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Moving beyond a Donor-Recipient Relationship?
Assessing Partnership in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

Karen del Biondo

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MOVING BEYOND A DONOR-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIP?

ASSESSING PARTNERSHIP IN THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY

Karen Del Biondo

Abstract

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which was adopted in 2007, aimed to break with the traditional donor-recipient relationship between the EU and Africa and to develop a true partnership. The concept of partnership has been central in EU-Africa relations ever since the Lomé Agreement (1975), but many have argued that it has been eroded by conditionalities and the end of special trade preferences. Ideally, a partnership is characterized by shared values, equality and trust, but are these principles reflected in the JAES? This study investigates this question by focusing on the thematic partnerships on peace and security and democratic governance and human rights. The paper argues that, despite the power asymmetries between the EU and Africa, the JAES has been characterized by equality in decision-making and by African ownership in capacity-building. However, while the JAES may objectively be based on shared values, the EU and the AU have often differed on how to apply those values in concrete situations, more particularly on the question which type of intervention is acceptable (conditionality, military intervention, etc.). Moreover, the analysis identifies a general feeling of mistrust amongst both parties in the partnership.

The Author

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## Contents

1. Introduction 5

2. Partnership in EU-Africa Relations 6

3. Operationalizing Partnership 10

4. Assessing Partnership in the JAES 12

   4.1 Shared Values 12

      4.1.1 Peace and Security 12
      4.1.2 Democratic Governance and Human Rights 14

   4.2 Equality 16

      4.2.1 Peace and Security 16
      4.2.2 Democratic Governance and Human Rights 18

   4.3 Trust 18

      4.3.1 Peace and Security 18
      4.3.2 Democratic Governance and Human Rights 19

5. Conclusions 20

References 22

Annex 1 26

Annex 2 28
1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has a long-standing relationship with the African continent, dating back to the colonial era and the Treaty of Rome. Ever since the Lomé Agreement (1975), the EU has strongly emphasized the principle of partnership in its relations with Africa. While its real commitment to partnership has been questioned, the EU has continued to use the partnership discourse in every agreement with African countries, including the Mediterranean region and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Since the 2000s, the EU has aimed to revive its relations with Africa “in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and co-operation”, as was proclaimed in the Cairo Declaration adopted at the first EU-Africa summit in 2000. This has led to the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) – also referred to as the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership - at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007. The JAES aims for increased cooperation in eight thematic areas: (1) Peace and Security, (2) Democratic Governance and Human Rights, (3) Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure, (4) the Millennium Development Goals, (5) Energy, (6) Climate Change, (7) Migration, Mobility and Employment and (8) Science, Information Society and Space.

The strengthened discourse on partnership in the JAES reflects a broader trend in EU foreign policy. First, there is an important power dimension to the partnership agenda. The EU is facing increased competition from new power blocks including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) as well as from other emerging nations. In this new power constellation, it can be expected that a relationship based on partnership is more easily put in practice. Particularly in Africa, many other international actors are now providing countries and regional organizations with financial support. This makes these countries and regional organizations less dependent on support from the EU. Second, the EU’s focus on partnership is also in line with its image as a foreign policy actor relying on soft power, who does not impose its will on partners, in contrast to, for example, the United States, who apply more interventionist methods (for example Manners 2008). This paper aims to find out whether such a discourse and foreign policy image are not limited to mere rhetoric.

Partnership can be conceptualized in various ways. This study has chosen three main criteria of partnership that have been underlined in the literature on partnership in development cooperation and international relations (Maxwell/Christiansen 2002; Maxwell/Riddell 1998; Tandon 1990; Hyden 2008; Blanco 2011): shared values, equality and trust. These principles are defined as follows in the current paper. Shared values do not only refer to general ideas but also to how these are applied to concrete cases. Equality implies joint decision-making in agenda-setting and ownership by the weaker partner of capacity-building. Trust reflects the donor’s belief that its investments will be worthwhile and the recipient’s belief that the donor will not abuse its power position. Does the Joint Africa-EU Strategy reflect these principles? This paper will

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answer this question by focusing on two thematic partnerships: the Peace and Security Partnership (PSP) and the Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights (PDGHR).

The analysis of these two thematic partnerships is based on three main sources of information. First, I investigated available official documents on the JAES, including reports from the Joint Task Force and Joint Expert Groups, action plans, roadmaps and implementation plans. Second, I conducted 31 semi-structured expert interviews with different actors involved in the partnership representing different interest groups (European institutions, EU and AU member state representatives, civil society, AU Commission). Most of these interviews took place in Brussels (December 2013 and April 2014) and Addis Ababa (February-March 2014). The names of the interviewees were withheld by mutual agreement to allow them to express their views freely. However, an overview of the interviews including dates and locations can be found in the annex to the paper. Third, I consulted available literature on the JAES, notably from academic experts, think-tanks and civil society organizations.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first part, it traces back the EU’s emphasis on partnership to the early days of EU-Africa relations. This section also discusses the evolution towards a relationship between the EU and Africa on the continental level. Subsequently, the PSP and the PDGHR are briefly discussed. The following section operationalizes partnership in the context of the JAES, based on a review of the literature on partnership in international development and international relations. In the next sections, the paper assesses whether the JAES is really characterized by shared values, equality and trust.

2. Partnership in EU-Africa Relations

The concept of partnership has been central in EU-Africa relations from early on. The Lomé Convention, signed in 1975 between the European Economic Community and the ACP group, was founded on the principle of “equality between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence” (Art. 2). It was hailed as a good example of partnership for agreements with developing countries, as it introduced the provision of development assistance decided upon by mutual agreement and without conditionalities, and granted non-reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP group (Cosgrove-Twitchett 1978; Maxwell/Riddell 1998: 260). In subsequent amendments economic and political conditionality was introduced, leading to the criticism that the partnership principle had been eroded (Crawford 1996; Raffer 2001, Rutazibwa 2010). The EU’s insistence to replace non-reciprocal trade relations with Free Trade Agreements with the ACP countries was equally seen as a move away from partnership. With non-reciprocal trade preferences, ACP countries enjoyed access to EU markets without having to open their markets for EU products. The abolishing of such preference was seen as primarily in the interest of the EU (Hurt 2003: 166-171; Carbone 2013a: 747-748; Meyn 2008). Nonetheless, the EU continued to use the language of partnership. In 2000, the Lomé Agreement was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which was based on the fundamental principle of “equality of the partners and ownership of the development strategies” (Art. 2). Similarly, with the group of Mediterranean countries, the EU engaged in a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership via the Barcelona Process. The 1995 Barcelona Declaration established a “comprehensive partnership [...] through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and
financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership” (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995). The European Neighborhood Policy (2003) further built on the Barcelona Process and aimed to “work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of prosperity and values” (European Commission 2003). Tellingly, the main financial instrument for the European Neighborhood Policy was called the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument.

Until the year 2000, the EU’s relations with Africa had been largely divided along geographical lines, between sub-Saharan Africa (the ACP group) and North Africa (the Mediterranean region). In 2000, however, the first EU-Africa Summit including all the Heads of State of the EU and the African continent took place in Cairo. At the summit, a comprehensive and structured political dialogue between the EU and Africa was launched. However, the adoption of an EU Strategy for Africa in 2005, without hardly any participation from African actors, showed that intentions to establish a true partnership were still limited to mere discourse. Moreover, disagreements over the participation of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe blocked a second summit between 2003 and 2007 (le Pere 2012: 267). As a result, it was only in December 2007 that the second EU-Africa summit took place in Lisbon, which eventually led to the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The JAES was “a strategy with Africa, rather than a strategy for Africa”, based on negotiations between the European Commission, the AU Commission and European and African member states (Mangala 2013a: 19). It aimed to finally move on from “the outdated, threadbare relationship of “donor” and beneficiary” (Michel 2008: 3). Indeed, when compared with previous documents on EU-Africa relations, words like “partnership”, “common”, “shared”, “unity” and “joint” figured particularly prominent in the documents of the JAES (Rutazibwa 2010: 216).

In sum, while the discourse of partnership had already been in use for a long time in the context of EU-Africa relations, the adoption of the JAES finally put this principle into practice. The international context was also riper for such a partnership. First of all, the African continent was in a relatively stronger position than previously, given the increased security and economic importance of the continent; but also the incremental presence of many competing international actors. In this context, the EU wanted to reposition itself as an important partner (Michel 2008: 11-15). Secondly, with the creation of the African Union in 2002, great progress had been made in terms of the political integration of the continent. As the EU has always been an important supporter of regional integration, it has had a particular interest in supporting the African Union (Sicurelli 2010) and in repositioning itself as the main partner of the African continent. Against this backdrop, the question should be raised whether the JAES really reflects the principle of partnership? This question will be answered by focusing on two thematic partnerships: the PSP and the PDGHR. The PSP is frequently referred to as the most successful and the most important thematic partnership between Africa and the EU (Mackie et al. 2013: 8; European Think Tanks Group 2013; Helly 2013: 149). In contrast, a report on the PDGHR has concluded that “the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is in hibernation” (Open Society European Policy Institute 2011: 20).

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2 The dialogue included all the member states of the African Union except for Western Sahara plus the non-AU member state Morocco.
It is expected that partnership is more likely to emerge when both parties have a strong interest in cooperating. This is the case for the PSP. African integration has been strongly inspired by a security imperative (Williams 2007: 259-262). The EU has increasingly become aware of the potential spill-overs of African insecurity for Europe in the form of migration flows, international terrorism and organized crime (European Commission 2006; Michel 2008: 8). In this light, the EU has long begun to finance African peacekeeping missions, including an AU mission to Burundi and a mission from the Economic Community of West African States to the Ivory Coast and Liberia in 2003. In the same year, the EU set up the African Peace Facility (APF), a fund of €250 million coming from the European Development Fund to finance African peacekeeping missions. The APF was used to finance Peace Support Operations by the AU in Sudan (AMIS 2004-2006) and by the Communauté Économique et Monétaire en Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) in the Central African Republic.

The PSP builds on this previous cooperation by focusing on three priority areas. First, it aims for a wide-ranging dialogue on peace and security issues at all levels. Such dialogue involves regular consultations between the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (EU PSC), coordinated efforts in relevant international fora (for example the UN), joint assessment missions, jointly addressing issues of common concern, sharing of analyses on crisis and conflict situations and consultations on issues such as the security-development nexus. The second priority area comprises close cooperation in building up elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture. And finally, the third priority is to establish predictable and sustainable funding mechanisms for peace and support operations by the AU and regional mechanisms (European Union and African Union 2007: 32-34).

Compared to the PSP, the PDGHR is less likely to reflect the principle of partnership, as here there interest from both sides to cooperate is questionable. On the one hand, there has been increased integration in the areas of democratic governance and human rights, providing a window of opportunity for the EU to enhance cooperation. While the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights dates back to 1981, the establishment of the African Union in the 2000s brought new impetus to this process, with the adoption of several declarations and the establishment of the New Partnership on African Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). On the other hand, cooperation on these issues has traditionally been very sensitive. In particular, African governments are opposed to negative conditionality. Zimbabwe is a case in the point. None of the African regional organizations have supported the sanctions that the EU imposed against Mugabe’s government in 2002. As was noted above, this caused the EU and Africa to disagree on the realization of a second EU-Africa summit until 2007.

Similar to the PSP, the PDGHR sets out three priority actions. First, it aims to achieve common positions and specific initiatives on key aspects of governance and human rights, including coordinated action in international fora. As part of this priority action, the PDGHR was set up in November 2010 as a forum for discussions on democratic governance and human rights that includes decision-makers, civil society representatives and other experts (Open Society European Policy Institute 2011: 8-10). Second, the PDGHR envisions a more efficient African governance architecture through enhanced support of the implementation of the APRM and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The third priority action

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focuses on cultural goods. Cooperation in this area includes exchanges between European and African cultural actors, the protection and promotion of cultural expressions and cultural diversity (European Union and African Union 2007: 39-44).

To achieve the ambitious objectives of the JAES, a complex institutional structure was set up. First, the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) provided a forum where experts from Africa and Europe could discuss the implementation and financing of their priority actions (Tywuschik/Sheriff 2009: 9). In addition to the JEGs, the meetings between the European Commission and the AU Commission (Commission to Commission meetings), which had already been held since 2005, would discuss the JAES. These meetings were supported by the AU-EU Task Force, which brought together staff from departments in the AU Commission, EU Commission and the Council Secretariat dealing with ‘second pillar’ matters. At the highest political level, the Africa-EU Ministerial Troikas would meet twice a year to discuss progress on the JAES. Finally, the Heads of State of the EU and 54 African states would meet every three years at the EU-Africa Summit (Mangala 2013a: 31). Each thematic partnership was assigned a lead member state. Given that peace and security primarily falls under the competence of the Council, the latter’s General Secretariat was appointed as European chair of the partnership. On the African side, Algeria led the Implementation Team (Tywuschik/Sherriff 2009: 16). As the addition of cultural goods to the JAES had been a specific request of Egypt, the latter was appointed as chair of the African Implementation Team of the PDGHR, with Nigeria as co-chair. On the European side, Germany acted as chair and Portugal became co-chair (interviews 1 and 2).

Table 1: Peace and Security Partnership and PDGHR Priority Areas

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<th>Priority areas</th>
<th>Peace and Security Partnership</th>
<th>Partnership an Democratic Governance and Human Rights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Enhance Dialogue on Challenges to Peace and Security</td>
<td>1. Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Full Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
<td>2. Promote the APRM and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</td>
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Scholars have argued that an asymmetrical relationship has been apparent in the negotiations (Kotsopoulos 2013) and financial contributions (Elowson/Nordlund, 2013: 21-22) to the JAES. However, there has not been any systematic analysis of partnership in the JAES. Recent scholarly works have mainly described its historical background and objectives (Adebajo/Whiteman 2012; Mangala 2013a). In choosing the most political of the thematic partnerships, I aim to assess whether the EU’s aim of going “beyond development” and engaging in a more political partnership with Africa has been achieved. This implies that a very controversial area of cooperation between the EU and Africa is omitted, namely trade. There is a thematic partnership on trade, regional integration and infrastructure, which has been blocked because of disagreement on the Economic Partnership Agreements. However, I prefer to focus on examples that are less rather than
least likely. Given that the African Governance Architecture is slowly taking ground, there is an opportunity for the EU to increase cooperation with the AU in this area. Moreover, while EU-Africa relations in the field of trade have been somewhat over-investigated (for example Hurt 2003; Meyn 2008; Faber and Orbie 2009; Storey 2006; Goodison 2007), literature on democratic governance and human rights is more limited (exceptions are Crawford 2013; Del Biondo 2011; Mangala 2013b).

While a systematic analysis of partnership in these areas of cooperation has not yet been made, several studies have touched upon related questions, particularly regarding cooperation on peace and security. Haastrup investigates whether the PSP is based on equality, ownership and partnership by looking at AMANI Africa⁴ and the EU’s support to the AU’s Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Her conclusions are mixed. While AMANI Africa realized the principle of partnership, enabling the AU to shape the process of training its forces, the Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons resembles a continuation of a typical donor-recipient relationship. As the AU had only limited resources and capabilities at its disposal, the European Commission was essentially in charge of the strategy, which in the end led to a unilateral approach steered by the Commission (Haastrup 2013: 61-62). Pirozzi’s analysis of the PSP only covers the period 2007-2009 and only peripherally addresses the issue of partnership. She points to an “unbalanced relationship between the two partners” due to the lack of capabilities on the side of the AU and the lack of genuine communication between the relevant actors (Pirozzi 2010). Rodt and Okeke’s (2013) analysis of the PSP concludes that “although the relationship between [the EU and the AU] may be a partnership in principle, in practice it is still symptomatic of a donor-recipient relationship”. This conclusion is based on two observations. First, the African Peace and Security Architecture is heavily dependent on EU funding. Second, EU financial support for peace and security in Africa has often been based on the EU’s own interests. One example was the EU’s unwillingness to support the AU’s mediation plan for Libya, as it did not match its own agenda, which supported a military intervention by NATO.

However, these studies are unsatisfactory with regard to three aspects. First, the principle of partnership is neither defined nor clarified. Second, the studies are either based on very general observations or on examples that are too specific. Third, they do not sufficiently include the views of those involved in the partnership. This study therefore starts with an operationalization of the partnership idea, in order to then analyze the entirety of activities in the Peace and Security and Democratic Governance Partnerships in relation to the partnership principle. The analysis is based on 31 interviews with experts involved in the partnership and thereby ensures the inclusion of views of all actors involved on the ground.

3. Operationalizing Partnership

Partnership has been a central principle of international development cooperation and has been frequently analyzed in this context by scholars. The idea of development based on partnership dates back to the 1969 report titled “Partners in Development” by the Pearson Commission of International Development, which called for “a new partnership based on an informal understanding expressing the reciprocal rights

⁴ AMANI Africa is a joint initiative of the EU and AU to train African forces for the African Standby Force.
and obligations of donors and recipients” (Commission of International Development, 1969: 127-128). Partnership-based development implies that development cooperation is based on a “social contract” between “development partners” (donors) and “partner governments” (recipients) on an equal level as well as on a thorough level of trust (Hyden 2008: 260). From the 1990s onwards, the term “strategic partnership” has frequently been used to describe cooperative relationships between international actors, but the meaning of this term and the difference to “regular” partnerships has never been clearly defined (Blanco 2011).

In this study, I will investigate the existence of “shared values”, “equality” and “trust” in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Shared values have been identified as a core element in partnerships (Maxwell/Riddell, 1998; Tandon 1990; Blanco 2011) and the JAES presupposes the existence of such shared values: “The partnership will be based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives”. Scholars have criticized this assumption of a harmonious donor-recipient relationship since, given the completely different history, traditions and interests of donors, such a relationship is often characterized by conflicts of interests (Eriksson Baaz 2005: 73; Hyden 2008). In this paper, the principle of shared values implies that donors and recipients do not only refer to the same values (peace, security, human rights, democracy), but also share opinions on what these values mean and how they should be defended in concrete situations (capacity-building, conditionality etc.).

Equality is another key element of partnerships (Maxwell/Christiansen 2002; Maxwell/Riddell 1998; Tandon 1990). It is also a key principle of the JAES, which aims “to move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterized by equality”. However, the notion of equality has been criticized in the context of relationships where one of the partners is visibly more powerful (Hyden 2008). This is clearly the case with the EU and the AU. In 2014, the African Union had a budget of about € 227.4 million (South African Foreign Policy Initiative 2013). The EU budget in the same year was € 142.7 billion (European Commission 2014a). The AU Commission had a staff of about 1,450 in that year (interview 8), compared to 33,039 in the European Commission (European Commission 2014b). These structural inequalities have been noted to obstruct the implementation of the principle of partnership, with the AUC often running into substantial delays (Haastrup 2013: 105; Elowson/Nordlund 2013: 21-22). In this sense, it is not surprising that the JAES has been criticized for being financed almost exclusively by the EU (Rodt/Okeke 2013; Tywuschik/Sheriff 2009). While structural characteristics of inequality are difficult to deal with, a more equal relationship can be created when the more powerful partner respects the position of the weaker partner and does not impose its own agenda on the recipient (Rutazibwa 2010, 219; Crewe/Harrison 1999: 70-71). In a dialogue, equality implies that both partners have equal influence in setting the agenda (Crawford 2003: 150-151). In capacity-building, equality refers to ownership: the idea that local actors are in the lead while external partners back their efforts (OECD 1996).

While trust has often been mentioned as a key element of partnership-based development (Hyden 2008; Postma 1994), it has not been clearly defined how trust can be translated in a donor-recipient relationship. In his analysis of the negotiations on the JAES, Kotsopoulos (2013) concludes that trust has been lacking. He uses a definition of trust proposed by Hoffman: “the willingness to place the fate of one’s interests under the control of others, [...] based on a belief [...] that potential trustees will avoid using their discretion to harm the interests of the first”. In this context, predictions about the future actions of partners are crucial,
namely the belief that partners will honor the commitments they make (Hoffman 2002; Kydd 2000). In development cooperation, trust is often associated with the conviction of donors that recipients will spend their aid well (Hyden 2008). This corresponds to the principle of mutual confidence that underpins the JAES. Trust can be strengthened by sharing information between partners (Hoffman 2002: 379). In this paper, trust will be operationalized as follows: from the EU side, it implies that those responsible for the partnership are convinced that their investments are worth it. For African partners, it implies a belief that the EU will not abuse its power position. A trust-based relationship would also be characterized by information-sharing from both sides.

4. Assessing Partnership in the JAES

Based on the operationalization of partnership discussed above, this section will evaluate the presence of shared values, equality and trust in the PSP and the PDGHR. One empirical problem is that it is not clearly delineated which activities fall within the scope of the JAES and which ones do not. The JAES builds on earlier initiatives, such as the EU-AU Human Rights Dialogue and the African Peace Facility, but it is not always clear how old and new initiatives relate to each other. Some aspects, such as human rights conditionality and the International Criminal Court, are not part of the JAES, but represent important dimensions of EU-Africa relations. While these issues have not been thoroughly discussed within the established frameworks of the JAES, they were frequently raised by officials and diplomats interviewed for this paper. In this sense, they were considered relevant to the analysis of the JAES. Moreover, the paper takes a broad approach by analyzing not only the African Union but also the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). While it is not entirely clear which part of the AU architecture is addressed in the PSP and which one in the PDGHR, I mainly follow the AU institutional separation. For example, while unconstitutional changes of government in Africa are closely related to democratic governance and human rights, they are discussed within the Peace and Security Council and thus also in the dialogue between the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the EU’s Political and Security Committee.

4.1 Shared Values

4.1.1 Peace and Security

Objectively, one would expect EU-Africa relations to be characterized by shared values when it comes to peace and security since both continents have undergone a process of shifting their focus from state security to human security. Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act gave the Union the right to intervene in a member state in the case of “grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. This was seen as an important shift from the policies of non-intervention and sovereignty of the AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, in the direction of international principles such as the Responsibility to Protect (Witt 2013: 16) and human security (Baimu/Sturman: 2003). The Solemn Declaration on the Common African Defense and Security Policy, which was adopted at the Conference on
Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (2004), declares that “[t]he concept of security must embrace all aspects of society including economic, political, and social and environmental dimensions of the individual, family, and community, local and national life”. The EU has made a similar shift towards human security. In several documents, including the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the EU has emphasized the link between security and development and the necessity to take a people-centered approach to security (Del Biondo et al. 2012). The EU has established itself as one of the main advocates of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (Kirn 2011).

In 2003 the AU’s Constitutive Act was amended to give the AU the possibility to intervene in the event of a serious threat to legitimate order and to restore peace and stability. This amendment was seen as a reversal to a more state-centered conception of security (Baimu/Sturman 2003; Witt 2012). In line with these statements on the protection of AU members against the threat of legitimate order, the AU has developed a range of policies on unconstitutional changes of democratically elected governments. The 2000 Lomé Declaration defines an unconstitutional change of government as: (1) a military coup d’état against a democratically elected government, (2) intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government, (3) replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements and (4) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections (Elvy 2013: 44, 61). The AU has a no tolerance stance regarding unconstitutional changes of governments, in which case sanctions are adopted (Hellquist 2014: 12-13). These policies are in line with those of the EU, which consistently suspends aid in the case of a coup d’état. Hence, the EU has expressed its explicit support to the AU’s policies on unconstitutional changes of government (African Union and European Union 2009). However, while AU policies have been inspired by a security rationale, for the EU the condemnation of coups is rather based on concerns about democracy and human rights. In the ACP group, the EU has consistently suspended development assistance in the case of a coup, based on a clause in the Cotonou Agreement stipulating that aid can be suspended in the event of serious violations of democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law (Laakso et al. 2007: 15).

This difference is illustrated by the EU’s cooperation with the AU and RECs since the adoption of the JAES. When it comes to cases that are security cases in the traditional sense of the word, referring to military threats, the EU and the AU have had fruitful cooperation. In Somalia, the EU has supported the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which supports the transitional government in Somalia, with over €444 million since 2007. Moreover, the EU’s own missions such as the Operation Atalanta and EU NAVFOR to combat piracy and the EU’s Training Mission to Somalia, are complimentary to AMISOM (Olsen 2014: 297-298). On Sudan, the EU and the AU have also cooperated fruitfully. In meetings between the AU PSC and EU PSC, both parties repeatedly underlined their commitment to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including the referendum on the independence of South Sudan. The AU’s Roadmap on South Sudan was financially supported by the EU. The EU has also expressed support to recent initiatives such as the AU field mission to Darfur in March 2013 and the plan to establish a Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations in South Sudan (European Union and African Union 2013). When Tuareg rebels seized the North of Mali in early 2012, followed by a coup in March 2012, the AU took the lead in the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), in which ECOWAS provided the majority of troops (Weiss/Welz forthcoming). The EU contributed €50 million from the APF to AFISMA. Moreover, the EU deployed a training mission, EUTM Mali, to support four battalions within the Malian army (Olsen 2014: 302). The
Central African Republic (CAR) is another example where EU and AU ideas have largely converged. Even before the offensive by rebel groups in December 2012, the EU provided support to African efforts to stabilize the CAR. The APF first supported FOMUC (see supra) and then MICOPAX (la Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique), a small mission from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). However, as the situation deteriorated after the military coup in early 2013, ECCAS asked the AU to take over. This resulted in the creation of MISCA, deployed in December 2013, with 6,000 troops (Welz 2014).

There has also been good cooperation between the EU and the AU on coups d’état. For example, the AU PSC to EU PSC meetings discussed the coups in Mauritania (2008), Madagascar (2009), Guinea (2009) and Guinea-Bissau (2012) with the result that these countries were suspended from the AU and subjected to EU sanctions. In all these cases, the EU and the AU were part of an International Contact Group, together with other actors such as the RECs and the UN. In Guinea-Bissau, the EU and the AU took part in a joint mission with ECOWAS and the UN (African Union 2013). In the case of the presidential elections in Ivory Coast from October to December 2010, both the EU and the AU imposed sanctions on Laurent Gbagbo after he refused to recognize electoral loss to his opponent, Alassane Ouattara. In this case, however, the AU took a more reconciliatory stance, proposing a power-sharing agreement led by Ouattara (Hara/Yabi 2013: 164).

Nonetheless, the Arab Spring confronted the EU and the AU with cases that could neither be classified as pure security nor as coup cases. The civil war in Libya (2011) is a case in point. In the beginning of the protests against the Khadafi regime in Libya, the AU did not invoke its principles to condemn unconstitutional changes of government (De Waal 2011: 369), but preferred a mediated solution to the crisis. The decision by NATO to impose a no-fly zone and start a military offensive, which was supported by the EU, was seen as ignoring, undermining and side-lining mediation efforts (Koko/Bakwesegha-Osula 2011: 7-8). Because of these opposed positions, dialogue on peace and security between the EU and AU was obstructed for a while (interviews 12 and 29). Another example is the case of Egypt. When democratically elected Mohammed Morsi was overthrown in a military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in July 2013, the AU suspended Egypt. The EU, however, refused to call the event a coup and thus did not suspend aid.

4.1.2 Democratic Governance and Human Rights

Some elements of what is currently referred to as the “African Governance Architecture” date back to the Organization of African Unity. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, often referred to as the Banjul Charter, was adopted in 1981 and has been ratified by all African states except South Sudan. The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, which promotes the Charter, was established in 1986 when the Charter came into force and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights was established by a special protocol in 2004.

While African integration on human rights dates far back, democracy only became an important issue with the establishment of the AU. During the inaugural AU summit in Durban in 2002, two declarations
Moving beyond a Donor-Recipient Relationship?

on democratic governance were adopted. The AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections underlined the importance of free and fair elections and requested the AU to play a role in this field via observation and monitoring missions. To implement these principles, a Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit was established within the AU Commission in 2006 (Elvy 2013: 65). The New Partnership for Africa’s Economic Development’s (NEPAD) Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance underlined the importance of democracy as well as economic and corporate governance in development, and established the NEPAD and its APRM. The latter is a scheme of cooperation by which African states agree to be peer-reviewed regarding all aspects of governance and socio-economic development.

In January 2008, the AU assembly adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, the first binding regional instrument on democracy and good governance. In accordance with the Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections, the Charter established the role of the AU Commission in providing electoral assistance and observer missions, which can be sent by the Commission upon request by member states (Engel 2010). To “unconstitutional changes of government”, the Charter adds a fifth element: “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government” (Glen 2012).

The EU has strongly supported the different elements of the African Governance Architecture. It has become the AU’s major partner in the area of election assistance and observation (interviews 11, 15, 17) and has supported the African Commission on Human and People’s rights and the NEPAD (interviews 15, 16).

While the EU and the AU have worked together on cases of coups and security issues, cooperation on cases that do not fall under these policies has proven more difficult. For example, in the case of Zimbabwe, the AU has never supported EU sanctions against the government of Robert Mugabe, which were in place due to the government’s poor human rights record and political violence against the opposition (Del Biondo: 2009; Glen 2012: 157). The issue of the travel sanctions against Zimbabwe has frequently come up in connection with the organization of EU-Africa Summits. At the most recent EU-Africa Summit in April 2014, Mugabe called upon African leaders to boycott the summit because his wife was refused a visa. The call was largely ignored by other African leaders, with the notable exception of President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, who sent a ministerial delegation in his place (Del Biondo 2014). Mugabe, consequently, did not attend the summit either.

Given the sensitive aspect of cases where democratic principles and human rights are violated, dialogue under the framework of the PDGHR has mostly been limited to general issues rather than concrete cases. In the EU-AU Human Rights Dialogue, policies related to human rights and democratic governance in the EU and Africa are discussed, followed by an overview of EU-AU cooperation within the PDGHR and a discussion of the AU-EU civil society human rights seminar. There have also been general discussions on human rights issues, including on the rights of the child, the death penalty, women’s rights, the rights of migrants and the right to development. The Africa-EU Platform on Democratic Governance and Human Rights consists of two working groups: freedom of expression and the governance of natural resources (interviews 2 and 6 Joint Communiqués for 2009-2013 were analyzed. The human rights dialogue has taken place since 2005, but earlier reports were not available.
4). The rather positive reports of these meetings conceal some serious differences in opinion, which were noted by participants. One example is the meeting on the freedom of expression, which was held in 2011 in Tunis. The African representatives at the workshop had completely differing views from the European representatives, as they placed strong emphasis on the problematic aspects of freedom of information, including the need to control the social media. For example, one session was devoted to a cartoon by Jonathan Shapiro in the Mail&Guardian depicting the Prophet Mohammed in a humiliating way (interviews 4 and 6).

Moreover, there are issues that are not discussed at all at these meetings, precisely because they are too sensitive. This does not mean that they are not relevant, as they usually pop up in more informal settings, such as the civil society human rights dialogue, the day-to-day dialogue between officials from the AU and the EU delegations or at meetings organized in the run-up to the EU-Africa Summit in 2014 (for example lunch meetings in Brussels and the “Fridays of the AU Commission”).

One such “elephant in the room” are LGBTI rights. The EU has been a vocal supporter of the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) persons (Council of the EU 2013). As a result, it has openly expressed concern about the increase in legislation in Africa targeting homosexuals, in particular in Uganda. However, many African governments refuse to see LGBTI rights as human rights and believe that these issues belong in the private sphere (interviews 21, 22). That said, there is no united African position on the issue as some countries like South Africa have fairly liberal views on the topic (interviews 10, 15).

Another controversial issue is that of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The EU has been a major supporter of the ICC (Council of the EU 2007) and has played an important role in persuading African countries to ratify and implement the Rome Statute (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2008: 612). While the majority of African states (34) is party to the ICC, most state leaders find that Heads of State should be immune from indictment. The question of immunity of Heads of State became even more important when Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were sworn in as President and Vice-President of Kenya in 2013. A few years earlier, the ICC had summoned Kenyatta and Ruto in relation to the violence that took place after the December 2007 presidential elections in Kenya. In September 2013, the AU held an extra-ordinary summit on the ICC, during which it positioned itself against ICC charges against Heads of State. During the summit it was agreed to send an AU delegation to New York to convince the members of the UN Security Council to defer the Kenyan cases. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief that the ICC particularly targets Africans, given that all the cases that are currently investigated are African (interviews 14, 15, 21, 22).

4.2 Equality

4.2.1 Peace and Security Partnership

The topics discussed during the meetings of the JAES are jointly decided. The three-yearly EU-Africa summits are preceded by a number of meetings between the AU Commission’s Department of Economic Affairs (which is responsible for the JAES) and the delegation of the EU and Member States to the AU. In the lower level meetings such as the Joint Expert Groups (JEG), it is the European chair together with the
European Commission and EEAS and the African chair together with the African Union Commission that decide. Interviews with those involved in the JEGs on Peace and Security confirmed that agenda-setting was jointly decided. While some observers, notably in civil society, have criticized the PSP for only dealing with “African issues” (interviews 4 and 31), it was noted by an AU Commission official that African actors did not have an interest in discussing security in Europe (interview 26).

In the area of capacity-building, the EU has not used its power of the purse by cherry-picking projects or by putting forward its own initiatives. Paraphrasing one official from the AU Commission responsible for peace and security: “I think it has been a successful partnership, because the AU was allowed to set its priorities, had some ownership” (interview 25).

The APF funds three kinds of activities: Peace Support Operations, long-term capacity-building of the African Peace and Security Architecture and short-term peace-related activities under the Early Response Mechanism. In order to get funding for such activities, the AU or the RECs need to submit a request. This request is then considered by the EEAS, European Commission and the EU Council preparatory working groups. The EU’s Political and Security Committee needs to approve the intervention on its appropriateness. This process usually takes about three months, but for the Early Response Mechanism a decision is made in ten days (European Commission 2013).

In general, the EU has been fairly comprehensive in its support to AU peace and security initiatives. It has supported all the peacekeeping missions of the AU to date as well as almost all elements of APSA. As was noted by an AU Commission official: “the EU finances almost the entire APSA, they do not pick and choose” (interview 25). The EU has paid salaries of personnel in the AU Commission’s Peace and Security Department, has supported workshops on the African Standby Force and has financed AU conflict prevention mechanisms including the Panel of the Wise and Continental Early Warning System. Other activities financed by the EU include the AU Liaison Offices, the AMANI Africa training schools and African Training Centers in Peace and Security (European Commission 2013; see list Annex).

The EU is not free to finance whatever it wants. In line with EDF regulations, it is allowed to fund the costs of transporting troops, soldiers’ living expenses, development of capabilities, but no military operations or arms expenditure (European Commission 2013: 7-8). However, the advantage of EU contributions is that they are paid in cash, which means that the AU has to respect international rules of accountability (interview 8).

Only on one occasion has the EU refused to respect the principle of ownership, namely in the context of the civil war in Libya in 2011. In March 2011, the AU adopted a roadmap that called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities and dialogue between the parties concerned (Koko/Bakwesegha-Osula 2011: 7-8). When the AU submitted a request for money from the Early Response Mechanism for its roadmap, this request was denied by the EU. Funding came in only after the fall of Khadafi (interviews 8, 12, 25, 30).

However, overall the AU seems to have maintained its autonomy when it comes to the implementation of EU funded projects. In fact, Europeans showed frustration about the AU claiming too much ownership.
The EU receives only limited reporting and information from the AUC about its capacity-building programs (interviews 8, 30). One interviewee put it this way:

We do not have the same vision on ownership as the AU. Unfortunately we too often have the feeling that for the African side ownership means: This is what we will do, this is how much it will cost and afterwards, it’s ownership, we will manage. But our vision of ownership is ownership plus partnership. Ownership on the objective to be reached, but on the other hand, partnership on the modalities to achieve those objectives (interview 30).

4.2.2 Democratic Governance and Human Rights

Also in the PDGHR, the setting of the agenda was decided on an equal basis. In the first couple of years, co-chair Egypt requested that the Joint Expert Meetings would mainly deal with cooperation on cultural goods, in particular the return of illegally acquired cultural goods to Africa (interviews 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14). It seems that this request was successful: the 2010 roadmap of the PDGHR lists several activities planned under priority action 3 (cooperation on cultural goods), but hardly mentions any activity under the other priority areas (PDGHR 2010a). Moreover, issues that are primarily of African concern, such as racism and the rights of migrants, were equally discussed in the partnership. In June 2012, an AU-EU joint workshop on the fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, which was an initiative of the African Group, was organized (PDGHR 2010b). The rights of migrants were also discussed in the AU-EU human rights dialogue at the request of the African side (interview 2). Conversely, issues that are primarily of European concern and that the Africans prefer not to discuss were held off the agenda. Indeed, while the European side wanted to discuss LGBTI rights within the partnership, this issue was never raised in the partnership (interviews 14, 15, 21).

Similar to the PSP, African beneficiaries of EU funding have maintained ownership in capacity-building. In the case of the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights and the New Partnership for Africa’s Economic Development, the EU has provided financial support to the secretariat (interview 16). In the area of elections, the AU wanted to become more professional and, given the expertise of the EU in this area, asked the EU to become its main partner. As one interviewee noted, “the basis for this cooperation is not the money, but both institutions realizing that it is an area of common interest” (interview 15).

4.3 Trust

4.3.1 Peace and Security

From the European side, there is a lack of confidence that the Partnership will deliver in the long term. EU officials feel that the AU is particularly good at “producing papers” (interview 16) and “drafting concepts” (interview 31), rather than at coming to visible results. For example, one interviewee mentioned that AU
efforts to establish APSA are strongly “resource-driven” (interview 8). Most European interviewees were skeptical about the African Standby Forces and its successor, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (interviews 7, 8). They were also skeptical about African efforts to mobilize resources for peace support operations and its slow progress, which they believe to be mainly a consequence of a lack of political will and African solidarity, rather than an incapability to contribute financially (interviews 7, 8). For example, it was noted that ECOWAS is funded by its member states which have equally limited resources (interviews 9, 18). This widespread feeling of frustration can be explained by the difficulty for many in the EU to understand the political nature of the AU as a young regional organization with very limited supranational powers and, related to this, the slow pace of reform in the AU (interviews 13, 23). From the African side, there have been serious concerns about whether the EU regards its African partners as equal. For example, the above-discussed disagreement on Libya, while somewhat minimized by European interviewees, was heavily criticized by those in the AU (interviews 12, 25). Similarly, when an EU non-paper on the possibility of a mission in the CAR was leaked in the press in late December 2013, the AU voiced concern about not being consulted. Again, this can be explained by the AU’s lack of understanding of EU decision-making, where a non-paper precedes the actual political process (interviews 8, 13, 25, 29, 30).

### 4.3.2 Democratic Governance and Human Rights

In the case of capacity-building in the PDGHR, EU officials emphasize that democratic governance and human rights is a fairly new area, so progress is bound to come about slowly (interviews 15, 16). However, there have also been serious concerns about how the APRM Secretariat has managed the €2 million that the EU has contributed via a UNDP fund (interview 15; Sore 2014). This comes in addition to frustrations about the voluntary character of the mechanism, which reduces the potential impact of the peer review procedure (interview 15; Manby 2004). Such findings are in line with the following statement by a foreign diplomat: “NEPAD is like [...] it’s like foam” (quoted in Taylor 2010: 63). From the African side, several interviews revealed a lack of trust that the EU will not abuse its power of the purse. As the JAES does not regulate the EU’s aid relations with African states, conditionality is not an issue in the PDGHR. However, concerns amongst African countries about increasing donor conditionalities have popped up regularly in more informal meetings related to the JAES. For example, during a conference organized by the think-tank ECDPM at the AU Commission in February 2014, several prominent African participants took the floor and mentioned the withdrawal of aid by European donors in response to anti-gay legislation in Uganda (based on the author’s own observations; interviews 20, 21, 22). Even at the most insignificant level, the African side has suspected the EU of not treating it as an equal partner. In 2011, a workshop was held on transparency in the governance of natural resources in Dakar. As the report came out in blue (the color of the EU) and did not include the AU logo, it was rejected by the AU (interview 10).
5. Conclusions

The EU is increasingly trying to redefine its relationship with third countries and regions as partnerships. In this sense, the EU presents itself as a benevolent power that does not impose its will on countries with which it maintains economic and political relations. In Africa, the EU has emphasized its willingness to build a relationship based on equality from the outset, hence breaking with the donor-recipient relationship that emerged in the postcolonial period. This has traditionally been difficult given the colonial history and resulting dependency relations and because of the large economic and political power difference. In the current context, however, partnership is more likely as the EU has lost its power monopoly in Africa and as the African continent, not least via the establishment of the African Union, has made great strides in economic and political power.

Still, one expected the EU to be reluctant to really consider its African partners as equal. Also, because there are reasons to believe that several requirements for a true partnership, such as the existence of shared values and trust, have been absent in relations between the EU and Africa. In this sense, I have critically assessed the concept of partnership within the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy; in particular, the presence of shared values, equality and trust in two thematic partnerships of the JAES, the Peace and Security Partnership and the Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights.

Surprisingly, I found that the principle of equality was largely respected in the JAES. The EU has not abused its power position by imposing its will on its African partners. Overall, the latter have retained ownership in their programs with the EU and have had an equal say in the issues discussed in the framework of the partnership. This is an interesting finding as it runs counter to what we would expect from a partnership with a strong donor-recipient background. It can be explained by the fact that many donors are keen on supporting the AU and thus the EU is definitely not the only game in town. But it also shows that the EU is willing to take ownership seriously, even if it has some doubts about the effectiveness of some of its programs, as I will discuss below. Given that the EU-Africa partnership was unlikely to be an equal partnership considering colonial history and huge economic differences, this conclusion is likely to be valid also for other partnerships where power is more evenly distributed.

However, the analysis also revealed a certain naiveté amongst the actors in the partnership who were of the belief that it is based on shared values and trust. It found that, while the EU and Africa refer to the same values, they often differ in how to approach concrete situations. This has been particularly the case for situations where democratic principles and human rights are violated. When governments are threatened by democratic uprisings that turn violent, the AU is still often bound by its support for state security, while the EU is more often willing to question the legitimacy of that state. A similar difference was noted in the area of democratic governance and human rights, where the AU has been vehemently opposed to the possibility of prosecuting incumbent Heads of State by international courts. These different stances between the EU and AU can easily be explained by the reluctance of the AU to abandon its policies of non-interference as well as by the fear of undemocratic governments to lose power or be discredited by the international community. In addition, there are also important cultural differences, which result in the EU and some African states having an entirely different view on issues such as LGBTI rights. Moreover, interviews with officials working on the partnership revealed a lack of trust between the partners. From the EU side, doubts
were expressed as to whether the partnership would deliver, while African actors have sometimes accused the EU of abusing its power of the purse. The lack of trust reflects an underlying problem, namely the lack of understanding between the partners of each other’s structures and decision-making rules. It should be further investigated whether this lack of trust also exists in other areas of cooperation. Moreover, it remains a crucial question how these issues can be overcome.

and 2008. The Indian Ocean Tsunami catalyzed the search for external ideas and led to the rapid adoption of AADMER, while Cyclone Nargis has opened the path for ratification of the agreement and the establishment of the AHA Center. The creation of the AHA Center confronted ASEAN with the need to find procedures and mechanisms, which would allow the Center to work and to coordinate monitoring and response to disasters at a regional level. ASEAN has also been keen to find out more about how the EU works in the field of disaster management. Of course, this search has been motivated by ASEAN’s attempts to preserve its legitimacy in the eyes of both the domestic and international community, after its failure to respond adequately in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. Thus a combination of lesson-drawing and emulation can be considered as the underlying mechanisms accounting for the gradual process of transfer from the EU.
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Annex 1: Overview of Missions and Initiatives Paid by the African Peace Facility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of the mission (€ in million)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>AMIS (76.1), FOMUC (Central African Republic, 2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>AMIS (61.6), FOMUC (6.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>FOMUC (7.1), AMISEC (4), AMIS (63.6)</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>AMISOM (107), MAES (1), MICOPAX (17.6)</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>AMISOM (133), MICOPAX (14.78)</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>AMISOM (184.7), AFISMA (22.6), MICOPAX (5.9)</td>
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### Early Response Mechanism

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (€million)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>2010-2013</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Implement peace agreement</td>
<td>2010-2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Peace consolidation and post conflict resolution</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda (Lord’s Resistance Army)</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Coordinate action amongst countries</td>
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<td>Ivory Coast</td>
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<td>Mediation</td>
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<td>Human rights observers</td>
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<td>AU</td>
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### African Peace and Security Architecture

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<tr>
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<td>Nihil</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>African Standby Forces (0.6)</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>APSA (7.4)</td>
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<td>AUC (1.5)</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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Annex 2: List of Interviews

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The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and Intensive Research

The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a funding program launched by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft - DFG) in 2008. As a Research College, it is intended to provide a scientifically stimulating environment for innovative research within a small group of senior and junior researchers.

The Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The Transformative Power of Europe” investigates how ideas spread across time and space. During its first phase of research, from 2008-2012, the KFG studied the diffusion of policy ideas and institutions within the European Union (EU), its candidates and neighborhood. During the second phase, from 2012-2016, the KFG realigns its focus of interest on the diffusion of ideas, policies, and institutions beyond Europe (comparative regionalism) and the analysis of the EU at the receiving end of external influences. Its two main research areas are:

- The EU and Regional Institutions in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia
- Europe and the EU and Recipients of Diffusion