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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

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RESISTANCE AGAINST FASCISM AND COMMUNISM IN EUROPE TOWARDS A MODEL OF ANALYSIS

JOSÉ M. FARALDO

Abstract: This article puts forward a model for the analysis of resistance against both communism and fascism in the specific period of time around WWII (1938–48/53). Such a model accommodates the experiences of Eastern and Western Europe, more precisely the fights against various types of fascisms and against the expansion of Soviet-type of communism. This type of analysis integrates different, but interrelated manifestations of resistance: discourses, political actions, military activities and everyday cultural practices. My research on resistance is methodologically inspired by the new trend in historiography initiated by the history of emotions.

Keywords: resistance; opposition; communism; fascism; Europe; history of emotions.

The resistance against foreign occupation and indigenous dictatorships in twentieth-century Europe has been thoroughly researched from different points of view. However, the research on resistance focused initially on military and political issues and thus explored neither the other dimensions of the problem nor the diversity of resistances. Thus, it showed a very homogenous image of this phenomenon. More recent research, usually drawing upon anthropology and sociology, described almost every expression of disappointment with the state or the authorities as an act of resistance. In contrast, this author assumes that resistance requires a conscious decision. Yet, such a decision might result not only from a purely rational impulse to resist dictatorship, but also from a romantic type of drive, as it happen at least during the twentieth century. Thus,

A part of this study has been published in Spanish within the introductory chapters to: José M. Faraldo, *La Europa Clandestina: Resistencia a las ocupaciones nazi y soviética* (Underground Europe: Resistance to the Nazi and Soviet occupations), Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011. This text represents a revised and extended version which the author understands as a step towards a theoretical consideration of the phenomenon of resistance. The text was also discussed in the workshop “Espressioni di violenza e strategie di controllo,” held in Firenze, 14-15 May 2013. I thank everyone present there and especially Luca Baldissara, Javier Rodrigo and Enrico Acciai. Discussions with my office mate, Dr. Oscar Bascuñán, have improved my interest for other forms of resistance, while my understanding of history of emotions owes a lot to Prof. Carolina Rodríguez.
the model proposed in this study relies on the new theories on the history of emotions in order build up a framework of analysis for the historical phenomenon of resistance. This model integrates both the consciousness of the resistance and the emotionally charged aspects of motivations. At the same time, this author considers resistance against communist or fascist dictatorships and against occupation regimes as a single phenomenon, notwithstanding their many ideological differences. Although usually the attempts of comparison and exploration of entanglements between fascism, national-socialism and communism had an ideological bias specific to the Cold War period, the comparative perspective has given lately good academic works and new perspectives of research (Rousso 1999; Geyer & Fitzpatrick 2009). In the same vein, this author considers that both types of resistance represented essentially reactions against the anti-liberal, anti-democratic and imperialistic experiences.

Reassessing Resistance

Lynn Viola, a well-known historian of Stalinism, defines resistance, referring to those who opposed the Soviet collectivization process in the 1930s, in a very broad way:

At its core, resistance involves opposition –active, passive, artfully disguised, attributed, and even inferred (...) Active forms of resistance may include rebellions, mutinies and riots; demonstrations and protest meetings; strikes and work stoppages; incendiary or oppositional broadsheets, threat letters and petitions; and arson, assaults and assassinations (Viola 2002, 18-20).

Moreover, Viola speaks about passive resistance too, quoting explicitly James C. Scott, and includes in this category attitudes of negligence, sabotage, theft and escape, as well as everyday forms of resistance, such as popular discourses, rituals, feigned ignorance, false pretense and faked complicity. According to such a definition, almost every practice that does not obey the dominant social order or contradicted it, really or symbolically, could be considered as “resistance.” In this way, not only practices like the refusal to pay a tax or the planting of a bomb in a café full of soldiers could be considered resistance, but also the deliberate use of one’s own words rather than the official parlance or the performance of a work of art that did not fit the aesthetic patterns required by the authorities. Essentially these would be – and this is how I understand the so-called “subaltern studies” – practices that show very broad opposition towards the “dominant power” (Chaturvedi 2000; Ludden 2002).

However, such an approach is misleading. Dissent against power can be driven from within the milieu in which the subject lives, and even more, the practices of resistance can be produced by more or less obvious constraints and
pressures of a given society. Individuals decide to resist because others have
decided to resist before them. Even societies which may be in subordinate
positions possess other social sub-orders that can be dominant within their own
social milieus (Guha 1997). Therefore, resistance practices in certain areas and
times may also be part of the social order. There is a kind of dominance into the
dominated, a use of resistance for securing or constructing a dominion upon
others. Employing paroles of resistance, specific social groups can impose their
hegemony and use it to fight enemies considered to be foreigners. This happens
for example in the territorial nationalism developed in the Basque Country and
Catalonia in Spain. The Catalan and Basque elites in those territories claim to
fight an external “imperialism,” constructing an almost totalitarian discourse
that applies pressure on their group out of the desire to homogenize the internal
social body. This causes in turn other kinds of resistances.

In fact, if one examines concrete historical cases such as the resistance
during WWII, one can observe that resistance emerges within those societies or
social sectors that maintain their own order instead of adopting that imposed by
others, which are considered to be alien. If there is no consideration of the
“other” (defined in a national, social, ethno-cultural or political way), there can
be no resistance. Furthermore, if some kind of oppositional social structure does
not exist – at least as a group or a tribal order – there cannot be resistance.

It is true that in every society, whatever their political structure or
economic system might be, there is at least a diffuse resistance. There are
always individuals and groups who are unhappy with the existing state of
affairs; there are always aspects of life that are perceived as unjust or unfair.
Scott describes how dissent and resistance emerge in agrarian societies, and
argues that these forms of resistance are replicated in all societies (Scott 1985;
Scott 1990). Stuart Hall and the “cultural studies” school investigate the tension
between domination and mechanisms of resistance and underline that culture is
the field where the fight takes place (Hall 1976). The popular classes are opposed to
domination; they put obstacles to the state. There is social conflict, but also simple
indifference, indolence, insult, ridicule, satire, party, carnival. There are “hidden
transcripts,” things that are not said, gestures that are not explicit, acts that are
not unequivocal. There is struggle against power, against all power.

Although this happens in every society, it is true that liberal democracy
systems allow some expression of that resistance and find channels for its
transformation into political action and real change, at least theoretically. In
dictatorial systems that possibility remains closed, so change must seek other
ways. The disagreement can be expressed by clearly political actions, such as
founding of clandestine organizations, agitating against the regime openly or
secretly, and organizing strikes and protests. However, it can also be extended
on an unconscious way, vaguely, by refusing to support the system and
displaying this attitude in real or symbolic forms. Gábor Tamás Rittersporn
made a point about the Soviet citizen who “whatever may have been his loyalties, for most individuals the question of being for or against the system was unclear and often hardly conceivable” (Rittersporn 2000, 302).

Not accepting orders, grumbling, mocking authority, stealing state materials, sabotaging public actions by the simple strategy of avoiding responsibilities, all of them were common attitudes in Stalinist societies. However, that did not mean that there was a conscious will to overthrow the system or even to change it radically. These attitudes rather sought to make the everyday life tolerable, to widen the field of specific liberties, which an individual considered necessary. Viola’s work about the resistance in Stalin’s USSR emphasize that societal responses to Stalinism included “accommodation, adaptation, acquiescence, apathy, internal emigration, opportunism and active support” (Viola 2002, 1). Attitudes of resistance as these may be, and in fact they are outstretched, but that does not mean they have a political liability or that they are the expression of a need to change a social or political system. This approach, applied usually to dictatorships which completely control the society, can also be applied to any other autocratic regime, including the occupation regimes.

Historical anthropology and cultural studies of the last thirty years have given much importance to the phenomena of resistance (Schneider & Rapp 1995, Kurtz 1996, Gledhill 2000, Lukes 2005; Sharma & Gupta 2006). Such studies have scrutinized the attitudes of the popular classes, the marginalized groups, the peasantry, the ethnic or religious minorities, the workers or the women. Although some of these works were imbued with considerable political bias rather than scientific scholarship, they have been able to detect a wide range of attitudes and forms of resistance adopted by social groups of all kinds. The toughest discussions have focused on whether to consider resistance any kind of denial of authority, inaction or unwillingness to support the expectations of an assumed power. Traditionally, it has been considered “resistance” a conscious and radical opposition to power. Attitudes of authority denial, sabotage or passive reluctance to accept orders, however, should be rather named as “resistencialist attitudes.” Pierre Laborie also felt the need to stress the awareness of being a resistant when defining someone as a part of the resistance. For him, a murder of a policeman of the occupation, for example, was resistance only if the murderer had that goal, and the act was conducted by the authors with that conviction (Laborie 1997, 22).

The consciousness of being a resistant is therefore a key aspect when undertaking the analysis of resistance. This seems to reverse the historical research on the topic to an analysis of elites, minorities or particular groups. Of course, one can do the sociology of resistance considering its most massive features such as urban risings, manifestations, political movements, and researching the social composition of their ranks. One can also use the
instruments of historical anthropology to examine how the practices of resistance were shaped. However, one cannot understand the phenomenon unless one starts from the broader basis of political and intellectual history with the tools of cultural history. Although part of national mythology over the last sixty years, the object of study remains specifically and explicitly the actual groups. Faced with an enemy of superior force, only a minority is able to find enough momentum or inexcusable reason to oppose. Social, political or national consciousness is needed to create networks of resistance with the aim of changing the future, but this is not enough. If the threat is too great, only a handful of people driven by deep feelings will launch a struggle that may seem futile. This last assertion is the key to link political and national consciousness to unplanned and automatic responses against dictatorship and occupation.

Understanding Resistance around WWII

The word “resistance” in the meaning it has in Europe today comes from what has come to be seen as the movement of opposition to Hitler’s occupation *par excellence*: the French “Résistance.” The word was already used by Charles de Gaulle himself in his famous radio address of 18 June 1940, but the reference was rather neutral, related to the action of resisting, without appropriating it as a nickname for his organization, which he saw as primarily military and pursuing conventional warfare. Over time, the word spread all the way to name the resistance movement, which was nonetheless very diverse politically. Although the resistance against the Nazis in France did not reach the greatest intensity, the prestige of the French culture and its ability to produce meanings contributed to the acceptance of the term abroad: “resistance” in English, “resistenza” in Italian, “resistencia” in Castilian Spanish. In Poland, where the resistance movement developed earlier and became numerically more important than in France, the most common denomination from 1939 to 1945 was “konspiracja” (conspiracy) or “podziemie” (hiding). Only after the war and under French influence, both researchers and laypeople began to use the expression “opposition movement” (ruch oporu), which emphasizes its political character. Forms similar to the Polish terms are also used in Serbo-Croatian, while the expression that became widely used in Russian was “resistance movement” (dviyenie sopotrebleniia). In Romania, it was also this latter expression that was adopted (mişcările de rezistenţă), but of course without linking it to the resistance against communism until after 1989 (Faraldo 2011).

However, in Yugoslavia and the USSR it was the word “partisan,” the equivalent of “maquis” in Spain (and France), the concept that consolidated the mythical symbolic meaning and content of the resistance. Interestingly, Milovan Djilas states in his memoirs that when he began the preparation of the
communist resistance units in Yugoslavia they did not make use of the word “partisan.” According to him, “these words were introduced afterwards (…), probably following the Russian example, because in our country they had never existed and it was a barbarism that had another meaning in our language” (Djilas 1978, 14).

In the beginning of the conflict, many of the armed groups used words derived from “guerrilla,” a word of Spanish origin which entered in many other European languages. In fact, the concept of “guerrilla” (Spanish for “little war”) spread throughout Europe during the Napoleonic wars. The semantic field of the words “maquis” and “partisan” is also related to older movements in the Mediterranean basin and had much to do with the domestic political opposition in the nineteenth century. “Maquis” comes from a Corsican word for the typical Mediterranean forest where bandits and fighters for independence used to hide, while “partisan” comes from Italian and refers to members of a faction.

There were many ancient traditional words that were used to name clandestine fighters, especially in the Balkans: “hajduk” in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, or “haiduc” in Romania. One of the main traditions that played a key role in the resistance during WWII is that of the “Chetniks” (Četnici, Четници) of Serbia. This word comes from Turkey and is related to “bands” or “groups,” which can be military, but can be bandits as well. The Chetniks fought in the wars against the Turks in the early twentieth century and then in WWII. During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, their successors, the Serb nationalists in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted the name “Chetniks” too. All these words have to do with the romanticist nationalist struggles driven by peasants or highlanders. Their use was a way of connecting the experiences of the struggle for national construction in the period of Romanticism with the freedom struggles of the anti-fascist partisans and later of the anti-communist resistance.

Interestingly enough, the enemies of the resistance used similar words to abuse the people whom they were combating. For the National-Socialists and the Wehrmacht, partisans were “Banditen,” while members of the urban resistance, apart from being called “saboteurs” and “criminals,” were named “Terroristen” (for instance, the bombing of German cities by allied aircraft were considered acts of terrorism). On their turn, the Soviets used the word “bandity,” which also related to “gangs”.

To explain the societal reaction against Hitler, German historians have eventually come to use the word “Widerstand” (German for resistance). For a long time, however, there was a heated debate in Germany about the appropriate concept, about the meanings of the words “resistance” and “opposition,” which some argued to be synonymous. However, opposition is not the same as resistance. Austrian historian Wolfgang Neugebauer, for example, claims that in circumstances where there was a solid police structure, with secret surveillance and draconian penalties for the possible resistant, as in the Nazi regime, all
opposition should be regarded as resistance, “even if there were only isolated attempts to stay honest” (Neugebauer 2008, 169). This, in my opinion, goes too far and contrasts somewhat with the consideration that the action of the resistance had at the time. Opposing a system or government does not mean acting in concert to bring them down. Opposition can be understood as “fair” attempts to provoke changes from within, at showing ways of driving the system away. Resistance must be at least in aims total, it must cut bridges, not let up. The opposition has not necessarily a violent background, whereas the resistance points up to an armed conflict, to a revolutionary crescendo.

My definition of resistance in the context of the period 1938-1948/53 is therefore more limited. Resistance should be a conscious act, seeking political goals, even if those goals are not explicit or specific. Resistance is always in one way or another, an organized movement, although there may be degrees of imaginary, unreal or virtual organization, because people may feel part of a movement without being actually integrated in it. Resistance can arise with a spontaneous act, but only its continuity and consciousness transform an uprising in proper resistance. It must have, as noted, political objectives, even if these are sometimes diffuse or vague. Resistance can take place against a foreign invader, but given the continuities and entanglements often includes the opposition against a domestic regime.

**Resistance as Social War**

As some authors suggested, resistance can also be seen as social war (Pavone 1991). Resistance is fed by patriotic impulses, by national utopia. It is a drive based on discourses of national sovereignty, but its formation as a movement had a lot to do with the nature of the political opposition. Remembering his experience as communist partisan leader, Djilas notes: “Our plans against the occupiers were simultaneously directed against the forces of the old order. (...) Without the simultaneous struggle against the occupying, revolution was unthinkable and impossible to carry out” (Djilas 1978). This was true not only of the communists in all countries, but also for much of the resistance everywhere: the very fact that the prior system had made the occupation possible showed its failure. Even where the political legitimacy of the previous system was not contested, as in Denmark, Norway, Holland, people became aware of the errors of political judgment and the need to reform the European security system. It was this kind of reflection that bore fruit after WWII and came to be at the origin of the more efficient policy of European unity (Friedländer 1968).

Organized resistance movements had decidedly political overtones, often with violent and warlike coloration. They drew upon nationalist traditions (be
these of state nationalism or of separatism) and anti-political experiences (be these communist or extreme right). They were also linked to the development of anti-liberal dictatorships and mass totalitarianism, which attempted to control every corner of society, to conquer and invade not only the territory, but the minds of the people. They not only wanted to free up a given space, but to change a system; they did not really try to restore the situation prior to the war, but to prevent what happened from not happening again. Change was the key word in all resistencial activity during WWII. The coming revolution was what united the resistance in all areas with previous political movements, even when there was no real organizational or programmatic continuity.

The usual definitions of resistance have emphasized its military character. Resistance was the “fourth force,” next to the army, navy and air forces. Even though the commanders of the armed forces did not have initially any confidence in it – for instance, the British High Command did not give the Special Operation Executive enough economic means, and Stalin did not support the partisans until the war was very advanced – resistance was used as an instrument. In his classic synthesis history of the resistance, Henri Bernard defines resistance as “the struggle against fascist or Nazi totalitarianism and for the respect of human dignity” (Bernard 1986, 13). However, his definition only captures part of the phenomenon. The integration of the resistance against the Nazis in the general war effort of the Allied Forces made of the resistance a “fourth force,” but the scope of the resistencialist phenomenon was much broader.

Even when it was violent, resistance might not have been connected to militarism, the armed expression of the state. The libertarian individualism and the desire for social revolution were no less important. Although the fight against “totalitarianism” – however one defines this term – was the goal of the resisters, they fought sometimes to promote other totalitarianisms instead, whether communist, fascist or nationalist. Respect for human dignity was part of many programmatic expressions of resistance, but these often appeared submerged in a sea of nationalism, unscrupulous collectivism, racism or ideological constructions such as the stereotype of the Judeo-bolshevism (Spiewak 2012). The liberation of the individual was usually linked to other endeavors, such as the social struggle or the national struggle. The Marxist historiography of the countries of real socialism used to distinguish between these forms. Accordingly, resistance movements were divided among “popular-revolutionary,” which were defined as progressive and patriotic, and “bourgeois,” which referred to the traditional struggle for national and civil rights (Bondarenko & Rezonov 1962).

François Bédarida’s definition or resistance shows a common limitation in Western research on the question. For him, resistance is “a clandestine action performed on behalf of the freedom of the nation and the dignity of the human person by volunteers, organized to fight against domination and most of the
time against the occupation of their country by a Nazi or fascist regime allied or satellite” (Bédarida 1986, 80). This definition, like others in Western historiography of resistance, leaves aside an important fact: the simultaneous or subsequent fight against the Soviet occupant, which in many parts of Eastern Europe had exactly the same meaning, was conducted under the same forms and even by the same people as the resistance against Nazis and fascists (Motyka, Wnuk, Stryjek & Baran 2012). While the communists had fought the Nazis to achieve not only national freedom, but also social change, anti-communist partisans who fought against communist governments also took into consideration such a goal. Their understanding of social change was though different, sometimes nebulous or even inarticulate, but the yearning for social change existed.

The Emotional Map of the Resistance

As mentioned, I consider essential to analyze the resistance around WWII from the standpoint of conscious practices. The resistance is thus considered primarily a choice. Such a choice might have been required of the individual by his milieu or the circumstance in which he found himself at a certain moment. What should a citizen who sees a foreign army parading down the main street of his town do? How should a person whose daily life is suddenly subjected to the orders and dictates of a foreign bureaucracy, generally enforced by military and police, behave? How should an individual faced with the daily experience of repression, unjustified violence or obligation to work for an occupying force, react? What is to be done? In all such circumstances, resistance required a conscious choice made in a moment when the only other alternative seemed suicide. Resistance is therefore also a product of an emotion.

That resistance arises from feelings and emotions is not a really new assertion (Michel 1970). As Susan Seymour argues, all explanations of the resistance that are focused only on the structures of political economy and the dominant cultural discourses are unsatisfactory, because these do not analyze the way in which power relations are experienced, transmitted and changed by individuals in their everyday life practices (Seymour 2006). The new research on the history of emotions, specially the concept of “emotional communities” developed by Barbara Rosenwein, might help one to understand the origin and the sources of resistance (Rosenwein 2007). According to the same author, an emotional community is a group of people with a set of feelings and a shared code: what is considered favorable or threatening, how the emotions of the others are evaluated, what are their emotional ties, which modes of emotional expression are expected, cultivated, tolerated and deplored.

Sometimes these feelings are enough to commit an act that will require continued resistance; sometimes emotions are suffocated. It is only an
appropriate milieu that allows emotions to be displayed and become embodied in action. During the twentieth century, three types of emotions inspired effective opposition to European dictatorships or autocracies of excessive power: moral and religious convictions, persuasions of patriotic exaltation, and a mixture of millenarianism, utopian dreams and patriotism of mutable object, whose ultimate expression was the Comintern communism and the German National Socialism. The three types of emotions were able to mobilize actions of more or less radicalized individuals in extreme moments, although these could get extended if circumstances were favorable and reach further segments of the population that had remained paralyzed by the occupation.

Moral and religious convictions, the need for a just order in the world, however this was ultimately defined, have always been considered sources of resistance. For example, for many inhabitants of Lithuania, a country that in 1939 was fraught with traditional rural Catholicism, it was very clear from the beginning that a regime that closed churches and persecuted priests was inherently “bad.” To take a stand against it was therefore logical and dependent only on external circumstances, such as the degree of repression. This dilemma was, however, much more complicated in the case of those individuals, like the Polish leftist intellectuals, who believed that the USSR represented nonetheless a progressive force (Shore 2006). When faced with the distressing reality, their moral convictions altered what they saw to the point of hiding and distorting it, even allowed them to justify crimes and repressions by considering them as temporary but necessary occurrences on the road of building the new world. The collaborationist phenomenon in the Europe of that time arose out of similar convictions: the New Order that the Nazis brought in the occupied countries seemed not only to radical right-wing people, but also to individuals with traditional authoritarian worldviews, a promise for a future for which they were willing to endure the shame of an occupation. During the interwar period, diverse groups across Europe had fought for a “national” revolution, in the case of right-wing radicalism, and for a “social” radical transformation, in the case of extreme-left groups. Both trends were animated by this pseudo-religious exaltation of a millennial Reign-to-come. Their forces were, however, too weak in most countries to gain power for their own. Only German troops with their panzers and the Red Army with their bayonets allowed these radical minorities to acquire the strength and power to transform effectively their societies. However, few of these groups became more than puppets in the hands of their masters (Tismâneanu 2009).

The resistance could also originate in the discontent regarding policies and measures concerning certain interest groups. Often, when these policies or measures disappeared, the resistance vanished too. For example, this was the case with certain Nazi policies, such as the attempts to form a pro-Nazi evangelical church or the euthanasia. The resistance to these policies within the
Christian churches almost disappeared once they were gradually revoked. On the contrary, a more fundamental opposition emerged from radically different worldviews or ideologies: generally, the social democrats opposed the Nazis, while the Christian democrats the communists, but both were against National Socialism. This opposition raised resistances that were usually of deeper level, but they were not immutable. The military and economic successes of Stalin and Hitler did paralyze many of their opponents, made them feel insecure and wonder if they were really right in their struggle against the system. The reluctance of many members of the Wehrmacht – especially of superior ranks – towards Hitler could not be turned into an open rebellion as long as the national socialist state seemed able to gradually overcome all difficulties and reach all its goals. These potential resisters realized that they had nothing to offer in exchange.

It is certainly not easy to discern the red line that separates the moral necessity of dissent from the not least moral obligation to support and to respect the system in which an individual lives. In case of the resistance during WWII and its aftermath, the difference lies in the phenomenon of occupation, which is the touchstone of the other great emotion of the resistance: patriotism/nationalism. Although ideologically close, the Polish right-wing fascists turned against the Nazis when these occupied their country (although there were minor attempts at collaboration, usually rejected by the Nazis). The Polish social-democrats also generally avoided to cooperate with the Soviet occupation in the years 1939–41. In many countries occupied by the Germans, a good part of the monarchist and right Christian democrats positioned themselves unequivocally against the Nazis, even though before the war they had welcome Hitler’s anti-communism. On the contrary, the patriotic feelings of Marshal Pétain and his men did not prevent them to collaborate with the Nazis, not only because they considered resistance as futile, but also because they thought that the occupation would help them to achieve their goal of political change. Similarly, Polish national communists as Władysław Gomułka were no less patriotic than the right-wing politicians or the social democrats (Zaremba 2001). However, they felt that the Soviet occupation gave them the opportunity to transform society, something that they had no chance to do before, because their political movement had been too weak. Thus, they collaborated with the Soviets.

The incredible power of the nationalist education during the years prior to 1939 is well reflected in the memoirs and diaries of the period. Dreams of national resurrection are found throughout writings of those times, in the hasty notes of the moment. “Stunned and hurt, France rises again and refuses to believe that the future is denied to her,” says a young Frenchman few days after the armistice was signed (Piobetta 1961, 64). The country is loved with tremendous veneration, as a higher and indisputable reality. The presence of foreign occupiers serves as confirmation of national pre-war teachings. Discourses that until then had been dry lessons of primary schools or ritualized
national holidays renewed their meanings and thus individuals perceived them daily, on every corner, at every encounter with the occupation forces. In areas with mixed populations, where a weak construction of national identities had not allowed a dominant ethnicity to assimilate the others, there was a sudden nationalization of the masses. In eastern Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, the south of the USSR, the Balkans, the presence of various invaders prompted many ambiguous identities to define themselves in one way or another. Also, the anti-Semitic actions of the National Socialists and their influence upon the occupied societies, as well as the need to take distance from the destruction of the Jewish minorities, led to the decrease of anti-Semitism among the autochthonous populations. The century long attempts at assimilating the Jews, which had been growing since the eighteenth century and reached their peak before WWI, also underwent a radical turn. Identities were ethnified, behaviors were patriotized.

However, not only the collective reasons were decisive. Many reports or diaries written at that time, unlike memories composed many years after, gave often as the reason for going into resistance the need for individual liberation, even if it is usually disguised under patriotic justifications. Topoi as “I choked,” “I could not stand it,” “I wanted to be free” were repeated, phrases like these appear frequently in texts (Pasiewicz 2006; Piketty 2009). Regardless of the form to be given to the utopian future that would come after the “liberation” (liberal democracy, nationalist regime, right-wing dictatorship, state socialism etc.), the plain fact was that young resisters just wanted to be “free,” to get the power to do what they pleased. It was a primary libertarian impulse, which went beyond and above ideologies, and was related to the modernization of behavior in the first quarter of the century and the development of personal individualism from Romanticism to Avant-garde. It was a freedom impulse born also from the collapse of the values of the Belle Époque in the aftermath of WWI and the sociological changes that led to the rise of communism and fascism as mass movements. These rebel masses represented the community in which the individual dive dreaming to lose that angst of being alone in a hostile and decadent world. Before 1939, as George Uscătescu very well describes, the twentieth century ranged from a revolt of the masses who wanted emancipation and the rebellion of a minority who wanted, on the one hand, to detach themselves from the masses in as much as these were regarded as bourgeois, and on the other, to surrender to the masses, as long as these were defined as popular or national (Uscătescu 1955).

One of the main characteristics of resistance that partly explains its origin is the youth of its members. Although resistance might have had relatively old leaders or ideologues, and the political symbols of many movements might have been a king or a retired general, their most active members were usually young. Georges Pierre (alias Colonel Fabien), the French communist who made the first attack on a German soldier in the Paris of 1941, was at that time 22 years old. Stanisław Aronson, a Jewish member of the Polish Home Army who fought in 1944 in the Warsaw Uprising, was 19. The Romanian anti-communist
partisan Aristina Pop Săileanu was only 18 in 1949, when she went into the mountains (Pop-Săileanu 2008). More than fifty percent of the participants in the Slovak uprising of August 1944 were under 30 years of age, while fifteen percent of the youngsters were under 18 (Gebhart & Šimovček 1989, 147). It is true that in all armies the young people were usually “meat for cannons” due to senile commanders’ orders, but in times of total war the civic resistance attracted those who were still children. The Polish Jewish partisan “Justyna” (alias Gusta Davidson-Draenger) has written in her notebook that “they were young, and the fact that they sought a revolutionary way was something natural for them” (Davidson-Draenger 1999, 29). Often the resistance began as a simple rebellion against the old, as in the case of the “Edelweisspiraten” in Germany or the French “zouzous,” a kind of urban tribes of the time. Sometimes their resistance was essentially political, such was for the “White Rose” in Germany and the “Grey Ranks” in Poland. The figurehead is the Polish “Little Rebel,” which symbolizes the children who served as links between the various groups which were engaged in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 against the Germans. Today a room in the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising is dedicated to them, while a statue in Warsaw’s Old Town, representing a child with a huge helmet on the head and a machine gun in the hand, commemorates their courage. The everyday violence of war is returned to us in the form of epic remembrance of a wasted youth.

One should not forget either that it was precisely these young people who introduced a strong element of violence in the resistance, a longing for blood caused by their lack of fear and their youth unconsciousness. Punitive raids, executions, violent blows were carried out and required by these young people, who demanded direct action and wanted to destroy the enemy with their own hands (Đambski 2010, 13). The experience of the expected outbreak of the armed uprising of Warsaw, the Prague Rebellion or the Slovak uprising is described by the youngest people as an explosion of joy, as a burst of freedom. This ended tragically for many, but this was what they had been waiting for four long years. For some children as young as sixteen or seventeen, WWII, the occupation, violence and hatred represented the experience that marked their lives. As Zeev Milo, a former Yugoslav partisan, notes when mentioning the fourteen-years-old individual who taught him to handle weapons, “among the partisans, there were many children. The Ustashe [Croat fascists] had killed their parents and the children that by chance did not die were saved by going with the partisans and became well-motivated soldiers” (Milo 2010, 130).

Conclusions

This paper has put forward a model of analysis of resistance for the specific period of time around the WWII (1938–48/53) and has integrated the experiences of Eastern and Western Europe, the fights against the various fascisms and against the expansion of Soviet-type of communism. My approach
presupposes that the resistance must be examined against the background of the consciousness of being a member of a certain resistance group. The “resistencialist attitudes,” such as non-voluntary dissent and opposition, can be considered as low-intensity resistance, symbolically expressed impotence or small-scale resistance of the performer. However, when these attitudes are not the product of conscious behavior, when they are not immersed in a project, however poorly defined, they must be regarded as something different: responses and feedbacks to the individual’s relationship with power, but not as resistance.

As project and conscious decision, resistance has an important component of rationality and choice, planning and construction. However, their motivation lies in an emotion or a series of emotions: patriotism, nationalism, xenophobia, desire for freedom, dreams of glory, even despair... A more detailed analysis of the landscape of the emotions of resistance could show a wide range of possibilities for a typology of the various forms of resistance. This would be the link between the “attitudes of resistance” – as something rather unconscious – and the politically planned resistance.

In short, the model of analysis of resistance around WWII defined above must broadly integrate a number of interrelated manifestations of this phenomenon, ranging from the analysis of speeches and other forms of expressing its goals to overt or covert political action, military activities (as long as these were connected to political action) and even everyday cultural practices. All these should have a place in the space left by two axes that intersect each other: resistance as a project (national, social, political etc.) and resistance as emotion (patriotic, libertarian, revenge etc.). In this light, the usual division between resistance in the East and the West no longer has epistemological power and research should focus therefore on integrating both in a wider, European model. Such a model, once devised, could be then applied to extra-European phenomena of resistance.

REFERENCES


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