An empty land? On population dynamics and ageing in a North European periphery
Malmberg, Gunnar

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Nutzungsbedingungen:
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.
An empty land?
– on population dynamics and ageing in a North European periphery

GUNNAR MALMBERG

Abstract
Based on various empirical investigations, the paper examines the population trends in the peripheral areas of northern Sweden. Though the region has experienced a population decline over the last decades, the population is rather stable and several forces seem to counteract the trends of population decline. Though mobility is a salient feature of today’s society, migration trends are not increasing and many people in the remote regions are tied to networks in their home regions. And since non-job related motives are less common also the peripheries may attract migrants. Further, population development is also influenced by temporary mobility, and what is here called the “second population” may be of great importance for the future of the northern peripheries. In conclusion, the most likely future population development for the northern periphery is still a slow and stable decline.

Zusammenfassung
Ein leeres Land?
- Über die Dynamik und das Altern der Bevölkerung an der Peripherie Nordeuropas
Der Beitrag untersucht anhand verschiedener empirischer Studien die Tendenzen der demographischen Entwicklung in den peripheren Gebieten Nordschwedens. Obwohl im Verlauf der letzten Jahrzehnte in der Region ein Rückgang der Bevölkerung zu verzeichnen war, ist die Bevölkerung ziemlich stabil, und mehrere Faktoren scheinen den Tendenzen einer Bevölkerungsabnahme entgegenzuwirken. Mobilität ist zwar ein hervorstechendes Merkmal der heutigen Gesellschaft, aber die Migrationstendenzen nehmen nicht zu, und viele Menschen in den peripheren Regionen sind in die Netzwerke ihrer Heimatregionen eingebunden. Und da nicht-arbeitsplatzbezogene Motive selten sind, können auch die peripheren Regionen Migranten anziehen. Weiterhin wird die Bevölkerungsentwicklung auch von temporärer Mobilität beeinflusst, und das, was man hier als „Zweitbevölkerung“ bezeichnet, kann für die Zukunft der nördlichen Peripherie von großem Bedeutung sein. Abschließend ist festzustellen, dass die wahrscheinlichste künftige Bevölkerungsentwicklung für die nördliche Peripherie immer noch eine langsamm und stetige Bevölkerungsabnahme ist.

Introduction
Among Europe’s peripheries, northern Scandinavia is often regarded as an extreme: sparsely populated, and so remote that it sometimes falls outside maps of the continent. Still, the northern periphery has many features in common with other remote regions: population decline, erosion of public and commercial service supply, and outmigration of the young and ageing population. Indeed, the European peripheries are sharp contrasts to the regions where most Europeans live their lives; they are far from the dynamic centres and latest trends. But while Europe in general is anticipating a demographic shift with ageing and even population decline, the European peripheries have been the forerunner in a way. Here, ageing and population drop have long been the normal situation to which life and policy are adjusted. So perhaps lessons could be learned from the peripheries, about survival under conditions of population decrease and increasing remoteness. In times of population ageing and regional concentration, the survival of the extreme is certainly a key issue.

Examining population density in Europe, the northern part of Scandinavia is less dense than any other region in the European Union, and many places have less than one inhabitant per square kilometre. The northern parts of Sweden have a long history of frontier expansion, colonization and population growth, and as can be seen in Figure 1 (and Fig. 3) population grew until the 1960s. But as illustrated in Figure 2 (and Fig. 3) the northern inland areas has experienced nothing but diminishing populations in the last four decades, while the more urbanised coast areas has had a more positive trend. But if peripheries in more central parts of Europe are also struggling against decline, how can people in the most peripheral regions endure? Why are the most remote peripheries not already empty?

The survival of the northern peripheries has indeed been a major issue in the local debate in the North. From a pessimistic perspective, one question has often been raised: How long will it take for this to become an empty land? Meanwhile, the optimists have countered by asking: When will the population decline end? In a way, these two questions reflect two standard theories about regional development; while the former is in line with the theory of cumulative causation and vicious circles, the latter follows the ideas of the neo-classical economic models, assuming that market mechanisms will over time result in a regional convergence.

This paper's focus is population change in peripheral regions, and though the arguments are partly based on previ-
Northern counties include the counties of Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten. Metropolitan counties include Counties of Stockholm, Goteborg och Bohuslän and Malmöhus. Southern Peripheries include the counties of Kristianstad, Blekinge, Kronoberg, Kalmar, Jönköping, Gotland, Skaraborg, Värmland, Dalarna and Gävleborg. All other counties are included in the categories Other Southern Counties.

Since population concentration. One evident force in the Scandinavian context is the regional policy and welfare state policy, supporting economic activities in peripheries, subsidizing public jobs and enabling people to remain in remote parts of the country. The trends in regional policy have shifted from the 1960s and 1970s distribution strategies where support of specific firms or selective municipalities was a salient feature. Now the focus is on growth and the policy is guided by the idea that every region, also the most peripheral, should be less dependent of state subsidies and contribute to the national economic growth (ITPS 2005). Still, the public sector is an important base for the local economy in many peripheral municipalities and in many cases the major employer. The sustainability of this strategy has been
questioned in the debate, but the costs of the public sector in the remote regions is just a marginal share of the total redistribution between different population groups in society (HOLM et al. 2004). Important to have in mind though, is the role of migration and population dynamics for the regional development. Obviously, regional patterns of population dynamics and regional development are also shaped by people’s demographic behaviour, by decisions to stay or to go, by ties to home regions, and residential preferences, for instance the attraction of rural amenities or social links to local networks. Hence, the population structure and dynamics is in fact one force counteracting the tendencies towards further concentration.

**Vicious circles?**
In the literature on regional development (MYRDAL 1957), mechanisms of population decline are often described by the cumulative causation or vicious circle model (illustrated in Fig. 4), based on the assumptions that economic restructuring results in a concentration of employment opportunities to metropolitan areas, causing unemployment in peripheral regions. Local unemployment triggers out-migration, and it is sometimes assumed that in the current times of increasing mobility opportunities, regional differentiation results in an accelerating exodus and a more rapid population decline. And since outmigration mainly includes the young, population ageing is one apparent consequence. One further effect is a negative population momentum, with low fertility rate and outmigration resulting in fewer women of reproductive age in a certain area in upcoming decades. In combination with the currently low age-specific fertility rates, the result is a natural population decline. What is more, population changes also affect the preconditions for economic activities: a declining tax base affects the public service supply as well as the local human capital stock, with negative effects on local investments and employment chances. And so the process continues in a vicious circle.

Yet, the pessimistic view of the vicious circle model has often been contested. And in focus in this paper is some previous research on regional population change in the northern regions of Sweden, scrutinizing some of the major assumptions in the vicious circle model by focusing on the following questions:
• Is there actually a trend towards increasing migration and decreasing place attachment?
• Are employment opportunities still the major determinant of interregional migration in the post-industrial society?
• How important is internal migration for regional population change as compared to international migration and natural population change?
• How important is the redistribution of the residential population for the formation of the local human capital stock? And how important is the extension of functional regions through commuting and other forms of temporary mobility?

**Increasing mobility?**
Some contemporary social science literature claims that we live in times of increasing mobility (SHELLER and URRY 2006) or in the age of migration (CASTLES and MILLER 2003). And doubtless, people now travel over much greater distances than in the past. Swedish data (SIKA 2009) show a 70% increase of person transport in the past 35 years. But when
the permanent migration between regions and countries is examined, the age of migration is not apparent. In fact, previous empirical studies on international migration show that only about 2% of the world population actually live in another country than the one they were born in (HAMMAR et al. 1997), and though the direction of international migration has changed over the past centuries we find no long-term tendencies of increasing rates of international migration. In Sweden, as in most other North European countries, the emigration waves of the 19th century changed during the 20th century to an immigration wave. But in relative terms, migration over the country’s borders is about the same today as it was a hundred years ago.

Examining intra-national migration rates, we also find quite stable migration flows. As illustrated in Figure 5, about 8% of the Swedish population has moved annually over parish borders throughout the 20th century. And as demonstrated in Figure 6, the portion of long-distance migration within all migration indicates that long-distance migration did not become more common during the period 1968-2001. What we find are very few signs of increasing or decreasing migration and few signs of large fluctuations, despite changing economic and political circumstances. And figures on the more contemporary mobility reveal limited migration rates for the interregional migration in Sweden in general. As many as 97.5% stay in the same region during the course of one year, 87% stay in the same region for ten years, and about 70% stay in the same region for a lifetime (FISCHER et al. 1998). Despite the talk about increasing mobility, the sedentary structure is still strong and many are firmly attached to and settled in their home region. One reason migration has not risen could be increasing commuting and other forms of temporary mobility, substituting for migration and allowing people to stay in their place of residence. So in a way, one type of increasing mobility could be the reason for the decrease in other types.

It is certainly difficult, however, to determine the extent to which these trends of (im-)mobility are unique to Sweden, since comparisons are not easy to make. But, for instance, research from the US, known for its high migration rates, shows tendencies of decreasing rather than increasing migration (PUTNAM 2000, p. 205).

But if we stick to the Swedish case, we can conclude that despite shorter time distances and more long-distance contact, people are in many ways equally tied to their place of residence, though the forms of place attachment have altered. This may be one major explanation for why the remote regions are not yet empty. But what are the determinants of this immobility?

The stayers

Previous empirical studies on Swedish data on migration propensities found that non-movers are to higher extent older, families with children, low-educated people, those who are employed, and long-term residents (FISCHER et al. 1998; FISCHER and MALMBERG 2001). Seemingly...
gly, people who have settled down and started a family, had children, secured housing and a job, have become very immobile. And this behaviour has been accentuated over time in a cumulative process. Those most likely to move again are recent movers.

In previous studies on migration and immobility determinants in the Swedish context, (FISCHER et al. 1998; FISCHER and MALMBERG 2001) it has been argued that long-time residents have accumulated a place-specific human capital including social networks and contacts important not only in working life but also in leisure activities; a non-transferable human capital that ties people to their place of residence. Moving to another region would transform these location-specific insider advantages into a sunk cost, and people would have to start all over again in accumulating a new location-specific human capital. And in fact, various empirical analyses have found that previous duration of stay is the single most important determinant of immobility (GORDON and MOLHO 1987; FISCHER and MALMBERG 2001).

By hanging onto their home regions, people contribute to the survival of the remote lands and counter the emptying of the peripheries. And though the immobility may have several positive effects, resisting population decline in remote regions, it may also have negative effects and, for instance, contribute to a kind of cumulative inertia in the local community, with people persisting in maintaining their social contacts within the same networks (GORDON and MOLHO 1987; FISCHER and MALMBERG 2001).

When looking at the age distribution of internal migrants in Sweden, we find a well-known distribution showing that mobility is largely a phenomenon for young unsettled people, while people who have settled – in their thirties and upwards – tend to be immobile. In an analysis of the long-term trend, LUNDHOLM (2007) found a decrease in mobility among those over age 25, while the migration propensity increased among younger adults. And when comparing the years 1970 and 2001, the study found that this concentration of mobility to the young age cohorts is increasing over time. On the other hand, families with children have especially become less mobile over time; one major explanation for this is the increase in two-earner households (BENGTTSON and JOHANSSON 1994; FISCHER and MALMBERG 2001; Lundholm 2007). What we see are trends of increasing and decreasing mobility behind the stable trends and an increasing differentiation, with the mobile becoming more mobile and the immobile becoming less mobile.

Place dependency
Hence, the empirical findings show how some people become increasingly immobile, or place dependent, and to some extent locally trapped in their current place of residence. And since this group is found in the periphery as well as in the more centrally located regions, their attachment to their place of residence is certainly one major force counteracting population decline in remote regions, levelling out tendencies towards regional concentration. In a way these people, through their migration behaviour, resist the concentration forces and try to cope with and adjust to local opportunities rather than moving away. And in deciding to stay, they are forced to find a strategy to survive in the periphery. Thus, the demographic effect of migration resistance is a slow-down of the population decline, triggering initiatives to survive in the sparsely and declining regions.

Obviously, employment opportunities are scarce in the peripheral areas, but employment in the public sector, for instance – school, care, health – has served as a major alternative. And although the tax base has eroded, governmental subsidies enable local municipalities to employ many people, not least women, in the public sector. Evidently, others will rely at least temporarily on unemployment allowances. But though it is hard to compete with industries in central locations, many make their living through self-employment and entrepreneurship. And indeed, the informal economy provides many additional income sources. Picking, fishing, hunting, cultivating, building and mutual assistance are all important features of the peripheral rural economy. Thus, I would insist to argue that population dynamics are in fact not always the consequence of changing employment opportunities, but in many cases a determinant shaping the local economy.

From exit and voices to silent resistance
Using the classical concepts – exit, voice, loyalty – developed by HIRSCHMANN (1970), one could argue that, in the 1960s when the exodus from the northern periphery started, two strategies seemed to dominate there: the exit strategy when young singles and families moved to the job opportunities in the North, and the voice strategy when people through political mobilization tried to counter the outmigration wave and urged for public investment in and support for the peripheral regions (ERIKSSON 2008). Though outmigration continues to be salient a feature of the northern peripheries and voices expressing desire for economic support and compensation are still heard, it seems that place loyalty or silent resistance would be a better way to characterize the contemporary reaction to problems facing the northern peripheries. Though the possibilities to find employment and have a career are more limited in the sparse and remote regions, the cost of relocation is certainly too high for many. However, these people search for ways to stay put, to struggle on in the periphery and to be loyal to their home place; a strategy that may have the unintended consequence of trapping them in a region with limited future prospects.

Moving to jobs?
A common theme in the literature on regional development is the importance of labour market conditions for migration flows. And though labour markets and regional income differential are usually regarded as major drivers of migration, their role as the major determinant in today’s post-industrial society has also been contested: Are people perhaps freer to choose their place of residence on grounds other than jobs? In a survey containing 2,800 answers from movers and stayers in Sweden (LUNDHOLM et al. 2000), only about 16 % of the migrants mentioned employment and labour market as a migration motive, even when they had the option to mention several alternatives. But a somewhat higher percentage of job motives was found among migrants in peripheral areas. However, the rather low level of labour market-related migration was further confirmed by an investigation also carried out in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Iceland), based on huge survey including over 9 600 respondents. And in fact, results similar to the Swedish case were found. In the other Nordic countries as well, the migrants tended to state motives other than labour...
In recent years, Finland, with as high as 27% mentioning the labour market as a migration motive, has seen an increase in migration. These results should be contrasted to those from a survey among Swedish migrants in the 50s and 60s, in which between 70% and 40% mentioned the labour market as the major migration motive (ANDERSSON 1987). The results thus far indicate that the labour market is a rather rare motive for migration, and also that its influence has decreased over time.

Investigations also confirm these results, and in a study of Swedish register data, LUNDHOLM (2007) found that the number of moves related to changing employment had decreased over time. Those who are outside the labour market are increasingly mobile, while those on the labour market are less likely to move. This change is of course strongly related to the increasing migration of young people who are not yet settled on the labour market, and also to the decreasing mobility of two-earner households. It is the result of changing household structures and the new patterns of the life course, whereby settling – getting a house, family and job – is postponed by the new generation (ibid). This new life-course pattern may influence the possibilities for the remote regions to keep their young inhabitants, since the young adults are having longer periods of unsettled life, while the regions’ chances to keep the middle-aged, who are already settled, will improve. From a short-term perspective this may be good for the peripheries, but in the long run it may contribute to a quicker drop in population.

On the other hand, if migration tends to be influenced more by factors other than income and employment opportunities, for instance by housing, environmental and social conditions, this could be an opportunity for the more peripheral areas in Sweden and other parts of Europe. Peripheral and sparsely populated regions may attract more migrants and prevent local residents from moving out; this could in turn have a positive effect on the human capital formation and thus on the economic performance of the regions. Thus, the changing characteristics of migration observed in the Nordic countries may be one factor counteracting the forces of economic and demographic concentration. However, the extreme peripheries could still experience great difficulty competing in the race to attract more people, at least in the Swedish case. In areas close to the big cities, one can also find rather untouched natural environments. So, the more centrally located peripheries could be more attractive than the more remote areas. Here people can combine the local rural environment while still having the access to services and the labour market that is typical of metropolitan regions (HJORT and MALMBERG 2006). And of course the labour market will influence where people live, even if jobs are not always the trigger of migration. So, despite the influence from non-labour market factors, people tend to end up and stay in metropolitan areas due to the more dynamic labour markets.

Not only internal migration!

Apparently, the changing migration patterns are crucial to the future population and socio-economic development in remote areas, but while the debate has focused on internal migration it is also important to turn to the next question raised at the beginning of this article: To what extent does internal migration shape population redistribution?

Though the focus in the regional debate has been on internal migration, the regional patterns of natural population change and the regional distribution of international migration are also key factors shaping the current regional population patterns. And as can be seen in Figure 7, the relative influence of internal migration on the regional population distribution in the country has decreased over time, as compared to natural population change and international migration. One reason for this is decreasing gross and net migration.

Moreover, the strong impact of natural population change is largely the effect of previous age-specific migration rates. Peripheral areas have fewer young men and women as a consequence of previous high outmigration rates, while the mirror image of this pattern is found in metropolitan areas. So although the age-specific fertility rates are not higher in urban areas, fewer children are born in the peripheries. And due to trends of population ageing, crude mortality rates are also higher in the remote regions. Hence, the peripheral areas still suffer from the urbanization era of the 1960 and 1970s and the age distribution of migration effects on the regional age distributions. Consequently, population decline will probably continue even if migration flows are dramatically redirected.

**Fig. 7: The relative impact on the number of residents in municipalities of internal migration, international migration and natural population change 1970-2007**

1,000 persons (three years running averages)

Source: Elaborated from Statistics Sweden data; Statistics Sweden 2009
Concerning international migration, the debate has focused mainly on its impact on a national level. But international migration is increasingly important for the geographical distribution of population. And since immigrants tend to cluster in metropolitan areas and few end up in the peripheries, international migration thus mainly takes place to the population concentration as and this effect has in relative terms increased over time. Furthermore, the impact of international migration on the regional distribution of population in Sweden was actually larger than the effect of internal migration, although the focus in the debate has been on the latter. Important questions for the peripheries are, apart from the initial distribution of immigrants, the secondary migration of immigrants.

One further demographic process to bear in mind is the international retirement migration, a huge phenomenon in many attractive and mainly sunny places in Europe and a major contribution to the population growth in some rather peripheral areas. But what are the possibilities for the less attractive and colder peripheries? Recently, several sparsely populated municipalities in northern Sweden have experienced increased immigration from countries in Central and Western Europe. Germans and not least Dutch immigrants, escaping the crowded environments of their home countries, have moved for environmental and housing motives, and have often created their own forms of livelihood. Hence, the preconditions for attracting international migrants may become a major factor countering the population decline in the peripheral area, although the effect still seems to be rather limited. But the role of international migration, both permanent and temporary, is a potentially important factor for the population development even in the peripheral areas of northern Sweden.

Can the population potential grow when the population declines?

Since the days of MARSHALL (1890), regional development researchers have emphasized the importance of the size of the local population for economies of scale, division of labour and possibilities for specialization. So, if we assume that scale economies and urbanization economies are major determinants of economic growth, the presence of a large human capital stock within daily reach of any local place is of great importance for the regional economic performance. This leads us to the last of the four initially raised questions: To what extent is local human capital formation influenced by population redistribution?

Obviously, the changing size of the local population potential is the result of three major forces: population growth, urbanization and increasing daily mobility. In a study of the long-term trends in Sweden, HAKANSSON (2000) found that on average the local population has increased almost 100 times since the early 1800s and that the growth of the local population potential in Sweden was mainly the outcome of population growth up to the 1870s. According to the same findings (HAKANSSON 2000), population concentration through urbanization was the major force increasing the local population potential from the 1870s and during the ensuing century. It enabled the local socio-economic specialization, and increased the local labour supply, taxation base and demand for local services. Moreover, with the diffusion of the motor car in the 1960s, it became possible for people not only to settle in the new suburban areas but also to extend their daily reach. Since then, the extension of the local population potential through increased daily mobility has been much more important than population redistribution. So while the focus is often on the population changes in defined and delimited regions, changes in people’s daily mobility are currently more important for the formation of the local human capital stock for the size of the population potential. But while daily commuting and travelling are increasingly important for extending the local human capital stock, they have more limited prospects in the remote peripheries. Travelling greater distances is not a very successful strategy for people living in a municipality like Jokkmokk in the northern periphery of Sweden, where you can travel twenty kilometres and hardly see a house.

One question is how long daily mobility will be a viable strategy for the further extension of functional regions. What is the next alternative? Virtual mobility? Or other forms of temporary mobility? What might the role of temporary mobility be in peripheral regions? Daily commuting is still increasing, but it is less feasible as a strategy in the peripheral areas, especially if we want to reduce the use of cars.

Multi-locality and the “Second Population”

There is a kind of mobility paradox in contemporary society. On one hand, people are more mobile and have contacts with more places, but on the other hand ties to place of residence are still very strong. Hence, different forms of temporary mobility might be increasingly important for people in solving the puzzle of being mobile while maintaining ties and place-specific human capital. Nonetheless, population research has the uni-local settlement pattern as a point of departure. Population is often analyzed as if people reside only in one place, while in fact the multi-local residence is also a salient and perhaps increasingly important feature of contemporary society. Many people actually live or stay for longer or shorter periods in several places. They may be commuters, frequent visitors, occasional workers, second-home owners, tourists or temporary returnees. We may even claim that any place has what could be called a second population: people who are visible in the landscape but not in the population statistics. This is a population of potentially equal importance for the peripheral areas as the permanent residents are. And although their impact within the local community may currently be rather limited, the second population may be a force countering the trends of regional concentration.

Daily commuters are of course the most visible and probably the most numerous part of the second population, but this is more the case in the metropolitan areas than in the regions of dispersed settlements. Other important groups in the peripheral areas may be the second-home owners who come for the summer holidays or the weekend, and although their demand for local services and their impact on the tax base and local labour market are rather limited, their importance for the local economy and society may increase if other more flexible time-space strategies emerge. Other frequent visitors may be out-migrated people from the area who return to relatives or friends and maintain their ties to the place and to the people there – these people are temporary consumers and potential returners, and occasional advocates of the interests of the local community. And to these groups we can also add tourists, who often are not only temporary visitors but also frequent returners, for whom the
visit to the periphery is multipurpose. In the future these “populations” could be equally important for the future of the peripheral areas as the permanent population is. And the second population could be yet another factor mitigating the emptying of the peripheral regions.

Concluding discussion
Population ageing, concentration and decline are three threats to the European peripheries. The sharpening regional competition for human capital, the clustering of economic activities and the demographic processes may result in vicious circles of economic decline and population collapse. And in fact, most peripheries have long experienced population decrease and ageing, tendencies that may hit even the densest part of Europe in the foreseeable future. For once, the peripheries have been the demographic forerunner. But despite the strong trends towards decline and outmigration, even the most remote regions are not yet empty. Obviously, there are forces counteracting the trends of concentration and vicious circles. One important explanation to the relative stability in population trend may be the regional policy and many have contested the long-term sustainability of a strategy based on regional subsidies to maintain population in the remote North. Being part of the EU, the problems of the Swedish periphery may not very urgent in comparison to the situation found in economically weaker regions in eastern and southern Europe and the finance of the regional subsidies may be threatened. But in recent years the regional policies has changed and now the focus is more on the contribution of all regions to the national economic growth. Nevertheless, the population trends in the northern peripheries are rather stable and it is argued in the article that this relative stability can only be understood if the current population trends are thoroughly scrutinised. Population dynamics is in itself a factor shaping the regional development.

The point of departure for this paper has been some previous research on regional population dynamics in Sweden and the scrutiny of some factors that partly counteract the strong trends of population concentration, even in the most extreme peripheries of Europe. One is the obvious impact of place attachment and immobility, since large groups have invested in a place-specific human capital and resist the concentration tendencies through immobility. Although the net migration flows go out of the peripheries, the sedentary structure mitigates the process of rapid exodus. Some contemporary research also indicates that social and environmental migration motives have become more common, which may be beneficial to the peripheral regions, though in the regional competition central peripheries may win over the more remote ones. But in contrast, a lack of employment and educational opportunities is still pushing the youth out of the peripheries.

Moreover, one could say that migration is not increasing in general, despite the notion of our time as the age of migration. According to previous research, we see tendencies of increasing immobility in some groups and of increasing migration in others. And referring to figures on the population dynamics, internal migration turns out to be less important for population redistribution, while age structure and international migration have become more decisive. Most important for the size of the functional regions and the potential for labour market differentiation, however, is the increasing importance of temporary mobility. If the multi-local structure becomes a more apparent feature of our future society, not only daily commuters but also other temporary movers such as visitors, temporary returnees, occasional workers, second-home owners, and tourists – what we here call the second population – are crucial to the local economy and population development. Yet, this effect is still quite marginal.

In the introduction, the two questions were raised: Will we soon experience an end to this long history of population decline? Will the remote peripheries become an empty land in the foreseeable future? Based on the experience from previous research, I would argue that the answer to both these questions is: No!

Even when we try to look at the peripheral North from an optimistic perspective, the most likely outcome is that the tendencies of population decline will continue. The major difference is that an increasing part of the more centrally located regions of Europe will also experience similar scenarios. Still, there are a number of forces counteracting the population decline, so I dare to guess that the peripheral North will not become an empty land in the foreseeable future. Though the tendencies of population concentration are counteracted by various population trends, these are doubtless too marginal to neutralize the effects of concentration; still, they do help to prevent a rapid decline. To conclude, the most probable scenario for the northern periphery and many other peripheries in Europe is neither an empty land nor a population growth, but rather a continued stable decline.

References
GARVILL, J., G. MALMBERG and K. WESTIN (2000): Värdet av att stanna och att flytta – om platsanknytning, livsvärden och flyttningsbeslut. Rap-
Résumés

BENTLAGE, MICHAEL et RAUH, JÜRGEN
« Anciens » et « nouveaux » médias en Allemagne: Marché de l'offre, utilisations et applications dans une perspective spatiale

Depuis longtemps déjà, les médias retiennent l'attention des chercheurs en sociologie et spécialistes de la communication, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la diversité des utilisations et des applications. Dans le présent article, les auteurs se sont efforcés de dégager l'utilisation et les applications des médias dans une perspective spatiale. A cette fin, ils utilisent la base de données allemande Media-Analyse qui donne accès à une information détaillée sur les applications d'Internet, de la radio, de la télévision et de la presse quotidienne, à côté de nombreux éléments d'information sociodémographiques.

L'accès aux nouveaux médias (en particulier Internet) reste marqué par une disparité très nette entre les régions urbaines et rurales, encore que l'on puisse constater une certaine évolution vers l'égalisation entre la ville et la campagne pendant les dernières années. La principale conclusion qui se dégage de cette étude est que de nouvelles lignes de séparation se font jour quant aux modalités et à l'environnement général des applications des médias. Par exemple, les régions rurales se caractérisent par un taux relativement élevé d'abonnements aux quotidiens, ce qui s'explique en partie par une certaine pénurie au niveau de l'offre des médias. Concernant l'intérêt pour les informations locales, on constate que les populations des régions rurales manifestent une grande curiosité qui est beaucoup plus affirmée que dans les villes.

Allemagne, utilisation des médias, Internet, presse quotidienne, typification spatiale

ANGELA HOF et THOMAS SCHMITT
Consommation d'espace par le tourisme de luxe à Majorque– analyse et évaluation selon les objectifs de Calvià Agenda Local 21

La municipalité de Calvià accueille environ 17 % de tous les touristes en Majorque tous les ans et en 1999 elle a élabore un Agenda 21 Local ayant pour but un développement municipal

...