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Structure of Ideology. Evidence from Serbia

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Abstract

The paper contributes to the research on the structure of socio-political attitudes through an analysis of survey data from Serbia. The main problem tackles two research traditions: one dealing with the existence of stable political attitudes and ideological orientations among the mass public, and the other dealing with the dimensionality of political attitudes or ideology. The analysis revealed a complex hierarchical organization of political attitudes. First-order factor analysis resulted in 15 attitudinal dimensions including nationalism, militarism, and traditionalism. The second-order factors resulted in 4 general ideological dimensions, labeled as the socialist conservatism, right-wing conservatism, social order and hierarchy orientation, and post-materialist orientation. The results are discussed with reference to the literature on hierarchical organization of political attitudes.

Keywords: political attitudes, ideology, Serbia, conservatism.



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Introduction

An important aspect of political culture concerns the way public attitudes towards various political objects and issues are organized. In political science it is typically assumed that the left-right ideological dimension captures the essential elements of individual orientations in the political world. One's position on this dimension would be informative about her attitudes towards various economic issues, towards social hierarchy, or towards social issues such as abortion or gay marriages, and so on.

However, it has been argued that the left-right dimension (or corresponding, but not identical, liberal-conservative) does not fully capture the structure of political views. The authoritarian-libertarian dimension and the post-materialist orientation have both been invoked as additional ideological dimensions, among others. For instance, Huber and Inglehart (1995) found that authoritarianism vs. democracy is an important political cleavage in many countries.

Political psychologists approached this issue in an inductive manner. The idea is that by studying the relationships between attitudes towards specific objects and issues one can determine the more general, underlying ideological dimensions. They would, then, explain the co-variation of the specific attitudes, and on the theoretical level, provide an empirically based structural model of individual ideological representations.

Most of the socio-psychological models include a liberal-conservative (or left-right) dimension, from the early studies by Eysenck (1954), through Wilson (1973), to Middendorp (1991). However, the models differ concerning additional dimensions. Wilson's model captures the most typical findings of ideological facets that constitute the main ideological axis in the Western world. Here, the general conservatism dimension consists of 4 primary dimensions: Militarism or Punitiveness, Antihedonism, Ethnocentrism, and Religious Puritanism.¹ In Wilson's (1973) model of conservative ideology, fear of uncertainty explains on the one side why various attitudes correlate with each other, and on the other why some individuals obtain higher or lower scores on his conservatism scale.

Obviously, the research on the structure of political attitudes is relevant for the study of political culture. Political culture of a society should include also the knowledge of the manner various political attitudes are organized. In different political, cultural and historic context the main ideological dimensions may differ. Thus, for instance, according to Walkey, Katz & Green (1990), conservatism operationalized by Wilson's Conservatism scale is a concept "*related to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, with its firmest roots in the English speaking branch of that tradition*" (Walkey, Katz & Green, 1990, p.988). The further a case is from this cultural background, the less evidence is there of the existence of general conservative among the respective public.

The bottom-line is that the picture of a society's political culture is incomplete without the research on the most relevant dimensions of ideology. Cross-cultural research is necessary in order to differentiate case-specific features from those of broader applicability, to uncover factors behind variations in attitude dimensionality, as well as to improve understanding of particular cases under study.

The aim of the current research is to contribute to the debate on the structure of socio-political attitudes through an analysis of survey data from Serbia. The main research problem, in its descriptive and taxonomic aspects, asks whether political attitudes are organized and, if so, how. The problem tackles two research traditions that have pervaded much of the political behavior literature over the past several decades. One debate concerns the very existence of stable political attitudes and ideological orientations among the mass public (e.g., Converse 1964; Batista-Foguet and Saris 1997; Lavine, Thomsen and

¹ For a detailed review of socio-psychological models of the structure of political attitudes, see Todosijević (2013).

Gonzales 1997; Zaller 1992). The other related issue is whether political attitudes can be seen as unidimensional or multidimensional (Middendorp 1991, Todosijević 2013).

The study also provides new information about the way political attitudes are organized among the Serbian public. Serbia is a post-communist country, and is expected to share certain similarities with other countries with this historical background. Comparable research in these societies is scarce, however, and even the available findings are difficult to summarize because of variations in methodology. Still, some relatively consistent findings have been reported in literature. This primarily concerns the reports on 'two conservatisms', one associated with attitudes commonly viewed as conservative or right-wing, and another one associated with various left-wing preferences and positive views of the former socialist regime and its values (Aspelund 2013, Enyedi and Todosijević 2003, Todosijević 2005, 2008).

It is possible to formulate several additional general expectations about the ideological orientations in Serbia. For example, throughout the 1990s the regime change and the national issue were at the center of societal and political conflicts, and are expected to shape the structure of mass ideology accordingly. The regime change issue, however, always has a particular ideological coloring. It matters whether the 'old regime' was, for example, right-wing authoritarianism or 'really existing socialism'. Hence, the fifty years of state socialist experience should leave a strong mark on the structuring of ideological orientations in Serbia. Above all, the attitude towards socialism and the former regime should give the meaning to the regime change division.

Following Evans and Whitefield (1993), since ethnicity and nationalism played an exceptionally significant political role in Serbia, its reflection on the structure of ideology is expected to be obvious. Since this has been the conflict that divided both political parties and the public, it should be able to structure relevant specific opinions into a more general nationalism dimension.

As already mentioned, socialism and extreme nationalism were initially opposed doctrines in Serbia. Subsequently, nationalism was increasingly characteristic both for the supporters of the semi-reformed Socialist Party *and* for the supporters of the radical right parties.² Hence, nationalist attitudes could be related to both right and left wing. The tendency was emphasized also by the constellation of the principal political opposition: on the one side was the 'red-brown coalition' ruling throughout the 1990s, while on the other were liberal, pro-democratic and reform forces.

The present study improves upon the existing research in several regards. Most of the existing research suffers from the unsystematic selection of attitudinal statements that enter into analysis. The incomplete basis is bound to provide an incomplete generalization. Also, the present analysis starts from a much broader set of initial attitude statements than is usual in the literature. The selection of the items is theoretically informed, and is based on the extensive review of theoretical and empirical literature on ideology. The intention is that the pool of attitudinal variables that enter into the analysis is sufficiently broad to be able to represent the major ideological facets.

Method

The main source of data is the author's survey of a random sample of Belgrade residents ($N=502$), conducted in February 2002.

Sampling was done according to the random route method, where the random selection of streets was done in 25 randomly chosen localities in 13 Belgrade municipalities (with three stages in street

² Hilde Weiss (2003) found that in several post-communist countries anti-capitalist feelings correlated with nationalism. The Serbian peculiarity is not in the anti-capitalist orientation of the nationalists, but rather in their affiliation with former communists.

selection: municipality, local community, and street). Face-to-face interviews with adult respondents (18 years and over) were conducted in respondents' homes and completion of each interview lasted approximately 90 minutes.

Measures of Political Attitudes

There were several general objectives that guided the selection of political attitude questions. One was to include both abstract or more 'philosophical' items, and more concrete ones, as advocated by Middendorp (1991). This approach allows the emergence of separate more abstract, and hence possibly more universal factors, and more contextually specific factors, but without preventing their combination within single factors.

Completeness was another main goal. A great care was devoted not to miss any of the important ideological facets. The items in the questionnaire were selected to represent various political attitudes that are relevant for constructing more general ideological orientations, as well as for specifically Serbian and post-communist ideological controversies.

The scale construction started first with outlining the most important ideological dimensions that should be measured, relying on the existing literature, and on examination of the specific case in point. The next step was to review the existing questionnaire operationalization of various ideological dimensions. The analysis of their content and of their metric characteristics (reliability, validity, and discriminativity) helped selecting the potential items to a manageable pool. The content analysis of items was especially relevant, because many items from the well-known scales would appear obsolete and/or inapplicable to respondents due to cultural differences. Likewise, psychometric performance of various items in the existing studies helped both choosing the more valid items and presenting them in more efficient format.

The outcome of this deductive procedure was the presently applied political attitude scale. It consists of 70 statement-type items, presented in Likert form, with five degrees of agreement-disagreement (from 1 - doesn't agree at all, to 5 - agrees completely).

Most of the questions have already appeared in various studies and have often been treated as indicating the named ideological orientations. For example, item 47, "*In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need money for eating and living*" comes from Adorno et al.'s (1950) Politico-Economic Conservatism scale (PEC). Some of the items, in more or less adjusted form, come from Eysenck, Middendorp, and other scholars, from several comparative databases, as well as from my previous research (e.g., Enyedi and Todosijević 2001).

Data Analysis

The initial factor analysis of the entire set of political attitude items served to construct the basic attitudinal dimensions. Based on these results, the next step focused on creation of attitudinal mini-scales. The criteria for creation of these scales included the initial factor analysis, content homogeneity, and internal consistency of the scales.

Given that the entire final conclusion depends on the reliability and validity of these indicators, special attention is devoted to the construction of the scales. I employed both deductive and inductive logics. That is, on the one hand, I selected items based on the principal tenets of major political philosophies and ideologies. Then, in the second step, I verified with exploratory factor-analysis whether the covariation among the entire pool of items coincides with my initial grouping. On the basis of the results of factor analysis I revisited many of the original scales and either improved them by adding or removing

some of the original items, or completely eliminated them. The aim of this eyeballing procedure was to reach coherent, meaningful, one-dimensional mini-scales. These mini-scales were conceived as constitutive elements of ideologies proper. In order to reach the level of generality the concept of "ideology" implies, I continued to identify the commonalities among the mini-scales, following the logic of hierarchical factor analysis.

Results

First-order ideological dimensions

The Guttman-Kaiser criterion for the number of factors suggested the extraction of 19 factors. This large number of suggested factors, and relative weakness of the first principal component, accounting for 15.76% of the total scale variance, demonstrates that a one-dimensional model could not account for the observed relationships between attitudinal items. Closer inspection showed that not more than 15 factors could be meaningfully interpreted as attitudinal dimensions. The extracted 15 factors account for 54.20% of the total scale variance.

On the basis of these results I created 15 mini-scales, operationalizing each of the obtained first-order dimensions. Each of these scales was constructed as the first principal component of the respective sets of items. **Table 1** summarizes the extracted attitudinal mini-scales and displays coefficients of internal consistency (*Alpha*) and corresponding number of items in each scale.

Table 1. Attitudinal mini-scales

Scale	<i>Alpha</i>	No. of items	Scale	<i>Alpha</i>	No. of items
Nationalism scale	.85	11	Work ethic	.50	3
Militarism	.82	4	'Philosophical' Liberalism	.50	3
International integration	.73	4	Economic Liberalism	.42	4
Clericalism	.76	3	Collectivism	.40	3
Traditionalism	.69	4	Punitiveness	.37	3
Regime attitude	.65	4	Elitism	.28	3
Socialist economy	.54	6	Feminism	.28	2
Environmentalism	.54	4			

Note: The reliability coefficients are based on summation while the subsequent analyses use the respective principal components. Hence, the coefficients could be seen as estimates of the lower bounds of internal consistency.

Some of the presented scales clearly represent reliable operationalization of the underlying constructs. Their internal consistency and loadings on the first principal component are psychometric proofs that the scales can be used as reliable research tools. Furthermore, the conceptual consistency of items in the scales is considerably enhanced when comparing factors after the initial extraction.

It is clear as well that some dimensions are more difficult to operationalize than others. For example, in Pratto et al. (1994), nationalism, patriotism, political-economic conservatism, or sexism, had rather high *Alphas*, while elitism was on the low end. The present scales are generally listed in order of their psychometric soundness and conceptual clarity. Nationalism, militarism, clericalism, and international integration scales are clearly successful examples. Traditionalism, attitude towards the former regime, and liberal and socialist views of economy, are somewhat less internally consistent, yet clear in their content. Finally, some of the scales are relatively weak psychometrically, such as feminism or elitism. Feminism however, is conceptually clear, while interpretation of some dimensions remained uncertain (e.g.,

collectivism). Most scales contain items in the reverse direction, but they are not fully balanced.³ Although this tends to decrease *Alpha* coefficients, it prevents the acquiescence objection.

The remainder of this section provides brief description of these primary attitudinal dimensions.

Table 2 shows that eleven items with a nationalist content define an exceptionally consistent ideological dimension (*Alpha*=.85). Although individual items deal with somewhat different aspects of nationalism, it was impossible to empirically separate any of them. It is worth noting that the scale contains both the general expressions of nationalist orientations that could be applicable across different contexts, as well as attitudes which are very specific to Serbian nationalist discourse. Thus, for example, items such as *Nationalism endangers the development of our country*, or *Schools should pay more attention to the patriotic education of young people*, could be, and in fact have been, applied in virtually any country. The sense of victimization, expressed in items such as *The Serbian people are victim of an international conspiracy*, is a noted feature of Serbian nationalism (e.g., Ramet 2004), but even that is hardly unique to Serbia.

Table 2. Nationalism scale

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_53	Serbs should be proud of their people.	Nationalism	.59
I1_54	No nation has such a glorious and at the same time tragic history as the Serbs.	Nationalism	.78
I1_55	Our country should follow its own way, not caring about the expectations of the West.	Nationalism	.65
I1_56_R	It is true that Albanians in Kosovo were victims of the persecution by the Serbian state.	Nationalism	.54
I1_57	There are few nations that contributed to the world's culture and science as ours.	Nationalism	.71
I1_58_R	Nationalism endangers the development of our country.	Nationalism	.17
I1_59	It is more important that a politician be a strong patriot than that he/she be an expert.	Nationalism	.58
I1_60	Our country should seek a peaceful reunification of those parts of the neighboring countries that are inhabited by ethnic Serbs with Serbia (e.g., <i>Republika Srpska</i>).	Nationalism	.59
I1_61	Schools should pay more attention to the patriotic education of young people	Nationalism	.73
I1_62	The Serbian people are a victim of an international conspiracy.	Nationalism	.77
I1_63	The Serbian people often suffered because it was too good towards the others.	Nationalism	.76

Note: Items with suffix "_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. *Alpha*=.85; explained variance =41.74%.

The scale combines several attitudes measuring national pride (e.g. I1_53) and belief in the nation's superiority (e.g. I1_54, I1_57), the desire for national sovereignty (I1_55), unification with territories inhabited by co-nationals (I1_60), request for introduction of 'patriotic' elements into school curricula, distrust of neighboring nations (I1_63), and rejection one's own nation's possible guilt (I1_56_R). In general, the scale in many respects corresponds to various other operationalizations of nationalist orientation (e.g. Kosterman and Feschbach 1989) and contains most of the aspects of the usually

³ Evans and Heath (1995) find that balanced and unbalanced scales measuring ideology differ in their performance but that this effect is "not problematic".

encountered nationalist doctrines (cf. Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn, 2003). In fact, it is remarkable that so heterogeneous scale in terms of its literal content performs so consistently. Hence, it can be safely concluded that this scale can be used as a reliable tool to estimate respondents' nationalist orientation.

Militarist attitudes also converged into an internally consistent scale (

Table 3). In fact, it is impressive that a four-item scale can achieve so high Alpha coefficient (.82). Obviously, respondents' attitudes toward the role of the (Yugoslav) army are well organized. Consistently high loadings show that army is an attitude object viewed in rather general terms – as either positive or negative. Army is seen as a source of security and pride and at the same time it is admired for its role in “the heroic fight against NATO aggression”, or one rejects all these attitudes together.

Table 3. Militarism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_34	Strong army is the only guarantee of our security.	Militarism	.78
I1_35	More money from the budget shall be devoted to modernizing our army.	Militarism	.86
I1_36	It is a great honor to serve in our army.	Militarism	.81
I1_37	We can be proud of great courage and heroism of our army shown in the heroic fight against NATO aggression.	Militarism	.77

Note: Alpha=.82; explained variance =64.70%.

International integration dimension is also a highly internally consistent scale ($Alpha=.73$). All the included items express positive (or negative) views of the integration of Serbia (Yugoslavia) into the international community. It is worth noting that a single item formulated in the opposite direction equally contributed to this scale. Typically, negatively formulated items (co called 'con-trait' items) are less successful measures. Concerning the content of this scale, it should be noted that it covers both economic (items I1_79, I1_11_R) and more political (I1_38, I1_41) integration. This is a dimension that is encountered less often in the literature.

Table 4. International integration

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_10	We should welcome openings of international companies, banks and other firms in Yugoslavia.	International integration	.79
I1_11_R*	Yugoslavia should rely on its own forces to develop economically, without foreign capital or credits.	International integration	.70
I1_38	Yugoslavia's future is joining the EU.	International integration	.75
I1_41	Western world is ready to accept and help democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia.	International integration	.73

Note: *Item coded in reverse. Alpha=.73; explained variance =55.30%.

The clericalist orientation scale is focused on the influence of the church on political and social matters (**Table 5**). Similar dimensions are present in virtually all models of social attitudes structure (e.g. Eysenck 1954; Middendorp 1991; Wilson 1973). The present scale is however, narrower in scope.

Table 5. Clericalism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_65	The role of the Church should be increased in managing the country's matters.	Clericalism	.84
I1_66	Religious teaching should be compulsory in all elementary and secondary schools.	Clericalism	.84
I1_67	Religion, that is Christian faith, should lead us in our life.	Clericalism	.78

Note: Alpha=.76; explained variance=67.18%.

The traditionalism scale (**ructure** (e.g. Eysenck, Wilson).

Table 6) deals with social issues. Two items refer to traditional sexual mores (I1_19 and I1_20), one item expresses a punitive attitude towards “certain lifestyles”, and an item requests television to “supports nation’s traditions”. Although traditionalism as a value or political orientation can include more topics, this scale still covers a relatively heterogeneous set of items. Yet, the scale is empirically consistent, and items show uniformly high loading on the first principal component. Counterparts to this dimension can be found in most of the models of attitude structure (e.g. Eysenck, Wilson).

Table 6. Traditionalism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_18	Television should support the nation's traditions	Traditionalism	.67
I1_19	Sexual relationships between people of the same sex are always wrong.	Traditionalism	.79
I1_20	Sex relations except in marriage are always wrong.	Traditionalism	.63
I1_21	There are certain life-styles the state (law) should not allow (e.g., marijuana smoke, religious sects, homosexual relations).	Traditionalism/Punitiveness	.78

Note: Alpha=.69; explained variance =51.72%.

A relatively clear attitudinal dimension expressing respondents’ attitudes towards the former socialist regime and the period during the 1990 under the rule of Slobodan Milošević was expected. It was not certain, however, whether the two aspects (attitude to socialism and to the regime during the 1990s) would necessarily converge into a single dimension. Part of the answer is offered in **Table 7**. This dimension shows that the two aspects co-vary only to a certain extent. Three of the four items explicitly mention Milošević, while only one expresses general evaluation of “communism” (I1_64). Other items from the broader set that referred to various aspects of socialist views (e.g. on economy) would not contribute to this dimension. Thus, it seems that this dimension reflects the attitude towards the (former) regime.

Table 7. The Regime Attitude

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_39	Milošević’s regime is mainly to be blamed for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia.	Regime/Nationalism	.76
I1_64	Communism caused great damage to the Serbian people.	Regime change	.56
I1_69_R	It was better when Milošević and SPS led the country.	Regime	.77

I1_70	Since the fall of Milošević regime, people can influence the fate of the country better.	Regime	.72
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Note: Items with suffix "_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. Alpha=.65; explained variance =49.66%.

Views concerning various tenets of the socialist organization of economy form a separate dimension (**The scale** has six items, two of which are formulated in the opposite direction.

Table 8). The scale has six items, two of which are formulated in the opposite direction.

Table 8. *Socialist Economy*

	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_5	For workers it is better to be employed in state-owned firms, than in private of privatized ones.	Socialist economy	.59
I1_6_R	The transfer of state-owned companies to private hands will help very much in solving the economic problems of our country.	Socialist economy	.69
I1_7_R	Unprofitable factories and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment.	Socialist economy	.60
I1_8	The state should provide job to everybody who wants to work.	Socialist economy	.46
I1_9	Trade unions should have more say in government business.	Socialist economy	.60
I1_12	Education should be accessible to everyone, therefore it should be free.	Socialism/ Egalitarianism	.47

Note: Items with suffix "_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. Alpha=.54; explained variance =33.15%.

The dominant theme, despite its relative broadness, seems to be the opposition to privatization (I1_6, I1_7). The interpretation of the scale is not really controversial. In fact, related dimensions have been obtained previously in countries of the former socialist bloc (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003).

Although environmentalist views loaded on different factors in the initial factor analysis, it was not difficult to create a single environmentalist scale. As shown in **Table 9**, the scale is relatively consistent and clear in content.

Table 9. *Environmentalism*

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_27_R	There are more important problems the state should care about than it is environmental pollution.	Environmentalism	.58
I1_28	The state should influence the decrease of the city traffic order to decrease air pollution.	Environmentalism	.54
I1_29	I would accept paying additional tax for environmental protection.	Environmentalism	.69
I1_30	It is more important to preserve and improve nature than to achieve economic development.	Environmentalism	.76

Note: Items with suffix "_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. Alpha=.54; explained variance =41.80%.

Items dealing with work ethic did not fit into a single scale easily. Hence, the work ethic scale in its final version consists of three items with high loadings. The scale represents the view of work as rigid

obligation, rather than as the expression of creative abilities. It is worth mentioning that a half-century-old item on economic security from Adorno et al.'s (1950) PEC scale still performs well (I1_48). Most of the reviewed models of the structure of attitudes do not include this attitude as a separate dimension, though it is often present in various facets of conservatism.⁴

Table 10. Work ethic

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_46	Laziness is one of the greatest human sins.	Work ethic	.67
I1_47	If only people would work and save more, the poverty would disappear from our society.	Work ethic	.79
I1_48	In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need money for eating and living.	Conservatism/Work ethic	.65

Note: Alpha=.50; explained variance=49.77%.

Liberal ideology has generally proven difficult for questionnaire operationalization. In the initial factor analysis, the intended indicators of liberalism loaded on diverse factors and typically had multiple loadings. Three items, shown in **Table 11**, converged into a mini-scale of liberalism. Indeed, the items involve some of the prototypical beliefs associated with liberalism. This includes the emphasis on individual freedom rather than economic equality (I1_22), belief that unequal abilities lead to 'inequality of outcomes' (I1_23), and the belief in meritocracy (I1_45). This scale captures a rather narrow attitude, but it still seems justifiable to label it as liberalism.

Table 11. 'Philosophical' Liberalism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_22	Important is freedom of the individual, not economic equality.	'Philosophical' Liberalism	.72
I1_23	Economic inequalities are a natural outcome of differences in abilities.	'Philosophical' Liberalism	.77
I1_45	The country should be lead by the capable; the average should follow the lead	Elitism	.63

Note: Alpha=.50; explained variance =5.15%.

Attitudes expressing liberal, or neo-liberal, views of economy form a separate scale, as shown in **Table 12**.

Table 12. Economic liberalism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_1	It is harmful for the economy if the government tries to reduce income differences between rich and poor.	Economic liberalism	.68
I1_2	Every individual has to take care of him/herself and it is no state business to worry about individual welfare.	Economic liberalism/individualism	.65
I1_3	The state ought to be involved in economy as little as possible.	Economic liberalism	.66
I1_4	The state does not have a right to tax the rich more than the less	Economic liberalism/hierarchy	.38

⁴Compare the three items with the following statement: "The promotion of idleness leads, as it always does, to the growth of vice, irresponsibility and crime." (The Principles of Conservatism: Margaret Thatcher's Lecture to the Heritage Foundation, December 10, 1997. Retrieved on April 19, 2005, from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/reagan_lecture_thatcher.cfm>).

well-off citizens.

Note: Alpha=.42; explained variance =36.49%.

Economic liberals, from Smith to Ricardo and Mill, to more contemporary liberals, would not easily reject any of the items in this scale. Thus, the economic liberalism scale includes rejection of state involvement in economy in general and in the redistributive role specifically. It seems that only the progressive taxation fits the scale less well than the other items (and this would apply to classical theorists as well). For the Western context, it is typical that these attitudes correlate with right-wing ideological orientation.

The scale presented in **Table 13** presents a considerable puzzle. Despite the relatively low *Alpha* coefficient, the three items have uniformly high loadings. The interpretation is however not obvious. The highest loading item (I1_26) represents belief that '*It is in the human nature to help each other*', while the first listed item states that individual interests might be secondary to interests of the community. The remaining item emphasizing the importance of duties over right, also expresses the belief that community is important. This factor could be related to classical conservative emphasis on community. Thus, the underlying dimension has conservative, traditionalist, and communitarian flavors. In the present context, the dimension might reflect collectivist views.

Table 13. Collectivism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_24	There are situations in which the individual should sacrifice his/her own interests and wishes for the benefit a community, such as for example the nation or the family.	Traditionalism	.64
I1_25	Duties are more important than rights.	(Philosophical) Conservatism	.66
I1_26	It is in the human nature to help each other.	(Philosophical) Conservatism)	.70

Note: Alpha=.40; explained variance =44.66%.

Demand for harsher treatments of those who fail to observe social rules is an element in many accounts of social attitudes. Punitiveness is one of the sub-dimensions of the general conservatism dimension in Wilson's (1973) model, and related constructs can be found in Adorno et al. (1950) and Eysenck (1954, 1975).

Table 14. Punitiveness

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_14	Law and authority is what holds the society not to turn into chaos and anarchy.	(Philosophical) Conservatism	.57
I1_16	The problem of crime cannot be solved without harsher punishments for criminals.	Punitiveness	.81
I1_17	Death penalty is the best punishment for the worst criminals.	Punitiveness	.62

Note: Alpha=.37; explained variance =45.52%.

The scale presented in **Table 14** actually contains items that appear in some of the named studies and dimensions. Two of the three items explicitly call for harsher treatment of criminals, including the death

penalty. The remaining item expresses a belief in the necessity of ‘law and authority’ as barriers for ‘chaos and anarchy’.

Although elitism (and its opposite) has been an important element in various ideologies, the operationalization of this construct has rarely been attempted. Inspiration for the present measure and some items (I1_52 and I1_52) came from Sidanius’ research (e.g. Pratto et al. 1994). Three items included in the present elitism scale (**Table 15**) do not form a particularly internally consistent set. Their correlation with the total scale score (summarized) is generally low (below .20), hence the low *Alpha* coefficient.⁵ Still, the items load rather significantly on the scale principal component, thus providing a basis for their involvement into a unitary scale.

Table 15. Elitism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_50	In life, it is important to rise above other, ordinary people.	Elitism/hierarchy	.71
I1_51	No formal schooling can make up for the lack of domestic upbringing.	Elitism	.54
I1_52	Great art is not meant for the common folk.	Elitism	.66

Note: Alpha=.28 ; explained variance =4.66%.

Gender equality has been an issue on political agendas across different political contexts in recent years. Various attitudes dealing with the social and political role for women have been included in many attitudinal measures. The goal presently was to focus on the political aspect of the issue. Some of the items intended to measure this construct did not converge as expected. Hence, the present feminism scale consists of two items only. Since one item is formulated in the opposite direction, the scale is balanced.

Table 116. Feminism

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_31_R	Sexual discrimination is not a serious problem in contemporary Yugoslavia.	Feminism	.76
I1_32	Women should politically organize in order to fight against sexual discrimination.	Feminism	.76

Note: Items with suffix "_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. *Alpha*=.28; explained variance=57.98%.

Second-Order Factor Analysis: General Dimensions of Political Attitudes

In accordance with the general scheme of hierarchical factor analysis, second-order extraction was performed on the 15 attitudinal mini-scales. The Guttman-Kaiser criterion suggested four factors for extraction, accounting for 55.11% of the total variance.⁶

Although the weight of the first principal component is considerably greater than for the rest of the extracted factors (accounting alone for 25.63% of variance), half of the initial scales had loading below .40

⁵Pratto et al.’s (1994) cultural elitism scale showed also rather low *Alpha* coefficients, though higher than here (their scale consisted of 17 items, however).

⁶ Although the Scree-test suggested three factors, the four-factor solution proved more interpretable. Both Varimax and Oblimin rotation resulted a in very similar factor structure (correlations between the respective factors is above .90), corroborating the robustness of the adopted solution.

thus showing the inapplicability of the unidimensional model. Clearly, political attitudes in Serbia cannot be fully reduced to a single higher-order ideological dimension.

Structure of the rotated factors (correlation of variables with factors) is presented in **Table 17**. The first factor is bipolar in nature. The positive pole is defined by nationalism, socialist economy, militarism, traditionalism, and with a small loading of collectivism. The negative pole is defined by support for international integration and favorable attitude towards the regime change. The positive pole of the factor is represented by attitudes that are often expressed by and/or ascribed to the supporters of the socialists. The political opposition was not entirely ideologically unison in their support for the opposite attitudes. Especially their position on the nationalism issue had been often ambiguous throughout 1990s. However, the common ground for the opposition parties was certainly in their rejection of the socialists and radicals, and in their affirmative view of the need for Serbia's international integration. Thus, the factor could be interpreted as the regime divide, or authoritarianism versus political reform division. It should be noted that the content of the reform is not obvious in this factor. The supposed democratic orientation is visible in the opposition to nationalist, militarist and other attitudes on the pro-regime side, rather than in any coherent positive perspective. Since the factor seems rather backward looking (sticking with socialist economy, tradition, nationalism, militarism, and rejection of international integration), it seems most useful to label this factor as *socialist conservatism*. Enyedi and Todosijević (2003) and Todosijević (2008) obtained a rather similar 'socialist conservatism' factor in Hungary.

Table 17. Factor structure of attitude scales after Oblimin rotation

Primary factors	F1	F2	F3	F4
Nationalism	.76	.52	.32	
Socialist economy	.71			
Environmentalism				.62
International integration	-.74			.32
Traditionalism	.53	.59	.38	
Feminism				.78
Militarism	.70	.43		
Clericalism		.60		
Elitism			.55	
Economic Liberalism			.69	
'Philosophical' Liberalism		.36	.68	
Collectivism	.31	.60	.38	
Work ethic			.56	
Regime attitude	-.77			
Punitiveness		.55	.48	
Eigenvalue after rotation	3.23	2.28	2.29	1.30

Note: Loadings below .30 not shown.

The second factor is defined by high loadings of clericalism, collectivism, traditionalism, punitiveness, nationalism, and to a somewhat lesser extent by militarism and liberalism. Most scholars dealing with attitude structure would not have problems in reading this factor as part of the classical social conservatism dimension. It closely corresponds, for example, to Wilson's conservatism factor (1973), Eysenck's R factor (1954), or Middendorp's attitudinal conservatism (1991). The presence of collectivism might seem surprising, but we should recall that items defining this scale were initially intended to indicate

pre-Thacherite conservative emphasis on community and responsibility. Because some of the scales load on both the first and second factors, the question is whether they can be differentiated. The common variables for the two factors are nationalism, traditionalism, and militarism (and to a lesser extent collectivism). The major difference is that this factor does not have a negative pole. The opponents of the regime do not oppose conservatism of the factor 2. Next and equally important, clericalism and punitiveness load only on the second factor, while socialist economy loads on only the first factor. Hence, it is clear that the second factor is very close to a *traditional right-wing conservative ideology*.

The highest loadings on the third factor belong to the two liberalism factors, followed by elitism and work ethic. Punitiveness, traditionalism, collectivism and nationalism are also significant variables, though to a smaller degree. It seems that a certain implication of the desirability or necessity of social inequalities is common for the highest loading attitudes. The 'philosophic' liberalism scale implies inequality as a part of human nature, while economic liberalism justifies economic inequalities as supposedly reflecting the economic and social laws. The elitism factor has similar implications - view of the world as hierarchically organized with those more capable and 'deserving' on top. Loading of the punitiveness factor fits this interpretation well: those who break the rules and norms should be punished. The work ethic factor expressed negative views of those who do not work hard enough. Loadings of nationalism and traditionalism could also be incorporated in this interpretation. Hence, the factor is interpreted as the *orientation towards social order and hierarchy*.

The fourth factor is simpler to interpret. It contains basically two first-order factors: environmentalism and feminism, with additional lower loading of international integration. Hence, the factor can be interpreted as the *post-materialist orientation*, since it expresses a favorable view of the two ideologies central for the 'new politics'.

The four higher-order factors are weakly inter-correlated, thus suggesting that further variable reduction is not necessary (Table). The regime divide, conservatism and social hierarchy factors are weakly positively correlated (between $r=.11$ and $r=.21$). The common ground inherent in the three factors could probably be thought of along the lines of the psychological theories of conservatism (e.g., Wilson 1973). The post-materialist orientation factor is not related with the socialist conservatism dimension, but it is weakly related with the right-wing conservatism and social hierarchy ($r=.12$ and $r=.11$, respectively). These relationships suggest that post-materialist orientation shares with the right-wing conservatism a certain emphasis on community. A common ground for post-materialism and social order and hierarchy orientation could be the acceptance of social stratification. It should be emphasized, however, that these four factors are fairly independent of each other.

Table 18. Correlation between the second-order ideological factors

	1. conservatism	Socialist conservatism	2. conservatism	Right-wing conservatism	3. Social order and hierarchy
2. Right-wing conservatism	.17**				
3. Social order and hierarchy	.11*		.21**		
4. Post-materialist orientation	-.05		.12**		.11*

** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$; two-tailed.

Discussion and conclusions

Extraction of primary attitude dimensions

The present analysis started from the pool of 70 political attitudes questions selected so that they are theoretically relevant as indicators of the major ideological orientations and applicable to and representative of post-communist and specifically Serbian ideological controversies. The initial factor analysis extracted fifteen primary attitudinal factors.

Semantic similarity or 'logical constraint' (Converse 1964) is clear in most of the first-order factors. It is important to emphasize that 'logical' here refers to elementary logic, not to what could be termed 'ideological logic'. Interpretation of the factors based on logical constraint was generally simple. Economic egalitarianism, feminism, clericalism, international integration, and environmentalism are examples of factors consisting of semantically homogenous items.

At the same time, it is apparent that structuration of these factors is not exclusively based on their literal meaning. In most cases, the constraint comes from societal and political traditions and from contemporaneous political divisions. On these grounds one can explain, for example, a finding that an item expressing a favorable attitude towards the integration into the international community hangs together with the two feminist items.

The key finding here is that attitudes of the Serbian public are not organized into a single overarching ideological dimension. Semantically close items are closely correlated and attitudinal factors converge toward the main lines of Serbian political divisions.

The attitudinal mini-scales improved the operationalization of the basic attitudinal dimensions, especially concerning the conceptual clarity and measurement reliability. The remainder of this section discusses the conceptual and methodological aspects of the 15 primary attitudinal dimensions.

The **nationalism** dimension consists of elements such as national pride, belief in the nation's superiority, the desire for national sovereignty, unification with territories inhabited by co-nationals, request for the introduction of 'patriotic' elements into school curricula, distrust of neighboring nations, and rejection of one's own nation's possible guilt. It differs from what would usually be defined as patriotism (positive attitude towards the in-group), by including the negative attitude towards out-groups. In this sense, it is close to the concept of ethnocentrism (Adorno et al. 1950). Earlier analyses of nationalist attitudes in Serbia also found a combination of similar items that formed a rather coherent nationalist orientation (e.g., Todosijević 2001). Moreover, the present scale corresponds to various other operationalizations of nationalist orientation in many respects (e.g. Kosterman and Feschbach 1989), and contains most of the aspects of the usually encountered nationalist doctrines (cf. Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn, 2003). In fact, it is remarkable that so heterogeneous of a scale, in terms of literal content, performs so consistently. This nationalist attitude homogenization could be a reflection of the nationalist mobilization in the political sphere (cf. Todosijević 2001).

A **militarist** attitude proved possible to measure by a small set of items that converged into a highly consistent scale. Earlier research on elements of socialist ideology in Serbia also showed that attitudes toward the role of the (Yugoslav) army are rather well organized (Todosijević 2005). Consistently high loadings show that army is an attitude object viewed in rather general terms – as either positive or negative. Army is seen as a source of security and pride and it is admired for its role in "the heroic fight against NATO aggression". Regardless of the local specificities, this factor closely corresponds to related dimensions obtained elsewhere (e.g. Wilson 1973).

An attitude towards **international integration** includes positive (or negative) views of the integration of Serbia (Yugoslavia) into the international community. It covers both economic and more political integration. This dimension is less often encountered in literature. Perhaps, its salience depends on

a particular country's position vis-à-vis the international community.⁷ It is perhaps not only the 'paranoid' nature of Serbian nationalism (Ramet 2004), but the facts of a decade long economic sanctions, political isolation, and, finally, a war, that made the attitude towards the 'international community' so salient of a political theme. Conceptually related dimensions have occasionally been reported in Western countries. For example, Sidanius and Ekehammar (1980) obtained a factor labeled Pro-West orientation in Sweden.

Clericalist orientation is a rather narrow attitude concerned with the political role of the Church and religion. Similar dimensions dealing with religion/religiosity are present in virtually all models of social attitudes structure (e.g. Eysenck 1954; Ferguson 1939; Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1991; Wilson 1973). The present scale is, however, narrower in scope and more clearly focused on the influence of the church on political and social matters.

The **traditionalism** scale deals with traditional sexual mores, punitiveness towards transgressors of social norms, and support for the public promotion of the "nation's traditions". This scale represents a relatively narrow operationalization of traditionalism, not unlike conventionalism as described by Adorno et al. (1950). Counterparts to this dimension can be found in most models of attitude structure (e.g. Eysenck, Wilson), despite the fact that particular traditions may considerably differ.

The speculation that the attitude towards the former **socialist system** and towards what is generally termed 'the Slobodan Milošević regime' might be relatively separate dimensions is confirmed. The attitude about the Slobodan Milošević regime is concisely expressed in the regime attitude factor. The fact that an item expressing general evaluation of "communism" loads on this factor testifies to its somewhat more complex nature than simply the view of Slobodan Milošević. This kind of attitudinal dimension generally does not appear in models developed in more stable political contexts. Thus, it may be a peculiarity of transitional cases, where regime change is the most salient issue (cf. Moreno 1999).

Items dealing with various aspects of the **socialist organization of economy**, as specifically applied in Serbia/Yugoslavia, converged into a separate dimension, labeled the socialist economy factor. Hence, a positive attitude towards the socialist economy does not necessarily go hand in hand with support for the 'Milošević regime'. The dominant theme in this factor is opposition to privatization, but there are also items mentioning trade unions, state guaranteed employment, and free education. Similar dimensions have been obtained previously in countries of the former socialist bloc (e.g., Todosijević 2005; Enyedi and Todosijević 2003). In the Western context, items of this profile would often load on the left side of the left-right ideological dimension or on the opposite side of the conservatism dimensions. Of course, instead of resistance to privatization the western attitudinal counterpart would include support for nationalization, especially in studies from 1960's and 1970s (e.g., Eysenck 1975; Middendorp 1991).

Environmentalism and feminism factors are conceptually pretty clear, although the former is operationally better defined. Environmentalism and feminism appear to be attitudes not very well integrated with other ideological dimensions. Thus, despite the presence of these themes in media and public discourse, they are not well integrated into broader ideological orientations.

Similar factors dealing with these post-materialist issues have been reported in the literature. For example, Riemann et al. (1993) obtained a separate environmentalist factor in Germany (though it was mostly focused on taxation for environmental purposes) and a women's equality factor which merged with items on social welfare (consider also, for example, the Women's Liberation factor in Ortet, Perez, and Wilson 1990, or the sexual freedom factor as one of five primary factors of liberalism in Kerlinger 1984).

None of the general models of the structure of political attitudes includes the **work ethic** as a separate dimension. However, the related items are often found built-in in various definitions of general

⁷ Though early research in the USA discovered an internationalist-isolationist dimension (Thurstone 1934).

conservatism. The work ethic attitude has a considerable history in political psychology research. It received prominent place in Adorno et al.'s research, as well as in more recent studies (e.g., Altemeyer 1998; Katz and Hass 1988; Pratto et al. 1994; Verkuyten and Brug 2004). In Serbia, Ignjatović conceptualized this attitude as “praxophilia” (Majstorović, Salaj, and Ignjatović 1994). In the current research, the items intended to measure the work ethic spread on several factors. Three items remained for defining the attitude to work as rigid obligation rather than as the expression of creative abilities. Given that items with very similar content are often interpreted as “protestant ethic ideology” (Katz and Hass 1988; Verkuyten and Brug 2004), it is possible that in cultures with weak protestant influence this attitude is less structured. However, although the final work ethic scale might seem weak psychometrically, it is rather consistent given the fact that it consists of three items.⁸

Liberal ideology has generally proved difficult to operationalize by questionnaire, even in countries with much stronger liberal traditions than Serbia. In many studies there is no separate dimension labeled “liberalism”. The opposite of conservatism is often interpreted as radicalism, especially in earlier studies (Thurstone 1934; Eysenck 1975). However, specific attitudes that could be seen as elements of liberal orientation are often found within general ideological factors. Thus, for example, emphasis on private enterprise and rejection of state involvement in economy are often elements of general conservatism. Cases when researchers report separate factors with liberalism in their labels testify to the multiplicity of meanings associated with this term. In Riemann et al. (1993) a factor labeled “Liberalism and technological progress” is one of four components of general conservatism obtained in Germany.

The most prominent and explicit position for liberalism is found in Kerlinger's (1984) two-dimensional model. There, liberalism is one of two ‘big’ independent factors, in addition to the conservatism factor. The meaning of Kerlinger's liberalism factor is, however, much closer to the American understanding of the term i.e., as dealing with social mores. Economic neo-liberalism would be much closer to one of Kerlinger's conservatism factors, namely, to the economic conservatism primary factor.

Presently, items pre-defined as indicators of liberalism loaded on diverse factors. They typically had multiple loadings which testify to the ambiguous interpretation of the respective items. In the end, two separate mini-scales dealing with liberalism were constructed. The scale of **liberalism** involved some of the prototypical beliefs associated with liberalism, such as the emphasis on individual freedom rather than economic equality, belief that unequal abilities lead to ‘inequality of outcomes’, and belief in meritocracy. The second factor captured liberal or rather **neo-liberal views of economy** (the two factors are moderately correlated: $r=.33$, $p<.001$). This factor includes rejection of state involvement in economy and, in particular, its redistributive role. In the Western context, these attitudes would typically correlate with right-wing ideological orientations.

Interpretation of the **collectivism** factor proved difficult. Two of the items were originally meant to indicate conservative orientation, with a remaining item representing traditionalism. In all of them, however, one could find an emphasis on the importance of collectivity and relatedness with the group to which one belongs. This factor could be related to a classical conservative emphasis on community⁹, as well as to the socialist tradition of collectivism. It seems that the underlying dimension has equally conservative, traditionalist, communitarian, and collectivist flavors. As a whole, the factor seems closest to a collectivist orientation as opposed to individualism. The current definition of collectivism has elements of both horizontal (based on fraternity) and vertical collectivism (based on hierarchically ordered structure of

⁸ Compare, for example with Katz and Hass 1988 or Furnham 1990. In Verkuyten and Brug (2004) a 10-item scale had coefficient $Alpha=.69$.

⁹ Giddens (1994) for example, calls for revival of the communitarian aspect of classical conservatism.

collectivity) (Triandis and Gelfand 1998; Kimmelmeier et al. 2003). The former is currently expressed in the attitude that 'it is in human nature to help each other'; the latter, in the belief that 'duties are more important than virtues'.

Punitiveness is one of the four main sub-dimensions of the general conservatism dimension in Wilson's (1973) model of the structure of social attitudes. Similar attitudes can be found in Thurstone's (1934) and Ferguson's (1939, 1973) factors of humanitarianism (negative loading), in Adorno et al.'s (1950) conception of authoritarian aggression, and in Eysenck's tough-mindedness. They are often found in descriptions of conservative ideology (e.g., Searing 1978). In Serbia, Majstorović, Salaj and Ignjatović (1994) obtained a similar factor, labeled as *penophilia*. The punitiveness factor obtained in the current study clearly belongs to this broader 'family'.

Support for or rejection of social elites is evidently an important component of ideological thinking. Yet, attempts to operationalize the construct of **elitism** have been rare. The incentive to include elitism as a hypothetical dimension in the present research, as well as two of the three items in the scale, came from Felicia Pratto and Jim Sidanius' research (e.g. Pratto et al. 1994). The attitude outlined in this scale includes preference for hierarchical order and view of the social world as consisting of culturally superior and inferior layers.

General Dimensions of Political Attitudes

By way of second-order factor analysis the primary factors are reduced to a smaller number of more general ideological orientations. The four-factor solution proved the most interpretable. Thus, on this level as well, one-dimensional model is inapplicable.

Socialist conservatism

The first extracted and obliquely rotated second-order factor is bi-polar, with both positive (e.g., nationalism, militarism, traditionalism, socialist economy) and negative loadings (e.g., international integration, opposition to the regime). The factor is interpreted as socialist conservatism and corresponds to the authoritarianism versus (democratic) political reform division (Moreno 1999), and to the 'socialist conservatism' factor obtained in Hungary by Enyedi and Todosijević (2003).

One side of the dimension is well represented by the substantive content (e.g., nationalism) but the other side is defined more by the rejection of these attitudes than in clear substantive preferences apart of the positive view of international integration and the desire for the regime change. The presumed democratic orientation is visible in the opposition to nationalist, militarist and other attitudes on the pro-regime side. In this regard, this ideological divide resembles early transitional divides in other cases of post-communist transitions where the regime party/(ies) is opposed by broad 'umbrella' movements or fora, rather than by ideologically coherent forces and ideological options (cf. Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). This testifies to the decade long delay in political transition in Serbia.

Bi-polarity of this factor counters Kerlinger's (1984) model of independent and unipolar ideological dimensions at the top of the attitude structure. He hints about the role of political extremism in cases when bi-polarity is obtained, but in the present case it seems more to be the role of the heightened political polarization or conflict. In Serbia, and, perhaps in transitional cases more generally, politics tend to be much more polarized and conflictual (as predicted by Mair 1997), than in more stable democracies.

This ideological dimension is also close to the combination of authoritarian and economic-populist attitudes, obtained in Bulgaria by Markowski (1997). The negative pole of the Serbian factor, however, cannot be described, as in his case, as containing pro-market attitudes, since economic neo-liberalism

does not load on this factor. It also cannot be clearly characterized as being libertarian, because although traditionalism loads on this factor, other attitudes such as environmentalism, feminism, clericalism, punitiveness, are not associated with it. A closer look at Markowski's findings actually reveals a considerable commonality. Namely, he had only fifteen items in total, defining four factors, where the libertarian side of the first factor was represented by basically two items "for liberal individualism" and "for environmental protection". Another potentially relevant item ("moral restraints on mass media") loaded a different (third) factor. A pro-market orientation aspect of the first factor was represented negatively, by the item "against market opinion", while "support for fast privatization" also loaded the third factor (rural smallholders' liberalism) (Markowski 1997, 251, Table A5). Thus, it seems that Markowski gave a somewhat broader interpretation to the factors than their item content would strictly allow. In general, it seems that the rejection of authoritarianism does not necessarily entail libertarian orientation, and the rejection of socialist economy does not imply wholehearted endorsement of economic neo-liberalism.

Right-wing conservatism

The second general factor is close to social conservatism factors obtained across political contexts (Wilson 1973; Kerlinger 1984). It is defined partly by the same primary factors as the previous second-order factor, namely nationalism, traditionalism, and, to a lesser extent, by militarism. Unique for this factor are, however, high loadings of clericalism, punitiveness, collectivism and, to a lesser degree, liberalism. Presence of collectivism might seem surprising but we should recall that items defining this scale were initially intended to indicate classical conservatism and traditionalism. What really differentiates the two second-order factors is that the first factor is clearly associated with leftist orientation, given the high loading of the socialist economy factor, while the second factor with high loading of clericalism is much closer to traditional right-wing conservative ideology. In general, most of the scholars dealing with attitude structure would not have problems in identifying this factor as a classical social conservatism dimension. It corresponds to Wilson's conservatism factor (1973), Eysenck's R factor (1954), Kerlinger's (1984) unipolar conservatism factor, or Middendorp's attitudinal conservatism (1991).

Social order and hierarchy orientation

The highest loadings on the third factor belong to the two liberalism factors, followed by elitism and work ethic. Punitiveness, traditionalism, collectivism and nationalism are also significant variables, though to a smaller degree. It seems that a certain implication of the desirability or necessity of social inequalities is common for the highest loading attitudes. The liberalism scale implies inequality as a part of human nature, while economic liberalism justifies economic inequalities as supposedly reflecting economic laws. The elitism factor has similar implications – a view of the world as hierarchically organized with those more capable and deserving on top. The work ethic factor expresses negative view of those who do not work hard enough. Punitiveness fits this interpretation also well. Loadings of nationalism and traditionalism could also be incorporated in this interpretation. Hence, the factor is interpreted as orientation towards social order and hierarchy.

While this factor seems close to general liberalism (the European kind, i.e., the version associated with the right-wing politics), in addition to its individualistic component it also contains elements of collectivism. Perhaps it reflects a preference for strict social order and rules rather than openness for laissez-faire competition. Hence, the factor is associated with both the socialist and right-wing conservatism second-order factors.

In many respects this factor is very close to the protestant ethic dimension described by various authors (e.g., Furnham 1990; Katz and Hass 1988). According to Verkuyten and Brug the protestant ethic ideology “is a hierarchy-enhancing ideology because it provides moral and intellectual justification for differences in status hierarchy and continued inequality among social groups” (2004, 650). The third factor, thus, could be seen as a functional equivalent to the protestant ethic dimension described in the western context. In the case of Serbia, it cannot be explained by reference to protestant cultural heritage, of course, but, rather, by a more universal socio-psychological foundation, such as authoritarianism.¹⁰ The fact that this factor is correlated with the second factor (i.e., right-wing conservatism) corroborates their common roots, since the protestant ethic is generally thought of as a component of conservatism in the west. Thus, classical conservatism appears separated into one component associated with religiosity and traditionalism (factor 2) and another component based on (European) liberalism and ideology of self-reliance (factor 3).

Post-Materialism

The fourth factor was defined by basically two attitudes - environmentalism and feminism, with an additional lower loading of international integration. Hence, the factor can be interpreted as a post-materialist orientation, since it expresses a favorable view of the two ideologies central to the 'new politics'. It is weakly associated with the other second-order factors. The fact that Serbian political attitudes cannot be put onto a single overarching ideological dimension should not be taken as a particularly unusual finding. In fact, positive evidence of the existence of such a dimension is rare. Even Wilson's (1973) conservatism factor is conceived as consisting of four rather independent sub-dimensions, and comparative research reveals a weak support for the strict unidimensionality hypothesis (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990).

Conclusion

Political attitudes among the general public have often been portrayed as incoherent and disorganized. The situation is supposed to be still worse in the post-communist context due to various aspects of the 'triple transition'. These considerations, however, apply to the more general levels of attitude integration. At the more basic level, attitudes are supposed to converge due to their semantic similarity, or logical constraints in Converse's terminology. According to the presented results, the Serbian public passed Middendorp's test of “thinking ideologically”, since the political attitudes show “a degree of interrelatedness - along one or a few dimensions - which can be meaningfully interpreted” (Middendorp 1991, 60-61). The hypothesis about the multidimensionality and the hierarchical structure of political attitudes in Serbia, such as postulated in Eysenck's (1975) Wilson's (1973) or Middendorp's (1991) models, is supported. Political attitudes at the most general level vary along four relatively independent dimensions: socialist conservatism, right-wing conservatism, social order and hierarchy orientation, and post-materialist orientation. The socialist conservatism dimension is defined by six primary attitudes: nationalism, militarism, socialist economy, rejection of the international integration, affirmative attitude towards the Milošević regime, and traditionalism. Primary attitudes that define right-wing conservatism include the clericalism factor, collectivism, traditionalism, punitiveness, and nationalism. The social order and hierarchy general ideological dimension includes primary attitudes such as the economic liberalism, liberalism, work ethic, elitism, and punitiveness. The post-materialist ideological dimension is based on environmentalist and pro-feminist attitudes.

¹⁰ In fact, Adorno et al.'s *The Authoritarian Personality* could be seen as a psychoanalytical complement to Weber's *The Protestant Ethics*.

The results of the initial factor analysis and attitudinal mini-scales construction clearly demonstrate the role of semantic similarity or 'logical constraint' (Converse 1964). However, the primary factors showed the work of other sources of constraint as well. This refers primarily to the constraint coming from societal and political traditions, and from contemporaneous political divisions, but also from psychological functionality. Thus, for example, the convergence of the militarist, nationalist, and attitudes about the Milošević regime into a single primary factor is attributable to the contemporaneous political processes.

The evidence also demonstrates a rather strong constraint in structuring the first second-order factor. A number of logically unrelated primary attitudes converged into a well-integrated higher-order ideological dimension of socialist conservatism. On the one hand, socialist conservatism is 'functionally similar' to the conservatism from Wilson's (1973) studies, in the sense that it can be interpreted as having psychological roots in the fear of uncertainty. On the other hand, it very closely corresponds to the ideological differences between the two main opposed political camps in Serbia at the time of data collection. Moreover, the division is not just between different issue positions and political preferences. It also concerns different political regimes and rules of the political game. The content of this dimension is close to the authoritarianism-democracy division (Moreno 1999) and related transitional cleavages (cf. Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). This finding corresponds to Kitschelt et al.'s (1999) claim that "the salience of the regime change issue acts as a center of gravity for many other more or less related issues". Additionally, the more specific hypothesis that the regime change and the national issue are at the core of the social and political conflicts in Serbia and accordingly shape the mass ideology is also supported. It was hypothesized that nationalism should have a very important role in structuring political attitudes and political divisions due to the specific events in recent Serbian history, but also following Evans and Whitefield's (1993) reasoning about ethnically divided societies. Although nationalist attitudes are well organized basically wherever they are analyzed (e.g., Thurstone 1934; Marjoribanks and Josefowitz 1975; Kosterman and Feschbach 1989, Todosijević, 2012) the present findings confirmed the specific hypothesis that nationalist attitude is a bipolar dimension.

The hypothesis about ideological coloring of the regime divide is also confirmed (following Moreno and Kitschelt et al. 1999). The evidence showed the convergence of nationalism and socialism over time – the convergence enabled by specific historical background. The findings suggest that the convergence is based on the appeal to the socio-psychological predispositions underlying both orientations. Serbia had relatively weak nationalist-clerical anti-communist opposition in the 1990s, so the support for the socialist ideology was not only *politically* conservative but also expressive of psychological conservatism. Hence, the somewhat unusual combination of socialist views with traditionalist orientation and other components of classical conservatism became possible (though economic liberalism is clearly not a part of this combination).

The existence of other general ideological dimensions is evident as well, though they should be interpreted as ideological syndromes rather than intellectually consistent ideological doctrines (see Derks 2004). Nonetheless, they point to additional sources of attitude constraints. The right-wing conservatism factor points towards the role of socialization (religiosity).

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