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National Identification: A multidimensional Scale Based on a Three-Country Study

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Gegenstand der Reihe sind Beiträge zur Analyse der Herausbildung einer europäischen Gesellschaftsstruktur und -kultur, vergleichende Analysen, die die Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen verschiedenen europäischen Gesellschaften thematisieren, sowie theoretische Versuche einer Soziologie Europas.

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Zitationsweise: BSSE-Arbeitspapier Nr. 29. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.

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Abstract: A Multidimensional Scale Measuring National Identification: Results from England, Germany, and Poland

We develop and test a multidimensional scale measuring national identification. Drawing on the extant literature on nations and national identity, we propose national identification as an understanding of how individuals subjectively and dynamically relate to different characteristics of nations that we operationalize as the dimensions of symbolic, civic, and solidary identification. We discuss the development of a number of questionnaire items representing each of these dimensions and report results of various validity and reliability tests using data from three surveys we conducted in England, Germany, and Poland. Results in general confirm the three-dimensional structure of the overall construct while at the same time suggesting country-specific adaptations to the scale.

Keywords: National identification, national identity, solidarity, national symbols, civic identification

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For several decades, scholars have argued that the nation is increasingly forfeiting its importance as a source of identity and an object of identification. Globalization and transnationalization are frequently mentioned as key processes diminishing the significance of the nation in everyday life and have led to debates about the emergence of a “postnational self” (Hedetoft and Hjort 2002). Others have argued that the nation as a form of social organization and nationalism as a dominant mode of practice are in fact far from disappearing (Calhoun 2007) and that the nation remains deeply rooted in the “ideological habits” (Billig 1995) of everyday life. Even more, it has been suggested that the increasing complexity of the contemporary world indeed revives the need for an (imagined) national community rather than diminishing it (Kinvall 2005).

When reviewing the prolonged discourse in the social sciences over this “paradox of nationalism in a global world” (Juergensmeyer 2002), it is striking that most of the debate revolves around theoretical considerations, political analyses, and descriptive accounts of changes or inertia regarding the relevance of nations as a source of identity and an object of identification (e.g., Smith 2007; Skey 2013). Although this body of scholarship is vastly insightful in terms of understanding the social and cultural developments that accompany or promote changes in how individuals relate to a nation, research attending to this paradox on the grounds of empirical measures of the relevance of nations for people’s everyday lives and its transformations still remains sparse.

Existing studies using standardized measures of the relevance and significance of nations for individual selves are often concerned with a very general understanding of this relevance, for example as a source of a more or less stable national identity (e.g., David and Bar-Tal 2009; Huddy and Khatib, 2007), they focus on specific manifestations of this relevance, for example as nationalism or patriotism (e.g., Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Mummendey, Klink and Brown 2001), or they rely on concise, but rather narrow, indicators of this relevance, for instance items used in large surveys such as the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) or Eurobarometer (e.g., Ariely 2012; Jones and Smith 2001).

Although these approaches no doubt offer valuable insights into how individuals relate to a nation, they also have been questioned on different grounds. For example, “identity” and “national identity” have been criticized for being conceptually hollow and empirically almost impossible to assess given the widespread confusion over the meaning of the term (e.g., Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Malesevic 2011). In this view, the concept of “identity” seems hardly capable of doing justice to the purportedly dynamic and changing nature of the subjective relevance of nations under conditions of enduring transformation in the contemporary world. Similarly, notions of patriotism and nationalism do not primarily address what is commonly at stake in current debates on the status of the nation as a source of identification because they mostly focus on normative connotations of desirable or undesirable forms of relating to a nation and corresponding actions. In addition, assessments of national identity in large

surveys suffer from the usual limitations of surveys, i.e. the often prohibitive costs of implementing many-item, multi-dimensional scales. Although few-item measures can be instructive in many ways (e.g., Ariely 2012), they cannot precisely tell us which facets of identity or identification (which are unanimously understood as multidimensional phenomena) change over time.

Given these limitations of current research on the subjective relevance of the nation as a source of identity, we herein propose a multidimensional measure of national identification that aims at doing justice to the multifaceted ways in which people relate to a nation, at accounting for the purportedly dynamic nature of this relation, and at considering the specificities of nations (in contrast to other groups) as objects of identification. The measure we developed should help informing present debates on the changing importance of nations in everyday life at a general level and contribute to more clearly pinpointing which dimensions of identification actually change over time or in responses to certain events, such as conflict, regime change, external shocks, political agendas, or economic developments.

We first discuss different ways of understanding of how individuals relate to a nation and how it constitutes a source of identity and identification. We propose that to do justice to the dynamic and multidimensional aspects of this relation, the concept of *identification* is especially well suited for operationalization using standardized measures. Second, in very briefly reviewing the extant literature on national identity and identification, we identify three core dimensions by which individuals relate to a nation. Third, we suggest a way to operationalize these dimensions using various rating-scale items, discuss the overall construct, and finally present the results of several studies conducted across three European countries (England, Germany, and Poland) demonstrating the reliability and validity of our scale. Fourth, we discuss our findings and highlight limitations and avenues for future research.

1. Identification with a Nation

1.1 Identity

The majority of social science theory and research has conceptualized the different ways in which individuals subjectively or experientially relate to a nation using the concept of “national identity” (e.g., Smith 1991; Kumar 2003). Although summarizing the vast literature on national identity is well beyond the scope of this article, we will very briefly discuss some general understandings of the term. National identity is often conceived of as a specific form of collective identity, which in turn is assumed to be a type of social identity (e.g., David and Bar-Tal 2009). Social identity essentially captures the idea that the construction and sense of self and self-understanding are fundamentally related to the social world (Cerulo 1997).

Understanding national identity along this framework implies processes of social categorization (Hogg and Reid 2006), e.g. understanding the self as belonging to and being constituted by some sort of socially defined category. Collective identity high-

lights the fact that many of these categories refer to existing or imagined social collectives in the broadest sense, such as groups, teams, or societies, and therefore give rise to perceptions of belonging, togetherness, and “we-ness” based on “the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce”, be they real or imagined (Cerulo 1997: 386). Regarding national identity and the disputed question of what nations are in the first place, it becomes apparent that any distinction between “real” or “imagined” is necessarily fuzzy, as is evident in debates between proponents of modernist (e.g., Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983) or ethnosymbolist (e.g., Smith 1991) perspectives on nations.

Understanding national identity thus does not only require a coherent conceptualization of identity, but likewise of nations and national groups. Indeed, some have argued that this is too much of a burden for one conceptual term given the vast array of different approaches to both, “nations” and “identity” (e.g., Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Some have even suggested that national identity in fact is no more than a “chimera” (Malesevic 2011). Aside from these conceptual issues, the role of national affiliation in identity construction has been challenged by postmodern accounts. These views suggest that globalization and transnationalization are undermining the centrality of nations and that instead alternative, and often localized, sources of identity become increasingly significant (e.g., Herrmann, Risse and Brewer 2004; Hedetoft and Hjort 2002).

The “identity” component of “national identity”, on the other hand, has been criticized for its inflationary use, fuzziness, and inherent ambivalence (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Most important, however, it has been questioned for – etymologically – carrying connotations of essential intraindividual *invariability* and, simultaneously, interindividual *sameness*, hence for the most part contradicting widely agreed upon views of identity as a non-essentialist, multiple, and constantly re-negotiated subjective relation to a national group (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). This latter issue is particularly evident when applied to the national context which, in postmodern times, is supposed to be constantly in flux.

1.2 Identification

An alternative view on how individuals subjectively relate to a nation – or any other social category, person, or material object – is reflected in the use of the concept of *identification*. In the nations and nationalism as well as the social psychological literature, the term is mostly used synonymously with “identity” or to denote the processual aspects of identity and identity formation (e.g., Cameron 2004; Kunovich 2009). In this respect, Graumann (1983) highlights that “the unity of a person is not a natural given, but has to be attained psychologically (by identification) and maintained (as identity) in a continuous and often conflicting process of socialization” (p. 315).

There is, however, a tradition that treats identification as distinctive and not *necessarily* related to identity. In this view, identification denotes a specific relation between a subject that identifies and an entity in the world that is the object of identifi-

cation (Gerhards 2000: 116). In principle, this subject-object relation can be positive or negative, but necessarily includes a certain degree of valence and valuation (see also Mühler and Opp, 2004: 15). It can be of a diverse nature, strong or barely noticeable, stable or malleable, cognitive or affective, depending both on the self and the social context. Identification thus first and foremost implies that individuals can meaningfully relate to or deem important an entity without necessarily including this entity into their sense of self (Weichart 1990: 15-17). When they do, however, identification is a key process underlying identity formation. Whereas identity is often assumed to reflect “who we are”, identification denotes a process of *actively relating* to an entity in the world (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009: 6).

One of the key aspects setting identification apart from identity is the former’s focus on a specific *object* or *entity*. Much in the same way as research on identity has frequently suggested the multi-dimensionality of the psychological processes underlying social identity (e.g., Cameron 2004; Schatz and Lavine 2007), one can assume that identification occurs along the lines of specific (subjective or objective) characteristics or qualities of an object. For example, one might identify with a certain material object due to its instrumental-rational usefulness, because it is aesthetically pleasing, because it symbolizes or represents some memory, value, or belief, or all of this. Despite the enduring debates over what a nation or national group actually is and how it is adequately defined, we suggest that identification with a nation also proceeds – in principle – along certain qualities and characteristics that individuals ascribe to or see in a nation.

To empirically assess identification with the nation from this perspective, it is critical to establish the qualities and characteristics of nations that are likely to be perceived as features to which individuals relate and with which they identify. In this respect, the extant literature on nations and nationalism – and particularly on national identity – is instructive to at least approximate some of these features that might form a common “relational core”.

1.3 Facets of Identification

This section develops what we call a “relational core” of features and characteristics of nations that become (intermediate) foci of identification. Based on a review of existing scholarship, three key themes emerged: Symbols representing the nation, political and institutional features deemed characteristic of nations, and perceptions of the nation as a solidary community. It is important to note that we are not making any claims related to the *ontology* of nations. Rather, we are suggesting that these are characteristic (and potentially differentiating) features of nations to which individuals subjectively *relate* and that form a common basis of *identification*, even if they only exist in the minds and memories of individuals.

1.4 Symbols and Culture

The importance of symbols for the identification with a group can at least be traced back to Durkheim (1995 [1912]). He argued that feelings of belonging to a group are evoked in rituals and attributed to the symbols representing the group and the groups shared cultural values and beliefs. In everyday, mundane contexts, these “emotionally charged” symbols then promote solidarity towards other member of the group. Symbols have been argued to be critical to the process of nation building and maintenance since they contribute to the “grounding” of an otherwise only imagined community (Hobsbawm 1990). They make the nation and its (alleged) cultural practices visible and tangible and grant concreteness to the otherwise rather abstract concept of nation (Cerulo 1997; Geisler 2009). Minogue (1967) argues that “flags and anthems can be used to create members of a nation by developing new habits and emotions; the Star spangled banner with its stars increasing as a new state joined the Union was an important symbol of America for the millions of immigrants to the United States” (p. 11).

Aside from the national flag, which is often seen as representing a nation’s history and political organization (Kimmelmeier and Winter 2008), the national coat of arms, the anthem, the currency, and places of remembrance are equally powerful symbols to which citizens relate. Tombs, statues of major historical figures, cathedrals, mausoleums or castles, residencies of a current head of state, or sites of historical importance, such as battlefields, all count as more or less visible symbols of a nation. Significantly, national symbols are usually protected by dedicated national laws (Kolstø 2006).

The identification with national symbols also plays an important role in concepts of ethnic nationalism (Ignatieff 1994) and in ethno-symbolist understandings of nations (e.g., Armstrong 1982). Here, symbols, along with myths, memories, traditions, and cultural practices in a broader understanding play a critical role in establishing and maintaining ethnic and other nation-related boundaries. Inasmuch as symbols contribute to the formation of such boundaries, they are seen as key facets of national groups to which individuals relate in processes of identification (Armstrong 1982; Hutchison 1994; see Smith 1998: 170ff). For example, symbolic manifestations of the nation often draw upon beliefs in a common ancestry and shared cultural properties of the people constituting a nation. This importance of symbols for nations and nationalism has recently been highlighted by Elgenius (2011).

Empirical studies have shown that the prolonged and intensified display of national flags, in particular in times of crisis, is motivated by patriotism (instead of nationalism) and likewise promotes patriotism (Skitka 2005), but also leads to increased out-group prejudice among highly nationalistic individuals (Becker et al. 2012). This finding is in line with “blind patriotism” as a consequence of what has been termed “symbolic involvement” (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999; Schatz and Lavine 2007).

In sum, nation-related symbols are publically accessible and thus perceptually highly salient facets of nations that not only operate in individual minds, but through

processes of objectification and externalization (Berger and Luckman 1966) become part and parcel of everyday experience.

1.5 Politics and Institutions

Throughout the history of studies on how individuals relate to nations, the ideological, institutional, and political structures of which – in particular modern – nation states are composed have been at the center of attention. In the literature on national identity, these dimensions are often related to ideas of citizenship and frequently subsumed under the concept of “civic identity”. Although civic identity is strongly linked to solidarity with fellow citizens (see the following section), it also refers to participatory engagement in the various institutions of a nation state (or other forms of social organization), for example “voting, holding or running for political office, jury duty, and so on” (Hart, Richardson and Wilkenfeld 2011: 773). As such, civic identity also reflects the basic components of citizenship, i.e. membership, rights, and participation (Bellamy 2008). Civic identity is traditionally distinguished from ethnic identity (e.g., Shulman 2002). The former relates to peoples’ perceptions that what unites or should unite members of a nation are features like “living on a common territory, belief in common political principles, possession of state citizenship, representation by a common set of political institutions and desire or consent to be part of the nation” (Shulman 2004: 35). In contrast, the latter highlights features like “common ancestry, culture, language, religion, traditions and race” (ibid.).

Civic identity is closely tied to civic nationalism (e.g., Ignatieff 1994), which is based on shared values and an emphasis on specific forms of political organization and corresponding principles. Civic nationalism has been argued to be “necessarily democratic” (Ignatieff 1994: 4), which sets it apart from, for example, nationalism (as a counterpart to patriotism) or ethnic nationalism. Close links are traditionally seen between civic nationalism and patriotism, both of which are assumed to rest on the “attachment to national values” (Adorno 1950: 107) representing certain forms of political principles and organization. In some regards, it is also comparable to “constitutional patriotism” (as marshaled by Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas; see Müller 2006).

In a similar vein, but from a more social psychological perspective, this form of relating to a nation has been described as “instrumental involvement” that reflects some “utilitarian concern for the functionality of the nation’s social, political, and economic institutions, and the perceived capability of those institutions to provide instrumental benefits to citizens” (Schatz and Lavine 2007: 331). Instrumental involvement thus shifts the view from a pronounced cultural understanding to an instrumental-rational relationship with a nation that does not necessarily involve inclusion of “civic” elements into one’s conception of the self.

Although this review is necessarily limited in scope, it is sufficient to suggest that forms of political organization and social and political institutions (such as welfare, health, and education) as well as the corresponding values, ideological principles,

rights, and entitlements constitute features of nations to which individuals relate and with which they identify. In contrast to symbolic identification, these features may be less salient in terms of sensory perception, but they significantly structure and organize people's everyday lives, which can be subjectively assessed as both positive (e.g., receiving health benefits) and negative (e.g., being fined for tax evasion). Moreover, these features clearly set modern nation states apart from one another in a way that goes well beyond symbolic boundaries.

1.6 Community and Solidarity

A third facet of identification commonly referred to in the literature neither relates to a nation's symbolic universe nor to its institutional makeup, but rather to the other members of a nation and one's relationship with those members. Social psychological research for some times has argued that identification with a group is distinct from identification with the members of a group (Karasawa 1991) and that in-group ties are a crucial dimension of social identity categories (Cameron 2004). In view of nations, this perspective is famously mirrored by Anderson's (1983) concept of the nation as an "imagined political community". Anderson's basic claim is that in most nations, members never come to personally know all other members of the nation, as might be the case for close-knit communities, such as those studied by Durkheim (1995 [1912]). Rather, they *imagine* a communion with others based on the belief that members mutually share a number of characteristics, e.g., beliefs, values, or a common heritage. This imagined community tends to be perceived "as a deep, horizontal comradeship" amongst members of a nation (Anderson 1983: 7).

Characteristically, the imagination of community and comradeship manifests in very concrete forms of action characterized by solidarity and prosocial behavior, which are said to exist in (actual) close-knit communities. Ever since Durkheim, solidarity has been considered a fundamental building block of community. Community and communitarian principles, in many ways, exist insofar as individual members are willing to forego personal gains in favor of the welfare of many. It is, so to speak, the political value against which individual freedom tends to be balanced (Pensky 2008: 1).

Whereas the solidarity implied in citizenship and civic identification refers to widely institutionalized forms of solidarity and indirect reciprocity, as is exemplified in welfare states, solidarity based on the imagination of community is rooted in the perceived likelihood of direct reciprocity amongst members of a nation. Although this may be no more than wishful thinking, it still presupposes interdependencies and (imagined) social relationships between members of a nation. In this view, solidarity "refers, first and foremost, to the status of intersubjectivity, in which a number of persons are bound together, whether by the facts of their existing needs or their interpretations of their own interest, into definite relations" (Pensky 2008: 9). Other members of an imagined community and the social relations with those members are considered a resource for the satisfaction of needs (*ibid.*). Some theories of national-

ism and national identity argue that a strong sense of identity does go hand in hand with the acceptance of altruistic obligations towards fellow members of the nation (e.g., Miller 1995: 96).

This understanding of the nexus between community and solidarity is also present in classical sociology. For example, it is mirrored in Tönnies's (1940) distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and in Durkheim's (1997 [1893]) notions of *mechanical* and *organic* solidarity (see Yuval-Davis 2006). Likewise, more recent research on "belonging" (Skey 2013) also refers to the links between an (imagined) community and solidarity. Importantly, this research emphasizes the "politics of belonging" as efforts aimed at maintaining and reproducing the political community of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006).

In sum, this research suggests that the members of a nation and the solidary relationships between those members – whether real or imagined – constitute a distinct facet of identification with a nation. There can be no doubt that these facets are intimately related to the symbolic and the institutional realms of nations. However, individuals' perceptions that they are members of a national community can in many ways even be seen as preconditions for symbolic and civic forms of identification.

2. Methods

The construction of our proposed national identification scale (NIS) is based on the theoretical arguments outlined above and was conducted using following steps: (1) development and selection of items for each of the hypothesized dimensions, (2) testing of the initially devised scale in a pilot study and the subsequent revision of this scale, (3) validation and further modification of the revised scale using three independent samples from Germany, Poland, and England.

2.1 Item Development

We devised an initial pool of 36 items of which 14 items represented the symbolic dimension of national identification, 11 items represented the civic dimension, and 11 items reflected the solidarity dimension. Of the 36 items, six were taken from or inspired by Schatz and Lavine (2007), one was taken from Jackson (2002), and one from Dekker and colleagues (2003). For the initial scale construction, these items were translated into German using a translation back-translation procedure. Original items were jointly developed by the authors in a series of suggestions, discussions, revisions, and language editing. All items were formulated as statements to which participants should indicate agreement on 7-point Likert scales (1 = "completely disagree" to 7 = "completely agree").

2.2 Pilot Study

This preliminary scale was administered to 69 respondents (41 female, 23 male, 5 non-specified; M age = 32.82; SD = 15.11) in a pilot study around a public science fair

at Freie Universität Berlin. Cronbach's alpha of the main scale was .81, indicating a good reliability. To identify items that significantly reduced the overall reliability, we used descriptive statistics to detect items with insufficient or skewed variance and item-total correlations (ranging between .11 and .59) to assess the fit of each item to the main scale. Moreover, we ran an exploratory factor analysis (EFA, details not reported here) on the overall scale and used the factor loadings of each item as an additional indicator. In sum, this procedure led to the removal of two items and the rephrasing of several items to reduce their skewedness.

2.3 Main Study

To ensure broader ecological validity of our construct, we tested the scale as part of a larger study in three European countries – Germany, Poland, and England – selected in view of pronounced differences in national histories, narratives, and traditions. For this purpose, the scale was translated from German into English and Polish using translation back-translation procedures. To accommodate certain country-specific peculiarities and to ensure the appropriateness of items, we made subtle changes in the wording of selected items (see *Appendix 1* for an overview). All questionnaires were administered as online surveys as part of a larger study on national and European identification. Items were presented in randomized order. Participants also answered a variety of socio-demographic questions.

Participants: Participants from the three countries were recruited using different procedures. The *German* sample consisted of three subsamples (see *Appendix 2* for details on the subsamples) and comprised individuals with German citizenship recruited via the dissemination of the survey URL through a snowballing procedure. Participants were incentivized with the drawing of vouchers of a large online vendor. In addition, we also used a commercial online access panel provider, *Survey Sampling International* (SSI), to increase the sample size. After removal of invalid or incomplete cases, the total size of the German sample was $N = 698$ cases (342 female, 318 male, 38 non-specified; M age = 34.77; $SD = 13.38$). The *Polish* sample consisted of two subsamples (see *Appendix 2* for details) of individuals with Polish citizenship that were recruited using snowballing procedures similar to those of the German sample. After removal of invalid or incomplete cases, the total sample size was $N = 370$ (177 female, 143 male; M age = 28.20 years; $SD = 8.82$). The *English* sample was recruited exclusively through a commercial access panel provider (SSI) and after removal of invalid or incomplete cases comprised $N = 238$ individuals (117 female, 121 male; M age = 42.12 years; $SD = 15.71$).

3. Results

As the NIS is designed to measure national identification as dynamically changing over time, we did not seek to provide test-retest reliability. The data of all samples

have been tested on the assumption of multivariate normality required for subsequent factor analyses. Using Mahalanobis distances and scatterplots, we observed no clear multivariate outliers; therefore, no additional cases have been removed from the sample.

3.1 Reliability

We tested the reliability of the overall scale and the three subscales for each national sample. Item-total correlations estimated the consistency of specific items with all other items of the scales for each national sample. Items were removed when they both lowered Cronbach's alpha and did not meet the cut-off criterion (.35) for the item-total correlations. Table 1 shows Cronbach's alpha before and after removal of items that significantly decreased overall reliability. Table 2 shows item-total correlations for each national sample, the main and subscales and indicates the number of items that have been removed. Table 3 gives an overview of the final list of items.

Table 1: Cronbach's α of the scale and its dimensions

	Germany		Poland		England	
	<i>initial</i>	<i>improved</i>	<i>initial</i>	<i>improved</i>	<i>initial</i>	<i>improved</i>
Total scale	.95	.96 (1)	.94	.95 (2)	.95	--
Symbolic subscale	.90	.91 (1)	.88	.88	.89	.89
Civic subscale	.88	.91 (1)	.84	.86 (1)	.92	--
Solidarity subscale	.86	--	.86	.86 (1)	.89	--

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of items that have been removed to improve Cronbach's alpha; -- no improvements suggested.

Table 2: Ranges of Item-Total Correlations

	Germany		Poland		England	
	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>
Total scale	.35	.75 (2)	.45	.78 (3)	.43	.79 (1)
Symbolic subscale	.51	.80 (1)	.48	.74 (1)	.41	.76 (0)
Civic subscale	.59	.77 (0)	.49	.67 (1)	.52	.79 (0)
Solidarity subscale	.51	.73 (1)	.50	.76 (1)	.54	.72 (1)

Note. Reported are item-total correlations (Pearson's r). Numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of items removed to improve correlations to reported levels

3.2 External validity

In one of the German subsamples, we used two well-established control questions related to national identity to test the external validity of the NIS. One question ("To what extent do you feel attached to Germany?") was taken from *ALLBUS*, the German General Social Survey, and the second ("To what extent do you perceive yourself as German?") was taken from *Eurobarometer*. We hypothesized that most items of

the NIS should moderately correlate with the two questions. Six items did not correlate significantly with either of the questions, five correlated significantly with both of them. The remaining items correlated with only one of the questions. One Polish subsample also contained the Eurobarometer question. However, this question did not correlate significantly with any of the items in the NIS. One explanation could be the distribution of responses to the *Eurobarometer* question, to which 98% of Polish respondents answered in the highest two categories. We consider these results as evidence for the need to distinguish between identity and identification rather than failure to establish external validity.

3.3 Internal Validity

To establish internal validity of the NIS, we first tested for comparability of the different samples and subsamples in terms of differences in means and variance. In general, and aside from significant differences between the German subsamples due to one of the sample's socio-demographic characteristics and partially significant differences within the other national samples, the scale shows comparable patterns of fit throughout, i.e. the same items tend to lower the NIS's overall alpha and to correlate less strongly with the overall scale. Also, the distribution of items for all subsamples was similar.

To further examine the internal structure of the NIS, we conducted a series of orthogonal EFAs using principal component extraction and varimax rotation, firstly without fixed parameters, secondly with a fixed three-factor structure, and finally with a single-factor structure. The analyses do not support a three-factor structure but instead suggest a one-dimensional structure with a single factor explaining 28.53% of variance in the German sample (factor two and three explained 13.77% and 10.04% of variance), 21.47 % in the Polish case (factors two and three explained 15.68% and 10.774% of variance), and 27.91% in the English sample (factors two and three explaining 21.44% and 10.58% of variance).

Table 3: Items and factor loadings, model constrained to three factors

Item	Germany (N = 698)			Poland (N = 370)			England (N = 238)		
	<i>Factor</i>								
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
<i>Symbolic</i>									
Tax money for national symbols like memorials would be better spent on other things. (reversed)		,63		,56					,62
German people should show more flags like people in other countries also do.	,72	,41		,67				,75	

I don't care about national holidays that celebrate German y (e.g., a holiday for German Unity Day). (reversed)		,57		,73						,80
I think it's great when the German flag can be seen in my neighbourhood on special occasions.	,71	,45		,75			,41	,72		
I like accessories in black-red-gold.	,65			,49		,35		,77		
I think it's important that all children learn to sing the national anthem in school.	,57	,47		,73			,41	,65		
I don't care if I see the German flag lying in dirt. (reversed)	,48	,54		,54				,75		
I would like it if there were more memorials in Germany which commemorated German history.	,44	,35		,53						,80
I like the thought that all people in Germany participate in procession on a common official holiday.	,65			,37	,43		,41	,64		
It is moving when I hear the national anthem.	,53	,57		,63			,61	,51		
The national anthem means nothing to me. (reversed)	,40	,72		,74			,37	,68		
I like the motto „Germany, the country of ideas“.	,50	,43	,34							,80
<i>Civic</i>						,59		,78		
I am proud that the Federal Constitutional Court enforces democratic principles in Germany.		,46	,56	,66	,33	,31				
I associate Germany with particular values that I share.	,60	,39	,32	,34	,56			,72		
I am proud of the leading role that Germany takes in environmental and nature conservation.	,34	,33	,57				,82	,51		
I believe that I have exactly the same sense of justice as most German people.	,60			,60			,37	,68		
I connect Germany with central ideas that are particularly important to me.	,71						,81	,73	,41	
I think I have completely different moral values to most German people.	,74				,55			,76		
German workmanship is something that the country can be proud of.	,66	,42					,68	,64		

I assume that I share similar worries in relation to Germany along with most German people.	,74			,52	,425		,73		
It is important that we, German citizens know our cultural traditions.	,56	,42		,45	,56		,73		
I identify personally with the constitutional democracy of Germany		,51	,55		,53		,76		
I feel ashamed of the national socialist past of Germany.			,46						
Solidarity				,56	,45	,37	,61	,42	
I see myself as a member of a community of German people.	,59	,43		,56	,34	,40	,76	,37	
I feel connected with other German people.	,68	,32	,30		,69		,57		
I feel good that my taxes support disempowered or disadvantaged German people.			,66		,53		,52	-,46	
I donate money to German citizens who are the victims of natural disasters (like floods, for example).	,38		,34	,40	,30	,34	,42	,61	
If German sportsmen or women participate in an international competition I get excited with them.	,43	,45			,42	,35	,58	,41	
I worry about German soldiers who are stationed in crisis zones outside of Europe.	,60			,48	,37		,67	,43	
It upsets me when the Germans are criticised generally.	,67				,64		,49	-,45	
Sometimes I put aside my own needs if this will help other disadvantaged or disempowered Germans			,65		,31		,37	-,53	
How good I am feeling also depends upon how good things are for all the other people in Germany			,59		,50	,40	,50	,40	
If German people die in an air disaster it emotionally affects me.	,64				,63		,73		
It is important that German people help each other.	,71								


Note 1. Item phrasing as in the German sample. See *Appendix 1* for Polish and English equivalents. Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Coefficients below .30 suppressed.

The EFA component matrix with a fixed three-factor structure revealed significant loadings of most items on more than just one factor. Contrary to our expectations, we

find no clear division of items along the three hypothesized dimensions (see Table 3 for details). These findings most likely result from either unclear distinctions between the contents of the three dimensions or from high correlations of items across the overall scale and large alpha coefficients. We then used confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) separately for each national sample to more specifically test whether the scale fits the underlying theoretical model.

Model specification: We defined an identical statistical model for all three country samples as a three-dimensional latent structure with ten to thirteen explicit items loading on each factor. The latent hierarchical structure included “national identification” as an umbrella construct and “symbolic”, “civic”, and “solidary” identification as sub-dimensions. In specifying the model, we allowed for correlations between factors, and items have been allowed to load on a single factor only (see Figure 1). To test whether a three-factor model explains the variance of the data comparatively well, we specified an alternative model with a single latent variable in which all items loaded on this single factor (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: Model specification: three latent dimensions (left) and single latent dimension (right).



Procedure: The CFA has been conducted using the *lavaan* package for R software. The analysis focused on the variance-covariance matrix produced by maximum likelihood (ML) estimations. All factor loadings have been standardized to allow for an interpretation in terms of standardized regression weights, ranging between -1 and +1 (Furr and Bacharach 2008: 345), and factor loadings of the first indicator within each factor were fixed at 1 to reduce the number of free parameters and the complexity of computations (see Rosseel 2012: 10, for details on this procedure).

The initial analysis indicated a poor fit of the three-factor model to our data. Contrary to our expectations based on the results of the EFA, the one-factor model did not fit the data well either (see Table 4 for fit indices for both models). Because goodness-of-fit indices are continuous, the one-factor model is even less fitting the data than the three-factor model.

Table 4: Summary of Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Model	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i> - <i>val</i> - <i>ue</i>	CFI	TLI	RMSEA A	SRM R	AIC
Germany (N = 698)								
<i>Initial</i>								
Three-factor	3142.526	524	.000	.808	.794	.085	.064	83792.813
One-factor	3606.630	527	.000	.774	.759	.092	.066	84250.916
<i>Confirmed</i>								
Three-factor	38.275	32	.206	.998	.997	.017	.017	25841.015
One-factor	51.751	35	.034	.994	.992	.026	.021	25848.491
Poland (N = 370)								
<i>Initial</i>								
Three-factor	1760.733	492	.000	.783	.767	.083	.068	43703.429
One-factor	1966.908	495	.000	.748	.731	.090	.071	43903.603
<i>Confirmed</i>								
Three-factor	76.031	51	.013	.982	.977	.036	.032	16089.834
One-factor	126.276	54	.000	.948	.937	.060	.042	16134.079
England (N = 238)								
<i>Initial</i>								
Three-factor	1724.876	461	.000	.762	.744	.107	.099	25083.512
One-factor	1970.160	464	.000	.717	.697	.117	.101	25322.796
<i>Confirmed</i>								
Three-factor	33.912	24	.086	.992	.988	.042	.025	6900.266
One-factor	60.378	27	.000	.973	.964	.072	.034	6920.732

Note. Confirmed model: see Table 5. One-factor alternative model to the confirmed three-factor model contains the same items but loading on a single factor. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion (smaller numbers indicate better model fit). Cut-off criteria: *p*-value of $\chi^2/df > .05$ (>.01 for marginal acceptance); CFI, TLI $\geq .95$; RMSEA < .05; SRMR < .06.

Model modification: In general, confirmatory factor analyses tend to favour less degrees of freedom and parameters. The more complex the model, the less stable the results tend to get. In our initial analysis, we had included all items of the three dimensions as suggested by the reliability and validity analyses. Because items are considerably correlated with each other, we used modification indices to investigate

whether a three-dimensional structure can be confirmed for a shorter scale (Furr and Bacharach 2008; Schreiber et al. 2006). In removing items, we focused on parameters with the highest potential impact on improving model-fit until the model was confirmed or the minimum of three variables per latent factor was reached. In line with our theoretical assumptions, we did not allow the transfer of items between factors.

Model confirmation: After removal of a number of items, we confirmed both the one- and three-factor models for all three national samples. We used relative fit-indices to determine which model explained the data more appropriately. The one-factor model has been tested using two separate procedures, first according to its own modification indices and second as a model including only the items that remained in the confirmed three-factor model. In the former case, the model was confirmed after removal of two thirds of the total number of items, which made it similar in size to the confirmed three-factor model. We then compared the three-factor model to the one-factor model. Table 4 shows fit indices for both the initial and the final models (see Table 5 for their overview). We consecutively controlled for parameter estimates and standard error outliers.

Table 5: Models confirmed by CFA across national samples

<i>Germany</i>	
<i>Symbolic</i>	<p>I like accessories in black-red-gold.</p> <p>I think it's important that all children learn to sing the national anthem in school.</p> <p>I don't care if I see the German flag lying in the dirt. (reversed)</p> <p>I would like it if there were more memorials in Germany which commemorated German history.</p>
<i>Civic</i>	<p>I believe that I have exactly the same sense of justice as most German people.</p> <p>I connect Germany with central ideas that are particularly important to me.</p> <p>German workmanship is something that the country can be proud of.</p>
<i>Solidarity</i>	<p>If German sportsmen or women participate in an international competition I get excited with them.</p> <p>It upsets me when the Germans in general are being criticised.</p> <p>If German people die in an air disaster it emotionally affects me.</p>

Poland

- Symbolic* Polish people should show more flags like people in other countries also do.
- I don't care about national holidays that celebrate Poland (e.g., the Independence Day or May 3rd Constitution Day).
- I don't care if I see the Polish flag lying in the dirt. (reversed)
- I would like it if there were more memorials in Poland which commemorated Polish history.
- It is moving when I hear the national anthem.
- Civic* I am proud of the leading role that Poland takes in the Central Eastern Europe.
- I assume that I share similar worries in relation to Poland along with most Polish people.
- I identify personally with the constitutional democracy of Poland.
- Solidarity* I feel connected with other Polish people.
- If Polish sportsmen or women participate in an international competition I get excited with them.
- It upsets me when the Poles in general are being criticised.
- It is important that Polish people help each other.
-

England

- Symbolic* I like accessories with St. George's Cross on them.
- I think it's important that all children learn to sing the English national anthem in school.
- I would like it if there were more memorials in England which commemorated English history.
- Civic* English workmanship is something that the country can be proud of.
- I associate England with central ideas that are particularly important to me.
- I assume that I share similar worries in relation to England along with most English people.
- Solidarity* I see myself as a member of a community of English people.
- I worry about English soldiers who are stationed in crisis zones outside of Europe.
- It upsets me when the English in general are being criticised.
-

4. Discussion

The aim of this study was to develop a multidimensional scale to assess national identification that allows for a more nuanced understanding of how individuals relate to a nation and how this relationship might change over time. Based on the extant literature, we identified three core relational themes mirroring ideal-typical categories of features and characteristics of nations to which individuals relate: the symbolic dimension referring to national symbols that represent certain cultural practices, values, and shared heritage; the civic dimension including political and institutional features characteristic of nations, and the solidarity dimension encompassing perceptions of the nation as a solidary community.

Statistical analysis of the proposed scale using data from three different European countries, Germany, Poland, and England, revealed a number of important findings. First, our analyses provide further support for the assumption of the multidimensionality of national identification. The examination of the various validity and reliability tests and statistical modelling, including Cronbach's alpha coefficients, item-total correlations, correlations with questions tapping external validity, as well as mean comparisons across subsamples all unambiguously suggest that our scale and the three subscales are a valid and reliable tool to assess the three theoretically derived dimensions of national identification in different European countries.

Although our analyses do not provide clear-cut support for either a one- or three-dimensional factor structure, results of the confirmatory factor analyses do indicate that a three-factor model fits the data better than an alternative one-factor model. The three factor model explains the variance in our data from all three national samples significantly better than the single-factor model, despite the high internal consistency of the scale which led to impaired statistical computing and harder interpretation of the results.

A second finding is that our scale emphasizes the need to distinguish national identity from national identification. This is best illustrated by the Polish data, where the vast majority of participants responded in the highest categories to the item assessing the external validity of our scale, which is otherwise well established in the literature. Skewedness of an item to such a pronounced degree renders it almost useless for research tapping variations in the way individuals relate to a nation. By focusing on the salient characteristics of nations instead of on nation-related meanings that become part and parcel of one's more permanent self-understanding, our scale is suitable to assess the supposedly dynamic nature of individuals' relations to a nation in modern societies.

Potential limitations of the suggested scale obviously pertain to questions of its universal applicability in cross-national terms. Although our study did not aim at developing a national identification scale that can be applied "as is" in any country, the relatively high consistency of findings across the three countries suggests that the three dimensions or "core relational themes" are in fact relevant in various social and

cultural contexts. However, it is equally clear that further uses and developments of the scale need to implement modifications to different degrees within the three dimensions. Here, items in the symbolic identification subscale can be tailored to different contexts without much effort. However, the civic and solidarity dimensions might require more attention to detail. For example, understandings of solidarity may vary as a function of cultural diversity within the nation. Members of ethnically and culturally highly diverse nations may perceive the basis of solidarity very differently from individuals in other countries, thus making the necessity for modifications on the solidarity subscale more likely. Future studies should therefore test the scale in non-European and ethnically more diverse countries. Likewise, the civic dimension might require more pronounced modifications in, for example, states lacking democratic institutions, well-developed legal or welfare systems.

These needs also become obvious when looking at the data from the three countries we studied and the subsequent country-specific scale improvements we made, from removal of different items to statistical differences in validity and reliability tests. This is probably best seen by looking at the three-factor models we tested in our confirmatory factor analyses, which are comprised of different items for each country. Although confirmatory factor analyses are highly sensitive to the data on which they are conducted and thus should not be overestimated as a criterion when judged against well-grounded theoretical reasons for a specific scale design, the differences in the final models support the need for country specific adaptations.

This notwithstanding, our scale in sum offers a more comprehensive account of national identification by covering three highly salient dimensions of identification understood as a fluid and dynamic process that contributes to but does not constitute national self-identity. Future research should attend to the task of further validating and developing the scale and, importantly, to devise a shorter version of the scale that can also be implemented in larger surveys. This can be achieved without problematic loss of relevant content to the subscales, since items generally correlated with one another, measuring the same latent construct. Such a "core" version of the scale can ideally be developed from the items on which the three-factor model of national identification was confirmed.

Potential applications of the scale include tracking changes in national identification at the macro-social level as a consequence of specific events or developments, such as economic downturn or important nation-wide celebrations or commemorations. The scale is also valuable for assessing the long-term consequences of social change, as is evident in processes of globalization, migration, or transnationalization. At the micro level, the scale may serve as an indicator social integration or even cohesion. Furthermore, changes in solidary or civic identification may help to investigate support among citizens for welfare programs or certain political decision or programs.

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Appendix 1. Complete scale with translation differences.

Item	England	Germany	Poland
<i>Symbolic</i>			
1_1	Tax money for national symbols like memorials would be better spent on other things.	Steuergelder für nationale Symbole wie Denkmale und Gedenkstätten sollte man besser für andere Dinge ausgeben. [Tax money for national symbols like memorials would be better spent on other things.]	Pieniądze z podatków, które wydawane są na symbole narodowe takie jak pomniki czy miejsca pamięci, powinny być wydawane na inne cele. [Tax money for national symbols like memorials would be better spent on other things.]
1_2	English people should show more flags like people in other countries also do.	Deutsche sollten ruhig mehr "Flagge zeigen", wie die Menschen in anderen Ländern das auch tun. [German people should show more flags like people in other countries also do.]	Polacy powinni częściej wywieszać polską flagę, tak jak to czynią inne nacje. [Polish people should show more flags like people in other countries also do.]
1_3	I don't care about national holidays that celebrate England (e.g., a holiday for St. George's Day).	Nationale Feiertage wie der Tag der Deutschen Einheit sind mir egal. [I don't care about national holidays that celebrate Germany (e.g., a holiday for German Unity Day).]	Nie obchodzą mnie święta narodowe typu 3 Maja czy Dzień Niepodległości. [I don't care about national holidays that celebrate Poland (e.g., the Independence Day or May 3 rd Constitution Day).]
1_4	I think it's great when St. George's Cross can be seen in my neighbourhood on special occasions.	Ich finde es schön, wenn in meiner Nachbarschaft zu bestimmten Anlässen die deutsche Flagge zu sehen ist. [I think it's great when the German flag can be seen in my neighbourhood on special occasions]	Podoba mi się, kiedy w święta narodowe w mojej okolicy ludzie wieszają polską flagę. [I think it's great when the Polish flag can be seen in my neighbourhood on special occasions.]
1_5	I like accessories with St. George's Cross on them.	Ich mag Accessoires in Schwarz-Rot-Gold. [I like accessories in black-red-gold.	Podobają mi się dodatki i gadżety w barwach narodowych. [I like accessories with the Polish flag on them.]

1_6	I think it's important that all children learn to sing the English national anthem in school.	Ich finde es wichtig, dass alle Kinder in der Schule die Nationalhymne singen lernen. [I think it's important that all children learn to sing the national anthem in school.]	To ważne, aby dzieci uczyły się w szkole śpiewać hymn narodowy. [I think it's important that all children learn to sing the national anthem in school.]
1_7	I don't care if I see the Cross of St. George lying in dirt.	Es ist mir egal, wenn ich die Deutschland-Flagge im Dreck liegen sehe. [I don't care if I see the German flag lying in the dirt.]	Nie oburza mnie, kiedy widzę, że flaga polska leży w błocie. [I don't care if I see the Polish flag lying in the dirt.]
1_8	I would like it if there were more memorials in England which commemorated English history.	Ich fände es schön, wenn es in Deutschland mehr Denkmäler gäbe, die an die deutsche Geschichte erinnern. [I would like it if there were more memorials in Germany which commemorated German history.]	Podobałoby mi się, gdyby w Polsce stawiano więcej pomników upamiętniających polską historię. [I would like it if there were more memorials in Poland which commemorated Polish history.]
1_9	I like the thought that all people in England participate in a festive parade on a common official holiday.	Mir gefällt der Gedanke, dass alle Menschen in Deutschland an einem gemeinsamen Feiertag an Festzügen teilnehmen. [I like the thought that all people in Germany participate in procession on a common official holiday.]	Podoba mi się pomysł, aby wszyscy Polacy tego samego dnia uczestniczyli w świątecznych festynach. [I like the thought that all people in Poland participate in gala on a common official holiday.]
1_10	It is moving when I hear "God save the Queen".	Die Nationalhymne zu hören, berührt mich [It is moving when I hear the national anthem.]	Kiedy grają Mazurka Dąbrowskiego, jestem wzruszony/a. [It is moving when I hear the national anthem.]
1_11	The national anthem "God save the Queen" means nothing to me.	Die Nationalhymne bedeutet mir nichts. [The national anthem means nothing to me.]	Polski hymn narodowy nic dla mnie nie znaczy. [The national anthem means nothing to me.]
1_12	I like the phrase "Three Lions".	Ich mag das Motto „Deutschland, Land der Ideen“. [I like the motto „Germany, the country of ideas“.]	<i>(no equivalent)</i>
Civic			
2_1	<i>(no equivalent)</i>	Ich bin stolz darauf, dass das Bundesverfassungsgericht demokratische Prinzipien in Deutschland durchsetzt. [I am proud that the Federal Constitutional Court enforces democratic principles in Germany.]	Jestem dumny (-a) z tego, że Trybunał Konstytucyjny stoi na straży demokracji w Polsce. [I am proud that the Constitutional Court enforces democratic principles in Poland.]

2_2	English workmanship is something that the country can be proud of.	Mit Deutschland verbinde ich bestimmte Werte, die ich teile. [I associate Germany with particular values that I share.]	Z Polską wiążą się pewne określone wartości, które są dla mnie ważne. [I associate Poland with particular values that I share.]
2_3	I am proud of the leading role that England takes in environmental and nature conservation.	Ich bin stolz auf die Vorreiterrolle, die Deutschland beim Umwelt- und Naturschutz einnimmt. [I am proud of the leading role that Germany takes in environmental and nature conservation.]	Jestem dumny/a z pozycji regionalnego lidera, jaką cieszy się Polska w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. [I am proud of the leading role that Poland takes in the Central Eastern Europe.]
2_4	I believe that I have exactly the same sense of justice as most English people.	Ich glaube, ich habe ganz ähnliche Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen wie die meisten Deutschen. [I believe that I have exactly the same sense of justice as most German people.]	Myslę, że większość Polaków ma bardzo podobne do mnie poczucie sprawiedliwości. [I believe that I have exactly the same sense of justice as most Polish people.]
2_5	I associate England with central ideas that are particularly important to me.	Mit Deutschland verbinde ich eine bestimmte Leitidee, die mir am Herzen liegt. [I connect Germany with central ideas that are particularly important to me.]	Z Polską łączy się pewna wielka idea, która jest mi bliska. [I connect Poland with central ideas that are particularly important to me.]
2_6	I think I have very similar moral values to most English people. (reversed)	Ich denke, ich habe ganz ähnliche Wertvorstellungen wie die meisten Deutschen. [I think I have quite similar moral values to most German people.]	Uważam, że większość Polaków myśli o świecie bardzo podobnie do mnie. [I think I have quite similar moral values to most Polish people.]
2_7	English workmanship is something that the country can be proud of.	Deutsche Wertarbeit ist etwas, worauf dieses Land stolz sein kann. [German workmanship is something that the country can be proud of.]	Polski wzrost gospodarczy to coś, z czego nasz kraj może być dumny. [Polish economic growth is something that the country can be proud of.]
2_8	I assume that I share similar worries in relation to England along with most English people.	Ich nehme an, dass ich mit den meisten Deutschen ähnliche Sorgen in Bezug auf Deutschland teile. [I assume that I share similar worries in relation to Germany along with most German people.]	Sądzę, że większość Polaków odczuwa podobną do mojej troskę o przyszłość Polski. [I assume that I share similar worries in relation to Poland along with most Polish people.]
2_9	It is important that we, citizens of England, know our cultural traditions.	Es ist wichtig, dass wir Deutschen unsere kulturellen Traditionen kennen. [It is important that we, German citizens know our cultural traditions.]	To ważne, żeby wszyscy w Polsce znali polską kulturę i tradycję. [It is important that we, Polish citizens know our cultural traditions.]

2_10	I identify personally with the constitutional democracy of England.	Ich identifiziere mich mit dem demokratischen Rechtsstaat Deutschland. [I identify personally with the constitutional democracy of Germany.]	Identyfikuję się z demokratycznym państwem polskim. [I identify personally with the constitutional democracy of Poland.]
2_11	I feel ashamed of the British Empire.	Ich schäme mich für die nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit Deutschlands. [I feel ashamed of the national socialist past of Germany.]	Wstydę się tego, że w czasie drugiej wojny światowej byli też Polacy, którzy mordowali Żydów. [I feel ashamed of the fact that there were some Poles murdering Jews during the second world war.]
Solidarity			
3_1	I see myself as a member of a community of English people.	Ich sehe mich als Mitglied einer Gemeinschaft von Deutschen. [I see myself as a member of a community of German people.]	Uważam się za członka wspólnoty wszystkich Polaków. [I see myself as a member of a community of Polish people.]
3_2	I feel connected with other English people.	Ich fühle mich verbunden mit den anderen Deutschen. [I feel connected with other German people.]	Czuję się związany/a z innymi Polakami. [I feel connected with other Polish people.]
3_3	I feel good that my taxes support disempowered or disadvantaged English people.	Es gibt mir ein gutes Gefühl, dass durch meine Steuerzahlungen schwächere oder benachteiligte Deutsche unterstützt werden. [I feel good that my taxes support disempowered or disadvantaged German people.]	To, że część moich podatków kierowana jest na pomoc słabszym bądź pokrzywdzonym Polakom, wzbudza we mnie dobre uczucia. [I feel good that my taxes support disempowered or disadvantaged Polish people.]
3_4	I donate money to English citizens who are the victims of natural disasters (like floods, for example).	Ich spende Geld für Deutsche, die von Naturkatastrophen (wie z.B. Hochwasser) heimgesucht wurden. [I donate money to German citizens who are the victims of natural disasters (like floods, for example).]	Biorę udział w zbiórkach pieniężnych na pomoc rodakom, którzy ucierpieli w wyniku katastrofy naturalnej (np. powodzi). [I donate money to v citizens who are the victims of natural disasters (like floods, for example).]
3_5	If English sportsmen or women participate in an international competition I get excited with them.	Wenn deutsche Sportler in einem internationalen Wettbewerb antreten, dann fiebere ich mit ihnen. [If German sportsmen or women participate in an international competition I get excited with them.]	Kiedy polscy sportowcy biorą udział w międzynarodowych turniejach, zawsze im kibicuję. [If Polish sportsmen or women participate in an international competition I get excited with them.]
3_6	I worry about English soldiers who are stationed in	Ich mache mir Sorgen um die deutschen Soldaten, die in Kriegsgebieten außerhalb Europa statio-	Martwię się o polskich żołnierzy stacjonujących w bazach zagranicznych w

	crisis zones outside of Europe.	niert sind. [I worry about German soldiers who are stationed in crisis zones outside of Europe.]	regionach ogarniętych kryzysem. [I worry about Polish soldiers who are stationed in crisis zones outside of Europe.]
3_7	It upsets me when the English in general are being criticised.	Es trifft mich, wenn Deutsche im Allgemeinen kritisiert werden. [It upsets me when the Germans in general are being criticised.]	Boli mnie, kiedy Polacy są wyśmiewani. [It upsets me when the Poles in general are being criticised.]
3_8	Sometimes I put aside my own needs if this will help other disadvantaged or disempowered English people.	Ich stelle meine eigenen Bedürfnisse auch mal ein Stück zurück, wenn das schwächeren oder benachteiligten deutschen Bürgern zugute kommt. [Sometimes I put aside my own needs if this will help other disadvantaged or disempowered Germans.]	Potrafię czasem ograniczyć moje potrzeby, jeśli miałyby to pomóc słabszym bądź dyskryminowanym rodakom. [Sometimes I put aside my own needs if this will help other disadvantaged or disempowered Poland.]
3_9	How good I am feeling also depends upon how good things are for all the other people in England.	Wie gut es mir geht, hängt auch davon ab, wie gut es allen anderen Menschen in Deutschland geht. [How good I am feeling also depends upon how good things are for all the other people in Germany.]	To, jak dobrze mi się powodzi, zależy też od tego, jak dobrze radzą sobie inni w Polsce. [How good I am feeling also depends upon how good things are for all the other people in Poland.]
3_10	If English people die in an air disaster it emotionally affects me.	Wenn Deutsche bei einem Flugzeugunglück ums Leben kommen, bin ich betroffen. [If German people die in an air disaster it emotionally affects me.]	Kiedy Polacy giną w wypadku samolotu, czuję się poruszony/a. [If Polish people die in an air disaster it emotionally affects me.]
3_11	It is important that English people help each other.	Es ist wichtig, dass Deutsche einander helfen. [It is important that German people help each other.]	To ważne, aby Polacy pomagali sobie wzajemnie. [It is important that Polish people help each other.]

Appendix 2. Details on subsamples.

German sample

All participants were adults with German citizenship. All incomplete and invalid cases have been removed to avoid flawed or missing data. There were no multivariate outliers; therefore no further cases have been removed from the sample. All reported numbers relate to the final size of the sample and respective subsamples, as used in the study.

The total size of the sample was $N = 698$ (342 female, 318 male, 38 non-specified; M age = 34.77; $SD = 13.38$).

Subsample A

Data were collected within two weeks between March and April 2012. Participants were recruited via snowballing distribution of the survey URL using email lists and contacts of friends and colleagues, through advertisements on social network sites and online forums. Participants were incentivized with the drawing of vouchers of a large online vendor.

The subsample size was $N = 99$ (42 female, 19 male, 38 non-specified; M age = 32.39; $SD = 10.11$).

Subsample B

Data were collected within two weeks in late May 2012. The participants were recruited via snowballing distribution of the survey URL using email lists and contacts of friends and colleagues, through advertisements on social network sites and online forums, and through newspaper adverts. Participants were incentivized with the drawing of vouchers of a large online vendor.

The subsample size was $N = 265$ (145 female, 120 male; M age = 32.96; $SD = 13.06$).

Subsample C

Data were collected within two weeks in late May 2012. The participants were recruited via the use of a commercial access panel provider, *Survey Sampling International*. Participants with lower educational attainment and aged above forty were overrepresented on purpose to compensate the high educational attainment and low age bias in subsamples A and B, a typical distortion in online snowballing procedures.

The subsample size was $N = 334$ (180 female, 154 male; M age = 36.87; $SD = 14.14$).

Polish sample

All participants were adults with Polish citizenship. All incomplete and invalid cases were removed to avoid flawed or missing data. There were no multivariate outliers so there was no need for further removal of cases. All reported numbers relate to the final size of the sample and subsamples.

The total sample size was $N = 370$ (177 female, 143 male; M age = 28.20; $SD = 8.82$).

Subsample D

Data were collected within two weeks between March and April 2012. The participants were recruited via snowballing distribution of the survey URL using email lists and contacts of friends and colleagues, through advertisements on social network sites and online forums.

The subsample size was $N = 163$ (97 female, 63 male, 3 non-specified; M age = 28.69; $SD = 7.70$).

Subsample E

Data were collected within two weeks in late May 2012. Participants were recruited as described for subsample D. Participants were incentivized with the drawing of vouchers of a large online vendor.

The subsample size was $N = 207$ (M age = 27.82; $SD = 9.60$).¹

English sample

The English sample was recruited exclusively through a commercial access panel provider, *Survey Sampling International*. All participants were adults of English nationality and British citizenship. The sample was adjusted to be roughly representative for the English population on several socio-demographic indicators, except for the equal number of males and females. All incomplete and invalid cases have been removed from the sample to avoid flawed or missing data. There were no multivariate outliers.

The sample comprised $N = 238$ individuals (117 female, 121 male; M age = 42.12 years; $SD = 15.71$).

¹ Unfortunately, data on reported gender in this sample were corrupted and thus cannot be reported.