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The Complexities of the Established-Outsiders Relations in Canada: Re-Integrating Socio-Historical Analysis and Engaging with some Post-Colonial Thoughts

Aurélie Lacassagne

Abstract: «Die komplexen Beziehungen zwischen Etablierten und Außenseitern in Kanada: Reintegration sozialgeschichtlicher Analyse und Auseinandersetzung mit einigen postkolonialen Betrachtungen». Canada represents a compelling illustration of the complexities of established-outsiders relations. A close examination of various historical processes, such as the official narrative of two founding peoples, different waves of colonization, and racialized immigration policies, sheds light on how dynamic and ever changing established-outsiders relations are developing. It also uncovers the tremendous importance of racialization in the shaping of Canadian figurations. First, I offer some historical highlights on the colonization processes and their effects on established-outsiders relations in Canada. Second, I look at inclusion/exclusion dynamics in the different immigration waves and focus more specifically on "whitening." It shows that established and outsiders are not two black boxes but very fluid and dynamic relational patterns. Lastly, I present the persistent hierarchies of the hierarchies within both the French-speakers and English-speakers which allows me to open the discussion on the problematic conceptualization of identity as a single root and multiculturalism. I finally argue that taking seriously rhizomatic identities seems a promising avenue to overcome established-outsiders relations.

Keywords: Immigration, Canada, whitening, established-outsiders, racialization, habitus, rhizome.

1. Introduction

Canada seems an interesting illustrative case study of the complexities of established-outsiders relations within a society of individuals: Its official foundation relies on two peoples and it ranks as one of the top recipient countries of immigration today. Moreover, the various waves of colonization, its racialized immigration policies, the opening to “non-white” immigrants in the last four
decades, and the adoption of multiculturalism are historical processes offering point of departure to engage with Elias’ work. If Elias and Scotson (2008 [1965]) studied a simple figuration, three neighbourhoods in Winston Parva, they also underlined that “[O]ne can discover variants of the same basic configuration, encounters between groups of newcomers, immigrants, foreigners and groups of old residents all over the world” (Elias and Scotson 2008, 181). The first task is then to think about the different colonizers. The first French settlers were mainly outsiders in their country of origin – Protestants fleeing oppression, landless nobles, female orphans, and poor peasants. Only the clergymen were established, a social position that remained intact until quite recently. Interestingly, many initial French colonizers, maybe because of their outsider status, mixed with the peoples indigenous to the land, thus forming what is now called the Métis nation. The case of the English-speaking colonizers is somewhat different. A disproportionate number of them, Irish and Scottish, outsiders in their homeland, became established primarily because others were more marginalized or easy to marginalize. Indigenous peoples, established as long as no European settler was in sight, were quickly transformed into outsiders within the Canadian society and remain as such up until nowadays. From a socio-historical perspective, the study of the development of established-outsiders relations in Canada has not yet been done and this article – notwithstanding its exploratory nature – aims at filling that gap. It allows integrating discussion on racialization. The strength of Elias and Scotson’s work (2008) was to show that inclusion/exclusion dynamics were not necessarily based on social classes, thus offering a powerful counter-perspective to Marxist approaches. While in some figurations, classes remain a powerful factor in such dynamics, in the case presented, racialization seems a central social process to be examined. Thus, it does not invalidate Elias and Scotson’s theory, but rather complements it and contributes to its development. First, I offer some historical highlights on the colonization processes and their effects on established-outsiders relations in Canada. Indeed, former colonial relationships are still so deeply internalized in the people’s habitus that the established-outsiders relations have in large part crystallized. Second, I look at inclusion/exclusion dynamics in the different immigration waves and focus more specifically on “whitening” and racialization. It shows that established and outsiders are fluid and dynamic relational patterns in which one outsider group will take advantage of the arrival of a new group to exclude this latter by stigmatizing, gossiping, and stereotyping. Lastly, I present the persistent hierarchies of the hierarchies within both the French-speakers and English-speakers which allows me to open the discussion on the problematic conceptualization of identity as a single root and multiculturalism. I finally argue that taking seriously rhizomatic identities seems a promising avenue to overcome established-outsiders relations.
2. Brief Historical Overviews on the Colonization Processes and their Aftermaths

In this part, the French and the Anglo-Saxon colonization processes are briefly discussed as they set up the first pyramid of established-outsiders; this pyramid was further complicated by the arrival of different immigration waves, but remains unchallenged up until today.

2.1 French Colonization and the Encounter with Aboriginal Peoples

The first encounters between French settlers and Aboriginal peoples were largely based on cooperative relations in the 16th and 17th centuries. The French needed the cooperation of the Aboriginals to survive in unknown territories, and for now they were interested in establishing trade relations and exploration (Miller 2000, 34). The first written records showed that the French were impressed by the organisation of Aboriginal tribes as well as the strong community solidarity based on redistribution and consensus (Miller 2000, 10). Throughout the 17th century, many customs transfers, on both sides, happened (Miller 2000, 52-4). In other words, in the early times of the colonization, the power ratios were more or less balanced as the interdependencies between both groups were high. Many original first male settlers intermixed with Aboriginal populations. They were impressed by the Aboriginals’ freedom and mores (Miller 2000, 54); but also because, and this is my contention, they were outsiders in France and therefore did not have an habitus based on the exclusion of others. These outsiders were landless low aristocrats, born second or third son and deprived of any heritage by law; they were Protestants flying discrimination. So that in the mid-17th, settlers thought of themselves as Canadiens, their ideas and worldview had become a mix of Aboriginal and French ways (Miller 2000, 56, 69). This deeply concerned the colonial authorities which decided to increase the number of missionaries and also to send the famous Filles du roi (1663-1673), French female orphans. We start to see the obsession of the “purity of the race.” Indeed, the missionaries (most of them), due to their moral narrow-mindedness they did not like the métissages having place.

In the 18th century that equilibrium disappeared (Miller 2000, 71) and was replaced by established-outsiders. This unfortunate transformation is due to three broad elements: (1) an increased number of French settlers-farmers (not traders); (2) the arrival of the English and thus the militarisation of the relations; and (3) the actions of the Catholic Church. We went from a positive representation of the aboriginals (the figure of the “noble savage”) to a stereotyped representation based on the supposed barbarity of the aboriginals in warfare, they became “blood-thirsty savages.”
At the same time, in the 18th century, the churchmen dedicated their energy to form a “French-Canadian, white and Catholic race.” They developed the community ties through the Church actions and surveillance in order for the French-Canadians to become the established. It did not have time to fully work as the British settlers had the political and economic means to hinder that project. But overall, they succeeded insofar as the French-Canadians would be irremediably separated from the aboriginals and in a position of established in relation to these latter. One could say that if the French-Canadians were so attached and docile to the Church until the 1960s, it was due to its key role in maintaining the cohesion of the group so that, at least, the group could maintain its established position relative to the aboriginals and immigrants’ groups. Being second was still seen as a better fate than being third or fourth.

2.2 British Colonization: From the Durham Report to the Residential Schools System

The British settlers rapidly set themselves as the established group because they held the political power and had a strong sense of superiority. Lord Durham, envoy of the British Crown to the Canadian colonies to solve the issues between the French and the British, exemplifies this strong feeling of superiority and was adamant that the conflict between French and English was not about the political institutions but about race: “I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state: I found a struggle, not of principles, but of races” (Durham 1963 [1839], 23). His famous Report is replete with instances of this racial superiority:

And is this French Canadian nationality one which, for the good merely of that people, we ought to strive to perpetuate, even if it were possible? I know of no national distinctions marking and continuing a more hopeless inferiority. The language, the laws, the character of the North American continent are English; and every race but the English (I apply this to all who speak the English language) appears there in a condition of inferiority. It is to elevate them from that inferiority that I desire to give to the Canadians our English character (Durham 1963 [1839], 148-9).

There can hardly be conceived a nationality more destitute of all that can invigorate and elevate a people, than that which is exhibited by the descendants of the French in Lower Canada, owing to their retaining their peculiar language and manners. They are a people with no history, and no literature (Durham 1963 [1839], 150).

Here, one sees a negative stereotyping: the French are depicted as ignorant and uncivilized. The issue is also cast in racial terms: the English must naturally be the established as they are “racially superior.” This racialization of the groups’ relations is paramount to understand as it starts with Durham; was reinforced by John A. Macdonald, first Prime Minister of Canada, obsessed by racial purity; and continues on up until today. Many French-Canadians still deny their
intermixed origins (that question was the object of an important debate at the
turn of the 20th century with proponents of unity between French and Métis
behind Mercier and proponents of a “pure race” behind Groulx (see Makropoulos,
2004, 244-6). French-Canadians are partly responsible insofar as they
developed “discourses on Frenchness incorporat[ing] the notion of race to
identify a group of people who share a common language, religion and cultural
practices” (Makropoulos, 2004, 243). As the Canadian state failed to “inte-
grate” French people into the English race” (ibid.) despite assimilation policies
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, there is still a persistent and subtle
racialized relation between French and English. Today when speaking French
in the streets, one can still be told “Speak white” i.e. speak English, a colour-
coding that leaves no doubt about the racialized otherization (Makropoulos,
2004, 244). In other words, since the beginning, racialized discourses have
shaped the Canadian habitus.

The English also had to deal with the Aboriginals. They chose a rather dif-
ferent way. First, there was very few inter-mixing. Aboriginals were perceived
as savages and the idea to mix English blood with “that blood” was unconceiv-
able. How the English would maintain their established position? Relative to
the French, they followed the remedy preconized by Durham, assimilation. In
several provinces, in the beginning of the 20th century, French language was
banned from schools (Bourhis 1994). The method was much more radical and
violent with the Aboriginals. The residential school system was implemented
and consisted of forcibly removing Aboriginal children from their families and
sent them to “schools” run by churches (Catholic and Protestant) to “kill[ing]
the Indian in the child.” This system was in effect as of 1876 (date of the Indian
Act) to 1996. An estimated 125 000 Aboriginal children went through that
system (Thornton 2001). Thousands died victims of neglect and abuse (Milloy
1999, 259-93). The intergenerational traumas are immense, including abuse
and suicide (Elias et al. 2012, 1560-9). For our purpose, the residential school
system had one effect: not only maintaining the Aboriginals as outsiders, but
more importantly locating them at the bottom of the established-outsiders hier-
archical pyramid, a position they still hold no matter the arrival of immigration
waves. Statistics show that, in terms of education attainment, employment and
income, Aboriginals are doing worse than foreign-born visible minorities. In
1996, 24.6% foreign-born visible minorities had a university level compared to
4.8% for Aboriginals (CCSD 2000, 16); the unemployment rate for foreign-
born visible minorities with less than a high school level was 16.5% compared
to 31.8% for Aboriginals with the same level (CCSD 2000, 19); 35.7% of for-
eign-born visible minorities with less than high school level were in the lowest
quintile of income compared to 49.1% of Aboriginals (CCSD 2000, 23).
2.3 Internalization of the Initial Habitus: The Persistence of this Foundational Hierarchy

At the eve of the 20th century, the foundational hierarchy of established-outsiders group dynamics was: British, then French, then Aboriginals. The French and the Aboriginals internalized the projected inferiority, a process explained by Elias and Scotson (2008, 12) in the following terms:

Moreover, where the power differential is very great, groups in an outsider position measure themselves with the yardstick of their oppressors. In terms of their oppressors’ norms they find themselves wanting; they experience themselves as being of lesser worth. Just as established groups, as a matter of course, regard their superior power as a sign of their higher human value, so outsiders groups, as long as the power differential is great and submission inescapable, emotionally experience their power inferiority as a sign of human inferiority (emphasis in the original).

In the same fashion as in Winston Parva, the exclusion dynamics between the three groups relied on exclusion. They did not speak to one another. Public spaces (churches, taverns, etc.) were largely segregated. Moreover, the British had a higher level of social cohesion in part due to the fact that British immigration was organised by the cooperation of British elites in Canada and British towns overseas.

Until the 1890’s [sic], with the beginning of the new ‘immigration,’ the question of who should come was not very pressing. Up until this time the social class of immigrants was, in the main, determined by what it has been in Great Britain. Within the cities and larger towns the upper class English as officials, administrators, professionals, and clergy attempted to reconstruct an aristocratic way of life, while the bottom layer was made up of large numbers of destitute immigrants from the factory cities. These indigents were shipped out by a variety of 'charitable' schemes, often said to be only devices to relieve the burden of poverty from English parishes (Porter 1965, 62).

As Cas Wouters highlighted in the introduction of his new edited version of Elias and Scotson’s study (2008, xiii) “the established are under greater pressure to control themselves than are the outsiders; in their balance of controls – the balance of external social controls and internal ones – there is more emphasis on self-controls.” This process can be illustrated by the women’s Christian temperance movement founded by an Ontario woman in 1874 and which mushrooming in many lodges through the country (Cook 1995). The word “lodge” is obviously not due to chance. The principles of this movement – English-speaking and Protestant – embodied the demands for greater social and self-controls of the established, as well as it laid out a not so subtle subtext of the French-speaking (Quebec was the only province where the sale of alcohol was not prohibited in 1915-1916) and Aboriginals (still the most common stereotype assigned to Aboriginals with laziness) as being alcoholic and unable to self-control, in a nutshell, less advanced in their civilising process. It appears
clearly that, since its inception, the Canadian established-outsiders relations have been cast in racialized discourses and representations, which formed the very specific We-image of each group.

3. Established/Outsiders Relations: Complex Processes of Inclusion / Exclusion within / from the Canadian Society. Or the Politics of Whitening and Racialization

In the late 19th century, the conquest of the Western territories and industrialisation demanded an increasing number of workers and, by the 1890s, British immigrants did not suffice. The immigration of other Europeans as well as non-Europeans became inescapable. The new immigration policies were shaped by a racial ideology where preference was given to Northern Europeans rather than Central and Southern Europeans, and Asians. This racial ideology was conveyed by means of stereotyping and gossiping. The successive arrivals of different immigration waves made the established-outsiders relations even more complex and dynamic. It also offers a good illustration of the importance of the length of residency – a main point of Elias and Scotson’s study – in these dynamics. Each time, a new immigrant group arrived, the previously arrived group seized the opportunity to climb up the established-outsiders hierarchy by excluding the new ones. The process by which that exclusion was done relied on stereotyping, colour-coded and racialized discourses, what some called the “whitening process.” Overall, in the racialized immigration policies of Canada, one can distinguish two opening moments to two sorts of “non-preferred races”: clearly after the First World War, Canada opened its door to the “non-preferred European races” (Osborne 1991, 86); and in the 1960s, to the “non-preferred non-European races.”

3.1 European Immigration and Stereotyping

Here, the racialized construction of two illustrative European immigrants – Italians and Ukrainians – is briefly described. Specific so-called natural traits were assigned to different nationalities, thus essentializing them. The Italians were not all put in the same bag. The “blackness of the Italians’ was an old preconceived idea (Harney 1993, 28-74) but the Canadian government was keen on making a clear delimitation between Northern Italians conceived as belonging to the “Teutonic race” and Southern Italians perceived as non-white and therefore not wanted. For instance in 1949 Colonel Laval Fortier, Canadian Commissioner of Immigration wrote:

My tour of Italy confirms a view I have heard expressed in Ottawa when discussing Italian immigration. Generally speaking, the Italian from the south is not the type of migrant we are looking for in Canada. His standard of living,
his way of working, even his civilization seems so different that I doubt if Ital-
ians from the south could ever become an asset to our country (cited in Har-
ney 1993, 49).

Italian immigrants were confined to be outsiders through group stigmatization
revolving around “fecundity, religious zeal, levels of trustworthiness, proclivity
to crime” (Harney 1993, 32). Slurring was another important process as Elias
and Scotson (2008, 6) explained:

In Winston Parva, as elsewhere, we found members of one group casting a
slur on those of another, not because of their qualities as individual people, but
because they were members of a group which they considered collectively as
different from, and inferior to, their own group.

The slur “Gino” to call Italians, that can still be heard, reveals this long-lasting
stigmatization and homogenization of individuals conflated into one outsider
group.

Italians were also considered as ill-suited for farming, and therefore used to
work in construction and mining. This brings about another important point:
exclusion dynamics were also based on very specific stereotypes about the
occupations immigrant groups could fulfil. As Harney (1993, 54-5) mentions:

A leit-motif of the times, among both labour and management – and a painful
memory for all Italians sojourners who worked in Canada – asserted the exist-
ence of two kinds of work opportunity in Canada, not accidentally given the
racism which pervaded North [/] American life, described as work for ‘white’
labour and work which required ‘black’ labour. Italians, Macedonians,
Greeks, and Asians who did ‘black’ labour – that is work so dangerous, dirty,
derpaid, unregulated, or noxious that no northwest European immigrant or
old stock Canadian would take it, or be directed to it – were seen as confirm-
ing their racial inferiority and low standards for doing so.

By contrast, the Ukrainians came to be seen, by necessity, as suited for farm
work. “‘Non-preferred’ they may have been, but needed they very definitely
were” (Osborne 1991, 88). This is how the minister of the Interior, Clifford
Sifton, supported Ukrainian immigration in 1922:

When I speak of quality […] I have in mind something that is quite different
from what is in mind of the average writer or speaker upon the question of
immigration. I think a stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat, born on the soil,
whose forefathers had been farmers for generations, with a stout wife and
held-dozen children is good quality (cited in Porter 1965, 66).

Ukrainians are depicted as strong and vigorous, brave and loyal, but these
stereotypes are expressed in a diminishing and paternalistic fashion. The
Ukrainians were also perceived as “black” (Gunew 1997, 23). Yet, Ukrainians
remained the group that, above all, the official authorities as well as the popula-
tion and the train companies, did not want to welcome. The stigma behind that
attitude: Ukrainians were “redder than the Reds,” communist troublemakers
(Osborne 1991, 99).
During the inter-war period and the recruitment of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, a carefully crafted policy was designed to select immigrants of what was called of the “German type.” For instance, the Dalmatians from Yugoslavia were excluded as they “were too dark in complexion” (Osborne 1991, 87). Within the Romanians, preference was given to “German and Hungarian types” (Osborne 1991, 90). This selection, quite reminiscent of other types of ‘selection,’ reveals the complexities of hierarchies created on racialized discourses and stereotypes, hierarchies within hierarchies. There were preferred people within the non-preferred; there were whiter people within the ‘dark’ people.

3.2 Chinese Immigrants: From Official Racism to Integration into the Established

The Chinese communities in Canada experienced a unique trajectory in the established-outsiders history of the country. They encountered an astonishing level of discrimination during the first half of the twentieth century; and yet, managed to move up to be established today. Chinese immigration to Canada started in the mid-1850s mainly to work for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Li 1988, 11). Since their arrival, Chinese people were object of stigmatization. Li (1988, 20) points out that “[V]irtually every conceivable social evil was blamed on the [sic] them, including epidemics, overcrowding, prostitution, opium-smoking, and corruption.” Although Chinese immigrants were wanting because they were thought to be industrious and appropriate for specific menial jobs, there were two concerns: that they will steal jobs of “white” workers and that they will never be able to integrate and therefore their immigration should be tightly controlled. What we see here are the tensions among the working class and how “ethnic” divisions were used to prevent class solidarity. Rioting and racist attacks were common. For example, in 1907

[A] parade organized by the Asiatic Exclusion League in Vancouver quickly turned into a riot […]. Among the slogans displayed on banners were these: ‘A White Canada and no cheap Asiatic labor’; ‘We have fought for the empire and are ready to fight again’; and ‘White Canada – patronize your own race and Canada’ (Li 1988, 32).

In this context, for the “white” workers, it became paramount to convey stigmatization and gossiping in order to keep the Chinese as outsiders. In this exclusionary endeavour, the federal government played a major role by designing a specific immigration policy for Chinese. The Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 implemented a “head tax of 50$ imposed, with few exceptions, upon every person of Chinese origin entering the country” (Li 1988, 29). This head tax will subsequently be raised to 100$ in 1900 and 500$ in 1903. The provinces also enacted anti-Chinese legislation. A 1903 law in British Columbia excluded Chinese “from nomination for municipal office, school trustees, jury
service, and election to provincial legislature [...]. The Chinese were also barred from the professions of law and pharmacy” (Li 1988, 28). This social and civic exclusion is typical, although extreme, of established-outsiders relations. The exclusionary process went a step further and took the form of a corporeal exclusion as the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act stated that the examination entry for admission on Canadian territory, for the Chinese only, are to be separated and non-public: “[T]he examination of persons of Chinese origin or descent applying for admission or entry to Canada shall be separated and apart from the public” (Statutes of Canada 1923, c.38, s.10; cited in Li 1988, 30). No other group (apart from the Aboriginals) had to experience such a systematic, legal and institutionalised racism and discrimination. How to explain this relentlessness?

Mainstream sociological perspectives would explain it in terms of racial relations or/and in terms on class relations. Elias and Scotson (2008, 15) were of the opinion that “[W]hat are called ‘race relations,’ in other words, are simply established-outsiders of a particular type.” Indeed, race relations, class relations and established-outsiders relations are not mutually exclusive; they are all part of the same process of exclusion-inclusion. From a methodological viewpoint, in order to have a better understanding of very complex relations within a large society (Canada in this case), we should examine all these relations as they are inherently intertwined. “Race” as discourse and representation, racialization as a process, contribute greatly to shaping established-outsiders dynamics. Nevertheless, elements underlined by Elias and Scotson such as length of residency and internal group cohesion are necessary to understand why nowadays, Chinese are rather an established group. Undoubtedly, the very strong communal ties fostered in part by their spatial concentration in urban centres, but also certainly as a resistance method to racism (Li 1988, 71), helped them to become established. The Chinese also concentrated in specific businesses (Li 1988, 52), allowing them to be successful economically and therefore avoid some traditional stigma against immigrants (stealing jobs, laziness, taking advantage of social benefits), but at the same time, it is used against them today. Chinese are accused of ‘living between themselves in their Chinatowns’ (a myth debunked by statistics, (Li 1988, 103)) in which established Canadians venture for food experience “but are not sure what they are eating.” The urban legends about Chinese eating dogs and cats represent very efficient discourses whose function is to barbarise the Chinese, as an advanced civilising process supposes a strong rejection of cruelty, including against animals. So, it is fascinating to observe that when one group climbs up the hierarchy, the established at the top change their discourse, find new stereotypes and gossips, usually about and on the very elements which allowed the group to be successful, to try keeping as outsiders. The established “white” Canadians feel obliged to keep the Chinese as outsiders because on the strong internalization of the racialized Canadian habitus: Chinese remain outsiders insofar as they are seen as “visible
minorities,” a code for non-white well entrenched in the Canadian habitus and discourse (Bannerji 2000, 111-3). Undeniably, as Li (1988, 111) remarks: "Certainly the Chinese have made many strides in post-war Canada, especially in the area of civil rights and job opportunity. But it would be incorrect to assume, on the grounds of educational and occupational mobility, that race is no longer a barrier for Chinese-Canadians.

3.3 Since 1962: “Non-White” Immigrants: Process of Whitening and Changes in Colour-Coding

One of the premises of figurational sociology, in which this exploratory research is grounded, is to look at relations on the longue durée. Without a clear examination over a long period of time of a particular social figuration, one cannot fully understand the dynamics, why and how they unfold in a certain way. In the present Canadian case study, the arrival of different groups at different time periods changes the dynamics. The arrival of a new group often means that a previously arrived group moves up in the social hierarchy; but the old habitus do not disappear, there are pushed down in the layers of habitus and more deeply internalized. They do not disappear but remain as traces, which sometimes quickly re-emerge. Specific discourses, practices, behaviours attached to these habitus may be used to exclude, to deny, and to humiliate at specific moments.

The opening to “non-white” immigration as of 1962 created an opportunity for older immigrants groups – who had been marginalized, stigmatized, discriminated and often not perceived as “white” – to whiten themselves by developing exclusionary discourses about the new immigrants. By “whitening” themselves, they became more established by making sure that the new residents will be conceived as outsiders. This concept of “whitening” is borrowed to a literature corpus that emerged in the United States (for an overview on whiteness studies, see Kolchin 2002).

European immigration became insufficient to support the post-war economic boom. Thus, reluctantly, Canada abandoned the distinction between “non-preferred races” and “preferred races” and changed its immigration policies. Any type of racial discrimination enshrined in the legislation was definitely abandoned in 1967. A new terminology quickly arose in public discourses: ‘visible minorities,’ ‘people of colour,’ ‘neo-Canadians’; labels used to maintain the boundaries between an ‘Us’ and ‘Them.’ The old European immigrants seized that opportunity. Elias and Scotson (2008, 7) explain that phenomenon in the following terms: “As soon as the power disparities or, in other words, the unevenness of the balance of power, diminishes, the former outsider groups, on their part, tend to retaliate. They resort to counter-stigmatization.” What were the stigmas attached to these ‘visible minorities’? An excerpt from interviews with Italian and Greek old immigrants nicely summarizes them:
European immigrants came here to work hard and helped build this nation. Look around, we added styles, we built houses, we enriched the Canadian cuisine [...] We are proud, respectful people and we adapted well. Now these Blacks, Latinos, Indo-Pakistanis and others like them, those people are unskilled, and right upon arrival they all want rights. Those people don’t like to work, some steal, others defraud the government [...] In their countries this was normal, so they’re used to living that way. Though the blacks are the worst, those other groups are also quite dirty and their food smells awful. I enter their houses, I know them well (Noivo 1998, 233).

The stigmas conveyed are: laziness, uncleanliness, proclivity to crime, ‘barbarian’ cultural origin, inability to adapt, lack of education. The irony surges insofar as the same stigma were used against Italians few decades earlier. But more generally, they are attached to many established-outsiders relations as Elias and Scotson (2008, 12) underline “[E]stablished groups with a great power margin at their disposal tend to experience their outsiders groups not only as unruly breakers of laws and norms (the laws and norms of the established), but also as not particularly clean.”

Thobani (1997, 75) speaks of “triangulated formation”; the Aboriginal – wiped out or survivors if they forget about their indigeneity; the ‘preferred race’ i.e. European Christians; the ‘non-preferred race’ i.e. immigrants of ‘colour.’ And even if after the 1960, it became easier for this last group to acquire the Canadian citizenship, there are still several practical and discursive processes to maintain them outside, at the margins of the ‘true’ Canadian nation. They are forever immigrants, visible minorities, newcomers, neo-Canadians, etc. They live largely in ghettoized neighbourhoods. They are vastly underemployed, while they have, in average, higher levels of education than Canadian-born. According to a large scale longitudinal research led by Berry (2006, 725) “In Canada, those of West and North European backgrounds are usually viewed more positively than those of other origins: East and South Europeans are lower in the hierarchy, followed by those not of European background.”

Why does this persistent racialized logic continue to exist? Two potential explanations can be advanced. First, Canada is a young nation and a very large and diversified country whose elements do not have much in common. Canada needs an Other to maintain the weak national cohesion, and continue building a national identity. Second, the foundational racialized habitus is deeply internalized and constitutive of many representations, discourses and practices. Elias and Scotson (2008, 183) explain that this process of exclusion serves a purpose: to reinforce the cohesion and superiority of the established group.

As the established are usually more highly integrated and, in general, more powerful, they are able by mutual induction and ostracism of doubters to give a very strong backing to their beliefs. They can often enough induce even the outsiders to accept an image of the established that is modelled on a ‘minority of the worst,’ and an image of the established that is modelled on a ‘minority of the best,’ which is an emotional generalisation from the few to the whole. They
can often impose on newcomers the belief that they are not only inferior in power but inferior by ‘nature’ to the established group. And this internalization by the socially inferior group of the disparaging belief of the superior group as part of their own conscience and self-image powerfully reinforces the superiority and the rule of the established group.

To summarize, historically, Blacks, Asians, and Caribbeans were conflated in the category ‘non-preferred races,’ which later became the category of ‘visible minorities’ (see Goldberg 2002). Contemporary Canada likes to picture itself as a welcoming and tolerant country. Yet, the national narrative is replete with historical denials, erasures, and re-writings (Montgomery 2005; see also Amadahy and Lawrence (2009, 105-36) for a discussion on the relations between Black people and Aboriginals in Canada and the erasure of historically old communities of colour, today treated as “new immigrants” (115)).

What remains astonishing in those whitening processes and exclusion practices and discourses is the fact that no matter how many immigrant waves, who is coming, how colour-coded they are, there is one constant fact: the maintenance, at the bottom of the hierarchy, of Aboriginal peoples. Elias and Scotson (2008, 4) note that “differentials in the degree internal cohesion and communal control, can play a decisive part in the power ratio on one group in relation to that of another.” Otherwise said, group cohesion is a very powerful structuring factor. Now, the residential school system aimed – and largely succeeded – at destroying all communal ties among Aboriginals, at eradicating all Aboriginal languages, cultures, and identities.

For Aboriginal people in Canada, colonization remains one of the most destructive elements affecting societal structures today. Family organization, child rearing practices, political and spiritual life, work and social activities have been turned upside-down by Canada’s colonial (Bourassa and Peach 2009, 7).

Consequently, Aboriginal peoples have an extremely low level of internal cohesion. They have been dehumanised since the beginning and still are.

4. Overcoming Established-Outsiders Relations: The Recognition of Hierarchies of Hierarchies, and the Promise of the Rhizome and the Poetics of Relation

The following discussion aims at, first, examining how complex the established-outsiders relations play even in the two most dominant groups in Canada: the English-speakers and the French-speakers. Indeed, it appears that within these two groups, one can observe hierarchies within the hierarchies. These processes seem largely the outcome of a specific conceptualization of identities based on so-called purity, homogenization, and a single-root. Thus, I offer a brief theo-
rtical insight on root identities versus rhizomatic identities that has the potential, if taken seriously, to perhaps overcome established-outsiders logics.

4.1 English Dominance but... Persistent Subtle Hierarchies among the English-Speaking Population

Elias and Scotson’s exploratory study was limited in scope. In the case presented, more than two groups are being actors of the figuration of established and outsiders. Membership to groups is not fixed; overlaps also exist. Several general elements may be noted. Firstly the multiplication of groups is due to the fact that creating a group is a sure way to exclude others. Groups are also obsessed (because they are made of individuals) with survival; and there is this tenuous idea that smaller a group is, more cohesive it would be and consequently chances of survival would be higher. Another aspect deals with the parameters of the membership, the criteria on who is in and who is out. Unsurprisingly, the established groups tend to be the ones deciding upon the membership criteria of the outsider groups. The British Canadians have mastered this art and based their approach on the old rule of divide and reign. When they took over, they were not a majority. Today, strictly speaking, they are still a minority, so they have designed strategies to divided up people: Status versus Non-status Indians; non-European Francophone immigrants are considered as “ethnocultural groups,” they are not French-Canadians. But even among the English-speaking group, descendants of settlers, a subtle hierarchy continues to exist, a hierarchy whose function is to maintain English-Protestant at the top and keep Catholic Irish and Scots as outsiders. In the history of Canadian colonization, the Ulster Irish were preferred by the Canadian elites. “The social and cultural differences between the Ulster and Southern Irish were to lead to an important cleavage in the politics of central Canada” (Porter 1965, 63). If in general the Irish got integrated into the English-speaking established, this did not happen un-problematically in Canada. “Irish Catholics undoubtedly faced discrimination” (Wilson 2009, 4). Moreover, if Irish Canadians did not experience dire conditions like in the USA, it is due to the selection operated prior to immigration which favoured Protestants from the 1820s to 1860s. “Irish Canadians were the single largest ethnic group in English-speaking Canada. Irish Catholics constituted around one-third of this group” (Wilson 2009, 9).

As for the Scots, a recent anecdote is quite illuminating. In December 2013, the Board of directors of Cape Breton’s Gaelic College (Colaisde na Gàidhlig)

1 For a lack of a better word, by “English-speaking population” here I mean populations descendnet of the English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish. The Canadian census uses the term “British Isles origin,” quite a problematical term for the Irish. The census offers as a break: English, Scottish, and Irish, erasing de facto the Welsh (Stevenson 2009, 164). That clarification illustrates in fact some of the issues at stake in this discussion and exemplifies the rather problematical construction of categories by the Canadian State.
decided to add the word “royal” to the institution’s name. An important number of Scottish descendants quickly organized and complained about what they saw as an insult. They recalled that many of them were heirs of Gaelic-speaking migrants forced to leave Scotland during the Highland Clearances to find refuge in Nova Scotia, and that the Crown was responsible for these traumatic historical events. This uproar achieved its goal as the prefix royal was abandoned in March 2014. This example gives evidence on how old dynamics of exclusion/inclusion can reappear whenever the established may fear their position to be threatened. The many reappearances and public displays of royal symbols decided by the Canadian government of Stephen Harper in his last term (2010-2015) may indicate such an identity crisis that led to a kind of disruption in the balance between self-restraint and external constraints. Elias (2012, 576) rightly pointed out that “the armour of civilised conduct would crumble very rapidly if, through a change in society, the degree of insecurity that existed earlier were to break upon us again.” The situation is not for now that dramatic, but some worrisome signs may be observed and carefully examined.

4.2  Dilemmas among French: The Rizhomatic Creolized Identity vs. the Root French Canadian Identity

Like their Anglophone counterparts, the French speakers do not represent a homogenous group. They are divided into several groups according to logics of established-outsiders. Indeed, the French-Canadians, descendants of the French settlers, managed throughout the centuries to develop community cohesion. The Catholic Church played an instrumental role in this process and influenced the ways identity was formed i.e. a White, Catholic, French-Canadian so-called race, a one-root identity. That conceptualization of the French-Canadian identity served to become more established as the expense of newer French-speakers who have been otherized and marginalized. The first otherization at stake dealt with the Métis. Most Métis (who for a long time were called ‘Half-breeds’) are, for their vast majority, descendent of Aboriginal (usually women) and French parents. Since 1982, the Métis are considered by the Federal government as an Aboriginal People, along with First Nations and Inuit. They were established in the Prairies where they fought to protect their rights against the British. They wanted to negotiate the integration of Manitoba into the newly created Canadian Confederation on equal terms, which Louis Riel managed to do. But the same scenario repeated itself in Saskatchewan and this time the Prime Minister John A. Macdonald did not want to negotiate. He sent troops and Orangist settlers, and finally hung Louis Riel, the leader of the Métis Resistance movement, in 1885 for treason. Today, Canadians still discuss if Riel was a traitor, a rebel, or a resistant (Braz 2003). Treason is the tenuous stigma associated to Métis to keep them as outsiders. But if the hanging of Riel inspired fear, dismay, and anger among the French-Canadians, these latter abandoned the Métis
to their fate. The Métis history was wiped out of Canadian history (Sealey and Lussier 1975). It is only recently that the emblematic figure of Riel has been re-appropriated by Quebec nationalists and that the Métis cause has been revived. But the French-Canadians, because of their need to build strong communal ties and control and because of their ideology of a root-identity, participated in making the Métis outsiders. The next division was to be observed in the 1960s, when the French-Canadians living in the province of Quebec decided to adopt another one-root identity and defined themselves as Quebecois. Interestingly, this move coincided with the opening of the Canadian immigration policy. Although the Quiet Revolution is said to have happened because of challenges internal to the group, it can be also due to a fear of losing the established position acquired because the new immigrants will be mainly English-speakers. Now, the emergence of a Quebecois identity automatically deprived the Francophone outside of Quebec of their French-Canadian identity. They have tried since then to re-create a linguistic/cultural identity based in the province they live in: the Franco-Ontarians, the Franco-Albertans, the Franco-Manitobans, etc. These new cultural groups are doubly marginalized: outsiders for the Anglophone majority and outsiders for the Quebecers constituting the majority of the French-speaking population. Lastly, one may observe the process of exclusion of “non-white” French-speaking immigrants. In the same fashion examined with the Southern Europeans, the arrival in the last four decades of French-speaking immigrants from Africa, Middle East, and the Caribbean region is used by more established Francophone to strengthen their established position. The established-outsiders relations between these various French-speaking groups exemplify (1) the role of the length of residency; (2) the challenge in adopting a creolised and rhizomatic identity instead of resorting to the old habitus of the single-root identity (for more details on these questions see Nieguth and Lacassagne 2009); (3) the complexities of intersecting hierarchies of differences; and (4) the colour-coding in action again as the immigrants from France, Belgium or Switzerland are not viewed as Others and directly integrated into the established groups in minority communities at least, less easily in Quebec.

4.3 The Root Identity versus the Rhizomatic Identity

It seems from the previous discussions that established-outsiders relations rely partly on the constitution of specific habitus. These habitus are overlapping; they are more or less internalized; and they are not fixed. Moreover, “[I]n the present structure of human society, by contrast, the expression ‘we,’ and so, too, the social habitus of individuals in a wider sense, has many layers” (Elias 1991, 202, 183). Therefore, one potential way of overcoming these exclusionary dynamics is to challenge identities based on one root and to embrace rhizomatic identities. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 7) explain “[P]rinciples of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything
other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes in order.” Édouard Glissant, the Caribbean poet and thinker, develops his postcolonial worldview by using these two fundamental conceptions of identity and reframes them:

The root is unique, a stock taking all upon itself and killing all around it. In opposition to this they [Deleuze and Guattari] propose the rhizome, an enmeshed root system, a network spreading either in the ground or in the air, with no predatory rootstock taking over permanently. The notion of the rhizome maintains, therefore, the idea of rootedness but challenges that of a totalitarian root. Rhizomatic thought is the principle behind what I call the Poetics of Relation, in which each and every identity is extended through a relationship with the Other (Glissant 1997, 11).

It appears quite clearly from the excerpt that Glissant is the relationist thinker in the same fashion as Norbert Elias. They both insist on the inherent relational character of individual and social identities. Both thinkers also focus on the dynamics, ever-changing and ever-moving feature of social relations. Besides, they understand that there is no unidirectional development. Elias speaks of unintended outcomes while Glissant insists that creolisation is “a limitless métissage, its elements diffracted and its consequences unforeseeable” (Glissant 1997, 34). Starting to accept that identities are rhizomatic re-roots us in a world of possibilities; permits us to get rid out of foundational myths and obsession with filiation and blood (particularly pure blood).

The groups discussed are obviously not homogenous but there is a strong tendency by the others to homogenize individuals within a specific group. The established groups get to define the criteria of belonging to any outsiders group. They delimitate the ‘borders’ of groups, sometimes through legal means (that is the case for Aboriginal Peoples and official language minority communities); sometimes through policies (multiculturalist policies); and through the usual social processes of stigmatizing, stereotyping, and gossiping. This will to classify, categorize, and homogenize feeds the exclusionary logics in societies. In Canada, a deeply entrenched misunderstanding exists that multiculturalism is a policy favouring the recognition of ‘diversity’ and differences, aiming at creating a ‘mosaic’ rather than a melting pot. Yet, within this multiculturalist framework, these ‘newcomers’ remain new comers indefinitely, neo-Canadians for life, immigrants for several generations. Multiculturalism embodies this ideology of root identity and homogeneity insofar as individuals are put in hermetic black boxes called ‘ethno-cultural communities’ regardless of their self-identification (why would one necessarily want to define oneself as Italian or Pakistani?), and regardless of their individuality (this is particularly problematical for women) (Bannerji 2000, 28-34). They cannot escape the fate of their assignment to a community; and are expected to behave certain ways. According to Bannerji (2000, 6) multiculturalism appears as

A device for constructing and ascribing political subjectivities and agencies for those who are seen as legitimate and full citizens and others who are pe-
ripheral to this in many senses. There is in this process an element of racialized ethnicization, which whitens North Americans of European origins and blackens or darkens their ‘others’ by the same stroke. This is integral to Canadian class and cultural formation and distribution of political entitlement. The old and established colonial/racist discourses of tradition and modernity, civilization and savagery, are the conceptual devices of the construction and ascription of these racialized ethnicities.

In other words, the issue of multiculturalism is that it constitutes and maintains racialized barriers between individuals. Groups live side by side, not together. There could actually be no encounters. But another future is possible, one that relies not only on encounters and exchanges but, on constant fluid relations, borrowings, incorporations, re-appropriations, resistances, fusions, openness, consciousness about otherness at the same time as sameness. These relations would be much more creative. Often individuals and societies are afraid to think in these terms because of their ontological fear, their need for certainty and foreseeability. Yet, force is to note that the world is not foreseeable, but if at least we can develop relations based on trust and genuine interest rather than fear and stigma, it would certainly help to alleviate the uncertainties of life.

5. Conclusion

Discourses are social processes to be taken seriously. In many aspects described by Elias and Scotson, the gossiping and stigmatization are developed through discourses, notably through labelling and re-appropriation of labels (Elias and Scotson 2008, 10). The established-outsiders relations remain made of practices, discourses, and behaviours that, methodologically, we ought to study through various instruments to uncover the dynamics at play. From the succinct historical overview presented, I conclude that: (1) within the established as well as within the outsiders, there are hierarchies (i.e. power differentials between groups); (2) the competition is the fiercest among the different outsiders’ groups as they want to change the power ratio in their favour; and (3) the groups who manage to reduce their power differentials are indeed the groups who develop a stronger internal cohesion. Yet, I highlighted that the stupefying permanence of Aboriginal peoples as outsiders as well as the dramatic power differential between them and any other groups allows us to question the role played by the length of residency. It does not invalidate its importance but forces us to recognize that the length of residency permits some groups to become established but not all of them. It also promises interesting and much needed future research avenues to understand why Aboriginal peoples remain outsiders. I provided several explanations but I am convinced that building a bridge between figurational sociology and some postcolonial thoughts as well as perspectives from cultural studies could prove useful to look at the effects of the residential school system. A group internal cohesion
rests in part on the culture of that group. It seems, for instance, that groups with oral cultures appear more in danger of remaining outsiders suggesting a link between oral-based culture and weaker community cohesion.

References


