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THE INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MANIFESTATION

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Abstract

This paper is qualitative and theoretical research of the concept of sovereignty and the libertarian theory, particularly the concept of individual liberty. It represents a concept developing study, with a specific accent laid on the individual liberty, and the theoretically established concept of sovereignty. The research focus could be identified with the conceptualization and manifestation of the individual sovereignty, as a theoretical phenomenon that is not fully conceptualized and strictly defined. In the scope of this paper, content analysis method and comparative method are used. The analysis, comparison and synthesis refer to the theories of sovereignty and the theory of libertarianism, resulting in developing the concept of individual sovereignty and its socio-political manifestation.

Key words: sovereignty; individual liberty; power; state; individual sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is qualitative and theoretical research of the concept of sovereignty and the libertarian theory, particularly the concept of individual liberty. It represents a concept developing study, with a specific accent laid on the individual liberty, and the theoretically established concept of sovereignty. The research focus could be identified with the conceptualization and manifestation of the individual sovereignty, as a phenomenon that is not fully conceptualized and strictly defined. In the scope of this paper, content analysis method and comparative method would be used. The analysis would refer to the theories of sovereignty and the theory of libertarianism. The comparative method would be used for comparison of these two theories. The paper would start with the analyze of the concept of sovereignty in its classical sense, its etymology and essence, the typology of sovereignty, the dimensions of sovereignty, the principles of sovereignty; would continue with analyzing the libertarianism as a specific theory, the idea of individual liberty, its principles and consequences; and in the end would finish with synthesis of the essence of the two theories resulting in conceptualization and manifestation of the individual sovereignty.

The first effort of defining and demystifying the potential concept of individual sovereignty would take place as a synthesis of the concept of sovereignty in its classical sense and the concept of individual liberty. The constitutive elements of the concept of individual liberty in classical sense would be transferred to the concept of sovereignty in classical sense. When the parallel is established, the constitutive elements of the both theory would potentially produce a new concept of individual sovereignty. After the conceptualization of the individual sovereignty, further operationalization would take part. The operationalization consists of the political manifestation in a certain potential political

organization and social manifestation in certain potential social consequence. In that way, the conceptualization and the manifestation of the concept would be done, and the concept could be listed among the other types and dimensions of sovereignty.

THE SOVEREIGNTY IN A CLASSICAL SENSE

Etymology and essence

The term *sovereignty* derives from Latin *superanus*, *supremus*, which means *the highest, superior, ultimate*, and from old French, representing characteristic attached to a subject – *supremacy* in certain domain. In that sense, the most general and etymological meaning of the term sovereignty is connected with (*political*) *supremacy*, or *ultimate, absolute, supreme will*. It is the *ultimate authority*. (Schmidt 1993, 11).

When it comes to *absolute, supreme will*, it goes hand in hand with *ultimate power*. From this pure rationalist analyze, emerges that sovereignty could represent power, understood in its broadest sense. The most common definition of power gives Max Weber, and it is defined “as the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons.” (Galbraith 1995, 4-5). In John Kenneth Galbraith’s typology of power, found in its *The Anatomy of Power*, there could be distinguished three kinds of power: *condign power, compensatory power* and *conditioned power*. (Galbraith 1995, 4). The term *supreme, ultimate, absolute* is narrowly connected to the concept of *condign power*. Galbraith defines the *condign power*, as:

Wining submission by the ability to impose an alternative to the preferences of the individual or group that is sufficiently unpleasant or painful so that these preferences are abandoned. There is an overtone of punishment. The expected rebuke is usually too harsh, so the individual will endure, submit, or give into the power from fear or threat. The individual is aware of the submission via compulsion. (Galbraith 1995, 4-5).

From other perspective, the concept of *condign power*, in Ayn Rand’s essay *Capitalism, the Unknown ideal*, is presented as a *political power*, or the power of threat, punishment, compulsion, or most general, the *power of institutionalized violence*. (Rand 1967, 53). In Rand typology of power, alongside the political power stands the *economic power*. Michael Mann, in his *The Source of Social power: Volume Two, The Rises of Classes and Nation-states*, is stating about that the *political power* “derives from the usefulness of territorial and centralized regulation.” (Mann 2006, 9). He continues “political power means state power” (Mann 2006, 9), and determines it as “essentially authoritative, commanded and willed from a center.” (Mann 2006, 9). The operationalized distinction between the all three most general types of power could be located in the *means* of power. Franz Oppenheimer, in his fundamental work *The State*, makes a distinction between *economic means* and *political means* (Oppenheimer 1926, 24-25); the last presenting means of violence, robbery, threat, as an operationalization of the *political power*. Or in Oppenheimer’s words: “the state is fully developed political means.” (Oppenheimer 1926, 276). The State is the final apparent product and manifestation of the further operationalization of the *political means*. In the sense of Max Weber, *the state* is human community, which successfully claims monopoly on legitimate use of physical coercion, on certain territory. (Fukuyama 2012, 24). In that sense, the state is a *violent, coercive*

regulator of the *social* relations. Or in the words of Hans Hermann Hoppe (he uses government instead of state), in his book *Democracy, the God that Failed*, the Government “is a territorial monopolist of compulsion – an agency which may engage in continual, institutionalized property right violations and the exploitation – in the form of expropriation, taxation and regulation of private property owners.” (Hoppe 2007, 45). Also the state is personified by the *political elites*, which hold the *political authority*. In addition,” the state is sovereign, or the supreme power, within its territory, and by definition the ultimate authority for all laws, i.e. binding rules supported by coercive sanctions.” (Dosenrode 2007, 19). From this analysis it could be concluded that there are three concepts, connected to the broadest concept of *sovereignty*, derived from its etymological and essential meaning. *The state* emerged as the last phase in the process of *operationalization* and *political manifestation* of the concept of sovereignty. The process of operationalization moves in this direction, *sovereignty – political power – political means – state*. From the opposite perspective, the sovereignty is the ultimate conceptualization of *the state*, understood as a concept or as a manifestation. The *sovereignty triad* consists of: *political power, political means* and *the state*.

The origins

Jean Bodin is the first author, explicitly focusing and writing about sovereignty in his masterpiece *Six livres de la République*. He defines the sovereignty as an *unlimited, unique, irresponsible, perpetual, undivided* and *inalienable* power (Bodin, 1903), or as “absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth.” (Merriam 2001, 7). Bodin emphasizes that sovereignty, must reside in a single individual. (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*). In that sense, the sovereignty could be identified with the ultimate (political) power of an individual. In the historical context, the individual with the ultimate (political) power represents the *monarch*. Sovereignty in Bodin’s context gives directions and provides the justifications of the Monarch’s political actions. The monarch’s will is ultimate, unlimited, institutionalized in the form of political power and conceptualized in the new term of *sovereignty*. *Thomas Hobbes* is the second important author, mentioning the terms *sovereignty* and *sovereign* in his *Leviathan*. Following Bodin’s tradition, Hobbes focuses on the personification of the political power in a society, emanated through the *Sovereign*. (Hobbes 2010, 143). The *Sovereign*, acts in the name of the society (its members), and its main function is providing security in it, through limiting individual’s freedom of action and establishing strict (political) order, in the frame of *the state*, or *Leviathan*. *The Sovereign* represents embodiment of the *social will*, and its aspiration towards the foundation of the *Leviathan*, and at the same time, it remains bearer (Hobbes 2010, 143) of the pure political power. *The Sovereign* is the new form of the *pure core-state*, which should provide *justification* for the individual’s restrictions. It could be concluded that the first broader and dominant meaning of the *sovereignty* is *absolute power* or *political power*, expressed in a *state*; on its territory, over individuals and objects located on it.

Typology

Generally defined, sovereignty involves specific elements attached to it, which could produce different types of it. Potential analyze of the types of sovereignty, would further produce an overall image and holistic definition of it, paying attention to the all elements that are incorporated in the concept and its various meanings. In the following part of the paper would be analyzed two elements of each type of sovereignty, the *source* of the sovereignty and the *political manifestation* of the concept. The source of the sovereignty would represent the independent variable(s); the type of the sovereignty and the political manifestation in certain political organization would represent dependent variable(s). It could be distinguished several major types of sovereignty. These concepts would be analyzed purely theoretical, and there is a room for marginal empirical inconsistency.

The divine sovereignty represents the oldest narrower concept of sovereignty, with specific source of it. Divine sovereignty theory, or theocratic theory, locates the source of the sovereignty or the source of the political power in *God* – “*Omnia potestas a Deo*”. (Shkarik & Siljanovska 2009, VII Ch.). In the sense of this theory of sovereignty, *the God* is the source of the sovereignty, and it provides the *legitimacy of the Sovereign*. *The Sovereign*, have a right, which is originally delegated from god, to govern and articulate the political power over certain people, territory and objects. In that direction, *the Sovereign* is a representative of the god on the earth, and it is enforcer of the god’s will on the earth. This theory emphasizes the duality of the power, the power on the heaven, and the power on earth, as an emanation of the previous one. In the context of Christian religious domination, this theory provides the justification for the emperor’s rule. When it comes to the political manifestation of this type of sovereignty, it is always connected with the *monarchy*, as a specific political organization. The monarch is the ultimate *Sovereign*.

National sovereignty represents concept of the era of political modernism, and emerges as an opposed concept to the concept of divine sovereignty. In this sovereignty concept, the central position takes the concept of nation, which could be identified as the source of this type of sovereignty. The nation could be determined as a source of the political power, and it presents a *collective, undivided body*, broader than the individuals living on the state’s territory. (Shkarik & Siljanovska 2009, VII Ch.). On the contrary, the nation could be defined as an *imagined political community*, which represents the *sovereign*. (Anderson 1998, 19). From this definition evolves that the nation as a sovereignty concept could be controversial, because it could be determined by the political power; it emerges as a result of the *modern state*. As a political manifestation of the concept of national sovereignty, the *Nation-state* arises, which is still the dominant form of political organization. The concept of national sovereignty is narrowly connected with the concept of popular sovereignty, and often they are interfering in the political praxis. *Popular sovereignty* is the most common and most referring type of sovereignty. The theory of the popular sovereignty emerges at the same time with the theory of the national sovereignty, and that is the main reason of their mutual interference. The source of the popular sovereignty could be identified with the *people*, living on the specific territory exposed to the direct effects of the certain political power. The founding father of the concept of popular sovereignty is Jean-Jack Rousseau. He is positioning *the people*, as the subject of the social contract, which gives a birth to the state body, and gives dynamics and will to it. (Rousseau 1978, 47). Following this statement, it could be concluded that every single individual is a party in the social contract and possess a part of the sovereignty. The

sovereignty is incorporated in the *social will*. (Rousseau 1978, 22). Unlike the national sovereignty, the popular one, highlight the individual as a part of the *People*, and it is partially sovereign in its part, conceptualized through the *positive liberty*. (Berlin 2000, 50). In this frame, *the people* do not represent collective body, but sum of individuals, living on a certain place in a certain period. (Shkarik & Siljanovska 2009, VII Ch.). The popular sovereignty is actualized in the political organization, where *the people*, as sum of individuals, participate, directly or indirectly, in the process of political decision-making. The political manifestation of this concept is the *Republic*, as a form of political organization.

Working People sovereignty is a type of sovereignty, or particularly it is a type of *popular sovereignty*. The difference between the both is that the *Working People* appears as the source of the sovereignty, so the difference is mainly rhetoric. The political manifestation could be observed in the *Socialist Republic*. The typology of the sovereignty that results in various types of sovereignties, show another dimension of the concept of the sovereignty. This dimension is the *justification* of the political power possessed by certain individual and group – political elites, through the concept of sovereignty. The *sovereignty (political power)* in its essence stays *unchanged* and *not challenged*, but the *source (justification)* of it varies.

Dimensions

Along with the typology of sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty involves two different dimensions: *internal sovereignty* and *external sovereignty*. In this case, the context is the independent variable, which could be *domestic* or *international*, which determines the concept of sovereignty. The both dimensions of the concept of sovereignty are interrelated, determine each other, and represent preconditions for each other existence.

Internal sovereignty as a concept could be connected to the concept of sovereignty projected on certain state territory – *domestic context*. According to Stephen D. Krasner within the frames of his book *Sovereignty, Organized Hypocrisy, internal sovereignty* means “supremacy over all other authorities within territory and population.” (Krasner 1999, 47). This particular concept, or the internal dimension of the sovereignty, is *oriented* towards the individuals living on the territory. The author Hannu Heinonen, determine the concept of internal sovereignty as a “degree of control exercised by public entities and the organization of authority within territorial boundaries.” (Heinonen 2006, 11). The concept of *internal sovereignty* could be identified with the etymology and the essence of the sovereignty, as an *ultimate, absolute* power, or *political power* of *the sovereign* within the certain territory and population on that territory. According to the stated, the concept covers the freedom of action of *the sovereign* on the concrete territory, acting as a subject of *sovereignty*, over the objects of *sovereignty* – population and objects on the territory. Following this logic, the state, represented through *the sovereign*, is the subject of the sovereignty, and the individuals could be identified as the objects of the sovereignty. It could be concluded that in the theoretical framework of *internal sovereignty*, the state is the *subject of the sovereignty*, the holder of the political power, using it as an *instrument* for achieving its goals. The highest principle of internal sovereignty is *freedom of action* of the state, on its own territory.

External sovereignty represents a concept, which is examined in different context from the internal sovereignty – *the international context*. The international context involves states, international organizations, and other entities that could partially play a role of an international actor. The dominant and most active subject in the international relations is *the state* and the world order is *state-centric*, or *Westphalian*. In this international context, the concept of external sovereignty is *state-oriented*. Krasner determines the external sovereignty as “independence of outside authorities.” (Krasner 1999, 47). Independence as a category represents the immunity of external, direct non-consensual action and in the case of the concept of *external sovereignty* and the state as its subject, the independence could be identified with *non-intervention* of other states in national issues, given through the basic principle of the international law – *non-interference in domestic affairs*. According to Heinonen, the external sovereignty is conceptualization of “the right of certain actors to enter into international agreements.” (Heinonen 2006, 11). In this case, the external sovereignty represents the ability of the states to engage in international voluntary relations, and further their capacity as an actor in the international context. The state has to express its consent for every relation that produces an effect on it. This statement is represented by the principle of *voluntarism in international affairs*.

In addition, three principles could be separated: *freedom of action*, *non-interference in domestic affairs* and *voluntarism in international affairs*. The mentioned principles are limited through some international norms – *jus cogens* norms. (Frckovski, Georgievski & Petrusevska 2012, 25). There is no need of a state’s consent for adoption of these norms, but it is obliged to respect them. In that way, *jus cogens* norms represent a common legal framework of state’s action within the international community. The expression of the concept of sovereignty is limited by these *jus cogens* norms.

THE INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY

The concept of individual sovereignty is relatively new concept, narrowly connected with some political theories and philosophies, focusing on the individual liberty at most. In that sense, the individual sovereignty would be analyzed through the theoretical framework of the theories of *libertarianism*, *individualist anarchism*, *classical liberalism* and other “-isms”, which have certain attitude towards the individual liberty. The basic elements and principles of the concept of sovereignty in classical sense would be used in favor of developing the concept of individual sovereignty. The concept of individual sovereignty could be further operationalized in a certain political manifestation or political organization, based on this concept.

Libertarianism

Libertarianism represents a political theory and political philosophy which puts the individual as the central actor in social relations, and the individual liberty as the highest value in its axiological system. It is built on the heritage of classical, or the old liberalism. The central position in the theory of classical liberalism takes *the physical integrity of the individual*, *individual’s property* and his *freedom of action*. (Locke, 2006). The libertarianism, as a theory stands on the *libertarian creed*. (Rothbard 2002, 22). In the words of Murray N. Rothbard, one of the greatest theorists and activists of individual liberty, in his book *For a New Liberty*:

The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the ‘nonaggression axiom’. ‘Aggression’ is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion. (Rothbard 2002, 22).

In the libertarian theory, the individual liberty is observed as the opposite principle of violence, or threat of violence. In that sense, the individual liberty is violated by using of violence, and the individual liberty refers to the absence of violence over the individual. In addition, the individual is free in the action he takes, as long as they are not *coercive*. The individual liberty could be projected as *the space* in which the individuals could act, and the *boundaries* of that space are other identical spaces. Defined by libertarians, the individual liberty is “an absence of interpersonal violence, the use of initiated force or violence, or its threat against the person or property of another.” (Osterfeld 1986, 239). Also the individual liberty could be defined as “the right of every human being to pursue his or her own happiness in him or her own way.” (Palmer 2015, 31). The idea of individual liberty express the concept of *self-ownership*, which, “asserts the absolute right of each man, by virtue of his (or her) being, to “own” his or her own body; that is, to control the body free of coercive interference.” (Rothbard 2002, 28). In Isaiah Berlin’s conceptualization of the freedom in his book *Four Essays on Liberty*, the individual liberty corresponds with the *negative liberty*, or the liberty that gives an answer to the question: “[w]hat is the area within which the subject (a person or group of persons) is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or to be, without interference by other persons?” (Berlin 2000, 50). The liberty is defined by its limits or the actions that limit it. Furthermore, the idea of individual liberty as the core-idea of libertarianism would be examined by its basic *principles* and the *consequences* it produces.

There are three *principles* of libertarianism: *individualism*, *voluntarism* and *non-interference*.

Individualism represents a principle of libertarianism which covers the epistemological and the ontological position of the relation between the individual being and social existence. The phenomena of individualism and collectivism, is conceptualized by Ervin Laszlo, in his book *Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power*. Furthermore, in the aspect of individualism, the individual being is primary, and the social existence is secondary; the man’s individual being, will determine, or mold the shape of his social existence. (Laszlo 1963, 6). In that sense, “The society is being the sum total of the social existence of individual beings, it tends to be determined by individuals.” (Laszlo 1963, 6). The principle of individualism is pointing to the “primacy of the individual human being as the fundamental moral unit, rather than the collective, whether state, class, race, or nation.” (Palmer 2015, 31). From the point of the individualism, the individual is the central actor of all relations in the frame of one society (represented as a sum of individuals), it is the only subject of the social (interpersonal) relations, and every relation is shaped by his rights and duties in it. The basic *precondition* for establishing social (interpersonal) relation is the individual liberty.

Voluntarism represents a principle of libertarianism which covers the *individual consent* for establishing a social (interpersonal) relation. The individual consent for every relation the individual is engaged, embraces *absence of coercion*. The *voluntary exchange* is the central category in the principle of voluntarism. The exchange is voluntary, when it is “entirely unhampered by violence or threat of violence.” (Rothbard 2009, 84). It is framed legally by *agreements*, and the ones that make the exchanges are called *contracts*. (Rothbard 2009, 91). In addition, according to Rothbard “the society based on voluntary contractual agreements is a *contractual society*.” (Rothbard 2009, 91). The central element of voluntarism covers “contract and voluntary exchange of goods and services, by individuals or groups, on the expectation of mutual benefit.” (Chartier & Charles 2011, 3). The *voluntarism* stands for the statement that every individual engaged in some social (interpersonal) relation that produces some effects over him, should express his consent about the engagement. In other words, *voluntarism* as a principle stands for no coercive engaging in social (interpersonal) relations. The individual is free to choose in which relation he would enter, with the responsibility of the effects of that relation. The individual makes the final judgment of a potential establishing a relation, in which he or she would represent one side.

Non-interference represents a principle of libertarianism which covers the absence of *violent action* or *coercion* in the social (interpersonal) relations. In the part above, it is examined the essence of the state, as a *coercive, violent regulator* of social (interpersonal) relations. In this sense, the non-interference principle points on state’s *passivity* in the social (interpersonal relations). The interference of the state –the coercive interference, is pointed to the “free choices of individuals.” (Rothbard 2009, 913). As defined, the individual liberty, as the absence of coercion or violence, the coercive interference is violating it. Also the non-interference principle relates to the state non-interference within property rights (Palmer 2009, 126), as the guarantee of the individual liberty. Concluding, the non-interference in individual liberty is a crucial principle for establishing system framed by the idea of individual liberty. In the libertarian logic, the individual has the ultimate right of *self-ownership* and the right of entering the social (interpersonal) relations he choose, *non-violently* and with an absence of coercion.

There are three *consequences* emerging after the implementation of the idea of individual liberty: *spontaneous order*, *non-coercive power* and *minimal government/private protective agencies*.

Spontaneous order refers to the first consequence potentially produced by fully implementation of the idea of individual liberty. The concept is also known by the names *voluntary order*, *unimposed order* (Bamyeh 2009, 28), *polycentric order* (Hayek 2011, 230) or *natural order*. (Hoppe 2007, 71). The concept of spontaneous order, where the individuals are the central actors, is opposed to the concept of *imposed order* (Bamyeh 2009, 28) or *conscious order*, where the order is established by the state – as a form of institution which regulates the social (interpersonal) relations with coercion. In that way, the spontaneous order could be defined as: “Significant and positive coordinating force – in which decentralized negotiations, exchanges, and entrepreneurship converge to produce large-scale coordination without, or beyond the capacity of, any deliberate plans or explicit common blueprints for social or economic development.” (Chartier & Charles 2011, 2).

Also, the spontaneous order could be described as the product of *networked individual liberties*, where the voluntary individuals enter in non-coercive social (interpersonal) relations. In that sense, the spontaneous order is the result of the individual’s

preferences, instead of the state's projection. This kind of order doesn't mean that everyone does what he or she likes, but rather it is shaped, or organized by the voluntary agreements and by the *practical authority* (Bamyeh 2009, 27) - instead of absolute or permanent political authority. Using Adam Ferguson's phrase, "the concept of spontaneous market order is a product of *human action* but not *human design*." (Chartier & Charles 2011, 389). The concept of spontaneous order covers the order which does not involve political authority constituting it, but instead it is based on the individual's wills. As it is putted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the founding father of anarchism, the liberty emerges as the *mother* of the order, not as its *daughter*. (Proudhon, 1863). *Non-coercive power* represents the second consequence of potential establishing of the idea of individual liberty, which refers to the types of power which does not involve coercive power, understood as power based of using violence or threat with using violence. The *non-coercive power* corresponds with the Galbraith's *compensatory power* and *conditioned power*. Galbraith defines the *compensatory power* as "winning submission by the offer of affirmative reward, by the giving of something of value to the individual so submitting (...) [t]he individual is aware of the submission for a reward." (Galbraith 1995, 5). It could be concluded, that the *compensatory power* could be identified with the power of *property*, the power of *reward*, the power of *production*, or the power of *service*. In addition, Galbraith defines also, the *conditioned power* as "Wining submission by changing beliefs. Persuasion, education, habituation, social commitment to what seems natural, proper, right causes the individual to submit to the will of another or others. Submission reflects the preferred course; the fact of submission is not recognized." (Galbraith 1995, 5-6). The *conditioned power* refers to the power of the ideas or the power of the persuasion. In the essence of these types of power is using non-violent method, which is totally opposite of the *condign power*, or the *political power*, as a power which is based on (non)institutionalized using of violence. In the typology of Ayn Rand, there are two types of power, the *political power* and the *economic power*. The first one is examined in the beginning of this paper. The economic power, according to Rand is the power of producing and selling the products. (Rand 1967, 52). In addition, it is the power expressed in positive manner, the power of reward, the power of motivation. (Rand 1967, 53). At the first sight it looks that the Rand's *economic power* and Galbraith's *compensatory power* are identical, but further analyze of the both could provide that the Rand's one is broader and incorporates the two types of Galbraith's powers, the *compensatory* and the *conditioned*. The producing, which the economic power is characterized by, does not refer only to some material goods, but also for ideas. In that sense, the market is not used only as an economic category, but rather as a social; it is not only a symbol of material exchange, but rather as comprehensive exchange of goods, which could be material and non-material. According to this statement, the *non-coercive power*, could be identified with the *economic power*, as an incorporating power of all powers which are not using the violence or the threat with violence as their method. In the libertarianism's judgment, the *economic power* is the only justified power for achieving individual or social goals. The Rand's *economic power* also is identical with Albert Jay Nock's concept of *social power*. (Rothbard 2009, 53). The individuals are totally free to use the *economic power*, instead of the *coercive* one. The further operationalization of the economic power results in *economic means* (Oppenheimer 1926, 25) which could also appear as a method of economic power, or as means for satisfying desires. (Oppenheimer 1926, 24).

Minimal government/Private protective agencies are the third consequence of the implementation of the idea of individual liberty. They refer to the political and legal frames of the established free society. The liberty that is attached to an individual is not *absolute*, but it is limited with the liberties of other individuals. The need for respecting the boundaries of each liberty could be satisfied with constituting *minimal government* or *private defense agencies*. These institutions are coercive by its nature, but they express the coercion as a response of coercion. Their function is protecting the individual's *physical integrity, property* and *liberty*. They articulate *condign power*, but in a manner of protection of the mentioned categories. In this context, it couldn't be referred to a political power, because the violence is not *initiatory*, but it is practiced as a *response*. Simply, *the minimal government* and *the private protective agencies* are institutions of *individual's protection*, not institutions of *social regulation*. On the other side, *the minimal government* and *the private protective agencies* differ among themselves. In the concept of *minimal government*, the Government represents *monopoly*. The concept of minimal government is usually adopted in the theories of *ultraminarchism, minarchism, objectivism* and *classical liberalism*. (Osterfeld 1986, 20-29). The theorists of these theories do not believe in the functionality of a fully *stateless society*. They believe in *minimal state*, or *night-watchmen state* (Nozick 1974, 26), who holds the monopoly of all use of *force*. (Nozick 1974, 26). Despite the *minarchists, the individualist anarchists, market anarchists* and *anarcho-capitalists* do believe in the idea of a fully *stateless society*. The idea of *private protective agency* or *dominant protective agency* (Nozick 1974, 25) is widely spread between the anarchists, as a concept who represents total *alternative* to the government. The *agencies* are private, they are offering protection, and the individuals could buy a protection; naive called *private government*. The main difference between the *minimal government*, or *the night-watchmen state* and the *private protective agency* or *dominant protective agency*, is that the first one represents a monopoly, a single center; and in the case of the agencies, it could be developed *multiple centers of power*. (Osterfeld 1986, 356).

The expressed *principles* of the individual liberty, and the *consequences* of the potential implementation of the individual liberty, could be the base of conceptual development of the individual sovereignty, and its manifestation in the society.

Conceptualization and manifestation

The concept of individual sovereignty could be a theoretical amalgam that contains the concept of *sovereignty in its classical sense*, and the political theory of *libertarianism*, specifically the idea of individual liberty, manifested through its *principles* and *consequences*.

The *conceptualization* of individual sovereignty could be based on three principles:

- *Ultimate freedom of his actions*, as long as he or she is not using coercive actions;
- *Voluntary engaging* in every kind of social (interpersonal) relations that produces some effect on him or her;
- *Non-interference* of other individuals or group of individuals with coercive methods and threat of using coercive methods.

The concept of individual sovereignty could result in three gradual *manifestations*:

- Economic/social power, as the only justified kind of power in the social (interpersonal) relations between individuals or group of individuals;
- Spontaneous order, developed on individual’s free will;
- Minimal Government/Private protective agency, as an institution for protecting individual’s physical integrity, property, liberty.

The *individual sovereignty triad* is constituted of:

- *Economic/social power*, as the operationalization of the individual sovereignty;
- *Economic means*, as non-coercive means for satisfying human’s desires;
- *Spontaneous order*, as the manifestation of the individual sovereignty in the social (interpersonal) relations.

In the end, the *individual sovereignty* could be defined as a concept which gives an ultimate primacy of the will of the individual, limited by other individual’s life, property and liberty; inviolable individual’s physical integrity and property; politically manifested in *minimal government* or *private protective agency* and socially manifested in *spontaneous order*.

Table 1: Types of sovereignty (source: My own depiction regarding the sovereignty phenomenon)

Types of sovereignty	Source of the sovereignty	Manifestation in specific political organization
Divine sovereignty	God	Monarchy
National sovereignty	Nation (collective body)	Nation-state
Popular sovereignty	People (sum of individuals)	Republic
Working People sovereignty	Working People	Socialist Republic
<i>Individual sovereignty</i>	<i>Individual</i>	<i>Minimal government/ Private protective agency</i>

Table 2: Dimensions of sovereignty (source: My own depiction regarding the sovereignty phenomenon)

Dimensions of sovereignty	Internal sovereignty	External sovereignty	<i>Individual sovereignty</i>
Context	Domestic	International	<i>General</i>
Actor	The state	The state	<i>Individual</i>
Essence	Supremacy	Independence	<i>Individual liberty</i>
Principle	Freedom of action	Non-intervention/Voluntarism	<i>Free will/ Voluntarism/ Non-interference</i>
Socio-political manifestation	The State	International anarchy	<i>Spontaneous order</i>
Limitation	<i>Jus cogens</i> norms	<i>Jus cogens</i> norms	<i>Life, Property, Liberty</i>




Figure 1: The sovereignty triad




Figure 2: The individual sovereignty triad

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that the conceptualization and manifestation of the individual sovereignty are done in the following way, first by analyze of the concepts of sovereignty and individual liberty, and finally with synthesis of the both. *The sovereignty in a classical sense* could be defined as the ultimate *political power*, practiced by *the state*, over a certain population and objects located on certain territory corresponding with the state's boundaries. *The sovereignty triad* consists of *political power*, *political means* and *the state*. *The sovereignty in classical sense*, determined of the *source* or the *justification* of it, could appear as *divine*, *national*, *popular* and *working people sovereignty*, each of it is manifested in different kind of *political organization*. Determined of the context, *domestic* or *international*, the sovereignty could have two dimensions, *internal* and *external*. The basic principles that the sovereignty rests are *freedom of action*, *non-interference in domestic affairs* and *voluntarism in international affairs*. The *limitations* of the sovereignty are the *jus cogens* norms. *The individual liberty* could be defined as the space in which the individuals can act freely, which is characterized by an absence of using violence or threat with using violence. The three *basic principles* of *the individual liberty* are *individualism*, *voluntarism* and *non-interference*. The three *consequences* of a potential fully adoption of the idea of individual liberty are the emergence of *spontaneous order*, dominance of *social/economic power* in the social (interpersonal) relations and political organization operationalized in a *minimal government* or *private protective agency*. *The individual sovereignty* could be defined as a concept which gives an ultimate primacy of the will of the individual, limited by other individual's life, property and liberty; inviolable individual's physical integrity and property; politically manifested in *minimal government* or *private protective agency* and socially manifested in *spontaneous order*. It is based on the principles of individual's *freedom of action*, *voluntarism* in the social (interpersonal) relations and *non-interference* with coercive means. *The individual sovereignty triad* consists of *economic/social power*, *economic means* and *spontaneous order*. The *limitations* of the individual sovereignty are the *physical integrity* of the individuals and their *property*.

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