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Culturalism of Exclusion in an Established- Outsider-Figuration

*Inken Rommel**

Abstract: »Kulturalisierung von Exklusion in einer Etablierten-Außenseiter-Figuration«. This paper paradigmatically deals with the problem of understanding and explanation of established-outsider-figurations which have been mostly grasped in the dominant research, public understanding as well as political debates under the category 'cultural differences.' Further, I am going to evaluate the concept of an established-outsider figuration of Norbert Elias as much more adequate to understand group conflicts and their dynamics in time. In this paper, using the example of the "Sarrazin debate," I would like to work out how the differences in power ratios could be perceived in an established-outsider-relationship as differences of human beings in terms of their quality as well as their values as groups and as individuals. This connection is conceptualised by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson as "the logic of the emotions."

Keywords: Norbert Elias, established-outsider-figuration, process sociology, Samuel P. Huntington, clash of civilizations, Thilo Sarrazin.

1. A New Dividing Paradigm

After the political and social examination of the horrible crime of the Holocaust within the National Socialist dictatorship and the clarification about the danger of racist ideologies in the public sector of educational entities, one could have thought that overt defamation of minorities must not longer be possible in Germany. The racist riots of the 1980s and 1990s seemed to be overcome. Nevertheless, it looks like a new dividing paradigm has established itself during the last decades. 'Culture' as a concept appears nowadays as the dominant frame of reference to explain social inequalities as well as crisis and conflicts between groups worldwide. 'Culture' is actually very fluid and constantly changing, and from this perspective is experienced as something solid and accordingly as something which fully determines individuals to their cultural group. I will argue in this paper that discriminations based on race or 'culture' may differ in their form and appearance, but not in their structure – a group of people gets stigmatised because of attributed categories and associated negative

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features, the members of the group get homogenised and regarded as inferior. Especially a mismatch or antagonism between Western and Muslim ‘culture’ seems to be self-evident to a group of Germans, which has been shown in Sarrazin debate. Attitudes like ‘Islam does not belong in Germany’ or ‘Islam mismatches with Western democratic merits,’ which appear a lot in the German discourse about Muslims, illustrate that. The rise of the party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AFD) and Pegida as a movement are among other things related to this kind of perception.

The concept of Muslim as the enemy is becoming more targeted, with Islam being held accountable for many social Problems, like unemployment, the supposed inundation of foreigners and deficits in education. A religion has become a scapegoat – and a focal point for intolerance and hate (Follath 2010, 3).

The analysis of interdependencies and figurations of human beings and groups with the aid of reality-congruent concepts are fundamental to understanding social life. Elias delivers such concepts in his theoretical framework. As Elias and Scotson evaluated in their study in Winston Parva on established and outsiders (Elias and Scotson 1994) the kind of stigmatising group disgrace which is attributed to the Muslims in Germany is not based on authentic characteristics of Muslim people as a group but on asymmetrical power-balances between Muslims and the majority society. Further in this article, I am going to point out significant aspects to power-relations and the perception of these power-relations within the “logic of emotions” (ibid., xxiii) established by Elias and Scotson, which have structured and are structuring the relationship between both groups as established and outsiders. In an established-outsider figuration there are always differences in the distribution of power and status resources. I am going to use this concept to explain the conflicts and discriminations between Autochthons and Muslim as established and outsider in Germany.

1.1 Sarrazin's View on Muslims

In Germany, the debate around Thilo Sarrazin, who published his book *Germany Does Away with Itself* in 2010, can be seen as a paradigmatic example for the antithetic discourse about the West and Islam in European countries. Sarrazin's book, which blames German Muslims to be the reason why “Germany Does Away with Itself,” including denigrator descriptions about the Muslim population in Germany became a bestseller and has been the main topic in public debates for months.¹ Here is how Sarrazin describes Muslims:

No other religion in Europe makes so many demands. No immigrant group rather than Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state

¹ Until 2012 Sarrazin had already sold 1.5 million hardcover prints of his book. It is already in its 10th edition <<http://www.gfk-entertainment.com/news/thilo-sarrazin-sprengt-alle-rekorde.html>>.

and crime. No group emphasizes their differences so strongly in public, especially through women's clothing. In no other religion is the transition to violence dictatorship and terrorism so fluid (Sarrazin 2010b).

Sarrazin points out the Muslim religion and culture as not matching German or Western merits. In result from that, as Sarrazin admits, the Muslim population in Germany is overrepresented in the underclass and under-represented in higher positions of society. Because of a high fertility that he assumes to Muslims, he predicts a foreign infiltration of Germany by this group within few generations (Sarrazin 2010a, 259). Sarrazin establishes a threatening front of Muslims in Germany which would be constantly growing. He blames Muslims for being underrepresented in employment market and overrepresented in the social care system, also as substandard in educational level and surpassing in crime. He suggests Muslims that Muslims aim to construct parallel societies to isolate themselves from the mainstream society and are not willing to learn the German language. In addition, Sarrazin argues that their orientation on religion and tradition makes them likely to join terrorist organisations (ibid., 265 et seq.). Even though a lot of Muslim immigrants have been in Germany for more than thirty years, already in their third and fourth generations being a regular part of German society, Sarrazin alienates Muslims and contrasts them with the autochthonous part of the society.

Interesting in this context is that not only the Neo-Nazi scene and right-wing parties in Germany seemed to agree with Sarrazin, a social democrat himself, but also a great range of people who actually see themselves as liberal and democratic and especially well-educated, such as editors of newspapers, politicians of established parties, writers and so on.² This shows that the paradigm of "culture" as something distinctive and somehow essentialist is widespread in German society. Also this fact opposes the popular conviction that racist and exclusive attitudes are only questions of the educational level of people. As racist I interpret attitudes which rely on the perception that genetic dispositions of one group make them more or less worth as human beings compared to others (Miles 1991, 9). Following Norbert Elias, it is more important what kind of education is received and what kind of self-image is transported in the national education system, in historical narratives, literature, and myths. Since Western societies have been in a hegemonic position in world affairs since more than 300 years, their philosophy, self-image, and history writing allege to that hegemonic position as developed and civilised promoting the view other societies are less developed and less civilised. This contains the claim that other societies are supposed to learn from the "West" and are supposed to be reviewed in their likeness to the Western societies. Especially so called 'Western merits' like freedom and equality constitute to a great degree the western

² Vigil Register of authors *Deutschland Stiftung Integration*.

“group charisma.” The author Dawud Gholamassad sees this historical background as a reason for Islamophobia in Western countries and calls these attitudes a “neurotic Culture of superiority” (Gholamassad 2015). Paradoxically, the outsiders are more or less excluded from these merits.³ According to Elias and Scotson these dynamics of exclusion are inherent part of an established-outsider-figuration (Elias and Scotson 1994).⁴

Sarrazin has mixed his cultural thesis about Muslims with a biological thesis concerning their intelligence. He opposes that Muslims, additional to their “inferior culture,” are genetically less intelligent than the ethnically German population. He also suggested that, because immigrants have not proven to be as successful in school in Germany as the autochthonous part of the society, “the country is not only shrinking, but it is also becoming less intelligent” (Sarrazin 2010a, 85).

The internal differences in performance [between Muslims and autochthons] result apparently broadly from innate differences in the ability to learn, there is no other possible reason, because these differences are stable although there are very diverse school-systems in the several German federal states (ibid., 213, translated by the author).

Because of the historical guilt of the National Socialist ideology which caused the Second World War, killing millions of people during the Holocaust, this kind of biological argumentation counts especially in Germany as very politically incorrect. If you use this kind of argumentation you will be perceived as a Nazi. In the Sarrazin debate I analysed, a lot of criticism against Sarrazin concentrates only on the biological argumentation of Sarrazin’s book, calling it racist, while his argumentation based on ‘culture’ gets explicitly or implicitly a lot of approval. Although in democratic societies stigmatisation gets covered in a “politically [HSR: politically] correct” language, however, the mechanism of exclusion and emotional defamation of the outsider-groups stay the same. There might be differences in the appearance in stigmatisation based on ‘race’ or ‘culture,’ but they share structural similarities.

1.2 Sarrazin Debate, Types of Argumentation

My Analysis of Sarrazin debate was based on two dimensions:

- Criticism on eugenic, racist argumentation – Yes or No?

³ Some authors show that those allegedly ‘Western’ merits are not originally Western but came up in several societies and to different times (Çağlar 2002; Sen 2007).

⁴ For example in Germany the guest workers earned much less than German workers, their housing became separated because of the inequality of wages. Because of the refusal of the status of citizenship until the late 1990ies, there were no options for them to participate in political processes, to vote or to contest a seat in parliament. There were also restrictions on the employment market, especially since the 1980s when unemployment became a major problem in Germany (Bade 1994).

- Criticism on cultural argumentation – Yes or No?

From this pattern four types of argumentation surrendered:

Type 1: (D1: Yes; D2 Yes) (37.8 %): Criticism on both: eugenic, racist, and cultural argumentation.

Type 2: (D1 Yes; D2 No) (40.5 %): Criticism on eugenic, racist argumentation, approval to cultural argumentation.

Type 3: (D1: No; D2 Yes) (0 %): Approval to eugenic, racist argumentation, criticism on cultural argumentation.

Type 4: (D1: No; D2: No) (21.7 %): Approval to both: eugenic, racist, and cultural argumentation of Sarrazin.

To illustrate the debate around Thilo Sarrazin some paradigmatic quotations for every Type of argumentation are presented here:

Type 1: Andrian Kreye, a German author and journalist, recognizes the indulgences of Sarrazin's argumentation on both dimensions: "At the moment the debate concentrates on the three big weak points in Sarrazin's text: the ethicising of a class problem, the eugenic consideration of an education problem and the segregated treatment of the problems of integration" (Kreye 2010, 75 et seq., translated by the author). This type of argumentation represents a critical view on Sarrazin's argumentation. The pseudoscientific descriptions of Muslims by Sarrazin are unmasked by Kreye and identified as covers of social inequalities.

The lawyer Eberhard Schulz works at the 'House of Democracy and Human Rights,' in Berlin; he admits that:

racism, at today's state of science and international discourses is far from being only a biological founded racial fanaticism. Increasingly racial patterns of argumentation base on attributions like 'cultures,' 'nations,' 'ethnicities' or 'religious affiliation.' Characteristic for racism is the construction of pretended homogenous groups, whose members negative Qualities are attributed (Schulz in *ibid.*, 103, translated by the author).

Schulz recognises the structural similarities between both types of stigmatisation. It is not the feature itself 'race' or 'culture' which makes stigmatisation possible, but the Believe that these features determine people and their normative valuation.

Type 2: Henrik M. Broder is a famous and approved editor in Germany.

He [Sarrazin] slips on the known banana peels of political correctness with vulnerable biologic shortages. But his findings referring to the failed integration of the Turkish and Arabic immigrants are beyond any doubt (Broder in *ibid.*, 124, translated by the author).

Broder represents the type of input in Sarrazin debate which criticises the eugenic argumentation as politically incorrect but to the cultural argumentation which is based on the same deterministic view as the eugenic one, he offers explicit agreement. Because of his own biographical experiences as a German Jew, Ralph Giordano disclaims a eugenic based argumentation of social ine-

qualities. To Sarrazin's descriptions about "Muslim parallel societies," including the claim that Muslims in Germany isolate themselves from the mainstream society, he agrees.

There is no integration without the overcoming of the barriers that emerge out of the manners, customs, and traditions of the Muslim minority itself. [...] Sarrazin's book points the view to the historical background: on the fact that, two cultural circles with very different stages of development clash: the Judaeo-Christian one, which stepped up enormously in the past 500 years with the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the civil revolution, and its perpetuation, while the other one, the Muslim circle stagnated during this period (Giordano in *ibid.*, 95 et seq., translated by the author).

Giordano captures Sarrazin's perspective, that the inclusion of Muslims in German society is not possible because of the specific features of this minority. As one can see above, this is the type of argumentation which emerged the most during Sarrazin debate. The logic in these inputs seem to be – since it is very politically incorrect to use eugenic argumentation for the stigmatisation of groups – 'culture' is now a new base to label people in a distinctive way without getting accused of being racist.

Type 3: There was no input which agreed with the eugenic argumentation and at the same time criticised the cultural argumentation of Sarrazin. This hints to the fact that Sarrazin's eugenic argumentation is perceived as more radical and inappropriate than the cultural argumentation.

Type 4: Klaus von Dohnanyi is a prominent politician who used to be minister of economic affairs in Germany as well as mayor in the city of Hamburg. Dohnanyi is of the opinion that Sarrazin is not a racist. Sarrazin's main argument would be:

that Germany is in danger to melt down its elites because those have an insufficient amount of kids, while groups which haven't been tracking attention for work and achievement are having a lot of kids therefore the level of performance of the nation will descend. Sarrazin's assertion that there are certain cultural attributes of ethnics groups, can't be doubted by anyone with subject knowledge (Dohnany in *ibid.*, 129, translated by the author).

He requests to his readers: "Please no cowardice of concepts like race, Jew, Muslim: they exist" (*ibid.*, 131, translated by the author). Klaus von Dohnanyi misconstrues the constructive character of categories like 'race' and 'culture.' Necla Kelek, a German sociologist, also agrees with both lines of argumentation in Sarrazin's book:

The connection between intelligence and demography revealed by Sarrazin is defamed as biologist. Withal the healthy human intellect seems to suggest, that ethnics like for example the peoples of Anatolia and Egypt, which over centuries were inhibited to learn to read and write by the Osman's, where still today girls aren't allowed to go to school, inherit different talents than the sons of Sebastian Bach and also that in concern of intelligence there is existing something like a Gaussian Distribution (Kelek in *ibid.*, 33, translated by the author).

Kelek expresses explicit approval to both strands of argumentation. She endeavours the “healthy human intellect” for her argumentation instead of scientific research and presents a closed negative picture of the Osman’s (group disgrace) and an admiring view on the picture of Germans “sons of Sebastian Bach” (group charisma).

The frequent unquestioned use of cultural stigmatisation in the German debate around Thilo Sarrazin, especially in well-educated milieus, brings up the idea that the German discourse about Muslims has been influenced by the theory of “Clash of Civilizations” which was established by Samuel P. Huntington in 1993. My hypothesis is that the culture-clash paradigm has had a great influence on the picture of Muslim immigrants in Germany and made them outsiders, also among the immigrants themselves. Especially the fact that most of the inputs to the discussion criticised Sarrazin’s eugenic theses as stigmatisation while at the same time his argumentation based on “culture” is giving a lot of approval gives a hint to the establishment of the culture-clash paradigm, which seems to be regarded as realistic, scientifically correct, and therefore not stigmatising. The new manifestations of excluding and stigmatising people on the frame of reference ‘race’ or ‘culture,’ may differ in their form and appearance, but they share structural similarities. The core of this both ways of discrimination is the uneven distribution of power resources in an established-outsider figuration and their self-relevant experience by the members of the established groups (Elias and Scotson, 1994). This strength of argumentation will be enlarged upon later in this paper.

2. The Clash of Civilizations – Culture-Clash Paradigm

Where does this conviction that differences in culture are the decisive measure causes of conflicts come from? In Sarrazin’s line of argumentation there are obviously traces to the theory of “the Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel P. Huntington, which he established in the 1990s and in summary implies “cultural identity” as the new paradigm worldwide. This paradigm particularly evolved in the absence of the Cold War ideologies and identified cultural differences as the main cause of conflicts.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington 1993, 22).

2.1 Antagonism between West and Islam

By defining the contrast between liberal, Christian, and democratic Western societies on the one side, and antiquated, fundamentalist Muslim societies on the other side, Huntington specially refers to this alleged “fundamental cultural difference” (Huntington 1997, 180). Also public discourses tend to pick up this line of arguments as it has shown in Sarrazin debate. Huntington emphasises a close cooperation between western countries against the alleged Islamic force:

The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power (Huntington 2002, 217).

In the following, I will sum up Huntington’s main theses why the West and the Islam are likely to “clash”: The collapse of communism has led to the emergence of new conflict potentials and power balances in the world. Huntington admits that an increasing Muslim population globally will lead to broad immigration of Muslims into Western countries. Additionally he assumes a dangerous “Islamic resurgence,” which allegedly has given Muslims renewed confidence and worth of their civilisation and values in comparison to Western societies. Here one can see great parallels to Sarrazin’s argumentation. At the same time the West tries furthermore to universalise its institutions and values which will give rise to the resistance of Muslims who are increasingly getting powerful. Huntington is convinced that increasing contact between Western and Muslim populations will stimulate the sense of their own identity and their differences on both sides (ibid., 211).

Events such as the terror attack on the World Trade Centre on 09.11.2001, and the following interventions of the United States of America in Iraq und Afghanistan seem to give evidence to the paradigm of the “Clash of Civilizations.” Recent events like the terror attack on the office of the satire paper *Charlie Hebdo* by a fundamentalist Muslim confirm the continuity of this perception. According to this perspective public and political debates tend to interpret social, economic, and political inequalities and conflicts between groups as a result of differences in “culture” (Benz 2013; Bukow et al. 2007).

2.2 Criticism of Huntington’s Argumentation

Though in public still very popular, Huntington’s theses gathered a lot of criticism in the scientific community.

In particular, Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (1993) has attracted an enormous amount of attention, both for its simplicity in dividing the world into mutually exclusive communities characterized by deep-essential differences, and for his pessimistic conclusion that these differences are so fundamental as to make the communities in question more or less implacably opposed to one another.[...] But even Huntington’s sharpest academic critics

have failed to provide a coherent alternative to civilizational essentialism (Hall and Jackson 2007, 1).

Edward Said criticises the essentialist terms that Huntington uses, camouflaging the complexity of the worlds interdependencies. “Labels like ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ serve only to confuse us about a disorderly reality” (Said 2001). The authors Hall and Jackson criticise Huntington because of the “essential differences” and “implacable opposition” between civilisations which Huntington promotes (Hall and Jackson 2007, 1 et seq.). The dichotomous thinking of Huntington renders it impossible for him to perceive the figuration between first and third world; in his thinking they are essential contradictions which have nothing to do with each other (Çağlar 2002, 147). Çağlar recognises the heritage of the Cartesian episteme in Huntington’s perspective, which disregards traditional elements in modern humans and modern elements in traditional humans. He validates the clash of civilisations paradigm as scientifically inadequate (ibid., 139).

“An abstract universalism is constructed to elevate a claim to power on this constructed matter” (ibid., 146 et seq., translated by the author). According to Çağlar, notions like ‘civilisation,’ ‘modernity’ and ‘West’ need to be proved in their ideological content instead of understanding them as neutral descriptions of the reality (ibid., 147), because: “insofar produces and reinforces the paradigm of Civilizations trained schemes of thinking on the background of an established political symbolic of the euro-centric discourse” (ibid., translated by the author).

Huntington handles ‘civilisation’ or ‘culture’ as reified and stationary entities and ignores their complex dynamics and interdependences as well as their potential of change and mixtures as human beings could change and integrate different contradictory identities in themselves. This kind of dichotomous writing interferes with recognising figurations between ‘West’ and ‘Islam.’ Huntington also does normative estimation of Islam and naturalises the conflict between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam,’ when he talks of an “historical antagonism” (Huntington 2002, 212). ‘Culture,’ however, cannot be seen as a homogeneous entity which determinates the individual identity and capabilities. Huntington’s perspective prevents the identification of power structures and associated social emotional valuations which lead to the creation of self- and other-images of established and outsiders. Furthermore, Huntington’s argumentation must be understood as an ideological and extremely involved perspective of the established part of the figuration slightly diminishing in aspects of their former power chances.

The concept of an established-outsider figuration seems to draw a much more differentiated picture of this kind of group processes and opens the view to regularities and interdependencies of group conflicts. According to this concept there is a very close connection between ‘power’ and ‘self-esteem.’ Behind every kind of social inequality one could notice this underlying connec-

tion. With an example of a German debate around Muslim immigration I demonstrated that this debate is being carried out in a more involved and heteronymous way than from a more distanced perspective as an established-outsider figuration.

Since a lot of European countries have a minority population of Muslims, some came as guest workers (especially in Germany), some from the past colonies of France or Great Britain, others fled from their home countries because of political or ethnical pursuit, there are also similarities in the discourses about this group. This debate about “Muslim immigrants as a problem” is carried out in a lot of European countries (Cinalli and Giugni 2013). Huntington seemed to provide arguments which emerged to be useful to explain some problems which arouse out of the disproportionate low status of Muslim people in European societies. From Huntington’s perspective, the low social position of a lot of Muslim immigrants is perceived as consequence of their distinctive cultural/religious identity. From a figurational perspective, following Norbert Elias one can see that Huntington has recognised some important fault lines of conflict in the world but that he has been misinterpreting difference in ‘culture’ as the origin for those conflicts. It is rather the other way around: the exclusion from all power resources could lead to ‘cultural,’ educational, and emotional differences (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxxii, xxix). As the experiences of integration’s processes of former outsider groups in some traditional emigration countries indicate this reality of a separated outsider-group could be changed in the course of processes of integration and inclusion by allowing the members of outsider groups to have a share of decisive power resources in the given society. Unfortunately Huntington’s lines of argumentation influenced public and political debates and contributed to a broad misinterpretation of the origins of increasing conflicts as ‘cultural.’

3. Figurational Perspective

From a figurational and process-sociological point of view, introduced by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, a totally different interpretation of conflicts between groups is possible. Important aspects of the theoretical framework are that the analysis of interdependencies and figurations of human beings are fundamental to understanding social life. In an established-outsider figuration there are always differences in the distribution of power and status resources. ‘Having power’ is translated in this kind of figuration normally as being worth more. This connection is named by Elias and Scotson as “the logic of emotions” (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxiii). Especially in the course of processes of democratisation, the members of established groups feel threatened by the members of outsiders groups as the ‘loss of power’ means according to this logic the ‘loss of worth’ in terms of human quality. This is, according to Elias

and Scotson, the reason why they try to stigmatise the former outsiders in an even more radical manner.

With their studies on established and outsiders in a small town near Leicester which they called Winston Parva, Elias and Scotson point out fundamental structures of group-processes and their dynamics in time. In this group-conflict, between the “old” community members and “new” inhabitants there were neither a cultural difference nor a difference of class or ethnicity between these groups but still a serious group conflict arose out of their living together. The old community members closed ranks against the newcomers even though they were from the same class and had the same ethnic or cultural background (*ibid.*, xvii). This fact is in opposition to Huntington’s and Sarrazin’s assumption that culturally closeness would evoke group cohesion automatically while cultural differences would cause conflict (*vigil.* 1.1; 2.1).

It seems that terms like ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic,’ widely used in this context both in sociology and in society at large, are symptomatic of an ideological avoidance action. By using them, one singles out for attention what is peripheral to these relationships (e.g. differences of skin colour) and turns the eye away from what is central (e.g. differences in power ratio and the exclusion of a power-inferior group from positions with a higher power potential) (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxx).

The studies on Winston Parva brought Elias and Scotson to the hypothesis that there are universal dynamics of group conflicts which take place if one group has the chance to monopolise key positions in society and accordingly increase their gain of power in opposition to the other group, their self- and other-images arise from their differences in power and follow certain patterns which are comparable in different societies. “One can observe again and again that members of groups which are, in terms of power, stronger than other interdependent groups, think of themselves in human terms as better than the others” (*ibid.*, xv).

As steeper as the hierarchy of established and outsiders is developed in terms of power, as greater is the difference in the self-images between both groups: the feeling of superiority and pride on the side of the established and the feeling of inferiority and pudency on the side of the outsiders. In extension to what Marx said about the coherence of material source and power, Elias and Scotson admit that economic resources play an important role in group conflicts, especially when people are starving for food and are not able to fulfil their personal material needs on a very basic level. However, when those basic material needs are gratified for both groups, the emotional evaluation of people, their aim to belong to a powerful group, and their need for a charismatic picture of their own group gain more and more relevance (*ibid.*, xxxii). The connection between personal merit and self-esteem and the power chances of a we-group they call “the logic of emotions” (*ibid.*, xxiii). “Power superiority is equated with human merit, human merit with special grace of nature and gods” (*ibid.*).

This experienced superiority of the established group is sustained by strict group norms which the outsiders get excluded from. Out of their felt superiority and their actual power chances, the established group is in the position to establish a “group charisma” for their own group and a “group disgrace” for the outsider group which becomes the basis of their stigmatisation. Since the outsider group complementary feels its lack of power chances as a shortage of human merit, they tend to experience themselves as less valuable than the established (ibid., xxiv). Out of this situation of a lack of power chances and stigmatisation, it is presumable that emotional deficits could emerge among the members of an outsider group (ibid., xxix). When power balances change between both groups in favour of the outsiders, the former lack of intrinsic value by members of the outsider group could lead to a strong requirement for revenge on the established among them. From the established point of view the cohesion and conformity of their group is of paramount importance to the preservation of their power: “Greater cohesion, solidarity, uniformity of norms and self-discipline helped to maintain monopolization, and this in turn helped to reinforce these group characteristics” (ibid., 152).

This is achieved by tabooing the contact with members of the outsider group as “anomic contagion” and is perceived with “praise-gossip” for the one’s acting norm conform and “blame-gossip” for the ones that break with the taboo and thereby endanger the grade of group cohesion (ibid., xvi et seq.). Another very effective tool to consolidate the group charisma of their own group and the group disgrace to the outsiders group is the “pars pro toto distortion” as observed by Elias and Scotson:

One example of the structural regularities of established-outsider relationships may help readers to discover others for themselves as they go along. As the study of Winston Parva indicates, an established group tends to attribute to its outsider group as a whole the ‘bad’ characteristics of that group’s ‘worst’ section – of its anomic minority. In contrast, the self-image of the established group tends to be modelled on its exemplary, most ‘nomic’ or norm-setting section, on the minority of its ‘best’ members (ibid., xix).

This aspect of distortion, which can be observed in Sarrazin debate, as well as in Huntington’s prescriptions of the West and Islam, constitutes another important tool to sustain the power differences to the outsiders and support the feeling of superiority of the established and inferiority of the outsiders as an integral part of their identity and accordingly their self-esteem relationships. Sarrazin for example argues that the Muslim people in Germany are less intelligent than the autochthones (Sarrazin 2010a, 85).

Even though these tools can be very efficient for the established group to sustain their amount of power, the power balances can slightly shift in favour of the established group and lead to the situation that the outsiders on the one hand feel their gain of power but on the other hand do neither see a direct change in the distribution of key positions in society at the institutional level

nor a change in the image of their group or more acceptance from the established. They become more and more impatient with their marginalised position and start to criticise the unequal chances to their group. The established in this situation insist even stronger on their superiority and their right to occupy key positions in society in favour of the outsiders. This is usually the point when the conflict between both groups heats up: the outsiders gain more power and out of this establish their own group charisma while the established face the realistic fear of loss of their privileges and power superiority and accompanying that their self-image of predominance. According to that group charisma and group disgrace are usually complementary.

The “logic of emotions” which Elias and Scotson admit might help to explain, why especially commoners and middle-class people seemed to fear the Muslim minority in Germany so much. Most Muslims in Germany are not in direct material competition with them, but they threaten the feelings of superiority of this part of the German society, this can be an explanation, no excuse, for their rigid defence against them. For Elias and Scotson, the task of their concept of an established-outsider-figuration is not to blame or to judge any group involved in these figurations, they rather want to enlighten the dynamics and reasons for such figurations to eventually prevent ongoing escalations between those groups (Elias and Scotson 1994, 155 et seq.).

4. Historical View on Muslims in Germany

Why are Muslims over-represented in German underclass and under-represented in elite positions? Following Elias and Scotson, a diachronic view on the balances of power between both groups can enlighten these kind of questions (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxxvi). The first bigger group of Muslims came in the 1960s and 1970s as guest workers mainly from Turkey some from Tunisia and Morocco to Germany. It began as a win-win situation for both sides of the figuration. Germany on the one hand needed a lot of industrial workers with a low claim of income, the guest workers on the other hand, even though they were paid much less than the German workers were able to earn a lot more than in their home countries. For the German workers, the arrival of the guest workers meant advancement in the social structure of Germany. They rose as a whole social class in social position (Treibel 2011, 56; 2015, 99 et seq.).⁵

Politically, those guest workers were only regarded in terms of the employment market, but not in terms of political or cultural integration at all as both sides expected them to leave the country at the end of their contracts. Political measures even had dividing effects on autochthonous and Muslims in Germany.

⁵ The concept originally was invented by the Swiss sociologist Hoffmann-Nowotny, in 1973.

Since the German politicians expected all the guest workers to leave after a period of work, there were no language courses supplied for them and their children (Bade 1994, ch. 5) and because of that, language barriers remained a problem even in the second and third generation in this group (Bade 2013, 68). The broad differences in income also led to separated housing of guest workers and autochthonous population and accordingly little personal contact between both groups (Treibel 2011, 100, 129 et seq.). Following Annette Treibel one could talk of a “general restriction of housing supply for foreigners” in Germany (ibid., 148).

In the 1980s the situation on German employment market changed, as far as in other European countries a great amount of industrial factories crashed, this led to massive unemployment. In political and public debates the repatriation (*Rückführung*) of the guest workers got into focus of foreigner politics (*Ausländerpolitik*), as it was called. German politicians surpassed each other by claiming Germany was no immigration country, which indicated a symbolic defence against the newcomers. As a result of the pressure of the German government on the one hand and individual reasons on the other hand, around 11 million Turkish guest workers left Germany in the 1980s. Only around 3-4 million of them stayed without being able to gain position politically (Bade 1994, 54). Since the situation on the employment market was so bad, the autochthonous part of the society felt more and more in competition with the guest workers and racist resentments rose. Until the 1980s all foreigners (*Ausländer*) got stigmatised under this category, Italians and Greeks as well as Turkish or Tunisian guest workers.

With the reunion of West and East Germany (*Wiedervereinigung*) accompanied by the narrower connection of Germany to the European Union a status difference between European and non-European foreigners in Germany was introduced. This among other things had repercussions on the identical dimension of the non-European migrants as well as in terms of their political participation and the access to employment market (ibid., 72 et seq.). For example foreigners from EU countries were able to participate in regional elections while non-European foreigners could not (ibid., 73 et seq.). These restrictions affected Turkish, Tunisian, and Moroccan people already living in Germany for two or three generations as well as Iranian, Balkan refugees who in great numbers moved to Germany in the 1990s. Great parts of these people had Muslim religion. All these developments described, especially the converse with Muslim people as outsiders structurally and identically embossed the low status of Muslim population in Germany.

This made a lot of Muslim people also structurally to outsiders under the immigrants in Germany. Especially in opposition to the immigration group of *Spätaussiedler* from the former UdSSR – who prevailed as ‘ethnic German’

(*Abstammungsprinzip*)⁶ and had the possibility to achieve the status of citizenship (ibid., 73). Sarrazin compares Muslim immigrants and *Spätaussiedler* in terms of socio-structural distribution and concludes the greater amount of *Spätaussiedler* in higher social positions as a proof that the cultural closeness would be the reason for the greater integration of them (Sarrazin 2010c). The *jus sanguinis* principle in German jurisdiction denoted an important aspect of structural discrimination to the group of Muslim immigrants (Bade 1994, 55) as well as the fact that non-Europeans were mostly excluded from status of citizenship until the year 2000. Also the world-wide debate around Islamic terrorism and ‘the axis of evil’ affected the picture of Muslims in Germany in a negative way (Benz 2013, 8).

While the idea of fundamental cultural differences à la Huntington embossed public debates and the situation of Muslims in terms of social structure was low, these ideas seemed to give a lot of evidence to a lot of people in the debate around Sarrazin. Sarrazin, as well as to a minority of the German Muslims who also insist on their cultural differences to the other Germans and introduced a counter group charisma which praises only Islam as the right way to live. From a process-sociological point of view one can see that the power ratios of the groups started off very different, especially in terms of political participation education and access to employment market, both bonds to the status of citizenship. The differences in power-ratio prevented a great amount of the group of Muslim to gain higher position in society. Besides, the symbolic defence, the claim ‘Germany is no immigration country’ and later the claim ‘Islam does not match a Western way of living’ excluded immigrants who appeared ethnical differently to the autochthonous from a German identity.

At the same time the discontent and frustration within German Muslim population in terms of their low status and chances on employment market arose. Since they were always addressed as foreigners, somehow ‘different’ and excluded from a positive connoted German identity, parts of the Muslim population themselves turned their backs on German society. Differences in chances and the power ratio between ethnic groups though never got into focus of the discussion. Since the paradigm of the ‘Clash of Civilization’ became en vogue, other possible reasons for group conflicts were overlooked. Especially as a little group of Muslims also applied to an alleged fundamental difference in culture to other Germans, the culture-clash-paradigm achieved even more evidence in social comprehension. In terms of Elias and Scotson, they created their own group charisma and adopted reciprocally the thesis that culture makes them different in a deterministic way. This little group embosses again the picture the established have from the outsiders (Pars pro toto) even though most Muslim-Germans speak German as their mother language, feel German in

⁶ It means ‘right of the blood’ principle.

terms of identity, and gain more and more position in terms of education and integration in employment market. *Germany Does Away with Itself* was a valve for the harassment, that so many immigrants already belong to Germany and identify themselves with this country” (Treibel 2015, 157).

This shows that the power ratio of Muslims in Germany rose, and still rises, and also gives a hint to the fact that conflicts between established and outsiders increase when the power balance shifts in favour of the outsiders. As Annette Treibel makes clear in her new book, *Integrate yourselves*, in a democratic country, the established have to become aware of their privileges and prepared to cede them if they take democracy seriously (Treibel 2015).

It has shown that the established-outsider figuration evolved out of the initial situation of *Unterschichtung* and out of the institutional discrimination of Muslim immigrants in proportion to autochthonous population and other Immigrants groups in Germany. The cultural view on social inequalities also excluded them from a positive German identity and advantaged re-ethnic identification processes in some parts of this group – who think of themselves as culturally different and superior in terms of human merit in comparison with the established.

The important question would remain: how can sociological research help to reinterpret those kinds of group conflicts and prevent misinterpretations like the culture-clash-paradigm which heads up conflicts and complicates intercultural communication? Because if every cultural group believes in their fundamental distinctiveness from other cultural groups dialog and approach to each other do not seem to be worthwhile and make confronting processions seem unavoidable.

5. Culturalism of Exclusion – Outlook

Sarrazin’s and Huntington’s way of understanding and explaining group-conflicts can be identified as a more or less unconscious strategy of the established part of the figuration to protect their privileged social positions in relation to the outsiders. Following Elias and Scotson their publications can be identified as parts of German respectively Western group charisma. It is an expression of their sensed superiority, which is achieved by monopolisation of an important power and status position.⁷ But the established mostly do not recognise the connection of power ratio and group charisma, self-esteem (individually), and believe in a “natural” superiority of themselves and their group members, compared to the outsiders. The belief in fundamental cultural-differences denotes a misin-

⁷ Vigil “Logic of the emotions” (Elias and Scotson 1994, xxiii).

terpretation of the real dynamic of group-processes which promotes a more involved view on group-conflicts and can lead to more violent conflicts.

It is necessary to establish a more distanced view on group conflicts and analyse them in synchronic and diachronic ways, to identify the power structures which are profound of these conflicts. This perspective represents the great explanatory power of the concept of an established-outsiders figuration. This concept can explain why there are so many structural similarities in the development beyond the form of appearance how these groups are involved with each other. It is existentially to understand that also in so called democratic countries there are still unequal chances for different groups to gain social position. Relying on Elias, Dawud Gholamasad embossed to rather talk of democratisation (which has not come to an end when democratic institutions are established) as a process of adjustment to power-equality of all groups in the society. "Ordinarily the functional, institutional and social-habitual dimensions of democratisation are reduced to the state of the institutional aspects" (Gholamassad 2015, translated by the author).

Accordingly processes of democratisation take place in several dimensions: functionally, institutionally, and symbolic-habitually. From his experiences, democracy often gets reduced to its institutional aspects. He interprets Islamism as well as Islamophobia as de-civilisation aspects of democratisation (ibid.). Whereby the term civilisation means something different than civilisation concept of Huntington:

The proportion of self-regulation and self-control in relation to all humans at in almost all situations increases. In coherence with the gaining of independence of the individual self-regulation entities, the range of the possibility of identification of a human being with other human beings increases relatively independent from their group affiliation. A de-civilisation thrust means according to that a change in the different direction, the reduction of empathy (ibid., translated by the author).

The term 'democratisation' seems to be more adequate and realistic than only talking of democracy, as it hints to the fact that also a democratic regime and institutions, does not mean that everyone is equal in terms of power resources. Earlier phases of democratisation in Germany concerned for example the power ratios between younger and elder generations in the 1968 movement and between men and women during the stages of feminist movements.

For a differentiated analysis we have to take perspective on both sides of the figuration: On the one hand the hubris of the established of being better people than the outsiders while at the same time fearing the loss of social position because of the outsiders. On the other hand the humiliated outsiders who either accept a low self-esteem, which results from their low position and status in society and the stigmatisation through the established, or they create their own group charisma which can be radically different from the established one and gives them the possibility of a positive identity but also exclude them from the

mainstream society. Since a positive self-esteem is a crucial part of the identity of human beings, especially if their self-experience of being a marginalised and disenfranchised outsider changes in the course of processes of “habitual democratisation” (Alikhani 2014) it is presumable that some of the outsiders adopt an Ideology which is radically different from the Ideology of the established. In terms of some Muslims in European countries a radical form of Islam can provide this kind of Ideology.

The delimitation of the outsiders in terms of their power chances could again lead to more conflicts and gives the conviction of the fundamental and deterministic differences between established and outsiders even more evidence. According to the “double-bind-concept” (Elias 1983, 173) of Elias, a more distanced perspective on group-conflicts is necessary to reduce the fear groups conceive towards other groups and to prevent escalation between them. In such situations, according to Elias, the members of the more powerful group is more able to detach themselves from this vicious circle and develop more reality-congruent strategies to overcome this destructive dynamic (ibid., 126 et seq.). Concluding one could say that the concept of an established-outsider figuration can help to understand the real reasons and dynamics of group conflicts and debilitate the evidence of the culture-clash paradigm. It is important to promote the reasons for established and outsider relations and strengthen the public awareness on such destructive emotional processes. This could help both groups to understand each other in a better way and may contribute to a de-escalation of the double-bind situation between Autochthones and Moslems as established and outsiders in Germany.

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