

## Political protest during economic crises: protest against the crisis or the crisis of protests?

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Arbeitspapier / working paper

### Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Simon, J. (2012). *Political protest during economic crises: protest against the crisis or the crisis of protests?* (Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin, Arbeitsschwerpunkt Politik, 75). Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, Osteuropa-Institut Abt. Politik. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-439688>

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Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts:  
**Arbeitsschwerpunkt Politik**

Julia Simon

Political Protest during  
Economic Crises:  
Protest against the Crisis  
or the Crisis of Protests?

**75** (2012)

**Freie Universität Berlin**

Julia Simon

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Arbeitspapiere  
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**Julia Simon**

**Political Protest during  
Economic Crises:  
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Arbeitsschwerpunkt Politik  
Herausgeber: Klaus Segbers

ISSN 1434 – 419X

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## List of Abbreviations

AFP	Agence France Presse
CPDS	Comparative Political Data Set
CV	Control Variable
EU	European Union
DG	Directorate General (Eurostat)
DV	Dependent Variable
EC	European Commission
HI	Hypothesis I
HII	Hypothesis II
HDI	Human Development Index
ICIWSS	Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IV	Independent Variable
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
SES	Socioeconomic Status
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

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## Introduction

One of the central claims about the motivation for research on political mass participation is that **“mass participation is essential to the lifeblood of representative democracy”**.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, in order to sustain a democracy, the interest and active engagement in politics of as many people as possible and in as many spheres of influence as possible is required.<sup>2</sup> Political participation can embrace very different forms, such as voting, participation in political campaigns, the signing of petitions and diverse others. These are **the so called “conventional” forms of political participation**. The study at hand, however, will focus on political protest which belongs to the so-called **“unconventional” forms of participation** encompassing demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins or the outbreak of political violence.<sup>3</sup> For Knoll and Herkenrath, political protest action refers to **“some of the most visible manifestations of social conflict”**.<sup>4</sup> This means that in the case of unconventional political participation materializing, social conflict and society’s disagreement with the government or its policies are being made visible. Yet, if there is no unconventional political action in a society, especially when major changes are evolving, it does not simply mean that there is no civil discontent. It is possible that in such cases societies are not in possession of the right preconditions, chances, motivations or the adequate tools to manifest their political action. This can in particular be exemplified in times of major changes in societies – such as economic or other crises.

Crises in general and economic crises in particular have a special connection to the rise of political participation and especially political protest. Economic crises can create the potential for growing political participation through **“a combination of high levels of social unrest, unstable electoral alignments, and a high salience of economic and social issues”**.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, a thorough insight into the reaction of civil societies towards the performance of their governments in critical time periods can explicitly be examined when comparing societies that were hit by the same crisis to an approximately similar degree. Why do some civil societies participate more in political protest in times of crises than others?

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<sup>1</sup> Norris 2002: 215.

<sup>2</sup> Yilmaz-Huber 2006: 25.

<sup>3</sup> van Deth 2006: 172.

<sup>4</sup> Knoll/Herkenrath 2011: 163.

<sup>5</sup> Kolb 2007: 71.

The most recent financial crisis that began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers bank in September 2008 in the United States and spread throughout the world with immense pace has majorly damaged the European economy. According to the European Commission in 2009:

*"The European economy is in the midst of the deepest recession since the 1930s, with real GDP projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in the history of the European Union".<sup>6</sup>*

The European Union (EU) is an economic and political confederation of 27 states and the most diverse conglomeration of countries in the world. The 2008-2010 economic and financial crisis had a varying effect on the countries of this union. Some were damaged early and hard, others fell from the initial financial crisis right into the next Euro-crisis, still others managed to come out of the crisis as winners. The governments of many of those countries that were hit to a high degree have tried to dampen the crisis by introducing several anti-crisis measures. One aspect that makes the study of the recent financial crisis interesting from the political science point of view is the reaction of the civil society towards such anti-crisis measures. Reactions in societies of EU-countries were mixed, ranging from major protest mobilization to a silent acceptance of political imposition and resilience. This circumstance leads to the general question of the study at hand:

***Why do some countries have a higher degree of protest against anti-crisis measures than other countries?***

Research on political participation and political protest with a special connection to crises in general and financial crises in particular is rather rare and findings are rather unsophisticated.<sup>7</sup> This study aims at illuminating political participation in connection with financial and economic crises. The recent global economic and financial crisis that began **in the US in 2008 has spread throughout the world with extreme speed and "transformed into the most severe global financial crisis since the Great Depression"**.<sup>8</sup> From a political participation theory perspective this process is inspiring because it is unique in its dimension and allows for extensive cross-national comparison. The regional interest of this study is focused on regional developments in Eastern Europe from a comparative

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<sup>6</sup> European Commission 07/2009: iii.

<sup>7</sup> A theoretical assessment on the connection between economic crises and political protest can be found in Hudson (1971). Glasberg and Shannon (2001) analyze the impact of the involvement of international institutions in domestic economic policies in times of crises and their connection to political protest. Besides that, the literature on protest behavior in times of crises is limited.

<sup>8</sup> Claessen et al 2009: 683.

angle. Thus, the recent global financial crisis constitutes an interesting aspect for the research on political protest in this region in comparison to others. Taking into account the common historical experiences, namely the communist heritage of more than fifty years throughout Eastern Europe, the assumption that the civil society reaction to the recent crisis might have been alike across Eastern European states seems obvious. However, to the contrary of this simplistic postulation, in the course of the financial crisis 2008-2010 more parallels across the East-**West "borderline" have become obvious than** within each region. The countries that were hit first and hardest by the crisis range from Ireland to the Baltic States. Similarly, in their anti-crisis measures, countries such as Ireland and Latvia or Hungary and Spain have revealed more connections than neighboring Eastern European states.<sup>9</sup>

This study will explore dissimilarities in degrees of political protesting as responses to anti-crisis measures in the European Union with the tools of a positivist research design. A **positivist design employs a "natural-science-model" for social science research to explain,** predict or control empirical observations with the means of theoretical explanations.<sup>10</sup> It uses the rules of formal logic in order to deduct testable hypotheses from underlying theory, bearing in mind that theory in positivism represents a set of causal laws and hypotheses.<sup>11</sup> Hypotheses, in turn, are intersubjectively comprehensible and testable conclusions.<sup>12</sup> In this study, testable hypotheses will be derived from political participation research, namely the socioeconomic status model and the political opportunity structure approach. From hypotheses based on these theories, independent (explaining) variables (IV) will be generated and subsequently tested for their influence on the dependent variable (DV, the variable that has to be explained) political protest. In order to produce a valid case sample for the case study, control variables (CV) will be included in the research design. Then, the countries for the case study will be selected based on the highest variation on the independent variable.<sup>13</sup> The initial universe of cases will contain all 27 countries of the European Union.

Formally, the analysis will at first focus on the object of the research – the dependent variable political protest, which will be defined, conceptualized and operationalized in the next chapter. Following the presentation of the dependent variable, the study will be

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<sup>9</sup> Gorzelak 2010: 251.

<sup>10</sup> Lee 1991: 343.

<sup>11</sup> van Evera 1997: 12.

<sup>12</sup> Früh 2007: 69.

<sup>13</sup> van Evera 1997: 29.

given a thorough theoretical basis in chapter 3. Herein, various theories on political participation and political protest study will be presented and those most appropriate for the study at hand will be chosen to be developed in the subsequent chapter on the research design of the study. Prior to selecting the cases for the final case study, the methodology case selection will be depicted in chapter 5. After the case selection based on methodological reasoning the case study will be conducted in chapter 7. Finally, conclusions from the case study referring to the validity of theories and hypotheses applied will be drawn. The research will close by summarizing statements and thoughts for further research on political protest in times of major economic and financial crises.

## **1. Political Protest – the Object of Research**

### **1.1 Definitional Matters - the Conceptualization of Political Participation and Political Protest**

For social and political scientists the minimum definition of political participation<sup>14</sup> is understood as “activities of private citizens intended to influence state structures, authorities and/or decisions regarding the allocation of public goods”.<sup>15</sup> Political participation is categorized in different ways. As stated in the introduction, the common differentiation of political participation follows a separation in “conventional” and “unconventional” forms, whereby activities such as voting, the signing of petitions or participation in political campaigns are “conventional” whereas demonstrations, sit-ins or even outbreaks of political violence are considered “unconventional”. Political protest, often also referred to as “protesting”, “protest action”, “protest activity”, “protest mobilization” or “protest movement”<sup>16</sup>, usually is subsumed under the “unconventional” mode of political participation in social science theory. Moreover, it is considered the most complex form of political participation<sup>17</sup>. In a broader definition on the individual level it means “a collective, public action by a non-governmental actor who expresses criticism or

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<sup>14</sup> In order to maintain definitional clarity, the terms “political participation”, “political engagement”, “collective action” or “political activism” shall be used as synonyms in this study.

<sup>15</sup> Roller/Wessels 1996: 4. For a thorough account on the development of different forms of political participation as well as their categorization over time see van Deth 2006: 183f.

<sup>16</sup> For the sake of terminological accuracy these terms shall be used as synonyms in this paper.

<sup>17</sup> Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 9.



**dissent and articulates a societal or political demand”.**<sup>18</sup> It is categorized in different ways. One way is to look at the legal/illegal aspects of political protest: political protest as a direct and non-institutionalized mode of participation can appear legally, as in attending lawful demonstrations and illegally, which can be further differentiated in non-violent forms such as joining unofficial strikes and violent forms such as damaging property.<sup>19</sup> Kriesi follows a wider categorization and depicts four categories of active forms of political protest activities: (1) conventional, e.g. juridical, political or media-directed strategies, (2) direct-democratic activities, e.g. civic initiatives and referendums, (3) demonstrative activities like demonstrations and protest marches, (4) confrontational action forms that are in turn separated in legal and illegal provocative activities, such as legal boycotts and sit-ins, illegal demonstrations or limited as well as strong violence like violent demonstrations and attacks.<sup>20</sup> The clarity of this differentiation shall be applied in this study which will focus on the forms of demonstrative and confrontational activities.

The research on political protest activism bears many parallels to research on social movements due to the fact that social movements are also generally classified into the category of unconventional participation.<sup>21</sup> Whereas political protest as a concept is one form of unconventional political participation, social movements represent a broader concept that makes use not only of unconventional forms of participation but also refers **to conventional possibilities. Social movements are “collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities”.**<sup>22</sup> It shall be emphasized **that the term “sustained” is what distinguishes social movements from political protest action.** The latter is not limited to an enduring expression of discontent, but rather **occurring and ending in a spontaneous manner. This “episodic” character of protest events is crucial for the definition and later operationalization of the concept.**<sup>23</sup> Protests, just like social movements, are a matter of groups and organizations. Nevertheless, the **essential difference between these two is that “social movements tend to protest, but not**

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<sup>18</sup> Rucht/Neidhardt 1998: 68.

<sup>19</sup> Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 88.

<sup>20</sup> Kriesi 1995a: 267f.

<sup>21</sup> **Social movements as against to protest activities are “pertinent, organized, and collective efforts to resist existing power structures, cultural repertoires, and practices and elite dominance and oppression or to introduce changes in them (...). They are organizational structures and strategies that may provide organizational opportunities for producing change from the bottom up within nations. In addition, they may allow the relatively powerless to affect international relations as well.”** (Glasberg/Shannon 2011: 150).

<sup>22</sup> Meyer 1998: 4.

<sup>23</sup> Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 88.

**all protests are conducted by social movements”.**<sup>24</sup> This means that protest action is one form of political participation, whereas social movements can at times even be considered as actors in the study of political (unconventional) participation. Therefore, drawing a clear line between political protesting and social movements in this study is critical.

Another definitional allocation has to be shown in order to clarify per definition what is meant by political protesting in this research. It is the distinction between the potential for protest mobilization and actual protest mobilization. On the one hand, potential for protest mobilization embraces those people in a society who are theoretically willing to be mobilized for political protest. On the other hand, actual protest mobilization refers to those citizens who are actually being mobilized by a certain protest at a certain time.<sup>25</sup> Following the definitions of political protest presented above, potential for protest **mobilization shall be unequivocally set apart from the actual “protest mobilization”.** This study will explicitly focus on actual protest mobilization and avoid mobilization potential.

**As stated above, the working definition of political protest in this study is “a collective, public action by a non-governmental actor who expresses criticism or dissent and articulates a societal or political demand”.**<sup>26</sup> The concept contains two terms – ‘political’ and ‘protest’. While the former is a direct hint to the aims of protest – political events and decisions made by politicians (policies), the latter points to the form of participation, namely its unconventional characteristic. As has already been depicted, protest is not subject to individual action but rather to the action of groups and organizations – collective non-governmental actors aiming to affect the interests of particular groups in a society.<sup>27</sup> The level of analysis of the political protest in the study is thus the aggregated micro-level.

Research on political protest in particular or unconventional participation in general has genuinely started to develop only after the eventful 1960s and 1970s. For instance, Kaase and Marsh, writing on political action in 1979, still had difficulties deciding while conceptualizing political participation, whether protest or unconventional participation in general is a legitimate (because not yet ultimately legal) form of political participation or

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<sup>24</sup> Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 9.

<sup>25</sup> Kriesi 1992: 24ff.

<sup>26</sup> Rucht/Neidhardt 1998: 68.

<sup>27</sup> Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 9.

not.<sup>28</sup> Hence, the question arises of what is political protest today and why is it worth looking at?

According to Norris, there are several reasons to focus on protest action when analyzing political participation: (1) protest activism by today accounts for a distinct dimension of political participation and is one of its essential components, (2) during the last decades of the 20th and the first decade of the 21st century this form of participation has become increasingly popular and widespread, and finally (3) protest politics as of today have **increasingly become "mainstream" and embrace all spheres and stratum of society.**<sup>29</sup>

When political protest occurs in a country, one either has been a witness or even a participant in the action or, in the most likely case, has come to know about it through the media, be it via television, radio, newspapers or the internet. This implies that the research on political protest mainly has to rely on various medial sources when considering the occurrence and the dimension of political protest. How this highly ambiguous concept can be operationalized and conveyed as a measurable indicator for analysis will be shown in the next section.

## **1.2 The Degree of Political Protest - Operationalization**

This study employs a positivist research design which implies the testing of hypotheses that will be formulated from the theories on political participation in the next chapter in order to prove their validity or falsify them in a comparative case study. Thus, the aim is to prove the applicability of the theories chosen for the explanation of political protest in times of crises. As already stated in the introduction, this study is unique so far in the way that political protest in times of crises has rarely been looked at, not to mention its analysis from the socioeconomic and political opportunity structure point of view.

Political protest in comparison to conventional forms of political participation is a rather fluent concept. Its capture poses several hindrances. Although the general public is confronted with protest on a daily basis, its timely, spatial and thematic dimensions are often contingent and cannot be described and therefore analyzed as easily as many other social and economic developments or conventional participation forms, such as voting patterns.<sup>30</sup> Consequently, the operationalization of political protest requires a stringent

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<sup>28</sup> Barnes 1979: 42ff.

<sup>29</sup> Norris 2002: 211.

<sup>30</sup> Rucht 2001: 7.

and precise systematization, bearing in mind that complete captures of all possible protest events, even if they are limited in time and space, are elusive. Especially when it comes to questions such as the aim of a special protest action or the actual number of participants, vague and varying responses can be found depending on the source of information consulted. Nevertheless, trends will always remain visible and the researcher will be able to filter the most important information as long as he uses reliable and recognized sources. For Koopmans, the problem of imperfect sources when analyzing political protest is not possible to be **solved completely. However, "it should be stressed that bias as such is not always a real problem as long as we are not interested in any 'absolute' truth and as long as the bias is systematic"**.<sup>31</sup> Accordingly, the research on protest action offers a **wide range of tools that facilitate the concept's operationalization.**

The method of protest event analysis has proven to be one of the main utensils for protest research in the last decades.<sup>32</sup> As mentioned above, the media are indispensable for the envisioning of political protest. In the course of the evolution of protest research, newspapers have proven to be the best source of information when it comes to tracing protest action. Although Koopmans argues that newspapers have become the preferred source for most **protest researchers, he admits that it was a "negative choice"**. This means picking the best of all relatively problematic sources, since all sources are circled by certain disadvantages.<sup>33</sup> This is due to the fact that official data on protest activities are lacking for the most part or, when available, are subject to equivocal or biased selection and categorization that often misfit scientific concepts. Moreover, official data is often itself based on media coverage. Archives, such as police reports and the like, are on the one hand often subject to bias and on the other hand frequently hard to access due to admission limitations or temporal restrictions.<sup>34</sup> One last option – direct participatory observation and questioning – should be ruled out for the simple reasons of unfeasibility if the research is based on national or even cross-national phenomena, like the one that will be conducted in this paper.<sup>35</sup>

As has become clear, newspaper analysis has distinctive superiority over other options to trace political protest. To begin with, newspapers present daily reports over a broad range of societal facts and phenomena. Newspapers are abundantly available and easier to

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<sup>31</sup> Koopmans 1998: 93.

<sup>32</sup> Almeida/Lichtbach 2000: 250.

<sup>33</sup> Koopmans 1998: 91.

<sup>34</sup> Koopmans 1998: 92; Maney/Oliver 2001: 165ff.

<sup>35</sup> Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 77.

access, to save and to analyze than television or radio reports. Moreover, reliable and established newspapers are not as superfluous as internet sources and can be narrowed down more easily. Further, in contrast to internet sources, newspapers "or at least those 'quality' papers with an educated readership"<sup>36</sup>, are believed to maintain their credibility due to the competition on the information market and are supposed to cover significant events accurately.<sup>37</sup>

Newspaper based protest event analysis will thus be used in this study as the main research method for the dependent variable. As already mentioned in the introduction, empirically protest events analyses date back to the initial studies of political protest – the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>38</sup> Long-term cross-country studies have been conducted by Ted Robert Gurr, who was focusing on the relative deprivation theory and the study of collective violence. A bulk of research was produced based on the data of the *World Handbook on Political and Social Indicators* that has gathered protest data for the period from the 1960s until the 1980s. Charles Tilly has developed a long-term study of political protest for several countries, focusing on strikes and collective violence. Moreover, research on social movements highly related to protest research has been widely accompanied by the methods of protest event analysis.<sup>39</sup> Similarly to the World Handbook, the *Cross-National Time Series Data Archive* initiated by Robert Bates covers annual data for a range of countries from 1815 to the present.<sup>40</sup> Interestingly, all of these studies and long-term research projects have focused on the use of common newspaper data. However, for the most part they have been relying on *The New York Times Index* or the analysis of other newspapers in the English language that are to be found within this or other online archives. This means that relying on such databases offers no advantage over an own newspaper based protest event analysis. Hence, it only remains to be determined what kind of protest event analysis shall be chosen.

Deciding on the method of the research at large depends on the research question and the object of study. Protest event analysis in the recent decades was mainly applied to social movement studies. Therefore, it can be distinguished on which side of a protest the protest event analysis is eager to focus. On the one hand, there is the external cognitive

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<sup>36</sup> Koopmans 1998: 93.

<sup>37</sup> Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 89.

<sup>38</sup> Rucht 2001: 13ff.

<sup>39</sup> Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 10ff.

<sup>40</sup> Knoll/Herkenrath 2009: 131. The Cross-National-Time Series Data Archive can be requested under: <http://www.databanksinternational.com/>. Unfortunately, it is liable to payment and could not be used in the present study for reasons explained above.

interest, reflecting the visible part of the protest event, such as the number of protesters or the timing of their action. On the other hand, there is the internal cognitive interest that centers on the aims and the meaning of the protest as well as its internal dynamics.<sup>41</sup> The object of interest proliferated by the research question is why political protest occurs in the first place and not its qualitative characteristics such as internal dynamics. Therefore, this study will focus on the external factors of political protest – so called *hard facts*. *Hard facts* are genuine aspects of protest events: timing, locality, number of participants, action form and the like. *Soft facts* refer to the internal motivation of participants. Newspapers are commonly recognized to reliably report on hard facts, whereas soft facts are rather subject to objective assessment of the journalist.<sup>42</sup> A similar differentiation follows the quantitative/qualitative divide in protest event analysis. Whereas quantitative measurement focuses on hard facts for the estimation of the degree of mobilization, qualitative analysis prefers to look at soft facts of a particular protest event or a series of events. A further differentiation is given by the scaling of qualitative versus quantitative events. While the former can be measured with the nominal scale only, the latter can be depicted with the ordinal, interval, or ratio scale which allows for **the “counting” of protest events and the counting of their characteristics in turn** facilitating their comparability.<sup>43</sup> In order to quantify the dependent variable of this study, fixed indicators for the degree of political protest shall be established. For the measurement of the degree of political protest Kolb uses two sets of indicators. The first is the extent of protest mobilization, encompassing the number of protest events and the time span of those events. The second is the intensity of protest mobilization that illuminates the properties of the given protest event: the disruptiveness of the protest form, whether it was legal or illegal and violent or non-violent, and the size of the protest event measured by the number of participants.<sup>44</sup> To this categorization, the timing of the protests will be added in this study because it is important for the research question if the protests have occurred as a direct response to anti-crisis. This ensures the analysis of protests that actually were protests against governmental anti-crisis measures and not protests against other issues.

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<sup>41</sup> Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 76.

<sup>42</sup> Koopmans 1998: 93.

<sup>43</sup> Früh 2007: 69f.

<sup>44</sup> Kolb 2007: 40.

Unifying **Kolb's account of measures for political protest and the study's own** considerations, the following indicators shall be operationalized and applied while testing the dependent variable:

1. timing of political protest
2. time span of the political protest
3. number of participants
4. form of political protest.

The separation of protests according to their dimension in protests that circle around the thresholds of 1.000, 10.000 or 100.000 participants is visible in empirical studies. However, this is not useful for a comparative study, because the numbers have to be put in relation to the total population that highly varies between countries. Therefore, in the case study of this particular research, the percentages of the numbers of protestors will be related to the total **population, after which the countries' percentages shall be merely** compared on a linear scale.

Having operationalized the dependent variable (DV), it is crucial to disclose the method of data collection for the dependent variable since it was pointed out above that data on political protest are not easily found in country statistics or records, let alone statistical databases. As already mentioned earlier in this section, the dependent variable shall be assessed deploying an autonomous newspaper-based protest event analysis.

Protest event analyses are centered on the conventional content analyses. A content analysis per definition is an empirical method aiming at a systematic and intersubjectively comprehensive description of the content and the formal characteristics of messages.<sup>45</sup> It embraces a variety of different single methods<sup>46</sup> with their common trait being the appraisal of the content of various communicative processes under distinctive perspectives as well as the provision of quantitative and qualitative facets of the content.<sup>47</sup> The original content analysis focused on quantifiable aspects of the content of texts, which is exactly what this research aims to do. Usually, content analysis is connected to a complicated and cost-intensive analysis of texts and is often conducted with the help of electronic tools such as content analysis software. The common procedure for content analyses is first the formation of hypotheses, the definition of the main unit of analysis and the universe/population of analysis (newspapers or texts that will be used). Second, from the universe a sample is derived. Following this method, a

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<sup>45</sup> Früh 2007: 25.

<sup>46</sup> For a comprehensive overview see Luzar 2004: 126ff.

<sup>47</sup> Luzar 2004: 126.

system of categories is developed for the coding procedure of the main concepts. After this theoretical phase, pre-tests are accomplished, followed by the actual process of **coding. The coded content is thereupon scaled or differentiated to advance the content's comparability.** Subsequently, the data derived from the coding are evaluated and can be interpreted.<sup>48</sup> The issues of reliability of the coders and the validity of the content that has been measured play an important role in standard content analysis. Reliability on the one hand refers to intercoder reliability – the consistency between several coders coding the same text – and intracoder reliability – the consistency between the same coder coding the same text after a certain time interval. If the categories are clearly defined, irregularities should be low. Validity is given as soon as data is measured that confirms **the researcher's concept** of reality and his definition of it.<sup>49</sup>

**As already mentioned, the method of research is closely connected to the researcher's** object. Therefore, a closer look at the unit of analysis developed in this study is necessary prior to the development of the precise **measurement of the concepts. The study's unit of analysis, its dependent variable, is the degree of anti-crisis measures political protest.** Hereby, not any random political protest is accounted for, but only political protest that might have occurred in reaction to anti-crisis measures that have been implemented between 2008 and 2010.<sup>50</sup> The four indicators of the degree of political protest stated above have to be traced from a content analysis of newspaper reports. Thus, several coding categories will have to be accounted for when analyzing the sample of the news reports.

Another constraint to the measurement, in particular in relation to the selection of the source and the sampling procedure, follows from the level of analysis. The level of analysis can be local, regional, national or cross-national and therefore influences the choice of media for the analysis. The level of analysis in this study is cross-national since the reaction to anti-crisis measures in the countries hit hardest by the crisis will be considered. This cross-national source for the analysis has to be a news source that covers at least the whole of the European Union. Rucht and Ohlenmacher have established four criteria for the optimum form of data collection. The sources have to be (1) continuous, which means that they cover the entire time period of analysis, (2) have to deploy a steady interest in the unit of analysis, (3) the filter for the source cannot be

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<sup>48</sup> Schöllkopf 2001: 12; Severin/Tankard 1997: 34.

<sup>49</sup> Früh 2007: 177ff. For a full up-to-date overview of content analysis methods see: Krippendorff 2009.

<sup>50</sup> The time period at consideration shall be looked at in part 5.3 in detail.



too selective to allow for the needed variance and (4) the source should be easily accessible.<sup>51</sup> The news sources that fulfill these criteria are limited. In principle, these are quality newspapers or news agencies that regard not only national, but transnational issues and in addition are issued in the English language. The latter has the pragmatic reason of comparability and the linguistic abilities of the researcher. **The first of Rucht and Ohlenmacher's criteria are fulfilled by almost all major national newspapers that have up to 2008 garnered some reputation and are issued in the English language.** As has become obvious above, most of the protest event analysis carried out so far was based on quality newspapers such as The New York Times that have existed for a long time and cover a broad range of international news. The New York Times, however, bears a slight bias in favor of Northern America and thus should not be used when analyzing protest in the European Union. When focusing on the EU, European news sources shall be favored. Turning to the second criterion, it shall be assumed for all major news sources in Europe that they have upheld a steady interest in the implications of the recent economic and financial crisis throughout the period 2008 until 2010.

As has been elaborated above, competition forces major newspapers to report on the **most important and "newsworthy" events. The financial crisis definitely was such an event.** It has had and still has major implications for all countries in Europe, even those that were spared its harshest implications, because it has a high overall impact on the common European market.<sup>52</sup> For the third criterion – **the selectivity of the sources' filter** – two pre-conditions have already been established: the importance of cross-national coverage and the availability of the source in the English language. In a further step it has to be reassured that the news source is not nationally biased. Thus, only newspapers with an extensive coverage on international issues and major international news agencies apply. Moreover, they have to be easily accessible for the researcher according to the last **of Rucht and Ohlenmacher's criterion. The last condition will be assured for in this study** due to free access to the *LexisNexis Academic* database. LexisNexis Academic is an internet-based host of news and commercial data. It owns a large archive of many major national and international newspapers, journals and news agency material as well as other documents related to politics, economy, finance and law. Its accessibility is

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<sup>51</sup> Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 89.

<sup>52</sup> This might seem a bit too confident at the first sight, but one has to keep in mind that Rucht and Ohlenmacher have established their criteria also considering the possible research on minor events and societal incidents which at some point might have lost or never have gained medial interest.

restricted to paying private and commercial customers as well as academics.<sup>53</sup> It has increasingly developed into a popular media source for protest analysis and has been deployed in numerous studies.<sup>54</sup> Within the LexisNexis Academic archive, the search in an extensive database is provided for with the tools of online analysis. One of the advantages of LexisNexis Academic is the possibility of choosing a combination of key words, which are then being searched for in the sample picked from the sources universe. Another clear advantage is the abundance of sources and their long temporal coverage. **Moreover, according to Fan, “although the basic elements of the search commands are simple, complex thoughts can be expressed by combining groups of words”.**<sup>55</sup> So called *Boolean search criteria* can be applied in LexisNexis Academic, meaning that texts can be searched for different terms describing the same or similar phenomena with the combination of the most important terms used for these concepts.<sup>56</sup> The exact terms and key words for the underlying political protest analyses will be depicted in the case study.

Combining the third and fourth criterion of Rucht and Ohlenmachers categorization, for this particular case study, news agency articles, and especially the news articles issued by the news agency *Agence France Presse*, shall be favored. To begin with, all news issued by Agence France Presse during 2008-2010 are available via LexisNexis Academic, which means that the forth of Rucht and Ohlenmachers criteria are fulfilled. Secondly, articles by *Agence France Presse* will be preferred to major European newspapers such as the *Irish Times* or the *Herald Tribune*, also available via LexisNexis Academic, due to its rather international and less biased character. News issued by news agencies tend to be less partial than articles in newspapers, because an objective opinion plays a minor role in **common newspapers. News agencies’ articles focus on the strict reporting of events and only to a very limited extent on their evaluation. Regarding the study’s object of interest – political protest in reaction to anti-crisis policies – and the conditions set up for the measurement of protest, the major interest lies in hard facts such as timing and the number of participants, which makes the opinion of journalists dispensable. News agencies’ articles are far more appropriate here. Agence France Presse was chosen over other news agencies available via LexisNexis Academic because it counts as the major and eldest news agency covering events throughout the world. It is considered highly**

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<sup>53</sup> LexisNexis Academic 2007.

<sup>54</sup> Almeida/Lichbach 2000: 25.

<sup>55</sup> Fan 1988: 40.

<sup>56</sup> Maney 2001: 139.

reliable.<sup>57</sup> Further, it includes the whole time period at consideration and does not use an overly narrow filter. Summing up, Agence France Presse fulfills all criteria submitted by Rucht and Ohlenmacher.

Having explored the dependent variable the study now turns to the theoretical underpinning which is supposed to produce the independent variables needed for the analysis of deviation in protest against anti-crisis measures.

## **2. Political Participation and Political Protest - Theoretical Embedment**

In part 2 the object of analysis was defined conceptualized and operationalized to a full extent. In order to examine it in a case study it needs to be backed up by a theoretical net that illuminates the emergence of political protesting. Accordingly, any reasonable research in political science needs to be embedded in a wider theoretical framework in order to produce a proper context for the following explanation of its relevancy. It is a necessity for any question or phenomenon that at the first sight might seem either hard to explain or rather trivial to be placed along the lines of the overall theoretical research **on this subject. Theories are "a kind of simplifying device that allows you to decide which facts matter and which do not".**<sup>58</sup> Moreover, they represent a starting point from which to depart when looking for a theoretical substantiation of the matter at consideration.

Research on political participation and political protest is conducted in the field of political sociology which represents a cross-section from politics to sociology. It combines research on the micro (individual) and meso- (societal) level with the macro- (state) level. It shall be shown in this section which most important theories are at work in this field and how they are applied. The aim is to be able to filter those approaches best suited for this study in the course of the theoretical elaboration.

The research on political participation in general and political protest in particular rests on a long tradition and has been mostly developed since the 1960s within the social and political sciences. One of the central questions of research on political participation has always been why some individuals, groups or whole societies participate politically by

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<sup>57</sup> LexisNexis Academic 2012a.

<sup>58</sup> Baylis/Smith/Owens 2008: 3-4.

going to a ballot box, by turning to a politician or participating in a demonstration.<sup>59</sup> A question following directly from that is why some individuals, groups or whole societies participate politically to a higher extent than others. Every form of political participation, be it voting, campaigning, demonstration or rioting has been examined by many authors posing different theories and approaches on all three levels of analysis.<sup>60</sup> However, the aim of this body of research is not to find an all-including explanation but **“to understand the relative importance of each of these factors”**.<sup>61</sup>

Norris distinguishes four different schools of political participation research. These are: (1) social modernization theories, (2) institutional accounts, (3) agency theories and at last (4) models incorporating the role of social resources and cultural motivation.<sup>62</sup> Social modernization theories imply that social tendencies that accompany post-industrialization such as improved standards of living, rising education and changes in employability opportunities shift the set-up of post-industrial societies and herewith convert, modify or actually alleviate the political participation of citizens in those societies. All those changes are assumed to lead to higher and broader political participation, amongst others in political protest.<sup>63</sup> Institutional accounts stress the possibilities that arise or fall with the institutional and constitutional build-up of countries. It is argued that the way in which electoral laws, party systems, alliance structures and other purely institutional factors are **set up can influence the political participation of the countries’ citizens. It is further** hypothesized that changes in the institutional set-up can provide for changes in participatory behavior.<sup>64</sup> Agency theories, as the term implies, concentrate on agencies such as parties, unions and other societal groups that are said to be able to mobilize individuals that partake in those agencies to rising participation. The mechanism at work here is the presumption that within those agencies individuals acquire the skills and knowledge needed for political engagement.<sup>65</sup> At last, motivational theories stress factors like political interest and political trust that also connect the motivation of individuals to the resources at their disposal when explaining political participation.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Jenkins 1983: 530.

<sup>60</sup> van Deth 2006: 182.

<sup>61</sup> Norris 2002: 30.

<sup>62</sup> Norris 2002: 19. For a broader overview on protest movement theories that would exceed the frame of this study see: Opp 2009.

<sup>63</sup> Norris 2002: 19.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

This initial insight into the field of participation research points out that the theories described can be arranged along the line of the levels of analysis. Whereas the modernization and the institutional accounts clearly focus on the macro-level, agency theory originates from meso-level explanations. Lastly, resource-based and motivational theories focus on the individual or micro-level of analysis. This differentiation will play a key role in the identification of the theoretical underpinning for this study. To this end, all four accounts shall be considered in more detail and be complemented with approaches **that are missing in Norris's summary. Building on this theoretical body, an explanation for diverging political participation in protest action in times of crises will be developed and successively applied in a case study.**

The modernization approach was one of the first developed in the wake of the coming into being of political participation theory on the macro-level. It stresses that increased demands for more active public participation is based on social trends that came about with the transformation of Western societies from industrialized to post-industrialized ones. This transformation was accompanied by developments such as urbanization, a growing level of general education, the specialization of the workforce, especially the growing employability in the service sector, rising standards of living, the greater availability of media, bureaucratization, the development of the welfare state and so on.<sup>67</sup> All of this is considered to have a positive influence on a growing level of political **participation. One participation concept related to modernization theory is Gurr's theory of relative deprivation.** This formerly psychological concept was developed insofar as he explained political action in general and political protest and political violence in particular based on the subjective comprehension of an actor. This subjective comprehension is based on the discrepancy between his value expectations and capabilities against the current value position.<sup>68</sup> As soon as the felt discrepancy becomes too large to bear, meaning that the relative deprivation intensifies, the individual becomes active and fights to close this subjective gap.<sup>69</sup> In contrast to modernization theory, however, the relative deprivation theory is best located on the individual (micro-) level of analysis.

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<sup>67</sup> Norris 2002: 21.

<sup>68</sup> Gurr 1970: 24; Opp 1989: 132.

<sup>69</sup> Gurr 1970: 29.

The second broad range of theories on political participation is the state structure or the institutional account.<sup>70</sup> Several branches of this theory exist. What they all have in common is the assumption that it is the way in which the structure of the state is set up that affects the level of participation in the respective society.<sup>71</sup> Accordingly, it is those constitutional “**rules of the game, such as the type of majoritarian or proportional electoral system, the levels of competition and fragmentation in the party system, the degree of pluralism or corporatism in the interest-group system**”<sup>72</sup> and so forth that shape the political engagement of citizens. One of those state structure models is the so-called political opportunities structure approach firstly developed by Eisinger in the 1970s. It states four major political opportunity structures –openness/closure of formal political access, stability/instability of political alignments, availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners and finally political conflicts within and among elites – that facilitate or hinder political participation and political protest.<sup>73</sup>

**Turning to Norris’s third main theoretical branch, mobilization or agency theories have to be explored.** Agency theories focus on the role of mobilizing organizations that exist in any society. These can be political parties, trade and other unions, religious, community and voluntary groups. Within these organizations individuals are assumed to have the opportunity to develop contacts to other individuals, therefore contributing to the emergence of social networks. There, they then learn to cultivate skills useful for political participation.<sup>74</sup> **Putnam’s theory on the importance of social capital for political mobilization** particularly stands out of this body of research. According to Putnam, all kinds of voluntary social groups facilitate and assist the development of social networks, reinforce the growth of bonds and trust within this community. This generates the development of certain skills useful for participation and enhances the potential for as well as actual collective action.<sup>75</sup> This theory branch is located at the meso- (societal) level of analysis.

At last, Norris turns to resources-based and motivational theories. Although she considers them together, they are merely connected by their focus on the individual (micro-) level

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<sup>70</sup> In this study institutions are defined according to neo-institutional theory, meaning that institutions are “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction” (North 1989: 6) and not only certain political, economic and other organizations/bodies.

<sup>71</sup> Norris 2002: 19.

<sup>72</sup> Norris 2002: 25.

<sup>73</sup> Kriesi 1995b: 167ff.

<sup>74</sup> Norris 2002: 19ff.

<sup>75</sup> Putnam 1993.

and shall be separated in this overview. Cultural motivation theories stress the motivation of a single individual to become active in public affairs.<sup>76</sup> Motivation here is divided between emotional, e.g. a sense of belonging or patriotism, and instrumental motivation influenced by the perceived benefits of participation.<sup>77</sup> In connection to the instrumental side of this theory stands the rational choice theory of political activism, to a large part developed by Olson. According to Olson, individuals act rationally and are motivated by their self-interest. Therefore, they would not contribute to political protest that aims to enhance collective goods (policies are seen as a collective good in this approach) unless they see a particular personal benefit.<sup>78</sup>

Resources-based models have proven to be valid for the explanation of political participation. One concept that has followed from resource-based research, the socioeconomic status (SES) model, stands out very positively. It has been thoroughly studied and widely recognized and verified. The underlying argument of the SES-model is that education, occupation and income have a significant influence on all forms of political participation. According to scientists such as Verba, Nie, Schlozman, Brady and many more, a higher socioeconomic status leads to higher political participation in society due to the fact that citizens become more aware of their surrounding world, internalize the norms of civic engagement and develop skills useful for participation.<sup>79</sup>

All political participation models mentioned are allocated along the lines of the levels of analysis shown in table 1. This overview is given in order facilitate the selection of the ones best eligible for the development of the study's research design.

**Table 1: Allocation of political participation theories**

Individual/micro-level	Societal/meso-level	State/macro-level
Rational Deprivation approach	Agency theory	Modernization theory
Rational Choice approach	<b>Putnam's Social Capital</b> theory	Institutional theory -
SES-Model		Political Opportunity Structure approach
Motivational approaches		

**Source: own depiction.**

<sup>76</sup> Norris 2002: 29.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> See Hinich/Munger 1997: 136-153.

<sup>79</sup> Verba/Nie 1972.

Considering modernization theories which are located at the macro-level, their limits can be spotted in the rather immense abstraction of the concept. Moreover, the abundance of possible factors of influence leads to the assumption that some of them could also point to an inverse causality than the linear one from modernization towards more political participation. Likewise, empirical evidence on the validity of the modernization concept is rather limited and its reduction to Western societies is obsolete, making the concept futile for the study at hand.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, this approach has proven to be best applicable for the explanation of conventional political participation such as voting and is thus less useful for the study of political protest.<sup>81</sup>

**Gurr's theory on relative deprivation leading to higher participation rates poses several** hindrances for its operationalization. First of all, it is only subject to post-hoc explanations, due to the main reason that thresholds predicting from which point of relative deprivation an individual will be ready to engage politically are missing in the theory. Secondly, the **subjective assessment of one's relative deprivation is** highly difficult to operationalize. It would have to be based on opinion polls and questionnaires but still would bear the bias of subjective comprehension of deprivation, making it hardly comparable. These methodological obstacles eliminate the relative deprivation approach for a more narrow analysis in this study.

The motivational approach on the individual level faces similar hindrances. It is hard to retrace individual motivation, especially its emotional side with measurable and comparable scales. Feelings such as patriotism can be expressed and measured in too many ways. Beyond that, the instrumental side of motivation theory, similar to the modernization approach, was rather applied to the analysis of voting and other conventional behavior.<sup>82</sup>

**Agency theories, amongst others Putnam's account, have proven particularly useful when** explaining conventional participation.<sup>83</sup> Due to their concentration on the meso-level they tend to better explain political participation along structured and organized lines. Since this study focuses on episodic participation in political protest and not on long-term political participation accounts on the meso-level will be disregarded, or rather implied as causal mechanisms.

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<sup>80</sup> Norris 2002: 22f.

<sup>81</sup> Norris 2002: 36ff.

<sup>82</sup> Norris 2002: 61f.

<sup>83</sup> Norris 2002: 137-167.



The rational choice approach was located at the individual level. Being a simplistic but slim theory, the rational choice and collective action approach has been extensively studied but for the most part has become the subject of concept amelioration.<sup>84</sup> Like modernization approaches it has most widely been used for explanations of conventional political engagement, especially voting behavior and is thus also neglected in this study.

The SES-model on the individual level and the political opportunity structure model on the macro-level that after a first sight have proven to be most useful for this study remain to be analyzed in more detail in the following chapters. This decision is based on the fact that these theories originate from different levels of analysis, providing the research with the required diversity. Moreover, both accounts have proven especially useful for the study of unconventional participation and are until this day widely used in national as well as cross-national comparative political participation research. Both shall be looked at more deeply to legitimate the preference of these approaches for the current analysis. Thus, the next chapter turns to the conceptualization and operationalization of the independent variables that find their theoretical base in the SES-model and the POS approach.

### **3. The Socioeconomic Status Model and the Political Opportunity Structure Approach – Specification of the Study's Research Design**

In the preceding chapter various possible theories pointing to different expressions of the dependent variable political protest were presented. Two concepts were chosen to be expanded in depth due to their most appropriate applicability to the dependent variable: the SES-model and the POS approach. From each of them an independent variable shall be traced for which an underlying hypothesis will be formulated. Subsequently, the hypotheses will be examined for their validity in explaining political protest action. According to a positivist research design, each of the two independent variables has to be operationalized through indicators that are measurable and comparable. In order to carry out the measurement, instruments and sources of data will be depicted, as accomplished for the dependent variable in part 2.

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<sup>84</sup> Barry 1970; Jenkins 1983: 536; Opp 1989: 76ff.

### 3.1 The Socioeconomic Status – Conceptualization and Operationalization of the IV I

The basic premise of the socioeconomic status model is that “[N]o matter how class is measured, studies consistently show that higher-class persons are more likely to participate in politics than lower-class persons”.<sup>85</sup> According to this model it is primarily education, the income as well as the occupational status that influence political participation.<sup>86</sup> All three factors are to a high extent internally correlated, but can be measured separately and show their highest explanatory ability when considered together. The reasons for a higher participation of citizens that are socioeconomically better situated are various. Amongst others, it is implied that they possess better possibilities for political participation, communicate more about politics and have internalized the norms and preconditions needed for political participation.<sup>87</sup> Methodologically, causal mechanisms “explain how a hypothesized cause creates a particular outcome in a given context”.<sup>88</sup> They represent a link between the independent and dependent variables and are constructed in order to “open the black box of law like probability statements that simply state the concurrence or correlation of certain phenomena or events”.<sup>89</sup> Thus, the underlying question for causal mechanisms is not if or why, but how. They can appear at any level of analysis and can at the same time explain several causal chains. The initial SES-model was extended by Verba and his colleagues to the so-called Civic Voluntarism model. It was by and large developed by Verba, Brady, Schlozman and Lehmann. They present a refinement of the SES-model assuming that individuals with higher education, income and better jobs also dispose over larger resources such as time, money and civic skills that they learn in their family, job or in their free time.<sup>90</sup> Again, these factors facilitate political participation. The factors that Verba and colleagues consider additional or intervening indicators of political participation in this study will be regarded as causal mechanisms that were actually already implied in

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<sup>85</sup> Milbrath/Goel 1972: 116.

<sup>86</sup> Verba/Nie 1972: 125; van Deth 2006: 184.

<sup>87</sup> Milbrath 1981: 224; Verba/Nie 1972: 126.

<sup>88</sup> Falletti/Lynch 2008: 3.

<sup>89</sup> Falletti/Lynch 2008: 4. Causal mechanisms, however, differ from context or contextual factors insofar as the latter are “the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads (probabilistically) to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal mechanisms”. (Falletti/Lynch 2008: 10).

<sup>90</sup> Verba/Schlozman/Brady 1995.

the basic model. Therefore, in the operationalization of the model, this study sticks to the basic premises of the SES model.

In view of that, the causal mechanisms at work in the SES-model need to be reflected in order to comprehend what characteristics lead to higher participation amongst socioeconomically better situated citizens. According to the initial model, the mechanisms **or as Verba and Nie call them “connective links” at work here can be summarized as follows:** (1) the social environment in which citizens with a socioeconomically higher status are more likely to be involved in organizations and be surrounded by other citizens who participate politically, (2) the availability of resources (time and money) and skills needed for participation, (3) the perception of being politically useful and the sense of contributing to the community, (4) the psychological involvement in politics meaning the expressed and felt interest in politics, which in turn is based on (5) the higher grade of information about politics. All these factors facilitate political participation or at least make it more probable for the individual.

Despite the strong and often proved rigor of the model, its applicability differs between different participation forms. So far it was verified to be least suitable for the explanation of voting behavior, whereas it was more suitable for other conventional and especially unconventional participation forms.<sup>91</sup>

In a nutshell, the correlation between the socioeconomic status and participation in political protest can be summarized in the first study hypothesis:

***HI:*** *the higher the degree of the aggregated socioeconomic status of individuals in a country, the higher the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this country.*

The hypothesis clarifies that this study needs to consider the socioeconomic status from an aggregate perspective if it wants to conduct a proper cross-national comparison. When comparing political participation in different countries based on the SES-model, cross-country studies based on the comparison of the socioeconomic status have been conducted on the aggregated micro-level. Comparison was made possible through the operationalization of such units of measure as median educational level, income per capita and occupational status. Using aggregate data, studies of political development

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<sup>91</sup> Verba/Nie 1972: 126, 132.

have found a close relationship between the rate of political participation and the aggregate socioeconomic status.<sup>92</sup>

The indicators with which educational level, income per capita and the employment status can be measured in this study will be extracted from the Eurostat database and the Human Development Index (HDI) measures. Eurostat is a Directorate-General (DG), an administrative branch of the European Commission. Eurostat was established in 1953 in order to collect and provide comparable statistical cross-country data on the main indicators from the spheres of politics, economy, population, health, environment and so forth to the public.<sup>93</sup> Eurostat will be used in this study to measure the aggregate educational and occupational level. It will be shown when it comes to the control variables that the case selection will only account for countries in the European Union, making the use of Eurostat as a source legitimate. The HDI is a summary composite index introduced in 1990 for almost all countries in the world measuring the development along three basic lines: health, knowledge and income.<sup>94</sup> Correspondingly, the income per capita will be measured with HDI data. This study adopts an additive comprehension of the composition of the indicators that make up the independent variables. It means that the single indicators will be considered together in their symbiosis.

The measure for the median education level in a country<sup>95</sup> that was chosen from the overall measure on education and training from the Eurostat data base is total population having completed at least upper secondary education. Hereby, the dispersion of the population aged 25 to 64 along this indicator in percent is considered.<sup>96</sup> It will be assumed that countries with a higher level of at least secondary education have a higher level of median education and thus are more eager to participate in political protest.

The second indicator – income per capita level in a country – will be operationalized using HDI. Comparing income distribution across countries poses the need to consider it in terms of purchasing power parity<sup>97</sup> in order to account for differences in living standards.

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<sup>92</sup> Verba/Nie 1972: 125.

<sup>93</sup> European Commission: 2012a.

<sup>94</sup> UNDP 2012a.

<sup>95</sup> Kolb 2007: 69.

<sup>96</sup> **"The indicator shows the percentage of the adult population (25-64 years old) that has completed upper secondary education. The indicator aims to measure the share of the population that is likely to have the minimum necessary qualifications to actively participate in social and economic life. It should be noted that completion of upper secondary education can be achieved in European countries after varying lengths of study, according to different national educational systems." European Commission 2011a.**

<sup>97</sup> Purchasing power parity is a principle stating that all goods have to be sold/bought at the same price regardless of their location/country. It refers to the exchange rates between currencies (Mankiw 2012: 756).

Since Eurostat does not provide such data, HDI is preferred at this point. The item income index (gross national income per capita) measures the gross national income per capita **with the 2005 purchasing power parity equalized in dollars and "expressed as an index using a minimum value of \$100 and observed maximum value over 1980-2011"**<sup>98</sup>. It is favorable because it implies that the higher the rate of the item, the higher the aggregate income level in the country. What makes this variable more valuable than other variables measuring income for instance including raw data on income in a certain currency is that it actually takes account of the differences in the standards of living between different countries by referring to purchasing power parity.

The last indicator is the occupational status of citizens. Eurostat data only deliver raw numbers of people occupied in different vocational fields such as legislators, senior officials or managers, professionals, technicians, clerks, service workers and the like. In order to produce comparable data, these raw numbers will have to be weighted in relation to the number of the overall active population. The data on the latter factor are also given in the Eurostat database.<sup>99</sup> Hence, the indicator distribution of employment status will be generated from these two measures.

Summing up, the following indicators shall be used for the operationalization of the concept of socioeconomic status on the aggregate individual level:

1. total population having completed at least upper secondary education
2. income index (gross national income per capita)
3. distribution of employment status as % of the active population.

The conceptualization and operationalization of the independent variable will be applied in chapter 6, when the cases for the case study will be chosen.

Accounting for the micro-level of analysis, the SES concept disregards the macro-level, which also plays an important role when explaining political participation behavior. Applying the **SES-model as the basis for this study's research it needs to be** looked upon on the macro-level to analyze additional factors that facilitate political participation, because single-variable explanations are often missing out crucial aspects.<sup>100</sup> This being said, the expansion focusing on structural factors, the political opportunity structure, will be conducted in the next section.

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<sup>98</sup> UNDP 2012b.

<sup>99</sup> European Commission 2012b.

<sup>100</sup> Nover 2009: 25.

### **3.2 The Political Opportunity Structure Model**

The SES-model presented in the previous chapter stems from the individual level of analysis. The second account shall be referred to the overarching political context of the state in which the individual resides and which is responsible for his opportunities to politically protest.

The political opportunity structure model originates from state structure accounts as was laid out in part 3. First introduced by Eisinger in 1973 who analyzed riot behavior in America in the 1960s on the local level, it has been since then elaborated and changed by several authors in local, national and cross-national studies.<sup>101</sup> In general, the POS of a **country refers to "the nature of resources and constraints external to the challenging group"**.<sup>102</sup> In a broader definition by one of the most important analysts of POS, Kitschelt, **these are "comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others"**.<sup>103</sup>

In order to make the concept of POS comprehensible, its main components have to be considered. It is implied in the concept that political opportunity structures apply to various levels of access to main political actors.<sup>104</sup> The main factors that have been established and agreed to in the course of the research on POS are (1) the formal political institutional structure, indicating the openness or closure of formal access to politicians **and thus furthering or hindering the perception of one's ability to influence political outcomes**, (2) informal strategies or posture of elites, denoting integrative or exclusive elites, (3) the configuration of power suggesting either a divided or a united elite and distinguishing between elites with inner conflicts or conflicts between elites and finally (4) the political output structure pointing to stabilities or instabilities in political alignments.<sup>105</sup> Whereas the first factor exemplifies the formal access to political institutions and actors, the latter three are based on rather informal access. Kriesi similarly describes the first factor as the institutional structure (in the sense of North, see chapter 3.) of a political

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<sup>101</sup> For an overview see Xie/van der Heijden 2010: 52.

<sup>102</sup> Meyer 2003: 19.

<sup>103</sup> Kitschelt 1986: 58.

<sup>104</sup> Josselin 2007: 22.

<sup>105</sup> For an extensive description of all four factors see Xie/van der Heijden 2010: 54; Kolb 2007: 54ff ; Glasberg/Shannon 2011: 158; Kriesi 1991: 2; Meyer 2003: 19.

system, whereas the factors (2) through (4) exemplify informal strategies and the configuration of power among the actors of the political system.<sup>106</sup>

It is fundamental for this study to identify those POS-factors that have the highest explanatory power for the research question. Since the unit of analysis is protest mobilization against anti-crisis measures, it is not the outcome of the protest that is analyzed but the mere question whether protest has taken place or not.<sup>107</sup> Johnston shows an explicit divide between the study of the occurrence of protest and the research comprised under the term outcomes.<sup>108</sup> It is the formal institutional structure of states – the most stable of all POS factors – that plays a central role for the conceptualization and operationalization of political opportunity structure in this research.<sup>109</sup> As several students of POS have pointed out, informal strategies and configurations of power among the actors of the political system play a higher role when it comes to the analysis of the outcomes of political mobilization and the ability of challengers to actually establish their demands.<sup>110</sup> For political mobilization to take place, however, formal institutional conditions are more important. Accordingly, Kriesi draws a line between procedural and substantial success of political mobilization. Procedural success means the actual coming into being of mobilization and substantial mobilization means success of the mobilized action to influence amend or introduce a policy.<sup>111</sup>

What then, is precisely implied by the formal institutional structure and how can this concept be operationalized? At the center of the concept of the formal institutional structure lies the degree of openness or closure of the political system of a state. A system is open when political decisions take various steps and include several actors or **groups of actors before policies are implemented. While “getting things done”** such a system also succeeds in involving as many actors as possible in the policy process.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Xei/van der Heijden 2010: 53; Kriesi 1991: 2.

<sup>107</sup> According to Rucht, explanations for the effect of protest are hard to trace in any way. Such analyses would have to include a much wider range of intervening variables. Moreover, protest effects are very hard to measure reliably because political decisions are never only influenced by the appearance of protest action and can appear with significant time lags (Rucht 1998).

<sup>108</sup> Johnston 2011: 34.

<sup>109</sup> It shall be mentioned that several analyses point to the fact that political opportunities can actually shift **over time and thus lead to „windows of opportunity”** that make it easier for the challengers to amend or influence the system (see Williams 2010: 443; Josselin 2007: 22f). In this study, however, the POS will be considered as stable, because the focus lies on the strong side of the POS. It is the political institutional structure that is only slowly changing in established democracies that will be at the center of the analysis of this study. Moreover, the time frame is not wide enough for an assumed shift in institutional structures to take place.

<sup>110</sup> Kolb 2007: 54; Kriesi 1991: 3.


<sup>111</sup> Kriesi 1991: 8.

<sup>112</sup> Kriesi 1991: 6.

However, there are two models that assume an influence of openness of a state on political protest. The first is the initial linear model which stresses that if the system is closed, then protest is high and it declines steadily with rising openness. The second model is curvilinear pointing out that in both highly open and highly closed systems only low protest occurs. In-between the two poles, protest raises to a certain point, after which protest declines again towards both ends of the curve (figure 1). Thus, mixed systems bear the highest numbers of protest. Empirically, the curvilinear model was proven to be most appropriate and thus will be used in this study.<sup>113</sup> Provided that only democracies are considered in the empirical analysis, and none of the systems to be analyzed can be viewed as completely closed, an interesting theoretical puzzle occurs. Applying the assumptions of the curvilinear correlation, the curve is subject to a partition in democratic and non-democratic systems that occur in the form of a threshold. This threshold is drawn in the middle of the curve in figure 1. This nuance leads to the following second hypothesis:

**HII:** *the higher the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure of a country, the lower the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this country.*

**Figure 1: Linear and curvilinear connection between POS and political protest**



**Source:** *own depiction based on Opp 2009.*

<sup>113</sup> Opp 2009: 163.



There are several indicators pointing to the openness or closure of the formal institutional structure of a state.<sup>114</sup> **In this study, Kitschelt's account shall be favored when conceptualizing the formal institutional structure.** He delineates the following indicators: (1) the separation of power between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary and especially the capacity of the legislature to develop policies independently of the **executive. Kitschelt incorporates this indicator on democratic terms "because a legislature is by definition an electorally accountable agent and is therefore much more sensitive to public demands, whereas only the uppermost positions in the executive are subject to such direct public pressure".**<sup>115</sup> The second indicator is (2) the number of parties and factions **which influence the formulation of policies. "The larger this number, the more 'centrifugal' a political system tends to be and the more difficult it is to confine electoral interest articulation to the 'cartel' of entrenched interests that is represented by the established, bureaucratized parties".**<sup>116</sup> The third and last indicator is (3) the pattern of intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch. When the system is pluralistic it allows for the incorporation of different opinions in the decision-making procedure, when it is corporatist, it allows only for the incorporation of some aggregate interests formed within main societal groups. As already stated when describing the indicators of IV I, the three indicators will be grasped additively.

Having formulated the second hypothesis and having established the indicators of the POS the question remains which direction the causality from POS to political participation will take. Both options are possible. The causality implied in most research is that the more open the institutional structure, the higher the participation of the citizens. However, considering protest action, the causality could also point to the inverse direction following from the assumption that the more the civil society feels restricted by the state, the more it will be eager to make its voice heard. The latter is implicitly assumed in this **study's hypothesis. Analogue to the SES-model,** the question of the causal mechanism at work in this logical chain arises. How does a better political opportunity structure lead to extended participation in political protest? The question of the causal mechanism shall be verified in the case study. So far, the established causality is assumed, leading to the proposition that the higher the separation of powers between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, the higher the number of political parties involved in the

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<sup>114</sup> For different accounts see: Kriesi 1991: 6f ; Kolb 2007: 54; Xei/van der Heijden 2010: 53.

<sup>115</sup> Kitschelt 1986: 63.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

legislative process<sup>117</sup>, the more pluralist the political system, the more open the political opportunity structure and thus the lower the degree of political protest.

In order to quantify the degree of openness of a state, each of the indicators presented has to be considered separately. Turning firstly to the *division of powers* in a state, the ability of the legislature to develop policies independently of the executive is quantified distinctly from the independence of the judiciary. The Comparative Political Data Set III (CPDS III) established by Klaus Armingeon et al. will be used to assess the first indicator. The CPDS III is a compilation of political and institutional annual data for 35 countries (OECD-members and/or EU-member countries). It ranges from 1990 to 2009 and combines data from the Comparative Political Data Sets I and II.<sup>118</sup> Under the wide range of variables **coded under the topic "institutions" in the dataset, the indicator *executive legislative relations according to Lijphart*** is used. Lijphart distinguishes between democracies with an executive dominance versus democracies in which the relation between the executive and the legislative is rather balanced according to several criteria that he stipulates.<sup>119</sup> From this distinction originates the following typology of the executive-legislative types of balance arrayed from most to least open: parliamentary systems; semi-presidential systems dominated by parliament; semi-presidential systems dominated by president; presidential systems; hybrid systems. This CPDS III indicator will be tested for the separation of powers in the case study.

Turning to the independence of the judiciary in a political system, the indicator of judicial independence will be operationalized. It will be drawn from the Economic Freedom of the World reports. The Economic Freedom of the World reports present data on several topics concerning economic development and are issued by the Fraser Institute for 141 countries, in some instances dating as far back as 1970.<sup>120</sup> The indicator *judicial independence* is a measure taken from the Global Competitiveness Report and incorporated in the Economic Freedom of the World reports. It was compiled from

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<sup>117</sup> This expression anticipates the existence of at least two competing parties to allow for democratic competition.

<sup>118</sup> Armingeon et al. 2011.

<sup>119</sup> Lijphart 1999: 116ff. Such differentiating criteria are: the right of dismissal of the head of government (prime-minister) by a vote of no confidence in parliamentary systems as against no such mechanisms in presidential systems; the popular election of a president versus the selection of a prime-minister by legislatures; collegial executives in parliamentary systems versus non-collegial in presidential.

<sup>120</sup> Gwartney/Lawson/Hall 2011.

answers to the question: "Is the judiciary in your country independent from political influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?".<sup>121</sup>

The next indicator, the number of parties involved in the legislative process, can also be measured using the CPDS III. In this study, parties that dispose of **seats in the country's** legislative body (the parliament) shall be equalized with parties involved in the legislative process. Therefore, a variable from CPDS III that scales the *effective number of parties on the seats level* shall be used<sup>122</sup>. The effective number of parties in parliament shows the number of parties in a parliament weighted by their relative strength. This allows not only for the counting of the parties in a parliament but at the same time for consideration of the fractualization in the parliament which is what this operationalization is looking for.<sup>123</sup> Thus, the higher the effective number of parties, the more centrifugal the system and the more it is subject to influences from outside.

The last indicator of the variable degree of openness of a state is pluralism in the structure of the given state. On the one hand, this implies the question if people are consulted on the most important issues (e.g. changes in the constitution or the joining of international organizations) via a referendum and if they have the means and possibilities to call for a referendum or a popular initiative. On the other hand, this indicator also comprises the differentiation in pluralist versus corporatist political systems. The latter means the involvement of popular representatives such as trade unions and other important peak organizations in the political procedures of the state, whereas the former does not account for such decision-making action.

The first indicator here is drawn from the CPDS III database. The database contains three different data that account for referenda and popular initiatives. The first item identifies the existence or absence of a mechanism where specific amendments of the Constitution or a law need to be submitted to the people automatically and only are implemented when the people vote in favor of the proposition.<sup>124</sup> The second item measures the popular veto as a non-required referendum that is triggered by so-called **"non-existing veto-players"**. **With non-existing veto-players** groups of citizens are implied.<sup>125</sup> The last item is the possibility for non-existing veto-players (electors) in a state to trigger a

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<sup>121</sup> No—heavily influenced (= 1) or Yes—entirely independent (= 10). (Gwartney/Lawson/Hall 2011: 193).

<sup>122</sup> Armingeon et al. 2011.

<sup>123</sup> For further insight into the calculation of the effective number of parties see: Laakso/Taagepera 1979.

<sup>124</sup> Armingeon et al. 2011. The coding follows the pattern 1=yes; 0=no.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

popular initiative which has to be brought to the decision of the people if they can collect enough support.<sup>126</sup>

The second track of measurement of the indicator degree of plurality in a state will be grasped from the pair of opposites: pluralism and corporatism. Whereas pluralism refers to systems where societal power is not concentrated in the hand of a few organizations **and thus is eligible to spontaneous and fluid influence, in corporatist systems "interest groups are integrated in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies"**<sup>127</sup>. Here, the interest groups tend to be large in size but small in number, are often united in **peak organizations and conduct regular consultations with the states' decision-makers**.<sup>128</sup> Thus, corporatist systems are less flexible, which leads to the conclusion that they represent a less open state.<sup>129</sup> If this causal mechanism is actually at work or not will be shown in the case study.

The concept of corporatism prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s and was revived since the end of the 1990s and 2000s with the emergence of new so called **"social pacts" in some countries**.<sup>130</sup> The operationalization of corporatism is a highly contested issue.<sup>131</sup> Kenworthy counts some 42 different measures of corporatism.<sup>132</sup> To adjust this amplitude to this study in order to be able to make a slim but purposeful analysis, one such variable shall be considered that is adequate and sufficient for a study of this scope. Such a variable was extracted from the database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2010 (ICTWSS), issued by the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies. The database covers a sample of 34 countries a large amount of data. The item chosen from this rich database is *routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policy*.<sup>133</sup> It rates the countries on a level from 0 to 2 ranging from regular, irregular to no involvement. Using the combination of the first variable for the indicator pluralism in a state – the options of referenda and public initiatives – and the second variable –

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid. The coding follows the pattern 1=yes; 0=no.

<sup>127</sup> Christiansen et al. 2010: 22.

<sup>128</sup> Lijphart 1999: 172.

<sup>129</sup> **This debate is paralleled by the debate on "associative democracy" and the degree to which it is able or rather unable to include the whole society.**

<sup>130</sup> Bocaro 2010: 2ff.

<sup>131</sup> For an overview see Woldendorp/Kemal 2008; Christiansen et al. 2009: 25ff.

<sup>132</sup> Kenworthy 2000: 36.

<sup>133</sup> Visser 2011: 13. The grade 2 means full concertation, regular and frequent involvement; 1 means partial concertation, irregular and infrequent involvement and 0 means nonconcertation, involvement is rare or absent.

corporatism versus pluralism, it shall be assessed how pluralistic the considered states are.

Having sorted out the main theoretical approaches for this study and having depicted their operationalization, it can be noted that all three levels of analysis are now covered. The dependent variable resides on the meso-level, the first independent variable is allocated on the aggregate micro-level and the second independent variable is located on the macro-level. This lends the study a fully-fledged concept. In order to conduct a thorough case study, the cases for closer analysis will be drawn from a body of possible cases that will be compared via their variance of the independent variables in the next chapter. Furthermore, prior to the selection on the IV, a pre-selection applying control variables will be accomplished.

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1 Positivist Research Design and the Method of Comparative Case Study Research

The employment of the positivist research design in this was already stressed in the introduction and in part 2. Hypotheses were formulated from the theories on political participation in the previous chapter. The following task is verifying them in a comparative case study.

To materialize this kind of theory verification, it is crucial to carefully choose appropriate comparative cases along which the hypotheses can be tested. The universe of cases is on the one hand limited by the unit of analysis itself<sup>134</sup> – political protest during the last financial and economic crisis meaning that only countries that were hit by the crisis can be accounted for. On the other hand it is constrained by the availability of data – in many countries “accurate and timely publication of political, economic, and social data remains a luxury”.<sup>135</sup> This means that the research has to rely on a sample of countries carefully chosen to ensure a minimal selection bias. The goal is to indicate a sample that allows for the generalization of the results of the analysis. In addition, the cases have to designate a

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<sup>134</sup> Gerring 2008: 676.

<sup>135</sup> Manheim/Rich 1995: 253.

variation along the variables that they are analyzed for (causal leverage).<sup>136</sup> This implies a non-random, purposive selection. Gerring counts nine different methods of purposive case selection: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar and most different.<sup>137</sup> All of them rest on at least one case; some require a minimum of two. These methods are used for small-N case selection procedures to be adopted in this study. Large-N selection procedures are rather related to randomized techniques. According to Woldendorp and Keman, choosing between a large-N and a small-N method is a trade-off between **"statistical explanation and thick description"**.<sup>138</sup> A large-N study allows for the generation of empirical support or empirical disprove of a theory and reduces the selection bias of cases, whereas a small-N study implies an in-depth understanding of a case.<sup>139</sup> A small-N study is preferred to a large-N study in the framework of this research because it allows for a strong test exposing first insights for the just recently developing research on civil society reaction to economic crises.<sup>140</sup> Nevertheless, a connection between a small-N case study and a large-N universe of cases is drawn from a large cases universe that the unit of analysis allows to consider by performing a pre-selection on the control and independent variables of the cases. This represents a combination of the statistical advantages of a large-N study with the advantages of a strong test via a small-N test by choosing two cases for a deeper insight from a large pool of countries that are determined initially.<sup>141</sup>

**To go back to Gerring's methods of case selection listed above it must be stressed that they are divided along the lines of the researcher's interest. They are either DV- or IV-centered, or centered on both the dependent and the independent variable. DV-centered methods aim to explain a puzzling case but pose no preconditions for the independent variables, IV-centered methods are informed about the causes of outcomes, but have no information on those outcomes. Such selection methods are exploratory and usually aim to generate new hypotheses. DV-/IV-centered research on the contrary connects causes with outcomes and has the purpose of testing existing hypotheses.**<sup>142</sup> In this research, the latter approach will be applied.

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<sup>136</sup> Gerring 2008: 645.

<sup>137</sup> Gerring 2008: 646ff.

<sup>138</sup> Woldendorp/Keman 2008: 259.

<sup>139</sup> Woldendorp/Keman 2008: 259f.

<sup>140</sup> van Evera 1997: 26f.

<sup>141</sup> Woldendorp/Keman 2008: 260.

<sup>142</sup> Gerring 2008: 646-648.

Of the nine case selection methods, the extreme-case and the deviant-case methods are used for hypotheses-generation only. All other methods are used either for hypotheses-testing or both hypotheses-testing and -generation. Gerring provides persuasive reasons to prefer the *diverse-case* technique of case selection. In his overview, the diverse method even gets ahead of the frequently used most-similar and most-different case selection methods due to the limitations of the latter.<sup>143</sup> The main goal of the diverse-case method is to include the maximum of variance along both the dependent and the independent variables. Another advantage of the method is that the variance can be measured with both categorical and continuous indicators. Then, either both, high and low, extreme values on the study variables are included or those that correspond to certain thresholds established by the researcher are selected.<sup>144</sup> This case-selection method thus matches best with the aims of this study.

According to the diverse-case hypotheses-testing technique it is recommended to choose **the cases in the first place on the highest variation of the independent variable: "The 'extreme value on the IV' method of case selection argues (...) that cases that are atypical in their endowment with the independent variable teach us the most"**.<sup>145</sup> Van Evera claims that a test that employs a case selected on the extreme values of the IV is the strongest test, allowing ruling out results that could stem from factors not included in the analysis.<sup>146</sup> Given that two independent variables will be tested, at least four representative cases will be extracted on their variance on the independent variables to allow for a proper theory test, given that those extreme cases are given after the IV-test. The first case with a high degree of SES and a high degree of POS, the second case with a high degree of SES and a low degree of POS, the third case with a low degree of SES and a high degree of POS and the last case with a low degree of SES and a low degree of POS.

Prior to the selection of the cases on their IV-characteristics, the universe of cases shall be tested for the control variables. Control variables (also called context or condition variables) are variables that frame given conditions and influence the impact that

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<sup>143</sup> On the most similar and most different system designs see for instance: van Evera 1997: 23; Mannheim/Rich 1994: 253ff; Pennings/Keman/ Kleinnihenhuis 1999: 43-49. For its critique see: Gerring 2008: 669ff. The most important point that eliminates these methods for this case study is that the cases are coded dichotomously which means that the cases cannot be continuous. This, however, will be crucial for the later empirical analysis of the study variables.

<sup>144</sup> Gerring 2008: 650f.

<sup>145</sup> van Evera 1997: 79.

<sup>146</sup> „[C]ases with extreme IV values are laboratories for strong tests“ van Evera 1997: 80.

independent variables have on the dependent variable.<sup>147</sup> In a way, they can be described **as the “environment” of the unit of analysis.**<sup>148</sup> In empirical analyses, they have to be held constant for all cases, when causal relations are tested.<sup>149</sup> Those control variables most vital for the comparison of political protest behavior against anti-crisis measures will be laid out in the next section. After an adjacent justification of the time period of the case study, the research will turn to the case selection according to the guidelines discussed in this paragraph.

## **4.2 Control Variables - Concept and Operationalization**

To conduct a case selection on the independent variable for the case study, various pre-steps have to be taken. A case universe which applies to the underlying research question has to be defined and controlled for. On the one hand, this case universe should preferably be as similar as possible given the comparability of the unit of the research – political protest against anti-crisis measures. On the other hand, it has to be as distinct as possible when it comes to the independent variables. In order to undertake these pre-steps, control variables have to be formulated and accounted for.

Control variables, as stated in part 5.1, are variables that have to be valid for all the cases that will be subject to the IV-case selection. Control variables for the study of political protest in reaction to anti-crisis measures in the course of the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2010 are thus predominantly of economical character.

The first control variable thus refers to economic ties that develop in constructed regions or regions that have economically grown together over time or due to geographical or cultural proximity. Countries that are members of the European Union will be taken into account. These countries are tied together by strong economic bonds, a fact which is crucial in the face of an economic crisis. These ties have become even more visible in the course of the Euro-crisis that followed the initial world-wide financial crisis and is ongoing to the day of writing.<sup>150</sup>

The second control variable is the degree with which countries of the EU were hit by the crisis. This choice follows a simple logical chain that presumes that in order to expect a

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<sup>147</sup> van Evera 1997: 11.

<sup>148</sup> Pennings/Keman/Kleinnijenhuis 1999: 46.

<sup>149</sup> Mannheim/Rich 1994: 441.

<sup>150</sup> Hodson 2011.



similar degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures the crisis has to have had a comparable impact in the countries. Bearing this in mind, the selected cases will have to be countries affected the most and to a similar degree by the crisis 2008-2010. This will become visible when comparing for the three most important economic indicators:

1. GDP per capita growth
2. unemployment rate
3. inflation rate.

Hereby, the preliminary selection will be drawn, picking countries that have gone through a recession within the time of the crisis. A recession is first and foremost classified by falling GDP over a period of two consecutive quarters.<sup>151</sup> This is the strongest of the three indicators and will thus be conferred with the highest weight. Furthermore, strong economic damage due to the crisis will be implied as soon as the unemployment rate as well as the inflation rate has been significantly rising.<sup>152</sup> All the three indicators will be traced via Eurostat. The *quarterly GDP per capita growth* data show the production activity of the residents and represents all goods and services produced minus the value of any goods or services used in their creation.<sup>153</sup> The *unemployment rate* depicts the rate of unemployed people as a percentage of the whole labor force.<sup>154</sup> Finally the *inflation rate* represents the annual average rate of change of the inflation in comparison to the previous year.<sup>155</sup>

The third control variable that has to be accounted for in order to conduct a proper comparison is the actual anti-crisis measures that were taken to fight the consequences in the countries that were hit by the crisis. Anti-crisis measures can differ to a great extent –

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<sup>151</sup> Campbell 2011.

<sup>152</sup> European Commission 2012c.

<sup>153</sup> **"Gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices is the final result of the production activity of resident producer units (ESA 1995, 8.89).** It is defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. Data are calculated as chain-linked volumes (i.e. data at previous year's prices, linked over the years via appropriate growth rates). Growth rates with respect to the previous quarter (Q/Q-1) are calculated from calendar and seasonally adjusted figures while growth rates with respect to the same quarter of the previous year (Q/Q-4) **are calculated from raw data"** (European Commission 2012d).

<sup>154</sup> **"Unemployment rates** represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a. without work during the reference week, b. currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week, c. actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start later, i.e. within a period of, at most, **three months"** (European Commission 2012e).

<sup>155</sup> **"Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs) are designed for international comparisons of consumer price inflation.** HICP is used for example by the European Central Bank for monitoring of inflation in the Economic and Monetary Union and for the assessment of inflation convergence as required under Article 121 of the Treaty of Amsterdam." (European Commission 2012f).

they can be fiscal, monetary or a mix of both.<sup>156</sup> Fiscal policy refers to taxation and public spending. It can either aim to increase economic activity via increased spending and decreased tax revenue, which leads to higher fiscal deficit. Or, fiscal policy can aim for a slower economy with a higher fiscal surplus by cutting spending and increasing tax revenue.<sup>157</sup> Monetary policy focuses on measures to manage money supply by adjusting for interest rates or regulating the conduct of market operations or changing the reserve requirements of banks. Similarly to fiscal policy, it can be loose or tight, depending on the aims of the authorities (keeping the money supply steady, raising or reducing it).<sup>158</sup> In times of crises, short-term as well as long-term fiscal and monetary policies can be conducted by governments in order to stabilize the outcomes of the crisis. Ditkiewicz and **Gorzela**k distinguish between three policy options for countries' crisis-solution: (1) the organization of large-scale public infrastructure programs in order to encourage domestic demand and relieve the fiscal strain of the banking system, (2) introduce austerity measures such as wage and employment reductions in the public sphere and cut public investment projects in order to restore the balance of public finance and (3) increase spending on the research and development of new technologies and other projects to rise the long-term competitiveness of the country.<sup>159</sup> As they become detectable from the definition of financial and monetary policy options and from the categorization given by Ditkiewicz and Gorzelak, fiscal or austerity measures can be taken out on the shoulders of the people in a more direct and visible way than monetary policies because the latter affect financial institutions in the first place.

In order to be able to compare protest reaction to anti-crisis measures by the civil societies, only countries that have issued anti-crisis policies that actually restrain the citizens – austerity measures – will be considered. In detail the following indicators will be looked at:

1. wage cuts in the public sector
2. cuts in public benefit spending
3. increases in taxation.

Due to a lack of an overarching source encompassing the austerity measures across the EU, various sources will have to be consulted. Gorzelak (2010a) offers a clear-cut

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<sup>156</sup> Fourceri/Mourugane 2009.

<sup>157</sup> Financial Times Lexicon Online 2012a.

<sup>158</sup> Financial Times Lexicon Online 2012b.

<sup>159</sup> Ditkiewicz / Gorzelak 2010: 199.

overview of the crisis, its implications and anti-crisis measures for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Vera Glassner (2010) provides a cross-European analysis of anti-crisis measures in the public sector. Additional data will be traced from country-specific analyses and government publications.

All variables that will be used in this study have been defined at this point and are listed in an overview in table 20 in the appendix.

The case selection by means of control and independent variables will be carried out in part 6 of the study, after the elaboration of the time frame for the case study.

### 4.3 Time Frame

The time period selected for the study is highly constrained by the object of research. It refers to the recent global financial and economic crisis which has shown its first signs in the beginning of 2008.<sup>160</sup> Worldwide, but also Europe-wide, economies started to recover from this heavy recession in 2010 which was by and large over by the end of that year.<sup>161</sup> Some European states, such as Italy, Spain, Greece and partly also Ireland have fallen victim to the following so-called **"Euro-crisis" beginning to appear in the course of 2010** and at times combined with the initial crisis. However, in this study, a sharp line shall be drawn between these two crises. First and foremost stands the fact of the availability of data. Most statistical political and economic data are issued with a certain time lag, which would make the analysis of the trends in 2011/12 impracticable. Second, the fact that the Euro-crisis has hit only some of the European countries would highly limit the universe of **cases for the crucial case selection. Third, the "Euro-crisis" as against to the 2008-2010** financial and economic crisis is far from being over at the time of writing leading to running the risk of preliminary assumptions that might not hold true when considering the whole time period of the crisis.

It has to be stressed at this point that the author of the study is highly aware of the narrowness of the underlying time period of three years. This awareness will be embodied **through a critical assessment of the study's results. However, this time restriction still is appropriate and sufficient for this research because the explanatory power of the study's** results will only be applied to the time period at consideration and will be treated with great cautiousness. The results from this short-term analysis can therefore be used to

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<sup>160</sup> Claessens 2010.

<sup>161</sup> Hodson 2010: 232.

enlighten trends in protest behavior in times of harsh crises and be further applied to the analysis of protest behavior during other crises.

## **5. Case Selection**

### **5.1 Pre-selection on the Control Variables**

As has already become clear in the preceding chapters, the case universe at the onset embraces all of the 27 countries that were members of the European Union between 2008 and 2010 (CV 1). These are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, as has been pointed out previously, not all of the countries of the EU were hit by the crisis with the same strength.<sup>162</sup> To pick countries that suffered severe economic damage, the EU-states need to be further differentiated via the second and third control variable.

In part 5.2 the indicators pointing to the economic damage of the crisis have been presented. The selection on the first indicator quarterly GDP per capita growth bears a country selection listed in table 2. Per definition only countries with more than two quarters of falling GDP rates will be included, leading to the drop out of Slovakia, Malta, Poland, Bulgaria and Sweden.

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<sup>162</sup> Claessens 2010: 269.

**Table 2: Quarterly GDP per capital growth 2008 (08), 2009 (09), 2010 (10)**

Country/ Time	08 Q1	08 Q2	08 Q3	08 Q4	09 Q1	09 Q2	09 Q3	09 Q4	10 Q1	10 Q2	10 Q3	10 Q4
Luxembourg	0.7	0.3	-1.0	-4.1	-1.2	-2.1	2.3	-0.7	1.2	1.5	0.0	1.2
Slovakia	-2.3	1.3	1.3	1.1	-8.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8
Finland	0.0	0.3	-0.2	-3.0	-6.0	-0.9	1.4	-0.4	0.7	3.0	0.1	1.5
Belgium	0.8	0.4	-0.6	-2.0	-1.8	0.2	1.1	0.6	0.1	1.1	0.4	0.5
Malta	2.8	1.2	0.3	-1.9	-2.8	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.0	-0.1	0.3	2.0
Netherlands	0.5	-0.4	0.0	-1.2	-2.2	-1.2	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.6
Germany	1.1	-0.4	-0.4	-2.2	-4.0	0.3	0.8	0.7	0.5	1.9	0.8	0.5
Austria	1.4	0.1	-1.1	-1.7	-1.8	-0.8	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.9	1.5	1.1
Portugal	0.0	-0.2	-0.5	-1.1	-2.3	0.3	0.6	-0.1	0.9	0.3	0.2	-0.4
Italy	0.4	-0.5	-1.1	-1.9	-3.2	-0.1	0.5	-0.1	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.0
Czech	0.5	1.0	0.1	-1.6	-3.3	-1.1	0.4	0.9	0.7	1.0	0.7	0.6
Poland	1.4	0.7	0.8	-0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	1.5	0.7	1.0	1.4	0.9
Slovenia	1.5	1.0	0.4	-3.9	-5.5	-0.6	0.4	-0.3	0.2	1.2	0.5	0.3
Bulgaria	1.5	1.4	1.4	0.4	-6.3	0.0	0.3	-3.1	0.9	1.6	0.7	0.5
France	0.3	-0.7	-0.3	-1.4	-1.6	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.4
Lithuania	-0.9	1.5	-1.4	-0.9	-12.7	-1.3	0.3	-1.3	1.2	0.7	0.7	1.8
United Kingdom	0.0	-1.3	-2.0	-2.3	-1.6	-0.2	0.2	0.7	0.4	1.1	0.7	-0.5
Denmark	-1.4	1.5	-1.8	-2.4	-2.3	-1.6	-0.2	0.3	0.0	1.5	1.1	-0.5
Spain	0.5	0.0	-0.8	-1.1	-1.6	-1.0	-0.3	-0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2
Cyprus	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.0	-1.1	-1.4	-0.3	-0.1	0.9	0.4	1.0	0.3
Sweden	-0.9	-0.1	0.0	-4.2	-2.4	0.5	-0.3	0.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.2
Romania	3.0	1.1	-0.5	-1.5	-3.3	-1.9	-0.5	-1.0	-0.1	0.3	-0.6	0.5
Ireland	-2.3	-2.1	0.0	-3.7	-2.7	-0.7	-0.6	-1.3	1.5	-0.5	0.4	-1.4
Greece	0.1	0.5	0.3	-0.8	-1.1	-1.0	-0.6	0.7	-1.9	-1.3	-1.6	-2.8
Hungary	1.4	-0.2	-1.0	-2.1	-3.3	-1.2	-0.9	0.2	1.1	0.4	0.7	0.2
Estonia	-1.7	1.0	-1.1	-8.6	-4.7	-4.0	-1.3	1.1	-0.1	2.8	1.3	2.1
Latvia	-0.7	-0.1	-6.1	-1.8	-9.6	-1.2	-6.8	1.1	1.2	0.0	0.9	0.9

**Source: European Commission 2012d.**

Additionally, severe damage was also operationalized via a strongly rising unemployment rate (table 3) or a strongly rising inflation rate (table 4) or both respectively. The selection via the unemployment rate was conducted through sorting out countries in which the unemployment rate rose more than the mean of all countries combined from 2008 to 2010. These countries are: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom.

**Table 3: Unemployment rate as percentage change in comparison to previous year**

Country/ Time	2007	2008	Change in %	2009	Change in %	2010	Change in %	Change in % 2008-2010
<b>Austria</b>	4.4	3.8	-14%	4.8	21%	4.4	-9%	-1%
<b>Belgium</b>	7.5	7	-7%	7.9	11%	8.3	5%	3%
<b>Cyprus</b>	3.9	3.7	-5%	5.3	30%	6.2	15%	13%
<b>Czech</b>	5.3	4.4	-17%	6.7	34%	7.3	8%	9%
<b>Denmark</b>	3.8	3.3	-13%	6	45%	7.4	19%	17%
<b>Estonia</b>	4.7	5.5	17%	13.8	60%	16.9	18%	32%
<b>Finland</b>	6.9	6.4	-7%	8.2	22%	8.4	2%	6%
<b>France</b>	8.4	7.8	-7%	9.5	18%	9.8	3%	5%
<b>Germany</b>	8.7	7.5	-14%	7.8	4%	7.1	-10%	-7%
<b>Greece</b>	8.3	7.7	-7%	9.5	19%	12.6	25%	12%
<b>Hungary</b>	7.4	7.8	5%	10	22%	11.2	11%	13%
<b>Ireland</b>	4.6	6.3	-37%	11.9	47%	13.7	13%	8%
<b>Italy</b>	6.1	6.7	10%	7.8	14%	8.4	7%	10%
<b>Latvia</b>	6	7.5	25%	17.1	56%	18.7	9%	30%
<b>Lithuania</b>	4.3	5.8	35%	13.7	58%	17.8	23%	39%
<b>Luxembourg</b>	4.2	4.9	17%	5.1	4%	4.6	-11%	3%
<b>Netherlands</b>	3.6	3.1	-14%	3.7	16%	4.5	18%	7%
<b>Portugal</b>	8.9	8.5	-4%	10.6	20%	12	12%	9%
<b>Romania</b>	6.4	5.8	-9%	6.9	16%	7.3	5%	4%
<b>Slovenia</b>	4.9	4.4	-10%	5.9	25%	7.3	19%	12%
<b>Spain</b>	8.3	11.3	36%	18	37%	20.1	10%	28%
<b>United Kingdom</b>	5.3	5.6	6%	7.6	26%	7.8	3%	12%
<b>MEAN</b>								<b>12%</b>

**Source: author's calculation based European Commission 2012e.**

**Note:** The countries highlighted in white are countries with a mean unemployment rate from 2008 to 2010 higher than the mean for all countries in this sample.

The third indicator – inflation rate – is calculated against the previous year. Accordingly to the unemployment rate, the mean for 2008-2010 was calculated and those countries that were above the overall mean of inflation rate were chosen for further analysis. Because most of the countries have already shown significant unemployment rates and have already been put forward for further selection, only Romania was added based on the high increase of its inflation rate.

**Table 4: Inflation rate as percentage of change to previous year**

Country/Time	2008	2009	2010	Mean in % 2008-2010
<b>Austria</b>	3.2	0.4	1.7	1.77
<b>Belgium</b>	4.5	0	2.3	2.27
<b>Cyprus</b>	4.4	0.2	2.6	2.4
<b>Czech Republic</b>	6.3	0.6	1.2	2.7
<b>Denmark</b>	3.6	1.1	2.2	2.3
<b>Estonia</b>	10.6	0.2	2.7	4.5
<b>Finland</b>	3.9	1.6	1.7	2.4
<b>France</b>	3.2	0.1	1.7	1.67
<b>Germany</b>	2.8	0.2	1.2	1.4
<b>Greece</b>	4.2	1.3	4.7	3.4
<b>Hungary</b>	6	4	4.7	4.9
<b>Ireland</b>	3.1	-1.7	-1.6	-0.07
<b>Italy</b>	3.5	0.8	1.6	1.97
<b>Latvia</b>	15.3	3.3	-1.2	5.8
<b>Lithuania</b>	11.1	4.2	1.2	5.5
<b>Luxembourg</b>	4.1	0	2.8	2.3
<b>Netherlands</b>	2.2	1	0.9	1.37
<b>Portugal</b>	2.7	-0.9	1.4	1.07
<b>Romania</b>	7.9	5.6	6.1	6.53
<b>Slovenia</b>	5.5	0.9	2.1	2.83
<b>Spain</b>	4.1	-0.2	2	1.97
<b>United Kingdom</b>	3.6	2.2	3.3	3.03
<b>MEAN</b>				<b>2.82</b>

**Source:** own calculation based on European Commission 2012f.

**Note:** the countries highlighted in white are countries in which the mean inflation rate from 2008 to 2010 is higher than the mean for all countries from 2008 to 2010.

The selection via all three indicators yields the following 12 countries for further deliberation: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Ireland is still included despite the fact that it has neither shown extremely rising unemployment nor inflation rates because its overall GDP-drop during the crisis was one of the highest in Europe. As was stated in part 5.2, the fluctuation of the GDP has the highest weight when analyzing economic damage. Thus, this exception seems appropriate.

For the analysis of political protest against anti-crisis measures the account of CV II was necessary but not sufficient. In order to assume protest against anti-crisis measures such measures must have been implemented or at least announced between 2008 and 2010. To this end, the third control variable – austerity measures – was conceptualized and operationalized in part 5.2. What are the results of the control for this third variable for the 12 countries detected from the selection on CV I and CV II? Table 5 gives a simplified overview of the main anti-crisis austerity measures. These are cuts in public sector wages, increases in taxation and cuts in public benefit spending. In cases where singular austerity

measures were too minor to cause significant public outrage, they will not be counted and receive a “No” in the table. To display details, an extensive overview of the measures taken in each country is provided in the appendix, table 21.

**Table 5: Anti-crisis measures by country**

Country/ Anti-crisis measure	Tax increases	Wage cuts in public sector	Cuts in public benefit spending
<b>Cyprus</b>	No	No	No
<b>Denmark</b>	No	No	No
<b>Estonia</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Greece</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Hungary</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Ireland</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Latvia</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Lithuania</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Romania</b>	No	No	No
<b>Slovenia</b>	No	No	No
<b>Spain</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Yes	No	Yes

**Source:** own interpretation based on data from table 21 in the appendix.

**Note:** countries highlighted in white are countries that have implemented or announced significant austerity measures between 2008 and 2010.

Table 5 indicates those countries from the initial universe of cases that remain for further differentiation on the independent variable. Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom all have applied at least two of the possible austerity measures to a higher degree than the other countries.

Following the pre-selection on the control variables, the eight remaining countries have to be measured on the indicators of the independent variables. For a thorough analysis, at least four cases representing all possible combinations of the IV-variation will have to follow from the IV-selection. Those countries with the most significant values on both IVs will be chosen for the adjacent case study.



## 5.2 Variation of the Socioeconomic Status and the Political Opportunity Structure - Final Case Selection

### 5.2.1 Selection according to the Socioeconomic Status (IV I)

It was shown in part 5.1 that the selection based on the control variables has been followed by selecting on the independent variables. This represents the most significant step in the case-selection procedure. The representative cases for the final case study will have to have the highest or respective, lowest values on the independent variables in the four possible combinations. The first independent variable – socioeconomic status – was operationalized via three indicators: educational, occupational and income status. They will be measured applying the indicators total population having completed at least upper secondary education, gross national income per capita and distribution of employment status as % of the active population. Table 6 shows the distribution of people with at least secondary education across the countries left after the CV selection.

**Table 6: Distribution of people with at least secondary education in per cent**

Country	Estonia	Greece	Ireland	Latvia	Lithuania	Romania	Spain	UK	Mean
<b>Mean 2008-2010</b>	88.87	61.6	71.67	87.03	91.3	74.8	51.7	74.7	<b>75.2</b>

**Source: European Commission 2011a**<sup>163</sup>

Of the eight countries left Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia show the highest percentages of better educated people. Romania, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece and especially Spain show the least percentage of people with at least secondary education for 2008 until 2010 and thus a lower educational status.

The indicator *distribution of income* was operationalized with the help of the HDI item *income index (gross national income per capita)* presented in table 7.

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<sup>163</sup> An illustration for all study years and countries is enclosed in the appendix, table 22.

**Table 7: Income index (gross national income per capita)**

Country	Estonia	Ireland	Greece	Spain	Latvia	Lithuania	Romania	UK	Mean
Mean 2008-2010	0,73	0,82	0,79	0,8	0,71	0,73	0,66	0,83	<b>0,75</b>

**Source: UNDP 2012b.**<sup>164</sup>

**Note:** the index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher scores showing a higher aggregate index.

According to table 7, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Greece have higher indices pointing to a higher aggregate income, whereas Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and especially Romania show lower scores and therefore lower income levels.

Finally, the occupational status in the eight countries left has to be assessed. The Eurostat variable occupational status contains the raw numbers of people employed as either (1) legislators, senior officials and managers, (2) professionals, (3) technicians and associate professionals, (4) clerks, (5) service workers and shop and market sales workers, (6) skilled agricultural and fishery workers, (7) craft and related trades workers, (8) plant and machine operators and assemblers or (9) workers in elementary occupations<sup>165</sup>. These numbers were divided by the figures of the variable active population. The occupations (1) through (5) and (7) are regarded as higher status occupations. With the professions (1) through (4) this is due to the prestige of those professions. Concerning (5) service workers and shop and market sales workers as well as (7) craft and related trade workers, it is assumed accordingly to the causal mechanisms at work in the SES-model that workers in those professions act in highly interactive professions where they are able to acquire extended social skills that in turn are crucial for political participation. Table 8 shows the dispersion of the aggregated numbers of the higher status professions (1) through (5) plus (7) for the years 2008 until 2010.

**Table 8: Percentage of distribution on different occupations as a mean for 2008-2010**

Country	Estonia	Ireland	Greece	Spain	Latvia	Lithuania	Romania	UK	Mean
Higher Occupation	9.4	9.8	7.1	8.0	8.8	9.1	7.0	10.7	8.7

**Source: Eurostat 2012b.**<sup>166</sup>

<sup>164</sup> Full table with data for each year 2008 through 2010 is provided in the appendix, table 23.

<sup>165</sup> Due to the insignificance in numbers, those parts of population working in the armed forces and those stating "no response" were not included in the assessment.

<sup>166</sup> Full table containing numbers for both high and low status professions for all years 2008 through 2010 are provided in the appendix, table 24.

The distribution along the high occupation status results in the following differentiation: the United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia seem to have more workers in better positions whereas people in Romania, Spain and Greece are to a lesser extent employed in high-status jobs.

The combination of all three SES-indicators that are considered additively reveals a picture summarized in table 9.

**Table 9: Distribution of countries along the SES-indicators and overall SES-status**

Value/Indicator	Education status	Income status	Occupational status	Overall SES-status
High	Lithuania	UK	Ireland	Ireland
	Estonia	Ireland	Lithuania	Estonia
	Latvia	Spain	UK	UK
		Greece	Latvia	Latvia
			Estonia	Lithuania
Low	Romania	Lithuania	Romania	Romania
	UK	Estonia	Spain	Spain
	Ireland	Latvia	Greece	Greece
	Greece	Romania		
	Spain			

**Source: own depiction.**

Countries with a high status along at least two of the three SES-indicators have been attributed high overall SES-status. Respectively, countries with a low status along at least two of the three SES-indicators have been attributed low overall SES-status. This leads to the concession of a high SES-status to Ireland, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Latvia and Lithuania and a low SES-status to Spain, Greece and Romania. In order to further differentiate the endowments of the countries, the study will continue with the selection on IV II – the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure.

### 5.2.2 Selection according to the Political Opportunity Structure (IV II)

The independent variable political opportunity structure was conceptualized as the openness or closure of a state with the underlying assumption that the higher the degree of openness of a state, the lower the political protest activity in this state. This assumption follows a curvilinear connection between POS and political participation shown in figure 1 and with the curve cut at its climax because democracies only are considered in this study. It will be measured using the three indicators *separation of powers*, *number of political parties* and *pluralism*.

The separation of powers is firstly measured by the *executive legislative relation according to Lijphart* variable contained in the CPDS III. The data available encompass the years 2008 and 2009 and show the following distribution: Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Spain and the United Kingdom are parliamentary democracies. Ireland, Romania and Lithuania are semi-parliamentary democracies dominated by the parliament.<sup>167</sup> Secondly, the judicial independence leading to a higher or lower separation of powers is accounted for using the *judicial independence* variable from the Economic Freedom of the World reports listed in table 10. The rating shows Ireland, the United Kingdom and Estonia to have higher and Spain, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania to have lower judicial independence.

**Table 10: Rating of judicial independence from 2008 to 2009 and mean rating**

Country/Time	2008	2009	Mean 2008-2009
Estonia	7.5	7.4	7.45
Greece	4.5	4.2	4.35
Ireland	8.9	8.7	8.8
Latvia	4.5	4.4	4.45
Lithuania	4.6	4.3	4.45
Romania	4.1	4.1	4.2
Spain	5.1	4.7	4.9
United Kingdom	8.4	8.8	8.6
<b>MEAN</b>			<b>5.9</b>

**Source: own calculation based on: Gwartney/Lawson/Hall 2011.**

**Notes:** the rating follows a 0-10 scale, with 10 representing the highest judicial independence and 0 the least judicial independence.

The second indicator is the number of political parties involved in the legislative process. It was operationalized with CPDS IIII data and refers to parties that dispose of seats in the country's legislative body. Table 11 shows the allocation of the combined effective numbers of parties for the years 2008 and 2009 in increasing order of the number. Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece and Ireland have the least numbers of parties with an influence on the legislative process, whereas Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have the most (>3).

**Table 11: Effective number of political parties involved in the legislative process 2008-2009**

Country	Spain	UK	Greece	Ireland	Romania	Estonia	Lithuania	Latvia
# of parties	2.34	2.46	2.61	3.0	3.72	4.37	5.79	6.0

**Source: own calculation based on Armingeon et al. 2011.**

<sup>167</sup> Armingeon et al. 2011.

The last indicator is the pluralistic structure of a state. For one it was measured by looking at the possibilities for the initiation of referenda. For the other it was by looking at the degree of corporatism. The existence of popular referenda is depicted with three different items picked from CPDS III in table 12 – required referenda for changes in the constitution, popular veto triggered by the citizens and popular initiatives also triggered by the citizens.

**Table 12: Required referenda, popular veto and popular initiatives possibilities 2008-2009**

Country	Estonia	Greece	Ireland	Latvia	Lithuania	Romania	Spain	UK
Referendum	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Popular veto	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Popular initiative	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

**Source: own calculation based on Armingeon et al. 2011.**

Those countries that have at least two such possibilities for popular expression are considered as more pluralist than those with merely one or no such possibilities. Therefore, the more pluralist group consists of Latvia, Ireland, Lithuania and Spain and the less pluralist group of the United Kingdom, Greece, Estonia and Romania.

Finally, corporatism has to be assessed. For its measurement the item *routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policy* was traced in the ICTWSS data base. Table 13 summarizes the findings for the years 2008 through 2010. Spain and Ireland reveal high involvement of umbrella organizations in government decisions. In Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Greece they are partially given and in the United Kingdom they are non-existent.

**Table 13: Routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policy 2008-2010**

Country	Estonia	Spain	Ireland	Lithuania	Latvia	Romania	UK	Greece
Rating of concertation	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	1

**Source: own calculation based on Visser 2011.**

**Notes:**

2 = full concertation, regular and frequent involvement

1 = partial concertation, irregular and infrequent involvement

0 = non concertation, involvement is rare or absent.<sup>168</sup>

<sup>168</sup> Accordingly to table 12, no changes in the involvement have occurred between 2008 and 2010 in the given countries which makes a listing for every year and country redundant.

Summing up, in table 14 the allocation of all countries around all POS-indicators is dispersed and grouped in more open and less open<sup>169</sup> systems. A more open system has a more independent legislative, a more independent judiciary, a high effective number of parties, grants the people various possibilities to initiate popular referenda and is not corporatist.

**Table 14: Distribution along the POS-indicators**

POS	Executive-legislative relation	Judiciary independence	Effective number of parties	Referenda/ Initiatives	Involvement of unions and employees	Overall POS-dispersion
Open	Estonia	UK	Romania	Latvia	UK	Estonia
	Greece	Ireland	Estonia	Ireland	Greece	Latvia
	Latvia	Estonia	Lithuania	Lithuania	Latvia	Lithuania
	Spain		Latvia	Spain	Lithuania	UK
	UK				Estonia	
Less open					Romania	
	Ireland	Spain	Spain	Estonia	Spain	Ireland
	Lithuania	Latvia	UK	Greece	Ireland	Spain
	Romania	Lithuania	Greece	Romania		Greece
		Greece	Ireland	UK		Romania
	Romania					

**Source: own depiction.**

The overall dispersion around the independent variable political opportunity structure was assessed identifying those countries with at least three open POS-features as rather open and those with less than three open opportunity structures as rather closed, at least as close as a democracy can get. According to the executed analysis the United Kingdom, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are open and Ireland, Spain, Greece and Romania less open systems.

What are the combinations of SES-status and POS-levels in the countries that are still at consideration and which of the remaining countries can be picked as the most representative for the case study? Table 15 shows the composed SES- and POS-features.

**Table 15: Distribution of countries along SES-Status and POS-level**

Country	Estonia	Spain	Ireland	Lithuania	Latvia	Romania	UK	Greece
SES-status	High	Low	High	High	High	Low	High	Low
POS-level	Open	Closed	Closed	Open	Open	Closed	Open	Closed

**Source: own depiction.**

<sup>169</sup> The differentiation does not point out open versus closed, because it cannot be spoken about closed democracies in Europe.

In the ideal case, four groups of countries would have been found according to their IV-characteristics. The first group has a high SES and an open POS. This group encompasses Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and the UK. The second group has a high SES and a closed POS. Here only Ireland is represented. In the third group low SES and closed POS have to be located. Out of the case universe Romania, Spain and Greece fit this categorization. The fourth group has a low SES and an open POS. Unfortunately, none of the eight countries fit the last category. Therefore, Ireland, Romania and Estonia remain for deeper insight in the case study.

Ireland is the only representative of the second category. Romania was picked over Greece and Spain because although its overall POS-level is similar to that of Greece and Spain, its overall SES-status is considerably lower than in Greece and Spain. Thus, Romania represents the most extreme of both cases. This is what is aimed for according to the case-selection method of this study (part 6). A similar reason leads to the selection of Estonia out of the four countries in the high SES and open POS group. Although **Estonia's POS is not distinctively more open than that of the other three countries** – the picture here is rather equivocal, considering the SES-level Estonia has a higher overall status and is therefore representative for this group.

While it could not be ensured that every constellation of the SES-level and POS-status could be analyzed in detail in the consecutive case study, three strong cases were generated along their IV-characteristics. Estonia shows a high SES-level and an open political opportunity structure. This should lead to moderate political protesting according **to the study's hypotheses. Ireland has both a high SES-level and a rather closed political opportunity structure.** Therefore, it should display the highest degree of political protesting in reaction to anti-crisis measures. Lastly Romania, similarly to Estonia, should bear mixed results in political protesting due to its low SES-level and a rather closed political opportunity structure. Whether the hypotheses can be verified or have to be rejected will be exposed in more detail in the adjacent case study. The fact that one case is missing for the constellation of a low SES-level and an open POS-level leading to assumingly no political participation according to the study hypotheses is a deficit in this operationalization. Thus, the results of the case study will have to be critically assessed with respect to their explanatory power.

## 6. Case Studies

As was revealed in the methodological section, the study employs a small-N case study for the hypotheses test. Having presented the cases with the highest variation on both **IV's from the cases universe, the three** remaining countries Estonia, Romania and Ireland shall be looked at more narrowly in this chapter.

### 6.1 Socioeconomic Status in Estonia, Romania and Ireland

The socioeconomic status of the universe of countries was partly presented in section 6.2.1. In the case study the SES shall be examined in-depth. Educational status, income dispersion and the distribution of the working population across occupational fields were defined as the variables of the SES-status to be highlighted beneath.

#### 6.1.1 Estonia

Estonia, along with the other two Baltic States Latvia and Lithuania, has shown very high educational status. It was operationalized incorporating the percentage of people with at least secondary education, meaning any equivalent to a high-school diploma. **Estonia's** mean from 2008-2010 amounted to almost 90%, which is a very high number in comparison with for instance Spain with slightly over 50% of the population carrying such a degree. It has remained high within the time frame (see appendix, table 22). According to a World Bank development report, for Estonia different legacies might be assumed to still be in place, because it belongs to the group of states of the former Soviet Union. These are the emphasis on educational input instead of output, the imposition of educational policies from the top instead of from within the educational structures and a distorted allocation of resources for education. To prove the opposite, Estonia has by now outperformed many of its western counterparts.<sup>170</sup> Moving ahead to the income status, in chapter 6.2.1 it was assessed using the indicator *income index (gross national income per capita)* presented in table 7. According to those numbers Estonia is located in the **half of the countries' universe. However, along with Lithuania it has the** highest income index within the countries of the lower group and they have been relatively steady throughout the study period (see appendix, table 23).

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<sup>170</sup> Sondergaard/Murthi 2012: XVf;3.



The next socio-economic status indicator is occupational or job status. Section 6.2.1 revealed that Estonia is one of the countries with higher ratio of persons employed in higher-status occupation. During the years 2008-2010 about 8.0% of the working population were employed as legislators, senior officials and managers, 11.3% were professional, 10.3% technicians or of similar profession, 5% were clerks, 10% were working in the service and market industry, 11.6% were craft workers or working an sales. Together, this accounts for almost 60% of the population. On the other side of the raw, only 1% of the working population was employed in agriculture and fishery, 7.6% were plant and machine operators and about 11.3% were working in elementary occupation (table 16).

**Table 16: Percentage of distribution on different occupations in Estonia as a mean for 2008-2010**

Country/Time	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	MEAN high	(6)	(8)	(9)	MEAN low
Estonia	8.0	11.3	10.3	5.0	10.0	11.6	9.4	1.0	7.6	11.3	6.7

**Source: own calculation based on European Commission 2012b.**

**Note:** "Mean high" is the mean percentage of people occupied in higher status professions, "Mean low" is the percentage of people occupied in lower status professions.

(1)=legislators, senior officials and managers, (2)=professionals, (3)= technicians and associate professionals, (4)=clerks, (5)=service workers and shop and market sales workers, (6)=skilled agricultural and fishery workers, (7)=craft and related trades workers, (8)=plant and machine operators and assemblers or (9)= workers in elementary occupations.

Overall, a more thorough look at the aggregate socioeconomic status in Estonia confirms its allocation as a high-status country along the SES-line.

### 6.1.2 Romania

Romania is the second Eastern European country in the final case selection. Contrary to Estonia, Romania as one of the many former socialist republics which does not seem to have performed as well, at least in terms of its socioeconomic status indicators. The number of persons with at least secondary education in Romania accounts for about 75%, which is more than 10 percentage points lower than in Estonia.

In accordance with the lower education level the income level in Romania turns out to be lower on average as well. The aggregated income level is the lowest in the cases universe. The gross national income per capita receives the lowest score of 0.66 on average between 2008 and 2010, with the score of 1 being the highest possible income level.

As for the scattering of the working population around the most important professions, the Romanian population was declared to be rather underrepresented in the professions of higher qualification. Table 17 shows the exact numbers aggregated for 2008-2010. Only 1% of Romanian working population was engaged as legislators, senior officials and managers, 9.3% stated to be professionals, 8.6% were technicians or other professional workers, 4.6% worked as clerks, 9.0% in service and sale and 9.6% in crafts and trade. On the other side of the occupational spectrum, however, it can be found that at least about 13% of the working population was engaged in elementary jobs.

**Table 17: Percentage of distribution on different occupations in Romania as a mean for 2008-2010**

Country/Time	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	MEAN high	(6)	(8)	(9)	MEAN low
Romania	1.0	9.3	8.6	4.6	9.0	9.6	7.0	0.0	5.6	13.0	5.1

**Source:** own calculation based on European Commission 2012b.

**Note:** for table descriptions see table 16.

All in all, the socioeconomic status in Romania along the lines of education, income and occupational status can be confirmed as rather low.

### 6.1.3 Ireland

Ireland was declared to have a high socioeconomic status in part 6. The percentage of people with at least secondary education totals about 72% as a mean for 2008-2010. Although it is even lower than in Romania, contrary to the latter it was markedly going up from 2008 to 2010, from around 70% to 73.5% (see appendix, table 22).

Ireland is one of the leaders of countries in the sample universe when it comes to the dispersion around the income level (gross national income per capita). According to table 7, the United Kingdom and Ireland dispose of the highest aggregate income levels. In Ireland the mean score for 2008-2010 is about 0.8. Thus, it is confirmed that the income level in Ireland is high, leading to a higher socioeconomic status and with it assumingly higher participation in political protesting.

The last point of interest for Ireland is the occupational status of its citizens depicted in detail in table 18.

**Table 18: Percentage of distribution on different occupations in Ireland as a mean for 2008-2010**

Country/Time	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	MEAN high	(6)	(8)	(9)	MEAN low
Ireland	8.0	14.3	5.0	11.0	15.3	5.0	9.8	0.3	6.6	6.6	4.0

**Source:** own calculation based on *European Commission 2012b*.

**Note:** for table description see table 16.

8% of the Irish working population occupies legislative, senior official and manager positions, 14% are professionals, 5% are technicians or related roles, 11% work in public administration, about 15% are service and market sales workers and 5% are engaged in crafts and trade. All in all, Ireland deploys one of the highest numbers in the sample of persons in high status occupations.

In sum, although the Irish educational level is not one of the highest in the sample chosen for this study, it has to be acknowledged that it is constantly growing and was higher than the EU27 average in 2010 for the first time. Furthermore, Ireland was the country with the highest income level compared to Estonia and Ireland and has shown more people in higher status occupations than both other countries. Hence, Ireland deserves the concession of a high socioeconomic status.

## 6.2 Political Opportunity Structure in Estonia, Ireland and Romania

To recapture, the degree of political opportunity structure was conceptualized in this study as the formal political institutional structure of a state pointing to either the openness or closure of the formal access to politics. The underlying hypothesis was that the higher the degree of openness of a state, the lower the participation in political protest. The indicators to measure the openness of a state have been broken down to the *balance of powers in a state*, the *number of its political parties having an influence on policies* and the *pluralism within the state*. The characteristics of the indicators have already been highlighted in chapter 6.2.2. On the following pages, they will be expanded with respect to the case examples.

### 6.2.1 Estonia

The overall Estonian POS was exposed to be rather open in section 6.2.2. Estonia is a parliamentary democracy by constitution. The unicameral parliament (Riigikogu) is the highest institutional authority in Estonia. It elects the president endowed with

representative tasks with a two-thirds majority and initiates and approves legislation that is supported by the prime minister, who in turn is directly responsible to the Riigikogu.<sup>171</sup>

The judiciary is independent in Estonia. According to the data for judicial independence from the Economic Freedom of the World Report, it has an average of 7.45 of 10 possible **“freedom points” on the scale of judicial independence and is only behind the UK and Ireland** of those countries considered in the primary cases universe. The missing points to achieve full judiciary independence in Estonia might stem from the financial dependency of the district and circuit courts from the executive. Whereas the Supreme Court in Estonia is an independent institution, the lower courts do not dispose of own administrative staff.<sup>172</sup> Although reforms of the judiciary were elaborated between 2009 and 2010, none have been implemented so far.<sup>173</sup>

Focusing on the composition of the legislature, or the effective number of parties as it was operationalized in section 4.2, Estonia amounts to the number 4.37 of effective parties. It is the highest number compared to the other countries in the case study, but it is the lowest number compared to the two other Baltic States. After the independence in 1991 many parties were founded, but only six major ones have consolidated by now. As the relatively high number of effective parties already suggests, most (mainly center-right) coalitions and governments have not lasted more than one year in Estonia after independence.<sup>174</sup> Interestingly however, the coalition put in place with the parliamentary elections in March 2007 of the center-liberal Estonian Reform Party (Eesti Reformierakond), a faction of the center-right Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Samaa ja Res Publica Liit) and the Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond) lasted until May 2009. Then, both conservative parties renounced the social democrats and continued to govern as a minority coalition until new elections in 2011. In 2011, the coalition led by the Estonian Prime minister Andrus Ansip was re-elected.<sup>175</sup> The other parties in the Riigikogu are the center-left Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond) as the major opposition party, the centre-left **People’s Union (Eestimaa Rahvaliid)** and the Green Party (Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised).<sup>176</sup> Thus, six different parties were in the

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<sup>171</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2010a: 2; Raudla 2011: 9.

<sup>172</sup> Pettai/Mölder 2011: 214.

<sup>173</sup> Pettai/Mölder 2011: 215f.

<sup>174</sup> Römpczyk 2010: 100.

<sup>175</sup> Peters/Pierre/Randma-Liiv 2011: 23.

<sup>176</sup> Raudla 2011: 9.

Estonian parliament throughout the time of the crisis, although only about four could have had actual influence on the legislation due to the allocation of MP-seats.

Turning to the pluralist-corporatist divide, it was found in the case selection that only a required referendum exists when amendments to the Constitution or other national issues are submitted to the people. However, they can only be forwarded to the citizens by the parliament. The citizens themselves do not possess the right to call for referenda or popular initiatives. This signifies a rather closed system. Over and above, it was found in the case selection that Estonia allows for partial concertation with an irregular and infrequent involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policies. This empirical finding is supported by qualitative research on Estonian corporatism. Despite the efforts of the Estonian social democratic party, the social **dialogue in Estonia between the government and the main employees' peak organizations like trade unions remains very limited. Only one central employees' association is allowed** to represent workers in tripartite negotiations. Moreover, such negotiations take place on a very infrequent basis.<sup>177</sup> Trade unions are predominantly active on the factory- and not the state-level. **Additionally, trade unions and other employees' organizations are** fragmented and have low membership numbers compared to the EU-average.<sup>178</sup> During the crisis years, there have been attempts on the part of trade unions and similar organizations to engage in tripartite dialogue between the state, employers and employees. However, prior to the implementations of most anti-crisis measures social partners, trade unions or employers organizations have either not been consulted at all, or tripartite meetings have shown only negligible results.<sup>179</sup>

On the whole, Estonia is a parliamentary democracy with a relatively independent judiciary, a relatively high effective party number and a relatively high level of pluralism. It points to a high degree of openness of the political opportunity structure. According to the second study hypothesis, this should detect a rather low degree of political protesting. However, combining the second hypothesis with the first hypothesis on the high degree of SES in Estonia, the results should be more diverse. The combination of the SES-status and the POS-level should bring about some political protesting against anti-crisis measures.

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<sup>177</sup> Römpczyk 2010: 107f.

<sup>178</sup> Römpczyk 2010: 150ff; Woolfson/Kallaste/Berzins 2010: 8.

<sup>179</sup> **Woolfson/Kallaste/Berzins 2010: 11 ff. See here for a deeper insight of trade union and employer's organizations in Estonia.**

### **6.2.2 Romania**

Romania is a semi-presidential democracy dominated by the parliament. Although the rights of the president are more abundant than in Estonia, he is hindered by the directive on countersignature required from the prime minister. The latter is also constrained by various limitations on his rights and is obliged to obey the Romanian bicameral parliament.<sup>180</sup> Therefore, the separation of powers between the executive and legislature **is limited in Romania and stands as one attribute of this system's closure. Moreover, the** personal constellation in Romania in the time period at consideration has been rather harmful to a functioning political process. This was due to emerging personal rivalries and ongoing power-struggle between president and prime minister, leading to the kind of negative political deadlock in the country, often credited to semi-presidential systems.<sup>181</sup>

The rating of the independence of the Romanian judiciary added up to only slightly more than 4 of 10 possible points according to the Economic Freedom of the World Report (see section 6.2.2). Deficits in the judiciary are significant: the constitutional court is assumed to give way to political pressure too often and is rarely dismissing political law on the basis of the constitution.<sup>182</sup> Moreover, the constitutional court is used for political decision-making to an increasingly high degree, one example being the impeachment procedure **against Romania's current president Traian Basescu which was championed by the prime minister and his supporters in 2007.**<sup>183</sup>

The effective number of political parties was established at 3.72 for the years 2008 **through 2010. Since independence, Romania was characterized as a "too-many-parties"** system for quite a long time. The still ongoing consolidation of Romanian parties led to a many-party system in the 2000s with two large party blocks and several minor parties. Main forces are the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat), the National-Liberal Party (National Liberal Partidul) and the Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat-Liberal).<sup>184</sup> After the 2008 parliamentary elections the Democrat-Liberal Party **formed a "grand coalition" with the Social Democrat Party, which broke down in 2009**

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<sup>180</sup> Baum-Ceisyg 2008: 195; Beichelt/Keudel 2011: 72.

<sup>181</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2010b: 2.

<sup>182</sup> Hönnige 2011: 274; Central Intelligence Agency 2010b: 2.

<sup>183</sup> Gabanyi 2010: 667.

<sup>184</sup> Gabanyi 2010: 660.

followed by a minority coalition of the democrat-liberal party and the minor Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania.<sup>185</sup>

Similarly to Estonia, referenda are only required in Romania when the constitution is subject to changes or important bills or decisions are given over to popular decision from the government or the parliament. The initiation of referenda is not possible from within the population, displaying the closure of the system.

Along the corporatism scale Romania, resembling Estonia, provides for partial concertation meaning irregular and infrequent involvement. On the part of several trade unions it is marked by a high proximity to political parties, which hinders their internal cohesion. On the part of employers a peak organization only recently has been put into place and has not yet gained the required strength. All in all, the social dialogue in Romania does take place on the sectorial, regional and even national level via trilateral bargaining to a limited degree. However, in those meetings, the government remains in the strongest position.<sup>186</sup>

On the whole, Romania can be described as a rather closed political system based on the case analysis because its executive-legislative relation is still not clearly defined and poses obstacles to political processes. The independence of the Romanian judiciary is still highly contested. Although the number of political parties is high in Romania, their actual influence on the decision-making process is low because of high intra-party cleavages. Romania does not offer its citizens the right to set in motion public initiatives and referenda. However, Romania is to some degree pluralistically organized in the way that its corporatist system is only developed to a very minor degree.

The low socioeconomic status in Romania and its rather closed political system should produce interesting results when considering the level of political protesting against anti-crisis measures. On the one hand, a low socioeconomic status leads to the assumption of low participation. On the other hand however, the rather closed political opportunity structure should lead to more political protesting according to the second study hypothesis. In combination, a moderate degree of protesting is to be expected.

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<sup>185</sup> Stefan/Sorin 2011.

<sup>186</sup> Ceisig 2008: 196; Gabanyi 2010: 661.

### **6.2.3 Ireland**

Ireland is a semi-presidential system dominated by the parliament. The president is elected directly for a term of seven years and appoints the prime minister (Taoiseach). The Taoiseach is the leader of the coalition of the Irish parliament – the House of Representatives (Dáil Éireann). The Taoiseach and his cabinet are directly responsible to the parliament. Because the president has largely representative functions, the term of a semi-presidential system is rather symbolic.<sup>187</sup> When it comes to the separation of powers, the executive in Ireland is assumed to be quite dominant over the legislature, hereby limiting the openness of the system.<sup>188</sup>

The ranking of the Irish judiciary received 8.8 of 10 possible points according to the Economic Freedom of the World reports. It is the country in the sample universe with the best ranking due to a complete independence of the judiciary in the exercise of its powers. Judges can only be removed from office by a common decision of the House of Representatives as well as the second Irish chamber – the Senate (Seanad Éireann).<sup>189</sup>

The Irish party system has long been considered as a two-and-a-half party system. The major parties are Fianna Fail, a center-right catch-all party, and Fine Gael, the Irish conservative party. The third party often allying with one of the major powers in place is the social democratic Irish Labor Party. Other parties that have garnered some attention during the last few decades are the liberal Progressive Democrats, the Greens, the **Worker's Party and Democratic Left**.<sup>190</sup> Despite the evolution of smaller parties, the effective number of parties in the Irish legislature is fixed at 3.0 according to CPDS III for the time period of this study. The government during this period was a coalition of Fianna Fail, the Greens and Progressive Democrats, and was voted out of office in the recent elections in 2011 when it was replaced by a coalition of Fine Gael and the Labor Party.<sup>191</sup>

Along the lines of direct popular participation, Ireland has been classified as rather pluralistic. It allows for both the required referenda on constitutional and other legal matters initiated top-down as well as for popular veto powers initiated bottom-up.

Finally, the corporatist system of Ireland shall be illuminated. In the recent decades, Ireland has somehow become the prototype for state concertation based on social pacts.

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<sup>187</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2010c.

<sup>188</sup> Hardiman 2010: 55f.

<sup>189</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2010c.

<sup>190</sup> **Mc Bride 2006: 242; Haman/Kelly 2011: 59; O'Donnell/Adshead/Thomas 2011: 95.**

<sup>191</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2010c.



This has already become visible by its high ranking along the routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policy 2008-2010 in chapter 6.2.2. The variation of corporatism is based upon social pacts and was initiated in Ireland at the end of the 1980s giving birth to over 100 social pacts until today. These **usually are set in motion between the government, peak employers' and employees' organizations**, and stand out as the prevalent modes of welfare, labor market, and wage reform.<sup>192</sup> All political parties in Ireland support such a mode of government to some degree.<sup>193</sup> The social pacts take the form of social partnership programs and have initially been set in place to regulate wages but have extended to other policies like taxes, unemployment, welfare and the like.<sup>194</sup> Amongst others, due to this trend, the unions and **other workers' as well as employees' organizations have been reduced or merged into larger and more influential unions. The government's conduct concerning social pacts** during the recent crisis thus is a highly interesting and a comprehensively analyzed issue.<sup>195</sup> The social pact system of Ireland has not remained unaffected or profited from the crisis but was significantly damaged. Although the government invested a lot of energy into negotiations with its social partners, they have for the most part ended with disagreement and unilateral imposition of anti-crisis measures that were presented in section 6.1. The suspension of a partnership agreement in 2009 is the most visible sign of the vulnerability of social pacts in Ireland at a time of increased economic pressure.<sup>196</sup> Although the three different actors have reached another agreement in 2010, the co-called **"Croke Park agreement" or "Public Service Agreement 2010-2014"**, the economic crisis has proven to be a hard test on Ireland's social partnership system.<sup>197</sup>

**All in all, Ireland's system has to be classified as rather closed, despite its largely independent judiciary.** The executive-legislative balance tends to prioritize the executive, the party number in Ireland is rather low, it offers limited possibilities for its citizens to directly participate in politics and more than anything else, it is still a highly corporatist system despite cracks in the social pacts during the recent economic crisis. Together with **Ireland's high socioeconomic status, such** preconditions should cause the highest rates of political protest action in this country.

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<sup>192</sup> Haman/Kelly 2011: 1; O'Donnell 2008: 73. On the corporatist structure in Ireland between 1974 until 2005 see Baccaro/Lim 2007: 27; Roche 2007.

<sup>193</sup> Haman/Kelly 2011: 65.

<sup>194</sup> O'Donnell/Adshead/Thomas 2011: 89.

<sup>195</sup> McDonough/Dundon 2010; O'Donnell/Adshead/Thomas 2011.

<sup>196</sup> O'Donnell/Adshead/Thomas 2011: 117.

<sup>197</sup> McDonough/Dundon 2010: 556.

The socioeconomic status and the political opportunity structure in the case study countries have been examined to a full extent in this chapter. The study hypotheses posed were that higher socioeconomic status and a rather closed political opportunity structure lead to a higher degree of political protest. According to the combined study hypotheses, the examination leads to the preliminary assumption of the highest grade of protest against anti-crisis measures in Ireland. Estonia and Romania both should show some level of protest action, but it is supposed to be much more limited than in Ireland. Again, it has to be mentioned that no case was found in the course of the case selection with a low SES-status but an open political opportunity structure that should make political protest improbable. Nevertheless, the three remaining cases should bear enough explanatory power to put some light on protest behavior against anti-crisis measures. The final examination of such behavior will be executed in the next chapter.

### **6.3 Political Protest in Estonia, Romania and Ireland in Response to Anti-crisis Measures 2008-2010**

The financial situation in the three countries between 2008 and 2010 was already presented in section 6.1. Estonia and Ireland entered the economic and financial crisis very early. Along with the United States, Latvia and Iceland they have been affected since the first quarter of 2008.<sup>198</sup> **Ireland, the so called "Celtic Tiger"**, as well as **Estonia, one of the "Baltic Tigers"**, so-named after the East Asian Tigers and characterized by very rapid economic expansion with vastly growing GDP-rates, both have undergone strong economic growth in the pre-crisis period. Accordingly, in both countries the eruption of the crisis was due to their high dependence on the **international market, the high indebtedness of both countries' citizens, caused by** expanding consumerism, and a real estate bubble that had burst with the first signs of financial drawbacks. Both countries have also implemented various austerity packages and budget cuts during the two years in observation. Ireland, amongst several other countries had to adhere to the EU and IMF requirements to receive major financial loans **(or "bailouts", mostly paid in several tranches)**. **Estonia rigorously implemented most of** its measures that were aimed at an internal devaluation and many of its short-term

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<sup>198</sup> Claessens 2010: 278.

emergency programs in order to meet the EU-criteria for joining the Euro-zone.<sup>199</sup> Estonia succeeded with this strict fiscal policy and was approved for the adaption of the common European currency (the Euro) in 2011.<sup>200</sup> Although in this study the time period is limited to the initial world-wide financial crisis from 2008 to 2010, it is important to stress at this point that Ireland is one of the countries that, although **seemingly stabilized by the middle of 2010, fell in the arms of the next financial "Euro-crisis" that began to loom in 2010 and endures until the time of writing of this paper.** The Irish GDP rate fell in the last quarter of 2010 and then again starting in third quarter of 2011, meaning that further IMF tranches were transferred leading to budget cuts as well as further protests on the streets of Ireland. The latter, however, are neglected in this study for reasons stated in section 5.3.

**Romania shows a slightly different picture than both "tiger" economies. It entered the crisis later, in the fourth quarter of 2008.**<sup>201</sup> Romania struggled from long-lasting credit expansion, the so-called credit bubble. Moreover, it had difficulties controlling its inflation rate, and stepped into the crisis with major debt rates. Romania has received an IMF standby agreement in 2009, which is marked as the start of major anti-crisis measures in late 2008 and especially from early 2009 onwards.<sup>202</sup> Romania was still very shaky during 2010 but economic growth started to reappear in the second half of that year.<sup>203</sup>

Looking at the expansion of the crisis in these three countries and the implementation of harsh anti-crisis austerity measures starting in the middle of 2008 at the latest, anti-protest behavior in all three countries throughout the whole time period seems to be possible. To get hold of the degree of protest action in Estonia, Romania and Ireland, protest will be measured applying a newspaper content analysis. This method of measurement of protest action was abundantly described in part 2. To reiterate, firstly the source will be searched for demonstrative and confrontational activities, specifically protests, demonstrations, riots and sit-ins only. Secondly, actual mobilization will be accounted for; the announcement of protesting as protest potential will be neglected. Thirdly, it was decided to use the news articles issued by the news agency Agence France Presse that are available via the LexisNexis Academic research platform due its

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<sup>199</sup> For extended accounts of the crisis in Estonia see Knodt/Urdze 2010; Peters/Pierre/Randma-Liiv 2010; Raudla 2011; Åslund 2010. For Ireland see Barrett 2011; Bergin et al 2011; Dukelow 2011; Hardiman 2010; Lane 2009; Pino/Yermo 2010.

<sup>200</sup> Åslund 2010: 42.

<sup>201</sup> Claessens 2010: 278.

<sup>202</sup> Bideleux 2011; Åslund 2010; Rae 2011.

<sup>203</sup> Åslund 2010: 38f.

availability, actuality and reliability. Finally, within the results displayed and most suitable for quantification, the hard indicators of protest behavior will be looked for: timing of the political protest, time span of the political protest, number of participants and the form of political protest.

The four preconditions lead to the following search path within AFP: [(((crisis!) AND HLEAD(country!) AND (protest! OR riot! OR demonstr! OR sit-in! OR strike!)) and Date(geq(01/01/2008) and leq(12/31/2010))]. The Boolean options AND allow to search **for different items within the same article. Thus, the term "crisis", the name of the respective country and a least one of the items pointing to protest – "protest", "demonstration", "riot" or "sit-in" have to be given in the article, whereby the name of the country has to appear in the article title or a least in the heading (HLEAD).** The Boolean option OR allows for the proliferation of at least one of the terms for political protest. Finally, the Boolean option exclamation mark (!) at the end of each word allows for the provision of any deviations from the word stem.<sup>204</sup> Every article yielded by the Boolean search will be analyzed for the four hard indicators of protest behavior. Those that prove to contain any information on anti-crisis protest will be subsequently used to assess the degree of the same.

In table 19 the results of the content analysis are summarized. The simple preliminary count of results following the command presented above typed into LexisNexis Academic to some amount reveals the expected degree of protesting in the case study countries. For Romania the search yields 71 matching articles, for Estonia there are only 22 articles matching the search criteria, whereas for Ireland the highest match is found: 228 articles issued by Agence France Presse. This, however, does not disclose any information about the occurrence or strength of political protest.

**Table 19: Political protest in Estonia, Romania and Ireland against anti-crisis measures between 2008 and 2010**

	Timing	Duration	# of participants	Action form
<b>Estonia</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>Romania</b>	After freezes of salaries in the public sector and reduction of expenses in 2009	One day 05/14/2009	Several thousand	March with slogans in front of government buildings and the economy ministry in Bucharest, workers from the energy and car manufacturing sectors, harbor and post office employees

<sup>204</sup> LexisNexis Academic 2012b.

	After the order to public sector employees of 10 days of unpaid leave and rumors about further cuts following a deal for a second IMF installment	One day 08/11/2009	Several hundred	Street demonstrations of police officers in Bucharest
	After announcement of public-sector salary system and pensions reform due to IMF commitments	One day 10/7/2009	Between 150.000 (police statistics) and 300.000 (trade unions)	Street demonstration in Bucharest
	After announcement of wage and pension cuts (25% and 15%) due to deal with the IMF	One day 05/17/2010	Between 300.000 (police records) and 500.000 (trade unions)	Street demonstrations of teachers, civil servants, medical staff, police and pensioners
	After announcement of public sector salaries cuts by 25%, a 24% increase on consumption tax, raise of retirement age to 65 by 2030 and freeze of pensions in 2011	One day 09/22/2010	About 9.000 (police records)	Street march from the Senate to government headquarters in Bucharest
	After announcement of salary and job cuts	One day 09/24/2010	About 5.000	Street protest by Romanian policemen
	In response to announcement of 25% salary cuts	One day 10/05/2010	About 6.500	Street protests in front of the prime minister's office and in front of the presidential palace, Romanian teachers
	In opposition to austerity plans announced since 07/2010	One day 10/27/2010	Between 20.000 (police) and 80.000 people (trade unions)	Protests: a march and a rally in front of the parliament and in front of the prime minister's office in Bucharest; nurses, professors, police officers, statisticians, electricity plant workers and other civil servants from all over
<b>Ireland</b>	In opposition austerity package, especially against increased pensions levy for about 350,000 public servants	One day 02/21/2009 (largest protest for 30 years)	Up to 120.000 people (police records)	Demonstration organized by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), teachers, police, and other civil servants
	<b>Against the government's</b> plans for budget cuts	One day 09/30/2009	15.000 people	Trade union rally and demonstrations in front of the parliament in Dublin
	Against austerity cuts in the next budget and after failed social dialogue	One day 24/10/2009	250.000 people	Public sector workers demonstrations
	Sit-in against lay-offs due to austerity measures	Two months from 02/2009		Sit-in by the workers of the Waterford crystal factory
	Against austerity measures to meet the requirements for IMF bailout	One day 11/23/2010	About 100 protesters	Protesters break in into parliament until police pushed them away
	Against newly planned austerity measures: cut of up to 25.000 jobs, cuts in public sector pay, pensions and social welfare (to meet IMF requirements)	One day 11/27/2010	Between 150.000 people (according to (ICTU) and 50.000 (police figure)	<b>March through Dublin "March for a better, fairer Way", largely peaceful,</b> although some bottles are thrown and fires set by single persons, one arrested

**Source: own depiction on the basis of AFP news reports 2008-2010, full list of articles used is included in the appendix, table 25.**

Evaluating all of the displayed articles, it was found that in the Irish case many of the news referred to conflicts (often described as crises) in Northern Ireland. In Romania, many matches dealt with conflicts (crises) with the Roma population.

In the end, for Estonia about eight articles genuinely referred to the financial crisis and protesting in Estonia. Astonishingly however, as shown in table 19, zero protests whatsoever in direct reaction to harsh anti-crisis measures was reported for Estonia. All eight articles have been describing the crisis in Estonia but when reporting protest behavior they exclusively mentioned protests in neighboring Latvia and Lithuania, countries that have implemented similar anti-crisis policies and where some protest seem to have occurred. Therefore, the finding for Estonia, where at least some protest behavior was expected coming from the combination of H1 and H11 is that the Estonian population has remained completely resilient and did not complain out loud in response to its **government's conduct. Estonians have even reelected their crisis prime minister as was** already mentioned above.<sup>205</sup>

For Romania moderate protest was expected from the symbiosis of the two study hypotheses. The newspaper analysis produced about ten AFP articles with valuable content. Thus, between 2008 and 2010 about ten major newsworthy protest actions have taken place in Romania. As table 19 reveals they were to a large part peaceful demonstrations and marches against austerity measures and have ranged from several hundred to an estimated highest number of 500.000 protesters. Taking into account numbers reported by trade unions within the AFP articles, two of the protest actions have broken the margin of 100.000 participants. One protest action was just slightly below that margin with about 80.000 protesters, and four further actions have remained under the 10.000 participants mark. For the sake of comparability, putting the numbers of protesters in relation to the overall Romanian population which totals to about 19.000.000 citizens, between 0.02% and 2.6% of the total population participated in the anti-crisis demonstrations.

In Ireland, despite many overall hits in the LexisNexis inquiry, also only about ten articles actually **referred to the unit of this study's analysis. Within these ten articles, six protest** activities that actually took place were reported. Two of the protests were minor – one refers to a small demonstration of about 100 people. The second refers to a sit-in in a factory in Waterford with no accurate reports concerning numbers of protesters reported

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<sup>205</sup> Åslund 2010: 41.

but with a high media echo. Within the four remaining protest actions, three crossed the **100.000 participants' margin with the highest number of 250.000 people** attending. The last protest crossed the 10.000 marge with about 15.000 people demonstrating. In **relation to the country's population of about 4.500.000 people, the percentages range** from 0.3% to about 5.5%. Over and above, more radical forms of political protest became visible in Ireland in comparison to Romania. The sit-in in Waterford is one example, the **second being the "March for a better, fairer way" in November 2010, where some violent action** occurred.

In sum, no political protest against anti-crisis action was found in Estonia. In Romania about ten protest actions were conducted between 2008 and 2010. In comparison to Ireland, however, although there seem to have been slightly more protests in Romania, they had relatively lower numbers of attendants. More than that, they were largely peaceful demonstrations, whereas in Ireland, different types of political protests were detected. Thus, Estonia reveals the lowest (or no) degree of political protesting, the degree of political protesting in Romania can be described as relatively high and enduring but not highly confrontational. The degree of protesting in Ireland was less enduring than in Romania, but with higher numbers of participants and much more confrontational action forms. Therefore, it was the highest of the three countries.

How do the results of the analysis of the dependent variable relate to those on the independent variables socioeconomic status and political opportunity structure described above? Can the hypotheses formulated be confirmed looking at political protest behavior of Estonia, Romania and Ireland? The answers to these questions shall be provided in the concluding section of part 7.

#### **6.4 To Protest or not to Protest? Verification and Assessment of the Study Hypotheses**

The case study was conducted on the basis of the preceding theoretical and methodological reasoning. The theoretical execution led to the formulation of two study hypotheses. H1: the higher the degree of the aggregated socioeconomic status of individuals in a country, the higher the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this country. HII: the higher the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure of a state, the lower the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this state. The case study looked at the IVs SES-status and POS-openness as

well as at the DV degree of political protesting against anti-crisis measures between 2008 and 2010 in Estonia, Romania and Ireland.

Estonia has shown a high overall SES-level and a relatively open POS. However, no political protesting against governmental austerity programs and implementations whatsoever could be traced in this country in the newspaper content analysis. According to the first study hypothesis, Estonia should have shown a high degree of protesting, according to the second study hypotheses a low degree of protesting. In combination, a moderate degree was expected. One reason for the political protest apathy in Estonia might have been the exodus of people with assumingly high SES-status.<sup>206</sup> Immigration was steadily increasing in this country until 2006 and went down for the first time in 2007 showing that the citizens of Estonia began to build more trust in the situation in their motherland. Starting in 2008 however, the population felt the urge to migrate again in steadily rising numbers. Accordingly, in 2008 re-immigration to Estonia fell in numbers again.<sup>207</sup> This point could back the first study hypothesis, by showing that those able and willing to protest simply have made themselves heard by the so-called **"voting by feet"**. This point nonetheless only shows one possible reason for the withdrawn reaction of Estonians to anti-crisis measures and cannot be accounted as a full-blown explanation for **the populations' behavior, especially** considering neighboring Latvia and Lithuania that show similar immigration numbers.

Ireland displays a relatively high SES-level and a rather closed POS. By expectation, it should have been the host of most political protest in comparison to both other cases. This expectation was confirmed looking at the protest behavior analysis. Ireland showed slightly less numbers of political action than Romania, in their scope however, they were more abundant, meaning that a higher percentage of the population participated in the protest and the forms of protest action were at times more radical and provocative than in Romania. Thus, the case of Ireland confirms the study hypotheses in their symbiosis.

Romania revealed a relatively low SES-level, but proved to have a rather closed political opportunity structure. Despite the expected moderate degree of protesting, although protest was less populated and less radical than in Ireland, by and large it was higher than expected according to the pooled study hypotheses.

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<sup>206</sup> Agence France Presse. 08.04.2009. Fitch cuts Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania ratings.

<sup>207</sup> See European Commission 2012g.



The empirical results have to be embraced with a high amount of caution due to the fact that no case was found in the case selection with a low SES-status and an open political opportunity structure. This case would have needed to show no value on the dependent variable whatsoever. Whether such a case would disprove HI and HII remains the subject of further examination with different examples.

Other explanations that might have been missing in this study will be further pointed out in the closing discussion which will provide a summary of the study and implications for further research on political protest behavior in times of financial and economic crises.

## Summary and Conclusion

Political participation in general and political protesting as one mode of political participation in particular is crucial to the existence of any genuine democracy. This was the starting point for the research on the question of what happens to political participation in democracies in times of financial and political crises. Are citizens part of the decision-making procedure when the economic future of a country is at stake and in what way are citizens being involved or bring themselves in? It was expected at the onset of the study that citizens personally highly affected by economic crises and especially the measures that governments take to fight such crises, would participate politically to avoid or reverse such implications and would especially tend towards political protest. The fact that citizens in different countries incline to such reactions to different degrees provided the ground for the puzzling question of the study: *Why do some countries have a higher degree of protest against anti-crisis measures than other countries?*

To approach this question using a positivist research design that relies on the testing of hypotheses drawn from theoretical accounts on the subject of matter, the most important theories and approaches dealing with political protest were displayed. From the vast theoretical collection on this subject two approaches were chosen for further development in the research design. The first approach – the socioeconomic status model – yielded the first study hypothesis: *the higher the degree of the aggregated socioeconomic status of individuals in a country, the higher the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this country.*

The second theoretical account – the political opportunity structure model – bore the second study hypothesis, claiming the openness of the POS to an most important feature for political protesting in times of crisis: *the higher the degree of openness of the political*

*opportunity structure of a country, the lower the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this country.* Both hypotheses were tested in combination applying a small-N case study. Prior to examination, the cases were selectively chosen from a large cases universe, firstly via control variables and secondly based on the highest variation of **the cases on the study's independent variables.** In the subsequent case study the independent variables as well as the dependent variable were carefully measured and set in relation to one another. The case study that unfortunately could only analyze three different cases due to a missing case with the special constellation of a low SES-status and an open POS, resulted in a partial verification of the combined study hypotheses. Due to the lack of a fourth case, the results have to be accepted with restraint and need further verification with future examples from other regions and time periods.

As was revealed in the introductory chapters, the research of protest behavior in times of economic crisis stands at its very beginning at the time of writing. This study applied the micro-level socioeconomic status model and the macro-level political opportunity structure model. In further analyses, it would be of value to prove, if those people that are socioeconomically better off and would thus participate more politically according to *HI*, actually were the ones within the society affected most by the crisis. In the case that only lower strata of society were affected to a high degree, *HI* might have been verified. Unfortunately, this differentiation was not feasible within the scope of this study.

There are further theoretical accounts that also might have been a stake in explaining why people protest against anti-crisis measures in some countries and restrain from it in others. Examples are cultural explanations that use the political culture in states as an argument for different reactions and different degrees of political participation and thus the degree of democratic consolidation in those countries. This might have to some extent be of importance in Estonia, where people tended to exit the country rather than to fight against anti-crisis measures and to make their voices heard on the political arena. According to this argument, people in Estonia in particular and in the Baltic States in general tend to political apathy.<sup>208</sup> The newspapers analysis however showed that even if in Estonia there was no political protesting whatsoever, even the few articles that put up a connection between the economic crisis between 2008 and 2010 and political protests pointed to protests to both the assumingly similarly apathetic Baltic States of Latvia and Lithuania. Thus, such cultural explanations bear little explanatory value in this context.

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<sup>208</sup> Agence France Presse. 09.03.2010. Austerity drives are old news for EU's Baltic states.

Moreover, it could be just as adequate to say that Estonians were restricted in their political outrage because they were strongly aware and committed to their impending entry into the Eurozone and were thus sticking to what their government carried out on their shoulders.

The political culture explanation bears connections to path-dependency accounts that highlight experiences in the past to mark their track in the present. Here, the main argument is that in countries that have recently undergone crises which are still memorable to their citizens, less political protesting is visible. It implies that the citizens being used to economic crises bear a higher awareness of the importance of the consequences that their governments have to draw.<sup>209</sup> However, such explanations seem rather superficial considering the fact that both Estonia and Romania went through major economic crises in the course of the 1990s but showed different degrees of protesting during the recent recession.

Other explanations allow for the inclusion of influence from outside and examine it on political protest. This embraces the influence of the IMF that sponsors austerity programs **throughout the European Union. The assumption here is that "the likelihood of political protest and mass disruption, as well as the intensity of such responses, was enhanced by increased external pressures by the IMF for countries to adopt the austerity programs".**<sup>210</sup> This actually might hold true even on the cases considered in this study's analysis – Estonia did not refer to the IMF as against to Ireland and Romania. In the latter countries a higher degree of political protesting became visible than in the former. This **explanation should be subject to further examination along with the study's SES- and POS- approaches.**

What is more, the time frame in further studies will have to be widened, which could not be accomplished in a study of this scope and at this time. Further accounts of political protesting in times of crises would have to rely on longer time-periods and higher-N case studies. The fact that the combined approach could only partially be verified, testifies that both theories deserve further scientific attention with connection to protest behavior in times of harsh and on-going economic and financial crises. Moreover, in the next step, they should be weighed against each other.

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<sup>209</sup> Mayes 2009.

<sup>210</sup> Glasberg/Shannon 2010: 162.

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## Appendix

**Table 20: Variable overview**

Indicator	Source
<b>Dependent Variable: degree of political protest</b>	
<b>Timing of political protest</b>	LexisNexis Academic
<b>Time span of political protest</b>	LexisNexis Academic
<b>Number of participants</b>	LexisNexis Academic
<b>Form of political protest</b>	LexisNexis Academic
<b>Independent Variable I: degree of aggregated socioeconomic status</b>	
<b>Educational level: <i>total population having completed at least upper secondary education</i></b>	Eurostat
<b>Income per capita level: <i>income index (gross national income per capita)</i></b>	HDI
<b>Occupational status: <i>distribution of employment status as % of the active population</i></b>	Eurostat
<b>Independent Variable II: degree of political opportunity structure</b>	
<b>Separation of powers: <i>executive legislative relations according to Lijphart/ judicial independence</i></b>	CPDS II / Economic Freedom of the World reports (Gwartney/Lawson/Hall 2011).
<b>Number of influential parties and factions: <i>effective number of parties on the seats level</i></b>	CPDS III
<b>Level of corporatism: <i>popular initiatives/ routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policy</i></b>	CPDS III/ ICTWSS
<b>Control Variable I: degree of regional economic closure</b>	
<b>Regional economic ties</b>	–
<b>Control Variable II: degree of economic damage through the crisis</b>	
<b>Quarterly GDP per capita growth rate</b>	Eurostat
<b>Unemployment rate</b>	Eurostat
<b>Inflation rate</b>	Eurostat
<b>Control Variable III: anti-crisis measures</b>	
<b>Wage cuts in the public sector</b>	Various, see appendix table 21
<b>Cuts in public benefit spending</b>	Various, see appendix table 21

**Source: own depiction.**



**Table 21: Anti-crisis measures by country**

Country/ Anti-crisis measure	Changes in VAT and other taxes	Cuts in public sector salaries	Expenditure in public spending
<b>Cyprus</b>	No (1)	No (1)	Limited impact of the crisis on the social security scheme; Implementation of on-the-job training programs for employees at risk of lay-off and unemployed persons (2)
<b>Denmark</b>	Cut of corporate taxation (3)	Demands for wage-freeze but only for 2011 (1)	Increases of pension allowances for some pension groups; Subsidies for housing projects (4)
<b>Estonia</b>	VAT increase from 18% to 20%; Unemployment insurance contribution rate increase from 0.9 to 4.2 percent; Pollution fees increase by 20% and fuel excise by 12% (7)	Cuts of -8% to -10% in 2009 in the general and the health sector and freeze for 2010-11 (1); Major cut-backs in numbers of civil service employees (6)	Cuts in sickness benefits; Freeze of unemployment benefits; Increased investment in adult training; Cuts in the health system by 9% in 2009 and 6% in 2010 (5)
<b>Greece</b>	Increase in VAT from 19 to 23 % (8); Increased taxes in certain commodities like tobacco and fuel (10)	-12% to -20% cuts for the general public service and civil service for 2010; Wage freeze for 2011 plus cuts in special bonuses (1)	2008-2009: Provision of lump sums to pensioners; Creation of new jobs in the public sector for unemployed people; Organization of training programs for the unemployed; Social solidarity aids to vulnerable employees (9); From 2010 onwards: Healthcare and pension reforms with major cuts (10)
<b>Hungary</b>	Various personal income tax reductions in 2009 and 2010; But: increase in VAT of 5% (13)	Employment in public service grows; Wage freeze and cuts of the 13 <sup>th</sup> salary for some workers in 2009 (11)	Cuts of social security contributions by 5 percent; Lump sums for pensioners in 2009; Increase of daytime care places for small children; Solidarity packaged for people with low incomes and <b>"job preservation packages"</b> for 2009 (12)
<b>Ireland</b>	Introduction of a pension levy for non-commercial public sector employees (16)	Freeze of public wages until at least 2010 6% wage cuts of employees in the public healthcare and education sectors, as well as in local and national administration, police and the armed forces (14)	Reduction in social security payments; Reduction of child benefits; Reduction of jobseekers allowances (15)
<b>Latvia</b>	VAT increase of 3% from 18% to 21% (18)	Wage cuts from 15% up to 30% across the public sector, especially in education and health (17)	Pensions cuts planned from 10% up to 70% for working pensioners (declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court); Large cuts in sickness, family and unemployment benefits (17)
<b>Lithuania</b>	VAT increase from 19% to 21% (19)	Cuts of -8% to -10% for civil service workers (1)	Reduction in state pensions and social support (20)
<b>Romania</b>	VAT increase from 19% to 23% (21)(1)	Cuts up to 25% (2010), but cuts in bonuses and other additional payments means cuts	Cuts in pensions and social benefits up to 15% (the pensions cuts were announced unconstitutional

	of up to 50% (21) (1)		by the constitutional court later) (22)
<b>Slovenia</b>	Decrease of corporate taxation (24)	Wage freeze for 2009 and 2010 in the public sector (1)	Pensions reform for extended working years; Increase of budget for subsistence benefits; Implementation of in-work benefits to retain jobs; Support for research and development programs (23)
<b>Spain</b>	VAT increase from 16% to 18% in 2010 (25)	Wage cuts of 5% for civil servants for 2010 (1)	Cuts in welfare benefits, amongst others child benefits; Freeze in pensions (25)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	VAT increase from 16,5% to 20% (26)	Wage freeze for public sector employees for 2010-2011 (1)	Measures for the creation of new jobs but announcement of large social benefit cuts in late 2010 (26)

**Sources:**

- (1) Glassner 2010, Table 1: 28-31.  
 (2) Council of Europe 2010: 16, 40.  
 (3) Council of Europe 2010: 34.  
 (4) Council of Europe 2010: 29, 44.  
 (5) Council of Europe 2010: 24, 27, 40; Knodt/Urdze 2010: 13; for detailed cuts see Raudla 2011.  
 (6) Peters/Pierre/Randma-Liiv 2010: 22.  
 (7) Raudla 2011: 8.  
 (8) Glassner 2010: 20.  
 (9) Council of Europe 2010: 29, 35, 41.  
 (10) Nelson/Belkin/Mix 2011: 6-7.  
 (11) Glassner 2010: 10, 19.  
 (12) Council of Europe 2010: 23, 29, 30, 32, 36; Gorzelak 2010: 102.  
 (13) Inotai 2010: 21, 28.  
 (14) Glassner 2010: 18.  
 (15) Council of Europe 2010: 17, 18.  
 (16) Council of Europe 2010: 34.  
 (17) Glassner 2010: 17.  
 (18) Council of Europe 2010: 18, 26.  
 (19) Council of Europe 2010: 35.  
 (20) Woolfson 2010: 494; Glassner 2010: 17.  
 (21) Glassner 2010: 19.  
 (22) Hoey 2010.  
 (23) Council of Europe 2010: 30, 32, 37; Gorzelak 2010: 219.  
 (24) Council of Europe 2010: 34.  
 (25) Reuters 22.02.2011.  
 (26) Glassner 2010: 21, 41.

**Table 22: Dispersion of education status 2008-2010**

Country/Time	% in 2008	% in 2009	% in 2010	Mean in % 2008 to 2010
<b>Estonia</b>	88,5	88,9	89,2	88,87
<b>Greece</b>	61,1	61,2	62,5	61,6
<b>Ireland</b>	70	71,5	73,5	71,67
<b>Latvia</b>	85,8	86,8	88,5	87,03
<b>Lithuania</b>	90,6	91,3	92	91,3
<b>Romania</b>	75,3	74,7	74,3	74,8
<b>Spain</b>	51	51,5	52,6	51,7
<b>United Kingdom</b>	73,4	74,6	76,1	74,7
<b>Mean</b>				<b>75,2</b>

**Source: European Commission 2011a.**

**Table 23: Income index (gross national income per capita)**

Rank /Country	2008	2009	2010	Mean 2008-2010
Estonia	0,74	0,724	0,729	0,73
Greece	0,798	0,795	0,788	0,79
Ireland	0,833	0,814	0,812	0,82
Latvia	0,721	0,705	0,706	0,71
Lithuania	0,735	0,718	0,722	0,73
Romania	0,682	0,673	0,671	0,66
Spain	0,805	0,799	0,798	0,8
United Kingdom	0,838	0,83	0,83	0,83
Mean				0,75875

**Source: UNDP 2012b.**

**Note:** the index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher scores showing a higher aggregate index.

**Table 24: Percentage of distribution on high and low occupations as a mean for 2008-2010**

Country/ Time	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	MEAN high	(6)	(8)	(9)	MEAN low	
Estonia	8,0	11,3	10,3	5,0	10,0	11,6	9,4	1,0	7,6	11,3	6,7	
Ireland	8,0	14,3	5,0	11,0	15,3	5,0	9,8	0,3	6,6	6,6	4,0	
Greece	1,0	10,0	7,0	9,6	10,0	5,0	7,1	0,0	6,0	8,0	3,7	
Spain	2,0	10,0	9,0	7,6	13,0	6,3	8,0	1,0	11,3	9,3	6,2	
Latvia	5,3	12,3	12,0	4,3	10,6	8,3	8,8	1,0	10,0	10,3	6,4	
Lithuania	7,3	15,3	10,0	4,0	9,6	8,3	9,1	1,0	7,0	14,0	5,4	
Romania	1,0	9,3	8,6	4,6	9,0	9,6	7,0	0,0	5,6	13,0	5,1	
United Kingdom	12,0	11,3	10,0	11,0	15,0	4,6	10,7	0,0	8,6	5,3	4,4	
MEAN							8,7					5,2

**Source: Eurostat 2012b.**

**Note:** "Mean low" is the mean percentage of people occupied in higher status professions, "Mean low" is the percentage of people occupied in lower status professions.

(1)=legislators, senior officials and managers, (2)=professionals, (3)= technicians and associate professionals, (4)=clerks, (5)=service workers and shop and market sales workers, (6)=skilled agricultural and fishery workers, (7)=craft and related trades workers, (8)=plant and machine operators and assemblers or (9)= workers in elementary occupations.

**Table 25: List of Agence France Presse articles used for DV-Analysis**

<b>Estonia:</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 20.01.2009. Estonia plans budget cuts to respect EU deficit limit: ministry.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 05.02.2009. Estonia slashes budget as crisis bites.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 05.02.2009. Estonia slashes budget by 8.2 percent as crisis bites.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 13.02.2009. Estonian economy slams into reverse.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 08.04.2009. Fitch cuts Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania ratings.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 16.02.2010. Recession's end little comfort for Estonia's unemployed</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 09.03.2010. Austerity drives are old news for EU's Baltic states.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 31.12.2010. Anti-euro posters pop up ahead of Estonia's euro switch.</b>
<b>Ireland:</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 21.02.2009. Up to 120,000 protest in recession-hit Ireland.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 30.10.2009. Irish PM warns voters as EU treaty poll starts.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 24.11.2009. Ireland hit by public sector strike against cuts.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 01.12.2009. Ireland's public sector calls off national strike.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 30.02.2010. Debt throws Eurozone back towards dangerous waters.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 17.10.2010. Irish glass-making city shattered by economic crisis.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 22.11.2010. Ireland bailout boosts euro but sparks political chaos.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 23.11.2010. Ireland in political chaos after bailout triggers election.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 27.11.2010. 50,000 Irish take to streets over cuts to seal bailout.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 27.11.2010. Irish in mass protest against cuts to seal bailout.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 28.11.2010. Ireland works on bailout as protesters take to streets.</b>
<b>Romania:</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 26.03.2009. Romania braces for IMF-linked spending cuts.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 14.05.2009. Protesters in Bucharest demand measures against crisis.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 11.08.2009. Romania orders unpaid leave for state employees.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 07.10.2009. Thousands of Romanians protest against austerity measures.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 19.05.2009. Romanians rally against austerity cuts.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 22.09.2009. Romanians protest government's austerity measures.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 24.10.2010. Some 5,000 Romanian policemen protest over pay cuts.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 05.10.2010. Thousands of Romanian teachers protest austerity cuts.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 27.10.2010. Romania's government faces no confidence vote amid protests.</b>
<b>Agence France Presse. 27.10.2010. Romania's government faces no-confidence vote amid protests.</b>

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