The 2014 European Elections. The Case of Poland
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Introduction

This article presents the conduct and consequence of the election to the European Parliament held in Poland on 25 May 2014. It is a commonly accepted view that elections are inherent in the democratic order. Members of the European Parliament are elected following a similar procedure to that governing the elections to national Parliaments. Probably as widespread is the opinion that, since they do not result in the election of the executive branch of government, European elections are of less significance to the competing parties – which appear to prioritise their participation in the future government – than the competition for seats in the national parliament. As a consequence, the lesser impact of the decisions made at the ballot box is also translated into a less intense interest in the European elections expressed by the electorate. For this reason, elections to the European Parliament are often referred to as a second-order election.\(^1\)

Irrespective of the significance attached to European Parliament elections, Polish citizens tend to be generally positive about the functioning of this institution. In fact, according to the results of the 2013 Eurobarometer survey, 51% of the Polish respondents expressed their trust in the EU Parliament in November 2013, a result which considerably exceeded the European average (39%) and ranked Poland 12\(^{th}\) in terms of the level of trust in this institution. It is also worth pointing out that the EU Parliament enjoyed greater trust of Poles than many of their home institutions did, including those

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fostering the highest levels of trust, i.e., the media (the above survey showed the following to have earned the greatest trust of Polish people: radio – 57%, television – 53%, press – 48%, Internet – 45%). The European Union as a whole managed to win the trust of 45% of Poles, as compared with 19% and 17% of trust placed in the Polish government and Parliament, respectively\(^2\).

As a rule, Poles do not question the significance of their country’s membership of EU structures, with their support for the EU peaking on the tenth anniversary of Poland’s accession to the European Union, which also corresponded with the third elections to the European Parliament participated in by Polish political parties. As is indicated by research conducted on a regular basis by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), the Poland of 2014 enjoys its citizens’ almost uniform approval of EU membership: in March 2014, its supporters amounted to as many as 89% of respondents, whereas opponents were a mere 7% of the sample. Similar results were obtained in 2007 – 89% of respondents declared their support for Poland’s EU membership, while only 5% were against it.

Among the most important advantages of being a member of the EU indicated by respondents were the opening up of borders and freedom of movement (31%), financial benefits in the form of EU funds (30%), extensive agricultural subsidies (13%), and impulse to economic growth (10%). As the study was conducted in 2014, in the face of the military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, a proportion of respondents (5%) emphasised the role of national security that Poland enjoys due to its membership of the EU.

The major threats and disadvantages indicated by respondents as arising out of Poland’s accession to the EU included excessive bureaucracy (12%), limited sovereignty of the state resulting from the necessity to comply with top-down decisions of the EU (8%), the need for adapting Polish law to EU regulations (6%), and making the Polish economy dependent on foreign capital (5\(^3\)).

The above observations make it justified to argue that, with respect to issues concerning the place of Poland in Europe, there is little potential for heated debate and fierce campaigns inasmuch as Polish elections to the European Parliament are concerned. However, despite a sweeping majority of Polish society declaring itself to be in favour of their country’s membership of the EU, there still exists a group of respondents who stressed the disadvantages of joining it. The Eurosceptics, who were relatively few in number among the country’s political elites, appealed to this group of voters and, as a result,
undermined the consensus that the elites had previously built about Poland’s membership of the EU.

**The Legal Framework for Elections to the European Parliament in Poland**

Elections to the European Parliament in Poland are governed by the provisions of the Act of 5 January 2011 – The Electoral Code, which replaced the previously binding electoral regulations that had been in force since 23 January 2004. Under the Electoral Code, candidates for deputies to the European Parliament can be nominated by electoral committees of political parties, electoral committees of a coalition (consisting of two or more political parties), and electoral committees of voters (formed by at least 15 citizens). Lists of candidates are submitted to constituency electoral commissions, which register them as constituency lists. Such lists, submitting between five and ten candidates each, must be supported by at least 10,000 voters who permanently reside in a given electoral constituency. The country is divided into 13 constituencies that cover the area of a province, two provinces, or part of a province, as is the case of the capital city of Warsaw and Mazovia Province.

An electoral committee may not exceed the expenditure limit on election campaigning calculated as the sum of 0.60 PLN (~ 0.14 EUR) on each voter included in the register of voters for a given constituency. Electoral committees may accept funds for electoral agitation from natural persons (limited up to 15 times the national minimum wage; in 2014, the limit was set to 25,200 PLN, i.e., ~ 6,031 EUR) and from candidates for deputies to the European Parliament (the limit, specified as 45 times the national minimum wage, was set in 2014 to 75,600 PLN, i.e., ~ 18,094 EUR). Furthermore, committees may obtain the funds by taking out bank loans, while political parties may fund their committees from their own resources pursuant to the Act of 1997 on political parties.

Electoral committees that have won at least one seat in the European Parliament are eligible for reimbursement of the expenditure incurred within so-called “subjective” donations. The donation is calculated according to the following formula:

\[
\text{The amount of the donation cannot exceed a given committee’s total expenditure on election campaigning.}
\]

Taking into account the method for calculating subjective donations, one cannot help but wonder why political parties are so devoted to mobilising the public to participate in the election. In other words, rather than striving for a

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broader voter participation, which would translate into a higher level of legitimisation of the European Parliament, it may be the case that political parties are equally concerned about the amount of donation, as it depends on the number of valid votes.

It is also worth emphasising that seats are distributed only among the committees that have received at least 5% of public support nationally. The distribution of seats is based on the d’Hondt method.

Another issue that is significant for the legal principles governing elections to the European Parliament in Poland is the possibility offered to electoral committees with respect to the presentation of their programmes in public media. Each committee that has registered constituency lists in at least half of the electoral constituencies is awarded the right to broadcast its election materials free of charge on nationwide channels of radio and television, whereas each committee that has registered at least one electoral constituency list is given such a right with regard to regional channels. The total airtime for broadcasting election materials on nationwide channels is limited to 15 hours of broadcast on Polish television from 5 p.m. to 11 p.m., and to 20 hours of broadcast by Polish Radio. Airtime for broadcasting materials on regional television and radio channels is limited to 10 and 20 hours, respectively. Airtime for broadcasting election materials is divided into equal parts among the committees that have registered their lists in at least half of the electoral constituencies, while in the case of the committees that have registered their lists in less than half of the constituencies, airtime is divided proportionally according to the number of constituency lists registered.

Following the definition of the legal principles governing electoral competition, I shall now proceed to describe the election campaign and present the parties competing in the election to the European Parliament in Poland.

**Election Campaign to the European Parliament**

Dominated for the last seven years by two major parties, the political situation in Poland on the eve of the 2014 election to the European Parliament was a stable one. The competitors were Civic Platform (PO), co-ruling since 2007, and the opposing Law and Justice (PiS) (see the Appendix, Table 1). Two other parties enjoyed the stable support of the electorate: Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL).

It has commonly been assumed that the 2014 election campaign was run in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its consequences for Poland and Europe. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the politicians laid particular emphasis on the issues concerning international politics and national security of the country. In its election spots, PO argued that the ruling party was the only one to ensure the safety of Polish citizens, as it was Donald Tusk, the then prime-minister, who maintained strong relationships with the political leaders of
France, Germany, and the United States, i.e., the countries of key significance to the functioning of NATO – the main guarantor of Poland’s security. In fact, in one of those spots the prime-minister expressly stated that “what is really at stake in these elections is the national security of Poland”. This and a number of similar declarations led multiple commentators to believe that Donald Tusk inspired a sense of threat in the public in order to present himself more convincingly as a statesman capable of leading Poland to safety. It was precisely such elements, which featured extensively in PO’s campaign, that made SLD claim that the incumbent party had come to resemble PiS more than ever before.

The salience of the international situation and security was indisputable. Nevertheless, the two largest actors on the Polish political scene conducted their campaigns with the primary focus on the negative: in line with the strategies they had been following for several years, the electoral committees of both PO and PiS indulged in pointing out the failures, negligence, and mistakes of their competitors. In addition, PO also took advantage of presenting their achievements as the incumbent party and underlined the opportunities that supporting it in the election to the European Parliament would create.

When commenting on the election campaign, it is worth pointing out that both committees with the highest chances of winning (PiS and PO) prepared election TV spots that turned out to follow similar conventions and share a number of similarities in terms of graphic design. PiS used its spot to denounce several of PO’s deputies to the European Parliament who, according to the authors of the film, failed to represent Poland with dignity, and instead brought disgrace upon their homeland. Those considered to be worthy of such condemnation were: former vice-president of the European Parliament, Jacek Protasiewicz, who came into conflict with customs officers of Frankfurt airport while under the influence of alcohol; the Minister of Finance, Jacek Rostowski, who was claimed to be responsible for increasing the external debt of the country; the Minister of Administration and Digitization, Michał Boni, who insisted on Poland’s signing of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which was perceived as posing a threat to freedom of using the Internet; and MEP Michał Kamiński – the “traitor” who abandoned PiS and was counted among MEPs to most frequently leave the meetings of the European Parliament before the end.

In response to that move, PO created a film entitled The Bringers of Shame, which, not unlike the original, also criticised its competitors by name: Adam Hofman, who bragged about the measurements of his penis to female employees; deputy Karol Karski, whom a Cypriot court found guilty of destroying hotel property; and deputy Krystyna Pawłowicz, who did not hesitate to call the flag of the European Union a “rag”. The above catalogue of

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5 The similarity was so striking that when I showed the spots of PO and PiS during a lecture delivered at the Comenius University in Bratislava, my colleagues and the students of the Department of Political Science supposed that they both must have been produced by one advertising agency.
behaviour which PO found to have brought shame on Poland was crowned by a PiS-organised manifestation during which the EU was compared to a concentration camp: the participants of the march carried a banner reading “Konzentration Lager Europa”.

The two dominant parties were not efficiently challenged by the smaller ones – Left Democratic Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). The situation of the former was complicated by the clash over the monopoly on representing leftist circles that occurred between SLD and Palikot’s Movement (RP) led by Janusz Palikot. The conflict was further intensified in February 2013 when Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former president of the Republic of Poland, who had remained close to SLD for many years, supported the initiative of Marek Siwiec (deputy to the European Parliament, who left the party at the end of 2012) and Janusz Palikot. The three politicians declared their aspiration to unite Polish centre-left parties, thus inviting members of SLD to cooperate. At the same time, they announced that Ryszard Kalisz, a member of SLD and former Chief of President Kwaśniewski’s Chancellery, had already received and accepted such an invitation. As a consequence of this event, Kalisz was expelled from SLD in April 2013.

A breakthrough in the process of institutionalising the cooperation between former SLD politicians and RP was made in March 2013 with the registration of Europa Plus Social Movement. Changes were also introduced to Palikot’s party, which was renamed Your Movement (TR) in October 2013. Notably, Marek Siwiec and Ryszard Kalisz joined the ranks of party members and in so doing heightened tensions between SLD and TR only further.

The initiative aiming to unite centre-left parties posed a serious threat to SLD, especially given the support of the still-popular ex-president Aleksander Kwaśniewski. It appears justified to argue that these ambitious plans of Europa Plus were thwarted by a single conference, namely one held in April 2013, during which Kwaśniewski appeared to many observers as being under the influence of alcohol. This attracted rather fierce criticism, especially as it was not the first time his behaviour had been suggestive of excessive alcohol use. The incident brought disgrace upon Europa Plus and rendered it no longer attractive for potential cooperation. Even so, the key factor leading to the gradual marginalisation of Europa Plus was in fact the attitude of SLD’s leaders, who, unwilling to share the benefits of leadership, consistently refused to cooperate with the Movement. In this context, it is worth taking a closer look at the election strategies that both parties adopted. In its spots, SLD tried to convince voters that PO and PiS were not significantly different from each other, and that it was only their party that was able to bring new ideas to public discourse and policy-making. In the opinion of SLD, PO came to resemble PiS in 2014 when its leader, Donald Tusk, chose to communicate with the public by means of rhetoric that had previously been employed mainly by PiS: his campaign speeches now featured the threat of war posed to East-Central Europe by Russia.
Europa Plus advertised itself as a broad political and social initiative based on modern values. This, however, did not prevent it from launching a negative campaign; it paid more attention to PiS, rather than PO, and focused on pointing out the backwardness of its programme and the party’s aspiration to turn Poland into a police state.

Among the less significant committees, the election campaign of Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New Right (KNP) deserves a special mention, as this party was the only representative of what might be called “Euroreject” or hard Euroscepticism. The campaign was executed mainly through meetings with electors as well as via the Internet. The party’s spot levelled sharp criticism at the EU for undergoing a continuous process of bureaucratisation and systematically violating civil liberties. In their own words, KNP’s deputies took their chance to win seats in the European Parliament so as to bring down the EU from the inside, a rhetoric that strongly resembles the one advocated by the Polish party League of Polish Families (LPR) during the 2004 European Parliament election campaign.

As most political parties are focused on advertising in the mass media, it is worth presenting at this point the broadcasting time that selected committees received by public and privately-owned television channels, which was the subject of a study carried out by the Public Media Department at the National Broadcasting Council’s Office (a constitutional body responsible for monitoring whether free speech, the right to information, and public interests are respected on radio and television). The study monitored television programmes broadcast during the two weeks leading up to the beginning of pre-election silence, i.e., between 10 May and 23 May, 12 a.m. The conclusion we may derive from the data given in Table 2 (see the Appendix) is that public and privately-owned TV channels privileged the main political actors. However, this lack of balance differed across particular cases. To summarize, it could be argued that the election campaign was not a particularly eventful one. Even so, a single initiative of PiS deserves to be mentioned at this point, as it added a touch of piquancy to the competition. In an ironic move, after they realised that PO’s

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spot was partially shot in the halls belonging to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, the representatives of PiS applied to the Chancellery for renting the very same venue so that they could film their own spots there. Arguably, this was aimed to show that the prime minister had abused his privileges while campaigning for power.

**Election Results**

The EP elections were held on 25 May 2014, between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m. Despite Polish enthusiasm for the European project, voter turnout remained rather low (23.82%). Low levels of participation in EP elections have recently become an East Central European trademark, and whereas Polish turnout was higher than in countries such as the Czech Republic (18.20%) and Slovakia (13.05%), it was still significantly lower compared to other countries in the region: Lithuania (47.35%), Latvia (36.52%), and Bulgaria (35.84%)\(^9\). The number of valid votes was 7,297,490, whereas the number of wasted votes amounted to 228,005, i.e., 3.12% of the total number of the vote cast (for detailed results see the Appendix, Table 3). The turnout in the 2014 EP election in Poland was similar to that in the 2004 (20.87%) and 2009 elections (24.53%)\(^1\).

With 32.13% of support, PO claimed yet another election victory, being however only slightly ahead of PiS (31.78%). Much to the surprise of observers, KNP received 7.15% of valid votes and came ahead of PSL (6.80%), which had been part of the ruling coalition. Similarly surprising was the low score of Europa Plus Your Movement: it received a mere 3.58% of support, a result which failed to achieve the minimal barrier clause that would secure the committee’s representation in the European Parliament. As a result, SLD, with 9.44% of votes, became the party chosen to represent centre-left circles.

As a consequence of the European elections, the Polish political parties joined the ranks of the political groups in the European Parliament to which they already belonged: PO, along with its coalition partner PSL, became members of the European People’s Party; PiS – European Conservatives and Reformists; and SLD – Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. As of yet (November 2014), only KNP, a new political party in the parliament, does not have an affiliation with a European party family. It is believed that French National Front might become an ally of KNP. However, the talks of these parties have so far proven fruitless.

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Concluding Remarks:
In the Aftermath of the Electoral Race

In conclusion, I would like to consider the view, which is widely accepted among political scientists, that the elections to the European Parliament are second-order elections. If one were to measure the importance of individual elections by voter turnout, the 2014 European election in Poland would certainly be a case in point. However, its results, which also confirmed that the Polish electoral system had developed a stable pattern of competition, led to far-reaching consequences for several parties. As it turned out, two of the recently established right-wing parties that aimed to compete for the votes with PiS, that is, Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidary Poland (SP; established by an ex-member of PiS) and Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together (established by an ex-member of PO), were to acknowledge the supremacy of the party led by Jarosław Kaczyński (that is, PiS). As a consequence of that defeat, both parties decided to cooperate with PiS during local government elections that are to be held in November 2014.

More salient changes were found to affect the left part of the competition. As has been mentioned above, the battle over the centre-left electorate was won by SLD. As a result of an internal crisis that afflicted Your Movement after the crushing defeat in the European elections, several members of the parliamentary group left the club of Your Movement, two of whom were immediately embraced by SLD.

As for Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s party, it is difficult to assess its chances of becoming a permanent element of the Polish party system. According to an election exit poll conducted on the day of the election by the Ipsos research group, which was commissioned by public television and the privately-owned TVN, KNP won the greatest support among the youngest members of the electorate – 43% of its supporters were aged between 18 and 25 years, while 31.1% were aged 26 to 39. Men constituted a sweeping majority of the party’s supporters – 74.2%, as opposed to 25.8% of women. Even so, the support received from female voters came as a surprise given the party leader’s highly controversial views concerning women. Janusz Korwin-Mikke is doubtless a valuable asset to his party. In the long run, however, his actions are likely to meet with the disapproval of voters, as even the most avid enthusiasts of scandalising behaviour in politics may turn away from violence, however low-level. This is a reference to an infamous situation when, while waiting for a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon after the results of the European

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election were made public, Korwin-Mikke slapped ex-Minister of Administration and Digitization, Michał Boni, in the face. The aggressor, who was eventually denied entry to the meeting, commented on the event that long ago he had promised Boni that he would slap him in the face for not being apologised to. In Korwin-Mikke’s opinion, he deserved an apology after Boni officially claimed him to be wrong in stating that Boni had collaborated with the security services in the past. Korwin-Mikke felt deeply hurt by his words, especially that several years later Boni admitted to having collaborated with the secret police of the People’s Republic of Poland.

The 2014 European elections opened up an election marathon in Poland. Still in 2014, the country is holding local government election, while in 2015 – parliamentary and presidential elections. The following year will show whether the trends established in the 2014 European election (marginalisation of Your Movement and growing importance of KNP) will also hold in future elections. It is with some degree of certainty, however, that one can expect both PiS and PO to retain their dominant position on the Polish political scene.
## APPENDIX

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The candidate of which electoral committee would you support in the upcoming elections?</th>
<th>Respondents’ answers according to polls</th>
<th>March 2014 (N=410)</th>
<th>April 2014 (N=380)</th>
<th>April/May 2014 (N=427)</th>
<th>May 2014 (N=418)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidary Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance – Labour Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europa Plus Your Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New Right</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other electoral committee</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral committee</th>
<th>Total airtime in main news programmes on public television</th>
<th>Total airtime in main news programmes on the privately-owned channel TVN</th>
<th>Total airtime in main news programmes on the privately-owned channel Polsat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform</td>
<td>45 minutes, 16 seconds</td>
<td>17 minutes, 27 seconds</td>
<td>17 minutes, 26 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>44 minutes, 39 seconds</td>
<td>22 minutes, 32 seconds</td>
<td>18 minutes, 49 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europa Plus Your Movement</td>
<td>27 minutes, 27 seconds</td>
<td>16 minutes, 31 seconds</td>
<td>06 minutes, 45 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance – Labour Union</td>
<td>23 minutes, 18 seconds</td>
<td>8 minutes, 19 seconds</td>
<td>3 minutes, 48 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New</td>
<td>17 minutes, 31 seconds</td>
<td>5 minutes, 12 seconds</td>
<td>2 minutes, 05 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidary Poland: 15 minutes, 20 seconds
Polish Peasant Party: 13 minutes, 47 seconds
Jaroslaw Gowin’s Poland Together: 11 minutes, 39 seconds
National Movement: 5 minutes, 46 seconds

Table 3
Results of the European Election Held in Poland on 25 May 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral committee</th>
<th>No. of valid votes</th>
<th>Votes in %</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidary Poland</td>
<td>281.079</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Movement</td>
<td>98.626</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance – Labour Union</td>
<td>667.319</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>2,246,870</td>
<td>31.78</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europa Plus Your Movement</td>
<td>252,779</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaroslaw Gowin’s Poland Together</td>
<td>223,733</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New Right</td>
<td>505,586</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform</td>
<td>2,271,215</td>
<td>32.13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party</td>
<td>480,846</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other electoral committee</td>
<td>41,432</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,141,840</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: You should cite the official source of your data. In this case, it appears that you are citing the official sources for election results and campaign strategies. You may want to include a direct quote or a specific sentence from the source to provide context. For example:
