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THE EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY POWER: THE NEW CHALLENGES WITH OLD DILEMMAS

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Abstract

Recent crises show clearly that Europeans security depends on external developments. The Common Security and Defense Policy failed to provide security, while the European Union military missions were limited in terms of their scope. This inability threatens the interests and security of the member states. Exactly, this research explores the concept of military power of the EU. In order to elaborate anatomy of military power of the EU, the descriptive-analytic method is used. Military performance analysis proves that the EU is able to have the greatest impact in the global arena. The research shows that with the achievement of a political strategy among the stakeholder, on which the replacement of the consensus mechanism with an ordinary majority is predicted, the EU would be able to lead a proactive and efficient security policy.

Key words: EU; Military; Power; Mechanism; Institutions; Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

Having received the Nobel Peace prize in 2012 for decades of work, the European Union stands out on the world stage to be the main promoter of dialogue as a tool to solve conflicts, wars and not to mention the historical divisions that have followed the European continent with their violence affected citizens and European policy makers to use force only as a last resort. In retrospect, built on the ruins of World War II, protected by shields and the will of the United States of America, with the sole intent to drive back the Soviets, the EU saw the light of day, because it was able to re-establish itself somehow avoiding military question. On the other hand, with Germany and France in the heart of the Union, which had fought each other it was inconceivable that these two great military powers, can describe future together in a common army. Geostrategic transformations that have resulted from the end of the Cold War oblige us to analyze some facts and above all, to review the current situation in a more realistic way. Europe is facing many challenges in a world that is changing at a high speed; all the issues require a joint international response. The latest crisis in Ukraine, the risk of conflict of Syria and the need for protection from terrorism, dramatically shows the extent to which the welfare, safety and quality of life of Europeans depend on external developments. The EU should be a more effective global actor, ready to share responsibility for global security and take the lead in defining common responses and challenges but this cannot be achieved if the Union does not have a simple juristic mechanism that will not protect the interests of the close states but the geostrategic interests of the Union itself.
The crisis in Ukraine and Syria openly displayed weakness of the EU on military matters. Although a decade ago the EU had provided that in case of crisis it will settle one to two thousand troops. Therefore it is clear that Europe, after leaving the problem for decades, now it is forced to take up its responsibilities. Hill argues that if the EU wants to become more convincing actor in the international arena, the gap should be closed, which means that European foreign policy should be indicated in its behavior, and not in aspirations and views. (Martinsen 2006, 1-2). This research examines the background of the demand for an independent army and European power, after the massacre of the Yugoslav wars and new challenges that threaten the continent. The Ukraine crisis and that of Syria, not to mention the rest, make Europe today to reconsider its approach on security and above all, to restore the fundamental issue, its future and its existence. However, this would be impossible if there will not become profound changes within the legal mechanisms of the EU.

A LITTLE BACKGROUND:
EFFORTS TO CREATE THE EU MILITARY POWER

If we look back, the security and defense are the main topic of discussion during the EU project. For much of the European Union’s existence, acquisition of a military power had been a strictly intangible concept. The French Government of Rene Pleven, was concerned by the resurgence of possible German militarism, in February 1951, in Paris, opened a conference on the establishment of Community Protection, including a ‘European army’\(^1\) which will never enter into force, because the French National Assembly refused to ratify (30 August 1954) after the French Communist Party and the Gaullist Party voted against. (George and Bache 2001, 69). At the time this initiative was considered as premature, and this failure dragged the project for an indefinite time. Although launched a number of successive initiatives during the Cold War, security and defense remained largely the domain of NATO and the United Nations. There had long been plans for a European Defense Community, for example, a pan-European collective mainly aimed towards countering a potentially unified Germany. However once West Germany joined NATO in 1955 these plans quickly fell from the agenda. Many attempts to introduce defense to the European agenda would follow the same pattern; initial enthusiasm before being disregarded. The Maastricht treaty saw the first concrete move towards the ratifying of an EU mission; containing an explicit reference to the framing of a joint defense policy but limited explanations of how this would be achieved. The Yugoslav Wars concentrated minds and led the EU to truly assess and question its military ineptitude for the first time. The brutality, media images of the appalling human rights abuses and enormous number of fatalities produced a harsh impetus for the move towards a concrete policy. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1995 was introduced as a direct response to the events in Yugoslavia and proved to be the most concrete strategy towards a militarized Europe. It created common strategies on key regions, greater capacity to act and more control over foreign policy instruments.

The headline goal was the establishment of the European Security and Defensive Policy which would be expanded by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 to incorporate both input from both the council and the commission. A decisive component, likely introduced to

\(^1\) Rene Pleven proposed the creation of a European army which would include 14 French divisions, 12 German, 11 Italian and three from Benelux countries with a common command.
appease the member states sense of sovereignty, was the “emergency brake”, enabling states to voice opposition on the grounds of national interest. (Pipes 2014).

With the birth of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in Saint-Malo in 1998, the Union has committed more than 20 crisis management operations, six of them militarily. It also adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and its update in 2008, which was the missing link that gave purpose and direction sense CSDP (Martinsen 2009, 2).

THEORETICAL APPROACH:
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE EU MILITARY POWER?

There are many definitions about “power”. It derives from the military power: the ability to use force. Having powerful resources such as raw materials, population, territory, economic power, military force, does not necessarily translate into “power” i.e. the ability to attain the outcome one wants. (Rois-Smith 2009, 279-280). Karen Smith outlines some instruments with which an actor can influence other actors: the use of persuasion, offering prizes, awards, threats. This definition is according to traditional principles. Joseph S. Nye distinguishes between two types of power: hard and soft. “Hard power” stems from military and economic strength and its characteristic is the use of “carrot” or “stick”. “Hard power” is characterized by traditional state instruments, use of force and bribery. On the other hand “Soft power”, is attractive, you force others to love the exact results that you want. (Ilik 2012, 82-83). The power of an actor depends on his ability to be a leading-example. If other actors respect and join his aspirations, then there is no need to use impacts and threats. “Soft power” can be derived from cultural and political values of a country. When the culture of a country includes universal values and its policies and promotes the values and interests that others receive, all this increases the likelihood of winning the desired results, due to attractive relations. (Haara 2013). Karen Smith suggests that this kind of actor uses and depends on military means to influence other actors, who wants unilateral military conclusion and foreign policy which is not democratic. Huntington believes that the use of military force is anti-humanitarian, whose purpose is to kill people in the most efficient manner. Huntington thinks about the purpose of the military power, its capacity should be used for humanitarian activities and other civic activities, but the military should not be engaged or be trained to perform such a role. (Krohn 2009). According to these definitions, only a dictatorial state could qualify as a pure military power, such as North Korea. But in this group we can also introduce US, due to its high military budget and unilateral actions in international relations. In addition, it is still reasonable to apply the concept of military power, because the role of military engagement as a whole seems to be changing in a new concept. The idea of territorial defense has changed into new idea. The EU as a whole does not have single army to ensure its protection. Consequently, the influence of Brussels is based mainly on the strength of its “soft”, its capacity to influence without obligation. Therefore, moving away from the concept of the EU as a clean civilian power; is it possible to regard the EU as a military force, but in the new sense?
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

As part of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU has launched several operations on her part about military crisis management and civil rights. Here is a brief overview of the main elements of the legal framework on operations in the Lisbon Treaty. This means that civilian and military operations found their way into the primary legislation of the EU as a liability and legal obligation. (Vooren et al. 2013). Under Article 42 (1) of the Lisbon Treaty, “the common security policy and defense,” gives the Union the operational capacity based on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the EU for maintaining peace, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter”. These missions are defined by Article 43 of this Treaty; they “shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization” and can “contribute to the fight against terrorism, including the support of the third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” (Naert 2011).

We can only note that since 2009 and the Lisbon Treaty, Europe has not moved forward much on this strategic file. Actually, Lisbon constitutes a notable progression after Maastricht (1993, creation of the CFSP) and Saint-Malo (propositions for a European Policy of Security and Defense, CSDP, 1998) by introducing an important clause, that of mutual Defense, which formally ensures the assistance of other Union members if a state is the object of aggression. With these increased powers, the European Defense Agency (EDA) ensures better coordination than before, which the Permanent Structured Cooperation now complements. But such a commitment does not really equal a global strategy, and these commendable advances are insufficient to provide Europe the status of superpower, which would enable it to affect the order of things and to ensure that tomorrow’s world is a better world. (Blin 2015).

THE MILITARY INTERVENTION AND ITS CAPACITY

However, as we already mentioned above, certain responsibilities of the EU include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks in military combat and crisis management, including peacemaking. On 31 March 2003, the EU launched its first military operation - peacekeeping mission in Macedonia. Operation ‘Concordia’ with 357 troops deployed (by all EU members except Ireland and Denmark, as well as 14 other countries - an average of 13 soldiers who took part by a Member State) in a small mountain country such as Macedonia, and successfully they kept the peace after the conflict in 2001. This was a big operation with political and modest symbolism compared to military size. By 2010, however, the EU launched a total of 27 missions in 16 countries on three continents. It is important to note that, from 27 missions, only six include military force. The EU has shown that it can deploy military forces in different variants. 7000 peacekeepers were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 and constitute the greatest strength that has ever been located. In 2003, 2000 troops were deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, without the help from NATO, which demonstrated the EU's ability to fight high-intensity battles against large rebel forces. 3700 soldiers were deployed to protect refugee camps in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 showed the EU's
ability to overcome major challenges and logistical challenges of ecological environment. Anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia shows that the EU takes a leading role in the maritime operation with many other countries (including those of NATO) that are coordinated from the headquarters of the EU. But despite the military capabilities proven in the field, the 'foot' of the EU military is not the main purpose of ESDP. (Hill and Smith 2011, 207-208). This is the first time that the EU has “military force”, which means that it is prepared for military actions. Even if the EU has achieved its own independent military ability, the question arises whether the member states will ever agree on any joint intervention? Humanitarian mission in Somalia issued in a state of war or mission in Congo, in which the Union participated directly in military frontal battle without the help of NATO. All this implies that the inclusion of the EU staff in the battle front clearly rejects the concept of the EU, as a civil pure power. However, the situation would have been different, if there were a single European army. Europe as a military force will end their ability to challenge the American power on its continent, but also in the Caucasus and Africa. A related question is that, if the EU has reached its own independent military capability, will the Member States ever agree for any joint intervention?

WAR AND DIPLOMACY REMAIN STATE FRANCHISE

The rhetorical question of the former US secretary Henry Kissinger “[w]hom do I call if I want to call Europe,” has expressed a lack of interaction and identity of the EU’s Foreign Policy. Unfortunately, the practical experience proved this in many crises as in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, all these showed real deep differences resulting share of the EU countries regarding the Foreign Policy and Security (CFSP). The EU remains a special and unique body of its kind, it does not work at the political level, according to classical schemes known as confederation or federation (like the US, Germany, Switzerland or Russia), in which foreign policy is exclusive federal jurisdiction and the role of federated states is limited. Although in a wide range of policy areas, the member states of the EU have a shared decision-making mechanism, thus significantly simplifying the construction of the compromise, the foreign policy does not work according to this reality. In the field of foreign policy, dominated by the concept of sovereignty and independence where the historical and geopolitical interests of the nations take advantage, the political game, requires support from all member states, the Brussels institutions have a simplistic role. Diplomacy, as well as war, remains a state completely exclusive and evaluated essentially as national sovereignty. The history of the EU operation has shown that the more files strengthen their political character, the more deepen interstate conflicts (the war in Iraq in 2003, military intervention in Mali in 2013, Syria in 2013, the issue of Kosovo, in which 5 Member States refuse its recognition, not to mention arguments over enlargement policies, etc.). The members’ political views are different from each other which generate disagreements.
THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS: 
THE NEED FOR A HISTORICAL STRATEGY

The research question is whether the EU has managed to have a military force that meets its needs? Any military activity is likely to acquire a majority vote if not total support and so states’ various vested interests and general foreign policy positions are likely to collide, for example, Germany’s legendary pragmatism clashing with Britain’s occasional notions of itself as a spreader of democracy.

Various mechanisms created over the years, that are affecting the foreign policy of the EU, have been assessed as ineffective for the complete fulfillment of this framework. Security Policy and the Common Defense, operates with a unanimous vote, which was never put into question, as long as there is no willingness to move to a qualified majority vote, to define a common foreign policy efficiently. The historical background of the crisis and conflicts has shown that national preferences take priority over those of Europe. Missing the political will, even the Lisbon Treaty failed to intervene in the political essence of this kind of functioning. The consensus among Member States was not to discuss this point. Creating a unifying mechanism would make possible the unification of attitudes of the Member States of the union in a single position. However, the Treaty of Lisbon enabled creating of some mechanisms to improve the decision-making process: the creation of the post of President of the Council; Office of the High Representative of the EU and the European Diplomatic Service Office. With the goal, the establishment of a functioning real political field, which will allow the strengthening of the European role in the international arena, the European countries should consider historical strategy that would make it easier EU participation in military conflicts. The proposed configurations, although appearing as a political necessity for strengthening the role of the EU diplomatic influence and its credibility in the international scene, it depends largely on consensus and finding a common political will. As long as we are dealing with a missing political will, the EU’s diplomatic voice will be represented by following national interests that will prevail over European ones. The actual European crisis re-creates the same functional scheme. (Dita, 2014).

However, without a serious political strategy of Member States, without a common foreign policy without a military structure which will serve as an instrument of this strategy, Europe is not only doomed to play a secondary role, but above all, put their safety at risk by disturbing instability of regions like the Middle East which has already had consequences on the European continent. To overcome this important step for the Union itself political difficulties are great.

CONCLUSION

The former Belgian Prime Minister Marc Eysken metaphorically described the European Communities as an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm. This metaphor points to the fact that it is an economic actor, but on the other hand it is not able to be aggressive player in the military, because of foreign policy, which cannot form political strategic and moves with one voice. The EU appears as a “multi-perspective” actor, which is “under construction”. It is developing as the integration process continues. So, as a result of this, the EU cannot be seen as a defined entity, but that changes and grows in its character and scope. This gives hope that the EU could change its future in the military. By the end of the Cold War until now the EU is working out how to take its place
in the new world order as a powerful actor. The Union does not want to be in the shadow of other powerful actors in the world. Therefore, the construction of a joint military structure is a vital issue for the future of the European Union. In fact, a quick look at the current military landscape in Europe tells us much about the absence of a common vision and the lack of interoperability between national forces. A related question is that, if the EU has reached its own independent military capability, will the Member States ever agree for any joint intervention? Any military activity is likely to get a majority vote but hard to track the positions of consensus and general foreign policy is likely to collide. Due to this, the EU needs a strategy in a historic decision that will enable the EU to intervene militarily without the consent of the Member States but with a simple majority, in cases when the continent will be threatened or felt threats within and outside Europe. Among other things, it would prevent the genocide, would defend itself from terrorist threats would provide security together with other global actors. It is a fact that Europe has often failed when it has been confused due to the inability of member states to coordinate and agree with each other. If it does not want to be a victim of external threats, Europe needs an efficient army. Therefore a European military force would be effective if it prevented conflicts within its territory and at the same time if it was necessary to intervene in other countries of the world, without being hindered by legal mechanisms.
REFERENCES