

After Kosovo: a political science symposium - perspectives from Southern Italy

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Klaus Segbers / Simon Raiser / Björn Warkalla (eds.)

After Kosovo

A Political Science Symposium – Perspectives
from Southern Italy

23_{/1999}

**Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts
der Freien Universität Berlin**
Arbeitsbereich Politik und Gesellschaft

Klaus Segbers / Simon Raiser / Björn Warkalla (eds.)

**After Kosovo. A Political Science
Symposium – Perspectives from
Southern Italy**

Heft 23/1999

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1) Preface

In May 1999, a group of researchers and students from the Department of Political and Social Sciences and some colleagues from other countries got together for the third time in the picturesque Campanian village of Positano. These meetings, traditionally labelled 'Horizons', provide the opportunity to discuss recent texts on social sciences, international relations, political economy, transformation processes and other fields, under the sun (and sometimes the rain) of Southern Italy. The context of this year's meeting, the public discussions, and in a direct sense flight delays all over Italy made it unavoidable to take up the most urgent subject for political scientists in those weeks: the military, political and cultural events in and around Kosovo.

The participants got some 15 questions regarding the Kosovo crisis or rather, more exactly, regarding possible consequences of the events for political science. These questions were answered shortly before the meeting, and the answers were worked over after Positano. The aim of this paper, however, was to preserve the spontaneous character of the original inputs. Together with the protocol of the actual discussion in Positano, the questionnaire and all answers are published below. Also, a connected but separate text by Klaus Segbers on the role of Russia is added (text in German). The contributions by Sergei Medvedev are excerpts from a forthcoming publication 'Kosovo as fin de siècle of European Security'. An important note: The contributions have been edited and repetitions deleted in order to enhance readability. Thus, omissions in the contributions do not mean that the particular author did not regard a particular point as relevant, it might just be the case that it is already expressed in a preceding comment.

While stressing different aspects and advancing various explanations, most participants of Horizons 1999 agreed in a remarkable way on some fundamental consequences of this conflict which was much more than a Balkan crisis. German and Russian actors' role and impact have to be reassessed. The future potential of military missions and the capability of Western societies to wage war must be re-evaluated. The so-called new international order – or disorder – is to be discussed, as well as the changing role of the UN and the Westphalian principle of sovereignty. The possibly most interesting aspects may be related to the questions of adhocism, virtual politics and missing agendas, possibly leading towards a new conception of agency.

We hope to contribute to a due discussion.

Klaus Segbers, Simon Raiser, Björn Warkalla

Free University of Berlin, July 1999

2) Questions on the war in Kosovo

2.1 In the conflict in and around Kosovo and Serbia, who were the relevant actors and parties involved, and what were their main interests?

RAI/BWA: Throughout the crisis, Milosevic's behaviour can best be explained by his absolute determination to stay in power. For this, it was necessary to show the Serbs that he was prepared to fight for a Serbian Kosovo, irrespective of the actual outcome. There were two possible outcomes of his strategy: Either he had succeeded in forcing NATO to stop the war due to public pressure in the Western states. In this case he could have painted himself as the guardian of Greater Serbia and a Serbian Kosovo having expelled the Kosovo Albanians. One could argue that his aim was a new Balkan conference in which he might have succeeded in having the Balkan maps redrawn, possibly trading off parts of Kosovo against the right to annex the Bosnian Serb Republic.

The second possibility was to concede military defeat in the face of the combined military might of the 'evil' powers of the western world, betrayed by the fellow Russian Slavs. In this case he could have claimed that he put up a brave fight for a Greater Serbia. In both cases his actions would have been shaped more by the pressures of the dominant nationalist discourse than by strategic and economic long-term interests concerning the fate of Yugoslavia as a whole.

NATO wanted to promote itself as a world-wide guarantor of peace and stability at the expense of the UN and other security regimes (OSCE, WEU). This is part of NATO's attempts to redefine its role in the post-Cold War world, and to legitimise its continued existence. Another aim was to show off the expensive high-tech weaponry and to justify continued high-level military spending. An important objective was to intimidate future aggressors and rogue states, a consideration that became paramount as soon as NATO had got involved. It could not afford to lose the war, as NATO would have been discredited as an effective organisation, especially in the year of its enlargement and 50th anniversary. Apart from this, a comprehensive and coherent military and especially political strategy did not seem to exist, however, and NATO was seen to be continuously overtaken by events.

USA: Clinton tried to end his presidency with a foreign policy 'success' to deflect attention from the Lewinsky affair. Also, the US wanted to promote its role as the primary power in world security issues at the expense of multilateral institutions (UN). The war showed once again that Europe is not able to intervene independently of US military support and resources (e.g. reconnaissance, transport).

US policy and the NATO strategy was heavily influenced by inner-departmental rivalries. The Pentagon wanted to demonstrate the need for continued high-level military spending, as did the military in the other NATO-states. The military establishment, however, was rather reluctant in committing itself to the war, as it did not see a realistic chance of winning it with the high-altitude, no-casualty strategy advocated by the Department of State. In the end, the administration's fear of a public backlash in the event of American casualties proved greater than that of the high numbers of Albanians that were bound to be displaced or killed under the cover of the heavy NATO bombardment.

Germany: The new government wanted to demonstrate its commitment to the Western alliance. Thus, the possibility of a new German *sonderweg* had to be ruled out decisively. Also, the new government wanted to promote itself as an important player on the diplomatic stage in Europe and elsewhere that carries diplomatic weight, e.g. with Russia. A more pragmatic objective was to prevent a refugee influx from the crisis zone, the lion's share of which would have had to be accommodated by Germany.

SIS: The international community with its diffuse interests and strategies wanted to interfere or just to do something for the sake of justice. Thus, it legitimised the actions of NATO, foremost the bombing, by acclamation.

NATO more or less slipped into the whole thing. It underestimated the situation and thought that it could protect human rights with a spectacular operation. Once it had started the operation it could not stop it, otherwise NATO would have lost its controlling power (See Principal-agent-model) and that might have been an encouragement for even more cases of human rights violations around the world.

Furthermore, it was not possible for NATO to lose a war in its anniversary year. In the end it would have shown NATO in the same line with Russia, not being able to win the war in Chechnya. And NATO is fighting a 'good war' like all the medieval warlords did. It is fighting for some higher objective, where no room for compromise is left. As a consequence, there was no clear agenda how to proceed with the war, but a clear agenda how to fight for the survival and glory of the NATO: to demonstrate the world its importance, military power, energy, decisiveness and so on, and promote itself as the relevant actor to enforce Western moral principles.

The Serbs (or better the political elite) wanted to show that they are strong enough to set the rules within its borders. At the same time, they functioned as the 'bad guys', uniting the international community in the 'good war' called humanitarian intervention against them.

The Albanian Kosovars have been fighting for their right of secession from Yugoslavia. Their struggle for the right of self-determination could be seen as a precedent for new developments in international law. The UCK was determined to gain the status as the sole representative of Kosovar Albanians' interests. This attempt was rather successful as the growing marginalisation and irrelevance of the advocates of a peaceful solution showed.

MED: Interests at play in the Kosovo conflict were numerous and conspicuous, from the post-Cold war NATO, desperately looking for a role, and a clear enemy, to the post-Lewinski Clinton, willing to show, *urbi et orbi*, that he is, after all, a morally responsible statesman. From the wish of the United States to reassert their position in the Transatlantic relations in the wake of the Amsterdam Treaty and arrival of the EMU, to desire of the EU states proper to prevent the inflow of a million Kosovar refugees. From interests of the military as sort of a transnational elite (paradoxically, Gen. Wesley Clark has probably had more understanding amongst the Serbian and Russian generals than on the Capitol Hill) to interests of the military industry and technology.

In the world of postmodern technology, hardware, like computers, communication networks and state-of-the-art arms, acquires a certain agency, and generates interests of its own. Anton Chekhov once wrote that if a gun appears hanging on the wall in the first act of a play, in the third act it should fire. Likewise, B2 bombers, top guns of our civilization, needed real-life missions – and fly they did, taking off from a base in Missouri, refueling over the Atlantic, bombing targets in Serbia, and returning to Missouri the same evening. As an American pilot confided in an interview, ‘the great thing about flying a B2 is that you start in the morning, accomplish a mission, and you’re back home by the evening, with wife, and kids, and a cold beer’. Welcome to the world of postmodern warfare and computer morality. Never mind cost-effectiveness of these B2 missions, they were all about media-effectiveness and a display of technological supremacy. ‘The medium is the message’. B2 is a message per se; it does not even have to do the dirty job of dropping bombs, all it has to do is fly, engaging in a communicative action rather than physical contact with the enemy.

SGB: The actors involved and their interests are, in my view:

Milosevic - but it is hard to tell what finally drives him.

Bill Clinton, who wants to overcome Kenneth & Monica and relaunch his dying presidency

Solana, the tragic secretary-turned intellectual (see García Marquez' reflections on him).

The mass media.

All the non-involved separatists and anarchists world-wide.

The National Rifle Association (NRA).

Looking with some distance: all the military people.

SBO: Human rights movements in Europe and US had their message used and transformed beyond recognition. They saw their human rights credentials abused for legitimising a war. Also, the producers of the film 'Wag the Dog' played a certain role.

CMZ: Since the UN as a relevant actor have been paralysed by Russia's and China's tactical obstruction, the only relevant actor from the so-called international community is US-lead NATO. Despite the hype in the Media about Europe's new role, it is still the US that command the resources, the know-how and the political will to enforce their policies. However, it is true that the Europeans have, compared to Bosnia and Dayton, taken a more prominent role on the stage; but I doubt that they have gained more influence or achieved a more coherent policy.

When it comes to Serbia, the relevant actors seem to be a relatively small inner circle around Milosevic, which rules Serbia without any obvious constraints by other sources of political power, like the parliament, opposition or public.

In Kosovo, there are the hawks and the doves. The doves tried to stick to their policy of stubborn, non-violent 'ignoring' of the Serbian policy. Whereas they succeeded in building a parallel state, they did not succeed in preventing violence. So the hawks took over, and the UCK, which pursued an active conflict-escalating role, is one of the winners of the war.

The most influential actor, however, was probably the Albanian refugees, as seen in the global mass media. The real time images of the ethnic cleansing exerted a massive pressure on policy makers in the West, which they did not want to resist, especially not after the lessons of Bosnia. Historical 'learning' played a decisive role - had it not be for the lessons from Bosnia, the western public and NATO had probably chosen a more moderate course of action, seeking for a negotiated settlement. However, Milosevic had lost any credibility.

When it comes to interests and motifs, however, I cannot see any vital interests in realist terms, neither for the West, nor for Russia. Kosovo is not about spheres of interest, nor is it about relative gains for one state or alliance at the expense of other states. There are, of course, secondary 'realist' interests, and they serve as additional legitimisers. The first was, especially in the case of Europe, to prevent massive migration flows. The second was the fear of a spill-over from Kosovo, to Macedonia and then Greece and Turkey. However, if these had been the main interests, then the war against Serbia was neither a very effective nor a risk limiting strategy to achieve these objectives.

A third realist explanation, which can be found quite often in the Russian media, assumes that the west has a vested interest in opening up the Serb economy for global capital and aspires to control the mineral resources in Northern Kosovo. I find this 'capitalist conspiracy theory' rather unconvincing.

The real question is: Why did the West engage in a very costly war, if there were no real interests in the realist sense? The answer can be found on four levels. First, there is a dominant moral discourse, which claims that Europe and the European idea can still be saved, after the short and bloody 20th century. If not now, when will the international community take action against ethnic cleansing, and prove that they are willing to enforce, if necessary, their humanitarian standards? The second factor is historical 'learning' – one Srebrenica was enough. The third factor is public pressure, which had built up in reaction to the media coverage of the ethnic cleansing. Last, it could be done! Serbia has no nukes, no real allies, no serious air defence, no strategic importance and not many friends left.

To conclude: Strange as it might seem, NATO bombed for the sake of principle. Bombing, however, was the 'easy' part. The other part depends on the success of a post war institutional arrangement, which guarantees the safe return of all refugees, the international borders of Serbia, a substantial autonomy of the Kosovo, and the minority rights of the Serbs who stay in the Kosovo. If this can be achieved without forced or voluntary population change, then the NATO bombs could have marked the beginning of a 'humanitarian powerpolitik', as opposed to realpolitik.

Another question is how to explain the internal conflict between Serbs and Kosovars. It seems to me that the term 'interest' does not grasp the dynamics of this conflict. In both camps, a closed, exclusive, nationalist discourse dominated, and both sides suffered from a high degree of pathological autism. In such an environment, there is not much room for the strategic behaviour of interest-driven political actors. Short-term, fragmented action on the ground prevails.

2.2 What was the Kosovo war about, and (for whom) has it been successful?

CMZ: It is still too early to give a final assessment of the war. My remarks are therefore very tentative. First of all, 'war' has won, but peace not yet. And the NATO-war will find its final legitimisation only when a viable institutional agreement is found for Kosovo and the Balkan as a whole. Such a framework should rule out border changes and forced ethnic segregation; it should include a changed federal framework and guarantees of minority rights.

What is new after Kosovo is clearly the fact that war as a means for peace is back on the European Agenda – and there should be a open debate about that. Secondly, a lesson which could follow is that peace sometimes involves ethnic segregation – an argument that is hard to bear from a normative point of view, but that seems to have won some credits during the last ten years on the Balkan.

What about winners and losers then? I leave this question in the first place to the Kosovars, who can now return to the ruins of their homes and the graves of their relatives. Are they winners or losers? As for international relations, there seems to me one clear loser, and that is Russia. Whether 'Europe' will use its media victory to consolidate a political position remains open. If the political will is there, then the window of opportunity could be used. For the scientific community, I expect that it will address these questions (and not leave it entirely to the politicians).

A third important question is not related to the war, but rather to the conditions of stability. The Balkan is nowadays sadly enough almost automatically associated with conflict and war. At the core of these conflicts lies the quest for a new institutional arrangement concerning the relations between territory, the state, and ethnic groups. These conflicts surely need to be explained and understood as a prerequisite for any future attempts to prevent or manage conflicts. There is no shortage of potential conflicts in the region that have yet to turn violent. In other words: Similar structural conditions do not always and not automatically translate into violent conflicts. Rapid institutional change, as occurring in Former Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet Union, can lead to new institutional arrangements on new, mostly smaller scales; and these new institutional arrangements can provide stability in inter-group relations and border management. The process of building a state and nation on the ruins of the lost empires, although by nature a fragmenting and separating process, does not necessarily lead to violent conflict. A key question is, consequently to identify what conditions foster new orders, and what factors and actors are necessary to create a stable equilibrium in intra- and inter-group relations.

SIS: After the end of the war, we are again confronted with chaos and awful pictures from the Kosovo and are still far away from a political solution. All the states involved are much poorer now, in terms of financial resources. We have seen again that war is a very expensive game. Much more expensive than taking the right measures in good time. Appropriate instruments of conflict prevention have not yet been fully developed. In other words, we can fly to far-away planets, but we are not able to devise ways of handling human problems. Thus, we should intensify our efforts to improve conflict prevention and finance research about how to monitor future conflicts and how to prevent them from escalating. Another lesson of the Kosovo war is that war is definitely not the right instrument to enforce the peaceful integration of different ethnic groups.

STA: In game theory the 'chain-store game' could offer an explanation for the Kosovo war based on 'reputational' logic. Since the USA and NATO belatedly got involved in Yugoslavia, they inadvertently acquired a reputational stake in the area, although they had no real interests there. If we imagine the USA as a powerful chain-store company, then we might say, it opened a branch in the Balkans. It has branches in many parts of the world, but there are also many parts which are without. The chain-store giant has – due to economies of scale – an unassailable, quasi-monopolistic market position. Nevertheless, single branches are always vulnerable to attacks from local competitors who can undercut quasi-monopolistic prices. If this happened everywhere simultaneously, the chain-store giant would lose its quasi-monopolistic rents. Therefore, as soon as such an attempt is made, the single chain-store branch launches an aggressive marketing and price-cutting campaign to close down the local challenger, thus establishing or maintaining a reputation, which will discourage other potential 'local heroes' from trying anything similar.

Thus, the actual political settlement to be achieved in the Kosovo is of little importance to NATO and the USA. The main objective was to force the Yugoslav regime to conform to American stipulations in order to maintain US reputation. In this, it has been largely successful.

Moreover, even the general picture of the West 'intervening' in a region cursed by ethnic hatred and conflict to keep the peace and prevent atrocities is a myth. The dynamic of events in the Balkans has been permeated from the very beginning by the influence of the West, with actors jockeying to position themselves with regard to the West: there are profits to be made from supporting or defying the West. Thus, NATO air strikes were neither the catalyst for ethnic cleansing, nor prevented it, but were clearly counted on by Milosevic from the start to provide a context for escalation. The West deceives itself when it distinguishes between 'western-orientated leaders' and 'authoritarian nationalists', since these profiles depend on contexts and constituencies. The 'political field' in this area is structured with reference to the West. This in fact is nothing new, since any national project of Balkan elites has defined itself with regard to European elites, and been in reality just as much an international project. In the 19th century this was closely linked to cultural capital, now far more to political capital such as the membership of nations eligible for aid and IMF funds etc being dependent on democratic credentials.

BWA/RAI: One of the objectives of the war was to demonstrate NATO's continued relevance and to legitimise NATO enlargement as a means of integrating trouble spots and containing future threats to Euro-Atlantic security. A prerequisite was to demonstrate the West's supremacy in terms of military power. The US asserted their status as the world's only superpower and their dominance over the indecisive Europeans. Now, after the 'victory', a precedent is set for self-mandated NATO interventions in other conflicts. One could argue that the Kosovo war was a test case of the future role of NATO as the armed wing of US

foreign policy, cloaked in the rhetoric of a new international moral consensus. In the Cold War, the superpowers had a negative veto in the UN Security Council. As a result of the Kosovo war, the US now holds a positive veto: 'If you do not want to play according to our rules, then we do it on our own.' This is a development that not only Europeans might dislike. This war had to be fought to the end irrespective of the damage it would cause – it had to be won because of its importance as a precedent. This was the basic concern of the US government. In this context, it would be interesting to consult the literature on bureaucratic decision-making as it occurs within a large organisation like NATO. When does the self-sustaining interest to avoid defeat and to assert one's importance and become paramount, at which point do these dynamics eclipse the reasons and justification for the organisation's very existence?

Thus, it was a humanitarian intervention only in a secondary sense, and this only to show the rest of the world that the West is willing to enforce its perceived common values even by recourse to military action. NATO's actual strategy in the war and especially the ruling out of ground troops from the beginning led to a dilemma, however. It lies in the logic of air strikes that victory is defined not in a territorial sense, e.g. as the forceful expulsion of the enemy from a given territory or as the prevention of atrocities by deploying troops that actually separate the perpetrators from the victims or put a halt to the expulsion of refugees. The logic of air strikes, on the contrary, demands the massive destruction of military and dual-use infrastructure on a scale that suffices to erode the enemy's morale. Destruction is thus not a collateral effect, but the very objective of air strikes and the massive scale of destruction needed makes substantial civilian casualties inevitable.

This, in turn, was not compatible with the political objective of the whole operation which was the protection of universal human rights. Also, one could pose the question whether the NATO strategy of high-altitude bombing was fair, as succeeded in minimising own casualties at the cost of quite substantial casualties among those civilians that NATO wanted to protect. In addition to this, the very distinction between military and civilian casualties, and the underlying assumption that the death of military personnel does not matter, is questionable. This is especially the case if one supposes that not every soldier in Milosevic's army is a marauding bandit and has volunteered to do his duty in the army of a nationalist dictatorship, as Yugoslavia is portrayed in the West. Of course, these arguments might be considered overly sensitive but they gain particular salience, again, in a war that is supposedly fought in defence of universal human rights.

Another implication of the war was that, once again, the irrelevance of conflict resolution and peace initiatives by NGOs at the grassroots level has been made clear. Many people warned ten years ago that something would happen in the Kosovo. One could have tried to make a difference already then. Instead, the West waited until the media coverage of atrocities prompted them into action. The prevailing view now, not only in the US, is that there had

been no alternative to the bombing, as the OSCE mission in the Kosovo had not been able to stop the ethnic cleansing. There would have been alternatives, but taking sides for the Kosovo Albanians and against the evil Serbs from the very beginning was a mistake. It blocked many options for a real dialogue and alienated the Serbs.

Besides, the choice of partners for the negotiations was rather peculiar. It is interesting to see that the UCK, an underground rebel movement, was accepted at the negotiating table, whereas in other cases, these kinds of movements are seen as terrorists and separatists, e.g. the Kurdish PKK. The advocates of a non-violent solution to the conflict among the Albanians (Rugova etc.) were marginalised from the very beginning and especially during the Rambouillet negotiations. Did this happen because the escalation scenario had already been decided in advance? This will probably remain an open question.

Another mistake was to concentrate exclusively on dealing with Milosevic, who knew how to play the game from past experience. Instead, the West could have started at an earlier stage to meet army generals (also in the Kosovo), and tried to convince them of the need to stop the atrocities or to renounce allegiance to Mr. Milosevic. They might have been impressed by the prospect of an eventual indictment and prosecution by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Or they might have been persuaded by a realistic exit option. Maybe they would have not, but the impression gained ground that it was not sincerely tried.

Against the general assumption, the OSCE mission was not a failure. According to members of the mission, the presence of the OSCE members contributed to de-escalation. The OSCE mission would have been even more successful, however, if the international community had been willing to adequately support it financially, logistically and staff-wise. As we have seen in the months of bombing, in some cases the lack of funds is a problem that can be overcome. The result, however, was to discredit the OSCE as an ineffective institution for conflict management and prevention, being supposedly unable to cope with such situations. Thus, the impact the OSCE could possibly have, was severely limited from the start.

Still, the Serbs were cooperating with the OSCE and pulled back their troops, only to find UCK fighters occupying the positions they had just left. This, in many cases, provoked an even more brutal reaction from the Serbs. The following fights between Serbs and the UCK were the reason for American demands to end the mission, and to start the bombing. This was in the end of January, which means the Americans had actually been planning a military intervention even before the Rambouillet talks were conceived. The Europeans did not resist the pressure from the Americans, even though before the 24th of March there was no mention of a planned and full expulsion of Kosovo Albanians in any report, neither by the OSCE, nor NATO, nor the foreign departments of the states. Only after the bombing had started and the

OSCE members and relief agencies' staff had been evacuated, the Kosovo Albanians were left at the mercy of the Serb troops.

This is not to say, however, that the NATO intervention was the reason for the mass displacement of Kosovo Albanians, but it definitely provoked a more aggressive reaction on the part of the Serbs. Besides, the aim of the intervention, to save a multicultural Kosovo and to stop the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians was not achieved. The bombing hastened the displacements and Nato was forced to change their publicly stated war aims from preventing the exodus to guaranteeing the safe return of the refugees. Now, after Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, Kosovo has been ethnically cleansed, too. And it will be for decades to come. One could argue that the risk of future conflicts has been diminished by the segregation of the conflicting parties but this would seem a price too high to pay. And what about the ethnic minorities in Macedonia, Montenegro and so on? It seems that accepting the logic of segregation only serves to entrench the perceived differences between the ethnic groups and create even more reasons for future conflicts. It seems that this war has been successful for all the wrong people.

One of them is Milosevic; for him, the war has so far been fairly successful – he is still in power. The opposition is weak and divided and, should it succeed in toppling him, prone to continuing his political program without a substantial change in the ideological outlook. The state bureaucracy, army and media are staffed with Milosevic's cronies, which will ensure a certain continuity in policy, as well.

SBO: The translation of humanitarian concerns over ethnic cleansing and atrocities committed in the region, of the frustration with Milosevic, and of feelings of guilt over past inaction in the face of humanitarian disaster, into the NATO bombing has been unfortunate, to say the least. War has a logic of its own that seems to be virtually independent from the political intentions that generated it. The bombing did not prevent and possibly precipitated the exodus of the Albanian refugees, although I do not believe that it caused it. Documents show that it was clearly in the making and Milosevic made all the preparations for it. The problem is that the only 'force' that the European and American governments could rely on was NATO. The bombing produced civilian casualties and created a newly volatile situation in the region and helped unite Serbs under Milosevic's banner. The mentality of a nation under siege with a propensity towards nationalism has its own logic. The propaganda on both sides tends to substitute cause and effect (Serbian and Russian TV stressed that Albanians were escaping the bombing, that NATO bombs caused the exodus). Virtual war should be waged on TV, not in real life. This does not mean, however, that the European Left should now fall back to the predictable anti-American, anti-NATO rhetoric. Yes, NATO has to be criticised but New Europe should be criticised as well. Now that the bombing has ended, I also hope that the crisis will foster a comprehensive rethinking of the present moment, not a falling back on predictable paradigms and conspiracy theories.

It would be wrong to speak of a success in the case of Kosovo, for another reason, as well. There were many other potential Kosovos after the Cold War where the escalation of the disaster was averted. What happened in the last ten years was:

- * a progressive elimination of moderate and democratic movements in the former Yugoslavia (Rugova, Democratic Movement in Belgrade, opposition to Tudjman, etc.), maybe with the exception of Slovenia, the lucky rich sister.
- * inaction in the Bosnian war,
- * the lack of any long-term strategy on the part of Europeans to support and build alternative democracies in the region and offer them financial support,
- * the lack of consistency when it came to minority rights and human right abuses,
- * turning a blind eye on both Milosevic and Tudjman's early abuses,
- * the shameful non-inclusion of Kosovo into the Dayton Peace Agreement.

It should have not come to the extreme stance: NATO vs. Milosevic. This seems like a nightmarish realisation of a sadomasochistic fantasy: the victimisers (like the Croatian ones before that) became victims, the NATO targets drawn on the T-shirts of cosmopolitan, fun-loving Belgradians became NATO targets, the exodus of Albanians did happen. The 'West' did reveal its technological violence, strategic and tactical weakness, ignorance as well as hypocrisy when it came to the value of the human life. I am afraid, however, that the whole history of the Yugoslav war will be remembered through the current confrontation between Milosevic and NATO; perpetrators of violence over the last ten years will be regarded as heroes or victims, paranoid conspiracy theory will be seen as legitimate. No self-questioning and 'management of the past', as it happened in Germany after Hitler, will take place, neither in Russia nor in Serbia. Will the critique of virtual war take place in US and Europe? I hope so.

MED: Serb security forces have evacuated the province, but remained essentially undefeated. The TV showed a dignified and orderly retreat of armed men, displaying Serb flags and Victory signs. This army can still be used for oppressing dissent within Serbia, or for waging war against Montenegro. The Kosovo Albanians are returning to what is left of their homes, but KFOR, for all its good will, cannot prevent acts of revenge, the fleeing of tens of thousands of Kosovo Serbs, and the rise of the para-criminal KLA. Like Bosnia, Kosovo will likely remain the West's protectorate for many years to come.

Moreover, one of the biggest bombing campaigns in history proved far from effective. The 79 days during which a relatively small Yugoslav contingent armed in the 1960s and 70s was holding out against the mightiest military machine in the world and retained the capacity to respond with anti-aircraft fire, were a remarkable achievement. Until the last two weeks of the fighting, when the kamikaze tactics of the Kosovar guerrillas flushed the Serbs' armour into the open and rendered it vulnerable to NATO's strikes, the Serb army had escaped serious injury (*The Economist*, 12 June 1999, p. 17). Even if now Milosevic is toppled, democracy installed in Serbia and independence granted for Kosovo (all of which is unlikely), the Serbs' resilience, and NATO's incapacity to degrade them and to stop ethnic cleansing during the 79 days, sent all kinds of wrong signals around the globe.

NATO's decision to start bombing was a mistake in the first place, but once it had started, the Alliance proved surprisingly obstinate and inflexible, yet hesitant and undecided. Despite mounting evidence of the ineffectiveness of bombing, loss of civilian life, and the acceleration of ethnic cleansing, NATO did not modify its strategy, and opt for a wiser halt in bombing or a riskier ground option. This lack of flexibility and resolve is quite understandable, given that NATO is an alliance of 19 nations ruled by consensus and by the politicians, not by orders and by the military, but this does not add to the future credibility of NATO's threat.

The overwhelming interest in waging a war against Serbia belonged not to a specific agency, or a group, but to a certain power-discourse, the post-Cold war dominant moral discourse of the 'West'. Claiming to have norms at its core (e.g. NATO as a 'community of values'), this discourse is about expansion and power, much like the Christian discourse and the White Man discourse that guided Western colonisation for the last 500 years under the banners of morality. After all, any ethical discourse is a discourse of power working by way of exclusion and punishment, by *surveiller et punir* (Michel Foucault) and the present moral assertiveness of the West simply follows a centuries-old tradition.

In seeking to establish itself as a norm for global conduct, the moral discourse of power is rather indiscriminate with respect to specific conflicts, instrumentalising them to its own advantage. In some cases, this discourse supports sovereignty (Kuwait), sometimes it supports human rights (Kosovo), and sometimes it supports neither (the Turkish Kurds). The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, real and terrible as it is, seems to have been not an overwhelming reason for western involvement, but rather a befitting pretext. In this sense, there has been no contradiction between *Idealpolitik* and *Realpolitik* in the Kosovo, as they both were manifestations of the same historical force, the same discourse of power. It was principle exercised as power, and power disguised as principle.

The first war in history said to be fought on moral grounds has been tainted with hypocrisy. It is hard to reconcile 'normative politics' with embracing an ally like the KLA, an organisation

with a well-documented history of terrorism, drug trafficking and ethnic cleansing, or with the use of cluster bombs which proved to be 'surgical' in the most direct sense of the word, i.e. amputational. Likewise, it is hard to reconcile the demand to abolish the death penalty that Europe (primarily the Council of Europe) is putting before its member states, with the right to kill innocent civilians for crimes committed by their leaders, that Europe asserted in the course of the NATO attack.

Even if one admits that the war in Kosovo to some extent had moral foundations, this was the morality of an action movie, the morality of western messianism and 'chasing monsters', the morality of Good and Evil, Us and Them. It was the binary mapping of the conflict in Kosovo (in which ambiguous forces like the KLA had to fall into 'Us' category, and western journalists glorified the guerrillas on trails of war in the mountains, while a very unclear case of Russia was relegated to 'Them' and identified as a 'Serb ally') that leads one to suggest that Europe was not simply striving to establish morality and justice, but rather its own identity, represented as morality. It was not some pre-established European norms that compelled Europe to intervene in Kosovo, but vice versa: the intervention was used by Europe to reinvent itself, and to imagine itself a moral fortress. Europe needed Kosovo for the construction of its own identity, and for consolidating the European project on a higher moral ground.

A 'community of values' is by and large an exclusive project working by the way of dissociation from the Other. For decades (indeed, centuries), Russia, and later the Soviet empire, served as the Other, creating a necessary external environment for the European identity. After the Soviet empire had crumbled, the European project was suddenly lacking otherness. On the one hand, Russia was still producing alien images ('Russian nationalism' and the 'Red Mafia' among them) but these were far from sufficient for reconstructing a post-Cold war European identity that would provide the basis for EU and NATO enlargement and include the nations of East Central Europe. And then, the Balkans erupted in the early 1990s, and with that, a new kind of otherness was invented, comfortably rooted in the collective memory of Europe. A new Other emerged in Europe, and a new fear: the fear of Balkanisation.

2.3 What are the implications for Germany in its new sobriety between Reichstag and Tetovo, the memorial and the Tornados?

STA: There are no new implications for Germany. That a federal government would support American foreign policy whatever the parties in power was always clear. It is more or less a definition of electability. Also, Germany cannot develop independent foreign policy initiatives for fear of weakening the EU and, at the same time, questioning the Westbindung.

The EU cannot develop any security policy structure on its own, either, due to German dominance and British abstinence.

BWA/RAI: The surprising lack of critical debate on the issue has shown that Germany is already far more 'normal' than policymakers and newspaper commentators thought. There doesn't seem to be much of a difference to other countries in the level of support for armed intervention. Thus, the project of the peace movement, if that has been to strive for peaceful conflict resolution and to prevent the German army from any engagement abroad that is not purely defensive in nature, has apparently failed. The German Sonderweg is over. War as a means of achieving political aims is gaining legitimacy again. This was not the case before and it had taken pacifists a long time to get where we were before the debate on out-of-area missions of the Bundeswehr started.

Another development became apparent in comments by Rudolf Scharping and others comparing atrocities committed by Serbs in the Kosovo to the crimes of the Third Reich. They were out of proportion and belittled Nazi crimes. But apart from the questionable historical validity of the arguments, which was promptly and roundly criticised, they demonstrated a willingness to leave behind the past and to strive for a new German 'normality'. The decision to abandon the Kohl-doctrine on no-go areas for the German army and claims that, after all, Germany is on the side of the 'Good' fighting against crimes against humanity comparable to those of the Third Reich should also be seen in this light.

CMZ: As a foreigner, I cannot really tell. I can only respect the cultural other! However, to me it seems: Bonn moved to Berlin – nothing happened. Tornados are flying – nothing happened. Germany lost to Croatia – nothing happened. They call the Bundestag Reichstag – nothing happened. To me it seems that Germany is sober. How long will it take until the Germans get sober?

MED: There was resolve and passion (Lev Gumilev's *passionarnost'*) in German repentance. Germany stood out in its restraint (even if it was a comfortable refuge). Now, German 'normality' turns out to be plain mediocrity, hesitance and neurosis. A divided Germany was a Big Narrative, rooted in Modernity and Culture. A reunified Germany is a phenomenon of postmodernity and civilisation, with all the inherent dullness of prosperity, and the fear of putting it at risk.

2.4 What are the implications for Russia?

SIS: Russia now has the missing proof that she really was defeated in the Cold War. They are the losers and NATO is the winner, who took all. They could now arrange themselves with the situation and concentrate on more pressing issues. At the moment, however, Russia uses it as evidence that the West is against her and behaves like a wounded bear, that is not willing to try and find a new role in the world.

CMZ: The *Kommersant Daily* wrote in allusion to the new tranche of IMF credits: Burning some US flags is fine, but we still keep the Dollars. Russia has no power to play any constructive part in world politics – but she can be a nuisance. One could say: Thank God she needs the IMF money. I think that exactly this dependence can be dangerous, though: Russia knows about her dependence on Western money and about her own weakness. And she is threatening with her weakness: ‘Take me serious or I get hysterical. Would you like to see me hysterical? I am very dangerous when I am hysterical’. Russian elites are playing with the west and with their own public, and everybody knows the game and everybody is playing along, because it could happen that Russia is getting hysterical. But as we know from everyday life – if this game is played for too long, nobody takes the players seriously anymore.

Mikhail Ryklin wrote in *Lettre* about a friend in Moscow, who was very concerned about the implication of Kosovo on Russian-Western relations. This friend feared that the fierce anti-western demonstrations in Moscow, the sabre-rattling rhetoric of the Kremlin and the manifest incompetence of the Russian foreign policy elite would harm Russia's standing as a serious partner in Europe and the US. He was right. Contrary to what the media, especially in Germany say, Russia is the big loser in the conflict.

Russia vetoed any UN resolution in the first place. Then she suffered from a short but violent attack of hysteria (‘The Third World War is coming’). Then she cooled down, for two reasons – IMF money is needed, and NATO was not impressed. Yeltsin sent Viktor Stepanovich to Belgrade, with the difficult task to sell Milosevic NATO's demands. In other words – Russia jumped on the NATO bandwagon when she saw that it was leaving – with or without her. When an agreement was reached, Russia tried to sell this as her success, especially the fact that the UN was brought back in. Nobody mentioned that the UN had been left out precisely because of the Russian veto.

Then a couple of Russian parachuters seized the airport of Pristina and the future KFOR HQ, twelve hours before KFOR was due to move in. Russia had given her word not to do this, and therefore, not surprisingly, nobody in Moscow knew who exactly had given the orders. Especially unknowing were the foreign and defence ministers. The Russians seized the airport, but they could not feed themselves, so they engaged in trading with the Serbs and

KFOR – zhrat' - to nado! In the end, Russia got her zones of co-responsibility and some mock liaison officers – and had lost credibility and trust.

Of course, the seizure of Pristina airport has a charming aspect, and who was not cheering at an over-confident NATO that found itself outmanoeuvred by 200 Russian soldiers and a three-star general. But in the long run, Russia will lose from her erratic Balkan politics. She is too weak to have real influence, so the best option would be to sell her symbolic influence to the highest bidder. By the sort of politics we have seen during the last weeks, though, Russia spoils the price even for her symbolic cooperation. Unfortunately, this will not change soon – not under the condition of a quasi-institutionalised power competition. On the other hand, who likes to cooperate with a partner like this? While the symbolic exchanges of mutual respect ('Without Russia, there will be no peace') continue, the real message of the Kosovo war is a different one: It would be good if Russia were reliable. But if not, who cares? And that is bad news.

MED: The reaction in Russia to the start of the NATO air campaign was overwhelming and unanimous. Deep-running political cleavages and partisanship were put aside for the display of protest against NATO and solidarity with the Serbs. The West had delivered Russia an eloquent and powerful proof of her defeat in the Cold War. In fact, the bombing provided a basis for the consolidation of the Russian political elite and a large part of the population on the anti-Western platform, playing directly into the hands of the Communists and nationalists.

Psychologically, there is a meaningful difference to Russia's former geopolitical losses. The withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany were seen as a unilateral gesture of good will (were they not?). NATO enlargement, for all its alleged strategic damage for Russia, was still negotiated with Moscow, and got a reluctant Russian consent (the Founding Act). But here, for the first time in the post-Cold war decade, something has been done with demonstrative neglect of Russia.

This was a revelation. The taboo from the theme of Russia's defeat was lifted, with some profound psychotherapeutic effects. What followed was a two-week carnival of national ambition, a ritual exorcism, complete with spontaneous mass demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, people volunteering to fight in Serbia, threats of supplying arms to Milosevic and of re-targeting the Russian nuclear missiles, and a sharp increase in the domestic role of the military. This emotional outburst proved once again, like the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, that the post-Cold war syndrome runs deep in the national consciousness. However, once the tabooed theme of Russia's defeat is brought to the open, the resentment is aired in a symbolic, verbal manner (popular demonstrations, Duma declarations, etc.) and thus somewhat mitigated. Indeed, the steam of Russian nationalism all went into the whistle. By mid-April the nationalist fever had calmed down. Admitting to the

impossibility of opposing the West or halting NATO bombing, Russia has taken on a rather sensible position of wait-and-see, criticising NATO's action, and gradually resuming cooperation with the West along financial lines.

In the meanwhile, important domestic shifts were taking place. Primakov's heavy-handed mediation in the Kosovo conflict gave way to more flexible and Western-minded efforts of the resurrected Viktor Chernomyrdin. Later, Primakov's fall from grace was confirmed by the sacking of his Communist-dominated government by President Yeltsin and the appointment of Yeltsin's protégé Sergei Stepashin. The composition of the new government and its economic program were closely coordinated with international financial institutions. Largely in response to that, large-scale cooperation between Russia and IFIs resumed for the first time after the August 1998 financial crisis. Finally, President Yeltsin emerged out of the political eclipse, scoring two major victories over the Communist Duma: first defeating the impeachment vote, and then getting his candidate for the Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin approved at the first attempt. The economy started showing signs of revival, the rouble was strengthening, and the stock market was recovering from the August 1998 shock. Suddenly, against all odds, Russia embarked upon a 'liberal spring'.

In other words, just as the Russian political system managed to take the internal shock of the August 1998 financial crisis, it is handling the external impact of the 1999 Kosovo crisis fairly well, and there seems to be no long-term political fallout on the domestic scene. The consequences for Russian foreign and security policy, however, are less salubrious. Speaking generally, in the last 5 to 6 years, ever since the Kozyrev line based on liberal internationalism and abandoning 'national interests' had faded away, Russian foreign policy has been oscillating between minimalist cooperation with the West and damage limitation. The Kosovo crisis has once again sent Russian foreign policy into the damage limitation mode, undermining mutual trust and fragile mechanisms of cooperation with NATO. In a sense, the West's war in Kosovo has undone the political and psychological achievement of the 1997 Paris Declaration and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. From appeasing Russia, the West has turned to sidelining Russia – a policy which is consistent with Russia's dwindling economic and diplomatic resources, but hardly sounds encouraging for the Russian elite.

The Kosovo crisis has had a dual effect on Russian foreign policy. On the one hand, it caused some immediate damage in the relationship with the West. A more important fact, however, is that Russia proved disinclined to surrender to neo-imperialist temptations, and remains unlikely to slide into isolationism and confrontation with the West even under most adverse circumstances. Russia was disturbed but not displaced. In this sense, the Kosovo story has strangely added some positive value to the Russian-Western relationship, demonstrating that Russia is being integrated into the New World Order, and will continue to fluctuate between minimalist cooperation and damage limitation, while staying in the general framework of dialogue with the West.

Moreover, after the initial neglect by the West, all of a sudden Russia seemed important, and the West began looking for ways to involve Russia in the crisis management. Semi-isolated, Russia unexpectedly started winning points on the diplomatic front. The Kosovo crisis created a common information field, a common context within which a dialogue with the West resumed. Indeed, one can see similarities with NATO enlargement debates which, too, were giving Russia a voice at the negotiating table of European security for a good four years (1993-1997). Both NATO enlargement and the Kosovo war were giving Russia an interface with the West, providing a forum where she could claim her national interests which otherwise would not even be heard. In both cases, Russia might have come out as the loser, but these losses have raised the level of global awareness about Russia, her problems, and her residual strengths. One is reminded of a daily ritual phrase, a magic incantation, repeated by the U.S. and NATO leaders: 'Our goal is to keep Russia involved'. In the world ruled by mass media, it is perceptions and images that count, not the actual territorial/strategic wins or losses. In both cases Russia was a Big Story of the global media, evoking distant memories of her lost glory, and this partly compensated for perceived geopolitical damages.

SBO: We should not forget that there are many real human casualties in this conflict. The implications of the war for the neighbouring countries are enormous and they were not properly thought through by the 'West'. Some ideals are also among the casualties. For East Europeans and Russians this has been a crash-course in failed ideals – from the communist utopia to socialism with a human face to the dream of Europe or a democratic West, Europe without the Euro, and belonging to the West not being reduced to membership in NATO. I wonder what happened to my generation's dream of the West, and I am saddened that this positive idea of the West is almost dead.

The thesis of a Russian '*Lust am Leiden*' (lust for suffering), which is advanced by commentators in the West and East alike, is a modern idea that the Russians got from romantics from Germany and elsewhere who travelled through Russia in the nineteenth century looking for the 'others' of the West in the 'near abroad'. So there is no need to further exoticise it. Russian peasants (judging from proverbs and folk art) were not into this 'lust' at all, since they actually suffered. Survivors lust for other things in life. Subsistence, perseverance, resilience in the face of external difficulties should not be confused with love for suffering. The idea was taken up by Dostoevsky (his genius notwithstanding) who, while writing great novels, had to some degree sentimentalised cruelty and turned ethics into a melodrama. Today, we are dealing with virtual suffering. Russia is not under siege. On the other hand, I think that in the early 1990s, the 'West' did not support democratic institutions. Rather, it turned the idea of democracy into IMF demands, misunderstood Russian cultural issues etc. Hence the resentment, that is not necessarily justifiable, but very understandable.

The last piece of Russian postmodernism that I encountered was hacker's art. When Russian computer hackers destroyed the NATO site they left a message with a cartoon representation of Beavis and Butthead. The signature was: 'From Russia with Love' 'Down with NATO' and KPZ (which is an abbreviation of the Soviet/Russian Police/KGB kamera predvaritel'nogo zakliucheniia) The cartoon is quite witty. The 'West' should get the message and get their 'global popculture' back from the hacker's hands like a boomerang. The language of international (or American) popculture is not a key to democratisation or mutual understanding. As for the message from the Russian side, it's hardly new, controversial or countercultural. It is the view of the Russian government, a national nit-jerk reaction. So medium (fun as it is) is not the message.

SGB: Some groups sort of needed the new war for some two weeks. To get something on which to project their disappointment and furore. Now, the late and post-Kosovo sobriety produces some pragmatism. As in real life. So the Russians have arrived in the global village, after all. As we have maintained for years!

2.5 What about the peace movements? The nearer the war, the less peaceniks?

MED: The difference to the 60s, 70s and even 80s is that nowadays you can be different without joining any kind of 'movement' or other big narrative. There is no longer a sociological rationale behind peace movements.

CMZ: The peaceniks have a problem – The Albanians (the good) are helped by NATO (the bad). I remember a critical student at a Kosovo information evening at the Free University: He heard the Serb position, the Albanian position, the Greek position, the Russian position ... he got angry, he demanded the microphone and categorically demanded that we should all 'kritisch hinterfragen' (critically scrutinise) NATO and UCK. And if we did? Would we get any clear answers? Would we be able to say yes or no decisively?

I guess not. Kosovo is a real challenge for people who are used to fixed, clear, ideological positions. On the one hand, ethnic cleansing of that extent is not tolerable under any circumstances. And there was no political way to stop Milosevic, as past experience clearly has shown. On the other hand, nobody liked the fact that a war was taking place in Europe, fought by a self-mandated military alliance, which has been looking for a new mission since the end of the Cold War. Nobody likes the idea of this huge military machine, that runs without giving much insight in its decision-making process. And nobody really trusts the UCK, and rightly so. And still nobody wants to stand by and let ethnic cleansing happen. So,

not surprisingly, the debate on Kosovo was characterised by a deep ambiguity of all comments, which is not altogether bad.

On the other hand I have not heard the intellectual who said: 'Kosovo? I really do not know', although the admission of a deep moral dilemma could have been a fruitful input into the debate. What I realised, however, is that many commentators complained about the cowardliness of NATO's strategy. They thought that the no-risk strategy of high-altitude bombings was not 'fair'. Why did the notions of fairness and cowardice slip into the debate? Did we not cease to mention these notions in connection with war two generations ago? Where does the need for 'fairness' in a war come from? I read this as yet another sign of the deep moral ambiguity towards the war, a yawning moral abyss which some would like to bridge with these notions.

RAI/BWA: The proximity of the war in the Kosovo certainly increased the awareness among the population at large that something was going on there in the first place. Furthermore, one could argue that support for the intervention has been higher, given the proximity of the events, especially after the experience of Western inaction on Bosnia. Still, the geographical proximity doesn't suffice to explain the low numbers turning out against the war and the high level of support for the bombings. The silence of the paceniks is better understood as a reaction to the complicated nature of the war that is supposedly being fought in defence of human rights. It has probably never been more difficult to be a pacifist than now, in the face of a war that is not about oil or world trade routes. The complexity of the issue is also reflected in the odd composition of the pro and contra camps in the debate. Martin Walser, proponent of German 'normality', sided with the pacifists, whereas Ignaz Bubis, his liberal counterpart in that debate, supported the war. Also, the post-communist PDS found itself in the uneasy company of the far right in its rejection of the NATO intervention.

2.6 Are we willing and able, can we afford to wage war? When, and what for? If the (post-)modern Western societies can only accept violence without victims, will they lose any campaign?

SIS: We should not fight wars. It is the least civilised thing nations can do. It means going back to a world of the 'Naturzustand' and disregarding the importance and possibilities of international law and the UN system.

MED: Since most of contemporary wars are positioned in a global context, the art of 'sending messages' (not only to the enemy but to the world at large) plays an ever increasing role in the conduct of war, sometimes eclipsing operational efficiency. In older times, it was mostly military parades that were part of PR, but now war proper, like NATO operation in Kosovo,

turned into a PR campaign. Apparently one of the reasons for the start of bombing in late March 1999 was the illusion of an easy victory that would fit nicely into the festive context of NATO's fiftieth anniversary in April (see Javier Solana's repeated pronouncements that the campaign would be over by the time of the Washington summit).

What likens the NATO air strikes to a PR campaign is the goal to have zero casualties among the allies, which is quite normal to a parade (unless an unfortunate onlooker falls under a tank), but not to a war. This obsession with safety revealed a paradoxical nature of the postmodern mind. On the one hand, a western man is ready, indeed willing, to wage wars, releasing his archaic instincts, but on the other hand, his willingness to sacrifice has been irretrievably lost through forces of hedonism, consumerism and atheistic humanism. That was the main problem of the Kosovo war, a campaign that the West wanted to fight in gloves.

Kosovo was a truly postmodern war, an Oscar-winning action movie, a new 3D computer game where one can employ his emotion and skill, and even be morally rewarded for defeating the Evil—without risking own life. Postmodernism is an entertaining game on a computer screen, but there happen to be real people somewhere underneath. The more virtual a game becomes for 'us', the harder it turns out for 'them'. The safer is the flight of an American pilot in the high-tech skies over Kosovo, the bloodier the mess on the ground (both from bombs and ethnic cleansing).

CMZ: I am a war-monger in that specific case. I think that this war was a bad option out of terrible alternatives, and I cannot see how any peaceful solution could have been achieved. The alternative to this war was watching the other war that was being waged against the Kosovo civilians. Besides, concerning an pervasive argument against the NATO war: I do not think that NATO made things worse – it only made them happen quicker. I find it cynical to blame NATO for the ethnic cleansing, as some critics do. But this is a very dangerous question, because it implies that Kosovo is a precedence, which it cannot be, because NATO is not going to bomb all over the planet, and not in all conflict areas are the good, the bad and the ugly that easily found. Again, without Srebrenica, there would not have been a NATO war in Kosovo.

The other part of the question is to be answered by military specialists. So far, we have no evidence that destroying a state's infrastructure from high altitude forces autocrats to comply. And even if it did – ethnic conflicts do not need factories, bridges or power plants, nor do they need authoritarian leaders. In short, it takes very specific conditions which make a war a viable policy option to stop ethnic and other conflicts: A single leader(ship) in control of the state; a state apparatus and army; an exit option for that leader(ship), like: 'Stop the war and you get en 'European perspective'; the existence of an infrastructure to be destroyed (what

factories could be bombed in Somalia, Rwanda, or Sudan?); a civil population which will blame their suffering at least partly on their leader; and no or low risk of retaliation.

BWA/RAI: It will still depend on whether vital national, i.e. economic or strategic interests of Western states are affected. 'Humanitarian' interventions cannot afford casualties and are therefore bound to be ineffective in a military sense. Also, the willingness of Western voters to risk lives for abstract moral principles will be low.

STA: E.H. Carr and Carl Schmitt criticised the 'hypocrisy' of morality in the anarchy of international relations as leading to disaster by ignoring real relations of power. Perhaps nowadays it is easy enough for western leaders to gain the support for a (certain) war through media reportage of horrific 'humanitarian catastrophes'; however, if they rely on this, they find their freedom of movement in pursuing military action massively limited by the same media reportage (e.g. restrictions in the use of force and in the ability to catch the enemy by surprise).

The idea that there is an aversion to seeing one's own soldiers killed is misconceived (at least in Britain). If there is a clear-cut 'national' conflict like the Falklands war or the Northern Ireland conflict, the death of (professional) soldiers does not decrease but rather increase public enthusiasm, as long as the war is seen as being won or at least fought competently. Remember that in the Gulf War high casualties in the ground attack were expected and accepted.

SGB: My probably unpopular 'personal' position is that we have wars in our cities which we are not ready to fight. We did, and we still do, accept violence, and we look in the opposite direction. It is an uneasy coexistence. It signifies, in terms of our homes, more and more the privatisation of public goods, especially of security. Does anyone fight this elementary feeling of uneasiness, which is shared by young Russians, Turks, Kurds, and German kids in German cities every single day?

2.7 Do the last weeks show that military power is (still) relevant? Or rather on the contrary?

STA: Military power is relevant in wars in which an enemy is directly engaged, e.g. the wars against Iraq or Argentina, but irrelevant in any sort of policing operations, i.e. maintaining order on the ground, enforcing and keeping the peace, e.g. in Kosovo and Chechnya. In the Kosovo war, there were two processes going on, to a large extent independently of each other, and each exacerbating the other: first, ethnic cleansing on the ground with a whole variety of

armed units and bands fighting Kosovo Albanians and, second, NATO air strikes against military personnel, hardware and infrastructure. There has been no war as such, there has even been a strong degree of complicity between NATO and Milosevic in using the term 'war'. Nor is there a 'Serbian military machine', nor is there (yet) a 'dictatorship' in Serbia, since purges or wide-scale imprisonments have never occurred.

In general, since full wars allowing for the full deployment of military strength are very unlikely given the West's monopoly on such strength (except nuclear weapons) that was demonstrated in the Second Gulf War. Future conflicts are likely to erupt in circumstances like in the Kosovo, i.e. low technology, 'guerrilla'-type campaigns where the West's formal military superiority is not as decisive. The question is whether the West 'bites the bullet' and enters conflicts like these on low-tech, 'hand-to-hand' terms.

BWA/RAI: The relevance of military power depends (naturally) on the type of warfare concerned: Air strikes and high-tech weaponry are not effective in sub-state wars involving paramilitary warfare, a blurring of the distinction between civilian and military targets, and ethnic cleansing; military supremacy and high-tech weaponry are no substitute for political solutions, they tend to increase tensions and decrease the likelihood for a lasting settlement. The NATO-type of military power might still be relevant in 'traditional' inter-state wars, whose likelihood, however, is decreasing in today's world. Military power that takes account of the sub-state characteristics of wars, however, can be highly effective. This can be witnessed in the relative 'success' of Serb Guerrilla and paramilitary tactics in achieving their objectives of expelling Albanian Kosovars and defying NATO power.

CMZ: It is a paradox: The strongest military alliance the world has ever seen is tamed by public opinion. They can threaten but not really enforce. It was nicely illustrated in a cartoon in the Berliner Zeitung: A smart weapon is cruising through a crowded street in a Serbian town. It is embarrassed and says to an elderly lady: 'Oh – this is a residential area – how embarrassing! Could you please tell me the way to the next military garrison?'

If we will ever know what made Milosevic give in, then we might be in a better position to answer this question. For the time being, I am not convinced that a high-tech-no-loss war fare is enough to force determined, cynic autocrats to give in. One lesson, however, is clear: only when the international community speaks with one voice will it be heard. And herein lies the rest of the Russian bargaining power: Russia has lost her military or economic power or political influence – but she can still trade her symbolic cooperation, although the price for that is falling.

SIS: The last weeks have shown that human beings and their actions in the real world have not really developed in the last centuries or even millennia. They do not match the sophisticated theoretical developments in IR theory, where much is written about the process of learning and institutional design. The war in Kosovo was another example for the right of the strongest. Now we have to ask ourselves, is this a communication problem between scientists and politicians or are there no other answers than military power?

Before talking about the relevance of military power, we should take a closer look at the connotations of power. The term power is still linked to attributes such as being strong, successful, to the definition by Weber, and so on. Powerful people do not discuss, they decide. They do not talk, they take action. Here we are close to images like the powerful lonesome rider (Sylvester Stallone, Clint Eastwood, John Wayne and the like). I would argue, as long as these images are still sexy or, more appropriately in our case, give a political leader the aura of being able to take control over the country, we have to talk about power politics and about one of its most important instruments: military power.

In this sense military power is still relevant. It means that any leader who wants to be powerful also needs military power at least for symbolic purposes. Who else should do the parades? Being in charge of military power gives a leader the possibility to use it and, consequently, he will use it. See here the independent existence of bureaucracies: when a military force is established it has to find its duties, just to justify its existence.

The last weeks showed that all the sophisticated discussion about regime building, the impact of transnational actors and so on are irrelevant as long as there is any attraction to violence. This brings me back to the old demand of the peace movement: abolishing military power. The military is still relevant to showing one's power, but nobody can handle it. What we are witnessing are not wars between states, which armies were made for, but aggressive actions of groups within a state against others. There is no clear-cut differentiation between the two groups. Before they consider interfering in such 'wars', NATO or the UN should think about alternatives.

Faced with NATO's eventual success, one could argue that, without NATO, peace would not have been achieved. But all the atrocities coming to light now, clearly show that military power is not a viable option in stopping ethnic conflicts. And last but not least: Fighting for peaceful integration with military power sounds a bit paradoxical and it is so indeed, as the revenge attacks of the UCK against Serbs in the Kosovo underline.

SGB: It is used, and it has effects. Especially collateral effects.

I did not serve in the German army (though I served in a psichushka), but I never was a pacifist. Seems still to be the right combination, after all.

2.8 Does this conflict give our colleagues Macchiavelli, Huntington and Gellner new legitimisation?

SBO: Contrary to all the Huntingtonian views embraced by the American right ('Pat Buchanan-types') as well as the Russian 'left' (Communist leaders of the Duma), I don't think that Kosovo had to happen. I don't see it as an inevitable conflict of civilisations; after all, the 'West' is supporting 'Muslims' (this time, even without the economic and strategic interest of endangered oil-resources); and orthodox Christians from Bulgaria and Romania are not sympathetic to Milosevic. I think that the problems in Yugoslavia are of a political, not an 'ethnic' or religious nature and that the European and American response to them has been a political failure that escalated into a full-fledged military crisis. NATO should not have been the 'main actor' in dealing with disaster in this region. Russian unconditional support for Milosevic is a projection of resentment rather than 'Orthodox brotherhood'. Over the last ten years, Russian media reporting on Yugoslavia was extremely skewed, even in the liberal press and long before the NATO intervention. Virtually nothing was reported on the Bosnian war, the siege on Sarajevo, the massacres etc. Instead, it was reported that they were staged for CNN.

The 'Clash of Civilization'-argument is based on essentialist and analogical thinking. History has already happened; now we are rehearsing the repertoire of ethnic hatred. I believe that analogical thinking is dangerous on all sides. This is not the 'battle for Kosovo', not the Cold War battle of NATO against a weakened Russia, not World War I, and not the Holocaust. Learning from history and thinking historically means that one does not think through analogies but analyses specific complexities of the given moment.

MED: As far as Huntington is concerned, he rather predicted the war of the West against Islam, and the eventual alliance of the West with Orthodoxy. We still have to see that.

CMZ: If somebody got it right then it was – sad to say – Ernest Gellner with his dark prophecy that nationalism, i.e. the congruence of state and culture and the idea that the realm of the national and the political should be identical, can be achieved in the 'East' only by violent ethnic cleansing? I am afraid that he has a point. But we should not give in to the Yugoslav evidence, there is no automatism connecting state building, nation building and ethnic violence – see Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, to name only a few. Why did it not happen in these cases?

SIS: In my view, there is an important German missing on the list: Clausewitz. To some extent it seems to me that this war is seen by NATO as the continuation of politics by other means. NATO is not fighting for land or peace, but for fulfilling political objectives. It is definitely not a war in the sense of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations. It is simply a war about power.

STA: The use of economic sanctions, at least in non-oil producing countries, especially in the case of Serbia is in fact an example of 'token' moralistic politics; a machiavellian approach would have been the earliest possible and complete lifting of all sanctions against Yugoslavia to encourage liberalisation from within. Machiavellianism in economic power politics from a Western and American point of view is perhaps not imposing sanctions, but letting loose the forces of economic integration.

SGB: Niccolo doesn't need any legitimisation. He is above that. I do like Gellner and always would find a legitimisation for his explanation of nationalism. Even though he should be converted into a historian.

2.9 Is this, after all, the revanche of the Modern against postmodernism?

STA: There's a Baudrillard piece about a 'stone-age tribe' discovered in the Papua New Guinea jungle. An international symposium in conjunction with the local authorities decided to lay a cordon of absolute exclusion for visitors and ethnologists alike around their entire area of movement to 'preserve this unique biosphere', 'simulating' the undiscovered. The 'unique multicultural environment' in the Balkans, that has to be protected and preserved, seems to be similarly simulated. Just as the aim is simulation, so are the methods simulation of war. Through the ineffectiveness of these methods, nostalgia for the archaic can only grow, as the archaic, primitive, and idyllic is continually being irrevocably lost, it is constituted by its destruction and disappearance. Moreover, nostalgia for evilness is also in the air. The West waits on tenterhooks for its worst fears to be fulfilled: whereas the nostalgia for the primitive and rural is backwards-orientated towards the villages set on fire, the nostalgia for evil is orientated to a point in the future when the mass-graves are opened, and the 'mystery of the missing males' is solved.

Milosevic and other Serbian groups mock modernity? All nationalist movements have oscillated between the desire to modernise, accompanied by a hatred of the less modern, fuelled by jealousy of other's modernity. However, since there is now a monopoly on modernity such that this modernity can deem itself universally valid, the jealousy of others'

modernity contents itself with mocking these universal claims by its very own displays of violence against the less modern. Thus contemporary modernisation movements diverge sharply between the Serbian and Polish or Hungarian examples: the universal claims of western modernity are either fully accepted by modernisers, thus ruling out all forms of violent and forced modernisation, or they are completely rejected in such a way that the jealousy of others' modernity and the hatred of the less-modern fuse: the less modern (Kosovo Albanians) are eradicated in such a violent way (by Yugoslav authorities) so as to mock the universalist claims of the more modern (the West) and upgrade the value of their own modernity. In this way, the universalism of modernity blocks itself. This might be postmodernity.

SBO: Now that the 'end of history' and the 'end of art' has already been declared, why not declare the end of postmodernism? The film 'Wag the Dog' was seen by many as a popculture postmodernism that came to life: The president covers up his 'indiscretions' with a manufactured war. Last year's events seem to imitate the film in an absurd postmodern fashion with even more explicit sexual details. When Clinton ordered the bombing of Iraq, it was easy to say that life imitates art. Or popculture. In the American imagination (mainstream left establishment, the New York Times included) there seems to be no war possible without TV sets.

In a recent interview, Dustin Hoffman (the popculture-1960s-'outsider'-type turned Hollywood producer) was asked what he felt about the fact that 'Wag the Dog' was shown on Serbian TV. He said that he was not disturbed at all. After all, it was just a film. He added that while covering the impeachment hearing, the journalists in Washington would go back to their rooms and watch 'Wag the Dog.' He seemed to find both equally amusing. In other words, his 1960s beliefs turned into an ironic scepticism. The problem with this kind of popular postmodernism is that there is nothing outside the TV. Baudrillard said on the eve of the Gulf War that the war would not take place. It seems that TV itself is wagging the dog. The make-up artist will get an Oscar for the Albanians. Pop-postmodernism, despite its apparent scepticism, does not upset the Western 'establishment' but fits into the media logic perfectly well.

I would like to return to the modern. I am nostalgic for critical modernity and reflective thinking that wasn't completely exhausted but rather made virtual by some postmodern thinkers. Postmodernism has won! Down With Postmodernism! Theoretical postmodernism was about the subversion of the 'master narratives' and the advocacy of difference. What happened with the cooption of critical postmodernism into popular culture is that the postmodern narrative itself became dominant and turned into a kind of cynical media narrative. Who is to blame for the impeachment trial? The media (I advanced this argument myself). Who is to blame for what is going on in Yugoslavia? Serbian TV. Who is to blame for the bombing? NATO and its agents at CNN (or the other way around). As for diversity it

turned into a diversity of make-up only: each identity politics was based on the same palpable narrative of victimhood, drive for recognition, economic share etc. Nabokov once wrote that pornography was not about explicit sexual material, but about a certain form of narrative that always produces the desired effect. It seems that there is something pornographic about the propaganda war on both sides. The real victims were the nameless refugees whose documents and even licence plates were confiscated on the border. Serbian civilians bombed by NATO 'by mistake' are also victims. One should not indulge in comparative victimhood, yet it is sad to hear that cosmopolitan Belgradians, hurt badly both by the bombing and by the internal political situation, never mention the refugees, that they say in passing that they fled from the NATO bombs or, even worse that they staged the destruction and massacres for the Western media. Thus, for them Albanians exist only on TV, dressed up American extras from 'Wag the Dog.'

SIS: It is not a revanche of the Modern, it is rather the evidence that we are far away from living in a pure postmodern world. Living in a postmodern world does not mean that aims like security and a decent life for everyone are no longer important. They are the basis, on which something like a postmodern world can be built. When they crumble, the whole concept falls apart, too, like the notion of postmodern human beings. Surveys show that values like democratic decision-making rules and the freedom of speech are growing more important to people. They are even more concerned about them than about their personal income. But this only holds true when personal income is secure. The same is true for personal security or the fear of aggression from other countries.

MED: At first glance, it seems that the Kosovo war was an outburst of modernity. Modern history has returned with a vengeance, in particular the Balkan history, with its post-Ottoman, post-Habsburg and post-Tito conflict potential. The shadow of Kosovo Pole, the memorial commemorating the 1389 defeat of the Serbs at the hands of a superior Turkish force in the Battle on the Field of Blackbirds (*Amselfeld*), suddenly loomed large over Europe, along with a number of other unresolved territorial disputes, unsettled borders and ethnic rivalries in East Central and South Eastern Europe. The conflict over Kosovo highlighted that the East has not yet completed the tasks of modernity, i.e. forming nations, states, and defining borders. In the age of globalisation and European integration, there turned out to be pockets of violent modern nationhood. On the other hand, the West, too, seems to have relapsed into modernity, making use of war and power politics, and waving national flags. British defence analysts on Sky News would jealously count the number of sorties flown by the Royal Air Force in the air campaign.

It would be too simplistic, however, to read the Kosovo war as a sudden recurrence of modernity, nationality and military security in late 20th century Europe. To begin with, Serbian, Albanian etc. nationalism is staged in a postmodern setting, i.e. this is nationalism as a response to globalisation and integration. Each of the nationalist movements in the region is

surprisingly global, positioning itself with respect to the ‘West’, that is the EU, NATO, the United States, but also with respect to Russia. Ethnic leaders are vying for the West’s attention, and their strategies are addressed to the international community, as well as to their direct opponents and domestic constituencies. That is to say that e.g. Milosevic is hardly an archaic nationalist, obsessed with ethnicity, and trying to defy the West. On the contrary, he is a pragmatic politician, playing the strategy of a regulated conflict with the West, and in fact using the West for the purpose of consolidating his own power. Provoking the NATO attack could have been Milosevic’s strategic (mis-)calculation with yet unforeseen consequences. Likewise, international PR has turned into a major activity of the KLA and other Kosovar leaders.

CMZ: It is a confirmation of the fact that the utopia of Modernity – purity, exclusiveness, homogeneity, truth, single code, historical facts – can only be reached at an appalling price.

2.10 What do we learn about sovereignty after the crisis? Do only ‘good’ states or great powers have a right to be sovereign?

MED: The Westphalian principle of sovereignty, originally created by monarchs to ensure their position against popular movements and systematically (ab-)used by rulers against their own subjects, is eroding. In fact, the very Weberian principle of the state as the legitimate monopoly on violence seems to be failing. It is no longer a sovereign that exercises this monopoly but the international community. Basic human rights are being defined by the West as universal principles, transcending sovereignty.

In the new normative paradigm of *Idealpolitik*, sovereignty is no longer an ontological given, no longer inviolate. In some cases, it may be restricted (like Milosevic’s token sovereignty over Kosovo today, or Saddam Hussein’s over Iraqi skies), in some cases simply revoked. As a result, sovereignty, and governance writ large, can arguably be made more responsible and accountable, encouraging greater public participation and observance of human rights. A small question remains: is governance responsible and accountable to the indigenous constituencies, or to the moral authority of the West, which is in some cases external to domestic discourses?

It is interesting, however, that the Kosovo war also infringed upon the sovereignty of Western nations, subjecting their alleged national interests to supranational purposes (NATO’s search of action and leadership, preserving the Transatlantic relationship, shaping ESDI and CFSP, preventing the refugee pressure on EU mechanisms, etc.) and to transnational technologies. In the Kosovo war, the leading actors were not states (with a possible exception of the USA, the last surviving nation-state), but institutions. The Kosovo story is taking place not in the

realpolitische field of traditional state interests, but in the highly virtual institutional field of 'European security'.

CMZ: Sovereignty in a westphalian sense means the right of a state to internal control without external interference. During the last decade or so, the principle of popular sovereignty has been added. This means, first, the right of groups to be sovereign (here: the Kosovars) and, second, that sovereignty derives from the people, is executed on behalf and for the people and can be revoked if it is practised against the people. If a people is too weak to stand up against violations of its right to self-determination, then the international community has the right to intervene. The question, however, remains: Who is the international community? Is it the UN, is it NATO, is it the OSCE, or is it a communicative consensus, mainly worked out by the mass media?

Thus, sovereignty is not an objective quality which can be achieved by fulfilling some criteria. It is an exclusive privilege which is granted to some and denied to others. How and when? There are two factors: good PR is one, a historical tradition of statehood the other. When it comes to the former socialist bloc, only those entities which had the status of Union republics have successfully claimed sovereignty and independence. Chechnya, Kosovo and Tatarstan, which were federal units on the second level, will not gain this privilege. But I can see a tendency towards sovereign groups instead of sovereign states. While this will cause huge problems, it is nevertheless a trend. Imagine: A global agency which registers groups as sovereign, if they pass some tests. And every five years, they have to renew the test, or – relegation to the status of non-sovereign groups.

SIS: We learn that sovereignty is nothing natural. It is connected to the state and established in international law, but has no moral or historical basis. The concept of sovereignty is more linked to a certain historical period. This period is conserved as the status quo in international law, which does not mean that it is the final, unchangeable truth. The concept of sovereignty was an appropriate solution for a particular problem, that evolved under special circumstances in a particular time. As far as the external factors changed, we may have to rethink the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty was accorded to states to diminish the role of violence and war in international relations. It was supposed to create stable islands, with a fixed order. It worked at its time. But which concept could there be instead? Surely not the distinction between good and wealthy sovereign states and poor and powerless dependent states.

SBO: While I think what happened was a result of a political error of unprecedented consequences on the part of a specific American and West-European leadership, I do think that nation states are weakened at present (through trade, investment, travel, porosity of the borders, etc), and this is not a bad thing. As a former student of Spanish and Catalan culture, I can say that the entry into the EU really helped ease the ethnic and national tensions. (The

same is true in the case of Britain and Ireland, and the Eastern European countries aspiring to join 'Europe' – Hungary and Romania, the Baltic states, etc.) What is needed, as Gyorgy Konrad claimed, is a consistency in the minority rights record. Thus, I do not think that Croatia should not have been recognised a sovereign state, but it should have been recognised with a proviso that it ensures minority rights. Hence, it is a matter of leadership and politics.

STA: The campaign demonstrates that not only has the value of sovereignty in real terms diminished in the course of international integration processes, but this has begun to have implications for the value accorded to sovereignty in international law. The decline of the nation state is signified by a institutionalised (50 years) coalition intervening in affairs of another state on 'grounds of principals' (or declaring to do so). Ethnic cleansing is not unusual (all states have a history of ethnic cleansing in one form or another), unusual is the intervention on grounds of ethics. Even the reasons based on '*Realpolitik*' are non-nation state in a classical sense: first, the prevention of mass immigration into the EU. This is a concern because of obligations under international law to accept refugees and provide for them. Second, the problem of internationalisation of diasporas (fears of a 'Balkanisation of Germany') in the age of 'space-time compression'.

RAI/BWA: The 'good' and 'great' powers who still enjoy unfettered sovereign rights are defined by the Western powers. A 'humanitarian Breshnev-doctrine' is used to legitimise intervention. However, this also signifies a possibly positive trend to a normative concept of 'responsible sovereignty'. This could help promote accountable governance and adherence to human rights standards if incorporated in a framework that takes the power to define 'good' behaviour out of the hands of the usual Western suspects.

2.11 Does anyone see on the Balkans elements of a new world order and what are the implications for the role of the United Nations (UN)?

WAL: According to a common argument, e.g. put forward by Habermas in *Die Zeit*, the Kosovo war heralds a new era in modern history by demonstrating the preparedness of the international community to intervene in sovereign states in order to safeguard human rights. Thus, the aim of the bombing was to secure an autonomous Kosovo within the borders of Yugoslavia – the intervention was justified by NATO on the grounds that it secured the rights of an ethnic minority which were victims of a genocide orchestrated by the Yugoslavian government. This is seen as an important step forward in the development of international law.

Instead of applying international law in a classical sense and legitimating the intervention with a mandate of the UN Security Council, it was justified with a cosmopolitan

understanding of human rights: Citizens of one nation intervene in sovereign states on behalf of their fellow citizens. This represented the development from the state citizen (*Staatsbürger*) to the world citizen (Jürgen Habermas: *Weltbürger*). While the rights of the *Staatsbürger* were already well established in many countries, those of the *Weltbürger* would still have to be codified. A legal framework would also have to be established, but still, the war in Yugoslavia was a manifestation of the principle that a state's sovereignty must be subordinate to human rights. This argument, however, is flawed in two respects. First, it misinterprets the causes of the intervention in Kosovo. Second, the implicit overall perspective seems questionable.

The supposed change in attitude and principle among the international community or at least among some Western governments is not easily brought in line with the conduct of the Western world in other international conflicts. Why is Israel not sanctioned for holding on to the occupied territories despite numerous UN resolutions? Why is there not more pressure by the main Western powers on Indonesia with its long record of human rights violations on the occupied islands? Why was there no sufficient interest in preventing genocide and bloodshed in Rwanda? The list could be continued without effort.

I advance the following, more 'pragmatic' interpretation of NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict: The governments of the intervening states were motivated by a mixture of economic and political interests and extensive media coverage. It can be argued, first, that particularly the European governments were ready to accept Anglo-American pressure for military intervention as they feared that the humanitarian catastrophe in the Kosovo would lead to a flood of new refugees. Also, there was widespread fear that an influx of refugees would destabilise the neighbouring countries. The costs destabilising the Balkans were well understood by the European Union.

Second, the impact of media coverage on NATO's strategy should not be underestimated. It might be interesting to find out to what extent NATO's strategy and the course of the intervention were shaped by opinion polls conducted almost daily in the US. One might suggest that the outcome would have been less favourable for NATO if a majority of the US citizens had rejected the idea to send in ground troops. As media coverage is highly selective (just compare the cases of Rwanda and the Kosovo), a policy driven by the day-to-day pressures of public opinion might quite often fail to defend human rights whenever this would be justified on moral grounds. Regarding the role of the media, one should also consider the (ab-)use of the 'fourth power' by politicians. For instance, there has been much discussion on how far domestic problems (e.g. the Lewinsky affair) had an impact on the tough position of the US against Iraq.

It was argued that the absence of a legal justification was not a basic deficiency of the intervention in the Kosovo. This perspective seems to be highly questionable under at least three aspects. First, if there is no written law which sets out the minimum requirements for an intervention, it remains unclear which incidences justify attacking a sovereign state. In particular, given that every war has immense external (or 'collateral') effects, it is an important question who decides on whether the benefits outweigh the costs and who has to bear these costs. As a result of the Kosovo war, apart from the significant number of military and civilian casualties, the neighbouring states (Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia) got trapped in a whirlpool of destabilisation, the Russian government came under heavy pressure, and the Serbian economy was thrown back by at least a decade. Furthermore, it is still unclear how the huge economic cost of rebuilding the neighbouring states can be financed by EU states.

Second, there are always conflicting preferences among different nations regarding any particular case for intervention that arise from the different interpretations of 'human rights' or simply the economic consequences of a war. Thus, there is an inbuilt tendency that ad hoc interventions will be heavily biased. The strong Western nations and in particular the US are prone to abusing their economic and military power to both conduct interventions at will and to impose the burden of financing them on the other states involved. In this respect, it would be interesting to analyse how far the new Eastern European members of the NATO had only the slightest chance of shaping NATO's strategy. In this respect, a major problem might be that only the OECD- or welfare-states might be in a position to bring their national interests in line with the 'new' requirements of the long-term moral standard of the UN. For many states of the 'second world', e.g. Libya or Iraq, national sovereignty is an important political resource to compensate for their unstable inner conditions.

Finally, it is astonishing that the warmongering governments are now silent on long-term strategies how to reshape the international institutions and law in order to be prepared for other conflicts of this kind. In fact, one could argue that such a discussion will not take place at all, as these very governments seem to avoid any efforts towards institutionalising the changes. This would necessitate the incorporation of a broader and therefore blurred definition of the objectives and means. Besides, if e.g. the Security Council was reformed in a way that decisions could be taken by majority votes, this could well backfire on some Western governments.

From a German perspective, the most important implication of the Kosovo crisis may well be the fact that Germany was ready to fulfil its role in NATO and did not choose a *Sonderweg*. In my view, the main differences both in assessing the crisis and in the choice of means to end the conflict arose between continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon states.

It seems that the US regarded the Kosovo crisis as an incidence where its superpower status obliged it to intervene on moral grounds. In this respect, the intervention was already fully justified by the perceived moral necessity. Moreover, with this understanding any further measures should be evaluated according to whether they facilitated the fulfilment of the moral task while incurring the least costs. Though continental Europe also recurred on human rights principles to justify the war, the precise meaning of these principles as well as how the objectives should be achieved was highly controversial. While it was US policy to 'correct' the wrongdoings of a foreign nation, the continental European countries chose a more integrative strategy (e.g., trying to include Russia in the negotiations, Fischer's peace plan etc.). Additionally, there was a long-term perspective of creating an institutional framework for future interventions of a similar kind. As such a framework would have to be agreed upon by a majority of the states, it was considered vital that this ad hoc intervention received broad support from the international community including Russia and China.

The Kosovo crisis allows for a variety of interpretations, which is also due to the divergence in the positions of the participating NATO states, despite their demonstrated unity. One major implication of the Kosovo crisis may therefore be that the perceived differences between the members of the former blocs may well be exacerbated in the future and this could constitute an opportunity for the EU (and in particular for Germany) whose foreign policy still has to find its way.

CMZ: It is too early to say, whether this signifies the beginning of a new world order. I think Kosovo will go down in history as the first war fought by 'the west' for the sake of principles, and not for the sake of self-defence or relative gains. I doubt, however, that this will be the paradigm of a new world order.

What would the opponents of NATO do without the UN? I remember Lafontaine's speech: 'It was no good to push away the UN'. In my view, nobody pushed away the UN – the UN pushes itself away all the time, because it is coalition of important states, two of which say no all the time. And Kofi Annan is very sad about that, but that does not change anything. So, either change the UN from consensual to majority principle. Or: Let us keep it for the ambience. And remember: If the UN speaks with one voice for all permanent Security Council Members, then this voice is heard.

SIS: I think that we witnessed an important precedence, which will lead to a reformulation of international law. A country's border is no longer the boundaries of international concern. The humanitarian intervention, which was until the Kosovo war just an option for the UN, will be applied to other cases. International law will become more normative and give place to moral aspects.

The lesson for the UN should be to stick to their agenda for peace from 1992 and to intensify their diplomatic efforts. The UN are the only actor left which represents something that could be labelled the international community. Within this framework they are legitimised to set new rules that may serve as a common ground for international relations.

For some groups (in particular the nationalists) the intervention of NATO in a sovereign state was a good example of NATO's aggressive potential and it underlines their argument of the need of a strong counterweight; this, in turn, gives NATO moral justification for its enlargement. The world learned from the conflict that Russia in a way is still a power which is far away from the western 'Wertegemeinschaft'.

SBO: Whatever consequences this war will have, I do believe that a part of the new global culture should be the enforcement of the laws against crimes against humanity (Nuremberg Trial, 1948 Genocide Convention, Hague Tribunal, etc). The fact that the practices of the implementation were faulted and that the rhetoric of the war against genocide has been used exploitatively does not mean that the issue is not relevant. (Most of the best ideas and ideals were used exploitatively – from humanism to Marxism to globalisation to sentimentalisation of the local.)

STA: It should not be forgotten that Bulgaria and Romania have managed to contain ethnic conflicts through party system and liberal governments with IMF support, and, thus have prospects for eventual EU and NATO integration as a further stimulus for solving conflicts peacefully. The NATO agenda is basically to incorporate on a step-by-step basis countries which want and are capable of being incorporated. However, there is a problem of ghettoisation of the countries not yet admitted, which means they react against NATO (thus increasing NATO's self-justification). Thus, the NATO/non-NATO border is likely at some point to become entrenched, against NATO's own intentions.

SGB: I do not see or expect a New World Order.

On the UN: They are the ultimate regulative Idee. In other words: they will not ever work. But they still are necessary.

BWA/RAI: The war in the Kosovo demonstrated the decreasing relevance of regional, non-military organisations like the OSCE, as non-military means are apparently not sufficient to stop serious cases of human rights violations. But rather than serving as a stimulus to further developing conflict prevention capacities and to upgrading the OSCE financially and logistically as a consequence of its apparent failure, the NATO intervention has demonstrated to the world that military means are more effective, thus legitimising the role of NATO as an international security organisation.

A lot of questions have to be raised in consequence, of which we attempt to answer only a fraction: What are the criteria for a legitimate intervention, who decides when to intervene, why in Kosovo, but not in Turkey, in Sierra Leone, or in Sudan? What about the future design of International Law and international institutions? Will moral grounds suffice as a legitimisation of interventions? Along these questions, one has to confront the moral dilemma many left-wing and pacifist people face after the war. How to deal with a determined violator of human rights? How to stop ethnic cleansing? Is there a place for morality in foreign policy and international relations or is it rather a disguise for more mundane interests? In short: Does the Left need a Kissinger?

Granting morality a role in international relations has always been a concern rather of the political Left. A classic topic in that debate was the new world economic order. Leftists have always demanded a more moral stance of the industrialised nations towards the Third World. Out of solidarity and a moral responsibility towards their fellow human beings, people in the North should care for the Third World and grant development aid and market access. Although some of the demands were also formulated in terms of the West's self-interest, it was essentially a moral discourse. Now the Left is in power throughout Europe and in the US, and people like Joschka Fischer, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair are responsible for a war that was fought in the name of morality. Suddenly, people get suspicious of morals in politics and especially of a moral justification of war – and rightly so.

A number of concerns stand out. First, different people in different cultures have different conceptions of morality. The debate on a perceived Western bias in the human rights framework as codified in various international covenants and treaties is far from over. Although a simplistic cultural relativism would ignore that every human being indeed possesses some fundamental, inalienable rights, an international consensus does not exist what exactly these basic rights are. More importantly, as soon as one tries to identify group rights, e.g. the right of accountable and democratic governance or the right of self-determination for people that consider themselves an ethnic group, one gets entangled in a complicated web of cultural, historical and political traditions and vital political and economic interests. The consequence is that the already small common ground disappears completely. This leads to the problem of all human rights agreements. If the stated rights were explicit and detailed enough to make a substantial difference, the states would not have signed the treaties. And in order to make enough parties sign the agreements, the norms have to be formulated in a way that ensures that they do not make a real difference or the enforcement mechanisms have to be kept powerless. In short, an actual consensus on moral questions and, thus, on good governance and the proper conduct of states does not exist.

Second, the debate on morality in international relations might be misleading or even dangerous, as it ignores the real relations of power. Regardless of whether all actors can agree on a minimum standard or not, the salient point lies in the process of agreeing on these

standards. As Habermas pointed out, a consensus on moral questions can never be reached by coercion, as the process of communication is an integral part of this very morality. The process of determining moral standards has to be transparent and free of domination by single states or other actors.

This, however, is not the case in the 'real' world. The moral discourse is heavily dominated by the West, the somewhat imprecise description of the web of formal and informal institutions and regimes that govern the decision making processes. In the course of the Kosovo war, the G8, the group of the seven most industrialised economies plus Russia, assumed a diplomatic weight that it should not have had. NATO does not score better in terms of transparency and accountability. But the same is true even with respect to the UN, much heralded and demanded as the adequate forum for legitimising the intervention. The dominance of the Western powers plus China and Russia on all matters of importance is entrenched by their notorious veto-power in the Security Council. As this has so far been justified by an overriding interest in preventing a war between the nuclear powers, NATO's self-mandated intervention has undermined the very reason for this exceptional role of the big powers in the system of international institutions.

The UN still are the only organisation that can claim any legitimate role in shaping international norms, as it is based on the principle of equal say of all states. To be of any relevance in the future, however, the UN are in desperate need of reform. Leaving aside the question whether non-state actors should also get a greater say in world affairs, the UN have to be made more accountable and democratic. The Security Council in its present form is outdated and should be changed. Numerous suggestions exist. They range from changing the principle of unanimity to majority voting, to installing a UN Supreme Court, that would have the final say on questions such as 'humanitarian interventions'. The discussion is still on a very early stage but it should be continued. In the worst case the UN would be reduced to a relief agency without relevance in international security issues. The present state, however, rules out the possibility of legitimising a war by recourse to morality, as the idea of a war legitimised on the basis of the moral convictions of a small but powerful group of states contradicts the very claim that a universal morality exists. However, this debate might be relevant only as the debunking of a dominant ideology. As we found out above, in reality the moral justification for the intervention was just one among a host of other, much more decisive reasons for acting against the held belief that war seldom brings peace.

There are also a number of side-effects of the intervention in the Kosovo for the future world order. First, a precedent was set for attempts to change international law by violating it and the UN were discredited in their role as an organisation based on the strict observance of the international law framework. Second, there seems to be less willingness in the 'West' to reach an international consensus on security issues, illustrated by the fact that widespread opposition around the globe was roundly ignored in the run-up to the intervention. Third,

military action as a means to achieve political ends has gained new legitimacy, thus reversing the development of the last decades. Fourth, there were discernible attempts in the EU to develop a coherent position but European dependence on US support has been vividly demonstrated again.

2.12 Adhocism, virtual politics and missing agendas. Towards a new conception of agency

STA: Whereas foreign policy was previously (at least represented as being) strategically long-term planned in accordance with national interests, and in general fairly independent of changes in government etc., and domestic politics was more linked with short term perspectives and rapid changes in direction due to parties with very different orientations competing, nowadays – as a result of international integration processes – the case is more that domestic politics is determined by economic constraints and very consistent, (even in Russia!), whereas ‘foreign politics’ – in as much as the term is relevant – are marked by very short-term perspectives linked with ‘crises’ and instabilities which are in everyone's backyard. Thus, foreign politics is marked by adhocerei. Moreover, American dominance means that all international players base their actions around anticipation of American responses, making the pursuit of any consistent (and predictable) foreign policy on the American side impossible. Thus, it is possible to argue that the actions of both UCK and the Serbian regime were from the very start aimed at escalation to force the US to intervene in the Kosovo question in one way or another, and to profit from this in different ways.

MED: The Kosovo war featured a new concept of agency which roughly corresponds to what the post-structuralist literary critics, following Roland Barthes, call ‘the death of the author’. The Kosovo story has no author, it is written by impersonal forces like ‘Europe’, or the ‘West’, or the ‘community of values’, or the ‘New World Order’. Discourses have no face or personality, and war in Kosovo is written by a collective body of the West, emerging in an electrified field of symbolic exchange and simulation. The most striking thing about the Kosovo war was that it materialized ‘out of thin air’ of late modernity. It has no author or mastermind behind it (even though there are interests involved), and NATO is no more than an instrument, an executor, a performer. In this way, the Kosovo war resembles Russia's war in Chechnya which now, almost five years after it had started, remains absolutely anonymous. It is totally unknown who made the decision and gave orders to start it, whereas the roles of the President, the Security Council and the Ministry of Defense are unclear. Considering the covert Byzantine nature of Russian politics, the ‘truth’ about the start of the Chechen war is not likely to be revealed any time soon (if this ‘truth’ exists at all).

The new concept of agency represented in the Kosovo conflict largely explains NATO's spectacular planning failures, and a general *ad hoc* and *ad libitum* mode of operation. Once it

became clear that NATO had failed to deter Milosevic from ethnic cleansing in the first few days of the air campaign, the impression seemed warranted that the Allies had no agenda whatsoever except continuing bombing with reckless abandon, driven by Napoleon's motto *on s'engage et puis on voit*. In an improvised field of events, increasingly panicky about the evident inefficacy of bombing, NATO started looking for alternative mechanisms of conflict management and/or retrospective justification of own action (which should have been involved in the first place): the OSCE, the United Nations, the Hague Tribunal, and finally the EU and Russia.

Indeed, the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission has virtually saved NATO which by late May 1999 seemed to have been hopelessly stuck in the Kosovo quagmire, unable to stop bombing on the one hand, and undetermined to employ the ground force on the other. Had not a political solution been mediated in early June, one can quite imagine that now, in late summer 1999, the bombs would be still falling (with 'collateral damage' mounting), the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo would have been completed, Serbian troops would be damaged but far from defeated or driven out of Kosovo, cracks within NATO would be growing, and the Balkan winter would be looming... An impersonal war machine of the West had to turn for help to personal-style politics from the European peripheries (Finland and Russia); a marginal discourse was needed to save the Grand Narrative of the New World Order.

3) Vom Nutzen und Elend Rußlands: Die Einbindungsdebatte¹

Von Klaus Segbers

Neben vielen anderen Denkwürdigkeiten der Kosovo Krise gibt es einen weiteren Aspekt, der politisch und politikwissenschaftlich von Interesse ist: Die Rolle Rußlands und die Rolle, die Rußland von außen zugeschrieben wird.

Dabei sollte es eigentlich überraschen, daß ein Land, dessen Haushalt wesentlich von Zuwendungen internationaler Organisationen und von Umschuldungsvereinbarungen mit transnationalen Gläubigern abhängt, eine eigenständige Vermittlungsrolle zugetraut wird. Tatsächlich hatten die Vertreter der Rußländischen Föderation (RF) zu keinem Zeitpunkt dieses Konflikts eine Gestaltungsoption aus eigener Kraft. Woher, dann, rühren die gegenläufigen Erwartungen?

¹ Dieser Beitrag erscheint in leicht veränderter Form unter dem Titel: Rußland einbinden. Vom Sinn und Zweck einer Simulation, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 44.7 (1999), 829-836

Dieser Frage soll in drei Schritten nachgegangen werden:

- 1 Wie ist die internationale Aktionsfähigkeit russischer Eliten einzuschätzen?

- 2 Welche Rolle spielte Rußland für das Verhalten Serbiens und westlicher Regierungen vor und nach dem Beginn des Krieges?

- 3 Wie wurde die Rolle Rußlands von den NATO-Staaten und westlichen Gesellschaften vor Beginn des Konflikts eingeschätzt? Hat sich diese Einschätzung bisher geändert?

Zum **ersten Problem**. Hier stehen Beobachter vor einer klaren Frage. Sie können entweder davon ausgehen, daß die Regierung und Eliten in der RF auf der nationalen und internationalen Ebene mehr oder weniger aktions- und kooperationsfähig sind. Diese können und müssen dann einbezogen und eingebunden werden. Sie agieren zumindest mit mittleren Zeithorizonten, sind im internationalen Umfeld ergebnisorientiert und intern (innenpolitisch) politik- und implementationsfähig.

Die andere Möglichkeit der Deutung nachsowjetischen Elitenverhaltens besagt, daß rußländische Regierungen eher Gruppenkoalitionen zur Verabredung innenpolitischer Spielregeln auf Zeit sind, und daß sie international nicht zur strategischen Interaktion in der Lage sind. Die Zeithorizonte dieser Akteure sind sehr kurz, sie selbst agieren durchaus rational, sind in der Substanz ihrer Präferenzen aber nicht an internationalen Fragen interessiert (allenfalls an deren innenpolitischem Tauschwert). Damit wären sie im Kern nach außen nicht politikfähig.

Analytiker russischer Politik, die in den letzten Jahren die dort laufenden Transformationen verfolgt haben und die nicht zu sehr durch klassische Ostforschung oder idealistische Annahmen 'realistischer' Außenpolitik geprägt sind, werden es schwerlich vermeiden können, für die zweite Position zu argumentieren. Das Problem dieser real realistischen Position ist, daß sie wenig nachgefragt wird. PolitikerInnen, Medien, und das interessierte Publikum sind unabhängig von politischen Prägungen und Präferenzen an diesen Erklärungsansätzen ungleich weniger interessiert, als an Interpretationen, die staatsfixiert sind und die die Annahme der Interaktionsfähigkeit russischer Politik nach außen machen.

Solche Annahmen sind jedoch irrig. Und die Gründe dafür sind struktureller Natur. Zwar gibt es in Rußland wie sonst auf der Welt auch immer wieder unfähiges Personal und mangelhafte Konzeptionen, Betrug, Korruption und 'Verrat'. Doch sind diese Faktoren Begleitumstände, die von wirklichen Ursachen institutioneller Inkonsistenz nicht ablenken sollten. So hatte die RF auch in sowjetischen Zeiten keine ausgebildeten eigenen staatlichen Organe – im Unterschied zu anderen Unionsrepubliken. Seit Beginn der beschleunigten Transformation (Mitte der achtziger Jahre) und seit der Unabhängigkeit (1991/92) sind solche Institutionen und Organisationen teilweise geschaffen worden (neue Verfassung im Dezember 1993, bislang zwei Parlamentswahlen zum Unterhaus, neue vertragliche Beziehungen zwischen dem föderalen Zentrum und Regionen sowie mit einzelnen Regionen, eine starke Präsidentschaft, ein Verfassungsgericht und andere mehr), aber sie haben bislang nur eine geringe Prägekraft entwickeln können. Die formalen Institutionen sind schwach und wenig durchsetzungsfähig.

Das wird – wenn man es wahrnehmen will – immer wieder deutlich. Zu allen außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Fragen gibt es weder konsistente Positionen noch ein konsequentes Außenverhalten. Reale Zuständigkeiten sind oft unklar, Äußerungen wechseln, mitunter rasch, und sind widersprüchlich. Die Regierung der RF ist im traditionellen Sinn kein Akteur; sie ähnelt eher einer Koalition, und zwar nicht zwischen Parteien, sondern zwischen wirtschaftlichem Lobbies und sozialen wie politischen Clans. Lange halten solche Koalitionen nie, was den raschen Verschleiß von Regierungen erklärt. Regierungsbildungen werden weniger nach sachlichen und Kompetenzaspekten vorgenommen, sondern nach Seilschaften und partikularen Interessen. Es geht dabei um die Nähe oder Ferne der Kandidaten und der Gruppen, die sie repräsentieren, zu einzelnen Ministerien und um Zugriffe auf staatliche Ressourcen, die sie in Aussicht stellen.

Verständlicherweise ist bei dem allumfassenden *bargaining* um Posten, Positionen und Ressourcen die Behörde für Eigentumsfragen ungleich interessanter als das Bildungsministerium, obgleich auch dieses den Inhabern gewisse Optionen bietet. Die Operettenhaftigkeit der Kabinettsbildungen, wie vor wenigen Wochen wieder deutlich zu beobachten, hat ihren Hintergrund in der allgemeinen institutionellen Schwäche, in der sich daraus ergebenden hohen kompensatorischen Bedeutung von Aushandlungsspielen und in der primären Orientierung aller Akteure auf Ressourcenzugriffe. An allen anderen Fragen sind Akteure in der RF derzeit und auf absehbare Zeit nicht oder nur instrumentell interessiert. Ohne diesen Aspekt zu begreifen, wird es schwer bis unmöglich sein, das Verhalten von Akteuren in und aus Rußland richtig zu deuten.

Es kommt hinzu, daß der Staat in der RF nicht nur historische *legacies* und transformationsbezogene Probleme hat, die seiner Stärkung im Wege stehen. Zusätzlich ist er dauerhaft, strukturell und dramatisch unterfinanziert. Wesentlichen Aufgaben wie Unterhalt und Modernisierung der Streitkräfte, Konzeptionierung und Organisation funktionierender sozialer Sicherungssysteme, Einrichtung einer professionellen Verwaltung, Modernisierung

des Ausbildungs- und Gesundheitssystems, Investitionen in Infrastruktur kann er kaum oder nicht mehr nachkommen. Der Haushalt 1999 (nominal 500 Milliarden Rubel, d.h. derzeit etwa \$ 20 Milliarden) ist nur zu etwa 50% durch Steuereinnahmen gedeckt. Hinzu kommen Rückzahlungsverpflichtungen für Außenschulden von über \$ 17 Milliarden in 1999. Aus diesen Proportionen wird deutlich, daß der Staat auch finanziell kaum handlungsfähig ist.

Schließlich gelten für die RF genau wie für alle anderen staatlichen Akteure weltweit die Auswirkungen der Globalisierung. Regulierungen auf staatlicher Ebene werden immer weniger effektiv. Klassische Aufgaben der Diplomatie werden durch inter- und transnationale Regime und Institutionen überwölbt und teilweise ersetzt. Das Konzept von Staatlichkeit selbst wird durch die Entterritorialisierung, Entmaterialisierung, Entsouveränisierung und Entgrenzung von wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen Interaktionen zu einer Hülle, in der Apparate zwar weiter agieren, aber zunehmend ohne Wirkung bleiben und funktionslos werden. Das immer wieder neue und teilweise atemberaubende Hineinstolpern westlicher Regierungen in das Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, in die (formale, staatliche) deutsche Einheit, in die Irakkrisen, und nun in die Kosovokrise verdeutlichen, daß Politik zunehmend nicht nach Meisterplänen und Konzepten gestaltet wird, sondern sich 'ereignet'. Außenverhalten der Regierungen ist oft ein Folgeprodukt von Spielzügen auf den innenpolitischen Tischen: *Politics by default, not by design*.

Da kann man schlecht erwarten, ausgerechnet in Rußland wäre das Außenverhalten zielgerichteter und reflektierter. Die hohe Akteursvielfalt, die klare Priorität innenpolitischer Belange und Interessen, die äußerst kurzen Zeithorizonte der Akteure, ihre partikularen Präferenzen und die strukturelle institutionelle Schwäche produzieren eine prinzipielle Volatilität von Verhalten. Daran ist derzeit weder dort noch von außen wesentliches zu ändern, solange die Anreizstrukturen für die relevanten Akteure so bleiben, wie sie sind.

Das hat natürlich auch zur Folge, daß es nicht sinnvoll ist, von 'russischen Interessen' zu sprechen. Das gilt im wesentlichen auch für andere Länder, seitdem überall eine zunehmend fragmentierte innere Akteurskonstellation mit sinkender Regelungskraft der Regierungen einhergeht. Doch ist dieses Phänomen der Akteurs- und der Interessenvielfalt sowie der daraus folgenden disparaten Handlungsstrategien in der RF besonders ausgeprägt. Das ist so oft zu beobachten, daß es erstaunlich ist, daß noch immer von 'Rußland' und seinen Interessen die Rede ist. Zur Klarstellung: Die Aussage ist hier nicht, daß russische Interessen falsch, westlichen unterlegen oder nicht zu berücksichtigen seien. Sie sind vielmehr so vage und uneinheitlich, oft auch gegensätzlich, daß sie beim besten Willen oft weder artikulierbar noch einbindungsfähig sind.

Allein seit Beginn der Kosovo-Krise gibt es reichlich Anschauungsmaterial für diese These. Die anfangs eher drohenden Einlassungen Jelzins riefen rasch Reaktionen aus den Republiken

in der RF hervor. Der tatarische Präsident Shaimiev verwahrte sich gegen die Entsendung russischer Soldaten zur Unterstützung Serbiens und kündigte für diesen Fall die Aufstellung von tatarischen Freiwilligenverbänden an, die auf Seiten der Kosovaren eingesetzt würden. Die Verhandlungsbemühungen des Sonderbeauftragten Chernomyrdin blieben stets in einem unklaren Verhältnis zur offiziellen russischen Diplomatie des Außenministers Ivanov und zum Präsidenten-Berater Prichod'ko. Bei seiner Rückkehr aus Belgrad, wo der Durchbruch zu einer Lösung zusammen mit Ahtisaari und Talbott erreicht schien, mußte Chernomyrdin erfahren, daß General Ivashov aus seiner eigenen Delegation die Ergebnisse ganz anders, nämlich als unzureichend, bewertete. Schließlich wurden am 11./12. Juni kleinere russische Verbände nach Pristina verlegt, was vom Außenministerium desselben Staates als 'Fehler' und Mißverständnis bezeichnet wurde.

Daß westliche Politik und westliche Medien dennoch und unverdrossen an dem Bild eines mehr oder weniger einigen, aktionsfähigen Rußland festhalten, hat viel mit einem tiefen westlichen Bedarf an diesem Rußlandverhalten zu tun, und kaum etwas mit der Realität dort (s. hierzu Punkt 3).

Zum **zweiten Problemkreis**. Die Rolle Rußlands in der Kosovokrise war – und bleibt – gering. Um einen selbständigen, größeren Einfluß ausüben zu können, muß zumindest eine von zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sein: entweder muß ein Akteur wirtschaftliche stark sein, um für Verhaltensänderungen Prämien aussetzen zu können; oder er sollte militärisch projektionsfähig und glaubwürdig sein, um Verhaltensänderungen durchsetzen, ggf. erzwingen zu können. Am besten sollten beide Voraussetzungen gegeben sein. Im Falle Rußlands trifft allerdings keine von beiden zu.

Die wirtschaftliche Situation der RF ist einigermaßen bekannt. Während die Lage keineswegs so düster ist, wie oft dargestellt, und obgleich einige Sektoren, Regionen, Firmen, soziale und generationale Gruppen sich erfolgreich mit den Problemen und Chancen des Übergangs und der Globalisierung auseinandersetzen, ist das Land insgesamt nicht in der Lage, Prämien auszusetzen. Faktisch ist es bankrott – trotz perspektivisch guter Potentiale in den Bereichen Ressourcen und *human capital*. Diese Potentiale werden zunehmend aktiviert werden, und die selektive Integration in Weltwirtschaft und transnationale Netzwerke schreitet fort. Doch die staatlichen und diplomatischen Repräsentanten der RF können nach außen mit ihrer Wirtschaft nichts Positives ausrichten. Wer die Wirtschaftsseiten der Zeitungen studiert, weiß, warum.

Ähnliches gilt für die sicherheitspolitischen Probleme der nachsowjetischen Räume. Auch hier gibt es eine deutliche und möglicherweise folgenreiche Untersteuerung von Politik. Die konventionellen Waffen und Einheiten sind überwiegend nicht mehr einsetzbar. Ersatzinvestitionen bleiben weitgehend aus. Soldaten und Offiziere verdienen mit

Nebentätigkeiten ihren Unterhalt. Manöver sind nicht mehr möglich. Eine russische Beteiligung an 'robuster Friedenssicherung' auf dem Balkan müßte von westlichen Regierungen oder Organisationen finanziert werden (bei 10.000 Soldaten würde das etwa \$ 150 Millionen kosten). Wohin all das führt, konnten wir im Verlauf des Waffenganges in Tschetschenien beobachten.

Leider verhält es sich mit den Nuklearwaffen nicht um so vieles besser. Wegen des problematischen Zustands der konventionellen Kräfte wird die Einsatzschwelle für – vor allem taktische – Nuklearwaffen in der Doktrin und wohl auch in der Realität abgesenkt. Zugleich wachsen die Zweifel an der Verlässlichkeit der Systeme – vor allem der unterliegenden Kühl- und Kontrollinstallationen. Diese Doppelentwicklung ist äußerst besorgniserregend – insbesondere in Kombination mit der Implementationsschwäche staatlicher Strukturen (s.o.). Jedenfalls ist die RF auch sicherheitspolitisch nicht in der Lage, auf dem Balkan oder sonstwo eine substantielle, eigenständige Rolle zu spielen.

Es bleibt, als Argument *of last resort* der Konsistenzverfechter, der Verweis auf den Sitz Rußlands im Sicherheitsrat der UN. Der Zustimmungsbedarf für gemeinsame bindende Resolutionen ist in der Tat eines der wenige Druckmittel, das russische Diplomaten einzusetzen suchen – allerdings mit eher abnehmendem Erfolg. Über *linkages* und *side payments* (IWF), und auch durch Koalitionen mit den realistischen und weltoffenen Teilen der Interessengruppen in Moskau gelingt es zumeist, die formale Zustimmung Moskaus zu erhalten. Wenn das nicht geht, wird eine wie immer vermutete Moskauer Position auch ignoriert, wie vor Beginn der Luftschläge im März. Welche Position welches russischen Akteurs jedoch jeweils ignoriert wird, wäre im Einzelfall zu definieren.

Generell gilt auch hier, daß alle relevanten russischen Akteure mit den bekannten inneren Problemen befaßt sind. Nur wenn es gelingt, inter- und transnationalen Themen ein außenpolitisches Profil oder doch einen Tauschwert für innenpolitische Bataillen zu geben, gibt es eine Chance – wenn auch keine große –, russische Akteure auf Zeit in Vereinbarungen und Regime einzubinden. Deshalb sind wohlmeinende Sorgen, westliche Interessen würden russischen übergestülpt oder diktiert, fehlgeleitet – und zwar aus einem zweifachen Grund. Zum einen ist die Interessenlage im 'Westen' ebenfalls sehr differenziert, auch in den USA, was gelegentlich übersehen wird. Zum anderen deshalb, weil die konturierten russischen Interessen, die von westlichen verdrängt werden, teilweise erst im Westen selbst konstruiert werden.

Dahinter liegt übrigens nicht nur ein postsowjetisches Deutungsdilemma, sondern auch ein fundamentales Regelungsproblem der Weltpolitik nach Ende des Kalten Krieges. Die UN und ihre Mitglieder klammern sich nach wie vor an das Souveränitätsprinzip, das auf nationalstaatlichen territorialen Ordnungen beruht. Zugleich wächst weltweit ein

unterschiedlich verursachter Interventionsbedarf gegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Hunger, Seuchen und Anarchie. Dafür muß das Souveränitätsprinzip aber relativiert werden – die Kosovo-Erfahrung sollte dafür die letzte und hoffentlich wirksame Erinnerung sein. Werden die staatlichen Amtsträger – nicht nur in Rußland, sondern auch in den entwickelten westlichen und asiatischen Industriestaaten – dem zustimmen? Sollte das möglich werden, sollten neue Prinzipien transnationaler Interaktionen entwickelt und durchgesetzt werden, dann wäre die so wenig faßbar scheinende und inkonsistent wirkende Akteurslandschaft in der RF viel eher einbindbar: denn wichtige Akteure dort werden ja zunehmend in internationale Kontexte eingebunden – zwar selektiv und partiell, aber das ist prinzipiell in anderen Räumen nicht anders. Dann wäre rußländische Akteursgruppen gar Vorreiter postmoderner, potsnationaler Regelungen und damit in trans- und internationale Mechanismen und Institutionen integrierbar.

Die **dritte Frage** zielt auf die Perzeptionen Rußlands im Westen. Nach all den vorgenannten Darlegungen scheint es erstaunlich, wie etatistisch die westlichen öffentlichen Erwartungen an die RF sind. Und nicht nur die öffentlichen. Rußland, so scheint es, soll unablässig 'eingebunden' zu werden. Wie ein so komplexes, fragiles und volatiles Gebilde 'eingebunden' werden kann, wird wenig bedacht.

An dieser Stelle muß wohl doch der Hinweis erfolgen, daß diese Ausführungen nicht normativ sind. Natürlich wäre es überaus vernünftig und politisch wichtig, 'Rußland einzubinden'. Die Frage ist, wie das möglich sein soll. Die Aufgabe erinnert daran, einen Pudding an die Wand zu nageln. Heterogene und fragmentierte Gebilde lassen sich schwer institutionell integrieren.

Dieses Argument hat aber auch eine Kehrseite: Einzelne Sektoren (Öl, Gas) sind längst eingebunden. Einzelne Regionen oder Städte auch (Moskau, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Nižnij Novgorod, Samara). Einige soziale und funktionale Gruppen und die junge Generation in den Städten sind so weltoffen und *connected*, daß man ihnen kaum noch Transformationsbedarf zuschreiben kann – sie sind längst angekommen und gestalten eine sich wandelnde Welt aktiv mit.

Das offiziöse westliche Streben nach immerwährendem Einbinden hat, wie mir scheint, mehrere Hintergründe. Bei manchen mag sich der Eindruck festigen, daß es doch unklug sei, stets gegen angenommene russische Interessen zu verfahren. Nach der Euphorie von 1989/90 – man erinnere sich an den Text der Pariser Charta – gab es in beträchtlichem Umfang Hunger- und Finanzhilfen. Aber es gab auch starke Signale der Ausgrenzung: die NATO-Ausdehnung, der Konflikt um die Beziehungen zum Iran, die Schläge gegen den Irak, und nun die Kosovo-Krise wurden in dem Bewußtsein realisiert und geführt, daß ein Rußland, das reaktionsfähig gewesen wäre, das alles schwerlich akzeptiert hätte. Andere favorisieren die Einbindungsrhetorik, da sie Rußland als Gegengewicht gegen vermeintlich neoliberale Politik und gegen Globalisierungsgeschehen einsetzen wollen.

Vor allem dient diese Losung aber dazu, von eigener Verwirrung abzulenken, und hausgemachte Probleme zu externalisieren. Die Einbindungsrhetorik hat hier insofern eine wichtige Funktion, als Bedenken gegen die Kriegsführung und ihre Folge, die in einigen westlichen Kontexten als solche nicht direkt geäußert wurden, auf dem Umweg über die Losung 'Rußland einbinden' ventiliert wurden. Damit können Grünen-Parteitage wie SPD-Fraktionen, Medien und Bevölkerungen offenbar beruhigt werden. Dabei ist die Integrationsrhetorik so richtig wie folgenlos, da sich dieses Rußland nur formal, kaum aber substantiell in irgend etwas einbinden läßt. Dazu ist die institutionelle Schwäche zu ausgeprägt.

Anscheinend braucht gerade Deutschland einen besonderen Rußland-Diskurs. Der wurde beinahe bruchlos vom angeblich realen Sozialismus mit der kurzen Unterbrechung der Perestrojka-Jahre in die nachsowjetischen Jahre hinübergerettet. In neuem Gewande ist er vitaler denn je. Die Konstante dieses Diskurses ist die Verbindung zweier Motive: Gefahr und Versagen. Vor 1985 war die UdSSR notorisch unfähig (die Wirtschaft funktionierte nicht, an Häusern hingen mehr Balkons, als es Etagen gab, etc.) und zugleich gefährlich (Rüstungsprogramme, weltweite Ausgriffigkeit).

Nach der Gorbatschow- und der frühen Jelzin-Euphorie, die sich am Neuen Denken, am europäischen Haus, an *glasnost'* und *perestrojka* festmachte – und auch am Fall der Mauer – wurde der klassische Doppeldiskurs seit etwa 1993 wieder aufgenommen. Die Ineffizienz läßt sich jetzt an der langsamen Verwirklichung von Reformprogrammen und der angeblichen Halbherzigkeit des politischen Personals festmachen. Und die Gefahr findet ebenfalls ihr Material – wahlweise die Mafia und das Chaospotential. Nur Taube und Stumme wissen diese Deutungen nicht elegant und unvermittelt in jedes Gespräch über Rußland einzuflechten. Belege sind nicht erforderlich; die Medien kauen die Deutungsmuster wieder. Deshalb sind James Bond -Filme so zeitlos – ebenso wie das West-Klischee russischer Frauen: stets betörend-verführerisch und gefahrbringend.

Aber es gibt auch östliche Selbsttäuschungen. Ein (übrigens auch im Westen) gern bemühter Mythos ist der von der gemeinsamen slawischen Identität. Die ist historisch wie aktuell eine Fiktion. Als solche kann sie auch nicht gestärkt werden – höchstens ihre symbolische Komponenten, soweit sie irgendwem nützlich sind.

Der artikulierten Empörung in russischen Medien und in der Duma liegt ein Diskurs- und Deutungsbedarf zugrunde, der weitgehend unabhängig von der Realität seine Befriedigung sucht. In Rußland ist auch eine tiefe 'Lust am Leiden' (Michael Thumann) am Wirken, in der die Empörung über die Bombardierung Serbiens in eine Erlösung umgedeutet wird: Virtuell wird endlich Rußland bombardiert. So werden Enttäuschungen über den bisherigen

Transformationsverlauf und über unrealistische, derweil schal gewordene Integrationshoffnungen abgearbeitet. Wenn der Westen und die Zivilisation schon nicht in ein paar Monaten, wie 1988 und noch 1992 erhofft, zu erreichen sind, dann ist er wesenlos und als Vorbild gänzlich ungeeignet. Das patriotische Jammern über den Ausverkauf russischer Erde und heimatlicher Ressourcen, verbunden mit dem Praktizieren westlicher Lebensstile kann mühelos in der Identifizierung mit serbischen Bombenopfern konvergieren.

Das Thema 'Kosovo, der Westen und Rußland' ist ein schwieriges. Nicht deshalb, weil es Datenprobleme und Deutungsschwächen gibt. Sondern vor allem deshalb, weil die 'Ergebnisse' so stark durch die Erwartungen des Publikums und die ihnen nachgebildeten Folien geformt werden. Wir machen zumeist unnötige und unrealistische Annahmen über die Geschlossenheit und die politische Steuerungsfähigkeit von Staaten. Über mittelfristig ausgerichtete und substantiell angelegte Problemlösungskompetenzen von Akteuren. Über die Homogenität von Akteuren und die Abschließbarkeit von Räumen. Alles Annahmen, die so weder auf Deutschland wie auf Rußland zutreffen. Solange wir diese Annahmen nicht aufgeben oder modifizieren, werden wir den Rußland-Diskurs des 20. Jahrhunderts fortführen. Auch dann, wenn er von der Realität entkoppelt ist.

Das bedeutet nicht, Rußland und seine Schwierigkeiten liegen zu lassen – links oder sonstwo. Es bleibt, eine Doppelstrategie zu entwickeln, die eine gewissen Simulation von Einbindung wissend fortsetzt, um bestimmten Interessengruppen Angebote zu machen und um Integrationsdruck aufrechtzuerhalten. Zugleich muß die Kontaktsuche noch ausgedehnt werden. Vor allem sektorale, regionale, gesellschaftliche Akteure müssen stärker direkt angesprochen und engagiert werden. Wenn dies nüchtern geschieht, ohne die traditionelle Hast der Hunger- und Hilfsdiskurse und ohne eigene Überforderung, kann manches auch an Kooperation gelingen. Prinzipiell lassen sich die reale Unordnung der Transformationsräume wie auch die partiellen Integrationserfolge von außen nicht ordnen und organisieren. Aber die Möglichkeiten, die es vor allem unterhalb der großen Politik zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen gibt, sollten genutzt werden. Pragmatisch und undramatisch. Die jüngst in Köln beschlossene Gemeinsame Strategie der EU gegenüber Rußland ist im Programmatischen vage und eher belanglos. Die Aktions- und Implementationskapitel enthalten jedoch durchaus praktikable Passagen, die gesellschaftliche und institutionelle Veränderungen von unten ermuntern und begleiten wollen – oder doch so gelesen werden können.

Das Nachdenken über Rußland muß nüchterner angelegt sein und entdramatisiert werden. Dann wird es auch wieder Chancen geben auf zielgerichtete und wirksame politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Interventionen und Interaktionen – auf den Ebenen, die sie dafür eignen.

4) The War in the Kosovo – Discussion in Positano/Italy, 13th – 17th May 1999

Why did Kosovo happen?

SBO: The conflict is about international post-modernism. In this context, it is relevant to ask: what is the role of history?

BWA: History plays a rather strange role in this conflict: the references made are to events in the distant past (Amsselfeld; ground troops during 2nd World War), not to recent events, such as the war in Bosnia, Croatia etc. The last ten years do not seem to be relevant (in the Western media?).

MED: History is irrelevant, anyway.

CMZ: There are many potential Kosovos in the world. I wonder why only this Kosovo happened and the others did not; and why did it happen now? If there is no real – e.g. economic – interest for the Western powers to intervene in Yugoslavia, why did they get involved in the first place? Was it to stop ethnic cleansing? Is the West bombing Yugoslavia just for moral reasons? If this is the case it will have serious effects for the entire world order. I wonder whether there is a direct link between morality and military action. Or did the West intervene solely because of domestic constellations and pressure?

SGB: Moreover, an interesting question is to ask for the criteria of selection, why did intervention happen particularly in this case?

BWA: The role of the media is crucial, they built up the conflict by showing the ‘right’ pictures. Then, something had to happen. Therefore, applying rational choice to the media would be interesting in order to understand the self-reinforcing processes going on and also the criteria applied in the selection of issues. Why do certain issues get on the media agenda and others do not?

SBO: Interestingly, the case of Bosnia was different. Even though there was a lot of media attention, nothing was done; so, this NATO-involvement seems like a late reaction.

MED: Bosnia was already ethnically cleansed when the West intervened.

STA: Also, the Kosovo conflict is much more one-sided, therefore it was easier to intervene.

Design or Default?

SGB: Is there a text around the conflict that can be reconstructed? Did it all happen by default or by design or strategy? I assume that in case of the West it was rather by default. In the West there are two decisive factors: reaction to media coverage and to domestic constellations or pressures. The whole action taken by the West was accumulated ad-hocism. This was not a reaction to the Yugoslav conflict and its resolution, but rather a reaction to domestic

constellations; my consulting experience tells me that most politicians have no idea about the subject or conflict etc. They just react to public opinion.

MED: I agree, there is no specific design, otherwise they would be/would have been smarter. It is a decision-making process without proper advice. It was the same in Chechnya: There was no plan, no will to win, only to destroy; otherwise ground troops would have been used in both cases. The confusing aspect of Kosovo is that there are two wars going on at the same time: Kosovo-Serb on the one side and NATO-Serb on the other; and one has little effect on the other.

SIS: I do not think that it was only a reaction to domestic constellations. It was also in the self-interest of NATO as an organisation. Why, after all, did it happen in the midst of NATO enlargement celebrations?

SBO: Milosevic definitely had/has a design. The West, on the other hand doesn't seem to have a master plan. „We bomb today and do not know about tomorrow“; this is very post-modern, but it cannot be in Clinton's interest.

What did the key actors gain from the conflict?

SIS: The military complex is still very important to have. So, NATO had to show the world that it is the most powerful military alliance that can intervene wherever and whenever it wants to. Another reason would be to justify further NATO enlargement and to discredit international institutions like the UN or the OSCE.

SGB: Furthermore, the prevention of migration to Germany, UK, France, i.e. containment of refugees in the area. There was a lot of media coverage in the West and something had to happen (domestic reasons)

The West thought: first Rambouillet, then the next step. NATO had postponed the use of force three times.

BWA: Rambouillet was too difficult to sign for the Serbs, it would have amounted to an occupation of Yugoslavia by NATO.

SGB: But otherwise, the Kosovo-Albanians would not have signed. That would have been better for Milosevic than the current situation, however; now, the outcome will be a Western-kept protectorate in Kosovo.

CMZ: There is no way to influence Milosevic. He will stay in power even after having withdrawn the troops from Kosovo. He is a madman. But would it constitute part of NATO's failure if Milosevic stayed in power?

SGB: I do not think that he is irrational. He will be successful once the Western public is turning against the war. He counts on that, which is very rational. His objective is to keep Kosovo without the Kosovo-Albanians.

CMZ: If Milosevic stays in power, it is probably only a question of time that the conflict spills over to Macedonia and Greece.

SGB: If it involved Macedonia, Greece would step in. As a result, Turkey would get involved and within a short time, NATO would fall apart. This would be a very clever and rational move by Milosevic.

What the West should have done

MED: Would ground forces have been an option?

SGB: The West should have installed safe havens for refugees with the help of ground-forces. There would probably have been less casualties. It would have been feasible if there had been the will to do it. It was a big mistake to rule out the option of safe havens in the first place. There was a lack of resolve and decisiveness among Western governments. One gets the impression that the West is unable to handle the major problems in the world due to indecisiveness.

SIS: Like in Chechnya, the problem is the type of warfare – NATO forces would not know who to attack. It would not be a conventional man-to-man fight.

MED: For me, ground troops are no longer an option. The West and specifically NATO has already lost the war. The bombing is a face-saving operation. We are now entering a new world order. One aspect is post-modern warfare. Its characteristics are: high tech and high altitude bombing; fighting on a substate level; practically no casualties; no man-to-man contact; the role of the media in transmitting pictures from the fighting 24 hours a day. As a result, warfare gains virtual character, at least for us in the West, far away from the actual fighting. The problem is, you cannot win such post-modern wars. Therefore, the NATO intervention has been and will continue to be a failure. The message sent to the world is that the West is unable to win a war on the substate level using high-tech bombing. This will have serious consequences for the future.

SIS: There are two levels. On one hand, the war is still fought with conventional means as far as the conflict between the Serbs and the KLA is concerned. On the other hand, the images become more and more virtual.

SBO: This is the internationalisation of virtualisation. The war reminds me of the movie „Wag the Dog“: Many Americans thought and may still think that Kosovo is all set up, as is the war in Albania in the movie.

SGB: This conflict, whether post-modern or not, opens up windows for other potential crises nobody cares about at the moment, e.g. in Belarus or in some African countries. Referring to the 'shadow of the future', NATO has to win this war decisively and at the same time avoid future constellations of this kind. The West had two options: either to stay out of Kosovo or to intervene. Now, as it has decided to intervene, the war has to be won decisively. The problem is that the West is not decisive at all. And Milosevic knew/knows that and could count on it. Western indecisiveness was/is part of his strategy.

SIS: This is a principal-agent problem: NATO has to win.

SBO: Apparently, the only option for the West was to bomb Yugoslavia. But the West could have and should have supported the opposition in Yugoslavia in the Winter of 1996/97. If they had supported them then, there would be alternatives to Milosevic now. There is a lot of civil society in Belgrade.

CMZ: The West never successfully supported democratic opposition movements. Besides, all apparent Serbian opposition leaders are nationalists. Being moderate is a strategic position in order to get Western backing. As soon as they gain power, they turn into fervent nationalists again.

MED: There should be greater leeway for economic sanctions and pay-offs. The money spent on the bombing could have been used more sensibly. Now, more and more innocent people are dying because NATO has to continue the war until they can pretend to have defeated Milosevic.

BWA: Only a small percentage of the money spent for the bombing would probably have sufficed to prevent the outbreak of the war. But the West does not seem to be interested in further developing and strengthening peaceful ways of conflict resolution. And furthermore, why did the West not take Russian interests and objections towards a NATO-involvement seriously? Russia could have been included earlier by economic incentives and as a result the chances to prevent the war would have been higher.

SBO: I agree. The problem of Kosovo is ten years old and there was a latent danger of an outbreak of the crisis. Experts warned years ago that the West should get involved diplomatically to prevent an outbreak of a bloody conflict. In the last ten years or even after the Dayton agreement there were many options to resolve the conflict.

RAI: The West should have done two things: Instead of slowly sending in 2.000 unarmed OSCE observers, it should have quickly sent 20.000. Also, it should have tried to find negotiating partners apart from Milosevic, e.g. Serbian generals.

The new world order

BWA: The biggest mistake was to start the war in the first place because it means that future conflicts will have to be resolved by NATO and that other international institutions will be further discredited.

MED: I would say that the new world order will be worse than the one we had. UN and OSCE are gone for good, no matter how the West will try to save these institutions. It would be hypocritical, anyway. This is finally the American world order they've been working for the past ten years: empowerment of NATO as a military alliance under American control and the further irrelevance of UN. But, as I said before, the other message for the world is that even with high-tech weaponry and military it is impossible to win a post-modern war.

BWA: I dislike the idea of NATO under American direction enforcing order around the world.

SGB: At the moment there is no real alternative unless you reform the international institutions. And this is rather unrealistic. What we need is new principles upon which to build the future world system.

BWA: How can you give up on the UN so quickly? There are ways to reform it to make it more flexible and effective.

SGB: That is romanticism. Think of the veto powers USA, Russia and China. Do you really think that they want to give up on their privileged position within the UN?

RAI: It is true that the UN is deadlocked. But does that mean that, in consequence, NATO is the only alternative? What about Russia, what about China and what about wars that will be fought outside the NATO area of influence? The danger is that this NATO involvement could be a precedent for other countries to break international law and to intervene in sovereign states on the basis of moral claims.

SIS: Military thinking is very close to economic reasoning: We all would like to be more efficient. At least we feel better now, because we can say that we have done something. The question is whether military involvement is the appropriate instrument to solve problems, especially if you cannot - as we learned - win post-modern wars. I think we have to find new ways for conflict resolution. Why is nobody bringing back the ideas of the Agenda for Peace by former UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali?

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