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# **Republicanism with the Position of Superpresident Differentiation of Presidential and Semi- Presidential Systems of Government with Superpresidents**

VITALIY S. LYTVYN

## *Introduction*

Today, in Political Science, there are two major methodological approaches of understanding political (or constitutional) systems of government, i.e. dichotomous and trichotomous approaches. The *dichotomous approach* takes into consideration such two classical systems of republican and monarchical forms of government as presidentialism and parliamentarism. According to the *trichotomous approach*, the scientific analysis is supplemented with such a republican system of government as semi-presidentialism<sup>1</sup>. Considering this, we must understand that Political Science tends to use the term “system of government”, not the term “form of government”. Such clarification is quite relevant because the form of government can be estimated and based on a method of formation or replacement of the head of state (without taking into account the responsibilities of the head of state). Instead, the system of government is based on formal (constitutional) or actual (political) prerequisites of interinstitutional relations concerning state power (without considering powers of the head of state). *Forms of government* are distinguished as republic, monarchy and combination or variation of republic and monarchy, because the head of state can be elected or obtain his/her seat, according to the hereditary principle. On the contrary, among different *systems of government* it is required to distinguish presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary types, which are different from monarchical and republican forms of government. It is clear that presidential and semi-presidential systems of government (presidentialism and semi-presidentialism) are the examples of the republican form of government, and parliamentary system of government is a type of republican or monarchical forms of government.

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<sup>1</sup> Very often in relation to the category of “semi-presidentialism”, the concept/definition of “mixed republicanism” is used. We believe it is a methodological misunderstanding because mixing can be possible only within classical presidentialism and classical parliamentarism without taking into account semi-presidentialism.

We can discover this particular (dichotomous or trichotomous) methodological structuring of forms and systems of government in the scientific reflections of Verney<sup>2</sup>, von Beyme<sup>3</sup>, Steffani<sup>4</sup>, Duverger<sup>5</sup>, Riggs<sup>6</sup>, Shugart and Carey<sup>7</sup>, Stepan and Skach<sup>8</sup>, Linz<sup>9</sup>, Sartori<sup>10</sup>, Mainwaring and Shugart<sup>11</sup>, Lijphart<sup>12</sup>, Siaroff<sup>13</sup>, Daly<sup>14</sup>, Strøm<sup>15</sup>, Elgie<sup>16</sup> and others. However, being the supporters of the trichotomous logical model and approach, we follow Elgie's definitions of constitutional systems within republican form of government, but with some our personal changes and clarifications<sup>17</sup>. This means that we take the

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- <sup>2</sup> Douglas Verney, *The Analysis of Political Systems*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1959; *Idem*, *The Analysis of Political Systems*, Routledge, London, 2013.
- <sup>3</sup> Klaus von Beyme, *Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa*, Piper, Munich, 1970.
- <sup>4</sup> Winfried Steffani, *Parlamentarische und präsidiale Demokratie*, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979.
- <sup>5</sup> Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government", *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp. 165-187.
- <sup>6</sup> Fred Riggs, "The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional Practices", *International Political Science Review*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1988, pp. 247-278.
- <sup>7</sup> Matthew Shugart, John Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
- <sup>8</sup> Alfred Stepan, Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism", *World Politics*, vol. 46, no. 1, 1993, pp. 1-22.
- <sup>9</sup> Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference", in Arturo Valenzuela, Juan Linz (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 3-87.
- <sup>10</sup> Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*, Houndmills, 1997.
- <sup>11</sup> Scott Mainwaring, Matthew Shugart, *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- <sup>12</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Yale University Press, 1999; *Idem*, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2004, pp. 96-109.
- <sup>13</sup> Alan Siaroff, "Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction", *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2003, pp. 287-312; *Idem*, "Varieties of Parliamentarism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies", *International Political Science Review*, vol. 24, no. 4, 2003, pp. 445-464.
- <sup>14</sup> Siobhan Daly, "The Ladder of Abstraction: A Framework for the Systematic Classification of Democratic Regime Types", *Politics*, vol. 23, no. 2, 2003, pp. 96-108.
- <sup>15</sup> Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller, Torbjörn Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
- <sup>16</sup> Robert Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; *Idem*, "The Classification of Democratic Regime Type: Conceptual Ambiguity and Contestable Assumptions", *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1998, pp. 219-238; *Idem*, "From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?", *Democratization*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 106-122; *Idem*, "Variations on a Theme: A Fresh Look at Semi-Presidentialism", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 3, 2005, pp. 1-21.
- <sup>17</sup> Vitaliy Lytvyn, "Do problemy rozriznennya napivprezidentalizmu ta parlamentaryzmu: napivprezident-s'ki systemy z nominal'nymy prezidentamy u Tsentral'niy Yevropi (na

definitions of constitutional systems proposed by Elgie as a basis, but slightly expand and refine them. As a result, we get three definitions of constitutional systems:

*Presidentialism* is a constitutional system of republican form of government, which inherits the position of a popularly (directly or indirectly) elected for a fixed term president (head of state) and cabinet or administration of a president (possibly even of a prime minister). The members of the cabinet or presidential administration are collectively responsible only to the president. Simultaneously members of the cabinet or presidential administration can be also individually responsible (reporting or responsible for) to the Parliament or to the leading house of Parliament, but it has no definitive meaning.

*Parliamentarism* is a constitutional system of republican form of government, where the president obtains the position after indirect elections (for example, in Parliament). The prime minister and the cabinet are collectively responsible only to the Parliament. The members of the cabinet, except the prime minister, may also be individually responsible to the president and Parliament or the leading house of Parliament, but it has no definitive meaning.

*Semi-presidentialism* is a constitutional system of republican form of government, which preserves the position of a popularly (directly or indirectly) elected for a fixed term president (head of state). The prime minister and the cabinet are obligatorily and collectively responsible to the Parliament. Simultaneously the prime minister and the cabinet can be collectively responsible to the Parliament and to the president. Moreover, members of the cabinet can be individually responsible to the Parliament and/or to the president, but it has no definitive meaning.

The above-proposed definitions of presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism are initially proposed by Elgie<sup>18</sup>, but somewhat clarified and expanded. It is interesting that Elgie's approach does not include formal and/or actual powers of presidents<sup>19</sup>. This, for example, is different from the idea of Duverger, under which semi-presidentialism should be characterized with "president's quite considerable powers"<sup>20</sup>. Similarly, a presidential republic

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przykładi Bolhariyi, Slovachchyny, Sloveniyyi ta Chekhiyyi)", in Zbigniew Bialoblockiy, Anatoliy Romanyuk (eds.), *Rozwój polityczny i społeczny państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Kutno, 2013, pp. 149-171.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Elgie, "The Classification of Democratic Regime Type:...cit."; *Idem*, *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; *Idem*, "Variations on a Theme:...cit."

<sup>19</sup> It is an advantage of the approach to the classification of constitutional systems, which are based on the statement that it is not necessary to reference on relational peculiarities of political process. In such way, there is implemented a mechanism of avoiding subjectivity in classification. See detailed: Robert Elgie, "The Classification of Democratic Regime Type:...cit."; Vitaliy Lytvyn, "Podviyna Vykonavcha Vlada: Teoriya ta Praktyka Yevropeys'koho Pivprezydentalizmu", *Osvita Rehionu: Politolohiya, Psyholohiya, Komunikaciyyi*, vol. 3, 2009, pp. 25-33.

<sup>20</sup> Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government",

should be drawn with a post of very strong president and a parliamentary republic with a post of very weak president. However, the real point is that presidential powers can vary depending not only on the constitutional but also on political, historical or psychological conditions. For example, presidential powers depend on the results of presidential and parliamentary elections, historical peculiarities of presidential responsibilities, the socioeconomic characteristics of the country, personal qualities of the president etc. As a result, the variation of presidential powers, which can be measured, based on both qualitative and quantitative indicators/markers, may affect actual positioning of certain constitutional systems of government.

As a result, presidentialisation or parliamentarisation (i.e. personalisation) of different (presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential) constitutional systems of government are possible. Some countries, while remaining constitutionally unchanged, may operate in practice, as evidenced by results of qualitative and quantitative comparison of actual presidential powers in different cases, as more presidential systems (such as Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, etc.), more parliamentary systems (such as Slovenia, Ireland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, etc.) or balanced systems (such as Poland, Lithuania, Romania, etc.). Therefore, it is clear that different constitutional systems of government can be divergent in concern of formal/actual presidential powers. Hereupon, presidentialism, parliamentarism and especially semi-presidentialism can have the position of a very weak (ceremonial or nominal), weak, intermediate (balanced), strong or very strong (powerful or super) president. For example, among semi-presidential systems of government (semi-presidentialism as defined by Elgie<sup>21</sup>) as of 2015, nominal presidents were in Ireland, Slovenia, etc., weak presidents were in Finland, Montenegro, etc., intermediate/balanced presidents were in Romania, Lithuania, Portugal, etc., strong presidents were in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, etc., and superpresidents were in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan etc.

However, even such theoretical and methodological differentiation of presidential powers in different constitutional systems of government quite widely shows that the understanding of political systems in political and academic discourse is vague and brings different requirements for separation semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism and presidentialism. The misunderstanding is usually caused by the literal transfer of positions of very weak presidents (without taking into account the type of presidential elections) into parliamentary systems of government or positions of very strong presidents (also without taking into account the type of presidential elections) into presidential systems of government. At the same time, formal assessments of presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential systems of

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*European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp. 165-187.

<sup>21</sup> Robert Elgie, "The Classification of Democratic Regime Type:...cit.".

government often remain out of site. Therefore, it is clear that the key analytical point of extrapolation should match the formal and actual powers of such institutions as president, prime minister (cabinet in general) and Parliament. This creates the possibility of comparative analysis of different constitutional systems of government based on the consideration of different political actors' powers. In our study, it generates the demand of comparative analysis of the republics with the positions of superpresident, which, as noted above, can be theoretically peculiar to different constitutional systems of government, but above all for presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Accordingly, our research is devoted to outlining the phenomenon and varieties of *republics with superpresidents*. The study is methodologically based on the related categories of *constitutional system of government* (especially in Elgie's reasoning with some our clarifications and explanations) and *powers of presidents* (using different indicators and markers, which had been previously singled out by different scientists). The study is comparatively and descriptively oriented and had been enforced within neo-institutional methodology.

### *Superpresidents and Republics with Superpresidents: The State of Literature*

While shifting specified feature to republican constitutional systems of government, we understand that in some of them there is, for example, a significant correlation of popularly elected presidents' powers. The problem goes deeper when powers of popularly elected presidents are *very significant*. Therefore, when republican systems of government have very powerful presidents, they are sometimes called "*republics with superpresidents*". Some scholars connect such republican systems of government only with presidential systems and others scholars with both presidential and semi-presidential systems. In dichotomous approaches of understanding political (constitutional) systems of government, the highlighted systems appear to be the cases of presidentialism. Instead, the taxonomy of the position of superpresident in trichotomous classifications of modern republicanism remains unresolved. The fact is that some scientists distinguish such republican systems of government as superpresidentialism (or superpresidential presidentialism) and others as super semi-presidentialism (or superpresidential semi-presidentialism). The synthesising attributes of specified taxonomies are very considerable powers of presidents, which, according to Holmes<sup>22</sup>, Ishiyama, Kennedy<sup>23</sup> and Fish<sup>24</sup>, are the reason for classification the following systems of

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<sup>22</sup> Stephen Holmes, "Superpresidentialism and Its Problems", *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1993, pp. 123-126.

<sup>23</sup> John T. Ishiyama, Ryan Kennedy, "Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development

government as “*republics with superpresidents*”.

Largely, the problem of republican systems of government with superpresidents (albeit in the context of appeals mostly to the phenomenon of superpresidentialism) was reflected in the researches of Western European, Eastern European and Latin American scientists. On their basis, Fish<sup>25</sup> singled out the main characteristics of republics with superpresidents: a strong executive headed by a president; an accountability of public expenditures and judiciary to a president; presidential right to issue decrees exercising the force of law; a cancelation or complexity of a president’s impeachment; absence of accountability of presidents and executives to legislatures. At the same time, Linz<sup>26</sup>, Clark and Wittrock<sup>27</sup> argued that legislative branch of government in some republics with superpresidents is formally enshrined together and simultaneously in Parliaments and cabinets, but the last one actually are governed by presidents. Therefore, Protsyk<sup>28</sup>, Morgan-Jones and Schleiter<sup>29</sup> are right indicating that superpresidents’ powers are more effective when they combine other institutional components and tools.

However, according to an empirical analysis of the republics with superpresidents made by Sakharov<sup>30</sup> and Zaznaev<sup>31</sup>, it is clear that “superpresidentialism” is not a kind of form of government but rather a synthetic format of republican system of government. The fact is that superpresidentialism as a format of system of government, which is characterised by the position of an all-powerful president, can easily be attributed to a republican form of government, but it is very difficultly attributed to any “pure” or classical system of government. That is why Colton and Skach noted that constructions of republican systems of government, characterised by

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in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 53, no. 8, 2001, pp. 1177-1191.

<sup>24</sup> Steven M. Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics”, in Valerie Sperling (ed.), *Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance*, Westview Press, Boulder, 2000, pp. 178-179.

<sup>26</sup> Juan Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:...cit.”, p. 63.

<sup>27</sup> Terry D. Clark, Jill N. Wittrock, “Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Post-Communist Systems”, *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 38, no. 2, 2005, p. 176.

<sup>28</sup> Oleg Protsyk, “Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in Russia and Ukraine”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 56, no. 5, 2004, pp. 637-660.

<sup>29</sup> Edward Morgan-Jones, Petra Schleiter, “Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003”, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2004, pp. 123-163.

<sup>30</sup> Nikolai A. Sakharov, *Institut Prezidentstva v Sovremennom Mire*, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, Moskva, 1994, p. 3.

<sup>31</sup> Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikatsiya Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, in Midhat Farukshin (ed.), *Dinamika Politicheskikh Sistem i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy: Vyp. 1*, Kazanckiy gosudarstvennyj universitet im. V. I. Ul’janova-Lenina, Kazan’, 2006, pp. 186-210.

the positions of superpresidents, are diverse in different states. Accordingly, all republics with positions of superpresidents can be subdivided into presidential and semi-presidential constitutional formats<sup>32</sup>. For example, Colton and Skach proposed to consider Russia<sup>33</sup>, especially after 2000<sup>34</sup>, as the illustration of semi-presidential republic with the position superpresident. Holmes<sup>35</sup>, Fish<sup>36</sup>, Chaisty<sup>37</sup>, Parrish<sup>38</sup>, Protsyk<sup>39</sup>, Shevtsova<sup>40</sup> Kliamkin<sup>41</sup>, Remington, Smith and Haspel<sup>42</sup> made similar conclusions about the superpresidential character of Russian semi-presidentialism (mostly for the period before 2000, often without the use of the term “superpresidentialism”).

Fish<sup>43</sup>, Ishiyama and Kennedy<sup>44</sup> expanded the problem and structure field of republics with superpresidents, applied the outlined concept for Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in the late 90s of the twentieth century and linked superpresidentialism with the features of political party development’s slowdown. The Latin American republics with superpresidents (in the second half

<sup>32</sup> Timothy J. Colton, Cindy Skach, *Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?*, III General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, 2004.

<sup>33</sup> *Idem*, “Superpresidentialism and Russia’s Backward State”, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1995, pp. 144-149.

<sup>34</sup> Timothy J. Colton, “The Russian Predicament”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 3, 2005, p. 120.

<sup>35</sup> Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism...cit.”.

<sup>36</sup> Steven M. Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution*, Princeton University Press, 1995; *Idem*, “The Perils of Russian Superpresidentialism”, *Current History*, vol. 96, 1997, pp. 326-330; *Idem*, “When More Is Less: Superexecutive Power and Political Underdevelopment in Russia”, in Victoria E. Bonnell, George W. Breslauer (eds.), *Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?*, Westview Press, Boulder, 2001, pp. 15-34; Steven M. FISH, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: ...cit.*

<sup>37</sup> Paul Chaisty, “The Legislative Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia”, *Government and Opposition*, vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, pp. 424-453.

<sup>38</sup> Scott Parrish, “Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-1995”, in John M. Carey, Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), *Executive Decree Authority*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 62-103.

<sup>39</sup> Oleg Protsyk, “Ruling with Decrees:...cit.”.

<sup>40</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, “The Problem of Executive Power in Russia”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2000, pp. 32-39; *Idem*, *Putin’s Russia*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Igor Kliamkin, “Rossiyskaya Vlast’ na Rubezhe Tysyacheletiy”, *Pro et Contra*, vol. 4, no. 2., 2001, pp. 63-87; Igor Kliamkin, Lilia Shevtsova, *Rezhim Borisa Vtorogo. Osobennosti postkommunisticheskoy vlasti v Rossiye*, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 1999.

<sup>42</sup> Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith, Moshe Haspel, “Decrees, Laws and Inter-Branch Relations in the Russian Federation”, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 14, no. 4, 1998, pp. 287-322.

<sup>43</sup> Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception:...cit.”, pp. 177-192.

<sup>44</sup> John T. Ishiyama, Ryan Kennedy, “Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development...cit.”.



of the twentieth century) were outlined in the refinements of Linz<sup>45</sup> and Orlov<sup>46</sup>. In particular, Orlov based on empirical evidence defined superpresidentialism as actually independent, uncontrolled by executive, legislative and judicial branches system of government, with dominant hypertrophied presidential powers. For weak legislative and parliamentary bodies and underdeveloped party democracy there is no institutional force that could balance the influence of the president, who actually becomes the centre of political life and transforms not only into the head of the executive, but of the nation overall. However, most Latin American constitutional systems of are still presidential. Consequently, it is clear that superpresidentialism in Latin America initially emerged as tangent to constitutional presidentialism. Heads of state in these republics are mostly chosen by election results, but between presidential elections, according to Beliaev<sup>47</sup> and Kubicek<sup>48</sup>, they are institutionally defined as unlimited political actors.

Based on the existing *acquis* concerning republics with superpresidents around the world, the scientists argued that different cases could be characterized by different degree of superpresidentialism, obtained on different methods and tools of measuring presidential powers. In Political Science, there are several well-known tools for comparative analysis of presidential powers<sup>49</sup>. These tools differently assess

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<sup>45</sup> Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:...cit.", pp. 3-87.

<sup>46</sup> Anatoliy Orlov, *Prezidentskie Respubliki v Latinskoy Amerike*, Jurist, Moskva, 1995; *Idem*, *Vysshie Organy Gosudarstvennoy Vlasti Stran Latinskoy Ameriki*, Ankil, Moskva, 2001.

<sup>47</sup> Mikhail V. Beliaev, "Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist Democracies", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, pp. 375-398.

<sup>48</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4, 1994, pp. 423-441.

<sup>49</sup> See detailed some of them (in chronological order of their publication): Matthew S. Shugart, John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 148-158; Christian Lucky, "Table of Presidential Powers in Eastern Europe", *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1993-1994, pp. 81-94; James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe", *RFR/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, pp. 23-31; Joel Hellman, "Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transitions", *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1996, pp. 46-56; Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 30, no. 5, 1997, pp. 523-552; *Idem*, *Changes in Post-Communist Presidential Power: A Political Economy Explanation*, University of Notre Dame, 1999; Steven Roper, "Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 34, no. 3, 2002, pp. 253-272; André Krouwel, "Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries", *Acta Politica*, vol. 38, no. 4, 2003, pp. 333-364; Alan Siaroff, "Comparative Presidencies: the Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction", *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2003, pp. 287-312; Andrei Kounov, Eugene Mazo, *Reexamining Presidential Power in the Post-Soviet States*, Stanford University, Stanford, 2004; Eugene Mazo, *Duverger's Dilemma: Debating the Uniqueness of Semi-Presidential Constitutions in Eastern Europe*, Social Science Research Council: Dissertation Development Workshop on Governance in Eurasia, Austin: University of Texas, 4-7 March 2004; Elgun A. Taghiyev,

the strength of presidents in modern republics, so that we can draw conclusions about the relationship between presidential powers in different constitutional systems.

A large number of scientific works is dedicated to connection between republics with superpresidents and democratic or undemocratic regimes. Karmazina<sup>50</sup>, D. Derbyshire and I. Derbyshire<sup>51</sup> unilaterally put republics with superpresidents in line with phenomena of dictatorship and tyranny in different variations of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Those systems are characterised by positions of unlimited presidents. Thus, according to Zaznaev<sup>52</sup>, Vanden and Prevost<sup>53</sup>, the important point is that the strong (unlimited) powers of presidents are not only fixed in constitutions, but also are implemented into practice. In return, Fish<sup>54</sup> argued that republics with superpresidents are usually undemocratic or partially democratic. Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power<sup>55</sup> made a similar conclusion and noted that nondictatorial republics with superpresidents actually operate according to the logic of hybrid forms of government. In addition, the scholars argued that superpresidentialism is also interpreted as the formal manifestation of a system of neopatrimonialism, which empowers presidents in other ways. Patronal presidentialism combines great formal power with informal power and resources derived from the networks of patron-client relations that span the state and economy<sup>56</sup>. Therefore, the phenomenon of patrimonial president often equate the

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“Measuring Presidential Power in Post-Soviet Countries”, *CEU Political Science Journal*, vol. 3, 2006, pp. 11-21; Klaus Armingeon, Romana Careja, *Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2007*, Institute of Political Science, Bern, 2007; Braulio Gómez Fortes, Pedro Magalhaes, *Presidential Elections in Semi-Presidential Systems: Presidential Powers, Electoral Turnout and the Performance of Government-Endorsed Candidates*, Digital CSIC, Lisbon, 2008; Jessica Fortin, “Measuring Presidential Powers: Revisiting Existing Aggregate Measurement”, *International Political Science Review*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2013, pp. 91-112; David Doyle, Robert Elgie, *Maximising the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power*, International Political Science Association biennial conference, Montreal: International Political Science Association, 20-24 July 2014; Robert Elgie, Cristina Bucur, Bernard Dolez, Annie Laurent, “Proximity, Candidates, and Presidential Power: How Directly Elected Presidents Shape the Legislative Party System”, *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 67, no. 3, 2014, pp. 467-477; Anna Fruhstorfer, *Putting Presidents Power into Place: A Measurement of Constitutional Presidential Strength in Non-Presidential Systems*, ECPR General Conference 2014, Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014.

<sup>50</sup> Maria Karmazina, “Institut Prezidentsva: Pohodzhennya ta Sutnist’ Fenomena”, *Politichniy Menedzhment*, vol. 3, no. 6, 2004, p. 37.

<sup>51</sup> Denis Derbyshire, Ian Derbyshire, *Political Systems of the World*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.

<sup>52</sup> Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikaciya Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, cit.

<sup>53</sup> Harry E. Vanden, Gary Prevost, *Politics of Latin America: The Power Game*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 184.

<sup>54</sup> Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception:...cit.”.

<sup>55</sup> Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power, *Rethinking the “Presidentialism Debate”. Conceptualising Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective*, 22nd IPSA World Congress, Madrid, 2012.

<sup>56</sup> Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet

phenomenon of superpresident, regardless the system of government<sup>57</sup>. This is despite the fact that regular and reasonably or partly free elections usually occur in such systems. On this occasion, Beliaev<sup>58</sup> argued that superpresidential regimes are the most unfavorable environment for democratic consolidation. As a result, Chirkin<sup>59</sup>, Sakharov<sup>60</sup> and Zaznaev<sup>61</sup> divided republican systems (along with presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary constitutional systems) into dictatorial and non-dictatorial. Among dictatorial republics, they identified presidential-monocratic, presidential-military and presidential-partocratic types.

However, according to Alekseenko<sup>62</sup>, the proposed classification does not directly relate to the phenomenon of republics with superpresidents. In general, existing scientific literature only partially overview the problem of superpresidents in republican systems of government. The fact is that scientists have not solved the problem of taxonomy of constitutional systems of government with superpresidents into clear varieties and types. In addition, the phenomenon of superpresident and republics with superpresidents also needs elaboration and clarification. Accordingly, the theoretical and methodological understanding of the phenomenon of republican systems of government with positions of superpresidents and their dichotomy onto formally presidential and semi-presidential systems of government is the main objective of the proposed scientific exploration and the largest gap of existing scientific literature. Therefore, the aim of the study is to ascertain whether it is necessary to distinguish between the proposed formats of republican systems of government with superpresidents as analytically separate occasions (i.e., to separate superpresidential presidentialism and superpresidential semi-presidentialism), or should they be interpreted as a definitive entity (i.e., superpresidentialism).

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Eurasia”, *World Politics*, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005, pp. 133-165; Ildar Gabdrifikov, Henry E. Hale, “Bashkortostan’s Democratic Moment? Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime Change, and Identity in Russia”, in Osamu Ieda, Tomohiko Uyama (eds.), *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, 2006, pp. 75-104; Keith A. Darden, “Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma”, *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2001, pp. 67-71; Oleg Protsyk, “Ruling with Decrees:...cit.”; Paul Chaisty, “The Legislative Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia”, *Government and Opposition*, vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, pp. 424-453; Hans van Zon, “Political Culture and Neopatrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 52, no. 5, 2005, pp. 12-22.

<sup>57</sup> Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power, *Rethinking the “Presidentialism Debate”*...cit.

<sup>58</sup> Mikhail V. Beliaev, “Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist Democracies”, *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, p. 394.

<sup>59</sup> Veniamin E. Chirkin, *Konstitucionnoe Pravo Zarubezhnyh Stran*, Jurist, Moskva, 1997, pp. 145-146; *Idem*, “Netipichnye Formy Pravleniya v Sovremennom Gosudarstve”, *Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, vol. 4, 1994, pp. 109-115.

<sup>60</sup> Nikolai A. Saharov, *Institut Prezidentstva v Sovremennom Mire*, Moskva, 1994, pp. 14-25.

<sup>61</sup> Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikaciyi Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, cit.

<sup>62</sup> Igor Alekseenko, “Superprezidents’ka Respublika yak Paradigma Vzaemodii Politichnih Institutiv”, *Ekonomichnyy Chasopys – XXI: Naukovyy Zhurnal*, vol. 7-8, 2010, pp. 14-17.

*The Notion, Features, Types and Reasons  
for the Installation of Republics with Superpresidents*

Reviewing and processing the abovementioned scientific literature allows us to state that the republic with superpresident (superpresidential republic, superpresidentialism) is a format of any republican system of government, where the president as the head of state (and possibly the chief executive or head of executive branch) formally (legally) and/or actually (politically) controls all branches and levers of government and state power<sup>63</sup>. According to Orlov<sup>64</sup>, superpresidentialism is actually independent, uncontrolled in practice by the executive, legislative and judicial branches system of government, with dominant hypertrophied presidential powers. Considering the ideas of D. Derbyshire and I. Derbyshire<sup>65</sup>, republics with superpresidents are samples of republican systems, which are common for different variants of authoritarianism and totalitarianism, and are characterised by positions of unlimited presidents (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and other countries are the examples of superpresidential republics). Thus, according to Zaznaev<sup>66</sup>, Vanden and Prevost<sup>67</sup>, the important point is that the strong (unlimited) powers of the president are not only fixed in the constitutions, but also are implemented into practice. Moreover, a formally strong president can hold additional excessive powers in practice, which he or she is not obliged to hold under the constitution. In fact, the president performs different functions – he/she is the head of the state, the commander in chief of the armed forces, the chief executive, the party leader and even the spiritual leader. This means that the actual multiple roles of the presidents greatly enhance the already strong formal presidential powers.

Instead, the Parliaments of republican systems of government with superpresidents are entirely or largely advisory bodies of the executive branch of government that impress superpresidential decisions. It means that

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<sup>63</sup> Such categories as “over-presidentialism” or “hyper-presidentialism” are used in Political Science synonymously and closely to the term “superpresidentialism”. See detailed: Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism and Its Problems”, *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1993, pp. 123-126; Juan LINZ, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:...cit.”, pp. 5, 76; Anatoliy Orlov, *Vysshie Organy Gosudarstvennoy Vlasti Stran Latinskoy Ameriki*, Ankil, Moskva, 2001, p. 7.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 9.

<sup>65</sup> Denis Derbyshire, Ian Derbyshire, *Political Systems of the World*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.

<sup>66</sup> Oleg Zaznaev, “Klassifikatsiya Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem”, cit.

<sup>67</sup> Harry E. Vanden, Gary Prevost, *Politics of Latin America: ...cit.*

superpresidents formally/actually are simultaneously heads of state and heads of executive branches of government with extraordinary and extremely extensive powers, which subjugate all (legislative, executive and judicial) branches of government and all levers of power. Superpresidential powers are *hypertrophied*, as they are not subjected to checks and balances of legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. The special feature of the superpresidents is that they are mostly chosen without intermediate bodies or authorities under the result of direct and nation-wide will expression. It is noteworthy that “over-the-topness” of superpresidential powers (hypertrophied superpresidential powers) traditionally are caused both formally (by the texts of laws and constitutions) and actually (by the presidents’ real powers and actions)<sup>68</sup>. However, it happens that the constitutional powers of superpresidents do not correspond or partially correspond to considerably larger superpresidential authority.

The main and defining *features of republican systems of government with positions of superpresidents* are:

1. The president is standing as a senior officer, leader or “father” of the nation (regardless of the form of government in a given country).
2. President’s supremacy in the system of government is absolute.
3. Election of the president for a fixed term usually performed under direct and nation-wide vote (in some autocratic forms of government superpresidents are elected or appointed for life term).
4. Positioning of the president as head of state and head of the executive branch of government (usually the following powers of presidents have constitutional regulation, but sometimes superpresidents formally are only the heads of state and actually perform the roles of chiefs executive).
5. Dominance of the executive (presidential-executive) branch over the other branches of government (firstly, over parliamentary-legislative branch, which is traditionally very weak), resulting in deformation and/or absence of systems of checks and balances among the branches of government<sup>69</sup>.
6. The president possesses unilateral, extraordinary and extremely extensive powers, which can be used in almost all areas of political process (including the president’s powers independently and at own discretion to

<sup>68</sup> Anatoliy Orlov, *Prezidentskie Respubliki v Latinskoy Amerike*, Jurist, Moskva, 1995, pp. 9-11.

<sup>69</sup> In some republics with superpresidents, legislative branch of government is formally enshrined together and simultaneously in Parliaments and cabinets, but the last one formally or actually are governed by the presidents. See detailed: Terry D. Clark, Jill N. Wittrock, “Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Post-Communist Systems”, *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 38, no. 2, 2005, p. 176; John T. Ishiyama, Ryan Kennedy, “Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development...cit.”, p. 1179; Juan Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:...cit.”, p. 63.

- enter or affect the imposition of emergency and/or military situation).
7. The possession by the president of power to dissolve the parliament or leading house of Parliament (independent from the other institutions of government right of the president to decide whether to dissolve the Parliament or controlled by the other institutions of government right of the president to dissolve the Parliament only in pursuant to the preconditions and events)<sup>70</sup>.
  8. The possession by the president of unilateral appointive powers (for example, the president can independently appoint or dismiss judges, lawyers, managers and prosecutors of national and local government bodies).
  9. The president possesses the right for direct or indirect passing regulatory acts, which have legal status or the function of law.
  10. Presidential control over the public media resulted in impossible or limited public criticism of government.
  11. The presidential affiliation to the largest and dominant political party under the conditions of relative weakness of other political parties those are loyal or oppositional to the president<sup>71</sup>.

However, in republican systems of government with superpresidents the role of political parties might be differentiated. *In the first group of countries*, there are formally installed multiparty systems, but superpresidents are leaning against the influence of the dominant parliamentary parties. *In the second group of countries*, there are formally established multiparty systems, but the power and position of the parties in such systems is unstable, minor and adventitious, thus superpresidents are able to manoeuvre between them, actually intensifying their own influence and authority. *In the third group of countries*, formally there are constitutionally established single-party systems or systems with hegemonic parties, thus the “party of power” formally and/or actually merges with very significant public and political powers of superpresidents. *In the fourth group of countries*, the activity of all or mostly all political parties is prohibited completely, and superpresidents mostly come to power after military coups and their rule is

<sup>70</sup> The list of constitutional prerequisites, required in order for the president (in republics with superpresidents) to dissolve the Parliament, is quite interesting. For example, the Belarusian president may dissolve the houses of Parliament because of the Constitutional Court conclusion in the case of systematic and gross violations of the constitution by the houses of Parliament (Article 94 of the Constitution). That is why the adoption on recognition constitutionality of the law in the Constitutional Court may be the cause of premature dissolution of Parliament. Instead, the Russian president may dissolve the State Duma (lower house of Parliament) when it re-expresses a vote of no confidence in the government (which at first was rejected by the president) or rejects a candidate for the prime minister proposed by the president for three times. See detailed: Yana Baris'ka, “Novitni Nadprezidents'ki Respubliki: Teoretiko-Pravovi Aspekti”, *Visnik Akademiyi Pravovih Nauk Ukrayini*, vol. 4, no. 59, 2009, p. 6.

<sup>71</sup> Scott Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave Democracies: The Case of Brazil*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999, pp. 274-275.

based on impact of the military junta. The political systems in republics with superpresidents are determined by the party systems' instability that acts as addition to the state machine, which is supported by the establishment of control over the parties' activity<sup>72</sup>.

For weak legislative and parliamentary bodies and underdeveloped party democracy there is no force that could balance the influence of the president, who actually becomes the centre of political life and transforms not only into the head of the executive branch of government, but of the nation overall<sup>73</sup>. In addition, the systems with superpresidents are narrowing the arenas of government, state and management decisions, which traditionally are taken on party-political arena, to decisions of specially selected technocrats. The process of making technocratic decisions prevents development of democratic principles of competition and participation, and therefore leaves the presidential-executive branch of government of any structural and systematic accountability to the legislature. This in turn clearly shows that regardless of whether there is a formal balance of the constitutional system of government, the political process is actually dominated by the president, whose powers significantly exceed the powers of other government bodies. Obviously, this leads to a government of autocratic/monocratic form, which typically shifts focus to the president on the part of all or most state agencies, where there is no electoral or liberal democracy, and human rights and freedoms are only formal and even of a fictitious character.

Nonetheless, Political Science fractured different interpretations of correlations with superpresidents and forms of government, which they conduct or to which they can lead. Thus, Sakharov<sup>74</sup> notes that republics with superpresidents in the context of forms of governments are to be distinguished between dictatorial and nondictatorial systems. *Dictatorial systems of government with superpresidents* are usually republican systems of government, where superpresidents fully exercise their power because of actual weakening of other branches/institutions of government and civil society. These republican systems of government are largely peculiar to totalitarianism/authoritarianism. Traditionally, superpresidents-dictators are peculiar to presidential-monocratic, presidential-military and presidential-partocratic republics<sup>75</sup>. *Nondictatorial systems of government*

<sup>72</sup> Examples of the first group of countries are Azerbaijan (the Party "New Azerbaijan"), Russia (the Party "United Russia"); the second group is Belarus; the third group is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the fourth group is Chile in times of "pinocracy" (government of Pinochet).

<sup>73</sup> Anatoliy Orlov, *Prezidentskie Respubliki...cit..*

<sup>74</sup> Nikolai A. Sakharov, *Institut Prezidentstva v Sovremennom Mire*, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, Moskva, 1994, pp. 14-25.

<sup>75</sup> Noted types of dictatorial systems with superpresidents, considering the natural dominance of heads of state in the structure of the government, were distinguished by Chirkin and Zaznaev. 1. *Presidential-monocratic republican system* of government is system of government with dictatorial superpresident, where the head of state, sometimes proclaimed

with *superpresidents* are usually republican systems of government, where superpresidents fully exercise their powers from the constitutional regulations and only confirm them actually. These are not necessarily autocratic republics, but they definitely fear threats and risks of a shift from electoral democracy (hybrid government) to authoritarianism.

Taking into account the definition given by O'Donnell<sup>76</sup> and remarks given by Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power<sup>77</sup> it is obvious that nondictatorial republics with positions of superpresidents actually operate according to the logic of hybrid forms of government or so-called "defective or delegative democracies". "Defectiveness" or "delegativeness" of democracy is explained by the constitutional president's concentration of powers in systems of government, especially in the executive and legislative branches of government, which tend to decrease in importance/impact of the institutional and political constraints, especially on the part of political parties and Parliaments<sup>78</sup>. Consequently, superpresidents between presidential elections are institutionally defined as unlimited political actors, and electoral process is determined with open

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as president for a life, heads the only allowed party in country, and such party is the carrier of the declared and mandatory official state ideology. Examples: Ghana during the government of Kwame (1960-1966), Guinea during the government of Sekou Toure (1958-1984), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) in the days of Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997), North Korea in times of Kim Il Sung (1972-1998), Equatorial Guinea (since 1979), Tunisia (1957-2011), Uganda (particularly in 1971-1979) etc. 2. *Presidential-military republican system* of government is a dictatorial system of government with superpresident, where the head of state gets superauthority as the result of a military coup. Examples: Chile (1973-1990), Indonesia (1967-1998). 3. *Presidential-partocratic republican system* of government is a dictatorial system of government with superpresident, where a head of state is chosen by a single highest body in the country, typically the socialist/communist party (e.g., the Soviet Union, Angola (since 1979), Benin (1975-1991), Mozambique (since 1975) etc.). The feasibility of separation of nondictatorial republican systems with superpresidents is obvious in view of the conclusion given by Alekseenko. He partially denied the classification of republics with superpresidents, which had been provided by Chirkin and Zaznaev. The researcher argued that the classification is obsolete, because the authors had not taken into account the characteristics of republicanism with superpresidents in countries that are not monocratic (single-party), partocratic or military states (including the example of some post-Soviet countries, i.e. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan etc.). See detailed: Igor Alekseenko, "Superprezidents'ka Respublika yak Paradigma Vzaemodii Politichnih Institutiv", *Ekonomichnyy Chasopys – XXI: Naukovyy Zhurnal*, vol. 7-8, 2010, pp. 14-17; Veniamin E. Chirkin, *Konstitucionnoe Pravo Zarubezhnyh Stran*, Jurist, Moskva, 1997, pp. 145-146; Oleg Zaznaev, "Klassifikatsiya Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem", cit..

<sup>76</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1994, pp. 55-69; *Idem*, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1998, pp. 112-126; *Idem*, "Illusions about Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1996, pp. 34-51.

<sup>77</sup> Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power, *Rethinking the "Presidentialism Debate"*...cit.

<sup>78</sup> Steven M. Fish, "Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 17, no. 1, 2006, pp. 5-20.



manipulations. This leads to a formalisation of concentrated and centralised powers of presidents, especially their proactive legislative powers, which include the right to issue decrees with the force of law and the right to arbitrate interinstitutional conflicts in the system of separation of governments' branches<sup>79</sup>.

Instead, Karmazina<sup>80</sup> unilaterally puts republics with superpresidents in line with such phenomena as dictatorship (civil or military dictatorship) and tyranny. The researcher notes that while talking about the rise of the institution of presidency over traditional branches of government, and even more – about its exaltation over all institutions of the state ... more acceptable equivalent is ... one of the following concepts: a superpresidential republic, dictatorship, tyranny etc. A similar conclusion was made by Fish<sup>81</sup>. However, he notes that republican systems of government with superpresidents, while not being democratic, could be half-democratic. The difference between half-democratic and “pure” authoritarian forms of government, according to researchers, is the presence of regular and reasonably free elections. On the one hand, it is true, but on the other hand, the gradual strengthening of powers of superpresidents leads to the process of concentration of all the state power and influence, which is more consistent with the principles of democracy, but not autocracy. Here lies the anti-institutional prejudice of the republics with superpresidents, outlined with the fact, that superpresidents are not interested in development of institutions that could potentially threaten their formal and/or actual power in system of government. That is exactly, in the words of Anderson et al.<sup>82</sup>, the difference between republican system of government with superpresident and any other republican system of government, which is characterised by the dispersal of government institutions. Therefore, according to Fish<sup>83</sup>, the main characteristics of republics with superpresident are the following:

1. There is a presence of a strong executive staff headed by the president who “overshadows” other public authorities in terms of power resources.
2. There is an accountability of all or almost all of the public expenditures to the president.
3. The president has a right to issue decrees exercising the force of law.
4. There is an accountability of the judiciary to the president, so that the

<sup>79</sup> Mikhail V. Beliaev, “Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist Democracies”, *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, pp. 375-398; Paul Kubicek, “Delegative democracy...cit.”.

<sup>80</sup> Maria Karmazina, “Institut Prezidentstva: Pohodzhennya ta Sutnist' Fenomena”, *Politichniy Menedzhment*, vol. 3, no. 6, 2004, p. 37.

<sup>81</sup> Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception:...cit.”.

<sup>82</sup> Richard D. Anderson, Steven M. Fish, Stephen E. Hanson, Philip G. Roeder, *Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy*, Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 83-84.

<sup>83</sup> Steven M. Fish, “The Executive Deception:...cit.”, pp. 178-179.

president and his activity/inactivity cannot be subjected to judicial investigation.

5. There is a cancelation/complexity of a president's impeachment.
6. There is no accountability of president and presidential-executive powers to the legislature.

Consequently, it is obvious that almost all undemocratic and half-democratic republics with superpresidents are institutional constructs of the so-called "patronymic presidentialism" or neopatrimonialism, which according to Hale, combines extensive formal and actual powers of presidents with all available potential resources, received from the patron-client relations in the politics and economy of a country<sup>84</sup>. This directly implies that "superpresidents' authorisation" and "limitation" of institutional checks and balances occur in all possible ways, even at the expense of alternative centres of state power. This is largely typical for post-Soviet countries in which the institution of president was introduced on the heritage of the Soviet political culture that enabled ruling through the mechanisms of patronage and personal management<sup>85</sup>. Hence, very strong and powerful presidents (superpresidents) in those countries actually coexist with very weak Parliaments that use relatively low levels of public confidence. Linz's remark is not always relevant in the sense that the instability of the position of a strong, popularly elected president is a direct consequence of the dual legitimacy of government in the construction of divided elections of the president and Parliament. On the contrary, a source of instability of superpresident's position is the excessive concentration in his hands of redundant powers and resources that are not based on the trust of the population and extrapolated in the form of the parliamentary parties' support<sup>86</sup>. Therefore,

<sup>84</sup> Henry E. Hale, "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia", *World Politics*, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005, p. 138.

<sup>85</sup> Among the post-Soviet states, "patronal presidentialism" first off all is peculiar to Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and was earlier peculiar for Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine. Under *patronymic presidentialism* it is understood not a republican system of government, but a management system, where the president, which is elected directly by citizens, is much more powerful than other institutions of power. In addition, the authority of the head of state is based not only on the formally specified powers, but also on the patron-client relations in the country. See detailed: Keith A. Darden, "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma", *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2001, pp. 67-71; Ildar Gabdrifikov, Henry E. Hale, "Bashkortostan's Democratic Moment? Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime Change, and Identity in Russia", in Osamu Ieda, Tomohiko Uyama (eds.), *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, 2006, pp. 75-104; Henry E. Hale, "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia", *World Politics*, vol. 58, no. 1, 2005, pp. 133-165; Neil Robinson, "The Presidency: the Politics of Institutional Chaos", in *Idem* (ed.), *Institutions and Political Change in Russia*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

<sup>86</sup> Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power, *Rethinking the "Presidentialism Debate"...*cit.;

Protsyk<sup>87</sup>, Morgan-Jones and Schleiter<sup>88</sup> are right indicating that the power of superpresidents is more effective when it combines other institutional components and tools. This way, for example, the superpresidents' authority to implement the legislative process and form a cabinet are crucial resources of the heads of state' strength, when they are endowed with the confidence of parliamentary parties and tools of parliamentary control over the legislative process<sup>89</sup>.

Among the reasons for the installation of republics with superpresidents, scientists often distinguish the processes associated with the curtailment of democratic reforms in a country. With this in mind, it is clear that the republican systems of government with superpresidents lead to a number of negative impacts and trends of socioeconomic and political developments. *First*, the phenomenon and role of superpresidency and vertical monocratic direction of the presidential powers leads to the impossibility of democratic government's installation for medium and long terms. *Second*, the concentration of power in the hands of one person (superpresident) and high dependency of socioeconomic and political processes on the person or group of persons ("family"), who are related to the president, institutionalise the practice of absolutism, in terms of which the republican system of government resembles a monarchical form of government. *Third*, subordination of all branches of government to the superpresident leads to fictitious and limited human and civil rights, weakness and even lack of political or social opposition and to marginalisation of the party and electoral

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Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith, Moshe Haspel, "Decrees, Laws and Inter-Branch Relations in the Russian Federation", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 14, no. 4, 1998, pp. 287-322.

<sup>87</sup> Oleg Protsyk, "Ruling with Decrees: ...cit.".

<sup>88</sup> Edward Morgan-Jones, Petra Schleiter, "Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: ...cit.".

<sup>89</sup> Reflecting of this is the fact that, for example, superpresidents of post-Soviet countries have become increasingly dependent on the parties they represent, as well as on some other parties, measured by presidents as institutionally reliable. As a result, there are more or less stable models of coalition cooperation within the Parliaments, into which superpresidents are incorporated. These examples of cooperation can be coalitions (earlier in Armenia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) or can, as result of co-optation processes, be finished with the formation of so-called "parties of power", which include those former parties that were previously independent members of coalitions (e.g., Azerbaijan, Russia). In a particular case, coalitions and "parties of power" serve as an institutional tool, which provides social and political trust for the president, and actually enhance his/her legislative powers or all presidential powers to influence the activities of parliament. On the other hand, superpresidents informally influence the formation of coalitions in different ways. The ways to distinguish informal influence include such steps, as providing particularistic interests and lobby parliamentarians, bribery, patronage and intimidation of voters and parliamentarians. See detailed: Paul Chaisty, "The Legislative Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia", *Government and Opposition*, vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, pp. 424-453; Oleksiy Haran, "From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine", *Democratisation*, vol. 19, no. 2, 2011, pp. 93-110; Hans van Zon, "Political Culture and Neopatrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma", *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 52, no. 5, 2005, pp. 12-22.

systems. *Fourth*, concentration of all powers in the superpresident's hands leads to the possibility of abuse of power in socioeconomic, political and other issues of public and/or personal developments. The experience of the most of republican systems with superpresidents in the world shows that this format of republicanism leads to economic and social decline, humanitarian collapse and national degradation. In return, republican systems with superpresidents rarely contribute to economic growth and modernisation (Pinochet's era in Chile or Suharto's era in Indonesia).

### *Superpresidentialism, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Republics with Superpresidents*

According to an empirical analysis of the republics with superpresidents made by Sakharov<sup>90</sup> and Zaznaev<sup>91</sup>, "superpresidentialism" is not a kind of "form of government" but rather a synthetic format of a "republican system of government". The fact is that *superpresidentialism* as a format of system of government, which is characterised by the position of an all-powerful president, can easily be attributed to a republican form of government, but it is very difficultly attributed to any "pure" or classical system of government. This is because within each of them (often in the case of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism), there could be formally provided and/or actually implemented the position of very strong president (superpresident). He or she dominates not just the executive branch, which can be a constitutional feature of presidents in all presidential and some semi-presidential systems of republican government, however all branches of government. Accordingly, the theoretical, methodological and empirical context, especially given by official (constitutional) options and features of defining systems of government, accumulates the differentiation of various types/formats of republics with superpresident, including *presidential republic with superpresidents* and *semi-presidential republic with superpresidents* (in trichotomous approach of government classification, it is appropriate to call them respectively "superpresidentialism" and "super semi-presidentialism").

There are several reasons to distinguish presidential and semi-presidential republics with superpresidents, which in the trichotomous approach of government classification represent quite different analytical perspectives, but in the dichotomous approach represent the only "synthetic whole" usually called superpresidentialism.

*First*, there is a divergent formal and constitutional logic of operation of presidential and semi-presidential systems of government with superpresidents.

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<sup>90</sup> Nikolai A. Sakharov, *Institut Prezidentstva...cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>91</sup> Oleg Zaznaev, "Klassifikaciya Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem", cit.

Referring to the definition of Elgie, it should be noted that presidentialism is a constitutional system of republican form of government, which inherits the position of popularly (directly or indirectly) elected president (head of state), for a fixed term, and cabinet or administration of the president (and possibly even of the prime minister). The members of the cabinet or presidential administration are collectively responsible only to the president. Instead, semi-presidentialism is a constitutional system of a republican form of government, which preserves the position of popularly (directly or indirectly) elected president (head of state), for a fixed term. The prime minister and the cabinet are obligatory and collectively responsible to the Parliament (simultaneously the prime minister and the cabinet can be collectively responsible to the Parliament and to the president). That is why in presidential republican systems of government the cabinet or the administration of the president is not in a hierarchical relationship with the Parliament: they are not formed in Parliament, do not get a vote of confidence from the Parliament and are not accountable to the Parliament. Vice versa, in semi-presidential republican systems of government, the cabinet is at least formally in the hierarchical relationship with the Parliament, as the latter gives the cabinet a vote of confidence (Parliament is involved in the formation/approval of the cabinet composition and/or program) and can dismiss the cabinet on the basis of the vote of no confidence. Accordingly, in the trichotomous approach of government classification the case with the position of a very strong president in presidentialism should be interpreted as presidentialism with superpresident (superpresidentialism), and the case with the position of a very strong president in semi-presidentialism should be interpreted as semi-presidentialism with superpresident (super semi-presidentialism).

*Second*, power functions and roles of superpresidents in presidential and semi-presidential republican systems of government are structurally differentiated in relation of formal and actual powers of presidents. Certainly, monistic models of executive power established in presidential republics, and powers of presidents and Parliaments are functionally separated, so that presidents are responsible for the exercise of executive power, Parliaments – for the exercise of legislative power. Instead, in semi-presidential systems, different forms of the dualistic model of executive power are approved, and powers of presidents, cabinets and Parliaments sometimes overlap. This, for example, can be seen in some legislative prerogatives of presidents and/or cabinets etc. At the same time, sometimes in presidential republics, superpresidents may interfere in the legislative powers of Parliaments, and in semi-presidential republics may encroach on the role of Parliaments in the process of cabinet formation and provision of cabinet support. For example, in semi-presidential states, such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (as well as earlier in Armenia and Georgia), where the position of strong president is provided, participation of the Parliament in provision of a vote of confidence for a cabinet is regulated, and a

candidate for the prime minister is suggested by the president. However, when after a set number of times in a row, the candidate for the position of the head of cabinet is not approved and the cabinet is not formed in the Parliament, the president is vested with the power to dissolve the Parliament and form the cabinet independently. It means that such semi-presidential systems of government with superpresidents may actually begin to function as presidential systems of government with superpresidents at any point of time. Somewhat divergent problems in classification of contemporary formally semi-presidential republican systems of government we can find in Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (and earlier in Georgia). The question is how to organise the republican systems of government, where the Parliament has the right to put forward a vote or censure of no confidence for the cabinet, but the latter takes effect only if the president supports it. These self-evident anomalies of constitutional semi-presidentialism (or semi-presidentialism as a constitutional system of government) with positions of very strong presidents (superpresidents) often in practice lead to semi-presidential systems with superpresidents being interpreted as presidential systems with superpresidents. The inverse problem is inherent in presidential constitutional systems of republican government with superpresidents, but at the same time with the positions of prime ministers, appointed by presidents without consent or by obtaining consent of parliaments (such process occurs in Guyana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Korea, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, earlier in Belarus and Georgia etc.). On the contrary, there is no position of prime minister in “pure” or classic presidentialism, because the cabinet or presidential administration is directly headed by the president. Instead, presidential republics with prime ministers approved by Parliaments partially approximate to the semi-presidential republics. Therefore, in scientific and political discourse (even within the trichotomous approach to systems of government classification) superpresidentialism is mistakenly defined as a synthetic form of semi-presidentialism and presidentialism with very strong presidents or as a system of government not based on formal (constitutional) and/or actual (political) prerequisites of interinstitutional relations concerning the exercise of state power. Instead, superpresidentialism is only based on the comprehensiveness of presidential powers in relation to other branches of government and political system as a whole.

*Third*, the phenomenon of superpresidentialism as a form of the republican system of government with superpresidents was initially designed in relation to presidential systems with very strong presidents. The term “superpresidentialism” was first proposed in Political Science to distinguish Latin American countries in the XIX–XX centuries as examples of systems of government, which formally being presidential republics, differed from the “pure”/classic presidentialism. Majority of presidential republics in Latin America during this period influenced the practice of “American” classic presidentialism. However, due to various political,

historical and socioeconomic characteristics of the countries in this region, their political systems largely did not approve effective mechanisms of control, checks and balances. Therefore, they were established as authoritarian forms of government and quasi-constitutional practices with superpresidents. This, for example, manifested in the fact that presidential positions in almost all countries in the region were closely associated with armed forces. Moreover, by the end of the XX century the army was traditionally considered as the key player in the overthrow of presidents in Latin American countries<sup>92</sup>. Historically, systems of semi-presidential government in this region were hardly represented, which resulted in the creation of a theoretical and methodological orientation of superpresidentialism at presidential systems of republican government in Latin America. Therefore, it is clear that superpresidentialism initially emerged as tangent to constitutional presidentialism. The problem was that superpresidentialism as a system of republicanism was determined solely on the position of a strong president (superpresident), bypassing institutional peculiarities of branches of government correlations, started being applied in relation to other, first of all semi-presidential, variants of republican systems of government<sup>93</sup>. Therefore, there was a significant theoretical and methodological gap in perception of superpresidentialism as a form of republican system of government in Political Science. The essence of the gap is that the interpretation of superpresidentialism exclusively as a system of government with the position of a very strong president occurs asymmetrically in the context of the formal and actual evaluation of the presidents' powers and separation of republican systems of government. Therefore, from a scientific point of view, the rule, which was established earlier, turned out to be erroneous, which said that a system of superpresidentialism unilaterally includes all formally presidential and semi-presidential republics, where positions of superpresidents are inherent formally and/or actually, and they incorporate all branches of state power. Instead, it is more appropriate to mark out the system of superpresidentialism in broad and narrow senses, and to distinguish between presidential and semi-presidential systems of government with superpresidents.

*In a broad sense*, superpresidentialism is a variant of the republican system of government, in which a fully or nearly uncontrolled and strong president (superpresident) is inherent. *In a narrow sense*, superpresidentialism is a variant of a purely presidential system of government, in which an uncontrolled and strong president (superpresident) is inherent. It means that in a narrow sense some examples of purely formal presidential republics can be superpresidential systems, and in a broad sense, some examples not only of formal presidential, but

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<sup>92</sup> Lidija R. Basta Fleiner, *Governmental Systems in Multicultural Societies*, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2005.

<sup>93</sup> Veniamin E. Chirkin, "Netipichnye Formy Pravleniya v Sovremennom Gosudarstve", *Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, vol. 4, 1994, pp. 109-115; Anatoliy Orlov, *Prezidentskie Respubliki...cit.*

also of formal semi-presidential republics (parliamentary republics usually cannot be superpresidential, at least because superpresidents are incorporated into the positions of popularly elected heads of state). It suggests that the phenomenon of superpresidents must be treated separately, considering not only the strength of the actual powers of the presidents, but also the formal and constitutional features of republican systems of government, the role and the place of the presidents and Parliaments in the structure of branches of government. This is especially true in the context of formation and termination of cabinets and cabinets' powers. In return, in a broad sense, it predetermines the need for distinguishing at least two variants of republican systems of government, in which the positions of superpresidents can be inherent, i.e. presidentialism and semi-presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents. However, it does not mean that special cases of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism with superpresidents can both be the examples of superpresidentialism in the narrow sense.

Obviously, *presidentialism with position of a superpresident* is a constitutional presidential system of republican government with the position of an all-powerful superpresident, who formally being the head of state and/or simultaneously the head of cabinet/executive power effectively subjugates all branches of government. It is true, even if the president have the position of subordinated prime minister who is not accountable to the Parliament.

*Semi-presidentialism with position of a superpresident* is a constitutional semi-presidential (primarily president-parliamentary) system of republican government with the position of an all-powerful superpresident, who formally being the head of state and/or simultaneously the head of cabinet/executive power actually subjugates all branches of government. It is true, even if the president have the position of either subordinated or unsubordinated prime minister who is compulsory accountable to the Parliament or its leading chamber.

Presidentialism with the position of a superpresident has inherent independence or very low dependence of the executive branch, represented by the head of state (with or without the position of prime minister) on the alignment of political forces (especially parties) in the Parliament. This means that regardless of the composition of the Parliament, the president (superpresident) is omnipotent, and any candidate for the prime minister in case of existence of such a position does not affect the actual powers of a superpresident (or actual presidentialisation of presidential republic).

Instead, semi-presidentialism with the position of a superpresident has inherent dependence on the alignment of political forces in the Parliament of the executive branch, represented by the prime minister or the prime minister and the head of the state, of various degrees (low/ high). This implies that constitutionally powerful superpresident may actually strengthen his/her powers in the event of dissolution of the Parliament. It may follow the parliamentary



disagreement about the candidacy of the prime minister (in the case of a refusal of the parliament to give a vote of confidence), proposed by the president, or president's reluctance to implement the decision of the Parliament of a vote of no confidence in the cabinet. This means that most often in the semi-presidential systems with the position of a superpresident, the prime minister is politically weightless a priori, regardless of whether the prime minister is politically and/or party subordinated or unsubordinated to the president in the context of the balance of political parties in the Parliament. With this in mind, it is clear why in some semi-presidential systems with superpresidents, there are frequently used majority or mixed electoral systems that lead to the representation of nonparty MPs. The reason is that actual increase of superpresidents' powers is probably more possible in the case of significant fragmentation of Parliaments, which because of their lack of structuring do not always fully perform and try to perform the proper functions of political institutions, which have to stabilise the presidents' powers over the exercise of state power. Instead, the exact type of electoral systems in presidential systems with superpresidents is actually irrelevant in the process and context of presidentialisation of superpresidents. This includes systems of coalitional presidentialism. The thing is even parties, which are in a coalitional opposition to the superpresident, cannot actually reduce or increase the formal and constitutional presidentialisation of the head of state regarding his or her exercise of the functions of chief executive. This is less typical for the systems of presidentialism where the positions of prime ministers are provided alongside the positions of superpresidents. Therefore, it should be noted that presidential governments with superpresidents institutionally are more stable than semi-presidential governments with superpresidents. The former have no need and/or usage for shifting to a more presidentialised model of republican system of government, and the latter have constitutionally conditioned "shifting potential" in certain phases of their operation to more effectively presidentialised systems, even resorting to the practice of presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents.

Comparative analysis of the actual examples of republican governments' systems with the positions of superpresidents based on appeal to the formal constitutional and actual political powers of heads of states, cabinets and Parliaments supports theoretical and methodological conclusion of the practicability to distinguish between systems of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism with positions of superpresidents.

For example, Angola (since 1979), Guyana (since 1980), Guinea (since 1984), Guinea Bissau (since 1980), North Korea (since 1948), Uzbekistan (since 1991), Tajikistan (since 1994), Turkmenistan (since 1991) and other countries are contemporary instances of *presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents* (or superpresidentialism in a narrow sense). Instead, Benin (1975-1991), Guatemala (especially in 1944-1986), Ghana (1960-1992), Honduras (especially in 1956-1982), Dominican Republic (1966-1978), Colombia (especially in

1953-1958), Costa Rica (particularly by 1948), Libya (1969-2011), Mexico (especially in 1884-1910 and 1946-1994), Nicaragua (especially in 1937-1987), Panama (especially in 1968-1978), Paraguay (particularly in 1814-1840, 1940-1948 and 1954-1989), Chile (especially in 1817-1826 and 1974-1990), Syria (1971-2012), Zambia (1964-1991), Zimbabwe (1987-2008), Mali (especially in 1979-1991 and 2002-2012), Yugoslavia (1953-1980), Indonesia (1945-1998), Philippines (1966-1981), Malawi (1966-1994), Uganda (particularly in 1971-1979), Tunisia (1957-2011), Equatorial Guinea (1979-2011), CAR (1966-1976), Congo (1965-1997), the USA (particularly in 1963-1969 and 1969-1974)<sup>94</sup>, Belarus (1994-1996)<sup>95</sup>, Georgia (1995-2004), Gabon (1973-1991), Egypt (1981-2007), Maldives (1968-2008), Cameroon (1960-1991), Mozambique (1975-1990), Peru (especially in 1919-1930), Rwanda (1973-1994), Togo (1967-1992) etc. were the historical examples of presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents.

In contrast, Azerbaijan (since 1995), Belarus (since 1996), Armenia (1995-2005), Gabon (since 1991), Georgia (2004-2013), Equatorial Guinea (since 2011), Kazakhstan (since 1993), Egypt (2007-2011), Cameroon (since 1991), Mozambique (since 1990), Namibia (since 1990), Peru (1979-1992 and since 1993), Russia (since 1993), Rwanda (since 2003), Syria (since 2012), Togo (since 1992), Sri Lanka (since 1976), the Philippines (1981-1986), France (1962-1974 and 1981-1986)<sup>96</sup> and other countries were or still are the examples of *semi-*

<sup>94</sup> Wilson outlined the phenomenon of “*American presidentialism*” in the XX century, as “*congressional system of government*”. At this time, the US Congress dominated the political life in the US. In contrast, in the XX century the position of the US being a case of “*pure*” or *classic presidentialism* was accepted. At the same time, during the presidency of Johnson and Nixon, the system was called *imperial presidency*, because the Congress was overshadowed.

<sup>95</sup> Belarus in 1994-1996 (as well as Georgia in 1995-2004 and Ukraine in 1995-1996) was formally considered a presidential republic with a prime minister. However, it was actually the position of the superpresident that was inherent. The thing is that according to the 1994 Constitution, the collective responsibility of the cabinet, which was headed by the “minister of state” (or the prime minister), to the Parliament of Belarus was not regulated. Various ministerial positions were to be individually approved by legislature. However, once they were approved, only the president could dismiss them. Such model was designed as a synthetic one by the examples of the USA and Russia. As a result, the position of president was singled out “above” the branches of government, formally concentrating upon it not only the functions of the head of state, but also the functions of the chief executive.

<sup>96</sup> Some researchers have suggested outlining the political system of France during 1962-1974 and 1981-1986 as the “hyper-presidential phase” of semi-presidentialism. The actual experience of existence of superpresident positions in France at that time and the experience of cohabitation became the key reason for the gradual reduction of the formal powers of the presidents of France. In 2000, president terms were reduced from seven years to five, and in 2006, it was regulated that the position of the president of France should be “comprehensively controlled”. As a result, actual presidentialisation of parties, competition and political process in general were reduced. See detailed: John. T.S. Keeler, Martin. A. Schain, “Institutions, Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France”, in Kurt von Mettenheim (ed.),

*presidentialism with the positions of superpresidents* (but not superpresidentialism in a narrow sense).

The formal and actual difference of various presidential and semi-presidential republics with superpresidents lies in the fact that contemporary superpresidents can be inherent by:

1. The republics, where presidents' superpowers are established constitutionally (usually, these are presidential republican systems);
2. The republics, where presidents are not or not fully provided with superpowers, but the extraordinary advantage of the state power division is masked (usually, these are semi-presidential republican systems of).

The peculiarity of *presidential republics with superpresidents* is explained by the fact that their range of potential implementation of presidents' constitutional emergency powers is wider than of "pure" or classic presidential republics, as well as presidential and semi-presidential republic with superpresidents. This, for instance, is evident in the fact that superpresidents in formally presidential republican systems of government have constitutional powers to issue the decrees, which have the power of law, to dismiss the Parliaments with their unilateral decisions, to displace the ministers and heads of territorial units etc. Besides, election and establishment of superpresident in presidential system may cause changes in the principle of periodical election of new president and establishment of lifetime presidency, even because of the referendum or voting of Parliament, fully controlled by a president. Election and establishment of superpresident in presidential system of government may also cause appointment of new president by the decision of preceding president with the following formal and electoral approval of this decision (by Parliament or another authorized body).

The peculiarity of *semi-presidential republics with superpresidents*, according to Fish<sup>97</sup> and Shevtsova<sup>98</sup>, lies in the fact that they are characterised by an excessive and superpowerful executive branch, unbalanced either by the legislative or judicial branch of government and unaccountable to them. This undermines the legitimacy of government, leads to authoritarian tendencies, suppresses or hinders development of nongovernmental political organisations, hinders the formation of efficient government and responsible cabinet.

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*Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 84-105; Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, "The Contemporary 'Models' of Government: Dilemmas and Challenges", *Iustinianus Primus Law Review*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1-26.

<sup>97</sup> Steven M. Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution*, Princeton University Press, 1995; *Idem*, "The Perils of Russian Superpresidentialism", *Current History*, vol. 96, 1997, pp. 326-330.

<sup>98</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, "The Problem of Executive Power in Russia", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2000, pp. 32-39.

According to the world practice (partially represented by the above suggested examples of republics with superpresidents), the practicability of allotment of semi-presidential systems of government with superpresidents is first of all caused by the practice of post-Soviet and other European, Asian and African countries, mostly after 1990. With regard to this, it is necessary to address the practice of some of them. Firstly, this should refer to the formally semi-presidential president-parliamentary systems of government in Russia, Belarus or Azerbaijan etc., which are frequently referred to be the examples of authoritarian-oligarchic systems of government with superpresidents<sup>99</sup>. According to Shugart and Carey<sup>100</sup>, these systems should be called president-like president-parliamentarism. Their *attributes/disadvantages* are as follows:

1. The reliability of presidents' monocratic and subjective powers on force structures and "parties of power" or on immaturity of party systems, without which the accumulation of power, which presidents actually have in their hands, is impossible;
2. The symbolism of monocratic subjectivity of powers between functional and territorial centres and periphery, based on "elections fetishism";
3. The non-realisation of the principle of political responsibility of central power organisations mainly manifested with a president<sup>101</sup>.

Moreover, the disadvantage of positions of superpresidents in semi-presidential and presidential republican systems with superpresidents leading to authoritarianisation and personalisation of governments is the way of presidential power transfer. Traditionally it is formally realised through elections and actually through the elections resulting in power transfer, i.e. through the election of successor by the predecessor (this, for example, is the characteristic of Azerbaijan, Russia etc.). However, sometimes the same person is the president regardless of how often (in a row or with intervals) he/she is elected (for example, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan etc.).

Besides, in semi-presidential republics with superpresidents, *presidents' dominating status* is dependent on the fact that they are formally put beyond the framework of the triad of governmental power distribution, though they actually stand over the triad of governmental power, because they also have authorities in the legislative and judicial branches of government. This is visible in the fact that

<sup>99</sup> Andrew Arato, "The New Democracies and the American Constitutional Design", *Constellations*, vol. 7, no. 3, 2000, p. 318; David Mastro, Kyle Christensen, *Power and Policy Making: The Case of Azerbaijan*, Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, 2006; Lilia Shevtsova, Kirill Holodkovskiy, *Rossiya Politicheskaya*, Moskovskiy Centr Karnegi, Moskva, 1998, pp. 22-28.

<sup>100</sup> Matthew S. Shugart, John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 148-158.

<sup>101</sup> Igor Kliamkin, "Rossiyskaya Vlast' na Rubezhe Tsyacheletiy", *Pro et Contra*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2001, pp. 63-87.

superpresidents of semi-presidential republics, who, from legislative point of view, are the “guarantors of the constitutions”, either being or not being formally the rulers of executive power (i.e. chief executives), actually chair executive vertical of government and disrupt the balance of governmental power distribution. Moreover, when it is referred to legal instruments of overconcentration of power in hands of presidents, political systems obviously can be legally transformed into nondemocratic forms of government. The important fact is that quite frequently superpresidents in semi-presidential republics consciously try to change of constitutional systems of government for their own benefit. This takes place either through more constitutional concentration of powers in implementing state powers by presidents, or through the constitutional increase of presidential terms, or through nonconstitutional and political increase of presidential powers (or by all means simultaneously). Instead, in presidential republics with superpresidents, *presidents' dominating status* is much formalised at least with regard to the fact that presidents constitutionally perform their roles and roles of the rulers of executive power (chief executives), i.e. they form their cabinets and control their activity themselves, regardless of legislatures.

With regard to this, it is clearly understandable that there is no theoretical and methodological question about republicanism with the position of superpresident (or in other words about superpresidentialism in a wide sense) as of integral and “pure” system of government. Instead, it should be noted that positions of superpresidents might exist in different systems of republican government, i.e. presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Hence, this corresponds to the conclusion drawn by Elgie that the type of constitutional republican system of government (presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarism) do not directly depend upon the formal and actual powers of key governmental actors, and is based only on the mechanism of powers, authorities distribution and the way of formation and termination of governmental institutions and bodies. Consequently, it is obvious that presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism can be represented by the positions of weak (nominal), intermediate, powerful and very powerful presidents (superpresidents)<sup>102</sup>. Therefore, it is appropriate not to identify superpresidentialism as an independent republican system of government with the position of superpresident, but to reduce it to the specific form of any independent republican system of government characterised by the position of superpresident, formally/actually dominating over the other branches of government. The matter is that the constructions of republican systems of government (or the mechanisms of comparison of authorities between the supreme executive and legislative branches of government) in different states, characterised by the positions of

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<sup>102</sup> Even despite this, presidential republics most often inherent strong or very strong presidents. Parliamentary republics most often are realized through weak or intermediate presidents. Instead, semi-presidential republics often are realized through weak, intermediate or strong presidents.

superpresidents, are diverse. Accordingly, *superpresidential semi-presidentialism* and *superpresidential presidentialism* should be frequently singled out<sup>103</sup>. Both the first and the second types traditionally gravitate towards and lead to autocracy (authoritarianism or totalitarianism), limiting or cancelling such principles of democracy as political participation and competitiveness<sup>104</sup>.

Alongside, presidential and semi-presidential systems of government with the positions of superpresidents combine different risks caused by superpresidents' positions. Accordingly, the ways of minimisation of risks of power accumulation in the hands of one person that a priori leads to autocracy are analogous. Among them, according to Zaznaev<sup>105</sup>, the following ways are singled out the most frequently:

1. Prohibition of re-election of the same person as a president for two times in a row or more than two times in a row;
2. Introduction of collective presidency institute;
3. Introduction of the instruments of parliamentary-governmental domination (for instance, "cabinet government");
4. Introduction of the instruments of quasi-parliamentarism to executive power institutions (for instance, impeachment procedures to members of cabinet on the side of the Parliament);
5. Practical implementation of mechanisms of approval (counterassigment) of all or key appointments made by a president;
6. Introduction of the institution of presidential acts' countersigning on the side of the chair of a cabinet or its members, as well as the system of joint exercising of executive power by a president and other governmental institutions;
7. Introduction or simplification of the presidential impeachment institution on the part of a Parliament or leading chamber of a Parliament;

<sup>103</sup> Timothy J. Colton, Cindy Skach, *Semi-Presidentialism in Russia...*cit.

<sup>104</sup> A striking example of the negative impact of republican systems of government with superpresidents on the prospects of democratisation is the experience of post-Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine and others. This is even despite significant progress in the first stage of their political transit and the fact that the presidents were positioned with media as "democratisators". For example, when Belarus in 1994 moved from the former Soviet quasi-parliamentarism to presidentialism and in 1996 to semi-presidentialism (actually with the position of superpresident), the democratic experiment was finished. Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, which also made the process of "investing dominant power to the presidents", are now positioned as autocratic governments. In contrast, moderate presidential or semi-presidential systems that took place in Georgia (1995–2004), Moldova (1994–2000) and Lithuania, as well as parliamentary systems (such as Estonia, Latvia and Moldova since 2000), where there was the dispersion of government power between different political institutions, now are moving toward democratic values (albeit in varying degrees). See detailed: Steven M. Fish, "Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratisation in East Europe and Eurasia", *Slavic Review*, vol. 58, no. 4, 1999, pp. 803–804.

<sup>105</sup> Oleg Zaznaev, "Klassifikaciyi Prezidentskoy, Parlamentskoy i Poluprezidentskoy Sistem", cit..

8. Formation and functioning of independent state-funded governmental agencies and departments;
9. Approval of distinctive systems of government, represented with coalitional presidentialism and semi-presidentialism.

### *Conclusions*

After estimating the practice of different republican systems of government with superpresidents, it is clear that it is much more difficult to minimise the risks of power accumulation in hands of one person in formally presidential republics. Even despite the introduction of more conspicuous and direct mechanisms of checks and balances of presidential powers, particularly in the context of executive power distribution between presidents, ministers, prime-ministers (which can even be partially/individually responsible to parliaments), the initial essence of presidential elections remains in force with “zero amount”, at which only one winner survives.

Instead, it is much easier to prevent the institutionalisation of the position of superpresident or to restrict the institutional risks related to superpresident’s position in semi-presidential republics. The main problem is the fact that in semi-presidential systems of government presidential powers significantly (more than in presidential republics) depend upon the party and political composition of a Parliament. Besides, in these political systems, the institute of executive power dualism is formalised (on the one hand, in the person of president, and on the other hand, in the institution of cabinet and the person of prime minister). However, even despite this, quite frequently in semi-presidential systems, presidents turn out to be equal in their powers or actually more powerful than in presidential systems. This is often conditioned by the fact that semi-presidentialism as republican system of government is changeable from a political and institutional point of view. Consequently, semi-presidentialism can obtain more features of either presidentialism or parliamentarism, depending on whether the presidential party (or political party associated with the president) is a part of a parliamentary coalition. Nevertheless, even despite this, from the formal point of view, superpresidents the most frequently are institutions of president-parliamentary and not premier-presidential types of semi-presidentialism. In the case of president-parliamentarism with the position of superpresident, constitutional system formally can be referred to semi-presidentialism. Instead, such political system is frequently referred to be presidential. This presupposes that in case of semi-presidentialism with the position of superpresident, the institute of executive power dualism is actually neglected. Instead, in presidentialism with the position of superpresident the executive power is formally monistic.