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Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: Effectively Protecting Civilians Without Threat of Violence

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Photo on page 1: Dialogue ending communal violence in South Sudan 2011, facilitated by Nonviolent Peaceforce. Photo: Christine Schweitzer
Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4
Terminology ................................................................................................................ 5
What is Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping? ................................................................. 6
Who are the Unarmed Civilian Peacekeepers? .......................................................... 8
How Does It Work? ..................................................................................................... 9
  Example 1: Colombia ............................................................................................. 10
  Example 2: South Sudan ....................................................................................... 11
  Example 3 Kosovo Verification Mission ............................................................... 12
Common Characteristics of UCP ................................................................................ 13
Evidence of Impact and Limitations of UCP ............................................................ 14
Implications for Replication and Expansion ............................................................ 16
Political Acceptance of UCP ..................................................................................... 17
UCP and Peace Research .......................................................................................... 17
UCP Challenges the Assumption That Violence is the Last Means ....................... 18
Literature ................................................................................................................... 20
Authors ...................................................................................................................... 24

Figures
Figure 1 Roots and Types of Civilian Peacekeeping ................................................... 8
One morning a group of mothers came to the office of the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in a city on the East coast of Sri Lanka. The night before, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) had abducted their sons at a Hindu Temple Festival and the mothers were desperate to retrieve their children. The Unarmed Civilian Peacekeepers helped the mothers locate the camp where the children had been taken; since NP’s regular strategy is to engage all conflict participants, NP staff had already had some communications with the LTTE. NP staff accompanied the mothers to the camp. When the mothers told the camp commanders that they wanted their sons, they were told to go away, but they held firm, backed up by the presence of expatriate UCPs. The camp leaders then sent for their superiors to deal with the situation. Negotiations continued for 36 hours. NP members called in UNICEF to bring food for the mothers; that pushed the negotiations forward because UNICEF had secured commitments in the past from this faction not to recruit children. Finally, the 26 boys were released (with bus fare!) and they returned home.

Subsequently, the LTTE issued a press release stating that 26 boys had run away from home and had come to their camp wanting to join up, but they had sent the boys away since they don’t use children as soldiers. (Nonviolent Peaceforce 2015)

Introduction

One of the thinking patterns most difficult to remove both in politics and society all over the world is that there are situations where “only violence can help”. Politicians and Think Tanks invoking the „Responsibility to Protect” or the one-size-fits-all concept of “security” (which is not only defended at the Hindukush but everywhere in the world) agree here with rebels fighting against oppression, dictatorship, land grabbing etc. Is this thinking pattern based on unchangeable facts, even human nature? Or doesn’t it serve a purpose like an appendix and may lead, given modern weapon technology, to the destruction of all that is to be defended, secured or fought for?

Regarding uprisings there is statistical evidence that nonviolent uprisings have much more chances for success than armed ones.¹ For war and defence there are no such statistics. Within the concept of civilian-based defence there is a concept of unarmed defence, based on a comparatively small number of cases of civil resistance, and there is growing knowledge about instances in which whole populations manage to avoid being drawn into war raging around them.² But their number seems to be limited and civilian-based defence is still more conceptual than practice.

What we present here is different. It is as well an element of a strategy to overcome war and violence by proposing a nonviolent alternative to military approaches, the military peacekeeping. But here practice dominates, and the conceptualization makes use of decades of experience. The subject is the protection of civil population in armed conflict. Protection without the use of arms and by other civilians, be it by internationals or by concerned fellow citizens. In the Anglo-Saxon world what we present here under the name of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) has started to become known both in peace research and at the United Nations. In the German language area we are just at the beginning. With this paper, we describe what UCP is, how it works, some of the scientific knowledge about its impact, and how much political acceptance it has found, and we would like to make a contribution to making the promising concept and practice known in the circles of the politically interested critical peace research.

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¹ Chenoweth & Stephan 2011
² See Anderson & Wallace 2013.
**Terminology**

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (or “Unarmed Civilian Protection”) is the work of trained civilians who use nonviolent, unarmed approaches to protect other civilians from violence and the threat of violence and support local efforts to build peace. This is something which has been happening for many decades around the world, by many actors though sometimes using different terminologies. The term Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) describes a set of activities that civilians undertake including, but not limited to accompaniment, presence, rumour control, community security meetings, securing safe passage, the creation of systems of early warning and early action, strengthening local self protection strategies, advocacy, and monitoring. In every place where it is used around the world it is always context specific, adapted and developed by the people who work on the ground. It is not always internationals coming to crises areas to protect local civilians – locals have often played the role of protecting their fellow-citizens’ from harm. And in a number of places international and local efforts have effectively been combined.\(^3\)

As far as terminology goes, UCP is a concept and practice that is only now beginning to receive attention (see below). The first researcher\(^4\) who to our knowledge used this term was Lisa Schirch in 1995 who introduced this term when she produced an overview of various peace team activities on behalf of the Swedish Life & Peace Institute. She argued that many of the activities of accompaniment and interpositioning are similar in function to military peacekeeping in that they both sought to separate armed groups and deter violence. The terminology is not yet universally agreed and examples of UCP definitions follow.

UCP is a strategic mix of essential nonviolent engagement methods, principles, values and skills. Specifically trained civilians, in close coordination with local actors, apply UCP to prevent violence, consolidate peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacemaking mechanisms as well as provide direct physical protection to civilians under threat. (Nonviolent Peaceforce & UNITAR, 2014).

Furnari (2014) writes that UCP means;

…efforts by unarmed civilian third parties, in the field, to prevent or diminish violence by influencing or controlling potential perpetrators for the purpose of protecting people and making it safe for local people to engage in peace and justice efforts. (Furnari, 2014, p. 38)

But NGOs in the field describe their work in other ways. For example:

Peace Brigade International’s (PBI) website says;

Protective accompaniment is a strategy pioneered by PBI for protecting human rights defenders and communities whose lives and work are threatened by political violence. (http://www.peacebrigades.org/about-pbi/ accessed on March 6th 2014)

While Meta Peace Team’s website states;

MPT Teams act to reduce and prevent violence in war or conflict zones, where they are invited by one or more party to a conflict. Teams practice a specific type of conflict intervention work that MPT refers to as “Third Party Conflict Intervention” or TPNI, although there are many names for this type of action. TPNI actions include: protective accompaniment, observation/documentation, peaceful presence/modeling peaceful behavior and reaction, and interpositioning.

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\(^3\) So for example the „Bantay Ceasefire“ on Mindanao / Philippines or the Osijek Peace Team in the 1990s in Croatia. See Bantay Ceasefire 2003 and Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights Osijek 2001.

\(^4\) The term was also used already by the activist Charles Walker in 1981.
The researchers Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber (2000) speak of “nonviolent intervention across borders”, in German the generic term “nonviolent intervention” is quite common.\(^5\)

Several activists and authors have used the term “peace force” in one or another variety (“peace force”, “interpositionary peace force”, “world police force”), or also “white berets”.\(^6\) In other words, UCP interventions focus on protecting civilians and supporting local peace efforts. They do not try to resolve conflicts themselves, nor do they generally provide other kinds of humanitarian aid.

### What is Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping?

Unlike the terminology, the practice behind the term is not new at all, and has several sources. The first was Gandhi’s concept of a Peace Army (Shanti Sena) which also became known between the World Wars in Europe and was realized as a sort of community defence force by Gandhi’s successor Vinoba Bhave in 1957.\(^7\) Gandhi envisioned people from other communities or ethnicities, coming to protect those in communities where violence (generally based on ethnicity, religion or caste) was occurring or threatened.

This idea was taken up several times by Europeans (mostly in Britain) who tried (usually unsuccessfully) to build up ‘peace armies’ to interposition themselves in certain conflicts.\(^8\)

There have been various proposals by individuals and organisations, directed mostly at the United Nations (since the 1990s also at the European Union), to establish a standing unarmed peacekeeping force.\(^9\)

Another source has been the different volunteer services that have developed since World War I seeking to contribute to reconciliation (particularly among youth) through voluntary work (Service Civil International, the various services of Christian Churches, etc.).\(^10\)

Yet another source of inspiration has of course been military peacekeeping. This is particularly true for unarmed governmental missions monitoring cease-fires.\(^11\)

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\(^5\) See the list of publications on the website of IFGK (www.ifgk.de) and of the Federation for Social Defence (www.soziale-verteidigung.de)

\(^6\) For details, see Schweitzer 2010:8pp

\(^7\) See Weber 1996, Easwaran 2002

\(^8\) For an overview, see Weber 2000.

\(^9\) Ibid, and also: Schweitzer et.al 2001, appendix to chapter 2


\(^11\) The term "peacekeeping" seems to have its origins with the United Nations. It was the “UN Emergency Force” (UNEF 1) that was established in response to the invasion of Egypt by British and French forces during the Suez Canal crisis which first was termed a “peacekeeping” mission. It set the parameters for what today can be considered classical military peacekeeping – the deployment of defensively armed troops of impartial countries and with the agreement of the state to which they are deployed, with the mandate of “help[ing] maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict” (Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:xii).

While such peacekeeping missions are still being carried out, new types of peacekeeping have been developed since 1988. These newer types are often multidimensional, inasmuch as they include reconstruction, state-building, civil society support and other peacebuilding tasks. The peacekeepers are heavily armed, often sent under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, powerful countries participate in the missions, and the peacekeepers usually operate in an environment very different from those of classical
Out of these various sources, different types of activities have developed that today are at the core of civilian peacekeeping. There are different peace team organisations, with quite different approaches, methods and purposes. At one end of the spectrum there is Peace Brigades International. PBI was founded in 1981 and has specialised in nonpartisan protective accompaniment of human rights activists and been very successful in this work in many countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia, Kenya). At the other end are groups, often of Christian orientation, engaging in solidarity work with people they perceive as oppressed, particularly in countries in which the United States (home to most of these groups) is involved in the conflicts. Several understand their work to be ‘God’s work’. Examples for this would be Christian Peacemaker Teams, Witness for Peace or Meta Peace Team.

The 1990s saw the first larger civilian missions with protection mandates deployed by governments or international organisations (IO’s) that used comparable methods and strategies. Though these governments and IO’s are not fundamentally committed to nonviolence or local ownership (two principles considered fundamental to organisations which exist solely to implement UCP projects), particular missions have been carried out by unarmed, nonviolent civilians, and may include as well, unarmed military personnel. The European Community (later European Union) Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in the former Yugoslavia and the Truce / Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville are examples, as are today’s EU observers in Georgia and the European/Turkish Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH).

In the last ten years, relief, development, (and human rights organisations have increasingly begun to realize that humanitarian protection is a task they must take into account in their programming and work in the field, and have started to use some of these methods.

The vision of large-scale UCP organisations fielding missions equivalent in size to multilateral interventions has not for the most part, been realized yet. The INGO peacekeeping missions—an environment of intrastate conflict where one or both sides are hostile to the peacekeepers.

The by now almost traditional picture of the lightly-armed Blue Helmet standing on some street surrounded by curious children has today (due to these developments and to wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are falsely presented to the international public as ‘humanitarian’) been replaced by the picture of a NATO soldier in combat dress sitting in an armoured vehicle, driving around in fear of a suicide attack by terrorists.

12 For Witness for Peace, see Griffin-Nolan 1991.
13 On the KVM, see the section further down in this article.
14 Bougainville is an island that belonged to Papua New Guinea. Since 1988, Bougainville went through a serious civil war between the “Bougainville Revolutionary Army” fighting for independence of the island from Papua New Guinea (PNG), and the PNG defence forces, supported by Australia. The war was brought to an end by two agreements in 1997 and 1998, and as part of the agreements, an unarmed Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was established. Under the leadership of the New Zealand military, in 1997 approximately 370 soldiers and civilians from New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu were sent to Bougainville to monitor the cease-fire and the implementation of the agreement. All members of the TMG had to be unarmed and wear civilian clothes, because an armed peacekeeping force would have been refused by the parties in conflict. The operation was set up according to military standards and rules, using a military infrastructure and approach. Most of the staff today are based in a tent camp in one central location. From there they go out to patrols in the villages to explain the cease-fire agreement and through their presence prevent new violence. See Böge 1999, Seminar: Monitoring Peace in Bougainville (1999) and the NP Feasibility Study, chapter 2 (Schweitzer et al 2001), Gehrmann et al 2015 and Wehner (ed.) 2001
Nonviolent Peaceforce that has been nominated for the Nobel Price for Peace in 2016 has set itself the goal to grow to numbers that would permit comparison to governmental peacekeeping missions. Though NP has made quick progress over the last years, it has not achieved these dimensions. Its largest project in South Sudan counts close to 200 staff. It is the second largest security organisation in South Sudan, smaller only than the UN, which fields c.13,500 staff. In comparison, the TIPH employs 64 international and 20 local staff, while the EU mission in Georgia fields about 200 and the OSCE in Ukraine about 700 international observers. Nonviolent Peaceforce has also made the largest contributions toward making the term “UCP” known both within civil society and with governments and the United Nations (at least in the Anglo-Saxon world and recently also in Germany).

Who are the Unarmed Civilian Peacekeepers?

INGOs who field UCP teams are generally invited to come by local or national civil society organisations. The teams are made up of international staff and, frequently, local staff as well. These local staff may be equal team members, though sometimes they may function primarily as interpreters and support staff. At some organisations (like NP), unarmed peacekeepers come from all regions of the world including Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and the Pacific region, at others they are primarily or exclusively North Americans and (West-)Europeans. The status of the civilian peacekeepers varies as well: Many organisations work with volunteers who may receive some small living stipend but no salary. Others employ and pay their staff, and there are also organisations (like PBI) that mix both models. The duration of deployment varies as well and ranges between some weeks or months to an average of two years or longer.

A similar breadth of varying practice can be found regarding required preparatory

16 As did many earlier organisations such as the Civilian Peace Service in Germany as well, only to abandon that goal at some point. See the articles in Evers 2000 and Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000
18 http://www.peacebrigades.org/resources/annual-reviews/?L=0
19 http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879?download=true
training or professional background. Many international UCP organisations field staff (or volunteers) that already have a background in international work and nonviolence, speak the language in the conflict region, and other relevant skills. Most organisations provide training on UCP methods lasting from several days to several weeks before deployment. Other organisations support volunteers with little background to come for shorter periods of time, emphasizing the work these volunteers do when they return home to keep the conflict visible in their own country.

The civilian peacekeepers live and work near or with the people they are protecting. In contrast to the UN, other ceasefire monitors and most other humanitarian staff who are based in compounds/barracks, UCP staff are accessible, thus they more easily learn about the conflict context, community security mechanisms that already exist and may also provide a safe space in which new committees, training or meetings can take place. Indigenous UCP teams, created and supported by local civil society organisations, already live in their communities. They have the advantages of local knowledge and connections, and the disadvantages of lacking privileges often accorded to international status, as well as the ability to leave and ‘go home’ to a safer place if the security risks become too high.

How Does It Work?

UCP frequently influences armed actors - whether government or non-government forces- through proactive presence. Being visible and known to all actors, using good communication, building good relationships across many social sectors, enabling other actors to communicate across divides, linking with networks and being locally based, UCP can reduce the threat of violence, protect civilians and create a space in which peaceful mechanisms can be built by local people themselves. In some contexts this is done through encouraging armed actors to meet international standards, to act in the interests of the people they purport to represent, training in human rights, or other encouragement strategies. Protection may also be accomplished by providing training and support to create or strengthen existing self protection strategies in communities such as local ceasefire monitoring, creating systems of early warning and early action or planning for evacuation/displacing if needed. The particular insights and needs of women may be addressed through women only local peace teams or other gender based practices. In other contexts, proactive presence acts as a deterrent, when armed groups are reluctant to be seen committing violence against civilians (or other ceasefire violations) by international or even national witnesses, or when UCP organisations advocate with influential institutions (often foreign governments who provide funding to the national government or ‘rebel’ armed group) to pressure particularly the local government or rebels, to refrain from harming civilians and to respect international humanitarian and human rights law.

UCP’s focus on deterring violence can also be seen as a vital component in strategies for building sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is a long term and complex set of activities, in which the rebuilding of relationships, trust and capacity is vital and easily undermined by renewed or threatened violence. As Furnari, Oldenhuis and Julian (2015) note:

UCP contributes to keeping local peacemakers and human rights defenders alive and building their confidence and capacity, so that these actors can play a role later on in solidifying peace and promoting reconciliation. UCP is oriented toward increasing local expertise, rather than bringing in outside experts, though it shares knowledge freely. UCP builds or strengthens local self-sustaining structures for the sake of security and protection, which may well be used for reconciliation and
conflict transformation as well. UCP has a nonviolent approach to security and protection, using acceptance and relationship building instead of walls and guns. Not only does this prepare the ground for peacebuilding efforts and structures, which are founded on the same values and principles, but it also shows local actors that guns and force can be pushed back even further than often thought. It questions the notion of peace enforcement, interrupts cycles of violence, and links means and ends (p.10).

If we consider a model in which successful peacekeeping overlaps with and transitions smoothly into long term peacebuilding then a peacekeeping method which encompasses and models engaging with conflict nonviolently and building relationships across conflict lines is already working to establish processes relevant for a time when the violence has been reduced or terminated.

The development and implementation of UCP practice is being led by INGOs and NGOs who respond and innovate, and seek to embed the strategies more widely, and so we consider UCP as both an external intervention strategy by INGOs working internationally for preventing and reducing violence, as well as a local/national civilian led strategy to prevent violence. These nationally or locally led organisations managing their own activities to prevent and reduce violence is a far less visible and barely studied component of UCP. As already noted, UCP type strategies and methods are successfully used by other intervenors such as EU unarmed monitoring missions. This underscores the effectiveness of these methods, though these interventions are deployed by institutions which are not overall committed to nonviolence and other basic principles considered essential for UCP effectiveness.20.

**Example 1: Colombia**

Colombia has the most international UCP organisations active in the same country, at this time. Organisations providing accompaniment, presence or a wider range of UCP methods, have been working there since PBI initiated a project in 1994.21 Other organisations with teams in Colombia include the Swedish, US and Austrian Fellowship of Reconciliation, Red de Hermandad, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Operation Dove (Operazione Colomba), and the Presbyterian Peace Fellowship. These organisations have provided protection to human rights organisations and their staff, individual lawyers or others working on behalf of human rights, as well as a number of specific communities. The majority of threats faced by those accompanied are related to the long civil war and have come from paramilitaries and the Colombian army, though there have been threats from the FARC and ELN. Increasingly now, there are threats from multinational corporations. Local communities which have organized against the exploitation of the natural resources and land in their areas, and displacement from their communities, have been threatened and need protection. Overall, the experience has been that when internationals are present, the level of violence decreases or ceases, with some painful exceptions. Accompaniment has provided protection to: human rights defenders when they have crossed check points and traveled to dangerous areas, other civilians who have been threatened with death for their work on behalf of peace and justice, and to communities who declare themselves unaligned and/or zones of peace. Accompaniment organisations have also worked to keep the international community focused on the atrocities committed against civilians in Colombia and have instigated diplomatic and economic pressure on the government to

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20 There needs to be more data comparing interventions fielded by INGOs, IOs or governments, and COS’s which would shed light on the differences, if any, in outcomes.

21 The following draws from Lindsay-Poland and Weintraub, 2016.
protect citizens from paramilitaries associated with the army. While there is little evidence that these UCP organisations have directly impacted the overall conflict trajectories, the fact that a number of high profile civilians have been able to continue their human rights and legal work, and that peace communities have continued to function, has undoubtedly had an indirect effect through this ongoing work and inspiration. People who have been accompanied have stated on many occasions that they are alive only due to the accompaniment, and communities that have been accompanied believe it has made a significant difference in their continued existence as regions of peace.

For example, the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó has received protection from several different UCP organisations. In 1997, and in response to escalating violence in the region, the community declared itself a peace community. They pledged not to support any armed group or army, and requested all armed groups to respect their civilian status. This was apparently an affront in particular to the paramilitary groups in the area and several members of the community were killed that year. Lindsay-Poland and Weintraub note “homicides and disappearances peaked in 1997, with 56 – 87% of which occurred after the declaration as a Peace Community (seven of them within a week of the declaration). Fifty of the 56 were reportedly carried out by the Army or paramilitaries, the remainder by the guerrillas. (p.68)” In 1998 PBI began to provide accompaniment to the community, as well as drawing international attention to the violence against them. In 2001 the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) sent a delegation and in 2002 began an accompaniment project in the affected communities. Though two families in the peace community were killed in 2005, overall, with accompaniment and international attention and pressure, killings and abductions dramatically decreased. As an example of the impact of international presence and accompaniment Lindsay-Poland and Weintraub state:

    FOR had a permanent presence in La Union from January to October of 2002, at which point it did not have prepared volunteers to serve on a team. During that seven-month period, although Army, paramilitary and guerrilla groups were active in the area, no La Union residents were harmed. Ten days after FOR’s departure, paramilitaries conducted an incursion into La Unión and abducted a teenage boy, forcibly disappearing him. (p.69)

UCP intervention protected hundreds of members of the community through their presence and through drawing international attention, which allowed the community to continue its work to support no armed groups, modelling nonviolence and inspiring others.

Example 2: South Sudan

In a very different region of the world, South Sudan, the Nonviolent Peaceforce fielded a UCP project (NPSS) at the request of two NGOs, beginning in 2009. By 2013 the project was well established in several states as well as providing protection to people returning from Sudan who arrived at the port in Juba. When civil war broke out in December of 2013, the Juba based team became the base for teams working in the Juba Protection of Civilians (PoC) areas which were rapidly created on and near UN mission areas of UNMISS. NPSS teams have: helped to reunify children who were separated from family in the chaos of fleeing; helped to prevent violence between ethnic groups in several PoC/IDP areas in other parts of the country; advocated for the security needs of civilians living in these areas with UN and other humanitarian

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22 The following draws from Furnari, 2016
agencies; patrolled areas around the camps to deter violence against IDPs who venture out; and investigated and responded to rumours - either verifying or falsifying them and helping civilians plan responses as needed. This last set of activities is often referred to as early warning/early response. Although there are many weapons in these areas (and in South Sudan generally) and with the soldiers surrounding them, NP's international and national staff have prevented violence and protected people without arms. Additionally in other areas, NP staff have helped chiefs of different sub-clans stop killing, and other violence, related to cattle raiding and negotiate a peace agreement; organized community security meetings and accompanied women to prevent rape when they go to draw water or collect firewood; initiated and supported local women to form women's peace teams which address their particular threats; and helped to bring the concerns of local communities to the attention of other humanitarian agencies. Since the beginning of the civil war in 2013, NP has also developed a rapid assessment team which has gone to areas where IDPs are thought to have congregated to do assessments, or to protect staff from other agencies, and provided protection at aid distributions as well as protection mainstreaming training to staff from other agencies.

While the project has become the largest protection agency other than the UN mission itself, and has protected thousands of civilians, there is little evidence (as of June 2016) that it has impacted the trajectory of the civil war. There is little evidence to date that anything besides the periodic pressure of other governments and the UN has had much effect either. The project has had to withdraw when conditions are too violent, and atrocities have then occurred in areas where they were working. And the project is small compared to the vast need and size of the country. Still, as the largest UCP intervention undertaken by an INGO to date, it demonstrates the effectiveness of well trained, unarmed, civilians - international and national working together - at protecting others.

**Example 3 Kosovo Verification Mission**

Although not undertaken by an organisation specialized in UCP, the Kosovo Verification Mission of the OSCE used UCP type methods and provides an excellent example of how UCP can be carried out by international governmental organisations. Under the threat of NATO intervention in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, the Yugoslav government under Milosevic agreed at the end of October 1998 to the deployment of a civilian peacekeeping force. An unarmed OSCE mission was acceptable to both sides, although the Kosovo-Albanian leadership would have preferred an armed peacekeeping force. Deployment began in November 1998, but not having the personnel (or equipment) ready, the Mission only reached around 75 percent of the agreed number of 2,000 staff before it was withdrawn on March 20, 1999 after the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations.

Its mandate was to establish a permanent presence throughout Kosovo, monitor the ceasefire agreed in October 1998 and to report ceasefire violations, conduct border monitoring, and facilitate the return of refugees along with ICRC and UNHCR. It was also anticipated that it would supervise elections in Kosovo. The Verifiers established permanent outposts in crisis areas, visited places where fighting was reported, monitored several court trials, conducted weapons verification inspections, accompanied Serbian police and Serbian investigators to places controlled by the UCK, and sought to intervene actively if they came across violence.

The evaluation of KVM is rather contested. On the one hand, it undoubtedly managed to reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain localized outbreaks of violence. In addition, their mere presence played a role in restraining violence. Specifically, at the beginning of the mission, the ceasefire was respected. Both
the Serbs and the more moderate commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for stabilisation of the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater numbers as the fighting calmed down. Even in January-February 1999 when the situation became tense again, the arrival of KVM personnel on the scene usually had a de-escalating effect.

On the other hand, the Verifiers could not fully contain the violence. There were attacks on police and civilians all the time in varying degrees, and increasingly also on the Verifiers themselves. The agreement to deploy KVM was also flawed because it was an agreement between the USA and FR Yugoslavia, with the Kosovo-Albanian leadership or the UCK not being a party to it, and not feeling bound by it. As Judah (2002:198) and Loquai (2000:62) point out, the ceasefire was used by the UCK to move back into its strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew, probably in preparation for a new offensive in spring 1999.

The evaluation would be that given the circumstances under which KVM was deployed—with one party of the conflict explicitly hoping to bring about the military intervention already threatened against the other party—the KVM was surprisingly successful in the field.

Common Characteristics of UCP

Based on comparative studies the authors have done, there are some common values most INGOs in this field share:

They are all nonviolent, based in the grassroots communities where they work, respect the primacy of local actors, and most are independent of any national or international institution or control. Many, though not all, are nonpartisan. Those that are partisan, work to support local groups working for peace and justice.

All nongovernmental UCP organisations are committed to nonviolence. The work of UCP is done by unarmed staff and volunteers, and does not rely on the threat of violence as a backup if local people or local armed groups do not cooperate. Being nonviolent and unarmed allows UCP workers to access areas they might not otherwise, as they do not present the kind of threat to sovereignty or control, which armed peacekeepers pose. They find it easier to build good working relationships, because they do not have the power of weapons to use as a backup threat, and they are often respected for doing dangerous work, unarmed. They also model dealing with conflict nonviolently, by their actions and engagement. And through their singular focus on civilian protection, they are generally able to mobilize others to recognize the need to protect civilians. This bedrock commitment to nonviolence distinguishes organisations that only do UCP interventions, from others that use UCP strategies and methods, but that may also rely on military strength as backup or for other aspects of their work (for example many European countries contribute to unarmed EU missions, but are also NATO members).

UCP interventions fielded by INGOs and local organisations respect the primacy of local actors and local ownership as another key principle. While there is debate and confusion as to who or what is local, by living in or near the communities where they work, being out and about in these communities unarmed and accessible, and reaching out to develop relationships across many sectors, UCP interventions develop a good sense of the area, who is working for peace and justice, and which leaders are

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23 See Calic 1998
related to what aspects of local society. The primacy of local actors is reflected in that
all the INGOs doing this work come at the invitation of local organisations or in rare
instances, the government. They do not have agendas developed at the national or
international level, but focus on supporting and protecting those who are working for
peace and human rights specifically, or more broadly, civilians in the regions where they
work.

While many UCP organisations state they are nonpartisan in relationship to local and
national political parties and debates, they are clear they are partisan for human rights
and civilian safety. Some UCP organisations are based in religious principles and state
they are doing God’s work in solidarity with local religious groups or as religious people
themselves (i.e. Presbyterian Peace Fellowship in Colombia or the Ecumenical
Accompaniment Project in Palestine/Israel), and others such as Red de Hermandad,
state they are partisan for the agendas of those they protect. Thus there is a good deal
of variation on this principle.26

Good relationships are seen as the key to effective peacekeeping by both armed and
unarmed peacekeepers.27 Thus in UCP interventions, much time and effort goes toward
building workable relationships with local military commanders, government officials,
and community and religious leaders. UCP staff/volunteers also generally build good
relationships with other humanitarian actors in their area and may participate in formal
and informal networks, as well as protection or child protection clusters, when present.
Many organisations also build relationships with diplomats from their own or other
countries in the capital cities, as well as with national level government. These
relationships can provide protective pressure for both UCP staff/volunteers and the
people and places they protect.

**Evidence of Impact and Limitations of UCP**

There is significant evidence that UPC interventions impact the behavior of armed
actors and of civilians, saves lives, make spaces safer for peace and justice activities,
and strengthen peace networks. Though not effective in all contexts, and needing
certain elements in order to be fielded28, UCP in many different contexts has
influenced armed actors to change their patterns of attacks on civilians or desist
entirely and civilians to more safely and effectively stand up for themselves and prevent
violence, protect themselves, or at least evacuate more safely. A comparative analysis
by Julian and Furnari29 shows that NP projects have a local level impact within two
years, but that it takes even longer to become more established and have a larger,
more strategic, impact. UCP effects are generally not a quick fix, though the arrival of
internationals may prevent threatened violence in the short term as the experience of
the KVM has shown.30

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) describe the difference they make as;

> We know that we have prevented deaths and deterred violence because we have
> stopped armed groups from acting. We know that the people with whom we
> work tell us they are safer because of our presence and work. We know that CPT’s
> work has expanded the “space” for local peacemakers to pursue their already-

26 See Furnari 2016 Chapter 6 for further discussion of different models of UCP.
27 Furnari, 2015 - peace review article
28 See Venturi 2015
29 Julian & Furnari 2014
30 Other examples of having a quick protective impact are discussed by Lindsay-Poland and Weintraub
(2016).
inspiring peace work”.[31]

Peace Brigades International (PBI) give a comprehensive view of the impact of their work in yearly reports that show the extent of their work and NP includes evaluations from some of their projects on their website.[32] Case studies of UCP in four different regions – Colombia, Palestine/Israel, Mindanao, Philippines, and South Sudan - though focused on effective practices, includes evidence which supports the claim that in a wide variety of contexts, UCP has effectively protected civilians and impacted the behavior of armed actors, including the government.[33]

Our review of organisations indicates that UCP is a relatively stable field. The organisations that set up to carry out a project or support an area, remain committed and involved for long periods of time, often 10 or more years. Although there are not many organisations, they are well established and all of them have initiated and ended various projects over the life of their organisation, giving them a solid track record. NP is the newest organisation to be established and they are now 12 years old. While there is a shared framework and documented effectiveness in many contexts, further sharing between UCP organisations and more focused research would certainly improve the practice and increase impacts.[34]

As with all other instruments of intervention in violence conflicts, UCP is not an instrument to be used in any and all situations. Some of limitations are as follows:[35]

A comparative analysis by Julian and Furnari[36] shows that NP projects have a local level impact within two years, but that it takes even longer to become more established and have a larger, more strategic, impact. So it seems that UCP effects are not a quick fix for underlying drivers of conflicts. On the other hand, there is also evidence that the arrival of internationals may prevent threatened violence in the short term as the experience of the KVM and other more short-term projects have shown. It may be theorized that perhaps the effect of UCP that is based on deterrence may set in very quickly but the effect that is achieved through trust-building with all sides – which in many ways may contribute to more sustainable change – takes longer to set in. It would require however further research to explore that issue which may be a vital one if UCP is considered an instrument-in-the-making of international organisations to replace military peacekeeping interventions.

The major conflict parties need to at least tolerate the civilian peacekeepers even if they did not invite them or welcome them whole-heartedly. If an armed group refuses contact or building some kind of acceptance of the UCP presence, and continues to threaten harm, there is little UCP peacekeepers can do. If there is no clear avenue to pressure the armed group to change position on this, a project will not begin or will withdraw from that area. Staff security is a high priority.

Unarmed peacekeepers do not have immediate physical force available to make combatants act or not act in a certain way. IFOR in Bosnia, the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Hercegovina after the Dayton agreement of 1995, being deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was able to point their guns at men trying to prevent IDPs visiting the graves of their families, and by force of arms opened a way for

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[33] Furnari, 2016
[34] See Furnari, 2016, Chapter 6 – Synthesis of Case Analysis).
the IDPs. On the other hand, there is also ample proof that there are situations where not carrying a gun was what made peacekeepers effective and/or also protected themselves. Speaking of the unarmed ceasefire monitoring intervention in Bougainville that was deployed since 1997 by four pacific states,, a participant said,

The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst in the Australian Defence Force at the time, but it was the right one. At least two occasions I encountered may have gone differently if we had been armed. Perhaps more fundamentally, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) experience reaffirmed for me that the role of peacekeepers is to not only stand between the warring sides to prevent more suffering but also to encourage the coming together of divided people.

While other limitations it may be overcome, they impact how quickly and effectively an intervention can be initiated and for how long it can be maintained. To begin with, finances can limit UCP intervention. Although a conflict context may seem likely to benefit greatly from a UCP intervention, it may be in an area of low concern to funders – whether a multilateral organisation like the EU, a government, or private donors. Even if funding can be acquired, it often takes many months, which limits the ability to respond to a crisis in a timely manner.

The same goes for finding personnel. Even governments that maintain a roster of trained available civilian staff (like the German government has created with the Center for International Peace Operations), first need to recruit and prepare those recruited for the particular deployment. All UCP organisations have processes for recruiting and training staff and volunteers, and at times face shortages. The Nonviolent Peaceforce and UNITAR have recently launched an online course in UCP to at least provide some general training in the field.

Like all peacekeeping, the area of impact is generally limited to the area where UCP is implemented. Additionally, because most of the UCP interventions are not linked to a specific national or international peace process, and the focus is on civilian protection rather than specifically addressing peacemaking tasks, many UCP interventions do not have direct impacts on ending violent conflict. However, many of the civilians protected, for example in Guatemala, have themselves been involved in peace processes. Their absence due to death, would have changed history. And those UCP interventions that are connected to peace processes, such as NP in Mindanao, have made direct contributions to this specific peace process.

Implications for Replication and Expansion

Each UCP intervention is based on extensive conflict and context analysis. Before beginning an intervention, there needs to be an assessment that UCP has a strong potential for protecting civilians, and a small potential for causing harm to civilians or UCP staff. Each intervention is then shaped by the initial analysis and developed within the frequent and ongoing analysis updates. Case studies suggest that while the core principles create an overall framework for replication, it is not possible to simply

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37 On SFOR/IFOR, see Riegler 1999, Kaufman 2002
38 Furnari 2015
39 New Zealand with Australien, Fiji und Vanuatu.
replicate any given program. Each intervention must be tailored to the current conditions and have the freedom to evolve as the conflict, and thus context, changes. This is in line with good practice and research into making peace activities effective. Many, if not all, the current UCP projects are well positioned for expansion. The projects have already developed deep knowledge about the conflict and the local contexts, as well as extensive relationships. As existing evidence of expansion already demonstrates, this provides a sound basis for expansion. However, again, each local context has variations, and even within a specific country or region, each local team may engage in different specific methods and activities, to respond appropriately to the protection challenges faced. In this way UCP is generally more responsive to actual needs than traditional peacekeeping, and thus may be more effective at providing protection.

Political Acceptance of UCP

UCP is not a concept well-known and accepted in the political field. That does not mean that there is no funding by state sources for it - at least some organisations like Peace Brigades International and Nonviolent Peaceforce have received considerable financial support from some European governments like Germany and Belgium for example, as well as in the case of NP from the European Commission and UN organisations. But looking at policy papers, detailing government strategies to deal with crises, there is very little. Recent mention appeared in two UN implementation reports in 2015 - one on Peacekeeping and the other on Resolution 1325. The report on Peacekeeping includes: “United Nations missions and non-governmental actors have important unarmed and civilian tools for protecting civilians and working with communities.” More expansively the Implementation report by UN Women devoted a whole page of their 400-odd page report on “Unarmed civilian protection” (p 153).

But in national or EU policy papers the concept of the protection of civilians by civilians is still simply mostly non-existent. In the German political debate, an important milestone was a hearing on UCP that the Subcommittee for Crisis Prevention of the German parliament held in March 2016. It remains to be seen if UCP finds entry into the new Guidelines for Crisis Prevention currently in development (2016).

UCP and Peace Research

Compared to other fields in peace and conflict research, civilian peacekeeping has so far received very little attention.

In English language literature, there are studies and other publications on "peace teams", "cross-boundary intervention", “proactive presence” or “civilians

42 For example see Autessere 2015
43 The front organisation of the Foreign Office, Zivik, was the first funder for a project of Nonviolent Peaceforce. The Ministry for Development finances the work of Peace Brigades International through means for the Civil Peace Service.
45 One such exception is the study by Dudouet and Clark 2009.
46 See https://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/auссhuesse18/a03/ua_zks/kww11-pa-zivile-krisenpraevention/412294
peacekeeping”. They mostly consist of case studies and overviews of different projects, missions and organisations. Aside from a few earlier articles in magazines and a book edited by Hare and Blumberg (1977), the first scientific studies on this topic only came out in the middle of the 1990s. Coy (1993 and 1997) on the work of PBI, Buettner (1995) on peace brigades in general, Schirch (1995) on civilian peacekeeping, Weber (1996) on Shanti Sena, and Mahony & Eguren (1997) on the theory of nonviolent deterrence based on the PBI experience are the first ones of which we are aware. In the early 2000s, the main publications on the issues have been Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber (eds., 2000), the NP Feasibility Study (Schweitzer et al. 2001), Müller (2004) on the Balkan Peace Team, Slim & Eguren 2004 and Slim & Bonwick (2005) on humanitarian protection, Schirch (2006) with an update of her 1995 study on civilian peacekeeping, and Mahony (2006) on “proactive presence”, a comparative study based on an overview of governmental missions. The Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (Lindgren 2008) published a study on nonviolence and external assistance. Also Clark (ed., 2009) contains a section on “nonviolent citizens’ intervention across borders”. Patrick Coy published in 2012 a comparative analysis of Peace Brigades International, Christian Peacemaker Teams, and the International Solidarity Movement. Even more recently, a volume of Peace Review was devoted to UCP (2015)47, Randy Janzen created a database on UCP48 and several articles have appeared in various journals, as well a comparative study on the practice of UCP edited by Furnari (2016) In academics, there is again, to our knowledge, only one course devoted to UCP, at the Canadian Selkirk College where the mentioned Randy Janzen is based.49

In Germany, there is very little research on this topic. On behalf of the Protestant Church of Baden, the institute FEST is currently conducting a study on “Just Policing” which is not on UCP but with armed protection but probably will ask related questions. A few researchers related to the small private Institute for Peace Work and Nonviolent Conflict Transformation (ifgk.de) have since the 1990s published some studies.50

UCP Challenges the Assumption That Violence is the Last Means

UCP approaches challenge the mainstream ideas on peacekeeping. We currently understand peacekeeping to be an action almost wholly carried out through the UN and involving the military. Additionally, for peacekeeping to be effectively carried out, we assume it must include the use of (or threat of use of) force and weapons in most situations. In fact peacekeeping is one of the three components of a model for building a sustainable peace that most interventions are based on. This includes peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. It is clear that peacemaking and peacebuilding are carried out by multiple actors at many levels. For example peacemaking usually involves international negotiation, but may also involve village dialogue projects. Peacebuilding has had wide ranging input from INGOs, NGOs and Community Based Organisations, focused on building state institutions, rebuilding connections and trust, economic development, and supporting peaceful norms. UCP demonstrates that peacekeeping also needs not to be the exclusive task of security forces. It helps us understand and challenge the way we think of security for ourselves and others. UCP gives us a practice

49 Selkirk College: http://selkirk.ca/unarmed-civilian-peacekeeping 4 month course
and evidence that peacekeeping can equally be done by civilians and (I)NGOs, does not necessarily need the military, and that in many contexts, UCP may be more effective at protecting civilians. But to end the dominance of military peacekeeping and the centrality of the UN DPKO, will be no easy task. It is not enough to shine a light on UCP, it requires a shift in paradigm. And this shift may be resisted in part because the belief in the efficacy of violence is so deep as well as while the need for large militaries has decreased since the end of the Cold War, NATO and others have redefined their role as necessary for maintaining/enforcing peace\textsuperscript{51}, so as to justify their continued size.

\textsuperscript{51} Whitworth, 2004
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Federation for Social Defence

The Federation for Social Defence (German: Bund für Soziale Verteidigung e.V.) is an association founded in 1989, specializing on nonviolent alternatives to violence and war. Its office is in Minden, Germany. Among its activities are the organisation of conferences and symposiums, the publication of papers, peace education and political campaigning. Check out its website: www.soziale-verteidigung.de/english: