election after the legislation period) cannot cause an earlier event (a representative's action during the legislation period), the representation is "just" built on the representative's beliefs about voter preferences during the next election: "In anticipatory representation, what appears to the representative to be a "power relation" thus works not forward, but "backward," through anticipated reactions, from the voter at Time 3 to the representative at Time 2: RT2 -- VT3." (Mansbridge 2003: 517). Representatives have also an information problem. They need information about their constituency's preferences and will tend to address the general needs rather than the specific interests of certain people, thereby reacting to their lack of information. However, representatives can at the same time use the time of their legislation period in order to educate the constituency and deliberate about certain preferences of their constituency that can develop into interests (also referred as enlightened preferences). Thus, in anticipatory representation, the quality of deliberation is much more relevant for representatives' relationships with their constituencies than the mere aggregation of votes (Mansbridge 2003: 516 17). In *gyroscope representation*, representatives refer to themselves and their own "gyroscopic compass" when acting as representatives. It seems similar to Burke's concept of virtual representation. The crucial point in gyroscopic representation is the successful deliberation at the point of recruitment of the representative. The voter does not have power over the action of the representative as such, but over the system and the decision to put this or that representative in the system. (Mansbridge 2003: 522). Gyroscopic representation in itself may also create a more definite space of public deliberation because representation may "provide cognitive distancing between persons and ar-

guments, between the “who” and the “what” [...]” (Castiglione and Warren 2006). Self-interested arguments may decrease, because the judge and the cause are separated (Madison et al. 1993 [1787/88]) and representatives can bring this reflexivity even to the individuals they represent by raising other arguments and thus involving interest holders in a discussion about their interests within a broader public space (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 11). *Surrogate representation* means the representation of constituents who live outside the district of the representative. Although surrogate representation comes from the Burkean idea of a representative without an electoral basis, in Mansbridge’s concept, it is thought of in much more territorial terms. It is not about the national interest that is represented by a representative; it is rather about representatives in one district also speaking and acting for constituencies who are outside their own district (Mansbridge 2003: 523). Surrogate responsibility often arises out of a form of group belonging and descriptive representation. If representatives share group membership with a specific social group, they might feel responsible to represent group members in general and not only within the electorate. If this is judged in deliberative terms, the best argument should decide about specific issue-related questions. Thus, surrogate representation reflects both deliberative and aggregative logics of representation. This is different from Burke’s virtual representation, which just focuses on (elite) deliberation.

In sum, the controversy between delegate and trusteeship representation contains three levels of divergence: (1) the normative justification of representation; (2) the relational aspects of representation; and (3) the substantive arrangement of representation.

(1) The legitimacy of the representative is either derived from representation of the common good (trusteeship) or the representation of people with interests (delegate). Thus, in the trusteeship model, the normative justification of the democratic legitimacy of a representative is reached by the representative’s representation of the common good, which means to be identified by wisdom and expertise rather than by counting people’s votes. Contrary to the trusteeship model, the delegate model assumes that interests are attached to people and thus should be represented as accurately as possible by representatives. If the representatives fulfill this task, they are legitimate.

(2) Relational aspects of representation are different between the delegate and trusteeship models insofar as a delegate is seen as a tool of the constituency, whereas a trustee is conceptualized as a free agent. This implies different responsibilities: the delegate’s task is to make the constituency’s interest visible and politically effective. The constituency’s task is to instruct the representative accurately. In contrast to this process, the trustees’ responsibility is to oversee the constituency as a whole and estimate a common good,

which they would then represent as well as discuss with their constituency. This leads to the substantive aspect of representation.

(3) The substantive aspects of representation are divided into deliberation among representatives and between representatives and constituency in the trusteeship model and the aggregation of votes in the delegate model. Whereas the trusteeship model follows the logic of finding a consensus about the common good through deliberation, the delegate model follows the logic of a numerical equality of the constituency's interests. It is difficult to divide those two dimensions of relational and substantive aspects, as Rehfeld critically notes with respect to Mansbridge's categorization of representation. Mansbridge's approach combines the conceptualization of relational aspects with the substantive aspects (deliberative and/or aggregative). This is not conducive to a clear cut categorization of representation (Rehfeld 2011).

3.3 The Prospects of Non-electoral Representation for Transnational Civil Society Networks

[...] anyone who performs a function for the group may seem to be its representative, for his actions may be attributed to it and are binding on it. (Pitkin 1967: 40–41)

Representation is an omnipresent social and political phenomenon. Representatives of certain groups and interests can be found everywhere. The crucial question that will be further investigated in this chapter is how this representation, which is not bound to election, can become democratic. Many political and social spheres that give input to political decision-making and generate representation without electoral authorization have evolved over the last 20 years. This development is specifically prevalent in spheres of civil society activities and in spheres of transnational governance. This form of non-electoral representation outside of state contexts is conceptualized either as a claims-making of proactive representatives that need not necessarily be democratic, or by considering accountability, i.e. account-giving as a substitute for electoral authorization. The second conceptualization based on accountability is thus more normatively constructed as a way to democratize representation in non-electoral settings, whereas the first conceptualization of claims-making (Saward 2010) is more of an empirical conceptualization. Both attempts to capture the practices of non-electoral representation will be presented and discussed in the following section.

The contextual nature of representation is very relevant when examining concepts about representation beyond elections and states. Representative relationships can be seen as something socially constructed, which cannot to be

captured by a single one-dimensional concept. In the context of transnational networks, representative relationships are rather contingent and ambiguous (Castiglione and Warren 2006). Whereas electoral politics rely on clear temporal sequences of authorization via elections and holding representatives accountable for their actions (mainly in retrospect) through the whole term of office, in non-electoral politics, the mechanisms of authorization and accountability can be diffuse and diverse. This is even more the case in informal representative relationships such as social movements where represented groups do not pre-exist the representative relationship. They are shaped and sometimes even constructed in the process of representation. In other words, by labeling the constituency as one unit or one group, the act of representation creates the groups that are represented. In an ongoing process, representation can also stabilize groups (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 13).

Holding Representatives Accountable by a Blurred Constituency

Accountability is a concept currently debated in political representation theory. Accountability is an alternative form of formality in representative relationships, which is according to Pitkin the opposite concept to authorization. While in authorizational representation, the represented (i.e. the constituents) are bound to and accountable for the actions taken and representatives are free in their mandate, in the concept of accountability these roles are changed. Here, the represented (i.e. the constituents) are rather free and representatives are bound by obligations and control (Pitkin 1967: 55). Representatives must be eventually (after the period of representation) held accountable for their actions. This is missing in the concepts of authorization theorists (Pitkin 1967: 57–58). Authorization just marks the beginning of representation, but not its final ending. In transnational civil society networks, there is often neither a clear start nor a clear ending of representation because these network relations evolve through the practices of involved actors. Thus, representation in transnational civil society networks is fluid, similar to other relationships between actors in networks. There is hardly any formalized attribution of representatives and constituency. Thus, formalized accountability mechanisms do not work. “In general the principal problem with network governance in this respect is that the network structure itself tends to blur the clearly defined roles of accountability holders and holdees in favour of a situation in which each actor is equally an accountability holder and holdee” (Esmark 2007: 282). The suggested solution for this problem is a widening of the definition of democratic representation in terms of the involved actors as well as the forms and directions of representation (ibid.). To further substantiate this form of holding representative accountable under the conditions

of blurring roles in non-electoral representation in civil society, Castiglione and Warren (2006) suggest functional equivalents for the formal mechanisms of authorization and accountability that can be found in electoral politics. They categorize these equivalents according to different types of civil society groups. A functional equivalent of authorization in non-electoral politics may be: the ability of groups to attract follows, mission statements of groups that converge or claim to converge with a constituency, descriptive characteristics such as gender or race, experiences, public visibility (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 15). In the case of voluntary organizations and NGOs, it is also suggested that accountability can be established by the “horizontal” mutual policing of groups in a network. This specific form of accountability is borrowed from the concept of organizational learning and peer-to-peer control. This is similar to Sørensen’s (2010) argument that “accountability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers” (Sørensen 2010: 17). Those mechanisms stress the horizontal relationship between representatives and thus circumvent or mitigate the difficult definition of the constituency in transnational civil society networks.

Accountability is specified as controlling and sanctioning of the “accountability holdee” i.e. the representative (Esmark 2007: 290). Esmark also states that representatives become automatically accountable as soon as they become representatives:

Insofar as actors take the position of representatives, they do in fact by implication become accountability holdees, not just to their readers, their organizational members or their peers, but also to the moral constituency. In fact, widening the field of eligible accountability holdees may be an equally important democratic challenge as widening the field of accountability holders. As stated earlier, however, it is more fun being an accountability holder than an accountability holdee. (Esmark 2007: 282)

In applying the stakeholder concept to transnational relations, Terry Macdonald (2008) suggested a concept that is built on public power as the main instrument of democratic control. “Multiple agents of public power” should be “held to account by their multiple overlapping ‘stakeholder’ communities” (Macdonald 2008: 13). The stakeholder concept was originally introduced in business studies in order to identify stakeholders, next to shareholders, as a group that should be included in decision-making on companies’ developments (Walk 2008). Within the literature on participatory democracy, the stakeholder concepts define a way to identify relevant affected groups, that should participate in political planning and decision-making processes (Walk 2008: 52-53). The stakeholder approach assumes that interest groups are sufficiently institutionalized in order to be identified by political authorities and that they contribute effectively to the problem solution. Thus, the output

criterion is in some of these approaches higher valued than the educational aspects that were highlighted by Pateman and others (ibid.). Moreover, in contrast to other participatory democratic approaches, the inclusion of stakeholders is limited to a manageable size of possible stakeholders. Stakeholder concepts are applied in public-private partnerships or in multi-stakeholder initiatives (ibid.). Beisheim and Kaan (Beisheim and Kaan 2010) for example find in their evaluation of transnational standard-setting public-private partnerships that the broad inclusion of stakeholders has a direct effect on the output of standard-setting in that a “customized institution” (2010: 138) could be developed. While Walk (2008) and Beisheim and Kaan (2010) identify the stakeholder concept as a rather pragmatic and empirical model of participatory governance, Bäckstrand (2006) and MacDonald (2008) envision a normative potential to broaden the range of participating actors in non-electoral contexts of global governance (Bäckstrand 2006) and to install direct democratic control in a “pluralist global order” (Macdonald and Macdonald 2010). MacDonald and MacDonald argue that the global order differs to the nation state order in that it is characterized by pluralist structures of power instead of sovereign structures of power. Sovereign structures of power are characterized by centralized and constitutionalized public power²⁴, whereas the public power across national borders is characterized by an “organizationally complex network of public political agencies” and a “radically decentralized” structure of state and nonstate actors (MacDonald and MacDonald 2010: 24). According to the authors, this poses two key challenges of democratic control in the global order: First, the multiple actors that exert public power need to be held directly accountable to their own stakeholder community. Indirect accountability, as in national governments to the delegatory chain of control is not possible. This makes any form of electoral control seem very improbable. Second, the so-called “nonsovereign forms of public power (such as corporate power)” (MacDonald and MacDonald 2010: 26) are less institutionally stable and transparent than sovereign forms of public power, which makes it more difficult to democratically control them (ibid.). The normative agenda of the global stakeholder democracy would thus be to connect the pluralist forms of public power with their multiple stakeholder groups (MacDonald and MacDonald 2010: 32). The more institutionally stable and transparent these forms of power are, the better responsibilities can be identified. This approach is insofar interesting as it neither tries to adopt democratic institutions from nation state contexts to the transnational level, nor does this approach claim to define a completely new democratic architec-

24 Public power is defined as the power that “prospectively affects in some problematic way the equal autonomous entitlements of individuals such that there is a normative imperative for its democratic control” (MacDonald and MacDonald 2010: 21).

ture for the global order. However, there is a major practicability concern that needs to be raised. It remains vague how these highly complex and decentralized coalitions of actors should be institutionally stabilized and bound back to their stakeholder communities in practice. The diagnosis of a pluralist global order with multiple overlapping stakeholder communities vis-à-vis pluralist forms of public power is a good starting point for the study of the substantive practices that actually take place in transnational civil society contexts. MacDonald and MacDonald (2010) come to a very negative assertion of the democratic control mechanisms which they ascribe to the absence of a constitutional structure and a generally weak institutionalization of control mechanisms. However, this evaluation is based on the criteria of the control of sovereign power within nation states. It should be considered to take the notion of different institutional preconditions in transnational relations more seriously and adopt, as argued before, a practice lens that can better identify democracy in such pluralist and decentralized transnational networks.

In widening the field of accountability holders, Koenig-Archibugi and MacDonald argue that accountability relationships in “non-state governance arrangements” (NGAs) (2013: 499) can be divided into direct beneficiary accountability “to the most affected by their decisions” (2013: 500) and accountability-by-proxy, which means that an actor “exercises accountability on behalf of other actors and is not itself accountable to them” (*ibid.*). In the non-state governance arrangements on labor rights, which were studied for their paper, Koenig-Archibugi and MacDonald identify (Western) consumers and activists as the ones who hold companies accountable on behalf of the workers and their families. They make the argument that the choice for policy instruments in these NGAs depends on whether the accountability mechanisms are pure beneficiary accountability mechanisms or hybrid forms of proxy and beneficiary accountability. While they differentiate between distant proxies (consumers), solidaristic proxies (activists) and beneficiaries (workers and their families), they find difference in policy choice between distant proxies on the one hand and solidaristic proxies and beneficiaries on the other hand (*ibid.*: 504–05). Thus, it could be argued that accountability-by-proxy of solidaristic activists could be democratically legitimate from an output perspective since the results of decisions made by solidaristic proxies resemble the choices that the “real” constituency, the beneficiaries would make. This can be explained by the much higher engagement, concrete knowledge and sense of solidarity that activists have in contrast to consumers (*ibid.*).

While it can be empirically observed that the boundaries of the constituency blur in transnational civil society networks, there are also normative arguments why constituencies and their interests are not always that clear-cut and well-defined as supposed to be in liberal nation states. The argument put forward by Iris Marion Young (2000) against the liberal concept of cit-

izens having a universal and fixed citizenship describes citizens as members of different and changing groups, as holders of a plurality of interests. This argument was picked up by several democratic theorists, for example by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) who transformed it into a model of discursive representation. He argues that every citizen subscribes to different discourses, and it is a matter of equally representing those discourses instead of equally representing certain individuals (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). This is analogous to Young who argued that citizens need to be represented according to their multiple group affiliations and not only as individual citizens (Young 2000).

In networks, it makes even more sense to think past the liberal notion of universal citizenship because it is even harder to define who is in and who is out, i.e. where are the borders of “citizenship” in networks. The complexity and openness of networks make it much harder to identify the spaces of affectedness. Much of democratic representation is linked to the external and internal boundaries of networks. People who are directly working in member organizations of the network are internally affected, and people who are the targets of the network’s policy outputs are externally affected. It is not easy to clearly identify the boundaries of internal and external affectedness. In other words, the lines between the external environment of networks and the internal members are blurry. It is neither possible to give every individual in this network context a voting right (apart from that would it be impossible to “find” all individuals of one constituency and for or against whom would they vote?) nor is it possible to weight voting rights. This would conflict with the basic idea of democracy and it would dissolve the network character by introducing a hierarchy. Thus, there is no real possibility to represent individuals in networks. Representation axes can rather go along group identities or discourses.

Trust as a Basis for Unelected Representatives

In the condition of complexity and opacity of network structures, the constituency, represented either by vertical representation (membership base to NGO elite) or horizontal representation (between NGOs in the network), might not know everything about the decisions taken because of a lack of time, capacity, interest etc. (Mansbridge 1999). In descriptive representation, the representative represents a group as a part of the group. This relationship is tightened by resemblance or reflection (Pitkin 1967; Kröger and Friedrich 2012: 20–21). Disadvantaged groups can be empowered by descriptive representation (Phillips 1996), and descriptive representation could enable models of representation that are built on trust rather than on control. Castiglione and

Warren (2006: 8) argue to emphasize trusteeship over delegation in general and in the sphere of civil society in particular because trust has the advantage that it is not as costly as control. Trusteeship as a form of representation is omnipresent in political life and beyond. Thus, Castiglione and Warren (2006) argue that this existence of trusteeship could be used to filter out democratic features of trusteeship in political representative relationships:

We might say that trusteeship is *democratic* when a citizen makes a decision to trust, based on knowledge of convergent (or encapsulated) interests or values. Clearly, this kind of representative relationship is common in civil society through voluntary association membership: we trust Greenpeace to represent our interests in their political activities, even though we are not active in the organization (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 9)

Here, trust is based on common interests that are shared by representatives and represented. This is a major difference to representative relationships between elected representatives and the constituency. The daily business of politics is usually characterized by the negotiation between conflicting interests (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 9). Trust as the basis for democratic representation could thus form one kind of representative relationship in-between other kinds of democratic representation, reflecting a representative relationship mainly found in civil society contexts. As Young pointed out, civil society follows different logic than the systematic logic of the state, which follows a specific system imperative and must handle conflicting interests (Young 2000: 169). Public communication in civil society is often not unified and orderly, but messy, playful and emotional (ibid.). Thus, representation cannot be thought of as a linear and highly formalized process.

Rather than striving for the identity of representative and represented as a controllable measure, one could imagine representation as a process that includes communication between representatives and the represented as well as among the represented, namely on a horizontal level (Young 2000: 127). This process could also be mediated in order to ensure equal access and opportunities, but it seems not possible to control or hold it accountable in terms of an output-orientation of representation. In general, deliberation with its open-ended quality gives better communicative chances to representatives who are close(r) to the issues (Mansbridge 1999: 635–36). They are even more important and better equipped in deliberation processes under the circumstances of communicative mistrust or uncrystallized interests. Here, Mansbridge states that in the context of uncrystallized interests, the horizontal deliberation between representatives is much more important than the vertical deliberation between constituency and representative. If interests are not really clear, descriptive representation is necessary because representatives of certain groups can better judge and feel like their constituency and get into an opinion building process parallel to their constituency (Mansbridge

1999: 644–645). According to concepts beyond the liberal democracy model, the individual person that is to be represented is not only a “bundle of interests, identities and values” (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 13). Representation is always a two-way process. Persons that are represented, are represented as citizen-agents with their capacities to argue, reflect, demonstrate, write and vote. Also, the interests, identities and values do not always pre-exist the representative relationship, they are sometimes articulated explicitly prior the representation, but for many individuals, they are framed and formed in the process of representation (Castiglione and Warren 2006):

When representatives – groups, public individuals, the media – carry interest positions into public decision making, they engage in more than “individual” judgment. They function as key figures in representing and mediating public debates, in this way reflecting interest and identity positions back to their constituents. This reflexive representation of positions and arguments should, ideally, enable constituents to follow debates and to reflect upon and defend their own positions, such that representatives can, ultimately claim to represent the “public will” as reflected in a developed “public opinion”. (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 13–14)

This points to the deliberative or discursive mode of democracy, which is also brought into being in the process of representation. Castiglione and Warren argue that representation can only be democratic in the sense of a representation of the public will, if there is a reflexive element in this representation. When people debate about opinions, they form and change opinions while exchanging ideas and values from different sides (ibid.).

The Substantive Practice of Representation

Castiglione and Warren argue, following Mansbridge (2003), that accountability or the account-giving of representatives is discursive in form and can be on-going through the term of office of a representative. Still, accountability in this sense needs regular elections as a formal mechanism to temporally frame the discursive account-giving. Non-electoral accountability, on the contrary, relies on the pro-active development of accountability by self-appointed representatives and the horizontal, “informal but effective” mutual control of different kinds of groups (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 17):

[...] the emerging political landscape provides more and more opportunities for individuals and groups to *propose* themselves as representatives, and to *function* in representative capacities. But once representation no longer has an electoral basis, *who* counts as a democratic representative is difficult to assess (Alcoff 1995). Democratic theorists should not, we believe, rule out any such claims at the outset, but we do need ways of judging their democratic credentials [sic] of representative claims. (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 15)

The proposition or self-appointment of representation is a conceptualization that frames representation as a performative action, following Judith Butler's work on the performative construction of gender identities (Butler 2006 [1990]). Representation is performatively produced (Saward 2010: 42) in an "ongoing process of making and receiving, accepting and rejecting claims -in, between, and outside electoral cycles" (Saward 2010: 36). In this framework, representation is a series of practices and events and, unlike the presence approach of representation (Phillips 1996), an institutionalized relationship between representatives and represented. In other words, representation is understood as making claims that give the impression of representation. Thus, it is less about a substantial relationship that can be explored than about the question of *how* the practice of representation is acted out, leading to the following question: How is presence constructed, defended or contested? (Saward 2010: 39).

Saward distinguishes different elements in representational practices: the maker, the subject, the object, the audience and the constituency. He provides an example about global civil society to exemplify the relation between the different elements: "Antiglobalization demonstrators (maker) set up themselves and their movements (subject) as representatives of the oppressed and marginalized (object) to Western governments (audience)." (Saward 2010: 37). There is a maker of representation, who "puts forward" a subject that stands for an object. Saward distinguishes maker and subject, although they can be the same. Also, the differentiation between constituency and audience is not automatically mutually exclusive. As he defines constituency as the people for or about whom claims are made, the audience is a group of people that are spoken to. Both groups can be overlapping or even be identical (Saward 2010: 50). Saward makes one important argument based on the assumption that representation is socially constructed; he concludes that subject and object are refined and clarified through the process of representation. What Castiglione and Warren said of civil society groups, namely that they are defined by representation, is, in Saward's framework, relevant for all sorts of representation. Representation as a social construction through a performative practice creates and strengthens representational identities of the involved actors.

This argument can be traced back to concepts such as symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1986, [1969]) and generally the so-called interpretive paradigm (Garfinkel 1967; Mead 1980), which see, on a more general level, interaction and its interpretation by individuals as the basis for individual identity development. Moreover, Saward describes this event of making representative claims as the core of the representative relationship: Claims-making is a constantly changing dialogue in which different actors make claims to audiences that discuss, reject or amend them (Saward 2010). Unelected

representatives are even more under pressure to make their claims very explicit because they cannot rely on the structure of representative institutions (Saward 2010: 65). However, since those representatives lack an electoral basis, it becomes difficult to assess who is a representative of whom or what (Castiglione and Warren 2006). In networks, many different representative claims, often by different actors, can be made, for example hypothetical consent, mirroring, and word from the street (Saward 2000: 95–103). Representative relationships are also influenced by this dynamic structure that creates informality as well as more direct links between representatives and represented (Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 13). Here, representative relationships are “like a game whose rules change with use” (Lord and Pollak 2010: 119). Since these conceptualizations of representation do not take into account the problem of democratic control and accountability, one could ask whether this kind of network representation just leads straight to arbitrariness. Thus, the democratic quality of claims-making can be doubted. Representation as claims-making suggests that only those claims are voiced for which a “maker” is present (Kröger and Friedrich 2012: 270). Therefore, representative claims seem to be “decoupled” from the institutional environment of democratic representative government and the general democratic value of political equality (ibid: 271). Kröger and Friedrich attest to this “wealth of multi-faceted practices of representation in the EU”, which confirms theoretical thinking about representation in non-state or semi-state contexts outlined above. Their findings show that although constituencies are addressed most frequently along national lines, the organizations of representation can have many different faces and can change dynamically back and forth between mandate, delegate or “solidarity” models of representation (Kröger and Friedrich 2012: 259–64). With regard to the democratic quality of those forms of representation, Kröger and Friedrich do not see a strong potential of the new forms of representation to replace institutionalized forms of democratic representation, as of now. At the same time, they admit that it is much more difficult to democratize non-electoral representation (Kröger and Friedrich 2012: 274–75). From these two observations, they conclude that democratic representation “requires a strong linkage to the institutional center of decision-making” (Kröger and Friedrich 2012: 276).

3.4 Conclusions

Different assumptions lay the ground for diverse perspectives on representation. The crucial questions can be summarized as follows: Which roles do representatives take on (trustees/delegates)? How are representative rela-

tionships structured over time (authorization/accountability)? What is the nature of interaction in representation (descriptive/ active/ interactive)? What is the general function of representation (description/ action for or deliberation with the constituency)? What is the object of representation (unattached, attached interests/groups/discourses)? Many of the authors discussed in this chapter share the argument that representative democracy is a form of democracy with its own quality. Democratic representation is not a mere substitute for direct democracy. Furthermore, many recent works on representation assume that representation is socially constructed. Thus, norms of representation mostly depend on the definition of representative relationships; the objects of representation and the ascribed roles of representatives, the represented and possibly the audience. Democratic representation may be differently practiced if individuals, groups, interests or the common good are represented. This rests upon the construction of representation as such and is highly contextual and ambiguous. However, it can be concluded that representation without formal elections could be democratically legitimized through different forms of accountability, for example being held accountable to a moral constituency or being held accountable by horizontal mutual peer-monitoring. These two forms of accountability are specifically suitable to a context of blurred constituencies. If a clearly defined constituency does not exist, it makes sense to either think of a moral constituency, which could be people affected by human rights violations, nature or future generations, or to install accountability mechanisms that are based on a mutual peer-to-peer accountability among NGOs in civil society. However, these norms of accountability can only work smoothly when there is trust between representatives and represented. In civil society networks, there are no capacities for extensive control measures, but there is a high potential of trust due to similar interests, common goals and homogeneity in and between the groups. Thus trust may play an important role in making democratic representation feasible in transnational civil society networks.

The performative aspect of representation is an additional dimension that needs further empirical scrutiny. Conceptualizing representation as a performative practice decouples representation from the common assumption of a dyadic relationship between representatives and represented. It involves more actors and is driven by the proactive proposals of self-proclaimed representatives rather than by elections. How this empirical concept can be normatively undergirded in order to speak of democratic representational performances is a question that remains open and can be further elaborated through the empirical study of such instances in transnational civil society networks.

Part II

Exploring Political Practice in Two Transnational Civil Society Networks

After having established the theoretical ground of this study, the second part of this book will now turn to the empirical study of transnational civil society networks. Chapter 4 will justify the choice for a reconstructive interview analysis with the twenty-six activists from two transnational civil society networks, *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and *Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)*; it will explain the case selection as well as the methods used for the qualitative interviews and the text analysis. The main section of this second part of the book comprises the presentation of the results from the reconstructive interview analysis (chapter 5). These results cover the political practices explored in the two transnational civil society networks. The political practices that were reconstructed in the interview material are described in this chapter systematically according to the broad general categories of participation, deliberation and representation practices.

4 Researching Practices

The exploration of political practices of transnational civil society networks requires a specific research design. A research methodology for studying practices should follow similar principles as practice theoretical accounts suggest. Bueger and Gadinger formulate the principles of practice research as recursivity, abduction, mobility, proximity and co-production (2014: 80). Research is thus a practice, too. Those principles mirror interpretive and ethnographic research methodologies, which do justice to the phenomenon of practices as “moving, shifting and changing entities” (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 78). Furthermore, practice theory research “does not want to fill gaps, but to problematize, to add and to enrich” (ibid: 80). Following those more general assumptions and principles, the following chapter suggests a concrete research design for studying political practices and democratic norms. This research design is built to explore political practices and democratic norms that are co-produced and contextual. A central element, the reconstructive interview analysis is a productive tool to widely explore the universe of political practices in transnational civil society networks and gain empirical material that really enriches the picture of democracy in transnational relations, adds reconstructed practices to the already known and problematizes the already established notions and understandings of how democracy should work.

The specific aim of the present explorative qualitative case study²⁵ is to analyze political practices in transnational civil society networks and interpret and discuss these practices from the perspective of democratic theory as well as from the standpoint of interviewed participants. Twenty-six semi-structured qualitative interviews with activists from two transnational civil society networks, *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and *Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)* were analyzed in a two-step analysis. First, political practices were identified through a reconstructive analysis. In a second step, the democratic character of these political practices was critically discussed in the light of the interviewees’ assessment and normative theories of participatory, representative and deliberative democracy. The interview analysis focused on a retrospective examination of political practices, perspectives of participating actors on

25 Generally, a case study is used in order to study one case or a small set of cases intensively, aiming at a generalization across a larger number of cases of the same general type (Gerring 2007: 65). Case studies as such are not bound to a certain methodological paradigm; they can for example follow the paradigm of cross-case methodology or can be interpretive. However, case studies are more useful for generating new hypotheses than for testing hypotheses (Gerring 2007: 67).

the practices, the positioning of actors to practices, rules and knowledge of practices, and their understanding and evaluation of practices in the two civil society networks. All those parts were meant to capture the phenomenon of political practice as a whole set of empirical phenomena. Transnational civil society networks are as the unit of analysis a new phenomenon in the field of IR. They are outside the three traditional analytical categories of the individual, the state and international system (Waltz 2001). The two civil society networks, FoE and CCC, which are investigated in this case study, address environmental issues as well as global justice and human rights issues. Since civil society actors, i.e. social movement organizations (SMOs) as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are mostly concerned with human rights as well as with environmental, women's, religious or global justice causes (Flam 2001; Khagram et al. 2002; Kern 2008), the two chosen networks and their respective issue focus are typical for transnational civil society organizations. The choice for qualitative interviews as the main instrument for data collection is appropriate in the light of this study's overall research interest and its methodological assumptions. The question of democratic practice in transnational civil society networks can only be answered by investigating individual actors and their experiences and knowledge within these networks and the practices developed there. In the interpretive paradigm, methods that support and further the understanding of certain complex interactions, structures and motivations are useful. Consequently, qualitative interviews and text interpretations are one of the most common methods in interpretive social sciences.

4.1 Methodological Assumptions of a Reconstructive Analysis

When exploring new phenomena, it seems reasonable to design an open and explorative analysis. While realist or positivist social scientists assume that there is a reality that exists independent of what and how we think about this world, where the researcher's task is to describe and explain this reality objectively, interpretive social scientists share a constructivist assumption about reality: there is not *the* one reality, but reality is socially constructed by the people living in it²⁶. Interpretive social sciences thus assume that the subjects of the study are also interpreting their realities while acting and even while talking about it in interviews (Przyborski 2004: 42). Thus, we can assume that

26 Moderate social constructivists of course assume that there is a basis of reality that does not change. Constructivists in international relations are for example interested in the social construction of power through arguments (Risse-Kappen 1994).

interview texts cannot be taken as an image of the objective reality; they are narrations of interpretations and can thus only be analyzed by reconstructing the underlying interpretations of the interviewee. When implementing these two opposing ontological assumptions in a methodological framework, realist or positivist social scientists often use standardized methods in order to detect the regularities of social life. On the contrary, interpretative social scientists argue that those regularities must be known before they can be investigated in a standardized way. Such regularities and standards are incorporated in practices and a form of a-theoretical knowledge. Therefore, they need to be empirically reconstructed. Thus, reconstructive methods of analysis, which reconstruct those regularities, are a prerequisite for the validity of theory building (ibid.). While standardized methods give insight into questions of distribution and causalities of pre-determined natural standards, reconstructive methods want to ask what those natural standards are in the first place. The shift from 'what'- to 'how'- questions is crucial for reconstructive methods in order to avoid remaining in description (Bohnsack 2001).

The central aspects of interpretive social science methodology structure and frame the methodical process of this qualitative case study's data collection and analysis. A first methodological aspect has to do with the aim of analysis: the aim is access to social structures of meaning, as extensively and directly as possible, through interpretive understanding. Secondly, a systematically open access to the empirical reality with the aim of discovering something new is important in interpretive methodology. Interpretive social sciences are above all based on the theories of Herbert Blumer's Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer 1986 [1969]) and Harold Garfinkel's Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967). Blumer sets out three basic methodological assumptions of symbolic interactionism that are also taken as basic principles of this study. First, individuals act with "things" according to the meaning those things have for them. "Things" can be objects, but also other persons, institutions or concepts such as friendship and honesty. Second, the meaning of things results from the interaction with other persons. Third, this interactively constructed meaning can be changed in an interpretative process in which individuals deal with those meanings and possibly modify them (Blumer 2004: 322). The second and third principles are specific to the theory of symbolic interactionism and particularly relevant for this empirical study. The second principle contrasts the realist assumption that meanings are inherently attached to objects and subjects. Symbolic interactionism declares that persons create meaning through interaction. In other words, meaning is a product of social interaction.

This assumption about reality also influences the choice of methods in interpretive social sciences. As it is assumed that the application of norms into action is not that unambiguous and unproblematic, it is necessary to gain rich and detailed information about the social context and interpret actors' choices

of their actions (Joas and Knöbl 2004: 183–84). Thus, when studying the democratic practice in networks, meanings of democracy verbalized in the interviews, websites and meeting minutes are always seen as something that was created in a process of negotiation of many actors. Even so, the interviews can be seen as reflections of one single person who is nonetheless embedded in a wider environment of social interactions. Based on the third principle, it can be assumed in this study that actors in the networks do not only adopt those meanings that were constructed through interaction, but also change them in a process of interpretation in the face of the concrete situation and the goals they follow. Based on those conditions, meanings are selected and modified. This means that actors in the networks are in a constant process of construction and modification of meaning through the interaction with their peers in the networks and others outside the networks as well as through their own interpretations of situations and adequacies. Thus, the norms of democracy can also change over time and are constructed and changed through interaction. Although the actors present their own interpretations of democracy in the interviews, their interpretations are still grounded in the social interactions they are involved with in the networks. This gives the interpretation of the interviews a broader and more general horizon.

The analysis of interview texts meant working with the medium “language.” Through language, we can access actors’ patterns of orientation and relevancy, which can be reconstructed with methods of interpretive text analysis. The qualitative semi-structured interviews with activists and coordinators of the two transnational civil society networks in Europe were analyzed and interpreted with a reconstructive hermeneutic method of text interpretation²⁷. A reconstructive hermeneutic method was chosen because the reconstruction allows a close analysis of the interview texts. Although there are clear definitions of democratic norms and procedures, the political practic-

27 Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the founding fathers of hermeneutics, defined the process of understanding as an act of recognizing an inner meaning in signs, which are externally given. He saw two different degrees of understanding, the daily understanding of others and oneself in social situations and the sophisticated understanding, which he calls interpretation. Interpretation that arrives at some controllable objectivity can only be exerted in written or otherwise documented expressions (Dilthey 2004: 23). In contrast, the volatility of social interaction makes it difficult to arrive at a deeper understanding of social practice as such in a concrete situation. Actors intuitively understand situations, in which they act, react and interact, but there is no possibility for a systemic ex-post understanding. Soeffner even speaks of the absent-mindedness of actors (Handelnde) who do not have any interest to speak with their actions to an (imagined) audience. Thus, an interpretation of practice is only possible through the documentation of action (Soeffner 1979), according to the conceptualization of hermeneutics as the methodological approach for humanities (as it is the explanatory approach for the natural science) (Dilthey 2004).

es in transnational networks are more flexible and contextual insofar as the network actors deal with those democratic norms and can create political practices that might not be concurrent with the given norms and procedures. With a clear cut set of criteria the patterns of political practices would only be predictable to the extent that they could or could not comply with democratic norms. However, with reconstructive text analysis, it is possible to explore how political practices are conducted and which roles network actors play in these practices. The descriptive interpretation of both cases takes into consideration the specific contexts of both cases and thus makes for a more valuable and in-depth study (Guba and Lincoln 1989: 37). Guba and Lincoln state that the positivist paradigm of inquiry and the context-stripping/control of determining categories also leads to evaluations which are “often found to be irrelevant at the local level, leading to the much lamented nonuse of evaluation findings” (Guba and Lincoln 1989: 37), because the evaluation results are too abstract and general.

Soeffner, a German sociologist and founder of the hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, argues that social sciences are linguistics because social science data as well as social science “products” are language, texts. The object of social sciences is symbolic, meaningfully represented and therefore interpretable social action²⁸. Social scientific data are the descriptions, recordings and presentations of social life, which are texts in almost all cases (Soeffner 1979). Turner (2005) and Schatzki (2005) make the same argument for verbal practices which they also see included as practices; thus, it can be said that the analysis of practices should be, to some extent, based on linguistics: “Any account of practice that fails to account for language will be defective, because linguistic practices are part and parcel of many other practices and because linguistic practices are in principle not sufficiently different from other practices to regard them as likely to have a radically different character.” (Turner 2005: 121).

Written texts represent different verbal and non-verbal realities and are not situated in a concrete situation; they can include many different possible realities and interpretations (Soeffner 2004: 95). This is especially crucial in

28 While interpreting texts, the interpreter uses contextual information and goes back and forth between understanding the whole through its parts and the parts through the whole (hermeneutic circle). The interpreter interacts with the text and the author of the text. The text itself is a product of an interaction (Soeffner 1979: 329). Hermeneutics aims at making implicit knowledge explicit, and therefore, hermeneutics is not concerned with the interpretation of knowledge, but with rules and conditions that enable knowledge as such. The potential for generalizable evidence lies only in the reconstruction of the origin, effect and alternatives of knowledge inherent in documents and interpretations. This can only be verified in the analysis of concrete texts. Hermeneutics is the work on single cases (Soeffner 2004: 108–12).

interviews, where actors can talk about many different situations that they have experienced, many different persons whom they have met or concepts they have in mind. Thus, text or interview analysis opens a broader horizon of reality than observation alone. The permanent availability of interpreted texts and the interpretations themselves are the formal prerequisites of scientific hermeneutics (Soeffner 2004: 118).

4.2 Qualitative Semi-structured Interviews

The qualitative interview is the most common method in qualitative research. Many different forms of qualitative interviews that are conceptualized for different kinds of research interests exist. Qualitative interviews are not standardized methods; they are communicative situations, which means that the quality of the data depends on the successful conduct of a highly complex interactive situation (Helfferich 2009: 9). The interest in investigating very specific issues is different from the interest in exploring new and unknown issues, typically done via qualitative interviews. The technique of asking questions must therefore vary over the course of the interview (Bryman 2008: 469). Qualitative interviews are “second-order observations” (Foerster 2000), where the interviewee, in addition to asking questions, observes what interviewees disclose. This kind of observation is fruitful for research interests that focus more on the *how of* issues rather than the *what*. The exploration of subjective structures of relevancy is the aim of qualitative semi-structured interviews. Therefore, they are more flexible and open than quantitative, structured interviews. Throughout the interview, the interviewer can change the order and wording of the questions and will try to adjust to the interviewees’ narrations and emphases (Bryman 2008: 437).

The qualitative interviews²⁹ for this study were done with persons involved in international campaigns of the two selected networks. Twenty-six interviewees from both civil society networks were interviewed from seventeen European countries and from four non-European countries. Interviewees can be categorized in three groups: international campaigners in charge of one specific campaign; international coordinators in charge of all international communication in their organization; and international network coordinators in charge of coordinating the whole network. The organizations’ positions differ with regard to their network centrality and affiliation status. Some of the organizations are central players with many responsibilities, whereas other

29 Interviews were conducted between April 2012 and February 2013.

organizations are rather marginal and/ or new network members or they are only associated with the network.

Beside the qualitative interviews, which form the central part of the empirical data, other sources and data are used in order to complement the interview data. The websites of network member organizations are a very instructive source for background information about the organization as well as the statutes and general self-images of the organization and campaigning activities. Besides this publicly available information, internal documents of meeting proceedings and decision-making procedures are important; for example, they support the evidence from the interviews. However, all the complementary material is of secondary importance compared to the interview data. The interview data were systematically analyzed, whereas the other empirical data was used as additional evidence supporting the interview analysis.

The exploration of practices through interview data can cause a translation gap because practices cannot be observed directly in interviews. In qualitative interviews, interviewees just tell their stories about practices and thus discursively construct meaning of what *they* think of how such practices are taking place and how they are to be classified and judged. Thus, the practices “as such” are not to be observed by conducting qualitative interviews³⁰. Still, practices can be studied with the help of qualitative interviews. The assumption that people cannot talk about their practices (Hitchings 2012) is even less true in this specific context, where not the subconscious forms of practices are investigated, but the consciously formed and framed practices of democracy. Furthermore, these qualitative interviews are valuable to examine the reasons for certain decision-making or deliberation strategies that actually cannot be observed. Interviews are well suited when processes need to be reconstructed because the development of certain strategies and practices are best investigated by interviewing people with a certain history in the networks. Furthermore, interviews allow for a greater breadth of topics and at the same time specify issues much more. For example, interviewees can talk about many more persons in their daily lives than for example a participant observer can observe. (Bryman 2008: 465-69). Political practices are very specific phenomena that require a focused investigation with the help of structured interviews. Furthermore, some of the political practices cannot be directly observed but must be recalled by interviewees, such as the writing of e-mails. Thus, qualitative interviews carry more weight under the perspective of reconstructing political practices. Also, this study’s research interest is not

30 The question can be posed in general, if it is possible at all to observe a social interaction “as such”. When we assume that social sciences are mostly doing second-order observations; they observe what people in their social context observe (Luhmann 1997), then there is no “pure” observation of facts (first-order observation) in social sciences.

solely on the practices as such, but also includes the knowledge, positioning and patterns of practices. The knowledge of the actors and the development of certain practices play a major part in reconstructing why certain political practices occur and are used in transnational civil society networks.

The qualitative interviews with activists and coordinators of two civil society networks in Europe were semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are not completely open such as narrative, biographical interviews and not completely structured the way highly structured interviews as well as quantitative surveys are (Helfferich 2009: 36). Interview questions varied between open and focused questions in order to balance between the research interest in discovering new phenomena and the focus on specific (theory-guided) categories of interest. The analytical categories, which structured the interview guidelines in main parts, were open and continuous categories. Those preliminary categories could be opened up to new phenomena found in the text material during the process of analysis. The conceptualization of the interview guidelines was a multistage process developed by qualitative interview methodologists (Helfferich 2009; Kruse 2011). This method of interview guideline construction is divided into four phases: (1) collection of interview questions in an open group brainstorming; (2) check and elimination of inapplicable questions; (3) arranging and reformulating of the chosen questions; and (4) subsumption under the guiding lines of the interview (Kruse 2011: 79).

This research project aims at exploring an empirically under-researched field: the democratic practices in transnational civil society networks. There is no clearly defined empirical expectation about what to find in the field. Therefore, a certain openness needed to be kept. At the same time, different normative and theoretical arguments exist and need to be taken into consideration. Many concepts that are proposed from different scholars are not translated into clear-cut categories. Those concepts are rather thoughts, questions and visions about different variants of democracy in networks (Enroth 2011). For this reason, the operationalization process is marked by a series of translation problems. Normative theory cannot be translated into analytical categories without losing (necessary) complexity. This means that openness is necessary and that there cannot be clear-cut categories. The interview guidelines provided a categorical structure, but the questions within the categories remained relatively open. The different items of the interview guidelines are grouped along the following clusters: (1) network architecture, (2) deliberation (3) representation (4) participation, (5) deliberation and (6) evaluative items.

4.3 The Method of Reconstructive Analysis

The integrative method, developed by Jan Kruse (Kruse 2011), which is chosen in this study, has many advantages. It integrates parts of different approaches, but mainly follows the logic of the documentary method (Garfinkel 1967; Mannheim 1980; Bohnsack et al. 2001). Bohnsack developed a method of text interpretation based on this documentary method of Mannheim. Mannheim and Bohnsack argue that there is a division between an action and the draft of such an action, the motive. Motives cannot be observed. They can only be speculated about. If actors are asked about their actions, we find only their subjective theories about practices, but not practices as such. The radical change of this analytical approach has led to the questioning of common sense. It should not be relevant to ask what the motives are, but how they are constructed, produced and ascribed. Second-order observations are more important than the search for an objective meaning of first-order observations³¹. In this sense, the question of the meaning of an action is a question about the structure, the generative pattern of the construction of that action. The identification of this generative pattern requires the observation of practices. Those practices can be observed directly or through stories and descriptions of actors.

The integrative method is focused on very close readings of the actual texts³². It is based on different assumptions and principles: (1) It is assumed that there is meaning in every word, transcending the actual or literal meaning of the word. Within the documentary method, those two meanings are labelled as immanent meaning and documentary meaning. Every word is a document for further meaning. (2) Rules and relevancies determine choices of articulation. In other words, how individuals verbalize their thoughts is not arbitrary, but follows rules of grammar as well as symbolic structures; subjective relevancies and interpretation patterns determine how things are said. (3) Those rules and relevancies can be reconstructed with the methodical process of analysis. (4) Analysis and interpretation are two distinct processes; analysis includes the reconstruction of the text's meanings, followed by the interpretation of these meanings. (5) The analysis must be strictly data-centered, while interpretations must be consistent with the text material. (6) A reconstructive attitude must be adopted. The interpreter needs to reconstruct

31 Luhmann marked this as a turning point in social science methodology. In second-order observations, social scientific typification can be distinguished from common-sense typification (Luhmann 1997).

32 Objective hermeneutics as an alternative interpretation method is a radically open method with less rules and regulations than the documentary method and the applied integrative approach. The results of interpretations can vary significantly and can be of limited value if the interpretations are not done by a very experienced scholar.

the subjective meaning within the text material rather than putting one's own subjective meaning into the text. (7) It is assumed that the articulations of the interviewees make sense to them and are "objectively" valid for them. There should be no claims about truth in those statements. (8) The interpretation must be transparent and intersubjectively verified and comprehensible (Kruse 2011: 156; Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann 2004: 95–100).

According to these basic premises, the texts of interview data are reconstructed. Reconstructive interview analysis means first of all an open hermeneutic method of description and interpretation of texts. The first step of the interview analysis is purely descriptive. Description without interpretation can be reached with several methods that deepen "Fremdverstehen" (the understanding of other), i.e. stepping back from one's own personal subjective systems of meanings. The general idea is to slow down the process of analysis. The description of the text, which includes a sequential analysis according to the principle of emergence (line-by-line analysis) of the introductory parts of each interview, is an instrument that helps to get to as many different ideas expressed of the text as possible. The different levels are examined after that: the pragmatic level of interaction positioning, the syntax level of grammar usage, timing and rhythm of language, and the semantic level of word choices as well as the creation of "semantic fields"(Kruse 2011: 161–62). The level of pragmatics, in which interviewees position themselves vis-à-vis narrative figures (persons they are talking about), is specifically relevant when reconstructing *practices*. This level of text analysis captures the positioning and agency of network actors and can give valuable insights into the conduct of political practices from different perspectives.

As already mentioned, the positioning of interviewees can help to explain relationships between actors in networks and the practices that constitute and form those relationships. Positioning analysis, which is the analysis of discursive practices, "the stories through which we make sense of our own and others' lives.", was developed by discursive psychologists in order to study identities or the self of individuals by investigating how they verbally interact within a specific context (Davies 1990). Three reconstructive levels in positioning can be identified: (1) "How the conversational units (i.e. characters, events, topics, verb structure, etc.) or general conversational structure are positioned in relation to one another within the reported events"; (2) „How the speaker both is positioned by and positions him/herself to the actual or imagined audience"; and (3) „How do the narrators position themselves in answering the specific and general question of ‚who am I?‘ and ‚how do I want to be understood?‘ "(Korobov 2001: 15–16). The third level focuses on the identity construction, which is a main aim of positioning analysis. However, the first and second levels are more relevant for the present empirical study. The first level emphasizes the characterization of individuals and their

agency in specific contexts. The second level contains interaction and speech acts such as giving excuses, blaming other persons, or giving advice. This conversational structure and content “is analyzed as a means to an end—one that is concerned with situating conversational structure within certain distinctive audience-driven interpretive modalities.” (Korobov 2001: 16). Those specific interpretive modalities that interviewees are using in order to position themselves within the context of the network are always positionings that are relational and can only be successful if the actors share specific knowledge and context. Actors are influenced by the context of norms, values and structure, but at the same time, they are “capable of exercising choice” (Davies 1990: 3).

Since actors are actively positioning themselves and others, they are constructing dynamic network relations. Those positionings of many actors in the network can be condensed into different types of practices in the networks. The interviewed activists in the two networks reflected upon their own roles and tasks in the network, evaluated processes of decision-making and deliberation and thus positioned themselves as specific actors in the network, for example as the rather marginalized group with only a few chances of influence or the powerful coordinator who firmly controls developments in the network. Through those narrations of roles and positionings, certain practices of “how things are done” can be identified and extracted.

Agency analysis is a second analytical tool that is used to investigate political practices with the help of the interview material. Agency is a specific form of positioning. The agency concept focuses on the cognitive representation of one’s own initiative power to action and the possible courses of action. Agency analysis categorizes different forms of subjective ideas about one’s own involvement in certain events or results. In the present case, it would be the interviewees’ involvement in democratic decision-making practices. This agency can be anonymous, collective, structural, indirect, consensual or individual (Kruse 2011: 203–04).

After this first period of descriptive analysis, the findings were structured and grouped into several interpretative pathways. In this phase, heuristics helped to structure the different findings. In this way, it is possible to categorize observations based on different interpretations of positioning, agency and practice. In a next step, the different interpretations were condensed into one consistent interpretation. In a last step, the empirical interpretations were put into the theoretical context and normatively discussed (Kruse 2011: 224–228). This step-by-step analysis was also done in an interpretation group. This is very important in order to avoid one interpretation that might be full of very specific assumptions and classifications. Interpretation groups provide an opportunity to collectively develop analyses and interpretations, which are validated through the triangulation of many subjective positions. Group interpretation also leads to theoretical sensitization (Kruse 2011: 183).

Particularities in analysis and interpretation arose when the interviews were held in a language that was foreign to both the interviewer as well as the interviewee. Interviews that are conducted in a foreign language seem to be problematic in the sense that we never know if the interview partners are really saying what they want to say with the same accuracy as if it were their mother tongue. At first, it must be assumed that individuals are able to articulate what they “really” want to say. Without this assumption, the analysis and interpretation would not be possible or lead to arbitrariness (Kruse 2012). The limited semantic repertoire of interviewees in a foreign language context is a phenomenon that needs specific and sensitive analysis of the choice of words and a specific concentration on the reconstructive and distancing attitude (*Verfremdungshaltung*). The interpretation of, for example, metaphors must be even more careful. Nevertheless, the foreignness of language makes it easier to adopt this distancing attitude in the interview situation and in the interview analysis. The understanding of language of the other person is not taken for granted, and thus a “*Verfremdungshaltung*” comes more naturally. During the interview, meanings and choices of words are more often questioned and asked for. Thus, the foreignness of language can help the reconstructive analysis in a positive way. Since the understanding of language is never trivial, be it the mother tongue or not, the commitment to basic principles of reconstructive analysis is even more necessary, but also even easier to conduct because the implicitness of meaning is not the same as in native-language communication (Kruse 2012: 20).

4.4 The Cases

The selected cases are two politically relevant transnational civil society networks that claim to be democratic: the environmental network *Friends of the Earth (FoE)* and the social rights network *Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)*. Both networks are typical examples of the broader universe of civil society networks. In this study, the network as the unit of analysis is chosen rather than other possible units of analysis such as activists, organizations or campaigns because of its specific structural character that poses challenges to traditional democratic institutions. These two cases were selected because they are diverse in regard to some important dimensions of transnational civil society networks and thus reflect to a certain degree the diversity of transnational civil society networks. Diverse cases are useful for exploratory studies because they “illuminate” the full range of possible cases in one population (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 297).

Besides the rough distinction between social movements and NGOs, many scholars have categorized social movements and also non-governmental organizations in different, more well-defined ways. Whereas NGOs are typologized according to their organizational status, founding context or orientation³³, social movements are often typologized according to social structure, goals or group structure. Typologies based on the goals of movements prevail in much of the research (Raschke 1985: 106). A general characterization of social movements is provided by Raschke (1985) based on the dimensions of (1) goals, (2) mobilization, (3) action repertoires and changes, (4) negotiation, (5) control, (6) situative factors, (7) strategy and (8) internal dynamics. The three dimensions of negotiation, control and situative factors somewhat correspond with the concept of political opportunity structure³⁴. Those external factors of social movement typology are clearly dependent on the nation state. In transnational social movements, these factors lose some of their explanatory power because organizations are not that much (still enough, but to a lesser extent) dependent upon domestic political institutions in their home countries. It can be observed for example that organizations that do not get access to media or decision-makers or cannot expect an extensive list of allies in countries such as Bangladesh, they will seek support elsewhere and find funding and support opportunities for example in Western European organizations³⁵. While the concepts of political opportunity structures, negotiation, control and situative factors are only marginally relevant in transnational networks, the concepts of goals, mobilization, action repertoires, strategy and internal dynamics are highly relevant in the context of this study.

For the changed context of transnational activism, sociologists studying transnational social movements conceptualized a more dynamic approach of transnational social movements (Tarrow 2006: 24). Mechanisms, processes and episodes form the triad with which Tarrow et al. want to describe and explain complex series of developments inside and outside movements which lead to contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)³⁶. Keck and Sikkink

33 There is a myriad of acronyms out there in order to categorize every kind of NGO, for example GONGO (government-operated NGO), QUANGO (quasi-autonomous NGO) or BINGO (business-friendly NGO), which try to do justice to the different contexts worldwide, in which NGOs are founded and operate.

34 Situative factors are slightly different from political opportunity structures according to (Raschke 1985: 363). Situative factors are narrow and temporary, but also provide external input to social movement development.

35 This particularity of transnational activism is conceptualized in the model of the "boomerang pattern" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13).

36 The concepts by Tarrow and others try to do justice to the increased range of actors and constellations in transnational relations such as NGOs, international organizations, advo-

(1998) systematize transnational advocacy networks with similar dynamic categories. While examining transnational campaigns, they differentiate between the categories of internal relationships among network actors and how they are maintained, different types of resources that enable campaigning, institutional structures, both international and domestic, that frame the activists campaigning, and different ways that tactics evolve (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 7):

Campaigns are processes of issue production constrained by the action context in which they are to be carried out: activists identify a problem, specify a cause, and propose a solution, all with an eye toward producing procedural, substantive, and normative change in their area of concern. In networked campaigns this process of “strategic portrayal” must work for the different actors in the network and also for target audiences. (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 8).

Furthermore, according to these authors, it is important to identify the major actors in such networks. Such actors are very diverse and range from local social movement groups to media outlets, research institutions or even parliamentary branches of governments (ibid. P. 9). A differentiation between different issue areas and the channels and forums of communication, as well as the way of the functioning of different networks and the construction of cognitive frames (information, symbolic, leverage or advocacy politics) seems to be crucial (ibid. p. 11–16). Bennett (2005) summarized Keck’s and Sikkink’s different dimensions in order to differentiate between the first generation of transnational activism portrayed by Keck and Sikkink and the second generation transnational activism, whose rise he identifies in, for example, the social justice activism (Bennett 2005: 212). While the transnational advocacy approach is more NGO-centered and defines NGOs as the central actors in transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the transnational activist networks approach reflects a more current form of transnational civil society networks, which are constituted of many different actors and articulate broader claims (Bennett 2005). Both of the chosen networks in this study feature different characteristics of both types to different degrees. The suggested catalogue of categories from Bennett (2005) is comprised of the following categories: (1) scope, (2) organization, (3) scale, (4) targets, (5) tactics, (6) goals and (7) capacity. He extends this list to further categories that mark the difference between national and transnational activism: (8) structure,

cacy networks or transnational labor activism. Also, they expanded the analytical focus beyond the Western liberal system and transferred the static categories of political opportunity structures into more dynamic kinds of mechanisms and processes (Tarrow 2006: 24). This further development of the concepts of social movements, as Raschke and others conceptualized them, leads to a modification of explanatory factors and descriptive categories.

(9) formation, (10) stability, (11) membership, (12) mobilization, (13) bridging, and (14) diffusion. They partly overlap with standard analyses of new social movements, such as the typology by Raschke (1985). Some of these categories do justice in capturing the dynamic network character of organizations or the transnational level of activism.

In combining these different approaches, a rather comprehensive catalog of categories can be established that can describe the two cases in this study and identify differences between these two networks:

- (1) *Goals* result from the specific interpretation of reality and the perceived necessary changes or perceived structural inconsistencies. Goals are the basic principles of a movement group or civil society network and project the future as an orientation for present action. Those goals can be targeted towards norms, values or institutions (Raschke 1985: 165–66).

The goals of both networks differ slightly. The *CCC*'s goals are very clear-cut criteria for living wages, working conditions and human rights implementation. The goals of *FoE* are more diverse and depend much on the local work of network members. The European branch of *FoE*, *FoE Europe*, focuses on lobbying activities in Brussels, whereas other groups in Europe have direct action and information exchange between local activists as their main goals. Both networks find themselves in the typical issue areas of civil society engagement. However, the breadth of the issues differs. The *CCC* defines a quite narrow issue area, namely the working conditions in a specific industrial sector. Moreover, the global garment industry has production facilities mainly in Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Cambodia and China. Thus, the issue focus also includes a regional focus. On the contrary, *FoE* has a very broad issue area that includes all kinds of environmental and ecological topics as well as social justice and participatory democracy.

- (2) *Collective identity or collective action frames* are schemata of interpretation that organize experience and guide action. Furthermore, they attract support, gain media attention and signal intentions (Tarrow 2006: 61, citing Snow et al. 1986/Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). Collective identity can be defined as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution.” (Polletta 2001).

Both transnational civil society networks identify as global grass-roots movements. While *FoE* frames this collective identity very prominently on its website, *CCC* states its network identity within a catalog of many ideas that they believe in. For example, “we are the world’s largest grass-roots

environmental network.”³⁷ can be read on FoE’s homepage. This idea is also featured in *CCC*’s self-portrait, stating that the cooperation in the network should be “based on mutual respect for each others (sic) different roles and methods, open and active communication, participatory consensus building and constructive criticism.”³⁸

- (3) *The organization or formation of networks* focuses on the composition of actors in the network and the form of organization between the actors (Bennett 2005). The main categories of organization in social movement research are social movements, campaign coalitions and advocacy networks³⁹. While social movement is a general term that classifies a very broad social protest phenomenon, coalitions and networks refer to organizational and structural traits of transnational civil societies. Furthermore, organization defines the range of members that are in the network and, which roles they play in the network.

The two chosen civil society networks are purposive in their action (the same as coalitions) and are not just networks of different “nodes” that are casually combined in the same area of activism. Furthermore, they are not just temporary coalitions that take action for a specific cause, but they are relatively stable and permanently networked cooperation structures (Tarrow 2006: 161–65). Both transnational networks are organized as networks of semi-autonomous member groups in different countries. These member groups are independent organizations that also campaign in other contexts. They pool resources, share information through their networks and agree on basic values and principles as admission criteria, but are permanent networks and not temporary, event-based coalitions. Members in the *CCC* network are quite diverse. Obviously, there are trade unions, but also social NGOs, women’s rights groups and church organ-

37 <http://www.foei.org/en> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

38 <https://cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

39 Coalitions are defined as different groups of actors that combine efforts and pool resources in order to gain joint political influence and to create solidarity against common threats (Tarrow 2006:164). Coalitions are temporary; they “frequently form around short-term threats and opportunities, but when the occasion for collaboration passes, many disperse or subside into “paper coalitions” “(Tarrow 2006: 165). While coalitions are mainly defined by their strategic cause, the standard account of transnational advocacy coalitions focuses on principled ideas and values as the driving force behind the so-called transnational advocacy networks. Besides this, the “ability to generate information quickly and accurately, and deploy it effectively” is also an important structural feature of transnational networks and the basis of a collective identity within a network (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 1, 11). NGOs are the central actors in those transnational advocacy networks, but also other actors such as foundations, churches, trade unions, intellectuals or media participate in those networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9).

izations. Every network member is part of a national platform, in which different kinds of organizations gather. The *FoE* network is in this regard rather homogeneous and consists mainly of environmental groups.

- (4) *Mobilization and action repertoires* describe the activation of resources with the aim of implementing the goals of the organization (Raschke 1985: 187), whereas actions describe the different forms of action that an organization or network realizes in order to reach its goals (Raschke 1985: 274). Both terms are empirically not always clearly distinguishable (ibid: 275) and thus will be used here as one category. The civil society networks in this case study are both permanent campaign networks with a history of 20 to 40 years, evolving over the years into global networks of local organizations. Both civil society networks mobilize through a combination of symbolic and information politics⁴⁰. Protest events are often choreographed in public, either on important dates or during significant events with highly symbolized theatrical performances. Those public protests are accompanied by mobilization through information and petition campaigns and the reporting of grievances to the public and political decision-makers.
- (5) *Internal relationships*⁴¹ are the connections established and maintained between network actors and their allies and opponents (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 7). In *FoE*, all network members formally have the same status as a member group. In the *CCC*, there is a division between coalitions in Europe and partner organizations in garment producing countries, which also results in different roles and obligations of different types of network members.
- (6) *Targets* are understood as the targets or addressees of action and social change (Bennett 2005). The *CCC* targets mainly international brands in the clothing industry such as Nike, H&M, and Zara in order to push them to take responsibility for their production sites in Asia. *FoE* also conducts campaigns that target specific industrial actors, but the targets of the network are in general broader and the campaigns last longer. *FoE* has been, for example, campaigning against Shell in the Niger Delta since the ear-

40 Symbolic politics are defined as “identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks.” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:22). Information politics’ purpose is explained as follows: “They provide information that would not otherwise be available [...] and they must make this information comprehensible and useful to activists and publics” (ibid. : 18).

41 Raschke’s term of internal dynamics resonates with the term of relationships, but goes far beyond it in modelling the evolution of social movements in different scenarios (Raschke 1985: 377–383), which seems too complex for the purposes of these categories.

ly 1990's. Although *FoE* has a specific target, the issues raised are much broader.

- (7) *Strategy* is the unit of basic rules of action for a multitude of situations. *Tactics* is understood as the behavior in a concrete situation (Raschke 1985: 368). The claims of *CCC* are made through strategic campaigns, which are often initiated by specific findings of drawbacks in clothing factories. One main instrument of campaigning is the *CCC* urgent appeals, which are published as reactions to particular human rights abuses or catastrophes in clothing factories. The *CCC* network uses consumer communication as a main tool for public protest. They are publicly addressing consumers and their choices of action. The *FoE* network does not focus on a specialized public; it changes from campaign to campaign or is assumed to affect all citizens globally.
- (8) *Capacity or social differentiation* of a network defines the range of issues and the fields of action in a network (Bennett 2005). The *CCC's* explicit issue focus is very narrow. Its capacities focus on the workers' rights in the global garment industry. At a second glance, it seems that there are different fields of action where the *CCC* is also involved; this concerns human rights advocacy (for workers whose rights were violated) and gender equality issues (advocacy for women's workers). *FoE* naturally has a very broad capacity of issues that they are addressing. Environmental issues such as climate change, biodiversity, or pollution are at the center of their agenda, but social topics such as land grabbing are also emphasized.

In sum, the two cases, *FoE* and *CCC*, differ in many main dimensions and thus mirror the diversity of transnational civil society networks. Still, they share the basic relevant preconditions for being considered in this study, namely the organization as a network, the collective identity as part of a grass-roots movement and the style of mobilization.

5 Political Practices in Transnational Civil Society Networks – An Exploration

“How does politics function in its everyday occurrence?” asked Nullmeier et al. in their book about political practices in higher education policies (Nullmeier et al. 2003). This will be the first question that guides the exploration of political practice. Political practice, analytically defined as an action taking place in a relational structure of more than one actor, a “community performance” (Nullmeier 2008: 22), is conceptually and empirically related to the analytical dimensions *knowledge* of actors and the *positioning* of actors, which are equally important for the interview text analysis (Korobov 2001). The political practices and the knowledge about them influence the actor’s positioning towards the political practices. Positioning can be self-positioning as well as intentional or unintentional positioning of others in the practices. The positioning of an actor is in turn based on a complex practice. When conducting political practices, actors use their specific knowledge. The modification of this specific actor’s knowledge can evoke certain political practices and enable or disable a certain positioning of the actor (Nullmeier et al. 2003: 16). The two analytical dimensions of positioning and knowledge structure the analysis and interpretation of the empirical material and help to identify political practices by recognizing the actors’ ways of positioning as well as forms and scale of knowledge. Through the ascribed meaning, namely the positioning and agency of interview partners within the two transnational civil society networks, the practices in the networks were reconstructed. That means in concrete terms, that practices such as those of a specific form of decision-making script specific roles such as moderators, working group leaders, presenters or discussants and at the same time network actors position themselves through the practice of decision-making in the context of the broader network for example as outsiders, opinion leaders, listeners or information brokers.

The exploration of political practices is roughly guided by the open categories which were developed in preparation of the interview analysis, as described in the previous chapter. This exploration comprises a thorough reconstruction of the different political practices that range in the spectrum of participation, representation and deliberation. Analytical categories broadly define participation, representation and deliberation practices in empirical terms and build a heuristic in order to identify them as political practices as such. The different categories of political practices can appear in different settings and phases and can develop different shapes. Consequently, they need

not be democratic. Representation and deliberation as empirical terms can comprise any kinds of deliberation and representation that include for example exclusive negotiation rounds or authoritarian representation strategies. Thus, the empirical conceptualization of the participation, deliberation and representation practices is very broad and includes all kinds of practices circling around these three terms. At the same time, such political practices are of course informed by normative claims and understandings of how participation or deliberation should be done. There is no clear dividing line between practices and norms, as I outlined in the chapter on practice theory (chap. 1). I will come back to this point when discussing the democratic character of the political practices. Before that, the following chapter 5 will outline the results of the empirical reconstruction of interviews. This will be structured along the open categories that were developed in order to have a very rough heuristics as a starting point for the reconstructive analysis:

Participation practice encompasses learning and empowerment practice, cooperation and joint decision-making as well as decentralized governance. First, learning and empowerment are practices of participation that involve the learning of skills to participate effectively and the learning processes that take part during participation. Empirically, this comes mainly into effect in empowerment practices of marginal or weaker groups. Second, cooperation and joint decision-making is the main part of participation practice in the two networks. It is a broader category that involves many kinds of different practices of campaigning, coordination, information distribution and decision-making. Lastly, the decentralization and establishing of autonomy is an important set of participation practices that aim at providing members with the freedom they need to decide on their own campaigns and let member participate in tasks that are devolved from the central offices to the local organizations.

Deliberation practice is subdivided into the identification of problems and defining of agendas, the structuration of deliberation processes and the decision-making during and after deliberation. All categories mark rather concrete practices that take place during deliberation or encompass deliberation processes. While the problem identification is not directly connected to deliberation, these practices prepare deliberation processes in that they set the points that will be discussed during deliberation practice. Structuring the deliberation is a practice that involves all actors in the network, namely coordinators, campaigners and facilitators. During deliberation we can again differentiate deliberation as such and decision-making practices. These practices are specifically interesting because they define how output is generated in deliberation.

Representation practice comprises practices of selection and instruction of representatives, communicating between representatives and represented and the making of representative claims. All those practices of representation

are related to the performance of the relationship between representatives and represented. The different ways of instructing or communicating thus form the representative relationships. The making of representative claims rather marks the outreach-dimension of representation.

Analytical Categories of Political Practice
(1) Learning and empowering
(2) Cooperating and making joint decisions
(3) Governing in a decentralized network
(4) Identifying problems and setting agendas
(5) Structuring deliberation processes
(6) Selecting and instructing representatives
(7) Communicating between representatives and represented
(8) Making representative claims about individuals and discourses

Table 1: Analytical Heuristics of Political Practice

After a general introduction of the two cases in chapters 5.1 and 5.2, the results of the reconstructive analysis are presented in chapter 5.3. This section does not follow the process of the interview analysis, but presents the results of this process divided into the analytical categories and complemented by further categories that were generated inductively throughout the process of the interview analysis. As empirical reality is chaotic and fragmentary, the description of the individual political practices cannot fulfil any demand of completeness. The observed political practices in the two networks that fit in the categories are described without completely filling out the analytical scope of the single categories. After this reconstruction of political practices, chapter 6 will deal with the question of how democratic such political practices can be.

5.1 A Campaign for Better Working Conditions in the Garment Industry: the CCC

The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) was founded in Amsterdam, Netherlands, as the “Schone Kleren Campaign” in 1989. The campaign is seen as “one of Europe’s most influential multistakeholder initiatives for pressuring companies to assume responsibilities for workers’ rights at their suppliers’ factories” (Egels-Zandén 2011: 259). The CCC can be classified as a permanent campaign network that is highly institutionalized and does not merely campaign on a temporary basis. As of today, it consists of seventeen national platforms in sixteen countries that were established over time. Although the CCC consists of many sub-campaigns that are conducted by its sixteen national platforms, the general issue area of the campaign is very focused: The CCC concentrates on “improving working conditions in the global garment industry”⁴². The CCC started in 1989 with a campaign against the clothing retailer C&A in the Netherlands. An activist at this time summarized the reasons for this first anti-brand campaign against C&A: “[...] it was Dutch, it was big and we already had information about its use of sweatshop labour” (Sluiter 2009: 9). Although internationalism and international solidarity were big topics among leftist activists, women’s groups and a few academics, the wider public was not interested at all. Where their clothes were stitched and manufactured was not a “hot” topic or of any concern for consumers at that time (Sluiter 2009: 14–15).

During the period of internationalization of NGOs during the 1990’s, the CCC expanded its network in Eastern Europe and outside of Europe. This development was also accompanied and influenced by the outsourcing of garment production outside of Europe, which began in the 1970’s. From the 1980’s to 1993, the garment production by European retailers that was actually manufactured in Europe dropped from 70% to 35% (Sluiter 2009). Reacting to this development, CCC has led more and more international campaigns about this issue. The campaigns were often successful in getting companies to sign codes of conducts or protect workers from prosecution and mistreatment:

The CCC has taken up more than 250 cases and many have been resolved : health and safety conditions improved; dismissed workers reinstated; unions recognised and activists released from prison. Some brand name companies have responded by adopting codes of conduct and drafting policies on corporate responsibility, considered an important first step in the process of abolishing sweatshop conditions.⁴³

42 <http://www.cleanclothes.org/> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

43 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-eidhr-compendium-2007-2010_en_5.pdf (accessed: 01.10.2016)

Goals

The CCC-network wants to reach its goals through the cooperation between trade unions and NGOs on a regional, national and global level: “Such cooperation should be based on mutual respect for each others [sic] different roles and methods, open and active communication, participatory consensus building and constructive criticism.” Furthermore, the empowerment of workers in their own local campaign work is a main instrument of the CCC-network. Besides this, public action is valued as an important instrument to reach better labor standards for workers, although the CCC does not promote boycotts.⁴⁴

The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) *Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work* (1998) and Article 23 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are the basis for the CCC’s code of labor practices. Furthermore, CCC principles state that workers have a right to know about their rights and to be educated and trained. According to the CCC, consumers as well have a right to information about the production conditions of their clothing and sportswear. Public campaigns of CCC should be conducted with consultation of the affected workers. Also, gender issues should be addressed⁴⁵. The garment industry, the CCC claims, has a responsibility to ensure good labor standards because their position of power enables them to enforce good labor standards⁴⁶. The CCC spent around one million Euros in 2012 for “press and political influencing” and national and international campaigns (Clean Clothes Campaign 2012).

Organization/Formation of the Campaign Network

The CCC is a network of very different organizations. Most organizations in Europe affiliated with the CCC are located in Western European countries. All these European organizations have built national coalitions that are called CCC platforms. Some of the smaller and younger groups can be found in Central-and Eastern European countries. The national platforms in each country consist of many national organizations. Trade unions are welcome to be part of these platforms. Besides trade unions, there are social justice organizations, women’s rights organizations, human rights organizations and church groups that are included in those national platforms. In most cases, one organization is the leading national organization on these platforms. Since the organiza-

44 <https://cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

45 The gender dimension was a reason for targeting the garment industry in the first place, most of the sewers are women and therefore it was of course a reason to engage for women’s groups (Sluiter 2009: 16).

46 <https://cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

tions that form national platforms often existed before they joined the CCC, the size and structure of the national organizations vary. The internal organization of national member organizations is diverse; some organizations have a broad membership base and/or very formal decision-making procedures while some organizations are very large with complex structures. Other organizations are very small and do not have formal members. Over the years, the CCC grew into a European network. The most recent newcomers are Finland and Ireland who joined in 2010. The International Secretariat, which is located in Amsterdam, split from the Dutch Clean Clothes Platform in 2003 and is now working independently for the entire network. The International Secretariat is more than just a secretariat with administrative responsibilities. It is very dynamic and does not simply serve the membership, as one British member of the CCC notes (Sluiter 2009: 171), but has started its own programs and initiatives. Staff members of the International Secretariat are going on field trips to Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Hong Kong every year. Due to the network's growth, in recent years, the network coordinators formed a steering committee in order to plan a restructuring of the network and adapting procedures with regard to the growing number of participants.

The sample of organizations that were interviewed in this study consists of different typical types of organizations that can be found in the network as such⁴⁷.

Besides the European groups, there are international partner organizations, for example Canadian and American partner organizations that are collaborating with the CCC. International partners in garment producing countries such as Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India etc. also play a crucial role because they are doing research on the ground and have established relationships with workers in the garment industry. Those partner organizations are often involved rather temporarily in specific CCC projects and are not institutionally connected with the European network. The CCC has only recently

47 Interviewed persons come from organizations from different regions in Europe: from Southern Europe, Western Europe, Northern Europe and Central-and Eastern Europe. There are smaller and bigger organizations, organizations with more or less resources, organizations that have been in the network for a very long time, and organizations that have recently joined the network. There are organizations that play a central role in the network and have many projects with other organizations, and there are organizations that are more peripheral and only to a limited degree involved in projects. Some of the organizations are grass-roots organizations with many volunteers; others are much professionalized with many paid staff members. Furthermore, the focus of campaigning is very different among the interviewed organizations: there are organizations that are focusing on fair trade issues; there are women's organizations, development aid organizations, Christian organizations, trade unions and human rights groups.

established a more formal structure of regional coordinators and started to hold frequent meetings in the Asian region⁴⁸. The coordination of all network activities is managed by the International Secretariat in Amsterdam. Different coordinators plan and structure meetings and forums, coordinate the communication between European platforms and international partners and strategize about long-term plans. The operative planning of campaigns is still done by the national platforms.

Internal Relationships

The internal relationships are heavily influenced by the diversity of actors involved. In contrast to other NGO-networks, trade unions are involved in the CCC. Those specific NGO-trade union relationships are not always harmonious, as the study by Egels-Zandén and Hyllmann (2011) about the cooperation of the Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign with trade unions has shown. They argue that the different financial capacities (trade-unions being more or less self-sufficient because of membership fees, and the NGOs getting only temporary project-based funding) lead to different time horizons and priorities in campaigning (ibid.). This poses specific challenges for internal relationships in the CCC.

In general, every organization in the network is quite autonomous in their operative work. Except for the general principles, which were described above, there are no other binding rules that prescribe the way how organizations can campaign and take action. This network of relatively autonomous groups is beneficial for a productive cooperation across ideological borders: "Also the coalition model implied that partners could cooperate on a practical level, even if they had different ideological agendas." (Sluiter 2009: 17). The relationships between the single platforms in the network vary. Some of them are collaborating very closely on a transnational level, whereas others are mainly concentrating on national campaigns. The CCC-network is structured around the so-called Euromeetings, which take place three times a year in different cities in Europe. Every platform is supposed to send a representative to those meetings. It is also a rule that the same representative should attend the meeting in order to secure continuity in information supply and negotiation. Within the Euromeetings, there are different working groups which pre-discuss certain issues. Those working groups are often formed around specific topics or campaigns. Everyone who is involved in that campaign or interested in that topic can participate. Usually, those working groups also prepare proposals for the general discussions in the plenary sessions. The partner or-

48 One interviewee spoke about this (C1).

ganizations from Asia do not take part in the Euromeetings and do not have voting rights for decisions that concern the inner network. However, there are regional meetings that are mainly steered by the partner organizations and where all matters that concern this cooperation are discussed and decided⁴⁹.

Mobilization/Action Repertoire

The action repertoires of the CCC differ depending on the specific contexts of the individual groups. In Western European countries, the mobilization is mostly awareness-raising action targeted at consumer behavior. Besides consumer education, which is a priority in Western Europe, worker's empowerment is one of the main fields of action in the international network. One of the main campaigning tools for workers' empowerment and solidarity action is the urgent appeals network. Urgent appeals are sent from workers or workers' organizations in garment factories whose rights were violated. The International Secretariat of the CCC examines those requests and decides if the CCC takes action and goes public with the case. It is very important for the International Secretariat that the workers really want to attract an international public audience as well as that the workers decide the demands of the campaign:

URGENT APPEALS ACTIVITIES include writing letters of protest to companies or public authorities, launching large-scale public e-mail and fax campaigns to pressure companies or governments to take positive action, writing letters of solidarity to workers and their organizations, and carrying out a variety of awareness-raising events (speaker tours, press conferences, demonstrations) to draw attention to cases of rights violations, both among the general public and the media. (Clean Clothes Campaign 2005).

Besides the urgent appeals, there are typical CCC campaigns that consist of phases of lobbying, public blaming of brands and research about working conditions. In Central-and Eastern European countries, which used to belong to the garment producing countries, the context is slightly different, and campaigns focus more on women's rights or education. In this region, a critical consumership hardly exists, which can be partly explained by the communist past and the short history of a free market in these countries. In the current garment-producing countries in Asia, the action repertoires are mainly comprised of public street action. However, this can be dangerous for activists in some countries; therefore, many groups focus on counseling workers and educational activities in order to make workers aware of their rights.

49 The information of this paragraph is taken from different interviews with CCC members. The interviewees were given pseudonyms. The pseudonyms of the interviewees that gave this information are C4, C7 and C10.

As two campaigns in the fall and winter 2012 showed, concerted local street actions are one of the main forms of public protest. In September and October 2012, CCC activists “fainted” in front of H&M stores in European and US cities to protest against bad working conditions and malnutrition of workers in H&M factories in Cambodia. In December 2012, many European and US-American activists joined “fashion mobs” to raise awareness among Christmas shoppers about the sweatshops of big brand companies⁵⁰. Such actions are also taken to convince passers-by to sign petitions and letters to brand companies in which they are demanded to pay living wages or engage otherwise in an improvement of working conditions.

Targets

CCC is mostly doing public awareness raising campaigns for an audience of Western consumers. They are the main targets of CCC campaigns, as they have a great “weight” in terms of buying many kilograms of clothes per year per person (März 2010: 198–99). The CCC frames consumers as *consumer citizens* who are responsible for their choices and not just mere passive and unconcerned shoppers. The term *consumer citizen* grew out of a debate about the question whether responsible citizens are reduced to infantile consumers within their commercialized life-world in Western societies and whether this development threatens the democratic political culture (Barber 2007). The rising of anti-corporate campaigns that address citizens as consumers can be interpreted as one part of this democratic erosion, but it can also be understood from the opposite perspective: through anti-corporate campaigns, consumption is politicized, the division between private and public action is dissolved, and acts of consumption become political actions (Baringhorst 2010: 33).

Besides consumer citizens, the CCC wants to target brands and retailers to hold them accountable for the control of their supply chains. A decade after the founding of the CCC, a widely debated CCC code of conduct was written down, which is used as a guideline to motivate companies to implement a code of conduct and to assess the work of many brand companies with the help of this measure. While consumer citizens and brands are the main targets of the CCC, governments and politicians are also asked to develop laws and regulations that would force companies to supervise production and pricing standards and establish transparency. Lastly, garment workers themselves are supported in their own campaigns and in the establishment of trade unions (Sluiter 2009: 17).

⁵⁰ <https://livingwage.cleanclothes.org/> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

5.2 A Network for Environmental Protection Worldwide: FoE

The second case in this empirical study is the Friends of the Earth (FoE) network, which is mainly concerned with environmental issues. FoE is an international grass-roots environment network, the world's largest of this kind, according to the organization's statements. Clearly, FoE belongs to the three biggest environmental NGOs, but in contrast to Greenpeace and WWF, the other two main environmental NGOs, FoE addresses environmental issues in reference to social and political inequality and voices explicit critique on neoliberalism in a broader ideological agenda than Greenpeace or WWF (Doherty 2006: 862). Furthermore, FoE's federal structure makes it different from the rather centralized NGOs Greenpeace and WWF. Seventy-six member organizations overall, present on every continent, and two million members⁵¹ campaign for environmental and social justice and sustainability. FoE was founded in 1971 by organizations from France, Sweden, England and the USA. A small secretariat was set up in 1981. Annual meetings took place and an executive committee was built in 1983 in order to govern the network and issues between the meetings. In 1985, the European member organizations set up a regional coordinating body in Brussels, FoE Europe. FoE arose from an emerging global environmental movement in the 1960's and 1970's. The anti-nuclear protests, they envisioned, were the driving force behind the founding of FoE. David Brower, the founder of FoE, coined the famous slogan: "Think globally, act locally."⁵² The environmental movement is according to activists as well as scholars very broadly and inclusively defined as "very diverse and complex, their organizational forms ranging from the highly organized and formally institutionalized to the radically informal, the spatial scope of their activities ranging from the local to the almost global, the nature of their concerns ranging from single issues to the full panoply of global environmental concerns." (-Rootes 1999: 2). The global nature of environmental movements cannot be doubted since global protest events like the Seattle WTO protests in 1999 took place. FoE has also consultation status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other relevant United Nations bodies⁵³.

51 <http://www.foei.org/member-groups> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

52 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1373616/David-Brower.html> Obituaries: David Brower, 8.Nov. 2000 (accessed: 11.1.2013) / (Radkau 2011: 611)

53 <http://www.foei.org/about-foei/organisation> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

Goals

FoE state that their mission is “to collectively ensure environmental and social justice, human dignity, and respect for human rights and peoples’ rights so as to secure sustainable societies. To halt and reverse environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources, nurture the earth’s ecological and cultural diversity, and secure sustainable livelihoods.”⁵⁴. Besides those environmental goals, FoE include in their mission statement the empowerment of indigenous peoples, local communities and women. Furthermore, it is part of the mission statement to broaden public participation, further the equality between and within societies, and to link diverse groups in the global struggles (ibid.).

FoE does not only react to the complexities of global environmental problems by campaigning comprehensively on all problematic details, they also campaign on issues, which are not originally environmental. FoE also campaigns for economic justice and against neoliberalism for example⁵⁵. Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), the European branch of FoE, name their focus areas as follows: climate and energy, corporate accountability, finance, food and agriculture, and resource use⁵⁶. Those areas are divided into “programs”, which are all coordinated by a program coordinator:

- *“Climate Justice and Energy*: including the EU’s climate responsibility, UN climate talks strategy, energy savings and community-based renewables;
- *Economic Justice*: including corporate transparency and responsibility, impact of European companies on developing countries, corporate lobby power, food speculation and extractive industries;
- *Food Agriculture and Biodiversity*: including GMOs, biofuels, EUs Common Agriculture Policy and biodiversity;
- *Resources and Consumption*: including measuring and reducing Europe’s resource use (waste policy, resource use, consumption and production patterns);
- *Sustainable EU Funds* (in co-operation with CEE Bank watch Network): including environmental and social indicators as the basis for the programming of EU funds over the period 2013–2020;

54 <http://www.foei.org/about-foei/mission-and-vision> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

55 <http://www.foei.org/what-we-do/economic-justice-resisting-neoliberalism> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

56 <http://www.foeurope.org/> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

- *Network Development*: including capacity building within the network, strengthening Young Friends of the Earth Europe and support to campaigns⁵⁷

The broad range of issues, FoE is tackling, stands in contrast to their rather small budget. In 2012, FoE spent around 4,5 Mio. Euros in total (Friends of the Earth 2012), compared to 183,4 Mio. Euros that for example Greenpeace spent on their campaigns in 2012 (Greenpeace 2012). However, the capacity to maintain a broad range of issues comes also from the local organizations, which often set their own agenda. This allows for a broader frame and the capacity to pursue different topics as well as use different strategies to reach the aims. While the Brussels organizations naturally focus on lobbying, other organizations are concentrating on maintaining relations with specific countries by helping other local organizations or considering one specific environmental issue as their top priority. FoE Europe is mainly funded by EU institutions. The Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud, Siim Kallas says in his report: "Last year, Friends of the Earth Europe received 50% of their funding from the EU and EU national governments – a high proportion for a 'non-governmental organisation'. Despite receiving € 635,000 from the Commission, they were initially very highly critical of our car CO2 emission proposals." (Kallas 2007).

Organization/Formation of the Campaign Network

Each of the above named programs is usually managed in a steering group. All program coordinators are located in the Brussels office and take the decisions for strategic and operational choices. Bigger questions are decided with the whole network, for example at one of the general meetings (F2, P.11). The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is their "ultimate decision-making body", where all organizations in Europe should be present⁵⁸. Besides this, there are also annual meetings of climate change campaigners and other campaign areas (F2, P.24). The general meeting is supposed to be attended by representatives that have a leading role in their organization. There is also the opportunity to send a "proxy", if representatives from one organization cannot come (ibid.). Besides the representatives of the single organizations, Brussels staff is attending the meetings in order to provide facilitation or follow up on other developments. Those meetings are divided in two parts: a formal part with approval of the accounts, the election of Executive Committee and setting strategic priorities. The second part includes workshops and discussions with

57 <http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

58 <http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

members (ibid.). The Executive Committee meets four times a year and takes strategic decisions, oversees the implementation of strategies and appoints the director of FoEE⁵⁹.

FoE International consists of seventy-four national organizations, thirty-one of them are situated in Europe, fourteen organizations in Latin America, fourteen organizations in Africa, thirteen in the Asian-Pacific region (including Australia) and one organization in the US and Canada respectively⁶⁰. Thus, around 42 % of all organizations come from European countries and for example only 17, 5 % are situated in the whole Asian-Pacific region. There are regional umbrella associations of FoE in Latin America, Asia-Pacific region, Africa and Europe. The FoE-network integrates different local organizations that are independent organizations and often have existed before they joined the FoE-network.

FoE International has three official languages: English, French and Spanish. In FoE Europe English is the only official language. FoE International meets biannually at a general meeting. National member organizations are supposed to send representatives to the general meetings. The national member organizations are quite autonomous; the network is coordinated like a federation. It is emphasized that all local organizations are enabled to participate in all international campaigns and activities of the FoE-network. The Executive Committee of FoE Europe is elected annually by the member organizations at the annual general meeting. The Executive Committee consists of five representatives of member organizations and is responsible for the general agenda and strategies together with the managing board (F4, P.60). Further responsibilities are shared between the Executive Committee, the secretariat in Brussels and the director in Brussels:

I'm not sure if it's really an executive body i mean friends of the earth europe is a strong secretariat in Brussels with a lot of staff and a director, so the work of the excom is to support the work of the director and of the main coordinators of the programs, and of course take a number of decisions which have to be taken by STATUTE by such a body which is elected, we are elected by the general assembly which takes place every year. and so we meet i think four times every year for two days in brussels, HAVE some e-mail conversation, it's not something very huge in fact BECAUSE it's the OFFICE as we say is very strong and work very well and very competent people, strong director et cetera so it's a bit formal but not only, i mean we have real discussion when we meet have to take decisions but i mean everything is well prepared and documented (F5, P.30)⁶¹

59 <http://www.foeeurope.org/about/how-we-work> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

60 <http://www.foei.org/member-groups> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

61 The interviewees were given pseudonyms from F1-F14.

Internal Relationships

Our vision is of a peaceful and sustainable world based on societies living in harmony with nature.⁶²

There are different principles that member organizations need to agree with. First and foremost, the democratic principle is important and there is a commitment to participatory democracy in the network, which is demanded to be reflected in local organizations, too: "Our decentralized and democratic structure allows all member groups to participate in decision-making."⁶³ The members need to be dedicated to the FoE vision, participatory democracy, gender balance, grass-roots and national activism, transparency and accountability to their constituents and FoE's fundraising principles. Furthermore, the member organizations should work independent from political parties, economic interests, state and religious organizations, work on multiple environmental topics and justice perspectives and engage also on the international level of FoE⁶⁴.

The internal relationships in the FoE-network are characterized by a deep commitment to equal north-south relations. This commitment is not always easy to pursue. During the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa in 2002, FoE went into a crisis over the balance of north-south agendas, which finally resulted in the resignation of Acción Ecológica (FoE Ecuador) (Doherty 2006: 862). The main dividing lines were identified in different ideological visions (Southern organizations being more radically anti-neoliberal, whereas northern organizations are sometimes either apolitical nature conservation organizations or rather moderate lobby organizations) and different capacities in putting forward the own agenda. (ibid.).

Action Repertoire

Local direct action is a main part of FoE's work. FoE Europe focuses their action on influencing European policies and raising public awareness on environmental issues. They provide information and expertise on different campaign topics. Grass-roots activities are supported from the Brussels office through knowledge, skills and resource sharing. The European network of FoE concentrates much on lobbying in Brussels and their role as experts. Thus, they focus much on providing reports about EU legislation and specific circumstances in EU countries and to a lesser degree on public mobilization.

62 <http://www.foei.org/about-foei/mission-and-vision> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

63 <http://www.foei.org/about-foei> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

64 <http://www.foei.org/about-foei/frequently-asked-questions> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

Public mobilization is done in rather spectacular events that try to raise media attention and get into national news all over Europe. The mobilization of citizens and potential activists is primarily organized on the national level in the respective organizations in one country. In national organizations, mostly classic mobilization strategies and action repertoires prevail: from public street action to informational campaigns. The international network mobilizes also via online-petitions and on big global events like UN conferences. In contrast to CCC, the FoE-network does not have a short-term campaigning tool like the urgent appeal actions. The campaigns are in general longer lasting and often broadened in their issue focus. Permanent campaigns with broad political goals are initiated mainly by one local organization, which cooperates with other organizations. Alliances with farmers' movements, indigenous organizations, women's organizations, human rights organizations and unions are quite usual.

Targets

While FoE Europe targets mainly EU institutions, above all the EU Commission, the local organizations and the international network targets different actors, ranging from international institutions like the UN or the World Bank to multinational corporations like Shell to state governments like in the "Big Ask"-campaign to reduce CO₂-emissions. FoE claims to speak to the citizens of the world, but there is a clear concentration in European and Northern American countries. The public is spoken to as a potentially environment sensitive constituency, which is informed and mobilized through different campaigns on various topics. Thus, also the type of audience can be defined very broad: peasants, consumers, pacifists are only few organizations that are talked to.

5.3 The Political Practices of Representation, Participation and Deliberation

After the general description of the two networks, the following chapters will present in detail the results of the interview analysis. The analysis of the cases of CCC and FoE is based on thirteen qualitative semi-structured interviews for each network. These twenty-six anonymous interviews are numbered consecutively from C1 to C13 (CCC-network) and from F1 to F13 (FoE-network) respectively. Single quotes of the interview texts are included in order to make the analysis more transparent and comprehensible. Since the interviews were

transcribed with intonations and accentuations, the quotes read differently compared to standard language. The quotes represent spoken language to the degree that they are still readable. Accentuations are marked by capital letters and all words, also nouns and pronouns such as “I”, are not capitalized. Furthermore, if interviewees refer to concrete persons, names, countries and nationalities are anonymized.

This chapter is organized as follows: at first, the general perception of the networks in which campaigns take place and network members interact is summarized. After that, the main part of analysis concentrates on the three core elements of analysis: participation practices, deliberation practices and representation practices. New forms of practices, which were inductively discovered in the interview material and did not fit into broader heuristics are described at the end of each section.

Inside the Transnational Civil Society Networks: General Perceptions

The network character and the respective joint missions of the two transnational civil society networks greatly influence the perception of members about their own organizing. This is insofar interesting, as it gives a broader overview of the general positions in the two networks. I will start by describing the perceptions in the CCC-network and after that will outline the general positions in the FoE-network.

At first, the interviewees’ *shared* perception of the network contributes to the collective identity⁶⁵ of the Clean Clothes Campaign. The main meaning that is attributed to the network is that of a loud and powerful coalition. Single organizations become stronger and louder when entering the network and therefore join the network (C5 P.55). When network member organizations speak for a whole network of very many organizations, it gives their word more power; they say (C1, P.177–180/C10, P.65; C4, P.138–144; C5 P.55). The network is also meant to be a mouthpiece for the interests of workers in Asian countries. Through the campaigning in Europe, fueled by the ground research in affected countries, the issues of workers are heard, and there is more and more pressure on the companies (C14, P.62). Thus, the network is perceived as a strong community that strengthens individual members and reinforces the common cause.

However, the CCC-network is perceived very differently from the central members in the network and peripheral members in the network. It can be divided into different (geographical) areas. While the core network consists

65 Collective identity can be defined as “an individual’s cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution”(Polletta 2001: 285).

of the oldest members in Western Europe, there are peripheries that vary in their marginal status according to self-perceived peripheral positions or peripheral positions that result from exclusionary rules or routines. The periphery stretches from Central-and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe to South-East Asia. Peripheral organizations have regular contact with other network members, but contacts are not very tight. They have few contact persons or manage their communication via the International Secretariat. Peripheral network members perceive the network as a highly professionalized network with a lot of complex structures and procedures, a very advanced network. They ascribe much expertise to the network. Beside the image of the network as having a strong outward voice, these organizations thus add another meaning to the network: a place for learning and struggle (C 7, C8, C12). The perceived high level of professionalism has ambivalent consequences for peripheral organizations: On the one hand, the network is perceived as a place where everything about successful campaigning can be learned; on the other hand, the adaptation to habits and practices in the network is critically evaluated as sometimes quite hard and difficult (C7, C8, C12). One person of a new member organization in the network summarized those difficulties in the following way: "Sometimes like i said before we have to adopt different ways of working here and there is no space for such big discussion in euromeeting (...) so that's why it's so difficult, i think it takes us more time to follow the processes in a way that it makes sense for us." (C7, P.12). A peripheral organization in the network describes a contrary experience: "i have also learned a lot because at the beginning i was really inexperienced but now i can really work with the projects and everything so it's really good for me, i understood the logic of EC projects" (C8, P.75). Although both organizations are in the periphery of the network, they look at the network from a different angle. The first organization is a new official member of the network, whereas the second one is not an official member of the network. This results in different expectations about the participation in the network. The second organization uses the advantages of being associated with the network without having to take part in Euromeetings, whereas the first organization is involved in all the network activities and has to fulfill obligations and might have more expectations about the network's functioning as such. The longtime established practices in the network can make smooth participation for peripheral or new members very difficult. Since peripheral members are often also new members of the network, this specific perception of being marginalized is also reflected in the practice of welcoming new organizations.

Core network members have a different outlook on the network than peripheral members. Many of them express how proud they are about the achievements of the Clean Clothes Campaign and frequently describe the efficient use of the network structures with few capacities as a real asset of

the Clean Clothes Campaign. One network member describes this from the perspective of an outside visitor: “they [outside visitors] quite realized how small we actually are and how much work we get done” (C10, p.63). Besides many examples, given by interviewees, that illustrate the public visibility of the campaign network, central members of the network do not see the proficiency of the network organization and the complexity of its structures as something that has to be mentioned explicitly or even should be seen as a problem. Rather, members of the International Secretariat and core members of the CCC-network praise the efficient mode of collaboration through a dynamic information flow inside the network:

I would say beCAUSE we are a network and also because you have a kind of formal structure in place it means campaigns like the sandblasting campaign can go very quick and have an impACT because you have the some different organizations involved and they KNOW the network they know the basic premises so SOME campaign topics can very easily be can go very quickly spread and have some impact, right? (C2, P.114)

Core members in the network appreciate the participatory approach to decision-making in the network, although they also see flaws in realizing participation practices (e.g. C1, C9, C3). There is a critical, realistic, but overall positive meaning ascribed to the network, which is above all substantiated by the efficient information flow in the network and the successful public campaigning.

Similarly, many FoE-members are very enthusiastic and emotionally attached to their network. As one interviewee states, FoE “is one of the greatest networks in europe,” (F6, P.58). The network is perceived as an alliance of like-minded environmentalists with a diverse set of approaches: “i think the fact that we are a network of thirty autonomous national member groups who all have their NATIONAL level strategies and campaigns and LEGal structures and so on vision and mission, means that we have a very diverse range of voices when we discuss the issue” (F2, P.70). Political alignment plays an important role in the network, as well as the diversity of voices and interests. Although political ideals must be shared, different approaches of campaigning and differing political opinions and goals in specific thematic fields are tolerated.

The diversity of the organizations in the FoE-network is, in general, a frequently referred category. Diversity means uniqueness, because other large NGOs, such as Greenpeace or WWF, are not that diverse. Activists in the FoE-network understand the network as a coalition of very passionate grass-roots people (F2, F6, F9). However, there are organizations that also value strategic choices and an output orientation more than the original grass-roots or social movement framed activism (F2, F3, F5). Thus, the diversity of the network organizations with a common political understanding is valued:

We have enormous diversity we have enormous victories we have enormous strength in our groups but also in some cases significant challenges within our groups we have a WIDE range of different ways of working we have a very i think high level of common understanding of the MAIN environmental ISSUES facing us and or is driving those environmental issues in terms of kind of political structures and economic structures driving some of the problems. (F2, P.80)

This wide range of difference among the organizations in the network can be seen very clearly when looking more deeply at some of the interviewed organizations: Some of the organizations are big organizations that are quiet giants in the network. They are concerned with nature conservation and biodiversity issues, i.e. issues that are not automatically political. Those organizations do not, or only to a limited degree, prefer (radical) public protest actions. They see the network as an umbrella organization for their interests and often see their own role in the network as a supporter for smaller or weaker organizations. Traditions of the organizations and of the environmental work are also very important. The language spoken by their representatives (the interviewees) is rather formal and self-confident. Those organizations are located in Western/Central Europe. Other organizations are very passionate about their campaigns and see the formal network framework as a second-range matter that helps to keep up their ideals and meet friends with same mindsets. They are not so much concerned with formalized procedures, but are rather attracted by the political opportunities and cooperation. They seem to have a grass-roots background, although they have somehow grown out of being a pure grass-roots organization. Still these organizations show a very strong commitment to grass-roots democracy. Typically these organizations are to be found in Southern European and Scandinavian countries. A third group of organizations can be characterized as active, independent, standing at the edge of the network. These organizations emphasize their own projects and the cooperation with other international networks. The contacts and communication with the network is not that intense. They are mostly also geographically at the edge of the network, in Central-and Eastern Europe or outside of Europe.

Whereas there are very obvious differences between the European organizations, the international differences are even more striking. This can be troubling when a common position is needed to be found. Different views on issues can inspire discussions, but it can at the same time prohibit any consensus on a matter of discussion. As pointed out in the quote below and also in other interviews, the difficulty to even find an agreement on how to articulate claims or problems comes mainly from the different cultural and political backgrounds of the involved organizations. Different organizations specialized in different topics such as climate change or anti-nuclear politics. Thus, other interviewees also say they would desire a stronger, more united

campaign network, although they value the grant of autonomy for every organization (F4, P.92). This will be again picked up in the chapter about deliberation practices and consensus.

There are groups that are well like [org. in country] or friends of the earth [country] that are more mainstream and not that well lefts left-win and then we have groups in latin america that are really environmental organizations but also in the forefront of the struggle for human rights and democracy so that have a completely different position in their society and different view of the struggles that have to be fought to get sustainable future and then it's of course very difficult to find a common language"(F1, P.39)

The diversity of the FoE-network goes hand in hand with a certain degree of complexity and the questioning of effectiveness of the network:

Of course the structure is relatively, especially if we speak about ah if we think about the international or the global level is relatively complex, not complex but i mean relatively not effective in the sense that very much bottom-up contrary of an organization like greenpeace which is maybe more effective in the sense that many things are decided in amsterdam in the head office and then the groups just implement. this FoE-networks totally different at friend of the earth so especially the international level, i mean the approach the cultural context, the views et cetera of the groups in the different regions are SO different and diverse so sometime it's even a miracle that we can increa- our number of BASIC position et cetera. but then when it comes to REALLY make international programs work really challenging(F5, P.104)

Thus, the diversity of organizations can be seen as both: a gain in strength and a loss in decision-making effectiveness. It seems to be a matter of perspective, and position in the network, what is weighted more: the advantages or disadvantages of diversity. Whereas grass-roots-minded organizations are more inclined to value the diversity, lobby organizations are rather seen the inefficiencies in overly long discussions. This results in different speeds of internal decision-making and a situation at the transnational level, which produces different perceptions of the procedures of decision-making.

If two organizations work in VERY different WAYS, let's say that you have one organization that make all their decisions within on a volunteer base that they all have to agree with every decision and the other organization makes their decisions only by a BOARD or a small GROUP that makes their decisions or by their office or whatEVER then they gonna work in very different PACES they are gonna be one is kind of running but the other one is walking- you know so of course that is a fact but then you have to plan a project after the politics that the organization has as well so and it is always important to be aware of the effect (F9, P.129)

Besides the European focus of campaigning, international solidarity with grass-roots organizations is viewed as something, which makes FoE quite

unique: “we are probably the only network of environmental groups in europe which takes seriously solidarity with grass-roots struggles in other regions” (F2, P81). Furthermore, the diversity of the network is raising the feeling of political efficacy.

We can link the struggles you know. we can SEE when we are in a federation, that we are not alone, i mean as affected groups affected people, you know you see, we are not alone. the same problem is happening in amazonia and the same problem is happening in indonesia and it is linked with a campaign in the netherlands, (...) this federation GIVES to us this opportunity to LINK the struggles, to work with other local groups to exchange the experiences and experiences with campaigns you see, (...) it makes us stronger to fight against something or for something. as a federation we have more power to FIGHT yes, with a company for example or court, or government. (F 13, P97)

If many different organizations are participating in campaigns, so the line of reasoning, it raises the pressure and has a bigger effect (F4, P86; F6, P.56). This membership in a big and well-known environmental protection network can not only put more strength on specific campaigns and claims, it can also make local members more attractive “at home”. This can be a motivation to join the network because it helps in recruiting new members at the local level (F11, P.81).

Learning and Empowering

The major effort of learning and empowerment in the CCC-network is targeted toward the workers in garment producing countries. The empowerment of workers in production countries is an important part of the network’s self-understanding. It is reflected in their principles as follows:

Workers themselves can and should take the lead in their own organising and empowerment. Workers can best assess their needs and the risks they take when asserting their rights. Public campaigns and other initiatives to take action in cases of rights violations and the development of strategies to address these issues must be done in consultation with workers or their representatives.⁶⁶

The empowerment of workers is not only written down in the principles; it is also seen as a central part of the mission of the CCC: “besides the principles we then have what we should disTINGuish. are four areas of work, so in order to reach our mission, which is improving working conditions in the global garment industry AND empowering workers in those industries” (C 10, P.29). This mission is practiced through coordinated projects with NGOs in the

66 <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

producing countries. Via mediation through these NGOs, workers are encouraged to raise concerns, problematize issues and get support for campaigns and self-organization. This empowerment-approach aims on the one hand at increasing the participation of workers in local workers' committees and workers organizations; on the other hand, it aims at increasing the participation in the international NGO network.

NGOs that work locally with garment workers⁶⁷ have the difficult responsibility to bridge participation problems: they are translators, supporters and educators of the workers and help them in regard to negotiations with local factory owners and multinational companies. Furthermore, local NGOs consist of researchers and educators for the international network and become the mouth-piece for the workers in a transnational public sphere. The following quote of an Asian NGO activist, who works in close collaboration with the CCC-network, exemplifies how difficult it is to support and educate workers in their struggle for better working and living conditions. Here, we can also see that empowerment involves also a gender aspect:

Then you know that garment workers are always feel powerless many of course young women, those women who are very submissive some well that's why it's difficult i mean to organize them, so that's why we have DESIGNED the PROgrams how to involve the garment workers, how to train training up the unions support them to i mean bargain with the company with the company with the owners with their bosses, so that, or even the governments so that their wages right can be guaranteed or i mean increased. (C12, P.26)

The interviewee describes the young women working in garment factories as very submissive, thereby making it difficult to mobilize them. In general, this quote captures the implicit aim of education and empowerment. Workers feel powerless; they do not see their political efficacy. The aim of designed programs is to train and support workers and union members. "Submissive" (woman) workers should develop awareness of their rights and learn skills of how they can "bargain" with the companies (C12, P.58). The empowerment approach in participatory democracy can be identified in the practices of encouraging workers' participation. The wording in the previous quotation from one of the interviewees already reveals that this seems to be a more top-down empowerment than a bottom-up learning process.

The empowerment, or capacity building, as FoE members call it, is practiced in the FoE-network in a very systematic and formalized way. One pro-

67 The learning and empowerment of workers, as an important part of participation practices, can only be described from the perspective of the NGOs in producing countries and not from the workers themselves because they were not interviewed. It would have been almost impossible to do that because it is very difficult, even for the European NGOs, to get in contact with the workers because of existing language barriers.

gram, which is called “capacity building through campaigns”, is mainly aimed at building the capacity of the campaigners to “win campaigns” (F2, P.22). The program contains skill sharing, information and knowledge exchange between national campaigners and the Brussels office. This means concretely that network events are set up to support campaigners in their development of necessary skills, but also that campaigners are supported in and through their campaign work at the national level (F2, P.22).

In order to find out how organizations are working and what they could need, a questionnaire was designed by the Brussels office and sent around to the organizations: “based on that we are developing some interventions with specific groups” (F2, P.22). This questionnaire had also other impacts in that it inspired one organization to reactivate their connections to FoE: “THEY sent us a questionnaire membership development questionnaire and many organizations also raised this question about membership of friends of earth. so we decided to reconnect with them again”(F11. P.73).

Besides those activities, which are centrally planned from the Brussels office, there was a twinship program aiming at bringing stronger and “weaker” organizations together in order to develop a peer-to-peer learning process.

We have been involved a lot during some years in friend of the earth europe CAPACITY building projects which were BASED on the idea of twinship between STRONGER groups and weaker groups or more developed and less developed groups et cetera so we have been part of this program and contributed to support we have been supporting, i mean the program was a rule with common activities et cetera but there was also this twinship and so we have been supporting foe [country 1] and foe [country 2] with visit, training, organized by ourselves et cetera. now this model has been a bit put aside, not because it was not good, i think it worked RATHER well in most of the cases, but well it was also a bit some time-expensive or time consuming or meaning a lot of resources so NOW we are developed we have developed more capacity within the campaigns. another approach that we find interesting currently in friend of the earth europe. so we are a bit LESS involved than before but will be contributing to that (F5, P.80)

Although this program is already stopped, there is a huge sense for solidarity in the FoE-network, which is expressed in much formalized practices of systematic support from the Brussels office as well as through a peer-to-peer system. This formalized support practices from the Brussels office are also applied to the participation of general meetings. Organizations that cannot come are supported by a specific budget. However, there are growing difficulties on how to distribute the financial support, as more and more organizations are in need of a travel budget:

There is a there is a budget to support such groups who have difficulties i can i couldn't explain you how exactly this budget is shared but there are there

is some money europe to support some european groups, for example this year there were MORE groups willing to get this budget than we had. so for example this was a decision from the board from the european board to decide to not whom will come but to whom we will give the money which is not necessarily an easy decision of course but you have to share the budget (...) it's really something difficult especially as we have more and more groups so the organization of such a meeting is something quite big, expensive and not easy to organize (F5, P.62)

One of the organizations even sees support for other member organizations as one of their main activities (F5, P.6):

Of course when other groups want to do something at that meeting we try to arrange our plans so that it's not prohibitive for them or we try to support other groups that want to join in so it's mostly that we DESIGN our campaigns so that it's attractive for other friends of the earth groups to join then that we first sit together and we try to really design it together (F1, P.35)

The sense of an increased political efficacy through participating in network meetings is a second dimension of learning and empowerment practices in the network, which is underlined by many interviewees, exemplified in the following quote: "It's the opportunity to see US altogether all the groups, this is really, really good because it makes the feeling that we can achieve BIGGER things if we work altogether than every than each group does what he wants" (F3, P.53).

The empowerment practices in the FoE-network are very comprehensive and cover mainly the capacity building of organizations. Financial support is given to organizations with lesser capacities in order to establish equal opportunities of participation. Additionally, the second dimension of empowerment practices, which can be observed as the increased sense of political efficacy and the consideration of different perspectives, is an important part of empowerment practices in the FoE-network.

Cooperating and Making Joint Decisions

Decision-making is conducted on different levels in the CCC-network: within the European CCC-network, within specific campaigns with international partners, and on the local level with workers and trade unions. A Western European NGO coordinator from the International Secretariat, who describes a scene in a Sri Lankan union's office, provides a first example of the local workers' level of decision-making. The interviewee takes this example to emphasize the general principle of providing equal participation, especially at the workers' level. Workers are the represented group, which makes a claim for legitimacy even stronger. This coordinator described the practice of talk-

ing to workers in union offices as a practice of formulating demands in collaboration with union staff. The coordinator described the overall campaign in very positive terms. The team that coordinates campaigns and cases from Western Europe is always “hyper careful” to make sure that workers decide what should be done. Although this interview does not allow us to estimate how common the described practice is, it shows that there is a deep awareness of how practices should look like:

The demands are actually formulated by the workers or at least by their representatives so by the union you know, that THEY’re talking to so you know i was in sri lanka last year and there was a case going on at that time and i went to one of the union offices and some of the workers were IN the office, talking to some of the people, and they were discussing the case. so you know, that’s how you can SEE how it works, how the demands are formulated in that way (C10, P.42)

A local NGO activist, who states that there are several practices of getting in touch with the workers, confirms the practice of inclusion as described by the International Secretariat coordinator; however, this interviewee describes practices that involve the pro-active locating of workers in their factories and the surroundings instead of awaiting them in their office. Similar practices are described by another local activist who was also interviewed (C14, P.60). Thus, here we can observe two similar practices of workers’ participation that are described quite differently from the “local” and the European perspective. The local NGOs emphasize their active part in “reaching” the workers or going to their factories or homes, whereas the coordinator from the CCC’s International Secretariat suggests that workers pro-actively show up talking and discussing in the office of a trade union. Overall, both descriptions of these participation practices draw a picture of a mutual, collective practice that is conducted without disruptions.

So we have a several ways to reach the workers right the one is that well we can go to the industrial zone when we do the research right that so-called national wage research and then we will go to the factory and then wait for the workers, right and then meet with the workers and also interview them the other way is go through the brand company and brand company they invite us go into the factory the supply factories and then to meet with the workers (C12, P.58)

The participation of workers in decision-making is drafted as a dialogue between the representatives (local NGOs or trade unions) and the workers. However, none of the interviewees focuses on participatory decision-making as a *collective* practice of workers. It appears that the practice of involving actors is rather a person-to-person practice. In general, local NGOs and representatives of the European network position themselves in favor of a pro-active inclusion of workers in decision-making within the network.

In contrast to the fairly smooth cooperation between workers, local NGOs, and the International Secretariat, NGOs that work as partner organizations in the periphery of the CCC-network seem to struggle with cultural differences and their role in the network. Both issues are ambivalent. Cultural differences produce misunderstandings and make it hard to adapt to practices of the network (C12); however, border-crossing cooperation is a source of enrichment and power for the project and the involved NGOs (C14). The cooperation with European NGOs makes the work for local NGOs sometimes more secure because the public visibility in European countries protects them from threats from local factory owners (C14). In that way, participation in the network is very valuable for NGOs in producing countries. However, when looking at participation practices of international partners, it can be observed that there are different meanings of participation. For example, one of the organization's representatives explains that they are from time to time "*called for these meetings and workshops to Europe*" (C14, P.6). This is an indicator of a rather instrumental and unequal partnership within the network. In other interviews, this instrumentality of participation practices is highlighted by assigning roles of mere researchers and information suppliers to international partners. For example, one person from Western Europe describes the way how most European partners begin to cooperate with "international partners" as follows:

Normally you would look at the country and think which group can be doing what kind of research or you have a discussion with groups and it's decided so it's i mean you in china you want to use a group that can connect with workers know the situation and et cetera. i think we normally choose more activist and client organizations so because then they know what we expect and they are not expensive (C2, P.36)

Here, the instrumental rationality of involving international partners is chosen over a normative participatory argumentation. The practice of beginning cooperation and negotiating about research work is characterized by a reasoning of how to get the best results they need without spending too much money. In this positioning towards practices of cooperation, a normative participatory approach is not involved. The participation of international partners is framed like an asymmetrical contractual relationship, where the activist organizations do not have much to say. This marks a contrast to what the same person says about the principle beliefs and norms of the network:

We would probably be careful to describe things in in geographically convined terms because it's almost NEVER a euroPEAN camPAIGN if WE do a campaign well and i would say we always do that well but or our STARTing point should be that SOUTHern organizations should be involved in the camPAIGN on a DECISION-making level so and this is not always how things happen cause sometimes you have campaigns where southern partners are probably relatively SMALL (C2, P.17)

With the comparison of the both statements above, there seems to be a gap between rules and norms on the one hand and the perception of practices on the other hand. Although these rules are described in the interview, they are to a certain degree avoided or re-interpreted in the practices. This cannot only be observed in the wider global network, but also inside the European network. Some working groups, for example, that form around organizations that are not official platforms in the network, struggle to have a voice in the network. This makes them subordinate groups, which are sometimes overrun by bigger and more influential groups. This is exemplified in a description of a working group that is mainly composed of peripheral organizations:

The people who are involved in this group are not in euromee- eurocoordination group so they are they do not have decision-making power so i guess it will be good to involve more people from european platform in this group THIS was also what we discussed during one meeting, but i was also near to this group so i did not i thought it has more IMPACT, but it seems that it all i think all in clean clothes depends on how people are engaged (C 7, P.23)

Besides the lack of formal participatory rights, the interviewee also thinks that this working group does not have a concrete enough topic to lobby it effectively inside the network. It seems that the initiative to do something in these working groups lies with the International Secretariat. Thus, the practice of decentralizing responsibilities can also lead to the opposite of participation. Groups that are less experienced and not in the core network are having difficulties to adapt to the working routines of the network and thus fall behind.

Although the CCC-network is very open to influence and input from the network environment, the actual procedure of integrating new members in the network is perceived by some new members as a challenging task on both sides: the network and the new members. Some organizations only recently joined the CCC-network while others have been long-term members. New members had different initial experiences with the CCC-network. These experiences present an unbiased and fresh outside perspective on the network. Some CCC organizations value their initial contact with the network as a very positive and inspiring experience. They describe the first meeting they attended as very creative, vivid and varied (C11) with a lot of opportunities to get in contact with fellow campaigners, which also helped them in future projects (C8). In the Euromeetings and other network meetings methods of facilitation, moderation, note-taking and evaluation are applied that are sometimes quite uncommon in the national contexts of the platforms. Besides the creativity of different brainstorming and workshop methodologies, the network's work is perceived as very constructive and efficient. This is seen as a consequence of the professionalized methods used in the meeting. However, it is also perceived as an obstacle for integration into the network, especially when organizations evaluate their own work as being different, for example by being less

efficient or doing things differently (C5, C12). Then, new organizations have doubts about how they can “fit in”.

Furthermore, member organizations also perceive the integration process into the network differently. While some feel that they were supported very well, especially by the International Secretariat, during the adaption period; other organizations do not see that they were helped much in the first phase of becoming a network member. Network member candidates have to fulfill certain criteria, for example having an office and forming a platform that consists of many organizations and trade unions. These criteria must be met before they can be a CCC platform. The dividing line between being a CCC platform in the network and just being an organization in the network is very clear. While organizations without a platform are not involved in Euromeetings, other relevant forums, and decision-making processes, official CCC platforms receive many more “services” (C11) from the International Secretariat and are much more involved in information distribution, meetings and strategic planning. One interview person describes the transition from a non-member to a member as being enabled to participate (C7). Thus, new network members gain many opportunities to participate and capacities to campaign, but the transition and integration process as such is quite difficult. Adapting to established practices of collaboration in general seems to lead to frustration and an inability to cope with certain rules and procedures.

International solidarity is a cornerstone of the international FoE-network and an important rule for cooperation in the European FoE-network. However, there is a certain distinct role allocation between European and non-European organizations within campaigns of FoE Europe. As it was described above, most of the funding for FoE Europe organizations comes from the EU. Therefore, there is often a clear capacity-related role distribution: European organizations have money that they can spend on campaigning, whereas Non-European organizations are often the organizations that represent affected people, villages or regions of diverse environmental damages. The non-European organizations in FoE Europe campaigns are “where the problems are” (F1, P.80). Cooperation between an African FoE organization and a European FoE organization shows the dilemma between maintaining mutual communication and at the same time having differences that cannot be easily diminished:

We want to be involved of course as an organization and what our involvements is that we make the case for the wider environmental issue is not only the harm done to the [local]citizen but also harm done to the [local] environment in general and then of course the lawyer is doing the case for us and the [locals] so it's not that we do it for the [locals] It's a [local] and WE together do it (...) the LAWyer has the leading role and the farmers, they are the most important persons but because they are quite far away. (F1, P.63–68)

While there is a law suit going on in Europe against a big oil company causing environmental damage in Africa, the campaigner of the European organizations broadens the frame of participation in the quote above. The claims of the campaign is made on a much more general level as a “case for the wider environmental issue” being not only a local problem in this country. On this ground it is made clear that the European organization is not doing this *for* the African organization but *together with* the African organization. When it comes to the concrete practices of involving the local FoE organization as well as even the farmers (who are the group of affected people in this case), the language of the interviewee changes:

So the farmers are not very much involved on a day-to-day basis, we tell them about what’s happening in general terms and [the local FoE group] has an important role in also translating what’s happening in [own country] to THEM and to their villages which is very important (...) [the local FoE group] is very important in explaining what’s happening and also organizing that and preparing people that if the court case will be successful (F1, P.69)

Now, the practice of participating in a campaign together is described differently. The European FoE organization explains the local FoE organization what is happening and the local FoE organization explains to the farmers the proceedings of the campaign and translates documents. This gives the impression of a rather unidirectional interaction between the European and the African organization. There is surely a dilemma between the participatory claims of a desired form of cooperation and real practices. Many such claims cannot be realized fully because of constrains of daily work and structural conditions.

The perspective of a Central-African FoE organization coordinator underlines these observations. The urgent need for more campaigns that serve the local needs is articulated:

Most of the time campaigns are designed for international people, you see? and there is most no coordination no, so you can do five years of activities, but local people of the country will not be affected of the origin, the country of origin will not be affected the situation will not be changed that much, so what we really need is YES, it’s good to have national or international campaigns, and sometimes national campaigns in europe, european countries but it’s also good to have some possibility to convert or to use the part of the project, data and everything for NATIONAL cause to national problem, we are trying to face, because there is SOMETHing to share the situation with international campaign it to international awareness BUT it’s also good to TACKLE problems to find solutions to the national problems (F12, P.64)

In this quote, the different target levels of campaigns are compared. There are many campaigns for “international people”, which are targeted in order to share problems that occur at the national or local level. However, with these international campaigns, the shared problems at the local level are not solved.

This would be a different sort of campaign, according to the interviewee. The interviewee wishes to use the data they collect locally for European partners about e.g. environmental damages and their consequences, for primary local campaigns, too.

A strong hint towards the relevance of practices instead of institutions in the implementation of rules and norms in transnational civil society networks is the way how people get involved in campaigning. Here, it can be observed that there are no clear rules of how to include whom in which phases of campaigning. It is rather a matter of perception and dynamic decisions:

I would guess about TWENTY of those people are really involved in campaigning and that mainly people that we call campaigners and some people who are program coordinators who are responsible for coordinating two or three CAMPAIGNS within a particular topic and most of that negotiation, most of that discussion and strategic planning happens at the level of campaigner or occasionally the program coordinator would be involved if it's a bit more strategic discussion or if there is maybe a bit more at STAKE **where we feel that we maybe have a DIFFERENT position from some allies then the program coordinator might get involved or potentially the director to come in** (F2, P.20)

It can be learned from the quote above, which is similarly stated by many other interviewees too (e.g. F4, F1, F5), that rules of inclusion are inherent in practices. They evolve dynamically and are probably rather based on experience than on explicit rules. Furthermore, inclusion is also dependent on the engagement of those that would need to be included. As one interviewee from a Central-African country states, being included and being heard is a constant active struggle over awareness:

I think MOST of the time our role is to bring to show or to display some EVIDENCE from the field, so we have to give the INSIGHT the regional view of the situation of people on the ground. WHAT really matters in our countries in the fields where we are from, what we need or what we would LIKE people to do in europe, for example in order to help changing the situation. (F11, P.57)

In stark contrast to this organic evolution of cooperation, the formal gathering, such as the Euromeetings in the CCC-network, are very structured, 2-3 day meetings where all representatives (one per country) meet in a European city and discuss urgent issues and longtime strategy. There are plenary sessions as well as working group meetings. Normally, the plenary sessions are prepared by working groups. The aim of all discussions is to most efficiently find a consensus in the end. One interviewee from an international partner organization articulated the impression of being in the way of a consensual decision because they need to understand, clarify and discuss so many issues that it takes too much time. One interviewee even described participating in these meet-

ings and coming to a shared understanding as “a painful experience” (C12, P.76). Another interviewee has the complete opposite impression:

The methods are very trying to involve participants as much as possible, (...) because sometimes we could be sixteen twenty people sitting around a table and that can be boring, so it's always organized with the WAYS to make small discussions on the way and to different ways to work and sometimes in-between some games to make it more vivid, and that was positive too. (C11, P.54)

The big strategic choices in the international general meetings of the FoE-network are taken by majority vote: “officially our general meetings make decision by majority rather than by consensus so you could in THEORY have a situation where one group or two groups or even ten groups have said NO to the strategic plan” (F2, P.75). However, this majority voting is only the last step after discussion: “it's not the voting itself which makes the decision but the decision is more like based on the consensus EARLIER and then the voting is more formal just a formal manifestation because it has to be in line with the statute and so on so on but it's rather a matter of discussion.” (F3, P.59). Consensus is the desired outcome of deliberation (F5, P.36).

Since organizations send representatives that have different degrees of knowledge, expertise and mandate about the discussed topics, decision-making at international or European general meetings is often seen as preliminary and it must be possible to go back to the home organization before a final decision at the next general meeting is taken (F4, P.32). At least one person of each member organization should be present when decisions are taken at the general meeting. This is not always the case, since some organizations do not have the capacities to attend every general meeting. This issue will be further explored in the section on representation practices. However, the positioning towards a transparent and democratic decision-making procedure is very strong and positive:

The process is mostly transparent, yes of course for the decision we have to take or to get at democracy in friends of the earth is very broad, (...) they invest we invest a lot in their on the democratic process of taking decision or to get at it, when we are talking about stuff to do together, it is a political decision so a political position or something that we have to proceed or the get at or to do, this is it happens without USUALLY without problem. it happens that someone doesn't agree on a political position with another country or with another political position and in THIS case in the network we have the opportunity to say it can't we insist on our position and we don't (?) your position, so there is a lot of independence, but it happens not so often. (F6, P.38)

The general information practice in the CCC-network has two sides. On the one hand, information spreads easily through the whole network, and network member organizations feel that they receive regular updates (C7, C8). On

the other hand, this less formalized way of distributing information through different actors and channels of communication cannot guarantee that information is really accessible by everyone in the network. As one interviewee states, due to this large amount of information, it can happen that actors are simply forgotten in the information distribution or receive the information with a certain time lag (C1, P.166–167). This can be the case when network members are not directly connected to central coordination offices, but receive the information indirectly through other network members (C 8, P.8).

The information diffusion from wider parts of the network to the European core of the network seems to work quite well:

WE came to i mean there are activists came to know about some labor rights violations and then workers were given capital punishments on the, were beaten, trashing and everything happening, on the shop floor, which we can – we got to know and we raised it and we and we also shared it witch ccc, then and ccc wrote an article and a campaign criticizing [brand name] because they were there. (C14, P.40)

This fast information flow between affected groups of workers in South-East Asia and the campaigners in Europe also contributes to the output of campaign work and provides the CCC-network with relevant information for effective and target-oriented campaigns.

Informal contacts and formal meetings established a functioning information practice in the FoE-network as well:

In my perception friends of earth is very transparent organization, like the decisions are with open voting and everything is visible, they're sending all the reports all the conclusions TIME and circulating through the members so i think that is very democratic and very open organization, so i'm really satisfied regarding with the work, and the way of choosing all the members and everything else which is connected to transparency (F11, P.77)

Whereas many network members state that they appreciate the easy communication and the resulting good information flow, especially in regard to new events and cooperation, the decision-making processes are perceived as difficult to understand. One interview person put it in a nutshell: "The decision making process is often very mysterious" (F1, P.98). The reasons for this evaluation of decision-making processes as very opaque and complex are explained by this interviewee as follows:

Not even in friends of the earth it could be transparent for ME but i just don't have the time to be involved in all those decision making processes only if it's really related to oil and mining my colleague or i will really be involved in the decision making process (F1, P.94)

It can be observed, that the transparency of decision-making processes is tightly connected to representation practices. The dialogue between repre-

representatives, who go to meetings where decisions are taken, and the members of the organization that stay at home, influences the degree of information sharing about decision-making process. Of course, as stated in the quote above, this information supply by representatives is an interaction between both parties: representatives and represented. If the represented individuals, such as the interviewee quoted above, do not have time and capacities to follow up on decision-making procedures, then this results in the perception of a “mysterious” process of decision-making.

One interviewee also evaluates the decision-making procedure as usually not that top-down, meaning not through majority voting (F10, P.85). However, many interviewees criticize that it is sometimes very difficult to find consensus on certain important issues. This debate is going on in the CCC-network as well. Many interviewees state that deliberation is time-consuming and gets on their nerves from time to time. The consensus-building process poses problems. Decisions are postponed to next meetings, which is not conducive to campaigning effectively and cooperating efficiently. Similarly, FoE-network members argue that long processes of finding consensus disturb the efficiency of campaigns, when there is not the one voice, the one statement which FoE can promote. Many FoE-activists compare FoE to Greenpeace, which just has very powerful message because they do not have this inclusive internal deliberation process. Especially across the continents, there are many disagreements that cannot be solved (F13, P.49), but also inside Europe it is difficult and leads to unfortunate and uncomfortable situations:

The problem then is that we don't have a EUROpean position which is sometimes is a shame because it of course european union also gives huge funds to CCS projects and maybe even the groups that are NOT against CCS would oppose putting so much public money into the projects but then it's difficult to really have a press release because then it's this ongoing discussion. (F1, P.84)

Thus, the outside message of FoE is sometimes complicated by their internal deliberation practices. However, despite those downsides, network members are still convinced of these procedures. One very important argument for deliberation is that decisions last much longer than if single individuals take decisions that the rest of the network does not want to live with.

Governing in a Decentralized Network

Decentralization in the network can work in two ways: through the establishment of autonomy of national member organizations and even local organizations within national member organizations, and through the consideration of local and national perspectives in transnational campaigning. The following

quote from a non-European activist shows how local perspectives differ from transnational campaigning goals and how they can be taken into account:

We need to TALK to that research institute to understand well if there are some aspects we need to understand well, at that we can still have or bring more informations about some aspect that we THINK we need to display in the report. because sometime you can just contribute to international campaign without taking into account WHAT the people are LIVING to what's the local situations of people, WHAT we really need to make (...) like consent of local farmer, if for example the report is about water, it can be really great to know what the situation of water in the cotton commodity cultivations, BUT most of the time you can realize that on the fields the needs of people is above water. so at that time we need to add that aspects of the discussion, so that the report can take it into account. and to display it in a general report. (F12, P.22)

However, different interests or even different realities, as stated in the quote below, also produce difficulties in coordinating projects: "Maybe they have good things to say cause i think is very difficult coordinate all these groups i think we are twelve groups twelve or i don't know, more than that, and we work with the impacts of european consumption (...) so it's the realities are very different and of course interest are very different" (F13, P.62-63).

The practice of different forms of participation is suggested as a solution of the dilemma of diverging interests in a decentralized network. If network members can decide relatively autonomously in which way they want to participate, some conflicts would be resolved.

There are different levels of campaigning that are decided during the when we write the projects and for instance for this project, the [project name] projects there are in Europe six or seven (...) that CAN participate and there is and some decided at the beginning to participate with a broader approach so being more propositive, more active and some other does decided to participate in a in a more passive way which means that some group decided to participate and do also the dissemination of the campaign contents in the schools, some other not and decided only to participate to the campaign to disseminate reports that are produced by issue and couple of press release per year et cetera so. (...) and of course the budget is allocated in different way. budget for the campaign that is moved from let's say from the BIG budgets is moved a budget to one country that does few things less budgets more things more budget (F 6, P.54)

Network member organizations are autonomous in their decisions about operative questions. The network structure is equated with a federal democratic system, with no steep hierarchies and long chains of command (F6, P.58). This decentralized structure especially within the European network of FoE is seen as a real asset in the daily lobby work in Brussels. Local knowledge can be transferred to the center of decision-making:

When the brussels ngos are working with the brussels institutions they tend to exchange this very formalized brussels language which does not always reflect what are the problems on the ground in the countries because they do not have neither the commission european commission nor the ngos themselves without these networks would have really the understanding of what are the problems on the ground so we are with the structure we are very effective in transferring this knowledge very fast (F3, P.103)

Network organizations in the CCC-network are in constant negotiation over the degree of local autonomy in a global network. Many interviewees state that they have the possibility to plan and conduct specific national activities, stand aside in decisions they do not agree with, or adapt campaigns to their national contexts (e.g. C9, C10, C3). The role of the International Secretariat is seen by many as ambiguous. Some interviewees argue the International Secretariat does not influence national groups, whereas others say that the International Secretariat is of course the central coordination institution that exerts its influence on members. This tension between autonomy and centralization is also reflected in outward relations and the network identity:

This is one of the KEY mechanisms of ccc, both in term of decision-making as in terms of campaigning and it's this DIFFerent way of looking at in terms of decision-making and in terms of campaigning (...) i'm not sure if it's a balance, but is this changing or shifting from tell me what to do, don't tell me what to do. both in terms of when we are in the euomeeting, we take a decision and there is like okay. we want to know what we – please please let's decide so we know what to do. tell us what to do and then there's the other part that says DON'T tell me what to do. yeah? because i will decide and then in terms of when you have to decide on what are demands or what's an approach towards companies, okay. tell the companies what to do, don't tell the companies what it's not our role to tell the companies what they should do. (C4, P.106)

Even on the local level, it is a difficult negotiation process about the autonomous space of action for local groups (C5, P.6). Therefore, the tensions between autonomy and decentralization on the one hand and centralization and support from the International Secretariat on the other hand cannot easily be dissolved. However, the interview material suggests that these tensions are constantly and interactively dealt with through discussions.

Leadership Practice

A rather unexpected finding from the interview analysis is the practice of taking over leadership. The question arose: Which network actors position themselves as leaders in which practices? At first, it can be observed that there are explicit norms and rules that identify certain persons or organizations as leaders. For example, if network actors apply for funding from the EU, it is

obligatory to name one leading organization. The (implicit) rule is that the active and often bigger members will “take the lead”. The justification for single leaderships is based on daily experiences: “my experience is that we need somebody, who takes the final decision, because first time is always running and there are just so many ways on how to write an application for funding” (C9, P.86, author’s own translation). This quote shows that decision-making is interpreted with reference to functionality and efficiency of processes. Also, the reference to the implicit rule of leadership is taken as a justification of inequalities in decision-making: “well in this project we are very small partners, very small but we are the small the smallest partner so we usually stick on the if there is a decision made between [organization a, organization b] and the International Secretariat, we usually stick to it.” (C8, P.27). The clear emphasis on the small size of the organization justifies the practice of not including this organization in decision-making processes in one campaign although formally they are equal partners. On the other hand, some interviews reveal that there is not always agreement on who takes the leadership role. As two partners in one campaign claim to be the only leaders in the campaign, it seems that there is no absolute consensus about who is the leader (C1, C9). The performance of these “leading practices” is also evaluated by others in the group: “because it’s different in various projects, in THIS project we have leading partner from [organization] and [person] is very like capable of really sticking to agenda and sticking to a time plan and so this is a good thing that the discussion remains constructive in a way”(C8, P.16). The explanation for the good quality of leadership is explained by the individual personality of the leader: “i mean this is i guess really like in the individuality of the leader, and also were of course the individual the personality of the coordination, here the coordinator here, for example my coordination and cooperation with other (organization) leader is really good and i’m really glad” [C9, P.47]. Being the leading organization means also taking responsibilities within certain practices. The leading partner prepares the deliberation, moderates and stimulates the discussion (C8, P.19). Thus, leadership practices are on the one hand evaluated as conducive for constructive, structured participation. On the other hand, the legitimization of leadership reproduces inequalities, for example based on the size of organizations.

Identifying Problems and Setting Agendas

The identification of problems is the first step of a campaign, followed by an agenda setting practice. The overarching goals of the CCC have been defined through a broad, long-term consensual process. Core members of the CCC-network refer to this extensive deliberation about their own code of conduct as

an initiating ritual, which is fundamental for the collective identity of the campaign network (e.g. C1, C10).

In contrast, the definition of concrete campaign goals is often an ad-hoc process: “you have some brainstorm and then one says okay i will make a proposal” (C4, P.92). Those brainstorming meetings take place in national groups as well as at European meetings (C1, C9). Many ideas or frames for campaigns are taken from the urgent appeal cases, which are perceived as mini-campaigns. Some of the urgent appeals that are evaluated as relevant are broadened and perpetuated. Consequently, the definition of new agendas often takes place in reaction to concrete events, such as workers getting fired or people getting killed in factories. Most often, interviewees say that things come up somewhere in the network and then go viral in the network until a critical mass is reached and a campaign starts (C10, P.31/C5, P.16). Thus, the identification of problems is practiced in very diverse ways. Furthermore, the practices of problem formulation are interconnected, interchanging between brainstorming sessions, authoritative decisions and rewriting of proposals. After problems are identified and ideas are formulated, the preliminary framing of such campaigns is often done in national platforms or working groups of the international network. Those preliminary proposals are then included in the agenda of the Euromeetings. However, much of the agenda setting is steered by the International Secretariat, which initiates new campaigns and suggests plans for further action. This can be very well exemplified by a typical agenda setting discussion at one Eurometing, as described by one of the interviewees:

Well it used to be sort of like an empty flip chart and then people start calling out things but sometimes that took a bit much time so basically the way i do it now i KNOW some topics that we have just discussed that will need an either an update or a longer discussion so they are pretty clear right? so i sort of make ah a suggestion i write on the flip chart a few of the topics that i think will probably people will want to discuss but you, people don't always agree with me so then we start sort of almost like negotiating (...) then we just sort of see where most people think it's most useful to discuss. but you know it's that's a way a bit EASier because it's yeah some of the topics it's pretty CLEAR that you know need to be on the agenda but there is often one or two that you know that COULD be interchanged by something else or sometimes that i would say ah it's fine have an update, people say no no no we really think we should discuss it longer or vice versa (C10, P.19)

The quotation above is also interesting insofar as it describes a development of a very open agenda setting. The interviewee states that “it used to be an empty flip chart”. Everyone could contribute to the practice of finding topics that need to be added to the agenda. However, over time, this practice seemed to become too time-consuming, and the International Secretariat learned

about the crucial topics in the network. As a result, the agenda setting practice became more goal-oriented, driven by the majority and less open. Still, according to the interviewee, it is possible to exchange and emphasize specific topics. In sum, it can be observed that problems are identified in the network through different channels of information. After that, the agenda setting practices are rather centrally coordinated.

Deliberation procedures are often extensively planned in the CCC-network, especially the preparation of deliberation practices at meetings is very thorough. A typical preparation practice of international meetings goes on as follows:

Basically the way it works is that the local national coalition will do a lot of the preparation on the ground. regarding the venue, accommodation, getting a note taker there you know those kinds of logistics (...) it's the european coordinator at the international secretariat(...)who then prepares more the content side and (...) the content side is basically after you know we've set the different items of the agenda previously but to sort of then determine the ORder which day will be discussing which item and in what order trying to make the agenda kind of not too intensive and you know interesting for different people and stuff. and so then the draft agenda is made and then the euro coordinator contacts the different working groups about their input documents that they will prepare and also (...) will discuss with the facilitator of the meeting about different sessions. (C10, P.8)

The central coordination office prepares the deliberation procedure with regard to the order of topics, the intensity and length of discussions, and the role of the moderator. The central coordinator takes into consideration the diversity of participants and receives input documents from different working groups. This suggests a structured central preparation process with different opportunities to open up the preparation to the input of participants.

Deliberations on Skype are also extensively planned:

Normally a skype meeting is PLANNED, so first is an email contact about we have a meeting at this and this TIME, the agenda will be and the- we have a list we have a list for eurocoordinators, so they distribute a lot of joined emails and on this email list that there will be a skype meeting and this is this time, sometimes it's coordinated who will be able to when. we use some of the tools for to finding to find a time where most of the interested people can join so it's decided when to have a meeting, who is responsible for calling the others and quite often it is also distributed an agenda on the email before you start the meeting and then the person who's responsible for the meeting calling the others, also is responsible for the agenda and leading the discussion. and quite often one of the participant is appointing (...) a short note of the meeting and that is also distributed afterwards on email, so that's the way it normally works. (C11, P.30)

Skype meetings often include fewer participants, which makes it possible to expand the preparation practice even more. The quote above seems to suggest that almost all preparatory questions are decided collectively. However, it is not really clear who is involved in the decision-making since the interviewee articulates these phrases in passive constructions.

Overall, preparing deliberation is mainly a practice of setting a suitable agenda that fits with the interests and expectations of the participants and to gather input from different angles about the contents of discussion. Therefore, a lot of material is gathered beforehand in order to prepare participants for the deliberation practice. Some interviewees even note that the preparation is very, almost too extensively planned. There is much to read beforehand (C12, P.24), and the focus of the planners is very much on efficiency of the debate and much less on deeper discussions (C3, P.98–99).

Prior to deliberation practices, which are mainly conducted either at network meetings or at campaign meetings and telephone conferences, agendas and preparative information is circulated by the organizers of the meetings. These practices are strongly dependent on the responsible person or organization. The timing of preparation is specifically diverse:

I would say at the european level usually it comes much BEFORE than at the international level, it's a bit a question of culture, but even it comes late if you compare to swiss or i think german standard, so some people sometimes they it's impossible. so i have to deal with all these differences you know, but that the international level it comes sometimes a bit late, at european i think it's quite okay, we get all the documents we can we can work out if we wish if we are willing for" (F5, P.70)

Similarly as in the CCC network, the problems and ideas for campaigns in the FoE-network come to the network from different members of even partners of the network. This open process is made possible by the specific network structure, which connects organizations so that they are just one e-mail away from each other:

We were involved and come there, so from the beginning. but this is because actually in a friends of the earth we are a NETwork, everytime it a group wants to apply or at european level on a specific budget for a project and usually these projects says that you have to involve at least three four five (...) different groups in different countries, **we as a network are quite facilitated in doing this because we are a network and it's simply an e-mail in the in the network e-mail address to say HEY we are preparing this who want to join?** and who want to join, says okay i'm interested let's talk about and the process start this way. (F6, P.34)

This identification of problems and brainstorming of ideas seems very common in the FoE-organizations (F4, F6, F10). Besides e-mail requests, campaigns are often initiated through informal personal contacts within the

network (F6, P.34). This process is a step-by-step project within a group of organizers. Finally, the ideas that everyone can agree to are implemented (F10, P.67). After finding an idea and possible campaign partners, the process gets more centralized in that the campaign idea is subsumed under one of the programs of FoE Europe and a steering group is formed, which functions as a leading committee of the campaign. This very initiation of a campaign is centrally steered by the Brussels office (F6, P.14) due to better facilities and infrastructure in the Brussels office. Furthermore, the elected board is in charge of the general agenda setting (F4, P.60). However, the questions in the agenda such as when to launch the project, how to approach issues or how to communicate to the public are discussed afterwards with the whole project groups. Thus, the process of agenda setting is opened again after an initial phase of formulating the campaign and setting the preliminary agenda (F6, P.22–24).

Structuring the Deliberation Process

Core members of the network are very concerned about the rules of procedures and the “real” implementation of those rules in practice (C1, C10, C9). This is a very important point that is often made because democratic standards of equal participation and consensus are highly valued (C1, C11, C10). However, the time-consuming exercise of deliberation is not always seen as positive, also among the core members in Western Europe (C11, C1, C4). One interviewee from a smaller Western European organization shares the impression that there is an interest in the network to avoid conflicts and arrive at a consensus as early as possible: “it’s also a way of pushing for or for stopping discussions you do not want to have because you think it would be too tricky too difficult [...] i think sometimes it’s an easy way to not enter into lot of disagreements also” (C3, P.55). From the perspective of a newcomer to the network, the formal structure of the network meetings prohibits further discussion that would be helpful for individuals who are not yet that familiar with the structure and topics of the meetings:

The euomeetings are very structured, there is certain method of facilitation, there is usually the way of discussing things, it’s the network works for very long time so some things are you know established. (...) for us everything was new, not only the way the euomeeting is organized, but also the topics (...) maybe it’s enough discussion for people who are working on this because you know the platforms are different. and but there are people who are working on this topic for twenty years so sometimes they do not need to discuss things from the beginning and i understand this because it would be you know a waste of time, but you know when you are just dropped there as a new person sometimes you would MAYBE need more explanation, but there is no space for it because the agenda has to be you know followed. (C7, P.12–21)

This interviewee described this situation as a dilemma. The person's organization is new to the network and has difficulties to adapt. Comprehensive discussions and explanations would help to understand and make participation easier. However, there is also the necessity of proceeding efficiently. The first quoted interviewee from a long-time member organization identified conflicts and disagreements with regard to specific topics in the network that are not solved in structured discussions. Similarly, the younger network member would welcome such discussions that could facilitate an easier adaptation, which in turn would increase their ability to participate in discussions.

Although formal procedures are important, there should be room for discussing informally about important matters. Thus, efficiency and deep deliberation are hard to combine in one practice. What this person thus suggests, is a combination of structured deliberation practices and informal deep discussions.

I think in one way what is really efficient in the network is the organization with schedules timelines moderators note-takers, i mean it's a guarantee of efficiency but i think it's not enough you sometimes you need to forget the schedule because some points have to be discussed as priorities so i think efficiency cannot be a goal as such we do not we just do not we do not just NEED to be efficient as such and sometimes yes our obsession for schedule consensus really prevents us from being maybe MORE efficient if we take the time to discuss very DEEP questions (C3, P.99)

It can be observed that the different network members share the understanding that deliberation practices are very important and are not too inefficient to further proceed with them. Some actors in the network would even argue for more frequent, deeper and even more informal deliberation practices.

In this situation, we can see the different positionings towards deliberation practices in the network. While a certain degree of inequality in deliberation is accepted somehow by both sides (core members and peripheral members), tension arises when concrete and closer cooperation develops. As seen in the last quote, the concrete practice of understanding, learning and strategizing at common meetings remains a difficult experience for both sides. This tension is not only a tension between different cultures of cooperation, but it also reveals the basic dilemma between efficiency and "deep" deliberation, which might be even more dramatic in a transnational network.

As it is pointed out by some network members in the FoE-network, facilitation is only used, when there are really important strategic decisions to be taken, or when there is a long input and brainstorming session about the start of new campaigns or kick-offs of certain developments (F2, F6). There are efforts to increase the rate of facilitation by training the staff in the Brussels office in facilitation and moderation, but since there are no rules, when to apply facilitation, it is not clear, when facilitation really takes place in meet-

ings: “we would HOPE that people are equalizing participation in meetings which they are facilitating, but we can’t you can’t really enforce it” (F2, P.47). Thus, the facilitation of meetings by FoE-staff is desired but not enforced, and usually conducted in meetings where people do not know each other or when difficult decisions are to be made (F2, P.47–49). External facilitators come in only at the European level in order to have someone without interests in specific campaigns (F2, P.51). “during the meeting we have a moderator usually it is a person of friends of the earth, sometimes in the network are we when we meet at friends of the earth europe level to discuss network and programs for the networking strategies then he’s also an external moderator” (F6, P.44). However, engaging an external facilitator is a matter of costs and sometimes this function is taken over by leading staff in the Brussels office (F2, P.51).

It is already mentioned, that the purpose of facilitation is to “equalize participation in meetings”. This is done also through a large variety of facilitation methods:

Varying between having plenaries and if you are having plenaries making sure that everyone can really participate, using small group discussion, having some time for informal discussion or for example PAIR discussion making really CLEAR what the objECTives of the meeting should be so that the people can prepare in advance [...]i think that is kind of cru- some crucial skills if you are really gonna engage in network and not just bring thirty people together to kind of nod and listen to some two or three experts standing on a panel speaking cause you might as well just send them the notes of the meeting afterwards. (F2, P.60)

In this quote the necessity to facilitate and structure deliberation meaningfully is made very clear. However, there is also the other side of the coin. Those methodologies are also used to push deliberation process into certain directions and outputs:

I think we have some really skilled facilitators within our network and within the groups that i’m working with and i also know that we have some people who are very able to manipulate is probably too strong a word but kind of SHAPE the outcome of discussions because of the methodologies they are using because of the way the meeting has been set up, and i think that’s you know that’s not ALWAYS illegitimate way of running of doing things, because as long as everyone AWARE of these sort of different methodologies then you know you are not abusing someones trust (F2, P.66–67)

This is certainly a difficult practice, where much depends on the facilitator. As the network coordinator points out, there are shades of grey: some facilitators are just not that open to disagreement and diverging opinions, whereas others (as mentioned in the quote above) are clearly and consciously leading discussions into certain directions (ibid.). Although we would commonly assume that the facilitation of deliberation is an asset because it structures the

deliberation, opens up discussions and balances the consideration of arguments, we can see in this case, that facilitation is not always the same matter. If and when facilitation is taking place seems to depend very much on the persons involved in organizing deliberation meetings and even if deliberation takes place, it is a matter of personality and interests of the facilitator, how the facilitation is conducted.

Speaking and Translating

The aspect of language in deliberation practices is very crucial in a transnational network. The interviewees in the network articulate their positions towards deliberation that show how important language skills are for an equal balance of arguments as well as the self-evaluation of effective participation in deliberation practices. It begins with the access to information prepared for deliberation: some policy papers are only available in English. If people in the national network want to discuss them, they must read them in English (which can be difficult for many people) or they must be translated, which is an extra effort in terms of time and costs for the organization. Also, information brochures or policy papers that are written in other languages than English cannot be read by members of other national platforms. This also limits the informational basis before deliberation. While some non-native speakers feel confident using the English language in meetings and for general communication (C4, C14,), others are describing difficulties in practicing deliberation because of their lack of English proficiency. One network member explains this as follows: “When you need to explain complex things (...) it’s very difficult to use i mean more simple and maybe more generic words. (...) so you feel that your idea is never translated in a very accurate way” (C3, P.43). When deliberation starts, some interviewees have had the impression that they cannot push their arguments convincingly because they lack the self-esteem or capabilities to discuss them in a way that they would discuss them in their native language. Furthermore, it is difficult for some actors to follow native speakers. It is a very frustrating situation when members cannot express their ideas very well. This problem is also recognized by the International Secretariat. One coordinator points out that meetings would of course have a different dynamic if all participants could speak in their mother tongue (C2). In addition, the fact that every meeting is in English limits the group of people who can participate at all. Some organizations must send the same person to each and every meeting because there is only this one person in the organization who speaks English. The experience of having difficulties to “make my point” is also relevant for skilled English speakers who are confronted with native speakers. Thus, translation is crucial, but hinders again the deliberation process as

such (C2, P.60–62). One person from the Asian region stresses the importance of translators. Without translators, international cooperation does not make sense according to this interviewee (C12, P.45). However, deliberation practices are modified due to the need of translators. These translators disrupt the deliberation process and impose breaks in the deliberation. Also, the direct contact with the campaigners from different countries is hindered by translations. Deliberation without translation is difficult, too. One interviewee interprets this unfortunate situation as being an instrument to shut discussions down, namely using the English language as a tool to exert authority where there is no legitimate authority ascribed (C3). In conclusion, those inequalities in the level of language proficiency also influence the outcome of deliberations because different degrees of English proficiency limit the ways how arguments can be formulated and even limit the arguments made as such:

When you don't have the same LEVEL of language (...) you can't PUSH for your ideas or for what you want with the same strength that someone who speaks VERY good english or so. it can be (...) you are a bit reluctant to speaking out loud and in front of everybody because your english is not so well so either you do not really speak enough you do not tell what you would need to tell or you are misunderstood or you do not know how EXACTLY to yeah express the ideas, so it has to my opinion an impact on the results of the discussion. (C3, P.45–46)

In this quote, the practice of deliberation is interpreted as a practice where power through skills plays a very dominant role. Language also becomes a distinguishing dimension when transnational campaigns consist in parts of national organizations that share the same or a similar language. These members of national organizations usually speak with each other in their mother tongue. However, as in one case, this has led to an at least temporary exclusion of members of other organizations who do not understand the language. These tendencies can also be caused by other circumstances, but it seems that language is often a catalyst for already existing inequalities (C1, C8, C9). Another crucial point concerning the impact of language is the remark of one interviewee who states that it is not only the English language that poses problems, but the technical jargon. For this person, it was hard to understand all internal abbreviations used during discussions, especially in the beginning. The technical jargon that is used in many meetings of course increases efficiency, but again presents an obstacle for newer and more passive participants in deliberation, especially in combination with the use of English as a foreign language (C7, P.41).

In the European FoE-network, English is the official language. The positions towards the policy of speaking English in all the meetings varies from extreme difficulties in even understanding what is spoken, to holding back opinions because of difficulties speaking English to the absolute irrelevant-

cy of language skills in deliberation processes and the highlighting of other differences, like class, age, experience, that matter much more than language proficiency (F8, F4, F2). I want to compare those three positions below. The first quote exemplifies the position of a non-native speaker, who, at least in the beginning of the network membership, “could not understand anything”. The person makes an even broader claim in generalizing this experience to “the rest of Europe”, who has this impression as well, and also formulates the consequences of this impression: namely that people do not dare to speak English. Taking this seriously, we must assume that communication in meetings is hardly possible. We can see parallels to the CGC network, where one person expressed similar difficulties in participating successfully in English deliberation processes: “In my first meetings ten years ago, sometimes i could not understand anything. well this is i mean i suppose all the rest of europe, except english people have this impression, so well in the north you speak much better but, it’s a problem also because you know you do not dare to speak SO MUCH than native English” (F8, P.103).

A more moderate position comes from a person, who acknowledges that a lack of English proficiency can be a problem for the participation of some people. The person even admits that people are naturally excluded from deliberation. This applies to people, who do not speak English. However, persons, who have basic English skills can somehow learn to deliberate in English and learn to not be shy of speaking in front of others because other persons speak the same basic English.

The most positive evaluation of language and deliberation comes from a person with a central coordinating position in the network, whose native language is English. This person does not necessarily see a link between language skills and participation in deliberation processes. It is rather assumed that people do not express their opinions out of other reasons like being less experienced than others, being shy in general or coming from a specific political culture. Also gender, age and class, the typical categories of intersectionality are named in order to explain difference in speaking out loud:

I mean some people, i mean to put it really bluntly it’s not because you are the best english speaker or a native english speaker that you have a big mouth (...) i think there are also native english speakers who are not confident about speaking in groups (...) we certainly do have some native english speakers who like speaking and have a lot to say in meetings but i think that’s not necessarily because they are native english speakers, (...)that can be to do with GENder that can just be to do with all sorts of LIFE experience or to do with HOW OFTen you have to speak in meetings and that you develop that confidence or it can be to do with CLASS or it can be to do with AGE quite often in some meetings so i think those are all cutting across also having language issues and DIFFerent cultural traditions of DEference and resPECT and will-

ingness to challenge authority and all these other things which are also not purely kind of NATIONally determined but i think to certain extent come from having a background in former communist country or having a background in northern european kind of scandinavian democracy where i think people seem to be more willing to speak so i think that's you know i think that's many different sorts of ISSUES cutting across that, as well as just the personality, it's kind of a very personal thing"(F2, P.45)

However, the interviewee still admits that language might be a problem in the selection of persons for the participation in deliberation. Those people that come to the meetings mostly have a quite good command of English, whereas the real problem arises earlier. The people who do not speak English that well do not even come to the meetings. This exclusion process could be also observed in the CCC network. The implications are that there is no balanced participation of people within one organization in the network meetings and the selection of participants is done on the grounds of already established capacities (here language skills) instead of equal share or knowledge. In sum, it can be seen that language plays a more or less important role, depending on the position of the speaker. Persons at the center of the network and/or with excellent language skills see the relation between language and deliberation very positive, whereas persons who position themselves at the margins of the network have sometimes a very negative outlook on the influence of language skills on deliberation.

Deliberating Online

Online telephone/video conferences are a very useful communication tool within both networks because they allow campaigners to have meetings without needing to travel. Network members say that they only recently began to use Skype for video conferences. Since Skype meetings are often not that large in terms of the participating persons, they are often a little less pre-structured. The context of having a Skype meeting evokes certain, very specific deliberation practices that are adapted in the light of the conditions of online meetings. Online meetings change the way people interact and talk to each other. Although Skype meetings are similarly structured as face-to-face meetings, i.e. there is an agenda that is sent out beforehand, and there is also more often a moderator, there are certain limits of practicing deliberation on Skype. At first, it is not possible (and this is confirmed by many interviewees) to discuss with more than a handful of people on Skype. The methodology that is used in face-to-face meetings to initiate or reinforce more and broader participa-

tion cannot easily be adapted on Skype⁶⁸. Technical problems, especially in countries with slower internet connections, make the deliberation as such difficult. Thus, there are some factors that limit the possibilities of deliberation on Skype and consequently disturb the equality of voices in particular. If participants cannot really follow the discussion because their internet connection breaks down frequently or if there is no chance to make deliberation more accessible through different moderation methods, the consideration of arguments in deliberation is severely obstructed. This is not that much a problem in the European network, but when we look beyond the narrow borders of the European network, we see many difficulties with that. Internet is of course not that naturally available in other continents of the “South” than it is in Europe.

In africa internet is not good, the bandwidth of internet is not good (...). so most of the time it will be difficult to have a voice call you will just type it and then you wait for the reply and you type another time, (...) it's not really usual to have internet with voice with discussions like we are DOing with because in [home country]i have a café cyber café, where i can have such discussions live voice and message you can type the message i can have VOICE and discussion, but IN the office it's not usual it's not common to have people on skype with voice, it's not usual. and in togo, the situation is WORSE there. so most of the time they can just call them through the telephones and they can to through telephone easy, just to have an information, yeah they can try to call them like that but most of the time for MEETing for discussions for long discussions, we use skype, conference calls. (F12, P.49)

This representative of an African network member of FoE clearly points out how difficult it is to have those skype meetings, which became the main way to communicate in the network. In order to handle the situation, adaption practices are conducted. Since the internet is too slow for voice call, they type in their messages in Skype while others are talking on Skype at the same time. Thus, these actors with slow internet connection participate in deliberations through written texts, while the rest of the group is talking at the same time. This of course obstructs them from hearing what is said during discussion. While they could talk on the phone, phone calls seem to be rather used for giving information, while discussions take place on Skype. This is of course a disadvantage for organizations with slow internet and even their coping practices do only mildly solve the problem. However, this practice of deliberation as a mixture of writing messages and talking is clearly a unique one, and interesting to further evaluate. A similar experience is described by an interviewee from Latin America, who concludes that it was impossible for them to communicate with Skype. This campaign group, which consists of many organizations in Asian, Latin American, African and European countries took the decision to

68 Working with cards, using visual media etc.

communicate via e-mail instead of Skype (F13, P.70), which might impede the coordination process in the campaign as such, but at the same time does not produce inequalities between campaigners in different countries.

Besides this tendency towards exclusion, the limits of communicating in a wholesome way are also interfering with a smooth deliberation. Decision-making during deliberation on Skype is only possible if you have met once in person (C11). The interviewee, who mentioned this, argued that regular decision-making ends with non-verbal signs of agreement or disagreement: "When you're with a group of colleagues and you have to make a decision, you always look around of people faces whether they oppose or whether they consent what is going on and you can see much more than they actually express" (C11, P.25). Since on Skype the deliberation participants cannot see each other this non-verbal communication is not possible. Consequently, Skype deliberation is very time-consuming if everybody expresses their opinions verbally or involved persons must already assume how this or that person might decide because they already know each other.

The identified difference between Skype and face-to-face meetings makes also clear how the increasing role of Skype meetings influences styles, structuration and outcomes of deliberation. There are different reasons, why deliberation on Skype is perceived as something different. One argumentation is based on cultural characteristics and a sort of long-practiced habit of personal meetings, which makes it difficult to adapt to those technology supported meetings. Later on the interviewee who expressed this cultural characteristic, also raised the issue, that due to a language barrier, people have much more opportunities (probably non-verbal) to express themselves in face-to-face contacts than during a Skype call. Thus, using Skype calls reinforces the language problem, which was already outlined above.

There is a difference. (...) when you have a skype meeting(...) it's sometime it's not easy to express exactly what you have to let people know about but physically is more as africans is i do not know but it's really GOOD to have people physically, to talk to people to meet people we are used to that and we really like that. as african i think is like a CULTURAL so it's, but coming back to the contents IF we have a topic to discuss, normally we can discuss, it even through skype maybe, we do not have problems to share or discuss our view so that but we prefer to have a physical meeting physical contacts with people (F12, P.38)

A similar alienation from Skype calls is expressed by a Central-Eastern European interviewee. While the reference to the African culture in the quote above is an expression of cultural identities, the positioning towards Skype calls in the following quote is taking place on the level of working routines. The major disadvantage is not the limited opportunities to communicate, but the not very efficient and focused way of communication.

We also have skype talks which is (...) i think this is major feature of our work, and personally i find it a bit even you know it's a bit even exaggerated, the amount of time that we spend on this discussions because they tend to be quite slow especially if you have a group of people and then people might not be always focused on the call if you are just sitting on your earphones for one and half an hour, so but this is definitely, THIS was for me new when i came to [own organization] and i do not think that many organizations work like this to this extent but i have some colleagues in the office who were even more involved in this international activities and they really spend a lot of time on skype. so i think that this is very characteristic feature. (F3, P.14)

The contrary position, namely that Skype conferences are a very efficient communication tool, can be found in the network as well (F4, P.74). In this person's argumentation, the reasons for the efficiency of Skype calls can be found in one of the advantages of it: there is no space for chatting over coffee and possibly coming to new (and unintended) ideas or projects in the coffee breaks. However, even Skype conferences are getting unproductive at a number of around 15 people (ibid.). Another interviewee from an Italian NGOs underlines the limitation of communication and the inefficiency of Skype calls, what is described here as pure "chaos": „Chaos because conference call with five six people on phone you know each other by person but on phone you do not know you do not see the gesture of the people so you do not, some-someone is speaking maybe he's speaking too long, you want to say SOMETHING then it's right to interrupt but then the communication is slightly postponed (...) but in the very end it works" (F6, P.30).

In sum, we can see many disadvantages that Skype deliberation brings for deliberation. Skype of course eases deliberation in that it does not necessitate travel costs and travel time to meetings. Everyone can install it on their computers. But this is only a conditional advantage when we look at the positions of the interviewees above. Especially those organizations that are at the periphery of the network have difficulties in participating in Skype meetings.

Talking About Politics

In the FoE-network, there seems to be a particular European deliberation style, which is very strategic, goal-oriented and straight-forward. A Southern American activist describes that there are sometimes adoption problems and even a lack of understanding, why European don't talk politically:

It's very good meetings you know they are very productive, they do a lot of things in a short time, but still it's very different from our meetings here in south america for example. cause **we include more how can i say that, we include more POLITICAL issues**, you know current issues and we talk about, first of all, we talk about what is going on in the continent in a political and

economic level and THEN we start to work in you know in very RAtional things, to DECIDE some campaigns and what strategy we take with some partners and so and sometimes in europe in a meeting of some campaigns, **they don't do it.** i don't know if, i really don't know, but i have some idea but i don't know WHY they don't do it, because i think i believe it is really, really important for friends of the earth, since we OUTSIDE you know outside the federation we do it. we discuss in a political level. (F13, P.33-34)

It could be even said, that the deliberation that is classified as specifically European is not deliberation but negotiation or strategy talk. The open and substantive quality of deliberation cannot be found in the description of this FoE member from Southern America. However, naturally European activists see this differently. They see the deliberation quality in the open access to deliberation and the consideration of all voices in deliberation (F10, P.143). The contents of deliberation are not considered a feature of the quality of deliberation.

Selecting and Instructing Representatives

The preparation of representatives for their representational tasks regularly takes place "at home" in the member organizations. Before representatives of a national platform in the CCC go to a Euromeeting for example, the meeting and tasks of the representatives are prepared in the national platform. The thoroughness and scope of preparation differs among national platforms. The initiative of such preparation often lies with the representatives themselves because they are mostly the national coordinators of the platform. How much they involve their constituency of national groups often depends on their perceived role in the platform and their knowledge about the platform. The more knowledge they have about their fellow group members and the more they feel secure and trusted, the less they involve other members in the preparation process of meetings. For example, a newer member of the network from Central-Eastern Europe describes the preparation with national organizations for Euromeetings as very thorough: "so when me or another person goes to the meeting we have a Skype call and we I circulate first the agenda and the materials so they can look at it and then we have goal issue by issue what we want to know what we want to be decided or what's important for us what's not"(C7, P.49). This very formal practice of preparing the representative for their task of representing the platform in transnational network meetings is very uncommon in other platforms and could be explained by the novelty of the network practices for this national platform. This platform copes with the insecurities about the treatment of certain agenda points by including all national organizations of the platform in the preparation process. Other older network members' representatives seem much more confident of their own

ability to judge what is important. One interviewee of a Western European platform, who has been in the network for over a decade, says that the person knows beforehand what will be discussed within the Euromeeting and that checking back with the national organizations is no more than a formal exercise without any surprises (C4, P.71). Due to the interviewee's long experience with the network, the representative only checks back with the platform when it is really relevant: "i have been the coordinator for sixteen or have worked with ccc for sixteen years. i know what is issues are delicate. so i know when i have to get back to my platform to be able to express our position at the euro-meetings" (C4, P.70). Thus, trust is an important factor in the selection and authorization of representatives. Many representations are practiced on the basis of the trusteeship model. This is interesting insofar as inside the European network, trusteeship prevails, but in the global context and among the constituency of workers in garment factories, there is the claim that the network representatives are delegates of their constituency rather than trustees.

A representation modeled on trusteeship does not only develop out of the longtime experience of the representative, but this practice can also evolve out of a different priority setting at the national level, as the following quote indicates:

I can say have the chance that they (the national organizations in the platform, H.K.) really trust me for the international level because i think i mean there are different kind of involvement for the national platforms in the international network some are really involved because they have either more capacities or decided that it's that the international network is the priority, in [own country] it's not really the case so it's not that people are inter- interested or do not feel it's important, but they feel the work i do as a national coordinator participating in the international network is sufficient or is enough and that we have to deal with other with a LOT of other topics at the national level" (C3, P.77)

In this case, it seems that the instruction of the representative is nothing that seems to be relevant for the platform. One interviewee describes the difficulties of the delegation model of representation within his own national platform: Besides the top level decision-making board with representatives of all organizations involved, working groups are formed at the national level that must report to the board. Topics are then delegated into the working groups. However, sometimes time restrictions make it impossible to first report to the board and then decide. Much more often, decisions are already taken in the working groups without further consultation (C1, 146). Thus, there are many reasons why representatives decide that trusteeship is a better and less cost-intensive way to handle representation. However, for some organizations, it might have specific advantages to consult beforehand, especially if the representatives are inexperienced and would benefit from advice. This seems

to be a rather horizontal peer-to-peer consultation and representation than a top-down or bottom-up representational relationship.

The selection of representatives is conducted differently in the individual national member organizations. Some organizations send their managing director, others send international coordinators and some organizations decide the selection according to the agenda. If there are many agricultural topics, for example, they will send the agriculture expert. This is very different among the organizations in the FoE-network because organizations are differently organized. Some are working on a volunteer basis, others have a big office with many staff members. Thus, some organizations cannot select representative out of a big pool of possible candidates, whereas others have even specialized experts for different topics.

Trust is an important matter in the instruction practices of representatives in the FoE-network as well. On the one hand, there is a need for trust, because not all decisions can be discussed with the sending organization out of time constraints. Similar as in the CCC-network it is also described that the interest in matters of international meetings is sometimes not that high in the national organization (F1). One interviewee also articulates the aspect of trust as follows: "I know in the spirit of whom I have to act" (F4, P.54, author's own translation). Only if so-called ad-hoc topics arise at the meeting, the representative decides depending on the importance of the issues, if the national board should be consulted (ibid.). This is a main practice of representation. Asked on which grounds an international coordinator represents, the interviewee responds: "good will good understanding of how the organization operates and yeah. in my own thinking." (F5, P.72). Thus, the knowledge of the representative plays a very important role in this kind of trusteeship representation practice.

Under the condition that national organization members are not that interested in "high level" international meetings, the chances are good that representation is practiced as trusteeship:

Because the meetings and the results of those meetings are often quite or the general meetings are quite on a high level so they are not really VERY important for the day-to-day work of me and my colleagues so therefore there is not TOO much interest in really preparing those meetings and the person going there knows generally what's is important for [own organization] so there is no NEED to prepare it in a better way but it i think it would be good to give more attention so that people feel more connected to the process and for the campaigns meeting well there will be a campaigner going generally the coordinator of a campaign so he's supposed to know EVERYthing so then there is also no need for bigger preparation but if well if necessary discuss it before the meeting. (F1, P.45)

This lack of instruction of representatives is critically evaluated. A common preparation would let people in the local organizations “feel more connected to the processes” (F1, P.45). Intensive instructions of representatives take place, when representatives go to international meetings for the first time (F7, P.24) or when new campaigns start. Most often this dialogical instruction of representative takes place within a restricted circle of interested persons in the organization (F1, F5, P.66). When the topics are more sensitive or more political, then more people or even directors are involved in the preparing discussions (F4). Thus, also the envisioned topics to be discussed at the international meetings are influencing the way how representatives are instructed by the represented constituency.

Communicating Between Representatives and Represented

The knowledge of representatives in the CCC-network can be characterized in two dimensions: On the one hand, representatives of the whole network in the International Secretariat are not always best informed about what is going on in the European member groups. They position themselves as being able to get feedback from groups via social media such as Facebook pages and twitter posts, but the bulk of information gathering should be done by the national platforms (C10, C2). On the other hand, the relevant and needed information is gathered from the constituency that is geographically farther removed, the workers. What *their* preferences and interests are is of much more interest and a focus of deeper research (ibid.). It seems that the interviewees from the International Secretariat perceive their roles as informed representatives in terms of the substantive interests of workers rather than as informed representatives of European national groups. At the representative level of national platforms the information situation is mostly very good. Representatives themselves evaluate their own knowledge of constituencies’ interests and positions as very high, especially if issues are not completely new (C4). If this is not the case, representatives not knowing what is going on poses problems to the functioning of campaigns,(C9). Thus, the national representatives need to stay informed.

The degree of knowledge that is needed to properly fulfill the roles as representatives, differs between the International Secretariat and national organizations. Representation at the International Secretariat is accounted for at the Euromeetings. Thus, there is a quite tight and frequent control of the representation practices of the International Secretariat. This is not the case in the representation of workers, where control mechanisms are at best informal. This explains the worry of International Secretariat staff about a good information flow from the workers to the International Secretariat. At the na-

tional level, representatives, as was described in the former section of this chapter, rely much more often on their experience and anticipations. Formal meetings where representatives' mandates are formulated and controlled are not as common on the local level than on the transnational level.

The practice of going through the decisions, topics and deliberation results of the Euromeetings with the national partner organizations also differs among the CCC national platforms. Whether there is a practice of informing the represented constituency at the national level about decision outcomes and new developments in the international network depends on many factors. One person from a Western European platform described this reporting as very difficult because documents (e.g. written reports) have to be translated from English into the native language, as almost nobody speaks English in the national platform. Furthermore, there are time constraints that hinder a thorough translation until the next meeting with platform members (C3, P.75). Other network members view the reporting of representatives to the national membership as a necessity in order to either comply with certain norms of representation in the national platform or to get the campaign work done, in other words to coordinate the work with other activities at the national level. Issues from the international network level must be discussed in the national groups in order to see if there are disagreements in the group on the one hand and to start working on the campaign in order to stay on schedule on the other hand (C12, P.47).

Reporting back to the represented organization also requires that this fits with the working routines of the national organization. While some organizations meet very frequently, for example every week, others meet only once a month or even less frequently. The lower the frequency of general meetings is, the lower is the chance that representatives transfer their knowledge to the other organizations about the decisions made at the Euromeetings (C3, C4, C8). Some interviewees say that they fall back on e-mail communication as an alternative, but such communication does not really reach their constituency (C3, C4). In general, it can be observed that newer members of the network are much more prone to reporting back and deliberating with their constituency at home about the experiences and decisions at European or international meetings of the CCC-network than older members.

Representation dialogues differ among different target groups and representatives' responsibilities. The representative, in this case the international coordinator in a national campaign, represents the international campaign in the national group as well as vice versa the national group at international campaign meetings. The representation of the national group in international meetings is more relevant because at the international meetings, decisions are taken that affect the national groups. International coordinators see themselves as the bridge or the mediator between two very different spheres. One

interviewee talked about the representative role as being the hinge between individual groups in the national platform and the international campaign network (C9). This role as a hinge often requires a balance between suggesting new ideas for projects in the international and national meetings and coordinating the wishes and ideas of the represented, i.e. the national groups. Many of these representational dialogues are done by e-mail. However, some people from the national groups might not read their e-mails or only some of them get back to their representative, the international coordinator, in order to discuss whether they agree on certain projects or not. This specific characteristic of e-mail communication is sometimes even desired because the represented are not that interested in all matters of international campaign activities. This can be because there is not much time left for the decision (C5, P.2), or because the representative does not want to disturb the national groups during their work:

In fact i report in between euomeetings and in between steering meetings by e-mail (...) let's say these ten people of my network. they are very busy so if i send an e-mail i do not disturb them during their work and they can read if they like and if they don't read it, it's a pity but after a while i can tell them, they start reading like five e-mails one after the other an- okay they catch up with it. so the e-mail is like a sort of NICE way to stay in touch. if i REALLY need input i will call them. and i do this, both when i expect they will support some point OR when i suspect they will completely disagree because i feel it's my role both to deal with agreement and disagreement. sometimes i even know that beforehand, that some organization or some person in organization will disagree, so i will look for that disagreement just to make sure that they have done a proper consultation (C4, P.73)

In the quote above, it seems as if the representative is seeking the discussion with the represented groups only if the representative senses a sort of disagreement. This can be a zigzag course between convincing and disapproval: "maybe two-thirds of the steering committee who thought it was not a good idea so they dropped – i dropped the idea fine. i mean i need the backup of i will try to if i'm really convinced i will try to convince them but if they disagree i will drop the idea." (C4, P.77). The ability of the represented constituency to build an informed opinion and express feedback about the representative's performance very much varies between national platforms and highly depends on the involved persons. This influences the deliberation processes among representatives at such international meetings. If directors who cannot know all the details of one specific campaign sit together with experts of one campaign, these discussions can be only preliminary. Consequentially, there is a practice of going back home after deliberation and talking to the constituency again (F4, P.31).

If coordinators represent volunteers in the international campaign, they have to manage this bridging role in a very ambitious way. Volunteers who give their spare time for projects expect more from their representatives than people who are employed in a member-NGO of the international campaign network. Volunteers want to agree to projects because this is their only motivation to join a project. They are not contracted employees who need to do projects because they are paid for them. Thus, the dialogue between representatives and represented is much more essential in this situation. Volunteers can literally always opt for the exit option. Thus, representatives care much more to “fill out” their role, help with coordination and office services, and above all keep the communication channel very open. In order for this to work well, there must be an institutional frame, reliability of the representative, and clarity of responsibilities (C5, P.42). This picture of the relationship between representative and represented is characterized by a very caring role of the representative, which initiates much of the decisions to be taken, filters information for the represented, and helps out in other matters. The represented are dependent on the good will and power of judgment of the representative. The representative in turn is dependent on the represented, too. If the represented volunteers decide that the representative is not doing a proper job, they can just quit.

The representation practice involves a high amount of deliberation between representatives and represented, which go beyond the mere delegation of tasks or the anticipation of preferences. As exemplary shown in the quote below, the mandate of the representative for an international meeting is, at least in contested issues, broadly and openly discussed in order to have a real mandate to decide in the name of the national group of volunteers.

I think it is about to DISCUSS! all things like that this is not something that's happening often (...) but if it DOES happen it is important to have a meeting WITHIN the organization where you discuss PROs and CONs and if it is something we stay BEHIND or NOT and if it is NOT we then just go back and say sorry this is not something that we can WORK on. so it is VERY important to have this implemented within the organizations since a lot of the work is done by volunTEERS. (F9, P.41)

Here, the representative's function is not only to gather preferences from their constituency, but to actively engage in discussion with the constituency and try to find a solution that suits all. However, the dialogue of representative and represented can look very different from the perspective of an employed campaigner. In the following quote, we can see a different practice of representation that creates an impression of opacity:

I think the decision making processes in other organizations are always big mysteries for their colleagues and then sometimes EVEN for the organizations themselves because it's always a big struggle in because organizations

are part of international networks well and often it's the director that goes there and then there is a big discussion and then there is a result and there were so many steps involved and then inbe= and then also that's mixed with FUNDing cause if it's possible to get money a lot is possible (F1, P.98)

In addition to the opacity of a multi-step decision-making process, that is conducted by the representative and cannot be traced by the constituency, the interviewee also articulates a suspicion why there is so little representative interaction: "if it's possible to get money a lot is possible" (ibid.). This means it is better if decision-making processes are not attuned with the national organizations, if funding is already in place. The difficulties in the representation dialogues between representatives and represented is confirmed by a representative. Asked the question: "Would you say you represent Friends of the Earth here in [local organization]?" The following interviewee becomes very clear it is necessary to explain and advocate the matter of FoE at the national level:

Yeah i do. CLEARLY, **i have really to constantly EXPLAIN** and yes because most of the peop- especially friends of the earth europe you know it's mostly dealing in the eu level (...) i mean many of things are not really relevant for us, and friend of the earth international yeah. we're not involved in many of the of the programs. for MANY here and here it's a HEAD office, but if i speak or think about people you know in our local groups, they really have very they know very little of friend of the earth and CARE really little about it, i guess and our members well i don't know but yeah. we in general (local organization) does not communicate a lot, it's really euphemism, about friend of the earth for different reason that i don't always understand myself but it's like that. (F5, P.75-76)

Peer-to-Peer Representation

Since networks do not have a much formalized hierarchical structure, representation more often takes place *between* network members. The practice of representing each other at formal meetings seems to be quite common. This is for example the practice of proxy vote in the FoE-network. If one national organization cannot come to a meeting, the organization can ask another organization to vote for them and be their proxy. This seems to be a representation practice which works on a horizontal peer-to-peer basis (F4). The so-called proxy-vote, which is practiced in the annual general meetings, is formalized insofar as the delegating organization has to give a written declaration that another organization is authorized to vote on their behalf. There is also a quite formal purpose behind it. It is not necessarily the interest of the represented organization, which drives this representation practices, but rather the need to fulfill a certain quorum in the annual general meetings in order to make

valid decisions. Thus, the organizational interest (instead of individual preferences of organizations) might preponderate in the motivation to practice this peer-to-peer representation. This proxy-vote is practiced among organizations which are similar to each other or share similar languages like the Scandinavian or Central-Eastern European organizations (F4, P.48). Thus the reason for delegating a vote is resemblance. This is plausible from the angle of a trusteeship modeled representation. Resemblance is a good basis for mutual trust. If the represented organization and the representing organization share a language or other characteristics, it is easier for the representing organization to understand the interests of the represented organization. Here, we can observe a representation practice that is close to descriptive representation.

Similarly, members of the executive committee have an alternate, a deputy, which is supposed to come, if the member cannot come. This sounds quite common and not very innovative. However, the practice around this alternate is, that this person is sometimes also from a “weaker” organization and is supported by the original member insofar, as the original member sometimes pays their travel costs alone and let the alternate come to the meetings on the expenses of the member attendance fund (F5). In this representation practice, it can be observed that the representation has a complete different function than to represent in the classical way. The representative, here the alternate, is brought into the executive committee in a way of fostering the participation of subordinate organizations. Although, there is a formal horizontality in the relationship among organizations, there is also a difference in terms of capacities. The formal representatives (alternate) are supported in their capacities to take part in decision-making processes and the represented (here the original member of the executive committee) is the supporter of the representative without necessarily needing the representation.

Making Representative Claims About Individuals and Discourses

The practice of making representative claims differs depending on the constituency that is targeted by the claim and on the range of the claim, i.e. how many people/groups or how many matters are covered by the claim. Nobody in the CCC-network, for example, made a general claim to represent the garment workers in Asian countries: “i do not really know how to formulate this, because i think it would be to BOLD to say that we are actually representing the workers? but they are the ones that it in the end it's all about.” (C10, P.39). While this was expressed by a Western European organization, similar statements were made by NGOs that are in close contact with the workers: “I will think that as campaigner we are only play these supportive role and the garment workers they have to stand up to the fight for their own rights. but of

course the method, we will we design a lot of programs and activity trying to s= support the worker garment workers to fight for higher wages.” (C12, P.26).

The role of the representative is limited to that of an assistant who supports the workers in their fight. Both quotes show a denial of real agency, the agency is ascribed to the workers themselves. In this network, we can observe a complex interplay of representation practices. While the local NGOs normally represent the workers’ demands towards the international or European network organizations, those European organizations, unlike the local NGOs, represent the workers’ demands towards companies and national governments. Local NGOs receive the legitimate right to participate in the network through their “working with workers”: “Well because we are this is in the human rights project or in urgent appeal we are not, i mean we are not getting funds for a project a particular so= amount, but this just because just for the fact that we are working with the garment workers for their rights and entitlements, that allow us to be in ccc, and that is why ccc also involves us in their work” (C14, P.16).

The representation of local workers towards companies and in the international network entitles these NGOs to participate in the network and to benefit from funds and support. If asked whom a local NGO represents, an NGO activist refers to the workers’ *rights*, not the workers themselves and to corporate social responsibility. Thus, they rather claim to represent certain normative concepts instead of a constituency as such: “we represent the workers’ rights (C2) and CSR interested to call corporates accountable and to uphold workers’ rights “(C14, P.55–56). It seems that many of the representative claims are very cautious and rather abstract. NGO activists in Western Europe and Asia alike emphasize the autonomy of workers and the mere instrumental role of the representative serving the represented. If direct claims are made, then they are made in relation to norms such as workers’ rights, or standards for socially responsible entrepreneurship.

Inside the European network, representative claims are pronounced with much more self-esteem and implicitness. Representative claims are made here in a very formal way. Interviewees see themselves as representing the matters of their organization in the network meetings. They are *the* representatives of their organization, platform or even campaign (C1, C4, C5). It becomes complicated to decide if they represent their organization or the entire European CCC-network only when facing the international network (C2, 14–15).

The following representative claim points to a topic that was discussed earlier: representing a whole network gives more strength also at the national level and vis-à-vis politicians and other decision-makers. In this representative claim, southern organizations are specifically named as being important represented organizations because they give even more credibility to the organizations in Europe. International solidarity is thus claimed, as a concept to

serve northern and southern interests. It is very important that the claim to speak for Southern organizations is substantiated by the reports of Southern organizations. Thus, the constituency's "testimonies" are the backbone of the general message of international solidarity.

In the end we represent here in [country] what seventy-six organizations are thinking, so it's very important for example in our relation north-south it's a really important for us to be of an organization that has a lot of members in southern countries. so this is quite often part of our message, that the impact of the north on the south and we can translate, we can show that because we are testing on it from our southern groups, so it's not just because of their view or because we saw image, NO it's because people from the south TELL us what is going on and altogether we try to find solutions that fits for north and for south together, so this is, it think this is really the strength of friends of the earth international, that the northern and the southern component are together and try to find a solution valid for both. (F8, P.87)

Besides the north-south solidarity that is that basis for broader representative claims, the federal character of the FoE-network is also used to argue that one can claim to represent the whole FoE-network:

Well i well whenever i speak in [country] or communicate with the outside world like media and politicians the way i see it is that i am communicating on behalf of [own organization] which is part of (...) the international federation so i don't i **can also say I'm representing (...) in some cases like the entire federation because we have a common position on something so there is this double identity i'd say.** (F3, P.90)

This quote can be complemented by another interview passage, in which the interviewee speaks about representing at first the network, because this is where all stand together (F4, P.64). So, the national and transnational sphere are of course two spaces, where constituencies are spoken for but it seems that the transnational network is the main reference point for representative claims. However, for global network actors outside of Europe it can be quite unclear what the representative positions of the FoE-network are:

Friends of the earth europe work at the parliament, so but they talk with everybody at the parliament and when they when we have to **when i have a meeting most of the time it's not clear what POSITION does friends of the earth europe have.** you know, is not clear. IF you are in the parliament, okay because we talk with someone from the conservatives, someone from the link, someone from the greens but and friends of the earth is really important, is really very clear WHAT position about something do you have. and sometimes for me it's not clear you see from me as an activist in [home country] it's not clear when i go europe, some groups, i don't know if they if they have the same position of the whole federation or of us , it's not clear (F13, P.36)

Another representative claim targets the other way around, representing the own organization and especially the volunteers, who cannot go to the international meetings:

What i repreSENT? i **represent MY organization** – i hope, i mean i am there beCAUSE basically because nobody else in my organization has been elected to go when it comes to like volunTEERs when they have the ability to go then follow me but it is also that i have a responsibility to make their work easier as volunteers that is basically my=so i take up their ideas and i motivate them to do stuff within the organization what they are expected to do -and i also handle the boring parts of projects (...) and such-reporting so therefore i very much feel that i represent my organization when i go. (F9, P.113)

In this representative claim is an emotional component of representation. The interview partner expresses the feeling to represent the organization, because there is a felt responsibility towards the volunteers. The one strong representative claim towards the main cause of FoE, the environment, is articulated by a big Western-European organization's activist, who claims to "give effect" to the "voice of the environment" (F10, P.2, author's own translation).

5.4 Conclusions

The political practices that are conducted in the networks alter through different phases of campaigning and in different contexts within the networks. The practices also changed over the time of the existence of both networks. This variability of practices can be specifically observed in the way participation practices change their mode of including actors in the course of campaign work or how representation practices are adopted and configured toward specific groups of constituents. Besides observing this flexibility in practicing participation, deliberation and representation in the two networks, the interview analysis helped to explore new features of political practice. Participation practices are for example accompanied by certain practices of leading and steering. Deliberation practices show specific forms of language practice, technologically co-produced forms of deliberation and forms of political talking. Representation in the two networks often materializes as a practice of peer-to-peer representation.

The participation practices in both networks are in the first phases of campaigning based on long-term processes of broadening the access to problem identification, closing and steering the concrete formulation of campaign goals and then opening up processes again. The empowerment and learning practices inside the CCC-network are differently interpreted by the interviewees. While core European network members value the norms of em-

powerment and try to foster their practices through workshops and workers' participation, local NGOs in the garment producing countries identify a lack of a sense of political efficacy among workers, which makes it hard for local NGOs to effectively reach workers with their empowerment strategies. Additionally to empowerment in the form of capacity building, the interviewees in the FoE-network also describe learning processes that evolve out of the collective experiences at meetings. These learning processes encompass the increasing sense of being part of a strong network. The networks are generally open, but specialized network practices create boundaries between the core and the periphery. Since the funding comes for most parts from European donors such as the European Commission, the European network members administer the money, whereas non-European network members are often responsible for the field work. Although non-European network members feel included in a way, they raise concerns about this specific role allocation which produces problems for participation. Leadership practices are on the one hand reinforcing existing inequalities to a certain degree, but on the other hand, leaders contribute to a more formalized, structured participation and they take charge of time-consuming administrative responsibilities so that others in the campaign have more time for the actual planning and decision-making practices. We can observe two gaps: one gap between the norms and practices of core member coordinators in the network, who value participatory decision making, but on the other hand equally value the efficient provision of research information. A second gap can be identified in the appliance of rules in different parts of the network. If rules do not apply for certain organizations in the network, for example the right to participate in decision-making, then participation is only equalized among the members in the network that hold these rights.

Deliberation practices in the CCC-network are generally very thoroughly planned and prepared. A big difference can be identified between the face-to-face Euromeetings and Skype meetings. While the Euromeeting deliberations are accompanied and structured by different deliberation methods and a moderator, Skype talks are often more informal and unstructured. Both forms of deliberation are structured by an agenda. Skype talks differ from Euromeetings in that they allow for a broader access to deliberation due to the lower costs of participation. However, there are restrictions of expressing oneself, following the deliberation and encouraging participation in deliberation that make Skype deliberation an ambiguous experience. Similar restrictions are caused by the different level of English proficiency in both networks. Thus, deliberation practices are usually prepared and conducted in a very considerate manner with an eye on efficiency. The deliberation practices in the FoE-network are characterized by step-by-step procedures of agenda-setting, which change between openness and authoritative steering. A huge variety of facil-

itation methods are outlined by many interviewees. However, due to scarce capacities, facilitation is only used at the big general meetings, if people don't know each other that well or if the issues are delicate or very important. The deliberation seems also very dependent on the moderators or facilitators in charge. Generally, it can be observed that just the formal practices can prohibit comprehensive deliberation from the standpoint of participants. Formal practices can have exclusionary effects because they assume a knowledge base about the complex rules and procedures that might not be shared by everybody. Moreover, these formal practices seem to channel the discussions into specific directions that increase efficiency, but leave out topics that are relevant to participants.

Representation practices in both networks depend very much on the national organizations. Due to the high autonomy of network members, the representation practices of instructing representations, informing representatives and constituencies, and reporting back to the constituencies depend on the internal coordination practices of the member organizations. This means especially the degree of internal formalization, the priority setting, and the member's familiarity with network practices. The trusteeship model of representation is practiced in the national organization to different degrees. The overall representational claims with regard to workers' representation are rather cautious in terms of workers' self-determination. Representation practices in the FoE-network are the most diverse practices among the three different types of practices. This can be explained by the diversity of network member organization which are directly involved in conducting representation practices. The positionings towards representation thus vary from organization to organization and are conducted in many different ways. This results in the gathering of very differently mandated, skilled and experienced representatives at international meetings and is also expressed in the practice of horizontal representation. However, far geographical distances, structural inequalities and differently organization network members influence the agency of actors to practice representation.

6 Situated Democratic Norms

The previous part of this book presented a broad spectrum of political practices in the two networks of the Clean Clothes Campaign and Friends of the Earth. These practices show how coordinators, activists, campaigners decide about future actions, coordinate their activities and gain shared understandings of their goals. Since both networks subscribe to ideas of democracy and community, the political practices already have a normative meaning for the actors involved. When actors ‘do’ participation, they already have in mind democratic norms such as self-efficacy or the creation of equal opportunities. Thus, political practice and democratic norms cannot be separated neatly. There is diffusion between these two spheres of normative democratic theory and political practice. In general, political practices result from interactions between actors as well as between actors and pre-given rules. Thus, *democratic* practices can develop out of the actors’ (collective) examination of rules (in this case rules that serve a democratic normativity) and the positioning towards other actors.

The following table shows on the left hand the reconstructed political practices in the two networks and on the right hand the democratic norms of participatory, deliberative and representative democracy, which were outlined and discussed in the first part of this book. The dotted line symbolizes the permeability of boundaries between both spheres.

Political Practices	Democratic Norms
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning and empowering • Cooperating and making joint-decisions • Governing in a decentralized network • Leading • Identifying problems and setting agendas • Structuring deliberation processes • Speaking and translating • Deliberating online • Talking about politics • Selecting and instructing representatives • Communicating between representatives and represented • Representing peer-to-peer • Making representative claims 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Participatory and Deliberative Democracy</i> • Self-efficacy, equal opportunities • Self-rule, autonomy • Equal inclusion • Openness • Diversity in talk • Considered judgement • <i>Representative Democracy</i> • Responsibility of the representatives • Accountability • Considerate claims

Table 2: Political Practices in the Transnational Civil Society Networks and Democratic Norms

Following the account of a 'citizen standpoint' (Saward 2010, Disch 2015), the following chapters shall discuss, if these practices are done "in a democratic way". As Disch points out, taking up a "citizen standpoint" as opposed to acting as "self-appointed adjudicators" (Disch 2015:2) facilitates an exploration of the conditions that have enabled citizens' judgements (ibid.). Such kind of exploration resonates with an understanding of democratic norms as "meaning-in-use" (Wiener 2014: 30) which are context-dependent and thus cannot be evaluated by supposedly unalterable and universal criteria. We rather should ask questions about the *contexts and conditions* (Disch 2015) under which political practices are framed as democratic by participants, deliberators, coordinators, constituents, representatives; namely all actors involved in the political practices described above.

Therefore the local knowledge and positionings should necessarily be taken into account not just as study objects but as legitimate forms of knowledge that stand beside and not behind forms of knowledge produced by scholars (see e.g. Saretzki 1997, Jaeggi 2014). Thus, what democratic practice, as practice 'in a democratic way' could mean in the two transnational civil society networks studied here, will be discussed in a dialogical manner between the strands of normative democratic theory that were outlined in the first part of this book, and the political practices and their interpretation by involved actors. Bringing normative democratic theory and empirical political practice into dialogue means equally weighing both forms of knowledge and their normative claims. Including the "citizen standpoint" in the discussion on democracy does not mean to throw normative democratic theory overboard. However, the inclusion of local situated knowledge and evaluations is a necessary condition for the transforming spaces of democracy in the transnational sphere. Philosophers and political theorists should contribute their knowledge and expertise, but they do not stand alone in the discussion, critique and definition of norms (see Jaeggi 2014: 53). Therefore, the following discussion of both, theoretical perspectives on democracy and empirical standpoints on the politics of transnational civil society networks will serve the goal of a mutual learning process. The researcher's and activists' understanding of democracy is of course heavily influenced by theoretical accounts of democracy. However, in the practices of activists new forms of politics occur that can be considered democratic. A back and forth movement between theoretical approaches and empirical practices can be fruitful for the discussion on transnational democracy. This dialogue about democratic norms in transnational practice shall start here but should be taken further in future research. The following three chapters will thus discuss under what conditions and in which contexts political practices were considered democratic by the involved actors. Furthermore, it shall be discussed in how far those practices and the attendant positionings relate back to normative democratic theory. The chap-

ters are divided along the lines of participatory, deliberative and representative democratic norms. Since the deliberation practices showed many new features in the empirical observation, they are discussed in a separate chapter and not included in the following chapter on participatory norms and practices.

6.1 Participatory Norms and Practices

Participation practice in the two transnational civil society networks is informed by the norms that stem from grass-roots democratic ideas in social movements. The transnational network character of organizing makes these practices, however, quite complex and sometimes even opaque in their alternation between the different levels of local, national and transnational campaigning. At the same time, practices in the CCC-network evolve dynamically and are open to the diverse input in decision-making due to the easy and quick practice of information sharing. Similarly, interviewees from the FoE-network successfully reframed what is usually seen as one of the main struggles in conceptualizing democratic legitimation beyond the nation-state, namely the large heterogeneity of interests (see Friedrich 2009). Many FoE-network members evaluate the huge diversity inside the network as a factor that gives much reason for all of the participation practices described above. While diversity lets them learn much more from each other, feel stronger about their own political efficacy, it is also a reason why autonomy of network members and a decentralized federation structure is viewed by network members as necessary. In the following, I will discuss the empirical observations in the two networks and contrast them with theoretical insights in the debates on participatory democratic theory. I will depart from the central terms of normative participatory democracy, namely (1) equal inclusion, (2) self-rule and autonomy and (3) self-efficacy and equal opportunities and will then engage in a critical discussion between theory and practice.

Equal inclusion. Equality of participation is a fundamental value of all kinds of participatory democracy. Beginning from the selection of representatives by lot in the Athenian city state to Rousseau, who argued that no citizen can be free if society is unequal (Rousseau 1762), participatory equality was central for those first theories and practices of participatory democracy. Modern participatory democrats reinforced the equality argument by referring to feminist critique of representative democracy (Phillips 1996) or to radical concepts of democracy (Macpherson 1977, Mouffe 1997). In practices of participatory democracy, the value of equality is often seen in the educational and transformative effect of participation (see e.g. Warren 1993).

The inclusion and exclusion practices in the two networks are fluid due to dissolving boundaries and decisions that are sometimes made on the spur of the moment. This makes equal inclusion in the broader network not a general democratic practice. Including groups or persons in specific campaigns or campaign phases is often an ad-hoc decision left to a small group of persons' discretion. This decision-making process is an inclusion practice between different representatives of member organizations. It is practiced horizontally among peers. Organizations are sometimes included temporarily if they suit a campaign's interest, without becoming formal members (e.g. partner organizations doing research in Asia or Africa are called to participate). However, they are often not included in the agenda setting of the campaign. Only a few persons in the central coordinating office or member organizations in Europe seem to decide about this functional inclusion. Thus, most often inclusive and equal campaigning is difficult as soon as the borders of Europe are crossed. The role allocation between European and non-European organizations is quite clearly divided in the organizations that apply for and receive the funding on the one hand, and the organizations that do the field work on the other hand. Although the positioning of European network members is often egalitarian and very respectful for the non-European groups, positionings occur that show a rather paternalistic or instrumental relationship with non-European partners. Similarly, the positionings of non-European organizations are undecided between the recognition and indignation about an unequal and less inclusive campaigning and the acceptance of one's own role. Thus, network members are included, but not necessarily on equal terms.

Besides these principal decisions about campaign team compositions, the concrete work on campaigns in smaller teams of three to five organizations is often well balanced between participatory equal inclusion and leadership. The necessity of leadership for the functioning of participation practices is clearly perceived and accepted by almost all groups in the networks. As Polletta (2002) pointed out in her study on participatory democracy in social movements groups, participatory democracy is not anymore seen as a total power-free enterprise. The dogmatic norms of participatory grass-roots democracy developed by new social movement groups in the 1970's are often relativized by present-day activists. This can be clearly observed in the participation practices of the members in the CCC-network. The discursive positioning of interview partners demonstrates the valued contribution of leading persons to an equalized and easily accessible campaigning process. Leaders do not only take over power, they also take over responsibilities and tasks, which can relieve others for example from exhausting administrative work and give them the time to concentrate on the content of campaigns for example. Thus, a certain amount of leadership can structure procedures and reduce complexity, which can be even motivating for people to participate. Thus, in-

clusion practices work much better on a small-scale than on the large-scale of the broader network.

The equal distribution of information is a precondition for equal inclusion. Sharing of information can range from a very centralized and exclusive information distribution to a rather egalitarian mode. Information is distributed in both networks quite frequently and easily due to the network character and the digital communication patterns. Everyone is connected to everyone in the network via e-mail lists and network databases. This is a very accessible practice of information sharing. It provides broad access for literally everyone, regardless of geographical place or capacities. Everyone has the opportunity to be informed and to gain knowledge about procedures as well as issues and campaigns at stake. However, this information flow can be overwhelming and can lead to confusion about which information can be accessed by whom. Thus, equal access is granted, but not always equal opportunities are guaranteed. The overload of information can also lead to an excessive demand for the participating member groups. This can lead to the practice, that representatives do not always forward the information to their national member groups. These members can thus sense the practices of decision-making for example as something “mysterious” that they do not understand, as one FoE member claims (F1). Thus, the network members’ evaluation of information transparency is mixed, although the prospects of quick information sharing for more inclusive political practice must be underlined.

Self-rule and autonomy. As in debates on associative democracy, the norm of self-rule or self-governance is strongly connected to decentralization efforts in the network. While the network character seems to provide a well-suited infrastructure for the self-determination of its members, the autonomy of single organizations can be threatened by a very excluding way of decision-making in the central offices of networks. Those top-down decisions limit the choices of network members to organize campaigns, decide over the form of campaigning and contribution in the network as well as their own identity in their respective country or region. However, it resembles Fung and Wright’s concept of Empowered Participatory Governance (2003 20–21), which claims that a centralized supervision and coordination is necessary to guarantee accountability. The International Secretariat in the CCC-network plays a quite important coordinating role and contributes to a centralized coordination, especially when member groups themselves cannot be that active due to a lack of capacities. This results in very context-specific understandings of self-rule across the network. On the one hand, the network is seen as very decentralized and organizations are perceived as autonomous by stronger and more active network members. On the other hand, it is seen as more centralized and controlled by weaker and more passive network members. This partly centralized coordination, however, can also imply an empowerment of these

weaker groups and thus can give way to a more independent campaigning of such groups. However, some dependencies of network members on the International Secretariat seem to endure over years.

FoE-network members refer to FoE as a federation of like-minded organizations. The identity of FoE as a federation has a very important meaning to many interviewees. It is stressed as very productive in particular because of the high diversity of network members. The decentralized coordination is also a tool to hand over coordination work for which the central coordination offices do not have enough capacities. Every organization participating in specific campaigns can choose their degree of participation in the campaign. However, this kind of autonomous rule can also lead to a reinforcement of existing inequalities in that weaker network members might choose to participate less due to fewer capacities. If it is assumed that the more prosperous organizations choose to take the more active part in campaigns, they in turn get also the higher budgets and consequently unequal structures are reinforced. Thus, self-rule can be perceived by network actors as over-stretching their capacities. While some see the burdens of much administration work, others view the virtue of self-determination as very important for their own work. This has also to do with the self-understandings of the organizations. This is mirrored in their positionings toward different self-rule practices: While some see themselves as learners in a network of very experienced organizations, others are very much grounded in their own local campaign work. Thus, self-rule and empowerment are in different situations mutually reinforcing or hindering their respective democratic way of practice.

Self-efficacy and equal opportunities. A strong commitment towards workers' empowerment is one main characteristic of the CCC-network. The conduct of such empowerment practice is balanced and sometimes charged with tension between European network members and local partners in the Asian region. The CCC-network empowerment approach is first of all targeted at the workers in garment producing factories. As a secondary form of empowerment, new and smaller CCC-network members are empowered. The worker's empowerment is practiced with a reflective and cautious positioning and the awareness of the inequalities between workers in South-East Asia and European NGOs. It is desired, that workers are leading their own empowerment, as written in the CCC principles: "Workers themselves can and should take the lead in their own organising and empowerment."⁶⁹ This norm of workers' self-empowerment, which is discursively reiterated and reinforced by European NGOs, is not necessarily what local NGOs experience. They are not so much aware of the norm of self-empowerment and see even many difficulties in a top-down-led empowerment because workers are sometimes not easily

69 <http://www.cleanclothes.org/about/principles> (accessed: 01.10.2016)

contacted and in a second step not easily convinced of an empowerment, positioning themselves in a submissive way, as one NGO activist describes it (C12, P.26). Local organizations are more interested in educating workers more basically and supporting them, especially in risky situations. This tension points to the dilemma that theorists face in deliberative and participatory democracy: people need to be in a certain already empowered, informed, educated state in order to be able to actively participate or “take the lead in their own organizing”. This is reflected in the tensions between the ideal vision of European NGOs and the assessment of local NGOs in the Asian region. Although the general empowerment goals are the same, there are partly conflicting interests of local, mostly Asian, network members and European network members. Thus, overlapping interests interfere with the norms of empowerment which were constituted at the beginning of campaign work.

The learning of ‘citizen skills’ and political efficacy, coined as “self-transformation” by Warren (1993) is crucial for participatory democratic theory. Within the core networks, it can be observed that this is taking place almost solely at face-to-face meetings. Participation practices at international meetings lead to a better sense of the individual members for political efficacy of the network and for the different legitimate perspectives on political issues at stake (see e.g. F8). This can be one reasoning, why the FoE-network has defined a quorum, which sets a mark of 28–29 out of 31 network members participating in international meetings (F4, P.46). The attempt to reach a participation rate as high as possible is reasoned by one campaign coordinator as an attempt to create broad ownership of decisions. Only if as many network members as possible discuss and finally agree on important topics, the campaign work is done “with high quality” and in time (F3, P.49).

The concept of ownership which is used here to argue for a broad participation points to the relationship between participatory decisions and the responsibility by all participants to properly carry out the decisions that were once taken by them. It is strategically reasonable for network actors to adopt participatory decision-making. Furthermore, broader participation legitimates the campaign and makes the campaigners more credible (F1, P.80).

Besides the legitimation of organizations through the broad global participation of organizations in the network, the federal structure of the network and the participation of various organizations from all over the world increases effective and efficient campaigning through the exchange of strategy, experience and knowledge and the increase of voice. The more organizations are involved and the broader “struggles are linked (F13), the better the campaign will be heard by the public and decision-makers.

Participatory practice in these two transnational civil society networks means the working with participatory norms in different contexts. Norms of empowerment by European organizations are reinterpreted or even neglect-

ed by Asian organizations. Instead, other norms of participatory practice are invented that put more emphasis on guidance, awareness-raising and education of workers in the garment industry. In different contexts, for example in the self-assurance of the network, empowerment is emphasized as a crucial outcome of participatory practice (in international meetings). Thus, the norm of empowerment is used to justify the participatory character of practices and the legitimation of the networks as such. In linking the struggles of environmental activists around the world, the network itself and its goals is legitimated by its participatory practice. Furthermore, empowerment practices unfold their democratic potential especially in face-to-face meetings. Here, they contribute to more self-efficacy of network members and equalized participation opportunities. Participatory practice in these two transnational civil society networks thus evolves in a back and forth between the formal norms of participatory democratic coordination, that network actors either gave themselves in a constituting act during the foundation of the networks or that were formally decided upon by member assemblies or international secretariats, and the situated interpretation and invention of empowerment practice through actors.

Fluid Participation Practices: Conclusions

In the overall view, three main aspects of participatory democracy in the studied transnational civil society networks are important: (1) the emphasis on difference and pluralism in participatory democracy and (2) the claim of self-transformation. Furthermore, (3) the personal contacts between network members seem to be of crucial importance for participation practice.

(1) In general, the inclusiveness of participation practices is quite high: many organizations can get easily access to the networks and become part of it. The fluent information circulation eases this access. The other side of the coin is that once organizations are really part of the network, the network structures of interfering levels, multiple participation practices and a large crowd of organizations makes the networks appear very complex and opaque and thus makes participation sometimes very unlikely and unattractive for the individual campaigner. A retreat to national or local arenas is a common reaction. The participatory norm to include the diversity of groups and individuals in participation processes is realized in practice in both networks. While Warren (2001) and Polletta (2002) argue that civil society groups tend to be homogenous and action oriented, or tend to consist of befriended persons (Polletta 2002), which both undermines participatory processes, we can observe that only rarely do befriended groups exclude others. To the contrary, although FoE groups are quite like-minded in their goals, attitudes and or-

organizations structures (as any civil society network is, compared to the diversity of the broader society), FoE groups developed very strong participatory practices through the emphasis of their (relative) diversity. The inclusion of difference is treated with much care and sensibility in the FoE-network. It could be observed that the diversity of network members is a crucial part of the identity of the network and almost always considered as very important. There are attempts to avoid allegedly universal positions and on the contrary praise diversity as a main characteristic of the network.

(2) This is in line with the findings of the interview data that the more often people of different organizations are present in face-to-face meeting, the more aware they are of the different perspectives in the networks and their overall shared cause. In contrast to the CCC-network, which does not emphasize its diversity that much, the FoE-network members more often state that they gain a better sense of their own power when they meet with all the diverse groups of FoE at international meetings. The diversity of organizational voices in the networks enriches many participation practices by manifold inputs. This furthers the democratic transformation of individuals, in the two ways that were described by Pateman (1970) as increasing sense of political efficacy and by Warren (1994) for example as enhancing psychological qualities, which are important claims of participatory democracy. Through meeting people with the same cause but a different perspective face-to-face, network members become aware of the wide range of different perspectives and the worthiness of their shared cause. Thus, although homogeneity of civil society exists, inclusive participation and self-transformation can be a successful and common practice within transnational civil society networks, if civil society actors value their internal diversity.

(3) Participation practices in the contexts of transnational networks can reinforce positive aspects of participatory democracy, such as inclusion, transparency of information and empowerment. However, in the single procedural steps, it looks as if the borderless networks with multiple arenas of interaction give more access than real equalized opportunities to participate, at least for some network members. This can be understood as an erosion of democratic rule bindingness through disembodied and dispersed participation practices. Transnational civil society networks, such as the two networks investigated in this study, live from the informal and spontaneous participation of many volunteers in many different places. This participation of active citizens and organization members is geographically very dispersed, often temporal, informal and dynamic. As one network member states, activists come and go (C1). This is mirrored in the respective organization's participation at the transnational level. If an organization has many motivated activists and volunteers, it will be more likely to actively engage at international meetings with other organizations. In turn, a very participatory international meeting will

radiate from the event to the local groups and national organizations. Since coordination of activities in-between meetings by e-mails, Skype meetings or telephone conferences are for many active volunteers a rather frustrating participatory experience, the meetings and workshops that take place as personal gatherings build much of the collective identity that is needed to motivate activists to keep on participating. Especially the equal participation of the poorly resourced and small organizations is only provided by the offering of personal meetings. Otherwise, it is quite hard to stay on track under conditions of uncertainty and high personal costs, if the goals and ideals of the network are not strengthened and reaffirmed on international network meetings. For many network members, the international meetings also give them a sense of their own political efficacy and the strength of the international network. Thus, online meetings might be an efficient mode of coordination, but they can only rarely contribute to participation practices inside the transnational civil society networks. Regarding the inclusion and empowerment of new and/or weaker organizations, international network meetings are very effective to introduce new and marginalized groups to the networks, empower and educate groups through workshops and include marginalized groups in giving them the opportunity to gain contacts and voice. These experiences of network members point to the essential relevance of face-to-face meetings for the quality of participation practices. Although participation practices take place locally and via the Internet throughout dispersed places, the need for a central gathering on international events is expressed by many network members.

6.2 Deliberative Norms and Practices

Deliberation practices in both networks are very skillfully planned and goal-oriented, which is done so in order to guarantee equal chances for all to participate. However, as the findings of the interview analysis show, the formalization of equalized deliberation does not automatically make participants of deliberation perceive themselves as equals. The goal-orientation can also impede deeper deliberation and an easy participation of newer and more marginal network members. Furthermore, the increasing use of Skype as a tool to deliberate online reinforces existing inequalities and can even complicate deliberative decision-making. The deliberation practices will be discussed along the dimensions of deliberative democracy, namely (1) openness, (2) diversity in talk and (3) considered judgment.

Openness. Seyla Benhabib (1996) famously argued that participants in deliberation should be able to decide and debate upon the purpose and object of

deliberation itself. Such openness at the beginning of deliberation procedures is practiced with some effort in the CCC-network. While the very first phase of problem identification is very open to input from any corner of the network and even the network environment, the agenda setting process is increasingly steered as the process goes on. However, this must not necessarily impede the openness of the agenda. Even if certain points are already set by the International Secretariat, for example in preparation of the Euromeetings, there seems to be always room for discussing the points on the agenda, as many interviewees state. However, the accessibility of agendas at least for certain participants can be questioned due to the overload of material and planning that confuses participants sometimes more than it guarantees accessibility. This is a dilemma since the provision of information is necessary in order to adequately prepare deliberation processes.

Although the practices of problem identification and agenda setting seem to be balanced between efficient leading practices and inclusive decision-making in the FoE network as well, there is also a closing tendency that could be observed: The initiation of campaigns at the local level depends very much on the capacities of local members. It needs motivating, engaged and talented people with time and money to be able to set the agenda for a new campaign (e.g. F7, P.42). In turn, this means that under-resourced organizations in the network are more often the ones, who just join an already existing campaign, where the relevant decisions about the agenda are already taken. Thus, organizations outside of Europe often participate in campaigns only as passive contributors of data, local research or campaign material. As one activist outside Europe put it: "so they decided to include it [=their campaign material, H.K.] in the campaign in the project, and we said YES." (F13, P.57). Thus, the open agenda setting more often does only take place among the European campaign partners. Non-European campaign partners are rather asked for contributions, but not extensively included in the problem and agenda definition process (F12, F13). However, the procedural, step-by-step character of the observed practices can ensure a certain horizontal peer-to-peer democratic control. If one step of the agenda setting process such as problem identification, formulation of ideas, brainstorming approaches, has been evaluated by actors as not democratic enough, the process can be opened up again in the following steps of agenda setting, when different actors lead the process. Thus, there is a democratic control mechanism that lies in the procedural character of the practice and the involvement of many different decision-makers in the different phases of the practice.

Diversity in talk. Many deliberative theorists agree that the Habermasian idea of non-coercion in deliberation processes is rather unrealistic in practice due to the ubiquity of power relations. However, the balancing of arguments

is still a normative claim of deliberative theorists. Diverse positions should be included in deliberation processes (see e.g. Fishkin 2009).

Deliberation practices are described by interviewees as structured in various ways. The inclusion of all the different organizations in the network into deliberation practices is emphasized. Therefore, actors can choose from a wide repertoire of equalizing deliberation practices and seem to be very much committed to equalizing access to deliberation. This seems to be a very good basis for the practice of inclusive and free deliberation inside the network. Rules that set the marks for balanced deliberation are seen as very important by central actors in the networks. Those rules are in turn evaluated as very complex and overwhelming by new or marginal network members. Due to the lack of knowledge about rules and procedures of deliberation practices, some of these organizations seem to be excluded from certain circles of deliberation and decision-making at first, or even for a longer period. In addition, the structuration of the deliberation process depends very much on the capacities that can be used to hire a facilitator. Second, the facilitator's own preferences and mode of structuring can influence the degree of inclusion of deliberation practice. The understanding of non-coercive deliberation must not necessarily be shared by every facilitator, as one interviewee states. Thus, there is a high contingency at the level of individual facilitators.

Moreover, the balance of arguments during deliberation practices is hindered by the inequality in language skills and by the differences of deliberation styles, specifically between European and non-European organizations. The language gap does produce inequalities that are not only caused by the inability to speak English like a native speaker, but more importantly by the lack of attention paid to language issues. This evokes the question of dominance and exclusion problems in deliberation. Although the imbalance of arguments through language barriers is not a problem that could be easily solved by the modification of collective practices, it seems very problematic, that central actors do not recognize this as a problem. This neglect makes deliberation practices not very sensitive towards balancing arguments across language barriers.

Deliberation in transnational networks is practiced in a space of geographical dispersion. Disembodied practices result as a consequence of it. However, the democratic anchor in deliberation practices is seen in the direct, not computer-mediated deliberation. Only the regular face-to-face deliberation in the two networks establishes commitment of participants, reliability among participants of deliberation and an honest and deep deliberation. Face-to-face deliberation holds many more opportunities for organizers to structure, balance and focus the deliberation process. Since online deliberation is taking place solely on Skype, which means a situation similar to a telephone conference with frequent interruptions caused by bad internet connections or

technology errors, the potential for a balanced and equalized deliberation is limited here. Online deliberation narrows down the access to individuals that have fast Internet connections. Otherwise, deliberation practices are modified in a way that questions the idea of inclusive and free deliberation, for example when people can only write in the chat protocol without hearing what others are saying.

Furthermore, many network members state that they need the personal meeting, the look into the faces of deliberation partners in order to find consensus among diverging positions, make more timely decisions and be more encouraged to participate in the future (C11, F8, F2). On the one hand, online computer-mediated deliberation is increasingly used in both networks. It contributes to more equality because more people can easily participate in deliberation processes without having to bear the costs of traveling. On the other hand, online deliberation practice does not necessarily contribute to equal will-formation and effective decision-making inside these two networks due to the technological restrictions and the impracticability of moderating and following discussions. Without the distinction marks of space and vision the participation rate in online deliberation is limited to a handful of persons. If deliberation participants cannot see the person behind the voice and all voices come from the same angle (the computer loud speaker), it is practically impossible to have more than five participants in a deliberation exercise. Furthermore, the decisions made in Skype deliberation are not that far-reaching as face-to-face deliberation at international meetings. Thus, also deliberation practices need the direct contact between participants in order to secure equality and balance of voice during deliberation. This need of personal meetings and face-to-face communication is expressed by almost every interviewed network member. Face-to-face situations provide actors with more opportunities to create reliability among participants: "obviously face-to-face meeting is a much STRONGer way of getting people's engagement, because once you've gotten in the room effectively shut the door and then they are there for EIGHT hours of discussion they can't get away" (F2, P.34). Furthermore, face-to-face situations enable participants of deliberation to find consensus through non-verbal adjustment or expressions of disagreement (C11, P.25).

Considered judgment. Various kinds of decisions must be made during the different stages of campaign work. A dynamic circle of people often make these different kinds of decisions. Actors have different opportunities to set the goals of a deliberation process: they can follow a practice of making strategic choices for arguments, they can conduct a practice of honestly reasoning about what they see as rational arguments (understood in the way that Offe and Preuss (1991) defined rational decisions) or they can deliberate about the very roles, identities and differences that exist in the networks. The last

option can be observed in the network quite often when differences are obvious. It is strongly connected to empowering processes in which actors feel strengthened by the exchange of different positions in the network. It makes them 'feel' the powerful network as a whole and all their diverse voices in it. They are more empathetic. Thus, rational and enlightened decisions are not always mentioned as the outcome of deliberation and are also by critical democratic theorists seen as undermining diversity (see e.g. Sanders 1997). Furthermore, finding consensus is by itself a challenging and ambiguous task and in recent deliberation theory relativized in favor of more moderate forms such as the "meta-consensus", i.e. agreeing on the disagreement (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007). However, some decisions need be agreed upon consensual. This can be an infinite back and forth between the different levels of national groups and transnational meetings. The need to find a consensus is seen by some interviewees in the FoE network as a burden. Some differences cannot be overcome by deliberation, as also deliberation theory suggests (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007).

The diversity of the network creates barriers for the network members' capability to act. If there is no clear position for a certain issue, many network members complain that it is difficult to campaign on it or represent the network publicly. This is why some network members and also moderators in both networks justify their practice of circumventing the ideals of deliberation for the sake of efficiency. This practice of steering deliberation into certain strategic directions and a specific decision is at the same time criticized by deliberation participants in the CCC-network for example who would welcome real "deep" deliberation (C3). Thus, there is a conscious addressing of deliberation norms such as honestly weighing arguments besides strategic talk. Critical reflection upon deliberation as such influences the deliberation practice and the goals set for deliberation.

The practice of making considerate decisions is further influenced by the use of online deliberation. This form of communication leads to a disembodied practice of deliberation, which is evaluated as difficult especially when decisions *have* to be made. Without the non-verbal notions of fellow deliberation participants it is hard or very time-consuming to find out the individuals positions on a specific topic. Thus, decision-making can only work, according to some interviewees, if the individuals involved have met each other beforehand. Thus, for the collective considered judgment over a specific topic, it needs more than a well-structured and balanced deliberation. The face-to-face experience seems to be a crucial factor in the deliberation process. It could be observed that people are more prone to show signs of consent or dissent with gestures and mimics than to explicitly express their opinion verbally. If this is the case, then deliberation on Skype also changes the quality of the decision in that it is a decision made by those few who talk most.

Disembodied Deliberation: Conclusions

Norms of deliberative democracy play different roles in the deliberation practices in the two transnational civil society networks. While the inclusion of all interested is formalized in almost all cases in the two networks, arguments must not always be balanced due to different capacities, mainly in language and technology. Furthermore, the goal to arrive at a considered judgment after deliberation is often torn between the very idealistic claim to find consensus and the pragmatic considerations of moderators and participants. The deliberation practices in the two networks are the most difficult practices for participants.

Deliberation practices are often conducted in a very sincere and planned manner. This makes them quite formal, which furthers formal access to deliberation. As many democratic theorists would argue, stability and formality can ensure democratic quality (MacDonald and MacDonald 2010). Also, the agendas for deliberation are often kept very open for participants' input, which defines a democratic norm of deliberation (see Benhabib 1996). At the same time, the extensive planning and structuration of deliberation deters participants who have different understandings of debate. These can be participants who would like to discuss more "political" and less goal-oriented or participants, who are not used to these kinds of structured, focused and rational discussions or participants, who do not have the capacities to read the material and prepare for the deliberation with their organization "at home". Moreover, the strict focus on consensus can lead moderators to frame deliberation processes and steer the discussion into a certain direction. This limits the equality of arguments. Thus, the very strong commitment of central members of the networks to formality in deliberation can have ambiguous effects. In this regard, it can exclude alternative forms of input that are often regarded as very valuable to solve problems through deliberation (Saretzki 1997, Polletta 2006).

The use of Skype as a tool to deliberate online is conducive to equally considering different arguments in the deliberation practice as people from around the world can meet on Skype as frequent as they want to. Skype broadens participation in deliberation. This marks first of all a gain in openness and accessibility of communication processes within the network. However, the disembodied online deliberation, which is more and more practiced in both networks, impedes the equal structuration of deliberation processes. In contrast, face-to-face deliberation can be more balanced because it is easier to be structured and balanced by a facilitator. This facilitator can work more effectively to encourage all people to articulate arguments in a face-to-face situation. Furthermore, the seemingly equal access of all kinds of alternative discussants to online deliberation is not always as equal as it seems. Due to

lacking technological capacities, Skype calls are not manageable for many activists outside Europe or the Skype deliberation is so immensely affected by bad Internet connections and breakdowns, that an equalized deliberation and the consideration of all voices is virtually impossible.

6.3 Representative Norms and Practices

While the selection and instruction of representatives is a highly arbitrary practice, the representatives' practices with regard to gaining knowledge and being accountable to the constituency are often skillfully tailored to the different constituencies in the networks. Representation practices are characterized by trustful bonds between peer-organizations within the network and a careful representation practice toward local volunteers and an almost complete absence of representative claims toward a general constituency. It can be observed that the stronger the bonds between representatives and represented, the fewer control mechanisms are implemented in representation practices. Representation practices are perceived as organic processes. This points to the non-linearity of the representation practice and the different "organs" involved with different roles to play, which complement each other in the representation practice. (1) The responsibility of representatives, (2) accountability and (3) considerate claims as norms of democratic representation will be discussed here.

Responsibility of representatives. Representation practices in transnational civil society networks are rooted in a direct horizontal democratic control. Since there are no hierarchical institutions of democratic government and control, accountability and balance of power is established and controlled through peer-to-peer practices. Whereas state democracy is thought of as a control of the many over the few, where the few have more power and responsibilities and must be accountable to the many, in transnational networks there is no such hierarchical differentiation. Formally all members in the network have similar power and responsibilities. There are temporary representatives, who have more responsibilities, but these positions can change from one project to the next one, or even from one meeting to another.

In reference to practice theoretical accounts, it can be observed that representation is "like a game whose rules change with use" (Lord and Polak 2010: 119). This gives more responsibility to the representatives, who better oversee the issues under discussion at transnational meetings. This greater responsibility necessitates that representatives are trusted by their accountability holders. Due to shared interests in civil society networks between representatives and represented, trusteeship models of representa-

tion are common. Trust becomes even more relevant as these transnational civil society networks can seem complex and opaque to individual members, which can result in rather uncrystallized interests on matters such as which strategic decision to take on a specific network campaign that the individual member may only barely know about. Mansbridge (1999) argued that under these conditions, representation by deliberation among representatives and a resemblance of representative and represented is the better way to practice representation. This can be clearly observed in the network. Even so we can observe instances of gyroscopic representation, when representatives with much experience use their own knowledge to make 'good' decisions. Due to time constraints, different priority settings and lack of resources, the extensive deliberation processes that Mansbridge envisioned cannot always be implemented. Although representation based on trust is, as Castiglione and Warren (2006) argued, a good way to solve the problem of time-consuming control mechanisms, this can only be realized through instantaneous and direct representation practices. This can be clearly observed in network practice.

Accountability. As recent representation theory works (Castiglione and Warren 2006, Saward 2010) pointed out, a two-way dialogue between representatives and represented is a way to hold representatives accountable in contexts of non-electoral representation. Acceptance or dissatisfaction of the represented is an expression of adequate representation by their representatives. As authorization is not extensively practiced in the FoE-network, it could be plausible that representatives are held accountable during representation, as theorists of non-electoral representation suggest (Castiglione and Warren 2006). What can be observed is that the accountability of representatives is shifted horizontally. This practice of handing over the representation responsibility to a peer network member follows again the logic of trusteeship and descriptive representation, since these responsibilities are often handed to peers that resemble the own organization without giving a clear mandate to this peer-representative. As noted in representation theory, trust plays a very important role in representation practices, especially in civil society (see Castiglione and Warren 2006). Due to the complexity of the network structure, the resemblance of representatives and represented in horizontal representation practices such as the ones in the FoE-network are important substitutes for accountability mechanisms. Through descriptive representation, representatives can assume much better, what the interests of the represented are. Also, making the decision to trust the other network member organization in representing their interests is very important in this regard because such kind of trusteeship can be described as approximating forms of democratic representation (Castiglione and Warren 2006).

In the CCC-network, the perceived role of a representative is more carefully practiced in regard to workers' representation than in regard to the rep-

resentation of network member groups at international meetings for example. The concern about workers' interests is very high and thus information supply and the sense of accountability towards workers is perceived as much more important than the accountability towards European network member organizations, where representatives rely much more on trust than on control. Thus, we can see two different approaches of practicing representation in this regard. They follow different logics and are practiced under completely different preconditions. The accountability toward and knowledge about workers is seen as a crucial aspect of representation practices in the CCC-network. However, it is more difficult to gain this knowledge than the accountability toward and knowledge about European organizations. Because the knowledge of the European constituency is quite solid, central actors do not consider accountability mechanisms as that important, in contrast to the accountability toward workers.

Representative dialogues are defined by the sequential timing of reporting and communicating back and forth between representatives and represented, which is sometimes complicated by the different and overlapping schedules of international and national campaigns. This is partly solved by the extensive use of e-mail communication, which is independent of time sequences. However, E-mail communication is easy in the way that the representative fulfills their duty of reporting back to the constituency, but these practices seem to be without any effects in providing a channel of communication for the represented. The disembodiment of the communication between representatives and represented leads to a decreasing bindingness of representational practice. Only the personal conversation is effective in managing the mandate of the representative because only in face-to-face communication the relationship between representative and represented can be built as a reliable and mutual dialogue.

The representation of volunteers differs considerably to the representational dialogue between employed members of the organizations and their representatives. The relationship between volunteers and their representatives is very close and certain. The expression of an informed opinion of volunteers is taken very seriously. In this case, the representative relationship is practiced as a mandated delegate relationship. Consultation between representative and constituency (volunteers) is practiced frequently. Volunteers are informed and are able to form an opinion about decisive matters. The relevancy of this kind of delegate representation is not perceived at the level of organization employees. Here, the mode of representation dialogue changes from delegation to trusteeship. The expression of the represented is not that frequently and thoroughly practiced. The medium of communication is also very different. While the dialogue with volunteers is always local and face-to-face, the communication with different national organizations and board

members for example is often done by e-mail. It can be said that the form of communication reinforces the tight bonds between volunteers and representatives and the loose relationship between representatives and other national stakeholders.

Considerate claims. The representative claims within the two networks are what Saward defines as claims of “wider interests and new voices” (2010: 99). He further subdivides these claims into categories, one of them being stakeholder claims: “based on the notion that one stands for or speaks for a group that has a material stake in a process or a decision” (ibid.).

The representative claims made in the FoE-network are often very considerate and well-founded. Network members are cautious in making too bold representative claims and are rather relating their claims to the federation of FoE or the own organization, but never to a concrete external constituency. The only claim that is made in this direction is vaguely referring to giving more voice to the environment. Thus, network members in the FoE-network are very cautious in claims-making and back up every claim by reasonable argumentations and the reference to the legitimacy of their claim. While internal representative claims made by national representatives in the CCC-network are articulated in a quite confident manner, the claims to represent the wider causes and people for whom or which campaigns are made for are articulated much more cautious.

A second interesting finding in the networks is that those cautious representative claims are complemented by claims that target abstract concepts such as corporate social responsibility or sustainability. Representing such abstract concepts is also a consequence of the lack of a well-defined constituency. The dissolving borders in and between constituencies lead to representative claims of for example workers' rights, which can be applied to many different constituencies without running the risk of making too bold claims about a specific constituency of people. Thus, representatives in both networks are very aware of the necessity to make claims that position themselves in the role of democratically legitimate representatives.

Dissolved Boundaries in and between Constituents and Representatives: Conclusions

Horizontal accountability means that representatives are equally accountable horizontally to their colleagues in other countries at the transnational level on the one hand, and practice peer-to-peer monitoring as holding unelected representatives accountable (see Castiglione and Warren 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2010) in the national organization and in the network across country borders on the other hand. Thus, the circle of accountability holders for

one representative is widened and the roles of accountability holders and accountability holdees are not fixed (see Esmark 2007). When representatives of national organizations for example go to transnational meetings and practice representation, there is often no clear point in time before or after representation practices, when representatives are either authorized beforehand or held accountable afterwards. There are instances of authorization and accountability, but these instances are practiced in a continuous and not always clearly timed form of interaction between representatives and the represented. As one interviewee noticed, this form of giving representative a mandate or hold them accountable is an “organic” process (see F4) that develops over time but not in a pre-determined manner

Since representation is already a form of indirect democracy, the indirect contact between representatives and represented further deteriorates the bindingness of representation. The mediated communication via e-mail for example loosens the bond of accountability. The necessity for prompt responsiveness is literally not given. This is true for both sides of representation. Thus, the horizontal representation practices need the direct contact between representatives and constituency in order to enforce accountability.

Regarding the representation of affected or beneficiary constituencies, it is clearly avoided by network members to make representative claims about “external” constituencies, e.g. all workers in a specific industry or all populations affected by climate change. This is not to say that the existence of affected constituencies is denied. Representative claims are rather articulated on a meta-level. Network members claim to represent concepts such as a living wage or sustainable agriculture instead of concrete, real constituencies. Thus, there is no direct accountability-giver in the sense of democratic representation. It can be observed that accountability functions as accountability-by-proxy (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2013). Since activists, as solidaristic proxies hold companies and political decision-makers accountable on behalf of the affected constituency in a way that is very sensitive towards the affected constituency, one can speak of an indirect accountability within the network. As argued throughout this chapter, representation practices in the two networks are the most inventive forms of practice, which show many productive re-interpretations of democratic representation that are configured to the specific contexts.

7 Conclusions: Transnational Democratic Practice

In a world (...) where transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, the questions of who should be accountable to whom, and on what grounds, do not easily resolve themselves. Overlapping spheres of influence, interference, and interest create fundamental problems at the centre of democratic thought, problems which ultimately concern the very basis of democratic authority. (Held 2003: 522)

David Held identifies the main struggle of democracy in the difficult realization of accountability in transnational spheres: Dissolving boundaries and overlapping responsibilities and interests create a problem of equivocal accountabilities. Democracy is originally thought of as a principle to govern in a community that needs to be rooted in defined borders. These borders are crossed in transnational democracy and thus, Held speaks of “fundamental problems at the centre of democratic thought” (ibid.).

These fundamental problems of democratic thought also relate to the main research interest of this study. In transnational civil society networks, the tensions between practices and institutions, between stability and temporality become apparent. While democratic theorists argue that democracy is and should be always subject to change (Saward 2000: 3), many democratic institutions gain their democratic quality from their stability. The findings of this study speak to this democratic tension. In this regard, the contribution of this study is two-fold: (1) Through integrating practice theory into the broader framework of process-oriented democratic theory I have argued throughout the book for a shift from institutions to practices in conceptualizing transnational democracy. In addressing the tensions and fundamental problems in democratic theory, I developed a practice theoretical account for studying democratic norms and political practice in transnational civil society. With these means I also argue that the practice theoretical methodology can enrich and inspire a rethinking about normativity more broadly. (2) The practice lens enables the exploration of a number of characteristic political practices in the two transnational civil society networks. The reconstruction of leading practices in participation, disembodied deliberation practice or horizontal representation adds new insights to the question of how democracy can evolve in the transnational sphere.

The transnational civil society networks observed in this study can be distinguished from institutionalized democracy systems by their geograph-

ical dispersion, dissolution of boundaries and multiple interferences. Those transnational network characteristics translate into a re-interpretation of democratic practice. This can be observed in indistinct roles and fluid responsibilities, disembodied communication and a multiplication of interaction forums.

Dissolved boundaries are reflected for example in representation practices: the boundaries between constituents and representatives blur; the constituency as a territorially defined demos does not exist. However, indistinct roles and fluid responsibilities in representation are productively re-interpreted in new forms of peer-to-peer-representation or representative claims about more general concepts of sustainability and workers' rights than about concrete constituencies.

Due to the necessity of online communication between network members, dispersed in different countries and continents, practices of deliberation, representation and participation become disentangled from face-to-face communication and personal contacts. This disembodied communication is understood as communication mediated through technical devices, computers or telephones, in which the bodily presence is excluded from talk. Disembodied communication has the advantage of gaining a broader scope, and reaching broader circles of persons and organizations. Such online communication as a daily practice in transnational networks can work in order to provide and distribute information, keep in touch and update involved persons about the current situation of a campaign. Such practices can thus further equality and transparency in the network. At the same time, this expansion of participation can diminish the bindingness and democratic control opportunities within practices. It limits opportunities to equalize and balance in deliberation practice due to the lacking opportunities of moderation and structuration of talk. The opportunities to hold representatives accountable are weaker due to the lack of bindingness and reciprocity in communication. These kinds of practices cannot *account* for democratic legitimation, be it control or accountability. Thus, the binding character of democracy is even more in need of actualizations and reinforcements (through frequent direct interaction, for example), in the fluid and digital spheres of transnational civil society networks than in institutionalized democracy. Although both civil society networks are committed to democratic norms, there is a need to actualize the binding character of these norms through face-to-face political practices.

Multiple interferences affect political practices in a way that they become more interactive between different levels of interaction while at the same time becoming more complex and difficult to time. Virtually every political practice within those networks is interactive. Mutual dialogue prevails over a unidirectional chain of command. Information flows and a stimulating diversity

among network members contribute to a very pro-active form of democratic decision-making. This leads to a very participatory and open practice on the one hand, and a tendency toward over-complexity and disembodiment on the other. While the network actors have a clear understanding of their participatory democratic values and the opportunities to live this inclusive democracy, they are at the same time constrained by the overwhelming complexity of coordination practices and the forms of disembodied online communication. As it has been observed, “the nature and quality of democracy within a particular community and the nature and quality of democratic relations among communities are interlocked” (Held 2003: 524). The transnational civil society networks examined in this study are networks of different local communities. Their local forms of practicing democracy influence the transnational network level and vice versa. Thus, the complexity of multi-level interactions influences democratic practices and challenges the formulation of democratic norms in practice.

Democratic practice can be observed in both of the two networks in various forms, mostly dependent on the commitment and capacity of the actors involved and the structural preconditions of these networks. While the structural influencing factors are similar in both networks, the commitment and capacities of actors make up for changing practices within and between networks. Although democracy can be practiced without the prior existence of institutions, it can be observed that democratic norms inherent in democratic practices are in need of constant actualizations (see Blee 2012).

The exploration of political practice in the two networks does not confirm the assumption that fluid, temporary and complex network structures generally deteriorate democratic norms. It could indeed be observed that the complexity of the network structures and the overlapping spheres of decision-making make it more difficult for network actors to participate, make democratic decisions or hold their representative accountable. However, the findings of the interview analysis also show that democratic practices can evolve through the innovative ideas of actors who try to cope with constraints on the one hand, and can be guided by an implicit normativity that creates very stable democratic practices on the other. This confirms the argument by Nullmeier and Pritzlaff (2010) that an explicit normativity must be complemented by an implicit normativity which comes into being in political practices (ibid.). Considering this implicit normativity in political practices allows us to detect democratic practice, where it would otherwise be overseen. The conceptual focus on practices can help theorize the forms of democracy that occur below the level of institutions (Nullmeier 2003: 18). The “in-process” normativity of practices (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff 2010: 357) becomes especially relevant in spheres where explicit normativity as formal rules hardly exists. Although democratic practices and democratic institutions cannot be

seen as mutually exclusive concepts, the practice lens makes crucial democratic practices visible that can contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of democracy at the transnational level.

Sometimes – perhaps more often than is commonly realized – the tasks of political theory require immersion in the context of material political worlds and the frames through which participants interpret those worlds. (Saward 2010: 154)

Saward argues for political theorists to immerse in material contexts and ask whether the participants of representative claims-making (or in the present case study, democratic practice more generally) evaluate those practices as democratic. This, so he argues from the background of feminist standpoint theories, better considers the perspectives of marginalized groups, which differ from the ‘false universalist’ criteria of, for example, democratic quality (see also Young 1990). Why is this a fruitful approach for studying democracy as practice? Practice theory takes into account the complexity of the transnational sphere and fruitfully translates categories of practice, knowledge and rules into a new analytical angle from which we can explore how actors are “‘doing’ in and on the world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 3). In exploring the transnational sphere from the perspective of practice, norms become much more dynamic and contestable, too (see e.g. Wiener 2014). This contextualized character of norms in turn necessitates a rethinking of the normative evaluation of static criteria. A political theorist’s task is here to step back from judging from a supposedly outside perspective, and rather pursue the research strategy of “immersion in the context of material political worlds and the frames through which participants interpret those worlds” (Saward 2010: 154). Taking over the citizen standpoint (Disch 2015) generates new questions and allows political theorists to study those areas that are often overlooked by standard accounts of analysis and evaluation. Thus, the field of *transnational democratic practice* opens up new research perspectives that can shed light on the workings of transnational actors on the ground, and the practices that take place in-between broader institutions and single actions.

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