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# The Romanian Political System after the Parliamentary Elections of November 30, 2008 

CRISTIAN PREDA

The elections of November 30, 2008 are the sixth electoral test organized since the fall of communism. These elections have been organized on the basis of a new electoral law - the fourth in two decades ${ }^{1}$. All the post-December electoral regulations have been inspired by a proportional philosophy. Until the 2008 scrutiny, the two Chambers were elected on the basis of a PR system with closed lists in plurinominal circumscriptions having as a territorial reference the county and a mechanism of allocation of mandates based on the electoral coefficient and the redistribution of the biggest remainders applied first at the level of the county and then at the national level. The magnitude of circumscriptions has varied from a law to another (see Table 1), being an "implicit threshold" quite important for small parties. An electoral threshold of 3\% was introduced in 1992, and then increased, after 2000 , to $5 \%$ for parties and, respectively $8-10 \%$, depending of the number of parties associated, for coalitions.

For the last decade, many voices of Romanian society, discontent by the vote based on lists, have called for a revolution of the electoral system, more precisely the "introduction of the uninominal vote". A modification in this sense was proposed only in 2007 by the Association Pro Democratia and resumed by the Liberals of the Tăriceanu government. This government has assumed responsibility, October 29, 2007, for a law project that foresaw a mixt electoral system in which half of the members of Parliament were to be designated in uninominal colleges by a majoritarian vote in one round, while the rest of mandates were to be obtained, accordingly to a proportional rule, by the candidates that lost the competition. The project passed the two Chambers but was called for as unconstitutional by the President November 21, 2007, the Court declaring that several of its provisions do not respect the Constitution ${ }^{2}$. In exchange, Traian Băsescu called for a referendum for the adoption of a majoritarian voting system in two rounds, in circumscriptions with one seat. Inspired by the French system for the election of the National Assembly, the project, assumed also by the Partidul Democrat Liberal (PDL), stipulated that each deputy or senator was to be elected if he obtained half

[^0]plus one of the votes of the electors inscribed on the lists or, when none of the candidates could achieve such a majority, if he occupied the first place in a second turn organized between the first two classified. Even if $81.36 \%$ of the electors declared they were favorable to the proposal made by the President, the referendum was invalidated because only 26.51 of the electoral body was present at the polls, the law requiring at least half.

In the end, the Parliament adopted an electoral law in March 2008 that continued neither the PNL project, neither the President project. The Law introduced, at the proposal of a social-democrat senator ${ }^{1}$, an eclectic electoral formula, according to which "deputies and senators are chosen in uninominal colleges...through a uninominal vote according to the principle of proportional representation" (art. 5 p. 1). Colleges, sub-unities of circumscriptions, are organized on the basis of a norm of representation of a deputy for each 70000 citizens and a senator for 160000 citizens. The college is uninominal because each "political competitor" submits one candidature. But the distribution of mandates is made accordingly to contradictory methods, a combination between a majoritarian formula and a proportional one: as such, win mandates all those candidates that manage to obtain minimum $50 \%$ plus one vote in the colleges in which they competed; if they do not achieve this majority, we resort to aspectively at the country level, on the basis of the aggregation of the biggest remainders (art. 48), reuniting for each party the votes granted to candidates that they endorsed. The law created for the first time a circumscription outside the country and introduced an alternative threshold: if a political formation does not obtain the percentages already mentioned it $h$ proportional distribution based on the same method of electoral quotas, calculated at two levels - in each circumscription (county) and, reas to occupy at least six first places in the deputy colleges and three in the senatorial ones to enter the Parliament. In exchange, the March 2008 law specifies that in the case of partial elections a system of vote à l'anglaise, that is, majoritarian in one tour (art. 48, let. 17) is used.

The electoral body shrunk from 1990 to 1992, so as to grow then constantly until 2008 when it arrived to almost 18.5 million electors. This evolution was not bereft of surprises: for example, at the 2000 general elections the electoral body amounted to 17699727 voters, a number 2 millions bigger than the one from the local elections organized 6 months earlier, when the permanent lists included only 15641534 electors. In exchange, as Table 2 indicates, electoral participation followed a downward curb: more than 6/7 in 1990,3/4 in 1992 and 1996, so as to oscillate around 2/3 in 2000 and 2004, descending dramatically at less than $40 \%$ in 2008.

The proportion of valid bulletins, that attest the degree of civic competency, was constantly of $93-95 \%$ with only one exception, the 1992 elections when $12 \%$ of the votes deposed in the urns were annulled (see Table 3). Unfortunately, until the last elections, it was not known how many of the votes annulled were the expression of protest or the refuse of the "political class". The 2008 law introduced the distinction between annulled and blank votes, differentiating thus the bulletins on which the stamp was not applied correctly and, respectively the bulletins introduced in the urn without a choice for a candidate made by the voter. As Table 3 bis shows, at the November 2008 elections, around $2 \%$ of the votes expressed were blank.

[^1]Between 1990 and 2008, the total number of formations that deposed candidatures at the general elections, alone or in alliances, was of 200 (see Table 4). Sixty percent of the competitors deposed lists once and only 13 of them participated to all the six elections held between the period 1990-2008, of which 11 are, in fact, minority formations (Lipoveni, Germans, Bulgarians, Armenians, Magyars, Turks, Greek, Czech, Slovaks, Polish, Serbian, and Ukrainian). The two parties present six times in front of the electorate are the Partidul Ecologist Român and the Partidul Național Liberal (PNL) that deposed candidatures also in the framework of alliances, PER 3 times and PNL twice ${ }^{1}$. The solution of alliances was embraced in fact at each electoral test but became less and less frequent as time passed: indeed, if in 1992 the 79 lists included 92 political formations, at the 2008 elections only two of the 29 competitors that entered the competition for the inferior Chamber were alliances ${ }^{2}$. Paradoxically, from the six elections organized in Romania after 1989, the last four have been won by a coalition or an electoral alliance: after the victory of the Frontul Salvării Nationale in 1990 and respectively of the Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale two years later, the 1996 elections were won by the Convenția Democrată Română, in 2000 the Polul Democrat-Social din România imposed itself, four years later - the Uniunea Națională PSD+PUR, and in 2008, the Alianta politică PSD-PC had the most votes.

The number of parties that submitted a candidature decreased with time. If we compare the lists submitted at the six post-communist electoral consultations, we shall see that in a first moment the number of parties is reduced only in what regards the elections for the Senate. In this case the decrease is not the effect of juridical constraints (such as the electoral threshold) but a result of the strategy of the formations of the national minorities: after the 1992 elections, these realized that the Senate is inaccessible for them and stopped submitting lists for the superior Chamber. Only the coming into force of the law of 2003 produced a significant reduction of the participants to the election: if in 1990, to the mandates of the inferior Chamber, aspired 71 political formations, in 2004 these were only 52, including here the formations of the minorities; at the Senate, the decrease is even more important: from 59 in the first year of post-communism to 25 at the 2004 elections. At the first European elections, held November 25, 200713 lists of parties and an independent candidate participated to the competition, whereas, in 2008 we have 10 parties in competition for the Senate and 11 for the Chamber of Deputies (see Table 5). Not only the number of parties but also the number of their members decreased after 2003. Thus, the 27 parties existing in 2003 had together 1735430 partisans, that is, $10 \%$ of the citizens that have the right to vote, whereas at the end of 2007 , as table 6 shows, the 21 parties had in total 1302417 members.

The number of parliamentary parties resulting of the post-communist elections varies, as table 7 indicates, between 5 and 12 in the Senate and, respectively, between 24 and 27 at the Chamber of Deputies, the latter including the formations of minorities that do not surpass the threshold but gain representation with one

[^2]mandate, formations which number rose from 11 in 1990 to 13 two years later, to 15 in 1996 and to 18 after the 2000 elections. The 2000 elections represent a key moment in the consolidation of the Romanian political stage. At the 2004 elections we have practically the same parties with the specification that two of the parties (PDSR and PSDR) had merge (under the name of PSD). In exchange, the 2008 elections eliminate a parliamentary party, the Partidul România Mare (PRM).

An important parameter for the characterization of the political system, the effective number of parties calculated after the formula of Marku Laakso and Rein Taagepera portrays a dramatic instability of the Romanian political spectrum: in 19 years the political system of Romania experienced three different formulas because it passed from the quasi-absolute domination of one party in 1990 to the multi party model without a dominant party between 1992 and 1996, so as to gain in 2000 the traits of a multi party system with a dominant party. After the 2004 elections, Romania had again a multi party system without a dominant party, a fact confirmed after the 2008 elections (see Table 8). The average value of the effective number of parties $(\mathrm{N}=3.69)$ situates the Romanian system in the table established by Lijphart after the study of 36 democracies, very close to the one of Iceland (3.72) with the difference that the number of elections that took place in Romania is smaller, and the difference between the minimum and the maximum value is bigger than in the Icelandic case. If we exclude the 1990 elections, than the average effective number of parties has the value of 4.10 (with a minimum of 3.19 and a maximum of 5.18), the Romanian system becoming closer to the Belgian one ${ }^{1}$.

The dimensions of the legislative have been, during the entire post-communist period, favorable to the expression of a very high proportionality because the Parliament is, as Table 9 shows, oversized: in fact, far from respecting "the rule of cubic root" - conforming to which the total number of mandates of the inferior Chamber tends to be equal to the cubic root of the number of the population - the Romanian legislative corresponds to a population of 36 million people, much more than the actual population of the country. But this favorable condition was not put to a good use. Between 1992 and 2000 the electoral system produced what Daniel Barbu called "proportional non-representativeness" ${ }^{2}$, in the sense that a considerable number of votes were granted to parties that did not enter the Parliament, being redistributed to parties that surpassed the legal electoral threshold: for example in $2000,20 \%$ of the choices of the voters, or in absolute terms around 2.3 million votes for the Chamber and 2.2 million for the Senate did not find their political expression in Parliament. In 2004, the weight of these "squandered" votes decreased significantly in both Chambers, reaching around $11-13 \%$. At the elections for the European Parliament of November 2007, the five parties that obtained mandates (PD, PSD, PNL, PLD, UDMR) and the independent candidate that managed to gain a seat in PE achieved together 4197345 of votes of the 5122226 valid votes, thereby squandered votes represented 924881 votes ( $18.05 \%$ ). The elections of November 2008 constituted in this sense a surprise, as they reduced the percentage to $6-7 \%$ (see Table 10).

Votes' redistribution in favor of parties that passed the electoral threshold was beneficial primarily to the party classed on the first place. Sometimes, as in

[^3]1990 or 2000 , the electoral bonus was of $10 \%$, other times the difference between the percentage of votes and that of mandates was minimal. In 2008, as it can be seen from Table 11, this difference barely surpassed $1 \%$. What is even more interesting is the fact that the increase in non-representativeness was accompanied by a progressive reduction of the effective number of mandates allocated through the redistribution of votes granted to the parties that did not pass the electoral threshold, even though, especially in the case of the Senate, this proportion remained, including in 2004 of over $50 \%$. In 2008 the system of transformation of votes into mandates changed, the candidates that obtained half plus one of the votes in the college in which they ran won a seat of deputy or senator, while the other mandates were redistributed proportionally at the level of the county and then, again proportionally, at the national level. In spite of the majoritarian bonus the system evolved practically in the parameters of 2004 as Table 12 shows. It is interesting to remark that the number of mandates distributed following the "direct" victory in colleges was of 85 at the Chamber (around $27 \%$ ) and 31 at the Senate (around $22 \%$ ). This means that the number of mandates distributed at the level of the county - 160 , respectively 41 - was the determining factor in the creation of the general equilibrium of representation.

Electoral disproportionality measured with the help of the formula of $\mathrm{Mi}-$ chael Gallagher is in the case of the Romanian political system of 18.47 , a value that places it between the last two cases of democracies in the classification realized by Arend Lijphart, more exactly between Jamaica (17.75) and France (21.08). This positioning is surprising if we take into account the fact that the Jamaican system is a pluralitarian one and the French one a majoritarian one while the Romanian system is - at least through its intentions - a proportional system. In the list realized by Lijphart the closest PR systems by their characteristics to the Romanian system are those of Venezuela ( $\mathrm{G}=14.41$ ), Costa Rica ( $\mathrm{G}=13.65$ ) and Columbia ( $\mathrm{G}-10.62$ ), all three considered as veritable examples of the mode in which can be perverted the proportional logic. Overcoming the disequilibria produced in these three countries, the Romanian system is the most disproportional PR known system. More than this: Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica are, as Romania, presidential democracies but the disproportionality which affects them is due before everything to presidential disproportionality and not to the legislative one; in Romania the exact contrary occurs, while in our case legislative disproportionality varies as it can be seen in table 13, between 4.36 and 9.38, in Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica, according to Lijphart ${ }^{1}$, the same parameter varies between 2.96 and 4.28. The majoritarian effects of the Romanian political-electoral system remain very significant even after the last elections, although somehow diminished.

The voting system introduced in 2008 has had major inequitable effects. As Table 14 shows, there is no correspondent between the number of mandates won, the number of first placed seats obtained in colleges and the number of colleges won with absolute majorities: PSD is the first from the point of view of seats won with $50 \%+1$, the first one from the point of view of votes obtained at the national level, but the second one from the point of view of mandates won. PNL has 37 first seats in the Chamber ( 4 being won with more than $50 \%+1$ ) and 15 first seats at the Senate ( 1 with a majority in the college), but 65 deputy seats and 28 senators. PDL obtained 196 first seats in colleges and only 166 mandates. If we take

[^4]into consideration the biggest circumscription (see Table 14-3), the one represented by the municipality of Bucharest, we observe that in the 28 colleges, only 3 candidates gained the mandate with more than half of the votes of the citizens who came to the urns in the college ( 2 from PSD and one from PDL). PNL, which was third in 25 of the 28 colleges, obtaining also a second place and two fourth places, reached 5 mandates. PDL was in the first place in 20 colleges gaining 12 mandates, and PSD, winner of the other 8 first places won 11 mandates, of which 4 on the second place!

The 2008 elections did not modify radically the landscape of political parties. In fact, only ten of the 200 parties that have participated to elections between 1990 and 2008 have managed to pass at least three electoral tests, obtaining actually each time, between $85 \%$ and $98 \%$ of the parliamentary mandates. Thus, these ten parties are those that played a decisive role in Romanian political life (see Table 15) The 2008 elections brought about two novelties: the first is the loosing by the PRM of the statute of parliamentary party after four legislatures in which it had between 3 and $20 \%$ of the mandates. The second novelty is brought by the third consecutive entry into Parliament of the representatives of the Partidul Conservator (PC): as in the past this thing happened in the framework of an alliance with the social-democrats. As Table 15 shows the other 9 parties had different strategies in what concerns the access to the legislative and the participation to government was not conditioned by the embracement of one of these strategies. Derived from a "common branch" - called in 1990 Frontul Salvării Nationale - PDSR and PD have chosen different paths to impose themselves in front of the electorate. Under the name of FDSN in 1992, of PDSR in 1996 and 2000, of PSD after 2001, the party regrouped around Ion Iliescu participated alone to the electoral tests of 1992 and 1996 (winning the first and loosing the second) and in coalition after 2000, 2004 and 2008 (winning elections in the three cases but participating to the government only after 2000 and 2008). Partidul Democrat which became after December 2007, Democrat Liberal, presented itself alone in 1992 (under the name of FSN) as in 2000 and 2008, respectively, in coalition with PSDR in 1996 and with PNL in 2004 managing to enter the government not only in these two cases, but also after the elections of 2008. Partidul Social Democrat Român (PSDR), alone in 1990, became member of the Convenția Democratică din România in 1992, of the Uniunea Social-Democrată in 1996 and of the Polul Democrattiei Sociale din România (PDSR) in 2000, these last two alliances allowing it to participate to the government. The fourth successful party, Partidul Ecologist Român was alone in 1990, than a member of the CDR in 1992 and 1996, elections following which it obtained a few mandates. Participating once again alone in 2000 and 2004, it was not able to send representatives in Parliament and in 2008, PER allied itself with Partidul Verde inside the Alianța Partidul Verde Ecologist but failed again to enter the Parliament. At their turn, Partidul National Țărănesc Creștin Democrat (PNTTCD) and Partidul Național Liberal chose different strategies: PNL had its own lists in 1990, 1992, 2000 and 2008 (the second time missing the entry in Parliament) and was part of the winning coalition (CDR) in 1996; in 2004 it submitted common candidatures together with the democrats, under the name of Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr PNL-PD, managing to form the government even if they came up second at the legislatives. After it submitted its own list in 1990, PNTCD opted for the variant of the coalition for the electoral tests organized between 1992 and 2000, this formula bringing to it the second place in 1992, the first place in 1996 and total failure at the 2000 elections (under the name CDR2000) In 2004 it failed again to enter the Parliament this time on its own lists and in 2008
it stopped presenting candidatures. Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România (UDMR) passed alone all the six electoral tests, with an average of 25 deputies and 11 senators. Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor (PUNR) surpassed the threshold both in coalition (in 1990, together with the Partidul Republican) and when it had its own lists (1992 and 1996); in 2000, associated with Partidul Național Român it failed to enter the Parliament; the same thing happened four years later when it had no more electoral allies; the party was erased from the Register of Political Parties in 2006. Finally, Partidul România Mare participated alone both to the four victorious electoral tests and to the failed one of 2008.

If we don't follow the electoral strategies of parties but the ideological relations between them, departing from the criteria used after 1989 to describe the politics of Central and Eastern Europe ${ }^{1}$, we have a more complex picture, with nine ideological families. As it can be observed easily from Table 16, four of these families - the greens, the extreme left, the minimalist agrarians and the defenders of particular interests - have an insignificant presence between one and two percents, even though sometimes, as it was the case with the greens at the beginning of the transition, they managed to send elected representatives in the Chambers. The other families have a sinuous evolution. The scene is dominated by social-democrats who have an electoral mean of over 40 percents and who never descended below $30 \%$, being divided until the 2004 elections including when one of the parties of this direction - Partidul Democrat - made a radical ideological realignment, entering the family of European popular. The liberals and modernist conservatives are just as divided as the social-democrats with a mean of over $20 \%$ with very strong variations from one electoral test to the other, but with a spectacular consolidation in the last years, which led to the 2008 situation when two right parties - PNL and PDL - had together more than half of the options expressed at the urns. On the third place from the point of view of the electoral score is the family of national-populist and extreme-right with a mean of 10.81 in the six elections: after a historic maximum in 2000, when PRM gathered one fifth of the votes expressed, at the 2008 elections this family descended at 5 percents, results that add in fact the performances of PRM (3.15\%) and the Partidul Noua Generatiie-PNG $(2.27 \%)$. On the following place in the general classification, with almost 9 percents, is the family of national minorities formed of UDMR and a number of 11-18 formations of other minorities. Finally, on the fifth place, organized around PNTCD, is the agrarian Christian-popular family and of the identitarian right, with an average score of 7 percents, but in a strong downward since $2000^{2}$.

Because of the division of political families and the profound polarization of the party system, many times the articulation of majorities is placed under the sign of the unpredictable and of fragility. This fact is even more clear as, excepting the 1990 elections that had as a result "a won majority", the electoral system had as a main political consequence the appearance of "natural minorities" and, in consequence, the negotiation of the formation of plural parliamentary majorities and, in several cases, instable. It has to be added that in three out of four cases,

[^5]respectively in 1992, 2000 and 2004 these parliamentary majorities were not found integrally at the level of the government formula, the cabinets Nicolae Văcăroiu, Adrian Năstase and Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu being minority cabinets (see Table 17). Let's remark finally the decisive weight of the electoral formula that allowed, between 1992 and 2004, that coalitions with a minority of votes have a majority of parliamentary mandates. The 2008 elections are inscribed in a different logic, the "grand coalition" realized by the PSD and PDL had at the urns two thirds of the votes expressed.

The political color of these majorities and its adversaries is changing significantly after each election. Between 1990 and 1992 we have the powerful domination of a left linked rather to the neo-communist ${ }^{1}$ identity than to the European values: intolerant with its political adversaries, arriving to the use of force (with the occasion of the incursions of miners in Bucharest in May 1990 and September 1991), nostalgic of a totalitarian economic past, with cultural options constructed around a national identity defined on an ethnic basis and opposing the occidentalization of the public space, this left had against it an alliance rather informal and, in any case, incoherent ${ }^{2}$, constituted by the Liberals (PNL), the fraction PNTCCD and the members of the Magyar minority (in total around $16 \%$ of the votes in 1990); beginning with 1991 after it eliminated Petre Roman, the left directed by President Iliescu on the path of the radical refuse of political and economic reform found in the small liberal party an ally of circumstance to support a government led by Theodor Stolojan and which was meant to prepare the new elections. Between 1992 and 1996, the nationalist-identitarian options and conservative of the economic and social structures of the previous regime formed a weak majority ( $42 \%$ of votes, $51 \%$ in mandates), but which knew to impose itself in front of a liberal right lacking unity ( $6.5 \%$ of the votes in Parliament versus $3.6 \%$ outside of it), in front of a Christian-agrarian family that held only $10 \%$ of the parliamentary seats, face to a social-democrat adversary (FSN/PD) refused for a long time as a partner by the supporters of modernization ( $10 \%$ of votes) and in front of a Magyar minority which was reduced to the statute of "committed spectator" (7.5\%). Between 1996 and 2000, the political system was defined by the fragile equilibrium between a pro-occident and liberal in economy coalition, but very divided on social and administrative problems (with almost $50 \%$ of votes - CDR ${ }^{3}$, USD and UDMR, each in part being already a coalition), and, on the other side, a left losing speed (PDSR) and which made an appeal, once in opposition, to the national-populists and radi-cal-extremists, nostalgic of communism regrouped around PUNR and PRM. After the 2000 elections, social-democracy - still lacking unity, but under a different formula (PDSR and PSDR merging against PD) - opened its gates to a collaboration with the party of the Magyar minority (UDMR), abandoning the alliance with the extreme-right (PRM). The occidentalist right lost thus not only the support of the Christian-democrats (that could not enter the Parliament anymore and who ex-

[^6]perienced at their turn at the beginning of 2001 internal division), but also that of UDMR, who became a faithful member of the new parliamentary majority. The 2004 elections created an unseen situation in Romanian politics. Three are the traits of this situation. In the first place, the elections confirmed the parliamentary statute of the six parties that had entered the Chambers four years before. In other words: for the first time after 1989 there was no new party entering the Parliament and no party that lost its parliamentary status. What changed was the weight of mandates, the big winner in relation to the 2000-2004 legislature being PNL, and the big loser - PRM. In the second place, contradicting (almost) all the sociological and politological estimations, the electorate voted one winner at the parliamentary elections - that is the National Union PSD+PUR (with around $37 \%$ of the votes) - and a winner for the presidential elections supported by the second placed at the legislatives - Alianta DA (which had won $31.3 \%$ of the votes). The third novelty resides in the post-electoral faith of alliances realized for elections. If in 1996 and 2000 the coalitions that had won elections formed the government, in 2004, the winning coalition in elections (formed of PSD and PUR) broke, PUR passing to the side of the Alianta PNL-PD to form the government, after having supported, in a first moment, December 20, 2004, PSD and PRM for the election of the presidents of the two Chambers. The victory in the presidential elections of the candidate of the Alianța DA, Traian Băsescu, led thus to the distribution of power, a natural corollary in fact, of the proportionalist effects of the legislative election itself. Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu became prime minister with the vote of 265 of the 465 senators and deputies from PNL, PD, UDMR and PUR, but also from the national minorities. It was a majority more eclectic than the ones that succeeded themselves since 1990, that is more than the revolutionary and national-identitarian left (of 1990-1992), more than the left conservatism with a powerful nationalist tint (from 1992-1996), than the center-right liberalism, ambiguous and varied, open to radical occidentalization (of 1996-2000), and more than social-democracy looking for a reformist definition in economy and of a protecting vision in the social field (2000-2004). The situation changed radically at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 when PUR (which had become Partidul Conservator) left the government, and then the PD was eliminated from the cabinet. Instead of a quadripartite cabinet, April $2^{\text {nd }}, 2007$ a bicolor government, PNL-UDMR, was sworn in. As the government defined itself primarily in opposition to the president it was in fact the creation of a regime of cohabitation with an ultra-minority government supported by a coalition that did not want to display itself publicly; a coalition which meant however, a massive political bloc of almost four fifths of the entire legislative (see Table 18). Thus, the weakest direct support created the most compact direct support. The 2008 elections brought in exchange to the government a bicolor coalition PSD-PDL. Its creation was possible as, for the fourth time after the fall of communism the organizers of elections went to the opposition.

Since 1996, Romania has a democratic culture based on discontinuity or rupture and not on consensus or equilibrium. This aspect is important for Romania which knew the unique party under communism and in the inter-war period had what Mattei Dogan called "governmental Parliaments and not parliamentary governments" ${ }^{1}$, in so much as the organizer of the election designated by the King won without mistake the elections.

[^7]
## TABLES

Table 1
Magnitude of Circumscriptions (1990-2008)


In 1990 the numbering of circumscriptions and the number of deputies and senators was done on the basis of the law-decree no. 92 /March 1990, through the Government decision no. 283 of March 19, 1990 (publ. in Monitorul Oficial, no. 39/21 March 1990); as the Electoral law tolerated, through art. 14 a deviation of $15 \%$ in accordance with the population of the circumscriptions, the number of deputies was not of 387 as the law-decree mentioned, but of 397. The electoral law of 1992 fixed at its turn the election in circumscriptions (art. 3. para. 1), and in annex 1 described their magnitude; then appears, as a new circumscription, the Agricultural Sector Ilfov. If at the next elections, of 1996, circumscriptions remained unchanged, in exchange, OUG no. 129/30 June 2000 introduced a new numbering of electoral circumscriptions: if the numbering of 1992 reproduced the alphabetical order of counties, with the exception of the "Agricultural Sector Ilfov", which was placed, under number 42, at the end of the list, after "the Municipality of Bucharest", the June 2000 ordinance introduced the Ilfov circumscription between Iasi and Maramures and re-numbered the following sections. The ordinance also modified the magnitude of some of the circumscriptions; the reform of the magnitude was limited: it consisted in the decrease with one mandate (in the Cluj county) of the number of deputies and the reduction with one unity of the magnitude of the senate circumscriptions of the Alba, Gorj and Satu Mare counties. The number of deputies of the 2000-2004 legislature is thus of 327 (to which are added the deputies of national minorities), and that of senators is of 140 . The 2004 electoral law reduced the magnitude both at the Chamber and at the Senate, limiting in this way the number of organization of minorities that can be represented in the inferior Chamber to 18 (cf. art. 4, para. 2). The 2008 electoral law made some minimal changes: the magnitude was reduced in several counties so as to include in almost the same limits seats for the new circumscription created, that of Romanian in foreign countries. For the rest the number of deputies of Arad was increased with a seat after the vote. If the average magnitude can be regarded as an "implicit threshold" and if the reasonable report between the two variables is $\mathrm{S}=75 \%(\mathrm{M}+1)$, where $S$ is the threshold and $M$ the average magnitude (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., pp. 149-150), than in the Romanian case, the average magnitude constitutes an obstacle for representativeness. At the 2004 elections, we have a level of magnitude of 3.26 for the Senate and 7.9 for the Chamber and, thus, an implicit threshold of over $17 \%$ for the Senate (three times bigger than the explicit threshold for parties) and, respectively of over $8 \%$ for the Chamber (that is more than the explicit threshold fixed in 2000 for the coalitions of two parties).

Table 2
Electoral Body and Participation

| Election | ALEP | APU | $\%$ |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| AG - 20.05.1990 | 17200722 | 14825017 | 86,18 |
| AG -27.09 .1992 | 16380663 | 12496430 | 76,28 |
| AP2 - 11.10.1992 | 16380663 | 12153810 | 74,19 |
| AG -03.11.1996 | 17218654 | 13088388 | 76,01 |
| AP2-17.11.1996 | 17230654 | 13078883 | 75,90 |
| AG - 26.11.2000 | 17699727 | 11559458 | 65,31 |
| AP2-10.12.2000 | 17711757 | 10184715 | 57,50 |
| AG -28.10.2004 | 18449676 | 10794653 | 58,51 |
| AP2 -12.12.2004 | 18316104 | 10112262 | 55,21 |
| EUR -25.11.2007 | 18224597 | 5370171 | 29,47 |
| AG -30.11.2008 | 18464274 | 7238871 | 39,20 |

[^8]The first column contains the type (AG = general elections; AP2 = the second tour of presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second column indicates the number of electors according to the permanent electoral lists (ALEP), the third the number of voters present at the urns (APU), and the fourth electoral participation, in percentages (\%). At the 1990 elections, the Central Electoral Bureau mentioned a different number of voters present at the urns at the three elections for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S) and Presidency (P), and so I also calculated participation for each one: in the table appears the number from the CD; for the Senate, APU was 14825764 ( $86,19 \%$ ), and at the Presidency, 14826616 (86,19\%).

Table 3
Valid Votes Expressed at the Post-1989 Elections

| Election | VVE | \%VVE - APU | \%VVE - ALEP |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AG - 20.05.1990 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 13707159 \text { (CD) } \\ 13956180(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 14378693(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 92,45(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 94,13(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 96,97(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 79,68(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 81,13(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 83,59(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| AG - 27.09.1992 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 10880252 \text { (CD) } \\ 10964818 \text { (S) } \\ 11898856(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 87,06(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 87,74(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 95,21(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 66,42(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 66,93(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 72,63(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| AP2 - 11.10.1992 | 12034636 | 99,01 | 73,46 |
| AG - 03.11.1996 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 12238746 \text { (CD) } \\ 12287671 \text { (S) } \\ 12652900(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 93,50(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 93,88(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 96,67(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 71,07(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 71,36(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 73,48(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| AP2-17. 11.1996 | 12972485 | 99,18 | 75,28 |
| AG - 26.11.2000 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 10839424 \text { (CD) } \\ 10891910 \text { (S) } \\ 11212974(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 93,77(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 94,22(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 97,00(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 61,24(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 61,53(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 63,35(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| AP2 - 10.12.2000 | 10020870 | 98,39 | 56,57 |
| AG - 28.11.2004 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 10188106 \text { (CD) } \\ 10231476 \text { (S) } \\ 10452205 \text { (P) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 94,38(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 94,78(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 96,83(\mathrm{P}) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 55,22(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 55,46(\mathrm{~S}) \\ 56,65 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| AP2 - 12.12.2004 | 10008314 | 98,97 | 54,64 |
| EUR - 25.11.2007 | 5122228 | 95,38 | 28,10 |
| AG - 30.11.2008 | $\begin{aligned} & 6886794 \text { (CD) } \\ & 6888055 \text { (S) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 95,14(\mathrm{CD}) \\ 95,15(\mathrm{~S}) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 37,29(\mathrm{CD}) \\ & 37,30(\mathrm{~S}) \end{aligned}$ |

The first column contains the type $(\mathrm{AG}=$ general elections; AP2 $=$ the second tour of presidential elections, EUR $=$ European elections) and the date of the election. The second indicates the total number of valid votes expressed (VVE) and the third the percentage of valid votes expressed in relation to the number of electors present at the urns ( $\% \mathrm{VVE}$ APU), and the fourth column the percentage of valid votes expressed, calculated in relation to the number of electors in the permanent electoral lists (\%VVE - ALEP). The data was indicated - where it was the case - separately for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S), respectively for the presidential elections ( P ) and the European ones (EUR).

Table 3 bis
Null Votes at the Post-1989 Elections

| Election | TVN | TVN \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AG - 20.05.1990 | $\begin{aligned} & 1117858(\mathrm{CD}) \\ & 869584(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & 447923(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 7,54(\mathrm{CD}) \\ & 5,86(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & 3,02(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| AG - 27.09.1992 | $\begin{aligned} & 1591071 \text { (CD) } \\ & 1507623 \text { (S) } \\ & 580017 \text { (P) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 12,73(\mathrm{CD}) \\ & 12,06(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & 4,64(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| AP2-11.10.1992 | 116092 | 0,95 |
| AG-3.11.1996 | $\begin{aligned} & 834687 \text { (CD) } \\ & 785977 \text { (S) } \\ & 426545(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 6,37 (CD) } \\ & 6,00(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & 3,25(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| AP2 - 17.11.1996 | 102579 | 0,78 |
| AG - 26.12.2000 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 706761 \text { (CD) } \\ & 653834 \text { (S) } \\ & 484643 \text { (P) } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 6,11(\mathrm{CD}) \\ & 5,66(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & 3,00(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| AP2 - 10.12.2000 | 160264 | 1,57 |
| AG - 28.11.2004 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 599641 \text { (CD) } \\ & 556128(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & 339010(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 5,55(\mathrm{CD}) \\ & 5,15(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & 3,14(\mathrm{P}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| AP2 - 12.12.2004 | 103245 | 1,02 |
| EUR - 25.11.2007 | 246555 | 4,62 |
| AG - 30.11.2008 | $\begin{aligned} & 210994 \text { (CD) } \\ & 172884 \text { (S) } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 2,91(\mathrm{CD}) \\ & 2,39(\mathrm{~S}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |

The first column contains the type $(A G=$ general elections; AP2 $=$ the second tour of presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second one indicates the total number of null votes (TVN), and the last one the percentage of null votes in comparison to the number of electors present at the urns (TVN\%), at the elections for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S) and Presidency (P). In 2008, were counted for the first time the blank votes: these were 139139 at the Chamber (1.92\%) and 176.217 for the Senate ( $2.43 \%$ ).

Table 4
Electoral Volatility

| No. participations | Electoral years | NP |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| One participation | 1990 | 30 |
|  | 1992 | 1996 |
|  | 2000 | 22 |
|  | 2004 | 23 |
|  | 2008 | 24 |
| Two participations | $1990 \& 1992$ | 21 |
|  | $1992 \& 1996$ | 3 |
|  | $1996 \& 2000$ | 5 |
|  | $2000 \& 2004$ | 2 |
|  | $2004 \& 2008$ | 1 |

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| No. participations | Electoral years | NP |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| Three participations | $1990 \& 1992 \& 1996$ | 4 |
|  | $1990 \& 1996 \& 2000$ | 1 |
|  | $1992 \& 1996 \& 2000$ | 6 |
|  | $1992 \& 2000 \& 2004$ | 1 |
|  | $1996 \& 2000 \& 2004$ | 3 |
|  | $1996 \& 2004 \& 2008$ | 1 |
| Four participations | $2000 \& 2004 \& 2008$ | 3 |
|  | $1990-2000$ | $1992-2004$ |
|  | $1996-2008$ | 2 |
| Five participations | $1990-2004$ | 3 |
|  | $1992-2008$ | 20 |
|  | $1990-2008$ | 13 |
| Total |  | 2 |

The calculation was made keeping in mind the following rules: I numbered the parties and the unions indifferent if they participated with their own lists or on the lists of alliances; the simple change of name of a party does not mean the appearance of a new actor; in exchange, I considered that a party disappears if it is absorbed by another formation under the name of this one or under a new one. I considered that Partidul Democrat Liberal (ex PD (FSN), ex PD) and, respectively Partidul Social Democrat (ex FDSN, ex PDSR) had five electoral participations (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008); I kept into account the fact that, beyond their common origin - Frontul Salvării Naționale -, each of the two parties followed a path of re-foundation beginning in March 1992.

Table 5
Parties Inscribed and Lists Submitted at the General Elections

| Date | Parties <br> inscribed | Lists submitted |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Senate |  |
| 28 January 1990 | 30 |  |  |
| 20 May 1990 | 80 | 71 | 59 |
| 27 September 1992 | 155 | 79 | 65 |
| 15 July 1993 | 159 |  |  |
| 1 October 1994 | 161 |  |  |
| 1 January 1996 | 200 |  |  |
| 3 November 1996 | 75 | 64 | 37 |
| 26 November 2000 | 73 | 68 | 37 |
| 28 November 2004 | 64 | 52 | 25 |
| 30 November 2008 | 38 | 29 | 10 |

The information about the parties inscribed comes from several sources: George VOICU, Pluripartidismul. O teorie a democratiei, All, Bucuresti, 1998, p. 213 (for 1990 and 1994), from the collection Partide politice, Agenția de presă Rompres, București, 1993 (for 1992 and 1993); Alexandru RADU, Nevoia schimbării. Un deceniu de pluripartidism in România, Editura "Ion Cristoiu", Bucuresti, 2000, p. 16 (for 1996; at pp. 341-345, the same author indicated

45 de parties existing in mid April 1999, without including in this number the formations of minorities, included in the data for 1990-1996); the Central Electoral Bureau (for the data of 2000 and 2004). If after 2000, the number of minorities legally recognized was fixed at 18 (the number of organizations being bigger, in the conditions where some of the minorities are represented by several formations), in exchange, the number of parties was reduced: January $1^{\text {st }} 2003$ there were 37 (cf. Roxana ANDRONIC, Bogdana PĂUN, "Legea partidelor nu sperie nici formatiiunile de buzunar", Ziua, January 23, 2003), at the fixed term for the re-registration of parties - that is July 18, 2003 - there were 27 left, and July 15, 2004 there were 30 inscribed (cf. Stan STOICA, Dictionarul partidelor politice din România 1989-2004, IV ${ }^{\text {th }}$ ed., Editura Meronia, Bucuresti, 2004, pp. 139-144). The column for the Chamber includes the formations of minorities. Since the European elections of 2007 BBC began to publish on each site of elections the list of the formations inscribed at the Tribunal.

Table 6
Party Sympathizers

|  | Name of the party | $\mathbf{0 1 . 0 7 . 2 0 0 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 1 . 1 2 . 2 0 0 7}$ |
| ---: | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1 | Partidul Național Liberal | 120115 | 116134 |
| 2 | Partidul Ecologist Român | 34810 | 28705 |
| 3 | P. Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat | 56163 | 35602 |
| 4 | Partidul Democrat | 148000 | 86461 |
| 5 | Partidul Social Democrat | 300000 | 290116 |
| 6 | Partidul Conservator | 95314 | 90663 |
| 7 | Acțiunea Populară | 33365 | - |
| 8 | Federația Ecologistă din România | 44348 | R |
| 9 | Partidul România Mare | 201827 | 106797 |
| 10 | Partidul Național Liberal Câmpeanu | 28391 | R |
| 11 | Partidul Socialist al Muncii | 61052 | R |
| 12 | Partidul Socialist al Renașterii Naționale | 35469 | R |
| 13 | Partidul Unității Națiunii Române | 54402 | R |
| 14 | Partidul Altenativa Ecologistă | 31041 | 26588 |
| 15 | Uniunea pentru Reconstrucția României | 32380 | R |
| 16 | Partidul Socialist Unit | 44081 | R |
| 17 | Partidul Muncitoresc Român | 32657 | R |
| 18 | Partidul Lege și Ordine | 28440 | - |
| 19 | Partidul Social Democrat C.Titel Petrescu | 29743 | 29503 |
| 20 | Partidul Noua Generație | 32000 | 92499 |
| 21 | Partidul Socialist Român | 31292 | 28187 |
| 22 | Partidul Popular și al Protecției Sociale | 50000 | 38836 |
| 23 | Partidul Popular Creștin | 27696 | R |
| 24 | Partidul Forța Dreptății | 65994 | - |
| 25 | Partidul Popular din România | 65000 | 26068 |
| 26 | Partidul Național Democrat Crestin | 26138 | 29031 |
| 27 | Partidul Creștin Democrat | 25712 | - |
| 28 | Partidul Renașterea României | - | 26844 |
| 29 | Partidul Alianța Socialistă | 36517 |  |

[^9]|  | Name of the party | $\mathbf{0 1 . 0 7 . 2 0 0 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 1 . 1 2 . 2 0 0 7}$ |
| ---: | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 30 | Partidul Republican | - | 63295 |
| 31 | Forța Democrată | - | 31724 |
| 32 | Partidul Inițiativa Națională | - | 25941 |
| 33 | Partidul Verde | - | 26034 |
| 34 | Partidul Liberal Democrat | - | 66872 |
| Total |  | $\mathbf{1 7 3 5 4 3 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 0 2 4 1 7}$ |

The information in the table is taken from The register of political parties of April 2004, of the article of Lucian GHEORGHIU, " 27 de partide au rămas in viată", Cotidianul, July 18, 2003 as from the documents entitled The register of political parties. Law no. 14/2003, published by the Central Electoral Bureau with the occasion of the elections of June and November 2008. Of the 27 parties existing on July $1^{\text {st }}, 2003$, nine were erased from the Register of political parties, (a fact noted with an R in the table) because they have undergone processes of merger/absorption: it is the case of Federatia Ecologistă din România and Partidul Popular Creștin (erased at 27.11.2003 following its fusion with PNL), the Partidul Național Liberal Câmpeanu (erased 27.11.2003, following its fusion with PNL), the Partidul Socialist al Renașterii Naționale and Partidul Socialist al Muncii (erased 22.10.2003 and respectively 05.12.2003, after they were absorbed by Partidul Social Democrat), the Partidul Unității Națiunii Române (erased la 09.08.2006, after it was absorbed by the Partidul Conservator), the Uniunea pentru Reconstrucția României (erased 10.03.2006, after it was absorbed by PNȚCD), the Partidul Socialist Unit and Partidul Muncitoresc Român (erased 07.04.2006 after they united under the name Partidul Stângii Unite). Other four parties, being quoted in the table with their actual denominations: it is the case of Partidul Umanist din România Social-Liberal which became since October 2005 Partidul Conservator, the Partidul Noua Democrație which changed its name in January 2007 in Partidul Alternativa Ecologistă, the Partidul Pensionarilor si Protectiei Sociale, which preferred since October 2005 to be called Partidul Popular si al Protectiei Sociale and the Partidul Tineretului Democrat, which became since 2005 Partidul Lege și Ordine. Four existing parties in 2003 did not submit lists at the end of 2007; in exchange, at the positions 28-34 of the table appear parties created after July 1st 2003, which presented signatures of the adherents in the term imposed by art. 27 of the law 14/2003. In total, January 1st, 2008 there were 21 parties politically active which declared the number of their members. In the spring of 2008, there were in the Register of parties, 11 political formations without having submitted lists with supporters at the end of 2007: Partidul Tinerilor din România (created in 2003 in the commune Voinești of Dâmbovița), Partidul Demnității Naționale (created in February 2004 by an ex candidate for the presidential, Eduard Gheorghe Manole), Partidul Pentru Patrie (politically active in the period 1996-2004), Uniunea Creștin Socială (established in 2004 under the name Blocul Național Democrat), Forta Civică (created in 2004 under the name of Partidul Crestin), Partidul Comuniștilor Nepeceristi (created in 2006 in the village Urechești of the commune Cicănești in the county Arges), Partidul Popular Agrar (created in February 2006 in Bucharest), Mișcarea Conservatoare din România (established in December 2006), Uniunea Populară Social-Creștină (created in November 2006), Partidul României Europene (created in January 2007), as the already recalled Partid al Stângii Unite, resulted from the merger of PSU-PMR. The Register records also the registration in March 2008 of the Partidul Civic Maghiar - Magyar Polgari Part, and in August 2008 of the

Partidul Uniunea Ecologistă din România, as the existence of four political alliances (Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr - Partidul Național Liberal - Partidul Democrat, then Alianța Partidul Popular European (Creștini Democrați) și Democrați Europeni, Alianța Uniunea Verde Ecologistă and Alianța Politică PSD+PC. The decrease in the number of members from 1735430 to 1302417 is explained by the reduction of these numbers for all parties, with the exception of two: PNG, which increases three times and PNTTCD, with an increase of 3000 members. In some cases, the phenomenon is hard to explain: for example, even though PSD absorbed two parties - PSM and PSRN - that had together almost 100 thousand members, the social-democrats decrease however from 300 to 290 thousand of sympathizers. With important quotas of confidence and on the first place at the Europeans of 2007, PD has a decrease from 148 thousands to 86 thousands of members: that is a diminution of over $40 \%$, explained probably by the fact that the formation submitted lists only from 21 counties. The record belongs to PRM with a reduction of almost $50 \%$. The distribution on counties holds its own surprises as results from table 6 bis.

Table 6 bis
Distribution of Sympathizers in Counties

| Name | NJ | Minimal |  |  | Maximum |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PNL | 41 | CV 311 | IF 724 | SV 860 | DJ 5141 | BV 5176 | CT 6519 |
| PER | 37 | TM 1 | HD 1 | GJ 6 | BR 1721 | BC 2211 | B 2862 |
| PNTTCD | 40 | VN 16 | BR 80 | MH 210 | CL 2555 | TN 2995 | B 4035 |
| PD | 21 | CL 761 | CV 927 | BH 992 | HD 6673 | B 10967 | BV 11932 |
| PSD | 42 | CV 772 | HR 798 | TR 1.653 | NT16 074 | DB 18459 | B 31641 |
| PC | 40 | TL 80 | HR 157 | CJ 257 | VL 8030 | BC 8900 | GL 11091 |
| PRM | 42 | HR 194 | SM 420 | GR 710 | NT 6083 | CT 6455 | SV 9269 |
| PAE | 23 | SB 724 | MH 731 | BZ 741 | BV 1755 | TL 1830 | GL5 249 |
| PSDCTP | 38 | CS 1 | GJ 1 | SJ 2 | AR 2068 | CT 2240 | B 4648 |
| PNG | 41 | CV 392 | SJ 854 | TM 879 | OT 4703 | VN 4867 | B 5166 |
| PSR | 33 | GR 6 | IS 9 | SV 23 | VL 1704 | GL 1793 | B 2506 |
| PPPS | 30 | SJ 294 | BH 364 | VS 455 | TR 2536 | AG 2658 | B 4455 |
| PPR | 36 | AR 40 | AG 40 | BR 40 | VL 1520 | BN 1700 | B 2180 |
| PNDC | 34 | BH 12 | CJ 13 | HR 24 | DB 2030 | PH 2459 | DJ 4497 |
| PRR | 23 | TM 703 | BR 720 | TL 822 | IS 1492 | B 2457 | VS 3277 |
| PAS | 37 | CV 20 | SM 60 | BV 75 | GJ 1828 | CJ 2175 | HD 2763 |
| PR | 25 | TM 95 | MH 318 | BH 320 | GR 3653 | VL 16840 | BT 17340 |
| FD | 20 | IF 337 | BR 707 | GJ 825 | VN 2010 | B 2241 | TM 3811 |
| PIN | 20 | VL 797 | BV 861 | GL 904 | IS 1640 | TM 1640 | MS 1890 |
| PV | 25 | TL 53 | BC 283 | BR 501 | BV 1635 | B 2056 | GL 2495 |
| PLD | 39 | TL 119 | SJ 146 | IF 153 | DB3 674 | VL4 180 | SV 4505 |

[^10]In table, I noted with $\mathrm{NJ}=$ the number of circumscriptions/counties from where come the sympathizers; Minim $=$ the 3 counties with the smallest number of sympathizers (county/their number). At PNL lack all together the lists from Harghita and in Bucharest the liberals only have 1769 members. PSD has lists in all the counties. At PNTCD, lists in 40 counties, without Harghita and Covasna. At PRM all the counties but in Bucharest only 3583. At PSDCTP are missing the counties Bihor, Covasna, Maramures, si Sibiu. At PC, without Sălaj and Satu Mare and in Bucharest 1409 members. At PNG is missing Harghita. PAS has in Bucharest only 1872 (the fourth filial as dimension). At PR exists only two over-dimensioned branches: In Vâlcea and Botoșani. PLD has no lists at Covasna, Buzău and Caras, Severin, and in Bucharest it has 3363 members.

Table 7
Parliamentary Forces (1990-2004)

| Year of election | Senate |  | Chamber of Deputies |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | A | B | C |  |
| 1990 | 7 | 7 | 16 | 16 | 11 |  |
| 1992 | 8 | 12 | 7 | 12 | 13 |  |
| 1996 | 6 | 12 | 6 | 12 | 15 |  |
| 2000 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 18 |  |
| 2004 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 18 |  |
| 2008 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 18 |  |

The table indicates for the two Chambers of Parliament the total number of political forces that passed the electoral threshold, coalitions and alliances taken as a whole (A), the number of parties that entered the Senate or the Chamber, each member of the coalition taken separately (B) and the number of minority organizations other than UDMR that entered the Chamber even though they did not pass the threshold (C). For 1990 the threshold was 0 but UDMR was still counted separately of the other minority formations.

Table 8
The Effective Number of Parties (1990-2008)

| ELECTION | $\mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{A}}$ | $\mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{B}}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1990 | 1,6297 | 1,6297 | 1,6297 |
| 1992 | 4,7502 | 5,6116 | 5,1809 |
| 1996 | 3,8936 | 5,9900 | 4,8293 |
| 2000 | 3,2273 | 3,6791 | 3,4532 |
| 2004 | 3,0321 | 4,6882 | 3,8602 |
| 2008 | 3,1986 | 3,1986 | 3,1986 |
| AVERAGE |  |  | 3,6920 |

The table contains the values of the effective number of parties $(\mathrm{N})$ calculated - to describe the party system - after the formula of Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera $\mathrm{N}=1 / \Sigma \mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}}^{2}$, where $s_{i}$ is the proportion of the seats of the party I (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., p. 79). Keeping in mind that the presence of minorities in the inferior Chamber complicates the system of representation, I made the calculation departing from the Senate (see Cristian PREDA, România postcomunistă și România interbelică, Meridiane, București, 2002, pp. 51-52); I calculated two parameters: $\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{A}}$ and $\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{B}}$, taking into account first coalitions/alliances as a whole $\left(\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{A}}\right)$ and then taking into account parliamentary parties separately $\left(\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{B}}\right)$, more precisely those parties that obtained at least $1 \%$ of parliamentary seats (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., pp. 76-80); I determined than the parameter of the effective number of parties ( N ) as an arithmetic mean of $\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{A}}$ and $\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{B}}$. For 2004 I also calculated the parameter for the Senate (the values are inscribed in the table), but also for the Chamber; in this second case I took into consideration first the group of minorities as such, neglecting in the case of the second parameter each formation taken separately, as none obtained $1 \%$ of mandates; the values obtained this way ( $\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{A}}=3.3322 ; \mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{B}}=4.0717$ and $\mathrm{N}=3.7019$ ) are very close of the ones that resulted from the calculation made on the basis of the mandates of the Senate. More than this, the calculation N can be made by taking into account the Chambers reunited, more precisely the weight of parliamentary groups at the level of the Parliament reunited; the calculation is relevant because, although after the 2004 elections, parties have quasi-identical power at the Senate and in the inferior Chamber, ensuring the majority involves, in fact, different constraints in each Chamber as at the level of the Parliament reunited. Departing from the observation that of the 469 seats of Parliament reunited at the end of 2004 PSD held 159 ( $33.9 \%$ ) PNL - 92 ( $19.62 \%$ ), PD - 69 ( $14.71 \%$ ), PRM also $69(14.71 \%)$, UDMR - $32(6.82 \%)$, PUR - $30(6.40 \%)$, and the group of minorities 18 mandates (that is $3.84 \%$ ), the value of N is 4.8333 , indicating - as the other values taken separately for the Senate and the Chamber - that we are dealing with a multi-party system without a dominant party. For 2008 I ignored the mandates of PC from the alliance Alianta PSD + PC, because the number was negligible - one mandate at the Senate (the 4 of the Chamber representing a little over $1 \%$ ).

Table 9
Oversize of the Legislative

| Year | Mandates |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1990 | 397 |
| 1992 | 341 |
| 1996 | 343 |
| 2000 | 345 |
| 2004 | 332 |
| 2008 | 334 |
| Optimum | 282 |

The table indicate the mandates of the inferior Chamber, including the places granted to the minority formations and, on the last row the optimum dimensions of the legislative, departing from the rule "of the cubic root" (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy ...cit., p. 151).

Table 10
"Squandered" Votes (1992-2008)

|  | Senate |  |  |  | Chamber of Deputies |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | VVEPP | VVE | VI | VI\% | VVEPP | VVE | VI | VI\% |
| 1992 | 9360739 | 10964818 | 1604079 | 14,63 | 8765014 | 10880252 | 2115238 | 19,45 |
| 1996 | 10239125 | 12287671 | 2048546 | 16,67 | 10049643 | 12238746 | 2189103 | 17,89 |
| 2000 | 8723251 | 10891910 | 2168659 | 19,92 | 8464543 | 10839424 | 2374881 | 21,91 |
| 2004 | 9081077 | 10231476 | 1150399 | 11,24 | 8866774 | 10188106 | 1321332 | 12,96 |
| 2008 | 6396804 | 6888055 | 491251 | 7,13 | 6466288 | 6886794 | 420506 | 6,10 |

In the first column is indicated the year of the election. VVEP indicates the total number of valid votes expressed for the parties that passed the electoral threshold. VVE is the total number of valid votes expressed. VI means squandered votes, that is, granted to parties that could not pass the threshold, in absolute numbers (VI). $\mathrm{VI} \%$ is the percentage of squandered votes from the total of valid votes expressed.

Table 11
Electoral Bonus for the Winners of Elections

| Year | Chamber | Senate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1990 | $-0,07$ | $+10,29$ |
| 1992 | $+6,60$ | $+5,97$ |
| 1996 | $+5,40$ | $+6,37$ |
| 2000 | $+8,31$ | $+9,33$ |
| 2004 | $+4,48$ | $+3,13$ |
| 2008 | $+1,04$ | $+1,61$ |

We indicate here the bonus granted to the party that was first in the classification - Frontul Salvării Naționale (1990), Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale (1992), Convenția Democrată Română (1996), Polul Democrat-Social din România (2000), Uniunea națională PSD+PUR (2004), Alianța Politică PSD + PC (2008) - calculated as a difference between the percentage of seats and the percentage of votes obtained.

Table 12
The Number of Mandates and their Allocation (1992-2008)

|  | Senate |  |  | Chamber of Deputies |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MS | MSR | \%MSR | MD | MDR | \%MDR |
| 1992 | 143 | 94 | 65,74 | 341 | 125 | 36,66 |
| 1996 | 143 | 85 | 59,45 | 343 | 118 | 34,41 |
| 2000 | 140 | 72 | 51,43 | 345 | 110 | 31,89 |
| 2004 | 137 | 71 | 51,82 | 314 | 71 | 22,61 |
| 2008 | 137 | 65 | 47,44 | 315 | 70 | 22,22 |

The first column indicates the year of elections. The following three specify the total number of senator mandates (MS), the number of mandates of senator allocated after the redistribution of votes obtained by the formations that do not reach the threshold (MSR)
and, respectively the percentage of mandates of senator allocated as a result of redistribution (\%MSR). The last three columns contain the total number of mandates of deputy, without the ones of minorities (MD), the number of mandates of deputy allocated after redistribution (MDR) and the percentage of mandates of deputy allocated as a result of redistribution (\%MDR). For 2008 I introduced in the columns MSR and MDR all the mandates allocated in the second stage of allocation, at the national level.

Table 13
Electoral Disproportionality (1990-2008)

|  | $\mathbf{G}_{\boldsymbol{L}}$ | $\mathbf{G}_{\mathrm{P}}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1 9 9 0}$ | 7,86 | 93,19 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 9 2}$ | 5,88 | 38,66 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 9 6}$ | 7,03 | 45,59 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 0}$ | 9,38 | 33,17 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | 4,98 | 48,77 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | 4,36 | - |
| Means | 6,58 | 51,88 |

The table contains the parameters of legislative disproportionality $\left(\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{L}}\right)$ and presidential disproportionality $\left(G_{p}\right)$ for the period 1990-2008, as well as, on the last row, the average values of these ones; the general value of G , calculated as a geometrical mean of the two parameters is $\mathrm{G}=18.47$. The parameter of legislative disproportionality was calculated after the formula of Michael Gallagher $G_{L}=\sqrt{1} / 2 \Sigma\left(v_{i}-1_{i}\right)^{2}$, where $v_{i}=$ the percentage of votes obtained by a party and $1_{i}=$ the percentage of seats obtained by that party, taking into account all the parties that obtained minimum $1 \%$; for the entire period, the table contains the data calculated departing from the result of elections at the Senate; in fact, for 2004, the parameter of legislative disproportionality has values very close if it is calculated for the Senate (4.98), respectively for the Chamber (4.31). In 2008 the difference is somewhat bigger: 3.27 for the Chamber and 4.36 for the Senate. Presidential disproportionality is equal to the score of the defeated candidate in the second tour of elections. For 1990-2000 the calculations can be found in the volume Cristian PREDA, România postcomunistă...cit., pp. 59-60.

Table 14
Mandates, First Places and Majorities in 2008

|  | Cham. Dep. |  |  | Senate |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Party | M | L1 | MAJ | M | L1 | MAJ |
| PSD | 114 | 117 | 40 | 51 | 55 | 12 |
| PDL | 115 | 138 | 27 | 49 | 58 | 11 |
| PNL | 65 | 37 | 4 | 28 | 15 | 1 |
| UDMR | 22 | 23 | 14 | 9 | 9 | 7 |
| Total | 316 | 315 | 85 | 137 | 137 | 31 |

M is the number of mandates, L 1 is the number of first places won in colleges. MAJ is the number of colleges won with more than half of the votes in colleges. In the table, PSD appears together with its ally, PC. The difference between L1 and M in the case of the Chamber of Deputies is explained by the increase of the magnitude of the circumscription of Arad with one seat.

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Table 14 bis
Allocation of Mandates on Counties in 2008

| County | Chamber of Deputies |  |  | Senate |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | M | JUD | 50\%+1 | M | JUD | 50\%+1 |
| AB | 5 | 4 | 3 PDL | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| AR | 8 | 5 | 5 PDL | 3 | 2 | 2 PDL |
| AG | 9 | 7 | 3 PSD | 4 | 3 | 2 PSD |
| BC | 10 | 9 | 2 PSD | 4 | 3 | 1 PSD |
| BH | 9 | 7 | 2 UDMR | 4 | 2 | 1 UDMR |
| BN | 4 | 2 | 1 PDL | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| BT | 6 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| BV | 8 | 6 | 1 PDL | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| BR | 5 | 3 | 1 PSD | 2 | 1 | 1 PSD |
| BZ | 7 | 6 | 1 PSD + 1 PNL | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| CS | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| CL | 5 | 4 | 1 PNL | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| CJ | 10 | 8 | 2 PDL | 4 | 1 | 1 PDL |
| CT | 10 | 9 | 4 PSD | 4 | 3 | 1 PSD |
| CV | 4 | 3 | 3 UDMR | 2 | 2 | 2 UDMR |
| DB | 8 | 6 | 4 PDL + 1 PSD | 3 | 2 | 2 PDL |
| DJ | 10 | 9 | 4 PSD | 5 | 3 | 2 PSD |
| GL | 9 | 7 | 3 PSD | 4 | 2 | 1 PSD |
| GR | 4 | 3 | 1 PNL | 2 | 1 | 1 PNL |
| GJ | 6 | 4 | 3 PSD | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| HR | 5 | 4 | 4 UDMR | 2 | 2 | 2 UDMR |
| HD | 7 | 5 | 1 PDL | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| IL | 4 | 2 | 1 PSD | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| IS | 12 | 11 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 |
| IF | 4 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| MM | 7 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| MH | 4 | 2 | 1 PDL | 2 | 1 | 1 PDL |
| MS | 8 | 6 | 3 UDMR | 4 | 1 | 1 UDMR |
| NT | 8 | 7 | 2 PSD + 2 PDL | 3 | 2 | 1 PDL |
| OT | 7 | 6 | $3 \mathrm{PSD}+1 \mathrm{PDL}$ | 3 | 2 | 1 PSD |
| PH | 12 | 10 | $1 \mathrm{PSD}+1 \mathrm{PDL}$ | 5 | 4 | 0 |
| SM | 5 | 3 | 1 UDMR | 2 | 1 | 1 UDMR |
| SJ | 4 | 3 | 1 UDMR | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| SB | 6 | 4 | 1 PDL + 1 PSD | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| SV | 10 | 8 | 2 PDL | 4 | 3 | 2 PDL |
| TR | 6 | 4 | 2 PSD + 1 PNL | 3 | 1 | 1 PSD |
| TM | 10 | 8 | 1 PDL | 4 | 2 | 1 PDL |
| TU | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 PDL |
| VS | 7 | 5 | 1 PSD | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| VL | 6 | 4 | 2 PSD | 3 | 1 | 1 PSD |
| VN | 6 | 5 | 3 PSD | 2 | 1 | 1 PSD |
| B | 28 | 27 | $2 \mathrm{PSD}+1 \mathrm{PDL}$ | 12 | 11 | 0 |
| 43 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 315 | 245 | 85 | 137 | 72 | 31 |

$M$ is the magnitude, that is, the number of deputies/senators on circumscription. JUD designates the number of mandates allocated at the level of the county. On the column $50 \%+1$ appears the number of mandates allocated following the "direct" victory, with minimum $50 \%+1$ of the votes of the college. In Arad, the magnitude for $C D$ fixed by the law was 7 , being increased with one mandate after the elections. In what regards the numbers of the column JUD, they differ from the data of BEC in the case of CV for the Chamber and in the cases of AR, CV, HR, MH, SM, and TL for the Senate in the sense in which at BEC appears in each case with one unity less. The explication is simple: in these cases, BEC ignored one directly won mandate because the party of winners did not reunite at the level of the county the corresponding electoral coefficient. The mandates won with minimum $50 \%+1$ are still won at the level of the circumscription and thus they appear in the table. The 85 mandates won "directly" at the Chamber pertain 40 PSD 27 PDL, 14 UDMR and 4 PNL, while the 31 of the Senate were won 12 by PSD, 11 by PDL, 7 by UDMR and one by PNL.

Table 14-3
Parties and Mandates in the Bucharest Circumscription

| Col. | I | II | III | M |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | PDL 4828 | PSD 4182 | PNL 3793 | PNL |
| 2 | PDL 4778 | PSD 3931 | PNL 3653 | PNL |
| 3 | PDL 5431 | PNL 4749 | PSD 4711 | PNL |
| 4 | PDL 10845 | PSD 8093 | PNL 5195 | PDL |
| 5 | PDL 6577 | PSD 6013 | PNL 3249 | PSD |
| 6 | PSD 8790 | PDL 7070 | PNL 2393 | PSD |
| 7 | PDL 6930 | PSD 6711 | PNL 2690 | PSD |
| 8 | PDL 7936 | PSD 5809 | PNG 4101 | PDL |
| 9 | PDL 8531 | PSD 6069 | PNL 3781 | PDL |
| 10 | PDL 7004 | PSD 4659 | PNL 2837 | PDL |
| 11 | PDL 8127 | PSD 4379 | PNL 2394 | PDL |
| 12 | PDL 8362 | PSD 5445 | PNL 2246 | PDL |
| 13 | PDL 8160 | PSD 5429 | PNL 1700 | PDL |
| 14 | PDL 8019 | PSD 5656 | PNL 2333 | PDL |
| 15 | PDL 8723 | PSD 3616 | PNL 1188 | PDL |
| 16 | PDL 5730 | PSD 5128 | PNL 2639 | PSD |
| 17 | PSD 4773 | PDL 4607 | PNL 2011 | PSD |
| 18 | PSD 9038 | PDL 7066 | PNL 3441 | PSD |
| 19 | PSD 11530 | PDL9 774 | PNL 2599 | PSD |
| 20 | PSD 12214 | PDL 5301 | PNG 3600 | PSD |
| 21 | PSD 5557 | PDL4 853 | PNL 2593 | PSD |
| 22 | PSD 3938 | PDL3 323 | PNL 3315 | PNL |
| 23 | PSD 10415 | PDL4 907 | PNL 2144 | PSD |
| 24 | PDL 8729 | PSD 7023 | PNL 3819 | PDL |
| 25 | PDL 11385 | PSD 7471 | PNL 4313 | PDL |
| 26 | PDL 6234 | PSD 4919 | PNL 3642 | PSD |
| 27 | PDL6 291 | PSD 4706 | PNL 3069 | PNL |
| 28 | PDL 7546 | PSD 5213 | PNL 2452 | PDL |

[^11]On the first column (Col) appears the number of the college. On columns I, II and III the occupiers of the first place, the second and the third, as the number of votes obtained. M indicates the party to which the mandate was allocated with italics being marked the cases in which candidates obtained the mandate with minimum $50 \%+1$.

Table 15
Parties that Passed at Least 3 Electoral Tests

| Party | 1990 |  | 1992 |  | 1996 |  | 2000 |  | 2004 |  | 2008 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CD | S | CD | S | CD | S | CD | S | CD | S | CD | S |
| PSD | 263 | 92 | 117 | 49 | 91 | 41 | 139 | 59 | 113 | 46 | 110 | 48 |
| PDL |  |  | 43 | 18 | 43 | 22 | 31 | 13 | 48 | 21 | 115 | 51 |
| PRM | - | - | 16 | 6 | 19 | 8 | 84 | 37 | 48 | 21 | - | - |
| PNL | 29 | 9 | - | - | 25 | 16 | 30 | 13 | 64 | 28 | 65 | 28 |
| PSDR | 2 | - | 10 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 3 | - | - | - | - |
| UDMR | 29 | 12 | 27 | 12 | 25 | 11 | 27 | 12 | 22 | 10 | 22 | 9 |
| PNTTCD | 12 | 1 | 41 | 21 | 83 | 27 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| PUNR | 9 | 2 | 30 | 14 | 18 | 7 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| PER | 8 | 1 | 4 | - | 5 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| PC | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | 3 | 19 | 11 | 4 | 1 |

The table indicates the number of parliamentary mandates obtained either individually, either in coalitions by the parties that passed three out of the five electoral tests, indifferently if they are still in Parliament or not (this is how is explained the fact that appear here PNTTCD and PUNR, absent of the first two legislatures) and indifferent of the fact if they still exist or not (PSDR, for example merged in 2001 with PSDR under the name PSD). I used the present acronyms (and not, for example FDSN - the name that PDSR had at the 1992 elections). For the year 1990 I mentioned, both at the Chamber (CD) as in the Senate (S), the mandates obtained by FSN, of which were detached PSD and PD.

Table 16
The Scores of the Political Families of Romania (1990-2008)

|  | 1990 | 1992 | 1996 | 2000 | 2004 | 2008 | Average |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Greens | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { 2,62 MER } \\ 1,69 \mathrm{PER} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0,98 \text { PER }^{*} \\ & 2,25 \text { MER } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1,24 \text { PER }^{*} \\ & 0,25 \text { FER }^{*} \end{aligned}$ | 0,84 PER | 0,72 FER | 0,26 PVE | 1,81 |
|  | 4,31 | 3,23 | 1,49 | 0,84 | 0,72 | 0,26 |  |
| Communists \& extreme left | 0,38 PDM | 3,04 PSM | $\begin{array}{r} 2,29 \mathrm{PS} \\ 2,15 \mathrm{PSM} \\ 1,73 \mathrm{PSMR} \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0,71 \mathrm{PSM} \\ & 0,48 \mathrm{PMR} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0,44 \mathrm{PSU} \\ 0,35 \mathrm{PMR} \\ 0,25 \mathrm{PAS} \\ 0,28 \mathrm{PSR} \end{gathered}$ | 0 | 2,02 |
|  | 0,38 | 3,04 | 6,17 | 1,19 | 1,32 | 0 |  |
| Agrarian minimalists | 1,83 PDAR | $\begin{array}{r} \text { 2,99 PDAR } \\ 0,45 \text { PNT } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 0,84 PNTT | 0,43 PNT | 0 | 0 | 1,09 |
|  | 1,83 | 3,44 | 0,84 | 0,43 | 0 | 0 |  |


|  | 1990 | 1992 | 1996 | 2000 | 2004 | 2008 | Average |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Social-democrats | $66,31 \mathrm{FSN}$ $1,05 \mathrm{PSoDR}$ $0,53 \mathrm{PSDR}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 27,72 \text { FDSN } \\ 2,40 \mathrm{PSDR}^{*} \\ 10,19 \mathrm{FSN} \\ 0,87 \mathrm{PsoDR} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 21,52 \mathrm{PDSR}^{*} \\ 10,48 \mathrm{PD}^{*} \\ 2,44 \mathrm{PSDR}^{*} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|r\|} \hline 36,61 \mathrm{PDSR} \\ 7,03 \mathrm{PD} \end{array}$ | $36,61 \mathrm{PSD}$ $0,78 \mathrm{FD}$ $0,21 \mathrm{PND}$ $0,2 \mathrm{PSDCTP}$ | 33,09 PSD | 43,07 |
|  | 67,89 | 41,18 | 34,44 | 43,64 | 37,80 | 33,09 |  |
| Liberals and conservatives maximalist and modernist | $\begin{array}{r} \hline \text { 6,41 PNL } \\ \text { 0,27 ULB } \\ 0,15 \text { PLLR } \end{array}$ | 3,12 $\mathrm{PAC}^{*}$ $2,64 \mathrm{PNLAT}^{*}$ $2,63 \mathrm{PNL}$ $0,72 \mathrm{PNLCD}^{*}$ $0,58 \mathrm{NPL}$ $0,51 \mathrm{ULB}$ | $6,18 \mathrm{PNL}^{*}$ $1,24 \mathrm{PNLCD}^{*}$ $1,57 \mathrm{ANL}$ $0,79 \mathrm{ANLE}$ $0,08 \mathrm{PLC}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 6,89 \mathrm{PNL} \\ 4,07 \mathrm{APR} \\ 1,40 \mathrm{PNLC} \\ 0,45 \mathrm{PLDR} \\ 0,03 \mathrm{ULB} \end{array}$ | 31,33 ADA | $\begin{aligned} & 18,57 \mathrm{PNL} \\ & 32,36 \mathrm{PDL} \end{aligned}$ | 20,33 |
|  | 6,83 | 10,20 | 9,86 | 12,84 | 31,33 | 50,93 |  |
| Agrarian, Christian populists and/or identitarian right | 2,56 PNTCD | 10,01 PNTTCD* | $\begin{array}{r} 20,51 \text { PNTCD }^{+} \\ 0,74 \text { PAR }^{*} \end{array}$ | 5,04 CDR | $\begin{array}{\|r\|} \hline 1,86 \mathrm{PNTCD} \\ 0,47 \mathrm{AP} \\ 0,32 \mathrm{URR} \end{array}$ | 0 | 6,92 |
|  | 2,56 | 10,01 | 21,25 | 5,04 | 2,65 | 0 |  |
| National-populists on an ethnic or religious basis, extreme right | 2,12 PUNR | $\begin{array}{r} \text { 7,72 PUNR } \\ \text { 3,89 PRM } \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 4,46 PRM } \\ 4,35 \text { PUNR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 19,48 \mathrm{PRM} \\ 1,38 \mathrm{PAN} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline \text { 12,99 PRM } \\ \text { 2,24 PNG } \\ 0,52 \text { PUNR } \\ 0,27 \mathrm{PNDC} \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 3,15 PRM } \\ & \text { 2,27 PNG } \end{aligned}$ | 10,81 |
|  | 2,12 | 11,61 | 8,81 | 20,86 | 16,02 | 5,42 |  |
| Defenders of specific interests, diverse | $0,48 \mathrm{GDC}$ $0,34 \mathrm{PLS}$ $0,32 \mathrm{PRNR}$ $0,32 \mathrm{PTLDR}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1,63 \mathrm{PR} \\ 0,73 \mathrm{SND} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline 1,44 \mathrm{PPR} \\ 0,87 \mathrm{GDC} \end{array}$ | 0,66 PPR | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 0,18 \mathrm{APCD} \\ 0,16 \mathrm{PTD} \\ 0,18 \text { other } \end{array}$ | 0,12 PPCD | 1,24 |
|  | 1,46 | 2,36 | 2,31 | 0,66 | 0,52 | 0,12 |  |
| Minorities | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 7,23 \text { UDMR } \\ 0,99 \text { other } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 7,46 \text { UDMR } \\ \text { 1,43 other } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { 6,63 UDMR } \\ \text { 1,71 other } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline 6,80 \text { UDMR } \\ 2,57 \text { other } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|r\|} \hline 6,19 \text { UDMR } \\ 2,88 \text { other } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline 6,17 \mathrm{UDMR} \\ 3,45 \text { other } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 8,92 |
|  | 8,22 | 8,89 | 8,34 | 9,37 | 9,07 | 9,62 |  |

I took into consideration the categories of party families defined by Christian VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo MEDINA LOCKHART, "La géographie électorale de l'Europe centre-orientale", in Jean-Michel DE WAELE (ed.), Partis politiques et démocraties...cit., pp. 17-34. The results are those for the Chamber of Deputies, the scores being calculated on the basis of performances of one or several parties that participated alone or in alliances (this last case is indicated with the help of an asterisk, the score being deducted proportionally with the weight of the respective formation in alliance). I used the following acronyms: ADA = Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr (PNL-PD); ANL = Alianța Națională Liberală; ANLE = Alianța Național-Liberală Ecologistă; AP = Acțiunea Populară; APCD = Alianța Popular Creștin Democrată (PPR+Partidul Renașterea României); APR = Alianța pentru România; CDR 2000 = Convenția Democrată Română 2000; FD = Forța Democrată din România; FDSN = Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale; FER = Federația Ecologistă din România; FSN = Frontul Salvării Naționale; GDC = Gruparea Democratică de Centru; NPL = Noul Partid Liberal; MER = Mișcarea Ecologistă din România; PAC = Partidul Aliantei Civice; PAN = Partidul Alianța Națională (ex-PUNR + PNR = Partidul Național Român); PAR = Partidul Alternativa României; PAS = Partidul Alianța Socialistă; PD = Partidul Democrat (ex-FSN); PDAR = Partidul Democrat-Agrar din România; PDM = Partidul Democrat al Muncii; PDSR = Partidul Democrației Sociale din România (ex-FDSN);

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PER = Partidul Ecologist din România; PLC= Partidul Liberal Crestin; PLDR = Partidul Liberal Democrat Român (ex-PNLCD); PLLR = Partidul Liberal (al Libertătii) din România; PLS $=$ Partidul Liber-Schimbist; PMR = Partidul Muncitoresc Român; PND = Partidul Noua Democrație; PNDC = Partidul Național Democrat Creștin; PNG = Partidul Noua Generație; PNL = Partidul Național Liberal; PNLAT = Partidul Național-Liberal Aripa Tânără; PNLC = Partidul Național Liberal Câmpeanu; PNLCD = Partidul Național Liberal Convenția Democrată; PNT = Partidul Național Țărănesc; PNȚCD $=$ Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin-Democrat; PPCD = Partidul Popular și al Protecției Sociale din România; PPR = Partidul Pensionarilor din România; PR = Partidul Republican; PRM = Partidul România Mare; PRNR = Partidul Reconstrucției Naționale din Romănia; PS = Partidul Socialist; PSD = Partidul Social Democrat (PDSR+PSDR); PSDCTP = Partidul Social Democrat Constantin Titel Petrescu; PSDR = Partidul Social-Democrat Român; PSM = Partidul Socialist al Muncii; PSMR = Partidul Socialist Muncitoresc Român; PSoDR = Partidul Socialist Democratic Român; PSR = Partidul Socialist Român; PSU = Partidul Socialist Unit; PTD = Partidul Tineretului Democrat; PTLDR = Partidul Tineretului Liber Democrat din România; PUNR = Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor/Partidul Unității Națiunii Române; PUR = Partidul Umanist din România; PVE = Partidul Verde Ecologist, alianță a PER și Partidului Verde; UDMR = Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România; SND = Solidaritatea Național-Democrată; ULB = Uniunea Liberală Brătianu; URR = Uniunea pentru Reconstructia României.

Table 17
Governmental Formulas and Parliamentary Majorities (1990-2004)

|  | Government formula |  |  | Parliamentary majority |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Composition | Votes | Man- <br> dates | Composition | Votes | Man- <br> dates |
| $1990-1991$ | FSN | 66,31 | 66,24 | FSN | 66,31 | 66,24 |
| $1991-1992$ | FSN+PNL | 72,72 | 73,54 | FSN+PNL | 72,72 | 73,54 |
| $1992-1996$ | FDSN | 27,71 | 34,31 | FDSN+PRM+PUNR+PSM | 42,34 | 51,60 |
| $1996-2000$ | CDR+USD+UDMR | 49,71 | 58,29 | CDR+USD+UDMR | 49,71 | 58,29 |
| $2000-2004$ | PSD+PUR | 36,61 | 44,92 | PSD+PUR+UDMR | 43,40 | 52,74 |
| $2004-2007$ | DA+UDMR+PUR | 44,70 | 46,18 | DA+UDMR+PUR+ <br> minorities | 46,87 | 51,60 |
| $2007-2008$ | PNL+UDMR | 24,18 | 22,50 | PNL+UDMR+PSD+PC+ <br> minorities | 63,66 | 79,00 |
| $2008-$ | PDL+PSD | 65,65 | 66,96 | PDL+PSD | 65,65 | 66,96 |

The table designates the votes and mandates obtained in the Chamber of Deputies. I took into account the composition of governments as that of majorities at the beginning of the mandate without considering neither the intra-parliament mobility, nor the repositioning such as that of PUR - which remained in the government formula of 2000-2004 with PSD only until 2003. I did not distinguish between the three governments of 1996-2000 (led by Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile and Mugur Isărescu), because their parliamentary support was identical. I distinguished nonetheless between the two Tăriceanu governments very different one from another.

Table 18
The Evolution of the Mandates of Parties in the Period 2004-2008

| PARTID | 28.12.2004 |  |  | 03.04.2007 |  |  | 01.12.2008 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CD | S | CD + S | CD | S | CD + S | CD | S | CD + S |
| PSD | 113 | 46 | 159 | 107 | 43 | 150 | 105 | 43 | 146 |
| PNL | 64 | 28 | 92 | 51 | 22 | 73 | 60 | 24 | 78 |
| PD* | 48 | 21 | 69 | 50 | 21 | 71 | 67 | 23 | 76 |
| PRM | 48 | 21 | 69 | 30 | 17 | 47 | 21 | 16 | 45 |
| UDMR | 22 | 10 | 32 | 22 | 10 | 32 | 22 | 10 | 32 |
| PUR (PC) | 19 | 11 | 30 | 19 | 12 | 31 | 19 | 10 | 26 |
| Minorities | 18 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 0 | 18 |
| Indep.** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 12 | 44 | 13 | 11 | 42 |
| Total ${ }^{* * *}$ | 332 | 137 | 469 | 329 | 137 | 466 | 323 | 137 | 460 |

The data considered in the table are 28.12 .2004 - the investiture of the $2^{\text {nd }}$ Tăriceanu cabinet; 03.09.2007 - the beginning of the last parliamentary session of the 2004-2008 legislature and, respectively 01.12 .2008 , the end of the legislature. Some supplementary specifications: * of February 2008 - PDL; ** among the independents April 3, 2007, 26 belonged to PLD, 18 at the Chamber and 8 at the Senate; *** - the 3 missing mandates at 03.04.2007, respectively the 6 missing mandates at 03.09.2007 are a consequence of the freeing of some posts occupied by the members of the Alianța DA. At the end of the legislature there were 9 vacant mandates at the Chamber.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The first post-communist elections were regulated by the Law-decree no. 92 of March 1990. Those from the period 1992-2000 were held on the basis of the Laws no. 68 and 69 of July 1992, modified several times. The 2004 elections were organized on the basis of the Laws no. 370 and 373 of September 2004 and those of 2008 on the basis of the Law 35 of March 2008.
    ${ }^{2}$ See the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania no. $1177 / 2007$, which answered the Intimation of unconstitutionality of the Law for the election of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate and for the modification and completion of the Law no. 67/2004 for the election of the authorities of the public local administration, of the Law of public local administration no. 215/2001 and the Law no. 393/2004 regarding the Statute of local elected representatives.

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ The paternity of this formula was reclaimed by the PSD deputy Anghel Stanciu, in an interview to the Romanian section of BBC, March 9, 2008.

[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ For the problem of volatility see Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship. Coalitions, Alliances, Fusions and Splits During the Transition and Post-transition Stages", in Geoffrey PRIDHAM \& Paul G. LEWIS (edited by), Stabilising Fragile Democracies, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp. 70-71.
    ${ }^{2}$ These are the Political Alliance PSD + PC and the Partidul Verde Ecologist, an alliance of the Partidul Verde and PER. The numbers indicated include the formations of national minorities.

[^3]:    ${ }^{1}$ See Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy.Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999 - quoted after Modele ale democratiei, Romanian transl. by C. Constantinescu, Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 85.
    ${ }^{2}$ Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, Nemira, București, 1999, pp. 163-180.

[^4]:    ${ }^{1}$ Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., pp. 156 and 159

[^5]:    ${ }^{1}$ Christian VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo MEDINA LOCKHART, "La géographie électorale de l'Europe centre-orientale", in Jean-Michel DE WAELE (ed.), Partis politiques et démocraties en Europe Centrale et Orientale, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2002, pp. 17-34.
    ${ }^{2}$ For other details see Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele si sistemul politic din România, Nemira, București, 2008, pp. 108-117. The following fragments resume, in a form updated with the results of 2008, paragraphs of the quoted volume, specially pp. 123-126.

[^6]:    ${ }^{1}$ For such a characterization, see for example Guy HERMET, Le passage à la démocratie, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 1996, p. 72.
    ${ }^{2}$ The lack of unity and incoherence of the opposition in this period were already remarked by Tom GALLAGHER, in an article that compares the reinvention of democracy in Romania and Portugal, „The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy. Romania and Portugal Compared", in Geoffrey PRIDHAM \& Paul G. LEWTS (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies, cit., p. 211.
    ${ }^{3}$ An analysis of CDR can be found in Dan PAVEL, Iulia HUTU, "Nu putem reusi decât împreună". O istorie analiticй a Conventiei Democratice, 1989-2000, Polirom, Iași, 2003.

[^7]:    ${ }^{1}$ Mattei DOGAN, „Romania, 1919-1938", in Myron WEINER, Ergun OZBUDUN (ed.), Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, Duke University Press, 1987, pp. 369-389.

[^8]:    Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 1 • 2009

[^9]:    Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 1 • 2009

[^10]:    Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 1 • 2009

[^11]:    Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 1 •

