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# Paradise Shift: Immigration, Mobility and Inequality in Southern California

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# Paradise Shift: Immigration, Mobility and Inequality in Southern California

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More immigrants come to the United States than to any other country in the world; more come to California than to any other state; and more settle in Southern California, especially the coastal corridor from Los Angeles to San Diego on the Mexican border, than in any other metropolitan region. The United States is home for a fifth of the world's migrant population (United Nations 2006). California is home for more than a fourth of all immigrants in the U.S., and more than a fourth of the state's population is foreign-born—a significantly greater proportion than any other state (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). And Southern California—a region of 21 million people encompassing the six contiguous counties of Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura, colloquially known as “SoCal”—is home to the largest concentrations of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Iranians, and other nationalities found outside of their respective countries of origin, and to sizable contingents of others, such as the Armenians, mainland Chinese, Hondurans, Indians, Laotians, Russian and Israeli Jews, and several Arab nationalities (Rumbaut 2004). Indeed, most of the largest immigrant nationalities that have settled in the United States since the 1960s—including the largest concentrations of refugees and of immigrant professionals, entrepreneurs, and unauthorized laborers—have established their primary settlements in greater Los Angeles, with the 1980s standing out as a decade of exceptional growth.

This demographic shift is all the more extraordinary when seen in the context of the region's recent past. As the historian Jon Weiner (2008) has observed, “from 1920 to 1960, Los Angeles was the whitest and most Protestant city in the United States, and the American city with the smallest proportion of immigrants—just 8 percent in 1960.” In the post-World War II period, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, SoCal came to be idealized as a paradise of sunshine, opportunity, youth culture and the “good life” in the popular imagination (May 2002)—an identity that was challenged and lost amid the upheavals of the 1960s. But much deeper transformations followed in the decades since. By 2007, Los Angeles County had the largest ethnic minority population in the country—7.1 million, or 71% of its total county population of 10 million—including the largest concentrations of Hispanics and Asians, the overwhelming majority of whom were of foreign birth or foreign parentage (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). (Indeed, Los Angeles County was home to one in every 14 of the nation's minority residents; the county's minority population alone was higher than the total population of all but 12 states.) For that matter, SoCal's other counties (Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino

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<sup>1</sup> I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Russell Sage Foundation for the two surveys upon which this research is based—IIMMLA (Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles) and CILS-III (Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, third wave), San Diego—which were carried out in Southern California during 2001-2004.

and Ventura) were also “majority-minority,” with populations that were more than 50% minority residents.

What happens to these diverse immigrants and to their offspring, to the communities where they settle, and to the formation of new patterns of ethnic inequality, constitutes a complex puzzle that raises issues of critical theoretical, practical, and policy significance, and is the subject of ongoing and heated public and political debates. This paper presents findings from Southern California on the mobility trajectories of the burgeoning generation of foreign-parentage young adults, focusing on key ethnic groups with distinct modes of incorporation, compared to native-parentage white, black and Mexican-American peers.

## **The Problem in National Context**

After four decades of accelerating migration flows, by 2006 about 38 million foreign-born persons were living in the United States, more than half of whom (56%) had immigrated since 1990, primarily from Latin America and Asia (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a). The U.S.-born second generation (with one or two foreign-born parents) totaled more than 30 million in 2006, so that immigrants and their children today add up to some 70 million persons, comprising 23% of the national total—and half of all Californians. The new immigration has transformed the ethnic composition of the U.S., sprouting ethnic “majority-minority” states (including California itself in 2000) and counties—nationally, about one in ten counties is now more than 50% minority (U.S. Census Bureau 2007b). Indeed, the 2000 census found that for the first time three Hispanic surnames—García, Rodríguez, and Martínez—were among the eleven most common in the U.S., displacing Wilson, Anderson and Taylor; Hernández, López, González, Pérez and Sánchez were not far behind (Roberts 2007).

New American ethnic groups are forming faster than ever, a process that has been accompanied by the official construction of one-size-fits-all pan-ethnic categories such as “Asians” and “Hispanics” into which newcomers from many different countries and cultures are classified (Rumbaut and Portes 2001). The U.S. Census Bureau (2004a, 2004b) announced that in 2003 Hispanics surpassed African Americans to become the largest minority in the country—and notably, for the first time in decades, their growth is now due more to natural increase than to immigration (Tienda *et al.*, 2006). Although Hispanics (45 million in 2007) comprise 15% of the population, they have accounted for half of U.S. population growth since 2000; given their higher fertility (2.9 children per woman in 2006) and youthful age structure (a median age of 27, compared to 41 for non-Hispanic whites), they will account for the lion’s share of U.S. population growth for the next several *decades*—regardless of what happens with immigration (Haub 2006; *cf.* Myers 2007). Overall, the immigrant-stock population, the largest ever, is young—and as today’s U.S.-born new second generation, with a median age of 12, reaches adulthood in large numbers within the next decade, their impact will be increasingly and widely felt in higher education, the labor market, sports and popular culture, criminal justice and religious institutions, the mall and the ballot box. They are coming of age in an aging society undergoing profound social and economic transformations—amid a hostile political backlash and rising animus toward immigrants, growing since the passage of Proposition 187 in California in

1994, and exacerbated after September 11, 2001. Perhaps not astonishingly—after a period of stepped-up deportations, workplace raids, and the passage of hundreds of state laws and local ordinances restricting access to driver’s licenses, education, employment, housing, even library cards—the 2007 National Survey of Latinos found that 53% of all Hispanic adults in the U.S. (about a quarter of whom are undocumented immigrants) feared that they, a family member or close friend would be deported (Pew Hispanic Center 2007; *cf.* Johnson 2005; Kanstroom 2007).

The ethnic and national diversity of contemporary immigrants pales in comparison to the diversity of their social class origins. By far the most educated *and* the least educated groups in the United States today are immigrants, a reflection of polar-opposite types of migrations embedded in different historical contexts—and inserted in an “hourglass-shaped” labor market, increasingly bifurcated into high-tech/high-wage and manual/low-wage sectors, which attracts both immigrant professionals and undocumented laborers. They come through regular immigration channels, or without legal authorization, or as state-sponsored refugees—legal statuses which interact with their human capital to shape distinct modes of incorporation. The undocumented tend to consist disproportionately of manual laborers, whose legal vulnerability makes them in turn more economically exploitable and likely to be concentrated in central cities; their children in turn tend to grow up in neighborhoods and attend schools where they are exposed disproportionately to peer groups involved with youth gangs and intergroup violence. “Brain drain” professionals mainly enter under the occupational preferences of U.S. law, and some are also found among the first waves of refugee flows; they are more likely to become naturalized citizens and, usually within the first generation, homeowners in the suburbs. Internal group characteristics, including the structure and cohesiveness of their families, interact in complex but patterned ways with external contexts of reception—government policies and programs, the state of the economy in the areas where they settle, employer preferences in local labor markets, the extent of racial discrimination and nativist hostility, the strength of existing ethnic communities—to form the conditions within which immigrants and their children adapt to different segments of American society (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut and Portes 2001).

If the immigrants are different, so is the society into which they are being absorbed. The incorporation of these newcomers since the 1970s has coincided with a post-industrial period of economic restructuring and rising inequality in income, wealth, and social well-being (Massey 2007), producing a “Great U-Turn” (Harrison and Bluestone 1988) that by the 1990s had led to levels of economic stratification not seen since the 1920s. As the returns to education and advanced educational credentials sharply increased, post-secondary schooling lengthened for young adults, increasingly extending into the mid to late twenties (with continuing parental support, if available). As the earnings and job stability of young workers fell relative to the cost of supporting a family, women entered the labor market in large numbers and worked longer hours, and two-income families and delayed childbearing became the norm, accompanied by changes in family forms—including what has come to be called a “retreat from marriage,” with high divorce rates (which peaked in 1980 but have remained high since) and sharp increases in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing (Landale *et al.* 2006). Unmarried childbearing reached a new record high in 2006, with the non-marital birth rate reaching 50.6 births per 1,000 unmarried females; indeed, unmarried mothers now account for nearly 40% of all

U.S. births (in contrast, the percentage of all live births in the U.S. to mothers under 20 is just over 10%, having last peaked in 1991 and declined since, although the rate is highest among Hispanic teens) (Hamilton *et al.*, 2007). Normative transitions to adulthood have thus become less predictable and more prolonged (Danziger and Rouse, 2007; Settersten *et al.* 2005). At the same time, the present era of mass immigration has unfolded during an era of mass imprisonment in the U.S. (Pettit and Western 2004; Rumbaut 2005b). The number of adults incarcerated in federal or state prisons or local jails in the U.S. more than quadrupled from 1980 to 2006; including those on probation or parole, over 7 million adults were under correctional supervision in the U.S. in 2006 (U.S. Department of Justice 2007). The majority are young men, from racial or ethnic minorities, with less than a high school education.

In this context, as post-secondary educational attainment has become critical to social mobility for both men and women, incarceration and early childbearing have emerged as key turning points that block or disrupt educational and occupational opportunities to develop human capital and move into the economic mainstream (Raphael 2007; Rumbaut 2005b; *cf.* Elder 1998). Having children at an early age is more strongly and negatively associated with the educational attainments and occupational choices of women than of men (Marini 1984; Feliciano and Rumbaut 2005). A prison record is linked to unemployment, lower wages, marital and family instability, and severe restrictions on social and voting rights (Manza and Uggen 2006; Western 2002; Western *et al.* 2001), as well as to stigmatized identities and pathways to criminal recidivism (Laub and Sampson 2003). In a cycle of cumulative disadvantage, young men and women with low levels of education are significantly more likely to become a prisoner or to become a parent, respectively, than same-age and same-sex peers with higher levels of education—and to widen social and economic inequalities in the process.

What do we know about foreign-parentage young adults in this transformed national context, and of their patterns of social mobility (*cf.* Alba and Nee, 2003; Portes and Fernández-Kelly, 2006)? How do they fare vis-à-vis native-parentage peers? Unfortunately, decennial census data on parental nativity, which had until 1970 permitted the identification of the foreign-born (the first generation) from the U.S.-born of foreign parentage (second generation) and of native parentage (third and beyond generations), have not been collected since 1980. Instead, scholarship on adult outcomes among the new second generation has relied mainly on the Current Population Survey (CPS), which after 1994 incorporated the parental nativity questions in its annual demographic survey of a nationally representative household sample (but which is limited in other respects); and especially designed regional surveys, such as the third wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS-III) (Portes and Rumbaut, 2005); the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) study (Kasinitz *et al.* 2008); and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey (Rumbaut *et al.* 2003). The merged IIMMLA and CILS-San Diego samples will be the focus of the analysis that will follow. But first we turn to an examination of national-level CPS data.

## Young Adults in the United States, by Gender and Generation

*Tables 1a and 1b* provide a profile of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Hispanic and non-Hispanic white, black, and Asian young adults 18 to 34 in the U.S. in 2006, broken down by gender (Table 1a) and generation (Table 1b). Those four ethnoracial groupings accounted for 65.5 million young adults in the United States, or nearly 98% of the total (the remainder consists of Native American and “mixed race” populations). Among Hispanics (two thirds of whom are of Mexican descent), there is a much greater proportion of males than females (54% to 46%)—a reflection of disproportionate numbers of young male migrant workers in this population. By contrast, only 46% of black young adults are males—a reflection in part of the fact that these estimates are drawn from a household survey of the non-institutionalized population and miss a disproportionate number of young black males who are incarcerated or in the military. “Non-Hispanic whites” and “blacks” are overwhelmingly long-term natives (nearly 90%), whereas 95% of “Asian” and 80% of “Hispanic” groups are of foreign birth or parentage (1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> generation). The newcomers in turn are situated at the polar ends of the opportunity structure, so that both an ethnic and a class divide (or “ethclasses,” to revive Milton Gordon’s term) are immediately apparent. Educational and related inequalities between whites and blacks seem narrow compared to the gulf that separates Asians from Hispanics. Asian men and women are at the top of the educational hierarchy: an extraordinary 62% had 4-year college or advanced degrees (nearly twice the 33% rate of white men), while only 8% failed to complete high school (compared to 12% of white men). Latinos are at the bottom: 41% of young adult males had not finished high school, and fewer than one in ten had earned college or advanced degrees. Particularly striking is the range in the attainment of advanced degrees (professional, master’s or doctorates), from 25% of Asian men to 8% of whites, 3% of blacks, and 2% of Hispanics. Young Latino men are also mired in the lowest rungs of the U.S. labor market, with nearly two out of three employed in low-wage labor, while 54% of Asian young men were employed in the highest status jobs. Non-Hispanic whites and blacks fall between those two poles. On the other hand, Hispanic men 18-34 have the highest labor force participation rate (87%) and are the most likely to be working full-time (70%); in fact, they are half as likely as young black men to be jobless (19% to 39%), and much less likely to be incarcerated (as estimated from 2000 census data). Hispanic women, in turn, are much more likely than the other groups to have children (48%), and Asian women are least likely—but both Hispanic and Asian women are more likely to be married than blacks or whites. Nonetheless, while Asians have higher family incomes and personal earnings, whites have the lowest poverty rates and blacks have the highest.

Table 1b breaks down these differences in socioeconomic status and family formation by generation within each of the panethnic groups, to examine the extent of intergenerational change from the foreign-born cohorts (1<sup>st</sup> generation) to those of foreign parentage (2<sup>nd</sup> generation) and native parentage (3<sup>rd</sup> and higher generations). Key comparisons are to 3<sup>rd</sup>-or-higher-generation whites and blacks—i.e., to native-stock majority and minority groups. (Significantly, first- and second-generation “whites” and “blacks”—from a wide range of immigrant origins in Europe, Canada, the Middle East, Africa, the Afro-Caribbean, and elsewhere—show much better outcomes on every indicator than do

**Table 1a.**  
**Social and Economic Characteristics of Young Adults in the United States, 18 to 34, by Panethnicity and Gender**

Selected Characteristics (Figures are column percentages unless noted)		Hispanic		Asian		Non-Hispanic Black		White	
		Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>Total young adults (18 to 34):</b>	N	6,737,822	5,752,740	1,622,549	1,687,121	3,973,738	4,642,216	20,579,352	20,518,648
<b>Nativity/generation:<sup>1</sup></b>									
Foreign-born (1st gen.)	%	58.8	51.9	69.6	75.5	10.3	9.3	4.8	4.8
US-born, foreign-born parent (2nd gen.)	%	21.5	25.0	25.3	20.7	4.5	4.1	4.5	4.4
US-born, US-born parents (3rd+ gen.)	%	19.6	23.1	5.1	3.8	85.2	86.5	90.8	90.7
<b>Educational attainment:<sup>2</sup></b>									
Less than high school	%	40.8	35.3	8.1	7.4	18.5	16.6	12.2	9.4
High school graduate only	%	31.5	29.7	16.6	15.5	39.7	33.4	31.2	25.7
Some college	%	20.8	26.0	29.7	29.3	30.7	35.4	34.3	37.3
Bachelor's degree (25 and older)	%	7.8	10.2	36.7	41.7	14.0	15.7	25.0	28.3
Advanced degree (25 and older)	%	2.0	2.6	25.1	20.5	3.1	5.2	7.9	10.2
<b>Labor force status:</b>									
Working full-time	%	69.8	41.0	59.0	42.3	50.5	47.0	64.9	47.4
Working part-time	%	10.9	14.7	12.6	14.7	10.7	14.2	13.3	22.0
Not working	%	19.3	44.3	28.4	43.0	38.9	38.8	21.8	30.6
<b>Occupational status index:<sup>3</sup></b>									
Low-wage labor (SEI < 25)	%	63.4	33.9	26.1	19.2	51.1	29.6	38.9	21.9
Middle (SEI > 25)	%	21.7	38.2	20.3	31.8	27.6	39.8	27.5	35.5
Higher (SEI > 50)	%	14.9	27.9	53.5	49.0	21.4	30.6	33.6	42.6
<b>Economic status:</b>									
Poverty rate (below poverty line)	%	16.4	25.6	12.9	13.3	18.6	29.2	8.4	12.7
Family annual income	\$	44,481	42,456	69,247	70,810	46,703	38,105	65,788	62,605
Earnings (of those working)	\$	24,330	19,484	40,957	31,305	25,448	21,245	33,635	24,012
<b>Marital and parental status:</b>									
Never married	%	53.9	38.8	64.4	44.3	69.0	65.6	54.8	42.5
Cohabiting	%	6.4	7.4	2.4	4.3	7.6	6.3	8.0	9.3
Currently married	%	36.2	47.4	31.8	48.8	19.6	20.7	33.7	42.5
Divorced, separated	%	3.5	6.4	1.3	2.6	3.7	7.4	3.5	5.7
Has one or more children	%	--	48.0	--	31.6	--	42.8	--	37.1
<b>Incarcerated (males only):</b>	%	3.26	--	0.72	--	11.15	--	1.68	--

Source: Merged Current Population Surveys, 2003-06. Note: Incarceration data are estimated from the 2000 census.

<sup>1</sup> 1st generation = foreign-born; 2nd = U.S.-born, one or both parents foreign-born; 3rd or higher = U.S.-born, both parents

<sup>2</sup> Educational attainment for Bachelor's degree or higher is reported only for 25-34

<sup>3</sup> Socioeconomic index (SEI): higher = professional, technical, white-collar occupations with SEI middle = services and skilled blue-collar jobs with SEI scores above 25; low = jobs with SEI scores below 25.



**Table 1b.**  
**Social and Economic Characteristics of Young Adults in the United States, 18 to 34, by Panethnicity and Generation**

Selected Characteristics	Generation <sup>1</sup> :	Hispanic			Asian			Non-Hispanic Black			White		
		1st	2nd	3rd+	1st	2nd	3rd+	1st	2nd	3rd+	1st	2nd	3rd+
<b>Total young adults (18 to 34):</b>	N	5,150,866	4,687,097	2,652,439	1,568,756	1,593,997	146,917	540,549	671,004	7,402,978	1,212,777	2,587,471	37,296,700
<b>Educational attainment:<sup>2</sup></b>													
Less than high school	%	56.2	28.5	20.8	6.5	9.1	6.7	15.3	12.6	18.1	10.1	8.9	10.9
High school graduate	%	27.8	31.0	35.8	15.0	17.0	16.6	31.2	25.7	37.6	26.0	22.4	28.9
Some college	%	10.3	31.3	33.8	20.6	37.5	38.5	31.2	43.5	32.5	22.7	37.6	36.1
Bachelor's degree (25 and older)	%	5.6	12.8	11.3	38.3	41.2	34.6	19.7	23.2	13.9	30.4	33.3	26.1
Advanced degree (25 and older)	%	1.6	2.8	3.3	27.5	16.1	15.8	7.9	7.8	3.7	18.6	12.5	8.4
<b>Labor force status:</b>													
Working full-time	%	59.6	53.9	55.0	52.2	48.9	49.4	55.9	42.6	48.6	56.8	52.2	56.3
Working part-time	%	10.1	14.1	15.3	11.0	15.7	19.9	14.4	15.3	12.2	12.4	17.7	17.9
Not working	%	30.3	32.0	29.7	36.8	35.4	30.7	29.7	42.1	39.2	30.9	30.0	25.8
<b>Occupational status index:<sup>3</sup></b>													
Low-wage labor (SEI < 25)	%	74.3	38.4	34.5	23.2	22.3	27.4	46.4	29.0	39.9	30.1	24.7	31.4
Middle (SEI > 25)	%	16.8	34.8	37.1	20.7	30.1	25.3	27.7	39.2	34.2	23.9	32.1	31.4
Higher (SEI > 50)	%	8.9	26.8	28.4	56.1	47.6	47.2	25.9	31.8	25.9	45.9	43.1	37.2
<b>Economic status:</b>													
Poverty rate (below poverty line)	%	25.8	17.1	16.6	15.8	10.9	8.8	19.7	13.8	25.6	13.7	8.9	10.6
Family annual income	\$	35,206	48,642	50,256	63,345	75,561	81,352	44,838	57,138	40,204	61,893	74,756	63,521
Earnings (of those working)	\$	20,252	23,936	24,612	39,911	33,615	35,725	23,938	26,430	22,818	35,356	31,741	28,803
<b>Marital and parental status:</b>													
Never married	%	35.5	57.2	51.1	38.5	69.0	61.1	55.0	76.9	67.2	33.8	57.5	48.5
Cohabiting	%	5.8	6.7	9.1	2.3	4.2	5.5	4.5	3.7	7.3	5.3	6.9	8.9
Currently married	%	54.1	31.9	33.5	57.2	24.9	30.5	36.6	15.1	19.5	57.6	32.6	37.8
Divorced, separated	%	4.6	4.3	6.3	2.0	1.9	3.0	3.9	4.2	5.9	3.3	3.1	4.8
Has children (females only)	%	56.2	37.2	41.9	36.4	13.8	32.1	37.3	21.7	44.4	39.3	29.8	37.3
<b>Incarcerated (males only):<sup>4</sup></b>	%	0.99	6.72		0.29	1.86		2.47	11.61		0.57	1.71	

Source: Merged Current Population Surveys, 2003-06. (Figures are column percentages unless noted.)

<sup>1</sup> 1st generation = foreign-born; 2nd = U.S.-born, one or both parents foreign-born; 3rd or higher =

<sup>2</sup> Educational attainment for Bachelor's degree or higher are reported only for 25-34 year olds.

<sup>3</sup> Socioeconomic index (SEI): higher = professional, technical, white-collar occupations with SEI (Duncan) scores above 50; middle = services and skilled blue-collar jobs with SEI scores above 25; low = jobs with SEI scores below 25.

<sup>4</sup> Incarceration data are estimated from the 2000 census, for foreign-born and U.S.-born males 18-34. Among the U.S.-born, census data do not

their native-stock counterparts.) Among Hispanics, the data show rapid upward educational, occupational and economic mobility from the first to the second generation. That in part reflects the very low starting points of the foreign-born. For example, the proportion with less than a high school diploma is cut in half from the first to the second (56% to 28%), though the figure of 21% by the third-plus remains double that of whites. Among foreign-born Latin Americans, many (especially undocumented labor migrants from Mexico and Central America) came to work in their teens and had not completed secondary schooling in their country of origin (it is not so much that they “dropped out” of high school than that they never “dropped in”). College graduation rates double from 7% among the foreign-born to 14% among the US-born. On the other hand, despite these positive indices, the rate of incarceration among Hispanic men sharply increases from less than 1% among the foreign-born to 6.7% among the U.S.-born—less than the 11.6% incarceration rate seen among native blacks, but much higher than the 1.7% rate among native whites. Because of the very high levels of education brought by immigrants from India, Taiwan and other Asian countries (a function of “brain-drain” migration histories noted earlier), we do not see the same pattern of upward intergenerational social mobility among Asians. Instead, among Asians, two out of three hold a Bachelor’s degree or higher in the immigrant generation (and a remarkable 28% hold advanced degrees); those rates drop to 57% (and 16%) in the second generation, and 50% in the third-plus. Despite the relative decline across generations, college graduation rates among Asians in every cohort are still far higher than any of the other groups. A similar pattern is repeated with regard to occupational status, with 56% of the first generation, compared to 47% of the second and 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations, holding high-status jobs. Still, poverty rates decrease across generations, and family incomes increase. While the process of intergenerational change is only hinted at with these data, the formation of new patterns of urban ethnic inequality seems evident.

## **Immigrant Nationalities and Modes of Incorporation**

This cross-sectional national profile of young adults provided by the CPS, while useful, conceals more than it reveals. The panethnic categories of “Asians” and “Hispanics” are not homogeneous, but lump together many different nationalities, migration histories, legal statuses, phenotypes, class and cultural backgrounds, and local contexts of adaptation in the U.S. *Table 2* begins to unpack these categories by examining the largest immigrant nationalities in the U.S., and providing a typology of three main modes of incorporation based on (1) legal status at entry as classified by the government (with or without authorization, or as state-sponsored refugees—or entry through the “front gate,” the “back door” or the “side door” [*cf.* Zolberg 2006]), and (2) human capital (as indicated by their level of education, ranging from professionals and entrepreneurs to manual laborers) (*cf.* Feliciano 2006). Each type is represented by several nationalities, but each nationality may also include individuals representing different types (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Mode I is typified by groups composed of a majority of unauthorized laborers with less than a high school education (Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans—and more recently Hondurans); Mode II is exemplified by groups composed of a majority of legal permanent residents with college degrees or more advanced credentials (Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, and Indians); and Mode III comprises groups admitted with refugee status (and

**Table 2.**  
**National Origins and Modes of Incorporation: Main Types (by Legal Status and Education)**  
**and Largest Foreign-Born Nationalities in U.S. and California, 2006**

National Origin	Foreign-born population in the United States						Foreign-born population in California			
	Foreign-born total		Undocumented proportion			Education (ages 25-64)		% of (U.S.) group in Calif.		
	N (000s)	% (of US)	N (000s)	% (of US)	% of group that is undoc.	% college graduate	% less than high school	N (000s)	%	% of (U.S.) group in Calif.
<b>Modes of incorporation:</b>										
<b>Mode I:</b>										
<i>Low education, unauthorized</i>										
Mexican	11,535	30.8	6,570	57.0	56.9	5.8	60.0	4,396	44.4	42.6
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	1,783	4.8	940	8.0	52.7	5.6	59.6	678	6.8	43.9
<b>Mode II:</b>										
<i>High education, legal entry</i>										
Filipino	1,634	4.4	280	2.4	17.1	51.7	2.7	750	7.6	47.7
Chinese, Taiwanese	1,933	5.2	190	1.6	9.8	54.8	15.8	659	6.7	37.5
Korean	1,021	2.7	250	2.2	24.4	57.8	2.9	323	3.3	30.6
Indian	1,505	4.0	270	2.3	17.9	80.6	3.6	303	3.1	19.5
<b>Mode III:</b>										
<i>Refugees, state-sponsored</i>										
Vietnamese	1,116	3.0	160	1.4	14.3	31.7	21.3	446	4.5	42.4
Cambodian, Laotian	329	0.9	NA	NA	NA	8.4	53.7	121	1.2	36.4
Cuban	936	2.5	†	†	†	25.5	25.3	42	0.4	4.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,548</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11,550</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>26.7</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>9,902</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>26.4</b>

Sources: American Community Survey 2006 (US Census Bureau 2007); Office of Immigration Statistics, DHS (Hoefler et al. 2007), for estimates of the undocumented population.

† The Cuban-born population in the U.S. was excluded from these estimates by DHS (Department of Homeland Security) since, according to immigration law (and under the U.S. government's "wet foot/dry foot" policy that is applicable only to Cubans), few Cubans living in the U.S. more than a year are at risk of being unauthorized.

access to public assistance on the same basis as U.S. citizens), albeit with a mixed (often low) human capital profile (Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, and Cubans). Nine of these nationalities (the Indians and Cubans excepted)—three groups per type—make up the bulk of the IIMMLA and CILS-III Southern California samples that will be the focus of analysis below.

While the nearly 38 million foreign-born in the U.S. in 2006 came from some 190 countries, 11.5 million (31%) came from only one: Mexico. Another 9 million (24%) came from China (including Taiwan), the Philippines, India, Vietnam, Korea, and El Salvador and Guatemala.<sup>2</sup> More than half (55%) of the foreign-born population has come from these nations—all with close historical ties to the U.S., including prior neo-colonial episodes and wars (India is a main exception in that regard). Those are also the principal sources of international migration to California, accounting for more than three-fourths of the state total. Of the 9.9 million foreign-born residing in California, Mexico alone accounts for 44%, and the other seven for 32%, as shown in Table 2. Moreover, while California is home for 10% of the native-born population of the U.S., between a third and a half of each of these foreign-born groups is concentrated in California (except for the Indians, who are relatively more dispersed).

In 2006, data from the Department of Homeland Security estimated the unauthorized population of the U.S. at 11.6 million (Hoefler *et al.* 2007; see also Passel 2006)—more than tripling since the early 1990s. Thus, nearly a third (31%) of the foreign-born today are undocumented (most “entered without inspection,” while as many as 40% entered legally but then overstayed their visas). Of the rest, about one third consist of legal permanent residents, and another third are naturalized citizens. An immigrant’s legal status is a critical factor in shaping mobility trajectories—and an unauthorized status can affect virtually every facet of an immigrant’s life (*cf.* Menjívar 2006b). As Table 2 documents, all of the principal sources of legal immigration to the U.S. are also among the top sources of unauthorized migration. More than half of all Mexican (57%) and Salvadoran and Guatemalan (53%) immigrants in the U.S. today are undocumented—together they account for nearly two thirds of the unauthorized population—but so are substantial proportions of the Koreans (24%), Indians (18%), Filipinos (17%), Vietnamese (14%) and Chinese (10%).

More specifically, within each of the three main types specified above, we can elaborate as follows on the nationalities that represent modal tendencies of each type, as well as note features that distinguish them from each other:

Mode I (preponderantly unauthorized laborers with less than a high school education):

The Mexicans are part of the longest and largest labor migration in the world today, and their story needs to be understood in the historical context of their long-time presence in California and the Southwest, which was once part of Mexico (Massey *et al.* 2002). With 6 million persons of Mexican descent in Southern California alone (and about 28 million in the country), they constitute by far the largest source of both legal and unauthorized immigration in the U.S., as well

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<sup>2</sup> Cuba and Canada ranked 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> in size of their foreign-born populations in 2006, each with less than 1 million, and the Dominican Republic was essentially tied with Guatemala for 10<sup>th</sup>—but the Cubans and Dominicans are concentrated in Florida and New York.

as the adult population with the lowest levels of education in the nation. Of the estimated 11.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 2006, most (57%) were Mexican nationals. Of the nearly 3 million legalized under the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act [IRCA] of 1986, two thirds were Mexican nationals; an INS survey (1992) of the national legalized population found that 25% resided in the Los Angeles area alone.

The Salvadorans and Guatemalans, who form the largest flows from Central America, share with the Mexicans the fact that a sizable proportion of them remain in unauthorized or (unlike any of the other groups) perennially uncertain and marginally legal statuses; and with the Vietnamese the fact that in the 1980s most came as refugees, from the Central American wars of the era—but were not recognized as refugees by the U.S. government (Coutin 2007; García 2006; Menjívar 2006a, 2006b). The Salvadorans, with scarcely a visible presence in the U.S. until after 1980, have grown rapidly among all Latin American-origin groups in the country, already surpassing the Cubans—and are disproportionately located in Los Angeles County. Estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. rank Salvadorans and Guatemalans as the largest groups after Mexicans, accounting for 8% of the total—and they also rank after Mexicans in their low levels of education.

Mode II (preponderantly regular immigrants with college degrees or more advanced credentials):

The Filipinos have the lowest poverty rate of any major ethnic group in the U.S. (a reflection of a large component of professionals among those who migrate, especially nurses), the highest proportion of immigrant enlistment in the U.S. military (principally the U.S. Navy), and are the largest sole-country source of immigration from Asia in California and the U.S. They are the only Asian country to have been colonized directly by the U.S. (and before that by Spain for three centuries)—sharing a number of historical commonalities with Puerto Rico—with the consequence that they are the only “Asians” who bear Spanish surnames, are preponderantly Roman Catholics, and (as with Indians) by and large speak English pre-arrival (*cf.* Espiritu 2003).

The Chinese are a complex, diverse, bimodal population (including at once highly educated professionals and others with only an elementary schooling), coming from multiple sources (mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong) and divergent class origins, but in most recent studies (*e.g.*, Kasinitz *et al.* 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou and Xiong 2005) their young adults are found at the very top of educational achievement rankings, despite modest social class origins in some cases. The Taiwanese especially rank with immigrants from India as the most educated population in the U.S.

The Koreans represent yet another distinct tendency within this general mode of incorporation, especially in contrast to the Filipinos (who have one of the lowest rates of self-employment in the country): the Koreans are at the other end, with by far the highest rates of entrepreneurship of any ethnic group in the U.S., native-born or foreign-born (Min 2005; Light and Bonacich 1988). In this regard the modal Korean case, reminiscent of such early 20<sup>th</sup>-century cases as those of the Japanese in California and the Jews in New York, raises questions about the effects of an entrepreneurial first generation for the educational, occupational and economic mobility of the

second-generation. Unlike other Asian-origin groups, the Koreans are primarily Protestants, and have established thousands of immigrant churches (mostly Presbyterian) throughout the United States.

Mode III (preponderantly admitted with refugee status, mixed human capital profile):

The Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians stand in sharp contrast: they are state-sponsored groups who entered the U.S. as part of the largest refugee resettlement program in the country's history, whose incorporation was assisted by a wide range of cash and non-cash public aid programs made available to them upon arrival and thereafter on the same basis as U.S.-citizens (unlike other immigrant groups), but yet arrived often destitute in the aftermath of the Indochina War, and (especially among the survivors of Cambodia's "killing fields") with chronic mental health problems. The poverty rates for the majority of the Vietnamese (those who came after 1975) remain higher than the national norm; and the rates for the Cambodians and Laotians (especially the Hmong) have been the highest in the U.S. (Hein 2006; Rumbaut 2005a).

Given these pronounced differences in migration histories, human capital, family backgrounds, and contexts of exit and of reception in the United States among these groups, we can hypothesize possible mobility trajectories for their 1.5- and 2<sup>nd</sup>-generation adult children as they acculturate and make their way in the Southern California region. However, since we cannot ascertain those mobility outcomes intergenerationally with available official statistics, we turn to two specialized surveys, IIMMLA and CILS.

### **Data and Measures: The CILS-III and IIMMLA Surveys in Southern California**

Data for the analysis that follows is drawn from two sources: the third wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) in San Diego, a decade-long panel study whose last phase of data collection ended in 2003; and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey, a cross-sectional study whose data collection was carried out in 2004. Both surveys were conducted in Southern California, a region adjacent to the Mexican border that has been the nation's largest net receiver of immigrants. By the year 2000 one of every five immigrants in the United States resided in the region's six contiguous counties (San Diego, Orange, Los Angeles, Ventura, Riverside and San Bernardino), including the largest communities of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and Cambodians outside of their countries of origin.

For purposes of this analysis the two data sets were merged (increasing sample size to N=6,135), since they are based on representative samples of respondents evenly divided by gender, of the same approximate age (28.6 years for IIMMLA respondents and 24.2 years for CILS) and national origins (Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians make up 76% of the merged sample, and other Latin American and Asian nationalities 10%), who were surveyed at about the same time (IIMMLA in 2004, CILS-III in 2001-2003) in the same metropolitan region (the six contiguous Southern California counties). In IIMMLA and CILS-III the focus was on patterns of adaptation of adult children of contemporary immigrants—both those who

were born abroad but arrived in the U.S. as children (the 1.5 generation), and those who were born in the U.S. of immigrant parents (the second generation); both surveys used identical measures of relevant variables. Merging the two data sets yields larger sample sizes for significant subgroups and greater precision and reliability for estimates of mobility outcomes by group and generation. (A detailed description of the sampling and research design of each study is attached in the *Appendix*.)

*Table 3* shows the number of IIMMLA and CILS respondents by gender, age group (20-24, 25 and older), and generational cohort (1.5, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and higher) for the main ethnic groups used in this analysis (which may also be seen as proxies for different modes of incorporation). Overall, their mean age was 27.5. Of the 6,135 respondents in the merged sample, 80% were 1.5 (n=2,356) or 2<sup>nd</sup> generation (n=2,566), and 20% were 3<sup>rd</sup> or higher generations (n=1,213). Among the 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations (n=4,922), Mode I groups (Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans) accounted for 1,621; Mode II groups (Filipinos, Chinese [including Taiwanese] and Koreans) numbered 1,824; and Mode III groups (from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) totaled 790. The “Other Latin Americans” (n=240) came from all of the other Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean, while “all other nationalities” (n=447) included respondents from Canada and dozens of countries from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the non-Spanish Caribbean. For all groups except Mexicans and non-Hispanic whites and blacks, immigration is so recent that sampling was not feasible beyond the second generation. (Indeed, for those groups without exception, more than 70% of their total population in the U.S. is foreign-born, and of the remainder nearly all belong to the U.S.-born second generation. For those groups and their descendants in Southern California, members of the fourth generation have not yet been born and members of the third generation are small in number and still in infancy or childhood.) Of the 2,566 born in the U.S. and classified as second generation, 76% had two foreign-born parents (the “2.0” cohort), while 24% had one U.S.-born parent (the “2.5” cohort). Of the 1,213 respondents classified as third or higher generations (U.S.-born persons with two U.S.-born parents), half of the Mexican Americans (47%) had four U.S.-born grandparents (“4th+” generation), as did two thirds (69%) of the non-Hispanic whites, and almost all (95%) of the black respondents.

Results from the merged sample are presented as follows. Tables 4, 5 and 6 focus first on antecedent variables hypothesized to have significant effects on the young adult respondents’ educational attainment: parental human capital (the educational attainment of father and mother), parental citizenship status and acculturation (years in the U.S., English fluency), and—during the respondents’ childhood and adolescent years—family structure, parental homeownership, and neighborhood contexts. Tables 7, 8 and 9 present a series of intervening and outcome variables—respondents’ linguistic acculturation, incarceration and early childbearing histories, and early educational achievement (high school grades)—and highest level of education attained in early adulthood. Table 10 then analyzes the extent of intergenerational educational mobility, comparing the educational attainment of sons and daughters vs. fathers and mothers. Finally, multivariate analyses are presented regressing years of education on selected predictors controlling for all of the preceding, to identify the most significant determinants.

**Table 3.**  
**Young Adults in Southern California: Sample Size by Ethnicity, Gender, Generation, and Age**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples, N=6,135)

	Total N	Gender		Generational Cohort <sup>1</sup>			Age		Mean age (years)
		Female	Male	1.5	2nd	3rd+	20-24	25 and older	
<b>Panethnicity</b>									
Hispanic	2,262	1,181	1,081	695	1,166	401	912	1,350	27.5
Asian	2,743	1,382	1,361	1,569	1,174	0	1,441	1,302	26.2
Black	432	239	193	11	24	397	104	328	30.5
White	698	362	336	81	202	415	172	526	30.3
<b>Ethnicity</b>									
Mexican	1,642	855	787	423	818	401	680	962	27.5
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	380	193	187	181	199	0	155	225	26.8
Other Latin American <sup>2</sup>	240	133	107	91	149	0	77	163	28.6
Filipino	983	508	475	411	572	0	586	397	25.5
Chinese	433	188	245	235	198	0	184	249	27.6
Korean	408	207	201	257	151	0	164	244	27.6
Vietnamese	590	296	294	434	156	0	320	270	26.0
Cambodian, Laotian	200	112	88	191	9	0	119	81	24.5
All other nationalities <sup>3</sup>	447	247	200	133	314	0	166	281	28.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,135</b>	<b>3,164</b>	<b>2,971</b>	<b>2,356</b>	<b>2,566</b>	<b>1,213</b>	<b>2,629</b>	<b>3,506</b>	<b>27.5</b>

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey; Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS-III), San

<sup>1</sup> Generational cohorts defined as follows: 1.5 = foreign born, but arrived in U.S. in childhood; 2nd = U.S.-born, one or both parents foreign-born; 3rd or higher = U.S.-born, both parents U.S.-born. Among the 2,566 classified as 2nd generation, 659 had one U.S.-born parent ("2.5" generation). Among the 1,213 classified as 3rd or higher generation, half of the Mexican Americans (47%) had four U.S.-born grandparents ("4th+" as did two thirds (69%) of the non-Hispanic white respondents, and almost all (95%) of the black

<sup>2</sup> "Other Latin Americans" include respondents from all other Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean.

<sup>3</sup> "All other nationalities" include respondents from Canada (42), and dozens of European, Middle Eastern, Afro-Caribbean and other Asian countries.



**Table 4.**  
**Parental Human Capital: Educational Attainment of Father and Mother, by Ethnicity and Generation**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples)

<i>(In percents)</i>	<b>Parents' Educational Attainment</b>					<b>Father</b>		<b>Mother</b>	
	Neither finished high school	Only one is hi school grad	Both finished high school	Only one is college grad	Both are college grads	Less than high school	College graduate	Less than high school	College graduate
<b>Panethnicity</b>									
Hispanic	40.0	26.9	21.8	7.3	3.9	53.3	10.7	53.6	8.4
Asian	16.8	14.7	22.9	19.7	26.0	21.8	41.7	26.5	35.4
(3rd+ gen.) Black	10.8	22.2	37.5	17.9	11.6	28.9	21.1	14.4	25.9
(3rd+ gen.) White	4.3	12.0	35.4	22.7	25.5	15.2	40.5	11.2	33.5
<b>Ethnicity</b>									
(1.5 gen.) Mexican	70.4	19.9	6.6	2.1	0.9	78.5	5.2	82.3	1.7
(2nd gen.) Mexican	44.0	29.3	20.0	4.3	2.3	58.7	6.2	58.7	5.9
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican	16.0	24.2	43.4	11.2	5.2	27.9	12.7	28.2	10.5
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	38.7	34.5	16.8	8.2	1.8	56.6	11.1	55.3	7.9
Other Latin American	15.0	23.8	26.7	18.8	15.8	27.9	31.3	25.8	26.7
Filipino	5.6	14.5	24.4	24.6	30.8	11.9	43.7	13.8	49.8
Chinese	11.8	12.9	21.5	19.6	34.2	16.2	55.4	20.3	38.1
Korean	6.1	9.1	22.3	22.5	40.0	8.8	60.3	12.5	44.6
Vietnamese	30.8	20.2	25.4	13.6	10.0	36.4	24.7	45.4	13.4
Cambodian, Laotian	67.5	15.5	10.0	3.5	3.5	69.5	9.5	81.0	5.5
All other nationalities	8.5	17.2	28.2	25.3	20.8	19.5	39.8	14.8	32.2
<b>Total</b>	23.7	19.7	24.6	15.5	16.5	33.2	28.7	33.9	24.6

Source: IIMMLA survey; CILS-III, San Diego.

## Unequal Origins

Parental human capital. *Table 4* presents data on parental human capital for the main ethnic groups, comparing their father's and mother's levels of completed education (including the proportion who had not graduated from high school, and who had graduated with a four-year college degree or more). Data for the larger Mexican-origin sample permit a breakdown between the 1.5, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations. Reflecting the national data presented earlier, there are very sharp ethnic differences between the Mexican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Cambodian and Laotian immigrant parents at one pole (between 55% and 82% of whose fathers and mothers had less than a high school education, while the proportions with college degrees were in the single digits), and the Chinese and Koreans at the other (more than half of the fathers and about 40% of the mothers had college degrees). In between these poles were all the other groups. Significantly greater proportions of Vietnamese fathers and mothers had less than a high school education, while significantly greater proportions of Filipino fathers and mothers had college degrees. Non-Hispanic whites (mostly 3<sup>rd</sup> and higher generation natives, who may serve as a reference group in this analysis) were in the middle, with 40% of fathers and 33% of mothers having college degrees (11-15% were high school dropouts). Among non-Hispanic blacks, the mothers (26% college grads, 14% high school dropouts) were notably more educated than the fathers (21% college grads, 29% high school dropouts).

The multigenerational Mexican sample reveals sharp within-group differences in the educational attainments of the *parents* of the 1.5, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations. Thus, among the 1.5-generation adult respondents (who came to the U.S. from Mexico as children), over 70% of both their fathers and mothers had less than a high school education, while scarcely 1% had completed a college degree. By contrast, 44% of both parents of 2<sup>nd</sup>-generation respondents had less than a high school education and 2.3% had a college degree; and among the parents of the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations, only 16% of both fathers and mothers were high school dropouts, while 5.2% had college degrees. These data suggest that the parents of the U.S.-born 2<sup>nd</sup> generation were more likely than the parents of the 1.5ers to have come to the U.S. as children (i.e., as 1.5ers themselves), and thus to be more acculturated and to have completed their educations in the U.S.—another reason for distinguishing the 1.5- from the 2<sup>nd</sup>-generations analytically, rather than lumping these cohorts into a *de facto* “second generation” (Rumbaut 2004).

Parental acculturation and citizenship. Differences in their immigrant parents' citizenship status, length of time in the U.S., and English-language ability are made clear by the data provided in *Table 5*. Again the results are broken down by ethnicity, but now only for immigrant parents (i.e., the parents of 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations are excluded). The immigrant parents in this Southern California sample are not recent arrivals: they had resided in the U.S. for an average of 26 years (over 95% had been in the U.S. for more than 10 years, and 75% for more than 20 years). But in all of the measures shown in *Table 5*, there are very significant differences for virtually all of the nationalities between the parents whose children were foreign-born (1.5ers) and those whose children were born in the U.S. (2<sup>nd</sup> generation). The parents of the latter had resided in the U.S. for over 31 years, while the parents of the 1.5ers had been in the U.S. for nearly 21 years—a difference of a decade, generally observable among all the

ethnic groups. Partly as a result, the immigrant mothers and fathers of the 2<sup>nd</sup>-generation were more than twice as likely to speak English “very well” (about 40% do) than the parents of the 1.5ers (less than 20%). When it comes to English fluency, Filipino parents—coming from a country where English is one of two official languages—are far more likely to speak it “very well” than any other nationality by far (nearly two-thirds do). Similarly, Filipino parents, followed closely by the Vietnamese, are most likely to have become naturalized U.S. citizens (a minimum of five years of prior legal permanent residency in the U.S. is a precondition for naturalization). Indeed, with the notable exception of the Cambodians and Laotians, over 90% of the parents of all 2<sup>nd</sup>-generation Asian-origin groups had become U.S. citizens. That contrasts sharply with the proportions of Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan fathers and mothers: nearly two-thirds of those with foreign-born (1.5-generation) offspring were *not* U.S. citizens, and neither were a quarter to a third of those with U.S.-born (2<sup>nd</sup>-generation) offspring, despite their extended length of residence in the country (which encompassed the period of the IRCA amnesty in the late 1980s, for which it is likely that many formerly undocumented Mexican parents qualified if they entered the U.S. prior to 1982).

Family and neighborhood contexts growing up. From prior research we know that in addition to parental human capital and mode of incorporation, other factors—particularly family structure and marital stability, financial and residential stability, and residential neighborhood contexts in childhood and adolescence—can shape educational and socioeconomic trajectories in early adulthood (see Attewell and Lavin, 2007:126-153; Kasinitz *et al.*, 2008:94-132; McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; *cf.* Bowles *et al.*, 2005). The data in *Table 6* show the percent of respondents, by ethnicity and panethnicity, who grew up in families with both natural parents present, in homes that were owned (not rented) by their parents, and in neighborhoods that experienced to varying degrees major problems with crime, drugs and gangs (as measured by a summed index of perceived neighborhood problems). These latter are correlated in turn with the degree of poverty and racial segregation in an area, and with the quality of neighborhood schools, congealing into structures of cumulating advantages or disadvantages. Striking differences are seen by ethnicity and panethnicity among all of these factors, as well as by generational cohorts within the Mexican-origin group.

First, with respect to family structure, Asian-origin respondents were almost twice as likely as native blacks (82% to 45%) to grow up in families with both birth parents present, with Hispanics (65%) and native whites (56%) in between. Among Asians, the proportions were above 80% for all groups except the poorest, the Cambodians and Laotians, only two-thirds of whom (65%) were raised in intact families (in many cases as a result of the death of a parent, as seen in the disproportionate number of Cambodian widows resettled as refugees in the 1980s). Among Mexican Americans, the 1.5 generation was most likely to be raised by both parents (72%), declining to 67% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation (with more acculturated parents) and 57% among the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations. Those generational shifts in family structure—with foreign-parentage families more likely to remain intact, and native-parentage families more likely to break up, primarily as a result of divorce—have been repeatedly observed in U.S. census data and national-level surveys (see, *e.g.*, Landale *et al.*, 2006).

**Table 5.**  
**Parental Status and Acculturation: Citizenship, Years in the United States, and English Fluency**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples)

Ethnicity and Generation	Father's Citizenship Status			Mother's Citizenship Status			Parents' years in U.S.	Speaks English "Very Well"		
	Born in U.S.	Naturalized citizen	Not a U.S. citizen	Born in U.S.	Naturalized citizen	Not a U.S. citizen		Father	Mother	
Mexican	1.5	2.8	35.5	61.7	1.2	37.4	61.5	21.3	9.0	4.9
	2nd	14.1	61.1	24.8	15.3	64.5	20.2	31.9	24.6	20.2
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	1.5	2.2	30.9	66.9	0.0	43.6	56.4	22.5	13.4	8.9
	2nd	5.5	61.8	32.7	3.0	72.9	24.1	29.4	34.2	21.1
Other Latin American	1.5	2.2	50.5	47.3	0.0	54.9	45.1	22.8	25.3	17.7
	2nd	17.4	61.7	20.8	20.1	71.8	8.1	34.6	58.5	52.6
Filipino	1.5	2.2	76.9	20.9	0.0	82.7	17.3	20.2	56.5	56.5
	2nd	16.4	80.2	3.3	5.6	90.7	3.7	28.6	64.6	66.6
Chinese	1.5	0.9	66.4	32.8	0.4	76.6	23.0	18.8	11.5	8.4
	2nd	8.1	84.8	7.1	6.1	87.4	6.6	32.1	42.8	38.1
Korean	1.5	1.9	59.9	38.1	0.8	64.2	35.0	21.6	12.9	2.7
	2nd	9.3	74.2	16.6	2.6	87.4	9.9	29.5	35.4	25.7
Vietnamese	1.5	0.9	80.9	18.2	0.2	81.6	18.2	19.6	8.6	5.9
	2nd	3.8	90.4	5.8	1.3	91.0	7.7	25.5	20.8	16.0
Cambodian, Laotian	1.5	0.0	46.6	53.4	0.0	46.6	53.4	19.7	3.3	3.3
	2nd	0.0	75.0	25.0	0.0	68.9	31.1	23.0	33.3	22.2
All other nationalities	1.5	7.5	61.7	30.8	2.3	70.7	27.1	23.9	49.6	48.0
	2nd	25.5	61.8	12.7	25.5	60.5	14.0	37.1	59.9	59.9
<b>Total</b>	1.5	2.0	59.4	38.5	0.5	64.0	35.4	20.7	19.3	15.8
	2nd	14.1	70.1	15.8	11.3	75.8	12.9	31.2	41.5	37.5

Source: IIMMLA survey; CILS-III, San

**Table 6.**  
**Growing Up: Family Structure, Parental Homeownership, and Neighborhood Contexts**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples)

<i>(In percents)</i>	<b>Family Structure</b>	<b>Family Home</b>	<b>Neighborhood Problems with Crime, Drugs, Gangs</b>		
	Intact family <sup>1</sup> (both parents present)	Parents owned home	<i>(based on summed index of neighborhood problems)</i>		
			No problems	Some problems	Big problems
<b>Panethnicity</b>					
Hispanic	65.1	57.1	32.6	39.7	27.7
Asian	81.9	69.9	55.2	36.6	8.3
(3rd+ gen.) Black	44.6	65.5	30.2	42.8	27.0
(3rd+ gen.) White	56.1	86.3	55.9	36.4	7.7
<b>Ethnicity</b>					
(1.5 gen.) Mexican	71.9	35.2	30.1	34.4	35.5
(2nd gen.) Mexican	66.9	62.3	34.0	38.7	27.3
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican	57.4	71.8	36.2	43.1	20.7
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	64.7	50.5	24.3	42.0	33.8
Other Latin American	60.4	63.8	39.9	41.7	18.4
Filipino	81.2	81.6	55.1	36.4	8.5
Chinese	85.9	85.0	58.3	36.0	5.7
Korean	87.0	77.2	58.3	36.0	5.8
Vietnamese	82.2	50.7	50.1	40.0	9.9
Cambodian, Laotian	65.0	17.5	54.3	34.0	11.7
All other nationalities	71.6	79.0	54.8	34.8	10.4
<b>Total</b>	70.8	66.5	44.9	38.2	16.9

Source: IIMMLA survey; CILS-III, San Diego.

<sup>1</sup> "Intact family:" grew up in 2-parent family; "non-intact:" parents divorced, separated, died or remarried during childhood or adolescence.

With respect to parental homeownership, and the relative financial and residential stability it implies (compared to renters), by far the highest proportions were reported for native-parentage whites (86%), followed by Asians (70%), blacks (65%) and Hispanics (57%). However, among Asian groups there were huge differences between the Chinese, Filipinos and Koreans (with homeownership rates ranging from 77% to 85%), the Vietnamese (51%), and the Cambodians and Laotians (at 17% by far the lowest of any group, reflecting the dismal economic situation of these refugee parents in the 1980s and 1990s). Among Mexican Americans too, there were large within-group differences by generation: the 1.5 generation was least likely to be raised in homes owned by their parents (35%), compared to 62% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation and 72% in the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations. Those homeownership patterns are the opposite of the patterns in family structure noted above: *i.e.*, over time and generation in the U.S., homeownership and financial stability increase while intact family structures and marital stability decrease.

Among the groups in our Southern California sample, very large differences were also observed in the risk of growing up in crime-ridden dangerous neighborhoods. More than a fourth of Hispanics (28%) and blacks (27%) reported that crime, drugs and gangs were “big problems” in the neighborhoods where they were raised, while the comparative proportion among Asians and whites was in the single digits, as Table 6 shows. By contrast, more than a half of whites (56%) and Asians (55%) reported growing up in safe neighborhoods where crime, drugs and gangs were not a problem, compared to less than a third of Hispanics and blacks. The proportions among the Asian groups applied across all national-origin groups, including the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians. Among Mexican Americans, neighborhood contexts became relatively safer over generation in the U.S., with 36% of the 1.5 generation reporting “big problems” with crime, drugs and gangs in their neighborhoods growing up, dropping to 27% in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 21% in the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations—paralleling, albeit to a lesser extent, the residential mobility observed in the parents’ growing rates of intergenerational homeownership.

## **Unequal Outcomes**

Linguistic acculturation. Having examined a range of antecedent factors hypothesized to shape social and economic outcomes of children of immigrants in early adulthood, we begin the analysis of outcomes by focusing first on their patterns of linguistic acculturation. In the United States, English proficiency has always been a key to socioeconomic mobility for immigrants and their children and to their full participation in their adoptive society. Indeed, immigrants and their children know that better than anyone else. Still, alarms are often raised in nativist political discourse and in the popular and even academic literature (*e.g.*, Huntington 2004) about the proliferation of foreign languages and the potential threat this may pose to English dominance—with particular concern about the Spanish language: after all, the 2000 census counted over 28 million people who spoke Spanish at home, by far the largest language minority in the country (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006).

**Table 7.**  
**Adult Children's Linguistic Acculturation: Language Used at Home Growing Up,**  
**and Current Language Preference and Proficiency**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples)

Ethnicity and Generation <sup>1</sup>	Growing up, % spoke non-English language at home	Currently, % prefers to speak English at home	Current non-English language proficiency		
			% can <i>speak</i> it "very well"	% can <i>read</i> it "very well"	
Mexican	1.5	96.7	33.6	59.3	64.3
	2.0	96.5	49.7	60.0	51.0
	2.5	81.3	76.3	34.6	27.9
	3rd+	26.4	96.0	7.5	5.5
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	1.5	96.7	44.2	64.6	62.4
	2.0	95.6	56.0	58.8	47.8
	2.5	58.8	76.5	29.4	23.5
Other Latin American	1.5	97.8	49.5	75.8	63.7
	2.0	91.4	71.0	48.4	39.8
	2.5	60.7	96.4	12.5	12.5
Filipino	1.5	88.6	80.8	27.3	23.1
	2.0	73.8	93.9	6.5	4.9
	2.5	61.1	96.8	0.8	1.6
Chinese	1.5	96.2	40.0	50.6	29.8
	2.0	93.5	71.8	22.4	4.7
	2.5	42.9	100.0	3.6	0.0
Korean	1.5	95.7	57.6	40.9	30.0
	2.0	85.0	71.4	16.5	8.3
	2.5	27.8	94.4	5.6	5.6
Vietnamese	1.5	97.5	47.0	40.3	19.4
	2.0	93.9	70.3	16.2	2.0
	2.5	75.0	87.5	0.0	0.0
Cambodian, Laotian	1.5	99.5	45.0	51.8	8.4
	2.0	99.5	55.6	44.4	11.1
	2.5	NA	NA	NA	NA
All other nationalities	1.5	72.2	78.2	38.3	16.5
	2.0	67.9	85.3	20.5	13.5
	2.5	25.6	98.1	3.2	3.2
<b>Total by Generation:</b>	1.5	94.1	52.4	46.6	34.3
	2.0	87.3	69.6	33.8	25.3
	2.5	58.4	88.9	15.9	13.3
	3rd+	13.7	98.4	2.8	2.6

Source: IIMMLA survey; CILS-III, San Diego.

<sup>1</sup> Generational cohorts defined as follows: 1.5 = foreign born, but arrived in U.S. in childhood; 2.0 = born; 2.5 = U.S.-born, one parent foreign-born, one parent U.S.-born; 3rd or higher = U.S.-born, both parents U.S.-born.

*Table 7* summarizes the relevant survey evidence on linguistic acculturation for our sample—comparing the percent that grew up speaking a non-English language at home vs. their current language preferences and level of proficiency in the non-English language. The data are broken down by ethnicity and more detailed generational cohorts: in addition to the 1.5 and 3<sup>rd</sup> and beyond generations, the U.S.-born second generation is divided here into those with two foreign-born parents (“2.0”), and those with one foreign-born and one U.S.-born parent (“2.5”). Overall, among foreign-parentage respondents, 94% of the 1.5ers and 87% of the “2.0” cohort grew up speaking a language other than English at home (somewhat less among the Filipinos)—but the proportion dropped to 58% among the 2.5ers, suggesting how rapidly English can become the sole language in homes where one parent is U.S.-born. By the 3rd+ generations, only 14% reported speaking a language other than English at home growing up. By contrast, those proportions are reversed by examining their actual language preferences in adulthood: overall, more than half of the foreign-born 1.5ers (52%) now prefer to speak English only at home, as do more than two thirds of the “2.0” (70%), 89% of the

2.5ers, and 98% of the 3<sup>rd</sup>+. That rapid language switch to English is accompanied by the rapid atrophy of our respondents' spoken and reading abilities in their non-English mother tongue over time and generation in the U.S. Among the 1.5ers, less than half (47%) could speak the non-English language "very well," and only a third could read it "very well" (34%); by the 2.0 generation only a third (34%) could speak the non-English language "very well," and only a quarter could read it "very well" (25%); among the 2.5ers those proportions decreased more sharply still to 16% and 13%, respectively; and the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations had become largely English monolinguals (less than 3% had either speaking or reading fluency in the non-English language).

These patterns hold without exception across all of the ethnic groups, and demonstrate the "straight line" rapidity with which English is acquired and comes to be preferred by immigrants who arrive at a young age and by the U.S.-born children and grandchildren of immigrants. However, as Table 7 documents, all of the Asian-origin groups are much more likely than all of the Spanish-speakers to lose bilingual skills (especially literacy skills) by the second generation, and to effectively become English monolinguals among the 2.5ers. Thus, among those of Mexican descent, between half and two thirds of the 1.5 and 2.0 cohorts can still speak and read Spanish very well, but those proportions fall to between a quarter and a third in the 2.5 cohort, and decrease to single digits by the 3<sup>rd</sup>+. (For comparative data on Spanish language retention across four to five generations of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio, see Telles and Ortiz, 2008.) Indeed, in a recent study of "linguistic life expectancies," also using the merged CILS-III and IIMMLA data sets, we estimated the average number of generations a mother tongue can be expected to survive after the arrival of an immigrant in Southern California—home for the nation's largest concentration of immigrants, including Spanish-speakers. The analysis showed that even among those of Mexican origin, the Spanish language "died" by the third generation; all other languages "died" between the second and third generations (Rumbaut et al., 2006).

Indicators of "downward assimilation." If English proficiency is a correlate of upward educational and economic mobility in early adulthood, other life events and experiences can function as negative turning points to detour or derail such socioeconomic trajectories—especially, as noted earlier, entanglements with the criminal justice system and premature childbearing. *Table 8* presents results by ethnicity, generation and gender of four such indicators of "downward assimilation:" among the men, whether they had ever been arrested or incarcerated (which in most cases involved being convicted and sentenced for the commission of a crime); and among the women, whether they had borne children out of wedlock or had been teen parents (had a child between the ages of 14 and 20). There are striking differences in each of these indicators between ethnic groups and generational cohorts.

Among the nearly 3,000 men in this Southern California sample (whose mean age was 27.5), the rates of arrest and incarceration were highest by far for blacks (almost all of whom were 4<sup>th</sup>+ generation African Americans), and lowest for Asians, with whites and Hispanics in between. Among native-stock blacks, fully 40% had been arrested at some point by the police and 27% had been incarcerated; among both native-stock whites and Hispanics, 29% had ever been arrested and 18% incarcerated; and among Asians, the respective figures were 10% and 6%. Intergenerational differences are strongly



significant overall, with the U.S.-born (second and 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations) much more likely to become ensnared with the criminal justice system than the foreign-born (the 1.5 generation), reflecting the national patterns noted earlier among young adult men 18 to 34 (*cf.* Rumbaut 2005b; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007). The patterns are linear, but with the outcomes worsening over time and generation—and acculturation—in the United States: among the 1.5ers, 13% had ever been arrested and 8% incarcerated, compared to 21% and 12% respectively in the second generation, and 36% and 24% in the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations.

**Table 8.**  
**Turning Points in Social Mobility among Young Adults:**  
**Arrest and Incarceration (men) and Early Childbearing (women)**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples: N=2,971 males, 3,164 females)

Ethnicity and Generation		Criminal Justice (males only)		Childbearing (females only)		
		% ever arrested	% ever incarcerated	% teenage childbearing	% non-marital childbearing	
<b>Panethnicity:</b>						
Hispanic	1.5-3rd+	29.0	18.1	28.1	18.0	
Asian	1.5-2nd	10.4	5.7	7.7	5.6	
Black	3rd+	40.4	27.3	28.0	32.2	
White	3rd+	29.4	18.1	14.2	11.8	
<b>Ethnicity:</b>						
Mexican	1.5	22.3	11.9	31.2	19.9	
	2nd	29.8	20.4	30.1	16.7	
	3rd+	39.6	26.6	29.2	18.2	
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	1.5	21.3	11.2	33.7	19.6	
	2nd	36.7	17.3	27.7	24.8	
Other Latin American	1.5	17.4	15.2	8.9	11.1	
	2nd	21.3	11.5	12.5	13.6	
Filipino	1.5	13.3	8.2	9.7	6.9	
	2nd	9.6	5.7	11.6	9.9	
Chinese	1.5	5.8	2.9	0.0	4.1	
	2nd	7.4	1.9	0.0	3.3	
Korean	1.5	11.6	3.9	0.8	0.6	
	2nd	18.1	2.8	8.9	2.5	
Vietnamese	1.5	8.1	5.8	3.3	3.3	
	2nd	12.7	9.9	8.2	3.5	
Cambodian, Laotian	1.5	8.4	8.4	21.3	10.2	
	2nd	20.0	20.0	NA	NA	
All other nationalities	1.5	12.3	7.0	6.6	5.3	
	2nd	21.7	11.9	11.7	9.4	
<b>Total by Generation:</b>		1.5	13.2	7.8	13.5	9.0
		2nd	20.7	12.1	17.6	12.1
		3rd+	36.3	23.8	23.8	20.8

Source: IIMMLA survey; CILS-III, San Diego.

Indeed, the rates for all of the immigrants and U.S.-born children of immigrants in this sample are lower than the rates for native-stock whites (see Kasinitz *et al.*, 2008:188, for parallel results in New York City, where rates of arrest and incarceration for a similarly aged sample of native-stock white men were 23% and 10%, and for black men 33% and 16%, while those for 1.5- and 2<sup>nd</sup>-generation Chinese were in the single digits and other immigrant-stock groups fell in between). For the large

Mexican-origin subsample, the intergenerational patterns are clear: among the Mexican-born 1.5ers, 22% had ever been arrested and 12% incarcerated, compared to 30% and 20% respectively in the second generation, and almost 40% and 27% in the 3<sup>rd</sup>+. The latter figures are identical to those for African American men—the highest observed in this sample, as well as nationally. Given the huge size of the Mexican-origin first and second generations compared to other groups in the United States, this is a finding fraught with implications for the future—not only for the downward mobility prospects of the men caught in a cycle of arrest and imprisonment (who typically have high rates of recidivism after release), but also for both the short-term and long-term effects on their ethnic communities.

Of the 3,164 women in this sample (whose mean age was 27.4), 44% had borne one or more children; half (52%) were single and a third were married (33%), with the remainder cohabiting or divorced (7% each). Rates of non-marital and teenage childbearing were highest for African Americans—32% and 28%, respectively. Among Hispanics, 18% reported unmarried births, but an equally high 28% had become teen parents. The rates for whites—12% and 14%—were about half those of Hispanics; while the rates for Asians—6% and 8%—were half those of whites and the lowest overall. Again, intergenerational differences are significant overall, with the U.S.-born (second and 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations) more likely to become unmarried or teen parents than the foreign-born (the 1.5 generation). Among the 1.5ers, only 9% had a child out of wedlock and 13% by or before age 20; in the second generation those rates increased to 12% and 18% respectively, and in the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ to 21% and 24%. The Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans were much more likely to have children, and to have had children between the ages of 14 and 20; for them, those rates (especially of teen births) were very high irrespective of generational status, and that extended into the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations among Mexican-descent women. The Chinese, Koreans and Vietnamese were least likely to have children, or to have become unmarried or teen parents (indeed, not a single Chinese woman had a teen birth). Filipinas and non-Hispanic white women were in between in these indicators. Their effects on educational attainment and ethnic inequality will be examined below.

Educational Achievement. Education, and particularly the attainment of a college degree, increasingly determines the occupational and economic opportunities and payoffs available to young adults in the U.S., and hence their prospects for upward (or downward) mobility in relation both to their peers and to their parents. Access to and success in higher education, in turn, is shaped by a complex of factors, including all of those examined above—as well as by early school achievement. *Table 9* presents two measures of educational attainment, broken down by ethnicity (and generational cohort for those of Mexican descent): their average grades in high school<sup>3</sup> (during adolescence); and their highest level of education attained (in adulthood). The latter specify the proportion that dropped out of high school,

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<sup>3</sup> High school grades were measured for CILS-San Diego respondents by official academic grade point averages calculated by the school district at the end of high school, on a 4-point scale (where A=4). IIMMLA respondents provided self-reports of high school GPAs. The measures were recoded so that “mostly As”=GPAs above 3.5, “mostly Bs”=2.5 to 3.5, “mostly C’s”=1.5 to 2.5, and “mostly Ds, Fs”=GPAs below 1.5.

**Table 9.**  
**Educational Attainment: Early Achievement (High School Grades) and Highest Education Attained, by Ethnicity and Generation**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples)

<i>(In percents)</i>	<b>High School Grades</b>				<b>Highest Educational Attainment<sup>1</sup></b>				
	Mostly Ds, Fs	Mostly Cs	Mostly Bs	Mostly As	High school dropout	High school graduate	Some college	Bachelor's degree (25 and older)	Advanced degree (25 and older)
<b>Panethnicity</b>									
Hispanic	10.2	29.6	45.0	15.3	17.6	25.3	41.0	14.1	7.2
Asian	5.2	11.4	43.0	40.4	2.7	11.0	42.6	40.9	18.0
(3rd+ gen.) Black	2.5	34.0	50.6	12.8	15.4	19.6	44.6	17.9	6.2
(3rd+ gen.) White	3.1	20.0	46.0	30.8	9.4	14.9	32.8	31.3	17.5
<b>Ethnicity</b>									
(1.5 gen.) Mexican	17.5	26.0	44.2	12.3	29.6	26.5	32.6	10.3	4.4
(2nd gen.) Mexican	13.6	31.9	41.3	13.2	15.0	28.9	42.2	11.7	7.7
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican	4.0	34.9	44.1	17.0	18.5	26.4	38.4	13.7	5.8
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	4.2	27.9	53.2	14.7	15.5	21.6	46.6	16.9	7.1
Other Latin American	5.4	21.7	47.1	25.8	7.1	15.0	47.1	23.3	12.9
Filipino	7.5	15.3	45.1	32.1	2.3	11.8	52.9	33.2	9.8
Chinese	1.8	7.4	39.5	51.3	0.7	5.3	30.9	49.0	33.3
Korean	1.7	8.1	40.2	50.0	2.2	6.6	31.6	50.8	26.6
Vietnamese	3.7	8.6	42.2	45.4	2.7	7.8	43.7	44.4	14.1
Cambodian, Laotian	13.5	16.0	50.5	20.0	6.5	40.0	39.0	12.3	3.7
All other nationalities	2.5	17.0	45.9	34.7	6.5	13.2	38.5	27.0	19.6
<b>Total</b>	6.6	20.6	44.7	28.2	9.6	17.3	41.3	26.6	13.0

Source: IIMMLA survey; CILS-III, San Diego.

<sup>1</sup> Educational attainment for Bachelor's or advanced degrees is reported only for

those who graduated from high school but went no further in their education, those who had some college but did not complete a “4-year” degree, and (for those 25 and older) those who earned a bachelor’s or an advanced degree (a master’s, doctorate, or professional degree). By both measures there are very significant ethnic differences. In general, the results reflect a pattern of transmission of educational (and socioeconomic) advantages and disadvantages from one generation to the other, observable in the children’s generation both in their high school grades during adolescence as well as in the highest level of education completed in adulthood.

Intergroup differences in early achievement are clearly discernible in high school grades. Getting mostly As in high school were Asian students (40%), followed by whites (31%), with Hispanics (15%) and blacks (13%) trailing well behind. Hispanics were more likely than other groups to get mostly Ds and Fs (10%), and blacks to get mostly Cs (34%). A clearer picture emerges when these panethnic categories are disaggregated by nationality and generation. Mexicans in both the 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations, as well as Cambodians and Laotians, were the groups most likely to get mostly Ds and Fs (14%)—but not the Salvadoran and Guatemalans, the majority of whom (53%) were B students. At the other end of the scale, fully half of the Chinese (51%) and Koreans (50%) were A students, followed closely by the Vietnamese (45%), but only a third of the Filipinos (32%) received mainly As, slightly above the proportion for whites.

A decade or so later on average, what was the highest level of educational attainment they had attained? Overall, 10% were high school dropouts, another 17% had attained only a high school diploma, and 41% had some college experience (but no college degree). At the other end, among those 25 and older, 27% had earned a Bachelor’s degree, and another 13% an advanced degree (or were enrolled in graduate or professional school). Virtually the same wide achievement gaps seen in high school are observable between groups in adulthood. High school dropout rates were much higher among Hispanics (18%) and blacks (15%) than among whites (8%) and Asians (under 3%). Asians (41%) and whites (31%) were twice as likely as Hispanics (14%) and blacks (18%) to have earned a Bachelor’s degree, and in addition Asians (18%) and whites (17%) were more than twice as likely as Hispanics and blacks to have earned advanced degrees (or be in the process of earning them). These results for a Southern California sample are only slightly more positive than those reported earlier with national-level survey data, and the interethnic group rank order matches the results precisely.

Examining educational attainment outcomes more closely by national origin and generation reveals wider differences—suggestive of widening future socioeconomic inequalities segmented by ethnicity. By far the most outstanding level of achievement is observed among the Chinese, with the lowest high school dropout rate (a miniscule 0.7%) and lowest high school-only attainment (5%), along with an extraordinarily high 33% who had earned or were earning an advanced degree, and another 49% who had already earned a Bachelor’s degree (see Kasinitz *et al.*, 2008, for similar results among the Chinese in New York City). They were followed closely by the Koreans (27% had earned or were earning an advanced degree, another 51% had a Bachelor’s, only 2% had failed to complete high school), and then the Vietnamese (14% had earned or was earning an advanced degree, another 44% had a Bachelor’s, only 3% had dropped out of high school). The Filipinos most closely resembled

majority-group whites, and the Salvadorans and Guatemalans resembled minority-group blacks, in their patterns of educational attainment. The Mexicans, Cambodians and Laotians were at the bottom of the achievement hierarchy, with the Mexicans having the highest dropout rates of any group.

In the Mexican case, data permit a more detailed analysis by generation, from the 1.5 to the second to the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ cohorts. Here the patterns are not linear, but reflect, first, a very significant improvement in high school dropout rates from the 1.5 to the second generation (cut in half from 30% to 15%), and a slight improvement in college graduation rates (from about 14% to 18%). However, achievement peaks in the second generation: by the 3<sup>rd</sup>+, high school dropout rates increase to 18%, while involvement in advanced-level education declines slightly.

### **Intergenerational Educational Mobility: Immigrant Parents and their Adult Children**

How do these patterns of educational attainment among young adults compare with those of their parents? Given the diversity of class origins among these nationalities, what evidence is there of intergenerational mobility in the level of education achieved by the adult children of immigrants vis-à-vis that of their parents? *Table 10* summarizes the relevant data for sons and daughters and for their fathers and mothers, looking at two extremes of educational attainment. The left panel of the table shows the percent of college graduates among them; the right panel, the percent that did not finish high school. In each a mobility index is calculated: in the former, the child-parent (C-P) measure shows the percent by which adult children exceed their parents in earning a college degree or more (or not); in the latter, the parent-child (P-C) measure shows the differential between parents and children in failing to complete high school. As such they gauge the extent of intergenerational mobility at each pole of the educational attainment spectrum.

For the sample as a whole, we note first that females outperform males in educational achievement: daughters are slightly more likely than sons to have completed college degrees, and less likely to have dropped out of high school. But among their parents the opposite is the case: fathers were more likely than mothers to have a college degree, although both were about as likely to have not completed high school. The C-P differential is 13% (*i.e.*, 13% more children were college graduates than are their parents—indeed, some are the first in their families to attend college); at the other extreme, the P-C differential is 24% (*i.e.*, 24% more parents than children had failed to finish high school).

Again wide differences in parent-child educational mobility are apparent between groups, by both ethnicity and gender. First, as points of comparison for the mobility experience of the immigrant groups, we provide data for native-stock whites and blacks. At the upper end (attaining a college degree), half of white daughters were college graduates (51%) compared to only a third of their mothers (33%), and white sons (47%) were also more likely than their fathers (40%) to earn at least a bachelor's degree; the C-P index for whites was a moderate 12%. But fewer black daughters (23%) were college graduates compared to their mothers (26%), while black sons (25%) were somewhat more likely to have a college degree than their fathers (21%); as a result, the C-P index for blacks was

**Table 10.**  
**Intergenerational Mobility: Educational Attainment of Sons and Daughters vs. Fathers and Mothers**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples)

<i>(In percents)</i>	% College graduate or more				C-P Mobility Differential <sup>2</sup>	% Less than high school graduate				P-C Mobility Differential <sup>3</sup>
	Sons <sup>1</sup> (25 and older)	Daughters <sup>1</sup> (25 and older)	Fathers	Mothers		Fathers	Mothers	Sons	Daughters	
<b>Panethnicity</b>										
Hispanic	20.9	21.7	10.7	8.4	11.8	53.3	53.6	20.3	15.2	35.8
Asian	55.2	63.0	41.7	35.4	20.5	21.8	26.5	2.7	2.7	21.4
(3rd+ gen.) Black	24.8	23.4	21.1	25.9	0.6	28.9	14.4	15.8	15.0	6.2
(3rd+ gen.) White	46.6	50.9	40.5	33.5	11.7	15.2	11.2	12.3	6.6	3.7
<b>Ethnicity</b>										
(1.5 gen.) Mexican	17.2	12.5	5.2	1.7	11.4	78.5	82.3	31.7	27.6	50.7
(2nd gen.) Mexican	22.1	16.8	6.2	5.9	13.4	58.7	58.7	19.1	11.3	43.5
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican	18.4	20.7	12.7	10.5	7.9	27.9	28.2	21.4	15.8	9.5
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	17.0	31.0	11.1	7.9	14.5	56.6	55.3	16.0	15.0	40.4
Other Latin American	34.7	37.4	31.3	26.7	7.1	27.9	25.8	8.4	6.0	19.7
Filipino	37.4	49.2	43.7	49.8	-3.5	11.9	13.8	2.1	2.6	10.5
Chinese	83.3	81.1	55.4	38.1	35.4	16.2	20.3	0.4	1.1	17.5
Korean	74.8	80.0	60.3	44.6	24.9	8.8	12.5	2.0	2.4	8.5
Vietnamese	50.3	68.6	24.7	13.4	40.4	36.4	45.4	4.1	1.4	38.2
Cambodian, Laotian	12.8	19.0	9.5	5.5	8.4	69.5	81.0	6.8	6.3	68.7
All other nationalities	48.9	44.7	39.8	32.2	10.7	19.5	14.8	5.0	7.7	10.8
<b>Total</b>	38.7	40.4	28.7	24.6	12.9	33.2	33.9	10.6	8.7	23.9

Source: IIMMLA survey; CILS-III, San Diego.

<sup>1</sup> The attainment of 4-year college degrees or more is reported only for sons and daughters

<sup>2</sup> High-end Child-Parent (C-P) Mobility Differential = mean college graduation rate of sons and daughters minus the mean of

<sup>3</sup> Low-end Parent-Child (P-C) Mobility Differential = mean 'dropout' rates (less than high school) of fathers and mothers minus the mean of

essentially zero, indicating no intergenerational educational mobility in college-level educational attainment. At the lower end (dropping out of high school), the P-C differential for both whites and blacks was in the single digits, reflecting relatively little mobility (although the dropout rate for black fathers was twice that of black mothers, 29% to 14%, while the dropout rates for their sons and daughters was 15%).

Among Asians, however, daughters were far more likely than mothers to earn college degrees (63% to 35%), and sons were also more likely than their fathers (55% to 42%); their C-P differential was a significant 21%. And at the other pole, Asian fathers and mothers were nearly ten times more likely than their sons and daughters to have less than a high school diploma; the P-C differential was also 21%. Hispanics as a whole reflected a still different pattern, although also indicative of considerable intergenerational educational mobility, especially at the lower end of achievement: the C-P differential was 12%, but the P-C differential was three times greater, 36%.

And again the differences are much sharper when examined by national origin and generation, rather than lumped into panethnic aggregates. Remarkably, over 80% of Chinese sons and daughters, and 75% to 80% of the Koreans, had college degrees or more; their immigrant fathers and mothers also had the highest proportion of college graduates of any group in the study (40% to 60%), but the superior achievement of their children still produced a C-P index of 35% for the Chinese and 25% for the Koreans. The C-P index of the Vietnamese, 40%, was the highest of all—a reflection of the fact that, while only 25% and 13% of their fathers and mothers were college graduates, 50% of their sons and an extraordinary 69% of their daughters had already attained a bachelor's degree or more. At the other end of the Vietnamese mobility story, the P-C index was 38%—a reflection of tiny high school dropout rates among the children, but large proportions among the fathers and mothers (36% to 45%) who did not complete secondary schooling in Vietnam. Indeed, the Vietnamese significantly surpassed the Filipinos, although Vietnamese parents were comparatively much more disadvantaged. The Filipinos, despite the superior educational profile of their immigrant parents (especially mothers, 50% of whom had college degrees), registered the only negative C-P index score: -3.5%. A lower proportion of Filipino children (especially sons) had attained a college degree, although they still achieved at about the same level as native whites. On the other hand, their high school dropout rates were less than 3% (much lower than the rates for white peers), producing a Filipino P-C score of 10% (suggesting upward educational mobility at the lower end). And the Cambodians and Laotians, the poorest and least educated of the Asian groups among both parents and children, reflected sharply different mobility scores: a C-P index of 8% (since very few are yet graduating from college), and a P-C index of 69%, by far the largest of any group (because the high school dropout rates of the sons and daughters were less than 7%, compared to 70% to 81% among their fathers and mothers, who hailed largely from rural Southeast Asia).

Among the groups of Latin American origin, the Salvadorans and Guatemalans exhibit moderate intergenerational educational mobility at the high end, with a C-P index of 15%, most of it reflecting the wide differential in college graduation rates between daughters (31%) and mothers (8%). At the low end of the achievement spectrum, the Salvadorans and Guatemalans show a large P-C mobility

score (40%)—reflecting the fact that more than half of their fathers and mothers had less than a high school education. The Mexicans, despite having a greater proportion of high school dropouts than other groups, had still achieved much higher levels of education than their immigrant parents—moderately at the high end, strongly at the low end. In their case, because we have data for multigenerational cohorts, it is possible to examine how intergenerational mobility patterns differed for both parents and children.

For parents, the patterns are strongly linear: among both fathers and mothers, college graduation rates, although small, increase from the 1.5 to the second generation, and are highest among 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation parents; conversely, while around 80% of the parents of 1.5 generation children never completed a secondary education, that proportion falls to 59% among the parents of the second generation, and to 28% for the 3<sup>rd</sup>+. However, for their children, the patterns are not linear: college graduation rates increase modestly from the 1.5 to the second generation, and more for sons than for daughters; high school dropout rates are significantly reduced from the 1.5 to the second generation, though more for daughters than for sons. In the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation, however, dropout rates increase again—suggesting a deterioration of educational outcomes among that segment of native-born Mexican Americans—while college graduation rates also decline for 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation sons, though increasing modestly for daughters. In general, educational achievement appears to peak in the second generation, and to become stymied thereafter (a finding confirmed by Telles and Ortiz [2008] in their multigenerational study of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio). While the evidence points to upward educational mobility for Mexican Americans when compared to their parents' generation, they nonetheless remain at the bottom of the status hierarchy when compared to their same-age peers in Southern California, with widening achievement gaps. Taken together, these results point to a pattern of sharp and broadening ethnic segmentation with respect to educational attainment—and, by implication, to the occupational and economic futures of the second generation.

## **Predicting Educational Attainment in Adulthood**

What predicts these educational attainment outcomes? *Table 11* presents the results of multiple linear regression models examining the effects of hypothesized antecedent variables (reviewed above) on total years of education attained—the central outcome in this study of upward or downward mobility among children of immigrants. Controlling for age and gender, factors predicted to lead to educational success or failure were generational status, ethnicity (a proxy for modes of incorporation experienced by different immigrant groups, as roughly indexed by the contexts of exit and reception of different nationalities), parental status (education, homeownership, citizenship), family structure growing up, and early achievement. Also examined is the association of incarceration, childbearing, and linguistic acculturation with educational attainment.



**Table 11.**  
**Regression of Years of Education Completed on Selected Predictors**  
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego sample, N=6,135)

Predictors	I			II			III			IV			V		
	B	t <sup>1</sup>	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.
<b>Age, Gender, Generation:</b>															
Age (years)	0.061	12.07	***	0.059	12.71	***	0.055	12.42	***	0.053	12.81	***	0.061	13.20	***
Gender (female)	0.206	3.75	***	0.249	4.97	***	0.294	6.19	***	0.041	0.93	NS	0.151	3.35	**
1.5 generation	0.679	8.78	***	-0.193	-2.09	*	0.513	5.32	***	0.513	5.76	***	0.409	4.46	***
2.0 generation	0.847	10.32	***	0.230	2.51	*	0.602	6.70	***	0.617	7.43	***	0.512	6.14	***
2.5 generation	0.425	4.03	***	-0.006	-0.06	NS	0.312	3.09	**	0.367	3.94	***	0.347	3.82	***
<b>Ethnicity:<sup>2</sup></b>															
Mexican				-1.401	-17.96	***	-0.766	-9.76	***	-0.506	-6.92	***	-0.345	-4.80	***
Salvadoran, Guatemalan				-1.010	-8.22	***	-0.417	-3.51	***	-0.359	-3.28	**	-0.239	-2.24	*
Filipino				0.281	3.00	**	-0.149	-1.65	NS	-0.024	-0.29	NS	0.005	0.06	NS
Chinese				1.297	11.10	***	0.878	7.85	***	0.571	5.50	***	0.529	5.25	***
Korean				1.094	9.08	***	0.624	5.40	***	0.365	3.40	**	0.357	3.43	**
Vietnamese				0.766	6.97	***	0.841	7.90	***	0.507	5.12	***	0.475	4.94	***
Cambodian, Laotian				-0.772	-4.76	***	0.014	0.09	NS	0.109	0.75	NS	0.069	0.49	NS
Non-Hispanic Black				-1.061	-8.48	***	-0.583	-4.85	***	-0.346	-3.11	**	-0.138	-1.28	NS
<b>Parental Status:</b>															
Parents not US citizens							-0.295	-7.60	***	-0.291	-8.10	***	-0.238	-6.79	***
Parents' education							0.396	18.89	***	0.293	14.89	***	0.250	13.03	***
Parents' homeownership							0.496	8.64	***	0.343	6.42	***	0.310	5.98	***
2-parent family							0.297	5.38	***	0.184	3.60	***	0.111	2.22	*
<b>Early Achievement:</b>															
High school GPA										0.964	32.10	***	0.868	29.48	***
<b>Turning Points:</b>															
Been incarcerated													-0.626	-7.51	***
Had child ages 14-20													-1.267	-16.90	***
Had child ages 20-24													-0.822	-11.75	***
Had child at 25 or older													-0.126	-1.69	NS
<b>Acculturation:</b>															
Prefers English at home													0.225	3.99	***
Speaks non-English very well													0.195	3.53	***
Constant	12.11	73.05	***	12.99	78.48	***	12.21	75.42	***	9.44	54.59	***	9.57	53.92	***
R <sup>2</sup> =		0.035			0.200			0.285			0.387			0.428	

Significance: \*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .01, \* p < .05, NS = not significant.

<sup>1</sup> Measure of strength of association (unstandardized regression coefficient divided by its standard error).

<sup>2</sup> 3rd+ generation (native-born/native-parentage) non-Hispanic whites are the reference group.

In the equations in Table 11, years of education completed are regressed on four sets of antecedent variables, entered sequentially into the analysis: (1) age, gender, and generation (the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation is the referent group); (2) ethnicity (non-Hispanic whites are the referent group); (3) parental status (parents' education, homeownership, citizenship) and family structure growing up; and (4) early achievement (as measured by high school grades). Educational attainment is fairly well accounted for in these models: jointly the predictor variables explain more than a third of the variance in years of education completed ( $R^2 = .387$ ). Finally, (5) added to the equation in the last panel of Table 11 are two key life change events (becoming a teen parent and ever having been incarcerated), expected to derail post-secondary school trajectories; and two measures of language preference and bilingualism (preference for speaking English at home, and ability to speak a non-English language very well). We are interested in examining their associations with educational attainment, but the temporal order of their effects cannot be clearly established with cross-sectional data (*e.g.*, an individual could have left school prior to or even as a result of being imprisoned or having a child).

The first model in Table 11 enters dummy variables for three key generational cohorts indexing children of *immigrants* (1.5, 2.0, 2.5), with the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation (children of *natives*) as the referent group, controlling for age and gender. All three generational cohorts (and the 2.0 cohort more than the other two) are associated with the completion of more years of education than 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation natives. All ethnic group indicators added into the equation in the second model have significant effects: the Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Cambodians and Laotians, and non-Hispanic blacks complete fewer years of education than 3<sup>rd</sup>+ non-Hispanic whites (the referent group), while Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese and Filipinos complete more years of education. Together these predictors explain 20% of the variance in educational attainment ( $R^2 = .200$ ).

The measures of parental socioeconomic and legal status (parents' education, homeownership, and U.S. citizenship) and of family structure (growing up in a two-parent family) have stronger effects on the outcome variable, above all parental education ( $t = 18.9$ ). When these are entered into the model, the previously significant effects of Filipino, Cambodian and Laotian ethnicity wash out (suggesting that their effects are accounted for by parental status variables). The single measure of early school achievement (GPA earned in high school) has by far the strongest net effect on highest education attained in adulthood ( $t = 32.1$ ); and once this is accounted for, gender fades into insignificance (females had significantly outperformed males in both high school grades and subsequent educational attainment). Most other predictors are attenuated in the fourth model but retain significant effects, while the effects of all three generational cohorts are strengthened—and the  $R^2$  increases to .387.

Having been incarcerated, and having had children (at ages 14-20, 21-24, and 25 or older), have significant negative effects on years of education completed, confirming their association with downward educational mobility in early adulthood. The younger the age at which the respondent became a parent (especially before age 20), the more negative the effect. Once these are entered (becoming a prisoner and prematurely becoming a parent), the negative association of non-Hispanic blacks with educational achievement washes out, suggesting that it is explained by them. However, Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan ethnicities retain negative significant effects on educational

attainment, while Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese retain positive effects, suggesting that, compared to native whites in this sample, there are additional characteristics about these groups not measured here that shape their divergent educational mobility trajectories. Finally, although we cannot disentangle a causal sequence with cross-sectional data, *both* language measures entered in this last model (preference for English at home, spoken fluency in a non-English language) are found to be significantly and positively associated with educational attainment, net of all other factors, suggesting that fluent bilingualism facilitates educational achievement (*cf.* Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, 2006). The  $R^2$  in this final model increases to .428. A similar model predicting educational attainment among the ISGMNY sample in New York City, with an adjusted  $R^2$  of .335, is reported by Kasinitz *et al.* (2008:144). In both the New York and Southern California cases, having a child had the strongest negative effect on educational attainment, while parental education (and high school grades in this study) had the strongest positive effect.

### **Predicting the Odds of Incarceration and Teenage Childbearing**

*Table 12* presents the results of logistic regressions analyzing the likelihood of having been incarcerated (for men) and of having had children before age 20 (for women). In both regressions, 3<sup>rd</sup>+ non-Hispanic whites are the reference group. In the equation on the left panel, predicting the odds of incarceration for males only, again the strongest determinant is early achievement (as measured by high school grades): being convicted and jailed for a crime, an overwhelmingly male phenomenon, is most strongly associated with poor educational attainment in adolescence (the Wald statistic is 53.8). That is followed in predictive strength by the generational status variables: compared to the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation (of native-stock white parents), the least likely to be incarcerated are the foreign-born 1.5-generation children of immigrants (Wald=26.4), followed by the U.S.-born 2.0 generation with two immigrant parents (Wald=15.7), and more weakly by the 2.5 cohort with one immigrant parent (Wald=2.8), confirming the data reviewed earlier and the research literature on “paradoxes of assimilation” (*e.g.*, Rumbaut 1997; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007). Parents’ education is negatively correlated with the likelihood of incarceration (Wald=24.2)—*i.e.*, involvement with the criminal justice system is in part a function of social class. Having been raised in a two-parent family also reduces the odds of incarceration for men (Wald=17.1), while growing up in dangerous neighborhoods (with major problems of drugs, crime and gangs) increases the odds (Wald=7.8). None of the ethnic group variables was significantly linked to incarceration—they all wash out once the other predictor variables are controlled—despite the fact that non-Hispanic blacks and Mexicans had the highest rates of arrest and incarceration, suggesting that the variables that remain in the equation account for those associations.

The equation on the right panel of *Table 12* examines the effect of the same set of determinants on the odds of teenage childbearing among females. Like the equation predicting incarceration, lower GPA in high school was the strongest predictor of teen births (Wald=50.8). Unlike the equation predicting incarceration, most of the ethnicity variables emerged as significant predictors, except for the Chinese, Koreans and Vietnamese. With other factors controlled for, Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan women were much more likely than other groups to have children very early, followed by non-

Hispanic blacks and Filipinas, and more weakly by Cambodians and Laotians.<sup>4</sup> Having been raised in a two-parent family significantly reduces the odds of teenage childbearing (Wald=16.4), while growing up in neighborhoods with major problems of drugs, crime and gangs increased the odds of teen births (Wald=4.8). Lower parental education, above all low *maternal* education, significantly increased the odds of early childbearing, as did having parents who were not U.S. citizens (who were also less acculturated and in more vulnerable legal statuses). And as with incarceration, generational cohort was significantly associated with childbearing among teenage girls: the 1.5 and 2.0 cohorts were significantly *less* likely to become teen parents, compared to 3<sup>rd</sup> generation native whites. Here again the evidence points to a protective or buffering net effect of immigrant families (*cf.* Harris, 1999), which appears paradoxically to deteriorate with acculturation and generation.

**Table 12.**  
**Logistic Regressions: Predictors of Incarceration (for Men) and Early Childbearing (for Women)**  
 (Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego sample: N=2,971 males, 3,164 females)

Predictors	Was incarcerated (males)				Had a child before age 20 (females)			
	<i>B</i>	Wald <sup>1</sup>	Sig.	Odds	<i>B</i>	Wald <sup>1</sup>	Sig.	Odds
<b>Age, Generation:</b>								
Age (years)	0.010	0.90	NS	1.010	0.000	0.00	NS	1.000
1.5 generation	-1.164	26.43	***	0.312	-0.936	21.56	***	0.392
2.0 generation	-0.777	15.65	***	0.460	-0.737	16.29	***	0.478
2.5 generation	-0.360	2.79	†	0.698	0.057	0.09	NS	1.059
<b>Ethnicity:<sup>2</sup></b>								
Mexican	0.184	1.16	NS	1.202	0.954	33.00	***	2.596
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	0.213	0.64	NS	1.238	1.228	29.32	***	3.413
Filipino	-0.125	0.27	NS	0.883	0.625	8.79	**	1.868
Korean	-0.316	0.56	NS	0.729	-0.197	0.25	NS	0.821
Vietnamese	0.006	0.00	NS	1.007	-0.202	0.39	NS	0.817
Cambodian, Laotian	-0.175	0.17	NS	0.840	0.623	4.19	*	1.865
Non-Hispanic Black	0.266	1.28	NS	1.305	0.869	14.18	***	2.385
<b>Parent/Family Contexts:</b>								
Parents not US citizens	-0.007	0.01	NS	0.993	0.360	19.86	***	1.433
Parents' education	-0.272	24.16	***	0.762	-0.254	24.77	***	0.775
2-parent family	-0.507	17.07	***	0.602	-0.430	16.38	***	0.651
Neighborhood drugs, gangs	0.377	7.82	**	1.458	0.281	4.81	*	1.325
<b>Early Achievement:</b>								
High school GPA	-0.588	53.81	***	0.555	-0.487	50.85	***	0.614
Constant	0.051	0.01	NS	1.053	-0.337	0.71	NS	0.714
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup> =		0.175				0.221		

Significance: \*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .01, \* p < .05, † p < .10, NS = not significant.

<sup>1</sup> Measure of strength of association (square of the logistic regression coefficient divided by its standard error).

<sup>2</sup> 3rd+ generation (native-born/native-parentage) non-Hispanic whites are the reference group.

<sup>4</sup> Because the Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans, as well as the Filipinas, were Catholics and reported more frequent attendance at religious services, a separate analysis (not shown) inserted Catholic religion and frequency of religious participation as potential predictors, but found they had no effect on childbearing outcomes. It was not religious belief or behavior that was linked to the outcome, but ethnicity, which remained significant regardless.

## Conclusions and Implications

The magnitude of the extraordinary transformations wrought by the present era of international migration is vividly seen today in California, the nation's largest state by far. Of the state's 36 million people, as estimated by the 2006 Current Population Survey, over a fourth (27%) were foreign born—as were a third (34%) of its workers. But half of all its children and teenagers (ages 0-19) were the U.S.-reared 1.5- and second-generation offspring of immigrants, as were nearly a third of all its young adults (ages 20-39). These generational differences are more noticeable still in Southern California, especially among the 16 million people concentrated in the three contiguous coastal counties of Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego: there, a striking 58% of the region's children and teenagers (0-19) were 1.5 and second generation, as were 44% of all young adults (20-39). California's future—and that of a country being transformed by immigration—will be fundamentally shaped by how the coming second generation is incorporated in its economy, polity and society. Virtually every aspect of that incorporation will be shaped, in turn, by the nature and extent of their access to and attainment of post-secondary education, and of the manifold payoffs to that education. Indeed, immigrants and their children are expected to account for most of the growth of the U.S. labor force in the coming two decades, with the fastest growing occupations requiring college degrees; in California, there are already not enough eligible college graduates to meet demand (Johnson and Reed, 2007).

For the children of immigrants, their prospects for socioeconomic mobility hinge on their access to public colleges and universities—much as in the last century City College served as the principal conduit to higher education for the sons and daughters of New York's immigrants, and as a trampoline for their subsequent occupational and economic futures. California's system of public higher education is based on a three-tier “master plan” adopted by the legislature in 1960, which sought to balance the demands of excellence for the few and educational access for the many. Under the plan, the top eighth of the state's graduating high school seniors (as determined mainly by GPAs and test scores) were to be eligible to enter one of the University of California (UC) campuses, the top third would be able to enter one of the California State University (CSU) campuses, and the community colleges would accept all applicants. Today, more than 2.5 million students are enrolled in the state's 109 community colleges, and eligible graduates can transfer to the CSU or UC systems in order to complete Bachelor's degrees; the 23 CSU campuses, which annually award about half of the state's Bachelor's degrees and a third of its Master's degrees, enroll more than 410,000 students; and over 220,000 students are enrolled in the 10 UC campuses, with eligibility in fact met by applicants ranked in the top 4% of their high school class; doctoral degrees are awarded almost entirely by the UC. In Fall 2007, based on the University of California's annual statistical summary, of UC's 168,000 undergraduates, 43% were of Asian origin (including 17% Chinese) and 16% of Latin American ancestry (including 12% of Mexican origin)—though the respective shares of the Asian and Hispanic populations in the state were 12% and 36%—and the overwhelming majority of them were 1.5- and second-generation students. The 36% non-Hispanic whites and 3% blacks among UC's undergraduates were underrepresented relative to their proportions in the population—and even among them, between a fourth and a third were children of immigrants. In the UC Irvine campus, of

its nearly 22,000 undergraduates, fully 55% were Asians, with only 13% Latinos, 26% whites and 2% blacks. At UC Berkeley, one of the most selective universities in the country, two-thirds of all undergraduates admitted as freshmen were 1.5- or (especially) second-generation students, with very high GPAs and parents who themselves had high levels of educational attainment. These skewed “ethclass” proportions confirm statewide the IIMMLA and CILS results reported earlier: on the one hand, California’s public universities are veritable factories of social mobility; on the other, they reproduce, reinforce, and widen social inequalities.

This study presented findings from Southern California on the mobility trajectories of foreign-parentage young adults, focusing on key ethnic groups (Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan, Filipino, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian) with distinct modes of incorporation, compared to native-parentage peers (white, black and Mexican-American). The outcomes examined are not reducible to a simple or single unilinear master trend, but are complex, multidirectional, and sharply segmented by class, ethnicity, and gender. Huge differences in parental human capital define the modes of incorporation of different groups: among groups preponderantly composed of immigrant laborers (Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans) and refugees (Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians), both fathers and mothers had less than a high school education on average; in contrast, immigrant Filipino, Chinese, and Korean fathers and mothers were far more likely to be college graduates. The former in turn were much more likely than the latter to grow up in less stable residential contexts and in poorer and more dangerous neighborhoods. Still, compared to their parents, all groups show inter-generational educational progress, albeit at very different rates. Compared to their peers, the Chinese and to a lesser extent the Koreans (both males and females) show exceptional achievement, as do especially the daughters (much more so than the sons) of Vietnamese refugees, with very high ratios of college-graduates-to-high-school-dropouts (ranging from 33 to above 200 for Chinese sons). In comparison, the ratios for Filipinos are moderate (about 18), but nonetheless surpass those for native whites (which range from 4 for males to 8 for females). The respective ratios for Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Cambodians and Laotians range between 1 and 3—i.e., there are slightly more college graduates than high school dropouts among them—close to the ratios observed among native black young adults (1.5). Among the Mexicans—by far the largest immigrant group—the 1.5 generation is twice more likely to drop out of high school than to graduate from college; the second generation reverses the pattern, with college graduates slightly exceeding high school dropouts, as do among females in the 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generations; but among 3<sup>rd</sup>+ generation males, the ratio again falls below 1, with dropouts exceeding college graduates.

These highly stratified results are not accounted for by differences in English language acculturation. On the contrary, for all groups without exception, proficiency in and preference for English is well established by the second generation, and effectively completed by the third among those of Mexican origin, with bilingualism rapidly atrophying (despite some evidence that fluent bilingualism is positively associated with educational attainment). At the same time, with increasing acculturation and from generation to generation, some indices of downward assimilation also increase—notably experiences of arrest and incarceration among males, and partly also non-marital and teenage childbearing among females. Paradoxically, incarceration rates are lowest among immigrant young

men, even the least educated among them, but they increase sharply by the second and higher generations, especially among the least educated. For that matter, the likelihood of growing up in a non-intact family increases from the first to the second to the 3rd+ generations; that in turn is linked with lower educational achievement, higher odds of incarceration and teenage childbearing, and by implication diminished occupational and economic success—widening social inequalities in a spiral of cumulating disadvantage for a not insignificant segment of these newcomer populations.

Immigrants' modes of incorporation differ not only by parental human capital, but by the context of their reception and legal status at entry (with or without state authorization). Indeed, an undocumented status has become a caste-like master status blocking access to the opportunity structure and paths to social mobility. It has become all the more consequential since the passage of draconian federal laws in 1996, and most recently since the failure by Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reforms at the national level, including the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. Instead, hundreds of laws and ordinances have been enacted by states and localities aimed to achieve social control at the local level, and federal raids of workplaces and private homes and other enforcement campaigns have been intensified. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants have been deported ("removed") over the past decade, severing families and leaving behind as of 2005 at least 1.6 million spouses and children, many of whom are U.S. citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Of the approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (and nearly 3 million in California), an estimated 15% are children (Passell, 2006). They cannot be denied access to a public elementary or secondary education under the equal protection clause of the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as the Supreme Court ruled in *Plyler v. Doe* (1982). But about 65,000 who have lived in the U.S. for more than five years graduate from high school each year, and only between 5% to 10% of them go to college: without a means to adjust their status they are ineligible for most forms of college financial aid and are excluded from the legal workforce, creating a growing pool of acculturated young adults who are being forced further underground instead of forging educational credentials and occupational skills that would redound to the benefit of the state and the nation in a global economy (Gonzales, 2007). The predictable result is the structural reproduction of enduring ethnic inequalities in the second generation and beyond. As the native-parentage labor force continues to shrink in California and in the U.S.—a process that will be accelerated as the baby boom generation reaches retirement age—that is an outcome that a dynamic society changing by the day can ill afford.

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## **Appendix. The IIMMLA and CILS Surveys.**

The IIMMLA Survey. The Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles study was a computer-assisted telephone survey conducted in 2004 among targeted random samples of 1.5, 2nd, and selected 3<sup>rd</sup> and higher generation adults in the five-county Los Angeles metropolitan area, which encompasses Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura counties (Rumbaut *et al.*, 2003). For purposes of sample design, eligible adult immigrants were defined as “1.5 generation” if they came to the United States to live prior to the age of 15; as “2nd generation” if they were born in the United States and had at least one parent who was foreign-born; and as “3rd+ generations” if both they and their parents were U.S.-born.

Prior to the start of interviewing, targeted quotas for ten ethnic strata were established for eligible respondents between the ages of 20 and 40 in the five-county area, with emphasis on the largest case—the Mexican-origin population. The IIMMLA project also sampled a strategic set of other large immigrant and refugee origin-groups that were expected to differ in their modes of incorporation to the United States (the Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and Salvadorans and Guatemalans taken together). All groups were assigned a separate sampling stratum for 1.5-to-2nd generation respondents, and targeted quotas of 3rd+ generation respondents were also established for Mexican Americans, non-Hispanic whites, and non-Hispanic blacks, following the model of the New York Second Generation Study (Kasinitz *et al.* 2008). The final design called for completing approximately 4,700 closed-ended telephone interviews with random samples of eligible respondents, about 3,500 with 1.5-2nd-generation respondents and around 1,200 with 3rd+ generation respondents.

Multi-frame sampling procedures were used to improve the chances of finding and interviewing members of targeted populations. The first stage used random digit dialing (RDD) to sample and screen households in the five-county area, and using this approach the IIMMLA was able to complete sample quotas for Mexicans, whites, and black of all generations. For other groups, samples were compiled using RDD until the incidence rates of eligible respondents became prohibitively low. At this point, more specific geographic and race-ethnic sampling frames were used, targeting RDD to households in high-density Asian residential areas and those on lists of Filipino, Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese surnames.

The surveys were administered in English or Spanish using a computer-assisted telephone interviewing system. A total of 4,655 interviews were completed between the start of full-scale interviewing in April 2004, and its conclusion in October 2004. Of these, 2,822 (61%) were derived from interviews using solely first-stage RDD sampling, while 1,833 (39%) resulted from interviews using the augmented samples. To achieve this, a total of 263,783 different telephone numbers were dialed at least once, including 122,984 listings from the first-stage RDD sampling frame and 140,799 from the augmented samples. These calls resulted in the identification of 10,893 adults meeting the eligibility requirements of one of the ten targeted sample subgroups. Efforts were made to complete interviews with 8,815 of these adults (in 2,078 cases the quota for the subgroup had already been filled).

The CILS Survey. The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study followed for more than a decade the progress of a large panel of youths representing several dozen nationalities in two main areas of immigrant settlement in the United States: Southern California (San Diego) and South Florida (the Miami and Fort Lauderdale metropolitan area). The baseline survey, conducted in Spring 1992, interviewed eligible students enrolled in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> grades of all the schools of the San Diego Unified School District (N=2,420). [A parallel sample was drawn from the Dade and Broward County Unified School Districts.] The sample was drawn in the junior high grades, when dropping out of school is rare, to avoid the potential bias of differential dropout rates between ethnic groups at the senior high school level. Students were eligible to enter the sample if they were U.S.-born but had at least one immigrant (foreign-born) parent, or if they themselves were foreign-born and had come to the U.S. at an early age (before age 13). The resulting sample was evenly balanced between males and females, and between foreign-born and U.S.-born children of immigrants. Reflecting the geographical clustering of recent immigration, the principal nationalities represented in the San Diego sample (as is largely the case in the IIMMLA sample) are Mexican, Filipino, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, Chinese, and smaller groups of other children of immigrants from Asia (mostly Korean, Japanese, and Indian) and Latin America (most of the Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean).

Three years later, a second survey of the same panel of children of immigrants was conducted. By this time the youths, who were originally interviewed when most were 14 or 15 years old, were now 17 to 18 years old and had reached the final year of high school (or had dropped out of school). The follow-up survey in San Diego succeeded in re-interviewing 2,063 or 85.2% of the baseline sample, with almost identical proportions of males and females, of native-born and foreign-born youth, of U.S. citizens and non-citizens, and of main nationalities. There was a slight tendency for children from intact families (2 parents present) to be overrepresented in the follow-up survey; other differences were statistically insignificant (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

During 2001-03, a decade after the original survey, a final follow-up was conducted. The respondents now ranged from 23 to 27 years of age, and most had to be contacted individually in their places of work or residence. Mailed questionnaires (which included detailed questions on language use, proficiency and preference) were the principal source of completed data in this third survey. Respondents were also interviewed by phone when possible; teams of trained interviewers visited respondents for whom no telephone numbers were available, but for whom their last known address or that of their parents was known. Over a period of more than 24 months of fieldwork, CILS-III in San Diego retrieved complete or partial information on 70% of the original sample and 82% of the first follow-up.

For our purposes here, we merged the 1,480 cases from the San Diego sample for which complete survey data over the span of a decade was available. Unlike the first follow-up, where effects of sample attrition were negligible, the time elapsed between the last two surveys and the significant sample mortality relative to the original one, indicate the need for adjusting results for sample selection bias. Family composition and early academic performance were the principal predictors of

presence/absence in CILS-III in San Diego. Preliminary runs indicate, however, that adjusted averages do not differ significantly from those unadjusted for this source of error. (For details on CILS-III, see Portes and Rumbaut 2005.)