Hidden mobilities in post-Soviet spaces: boundaries, scales, identities and informal routes to livelihood
Assche, Kristof van; Hornidge, Anna-Katharina

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Hidden mobilities in post-Soviet Spaces. Boundaries, scales, identities and informal routes to livelihood.

Kristof Van Assche & Anna-Katharina Hornidge
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Competence Network Crossroads Asia: Conflict – Migration – Development
Project Office
Center for Development Research/ZEFa
Department of Political and Cultural Change
University of Bonn
Walter-Flex Str. 3
D-53113 Bonn
Tel: + 49-228-731722
Fax: + 49-228-731972
Email: crossroads@uni-bonn.de
Homepage: www.crossroads-asia.de
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Kristof Van Assche & Anna-Katharina Hornidge

1 Kristof Van Assche [vanassch@ualberta.ca] was Crossroads Asia fellow at the Center for Development Research, Bonn in September-December 2013. He is currently associate professor in planning, governance and development at the University of Alberta. Anna-Katharina Hornidge [horndige@uni-bonn.de] is the scientific coordinator of the competence network Crossroads Asia and senior researcher at Center for Development Research, Bonn.
# Table of contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... iv

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1

2. Conceptual analysis: mobilities as bringers of change and policies aiming at change ......................... 4
   Deleuzian mobilities ............................................................................................................................. 4
   Mobilities and power ............................................................................................................................ 5
   Mobilities, boundaries and scales ......................................................................................................... 7
   Mobilities and boundaries ....................................................................................................................... 8
   Mobilities and scale ............................................................................................................................... 10
   Mobilities and (seeming) stability ......................................................................................................... 11
   Mobilities and institutions .................................................................................................................... 12
   Mobilities and the functions of law (as formal institution) .................................................................. 13

3. Soviet and post-Soviet mobilities ........................................................................................................ 15
   Managing mobilities ............................................................................................................................. 15
   Mending the gaps in mobilities management ....................................................................................... 18
   Silent acknowledgment of incomplete control .................................................................................... 20
   Central Asia: internal margin and darling of Soviet development .................................................... 20
   Soviet breakup: new boundaries, scales, mobilities ........................................................................... 22
   New states, new mobilities .................................................................................................................... 23

4. Uzbek Mobilities ................................................................................................................................ 25
   Mobilities and the immobility of irrigation systems and production quota ........................................... 25
   Building Networks / Redrawing social boundaries ............................................................................ 26
   Risks of visibility and visibility for whom? .......................................................................................... 27

5. Tajik Mobilities .................................................................................................................................... 28
   A history of marginality and recent fragmentation ............................................................................. 28
   Drivers of mobilities: positive and negative ....................................................................................... 29
   Fragmented structures present new freedoms and new limitations ................................................... 30

6. Discussion and conclusions ................................................................................................................. 31
   Hidden mobilities and power/knowledge configurations ................................................................. 31
   Hidden mobilities and the post-Soviet condition: elite games and the rest ....................................... 33
   Post-Soviet hidden mobilities: perspectives on ‘development’ ........................................................... 34
   Rethinking development given hidden mobilities = Rethinking the Nation State ............................. 35

Literature ....................................................................................................................................................... 38

Information on the competence network Crossroads Asia ....................................................................... 49

Publications in the Crossroads Asia Working Paper Series ..................................................................... 50
Abstract

We analyze the hidden mobilities, in physio-spatial, epistemic and social terms that are part and parcel of livelihood strategies in places dominated by informal institutions and authoritarian governance regimes. Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbekistan and Tajikistan serve as empirical references to develop the theoretical perspective. We link this analysis with an analysis of the roles of boundaries, scales and mobilities in general, with special emphasis on the role of formal and informal institutions and on networks of mobility. We thus link a Deleuzian-inspired frame with a new institutionalist perspective on development and discuss the potential of development interventions to alter rules, roles and routes of people and the influence of mobilities, hidden and visible, to alter the effects of development (intervention).

Keywords
mobilities, boundaries, identities, Deleuze, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, development
1. Introduction

In this paper, we first develop a Deleuzian-inspired conceptual frame to rethink ‘mobilities’, in line with recent literature on mobilities in geography and anthropology, and more broadly in line with the ‘spatial’ and ‘material’ turns in these disciplines, which in many cases, especially in geography, meant an exploration of Deleuzian concepts in an attempt to overcome the supposed logo-centrism of structuralist and many post-structuralist theories.

We develop a concept of mobilities that includes physio-spatial, social and epistemic mobilities, mobilities that entail the crossing of physio-spatial, social and epistemic boundaries and the reshaping of identities. Mobilities can be visible and invisible, and we argue that the difference between visible and invisible mobilities has social, economic and political consequences. Invisible mobilities we call hidden mobilities. In two countries with an abundance of hidden mobilities, namely Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, we investigate the origins of this situation, the functioning of these mobilities and the impact on development efforts.

Thus, we study Uzbek and Tajik rural areas, as places marked by hidden mobilities: forms and sites of income generation and wealth creation, status upgrading, travel and migration and the socio-spatial networks enabling these mobilities. Uzbek and Tajik rural areas are environments where people move physio-spatially and socially, much of it in secrecy. The distrust vis-à-vis government and in formal institutions (i.e. laws, policies, plans) created in both areas a predominance of informal institutions. Informality here is not a separate world of alternative coordination, but in many cases one deals with rules to apply, ignore and enforce the formal rules. This situation both creates mobility, to survive and sometimes be successful and it forces much of that mobility to become invisible, as it is either technically illegal or legal without trust in legal protection. Furthermore these mobilities are entwined with epistemic mobilities and thus with traveling concepts, discourses, narratives (Bal, 2002; Teampau & Van Assche, 2009) as the below will illustrate.

The case analyses serve to develop a conceptual perspective for studying hidden mobilities and to explore linkages with an institutionalist perspective on economic development, in line with Douglass North, Paul Seabright, Avner Greif and Elinor Ostrom, in which actors and institutions, rules and roles are not pre-defined in the history and economic development of an area. Just as with Deleuze and the geographers and anthropologists in his wake (often via interpreters as Manuel de Landa) identities are formed in history, in contact with other identities, with rules of coordination and with contingent events in the environment. Deleuze and the institutionalists do not share the same ontological set of references and neither do they share a political ideology or a perspective on scientific methodology. This is not a problem, we argue, since no theory is completely consistent and no ontological embedding completely accounts for all the other elements of the theory. In other words, critical analysis can reveal the consistency of different parts of the theory and evaluate the productive capacity of combinations with parts of other theories. This is certainly a Deleuzian exercise (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). The consistency sought in this paper is to be found in the domain of the analysis of different types of mobilities and
boundaries\(^2\) linked to issues of identity and scale, where mobilities can be coupled with analyses of de facto versus de jure coordination of actions and transactions, analyses of actor formation, rule of law stabilization and economic development, traditional ground for institutional economics.

In order to smoothen the linkage between Deleuze and the institutionalists, in a manner productive for the analysis of development efforts, we need to establish a broad enough concept of institutions and especially of formal institutions. In a Deleuzian universe, it seems essential to look at the actual forms of coordination between actors (and between actors, ideas, rules, material objects). Narrowing this idea down, one can say, first, that laws, as formal institutions deemed essential in development efforts nowadays, cannot be seen as the only form of formal institutions, and secondly, that the functions of law in development should be interpreted broadly, not only as rules that have to be obeyed (while sometimes they are not) but also in terms of the multitude of effects they have or, in other words, the variety of functions they can be attributed to. These functions of law in development policy we will divide in three.

Law for us has several roles in development policy: upholding, delimiting and enabling (Beunen et al., 2014). Any policy aimed at development, whether emanating from within or from outside a respective organizational unit (i.e. organizations, countries, etc.), needs law in these three roles: the policy needs to be legal, as in allowed, it needs legal tools for implementation and it will be delimited in implementation by other laws. If these three roles are stabilized, it is possible for law to stabilize expectations of various actors (Luhmann, 2004), so that legal tools such as contracts become functional (with regard to Uzbekistan this is exemplified in Djanibekov et al., 2013). Crystallization of legal rules (institutions) and roles (positions in a form of judiciary, positions in economic transactions) is therefore essential for economic development (Van Assche et al., 2013c).

This starting point already points at a limitation of development strategies that rely on formal institutions: simply introducing new laws, policies and plans is unlikely to succeed if the three functions of law are not present and mutually supportive (Ostrom, 2005; Jacobs, 1991). In addition, new formal institutions are likely to be subsumed in a network of informality that can render them useless or pervert their effects (Hayoz & Giordano, 2013; Easterly, 2006). On the other hand, existing informal institutions can also enhance the functioning of law, e.g. in the support of development initiatives (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). And conversely, initiatives that rely on informal institutions entirely are a priori vulnerable to erosion by other informalities or by initiatives, internal or external, that invoke the authority of formal institutions (de Soto, 2000). Thus, the old exaggerated trust in laws and policies for development, and in ‘development’ as the object of social engineering in general, was indeed exaggerated but one cannot replace it with full reliance on self-organization and informality (Ferguson, 1994; Verdery, 2003; Luhmann, 1995).

If this is the case, it is useful to delineate the functions of law and of informal institutions and, more importantly, to grasp their case-specific dialectics. By this we mean the continuous interaction between

\(^2\) The use of the plural thus aims to underline the study of different types, rather than indicating the sheer plurality of singular events of mobility and boundary.
formal and informal institutions in an evolution that shapes them both (Van Assche et al., 2013b). We argue that, rather than evaluating specific sets of formal or informal institutions separately, it makes more sense to speak of formal/informal configurations that co-evolved and have certain effects that can be evaluated.

The Soviet legacy of discrepancy between formal and informal institutions can be seen as de facto giving space to a plurality of legal regimes at the local and regional level and this old plurality has implications for the current functioning of law (Gelman, 2004; Hayoz et al., 2013; Kornai, 1979). For the responses to development initiatives, we intend to investigate more precisely how Soviet legacies structure the patterns of expectations locally and thus the responses to new rules (legal change) and to other interventions aiming at development (e.g. projects). In post-Soviet locales, formal/informal dialectics are often highly opaque, leading to complex and unpredictable effects of changes in informality as well (Ledeneva, 2005).

Unraveling networks of hidden mobility is thus closely linked to an unraveling of formal/informal configurations. Discerning the rules to apply/ignore the rules, or in other cases parallel rule sets, is discerning the networks in which these institutions function. Unraveling formal/informal configurations therefore aims at a better understanding of the reasons for opacity, including opacity regarding the structure and function of networks (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

In the following we therefore regard networks as the infrastructures for hidden mobilities (Djanibekov et al., 2013; Latour, 2004). We try to get a deeper understanding of (a) the functioning of these networks by focusing on the need for invisibility, and (b) the prevalent opacity by focusing on the layout of overlapping networks and the ways to navigate them.

Hidden mobilities, then, can be understood when envisioning formal/informal configurations in a particular community and the networks marking it. Regarding the networks themselves, we believe it will be useful to distinguish between different types of networks. Some networks are more stable than others, some are more linked to (in-)formal institutions, navigating some involves more risk than others (cf Latour, 2004). The research sheds a light on the production of networks as well: in some cases, it can be expected that networks pre-existed mobilities, while in others, formal/informal configurations drove mobilities and the simultaneous construction of networks (Fuchs, 2001; Thrift, 2006).

Once these insights are acquired, one can get a better idea of the impact of development interventions in these and similar communities: which effects will projects, plans, policies and laws aiming at development have? Will they alter the local roles of law? Of informal institutions? Of the dialectics with formal institutions? Will they alter the patterns of mobility, the creation of identities, the crossing and changing of boundaries? And will they reduce the need for invisibility? We argue that this set of questions needs to be asked before intervention and before assuming that 'best practices' imported from elsewhere will work in Central Asia.
2. Conceptual analysis: mobilities as bringers of change and policies aiming at change

Deleuzian mobilities

Mobilities is a concept which has received much attention recently, in anthropology, sociology and, probably most extensively, in geography. With John Urry, the interest started with long-standing tourism research (Urry, 2000). In many cases, the concept is an extension of the interest in materialities and embodiment (the so-called ‘material turn’, associated with names such as Nigel Thrift, Doreen Massey, Sara Whatmore), an interest which was, in turn, partly motivated by the supposed lack of attention to these things in structuralism and post-structuralism (i.e. De Landa 2006; Teampau & Van Assche, 2009). Mobilities in this perspective can still mean many things, ranging from migration to movement and change in ecosystems, movement of people, transportation in the narrow sense and the travelling of concepts and identities. In many cases, Deleuzian concepts stand in the behind the developed arguments, ideas of a reality made up of events, flows, with identities unfolding, concepts opening up new spaces of thought and action, intensities as basis for identity shifts, multiplicities as gates to a diversity of unfolding universes, rhizomes as capable of making the most unexpected connections between places, actions, concepts and conceptual frames (Buchanan, 2005; Hardt, 1993).

Space, in Deleuzian geography, is a confluence of stories, of bodies, rocks, water, plants, a temporary stabilization and configuration of many things in flux (Massey, 2005); yet this impermanence can still exert a deep influence on subjects and subjectivities (De Landa, 2002).

Mobilities, then, in such materialist versions of post-structuralism, are shaping identity (Cresswell, 1997). Actually moving through space changes the subject and everything else in that space and dwelling longer in certain places makes this influence stronger. In case of migration, tied to a change in ‘home’ or territory, the impact on identities is even more profound (Braidotti, 2006). At the same time, patterns of mobility also create identity of spaces and subjects in a different sense, as patterns: people can be marked by patterns of moving, between spaces, between groups, between concepts and spaces can be typified by the patterns of movement taking place in them – as structures in the flux (Buchanan, 1999) or, in Deleuzian speak, plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Mobilities in the conceptual sense can constitute Deleuzian ‘lines of flight’, breaking away from conceptual frames, moving away from a plateau, to create new connections between ideas, bodies, matter and thus new insights and identities (Hardt, 1993). Mobilities hence are integral to Deleuzian ideas of territorialization and de-territorialization: moving around breaks patterns of boundaries, while somewhere else, new, temporary boundaries are created, allowing for the production of new insights and identities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994).

If we link the ongoing discussions on mobility sketched out above more thoroughly with the Deleuzian philosophy, we can add a few notions, which will be elaborated in the next paragraphs. Mobilities for Deleuze closely link to his concept of becoming. For him, in western philosophy, the concept of being

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3 For overviews, please see the works of Urry, Cresswell and Hvattum listed in the reference list.
has been privileged consistently and this masks for him the reality of eternal becoming, of eternal change where change is not a transition between situation A and B, which are considered more real, and more prone to theorizing. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is the process of change itself, the becoming something, that reflects more accurately the state of beings. Becoming is a chain of events and changes in intensity. Repetition is not a return of the same, but a continuous change, as intensities will change, affected by other bodies, thoughts, places, or other contexts and these intensities render the difference between states significant. Becoming is this becoming without a plan, without an external imposition of a ground scheme, for the future or for the self (becoming as growing into a pre-determined identity). Mobilities are thus to be considered transformative and creative, not a movement of the same in a space that remains the same. Both, space and moving entity alter in the process. The entity in case, for Deleuze, can be a body, a thought, a system of organization, a material object; these can all enter into transversal relations that enable their reproduction and the production of new objects, thoughts etc. The process of establishing connections between those disparate elements, according to a non-plan, is called rhizomatic. Reality reproduces itself rhizomatically and rhizomatic thought comes closer to the structure of that reality. Mobilities can create such varied effects because so many connections can be made, with other thoughts, bodies and objects. Mobilities for Deleuze can take the form of lines of flight, in which a constellation of ideas and matter produces thoughts, actions, movements that enter a new space, that create new perceptions, affects, concepts and create new objects unforeseen in the producing of constellation (or ‘machinic assemblage’). Not all mobilities can be considered lines of flight, but when it is the case, one can speak of a more radical transformation, production and vanishing in the process of moving; the new pattern that emerges is the product of emergence, a new complexity which cannot be reduced to the new pattern. Mobilities can affect both actual and virtual space and actual and virtual concepts, bodies, etc., which means that transformations can take place by and in non-actualized movements, reshuffling of the potential present in a given situation. Virtual mobilities can engender actual mobilities, and vice versa; the actual movement of bodies, ideas and matter can transform the field of potential alternatives.

**Mobilities and power**

Mobilities, as for Deleuze and Guattari represented by nomadic lifestyles, are a priori threatening to centralized powers, trying to stabilize borders and boundaries, enabling them to control a territory more thoroughly (Adey, 2009; Buchanan & Lambert, 2005). Exerting power is stopping or controlling mobilities, in an attempt to stabilize power/knowledge configurations (Patton, 2000). Yet power also needs channels, infrastructure, in the conceptual and physical sense (De Landa, 2006). States need highways, communication channels, and administrative (enforcing and symbolic) representations to become engrained in people’s lives, to shape their identities in ways preferred by those in power (Hvattum et al., 2012). And the same (as well as additional, non-state, informal, formal/informal hybrid) infrastructures can and will be used to create new mobilities, and these will have unanticipated effects (Urry, 2000; Shields, 2013).

If we see society also as a set of socio-economic positions, then mobilities include moving between those positions (cf. Patton, 2000). Moving to a position perceived as better, moving away from a
position perceived as worse, or, in more extreme cases, a position marked by scarcity, creating a
necessity to change, to move, with perishing as only alternative (a different aspect of materiality). In
some higher positions, moving around is required, physical mobility a necessity to maintain the position;
it can also become a symbol of the position (Urry, 2000). Also here infrastructure is essential, and can
include physical, institutional and scientific structures. Education and learning can turn small
observations into information, i.e. knowing the language of power and its associated bureaucracies and
scientific disciplines (cf. Luhmann, 1990; Foucault, 2003), useful to move and to climb the ladder.

Mobilities require and cause the crossing of boundaries, and, with that, changes in the meaning and
functioning of boundaries (Buchanan & Lambert, 2005). In some cases, the boundaries loose their
function, erode, collapse and with that, the integrity of what is bounded, of what is delineated (Saldanha
& Adams, 2012; Buchanan & Thoburn, 2008). This, by itself, is threatening for power/knowledge
configurations, for the regimes associated with them and/or producing them (Barthes, 1958). The less
democratic regimes are, or, more broadly, the less adapted to their environment and accepted in that
environment (including the own society), the more mobilities will be hidden (Scott, 1998; cf. Luhmann,
1995). Yet, at the same time, the more pressure is exerted, the more counter-pressure can be expected,
e.g. the more motivation will be created in society to create alternative identities and mobilities
(Foucault, 2003; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). In addition, strict controls, or in Deleuzian terms, a molar
thinking creating a hyper-territorialized society, will make it harder for many to take initiative, move,
explore, get new understandings, create new things, new identities (Buchanan, 1999), and – and this is
not in the Deleuzian vocabulary – economic opportunities. As we have shown in earlier research on
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Hornidge et al. 2014b, forthcoming, Van Assche et al., 2013a) control creates
scarcity, over time and lacking observation of new opportunities, and this is another aspect of its self-
derlying identity, of its call for de-territorialization. Power/knowledge configurations that allow too
little space for transformation and deviation, thus undermining themselves (Luhmann, 1995; Pottage,
2004) and this undermining can be described as the creation of hidden mobilities.

For Deleuze, the ‘societies of discipline’ as described by Foucault are replaced by societies of control, in
which (in line with the later Foucault) control is more interiorized, coupled with structures of incentives
engrained in body and mind. Time/space configurations in these societies become segmented in such a
way that re-articulation is hard, that identities are expected to be fixed, tied to stable boundaries of
concepts, bodies, forms of organization and material order. In reality, this fixing is impossible, but the
exploration of new identities, including new roles in society, becomes impeded and both actual and
virtual changes become limited, in the sense of narrower in scope, and less connected to other
mechanic forces. Conceptual simplification and rigidity implies reduction of the virtual and thus
reduction of the possibilities for actual change, and reduction of the potential creativity and creativity in
a given place or community. The nomadic space preferred over molar space is a space that does not pre-
exist movement; the nomad creates the space by means of movement, actions, thoughts and the
identity of the nomad changes while moving. The act of moving itself is the only persistent element of
self-definition. Space-time is created in the act of moving of the nomad and concepts, bodies,
projections for the future, are tied to that. The frames of reference that produce other entities,
conceptual and material, are thus a co-production of nomad and movement and not something that can
be ascribed to either a nomad individual or social identity assumed stable or a physio-spatial referent assumed stable. This, for Deleuze, represents a way of life and thinking and becoming that resonates more with the creative possibilities inherent in a universe where things and thoughts are in a constant flux.

**Mobilities, boundaries and scales**

Power/knowledge configurations, we argue in line with Foucault (1968, 1975, 2003), tend historically and logically to scale up, to grow, to incorporate and transform others. This makes a more complex and therefore scaled internal organization necessary (Luhmann, 1995). Growth means organization and organization requires segmentation and hence scaling. The set of changes often described as globalization brings along new patterns of scaling in new patterns of organization (Castells, 1996; Fuchs, 2001). Multinational companies might in many ways disregard and undermine national boundaries, but internally their size and complexity creates layers and segments and the coordination of their activities, and compliance with a central vision, becomes ever more complex (Christensen, 1997; Seidl, 2005). Politically, the growing importance of the EU, undermining some functions of the nation-state, practically required the strengthening of regions and/or local political entities. The homogenization of social, cultural, economic life also brought forth the re-articulation of older small-scale identities, or their reinvention (Swyngedouw, 2004; Paasi, 1991; Van Assche, 2004). This, we argue, in contrast with much of the literature, is not primarily a matter of protest or resistance and neither it is a sign of the inherent failing of the global capitalist system. It is rather, and simply, part of the same set of boundary and scale transformations that can be traced back to the European medieval city states and their modes of organization (Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014; cf. Greif, 2006, Luhmann, 1995).

Societies, and communities embedded in them, thus need boundaries and scales, to organize themselves, in practical and cognitive terms, to allow power/knowledge configurations to reproduce themselves and to enable coordination of action, by means of formal and informal institutions (Van Assche et al., 2013b, c; Hornidge et al. 2013). Physio-spatial, social and epistemic boundaries shape and alter each other however and this renders different scales relevant for different reasons at different times. Mobilities render the nature of these processes more dynamic. They cannot be considered solely in their undermining effects on boundaries and scales. Mobilities just as well contribute to the formation of new boundaries and scales; new mobilities in societies, with formerly rigid patterns of stratification and territorialization, can cause and be caused by new social boundaries, e.g. by an intensification of clan contacts and a solidification of clan boundaries. Medieval Mongols had to be tightly organized, in military units that served as social units and the boundaries of those were guarded and maintained zealously. Entirely unstructured (unbounded) self-transformation thus seems to be impossible, as then there is no self left to transform (De Landa, 2006; cf Varela & Maturana, 1992). Erasing boundaries and scales comes down to reducing societal complexity, which is possible and could be observed, but the communities left are de facto more bound by smaller spaces and smaller epistemic spaces, thus recreating boundaries more rigid and rigidly coupled, at a smaller scale.
Mobilities are therefore not only traditionally threatening for the centers of power (in consequence causing hidden mobilities) but are also in the popular imagination fraught with danger and often cast in a menacing light: the nomads not only were possible raiders, their presence also loosened the epistemic and social frameworks people relied on to identify, orient and coordinate themselves with (Braidotti, 2006; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Bonta & Protevi, 2004). Their mere presence and their success, rendered the story of a natural and necessary order in society, their order, less persuasive, and this was not only a threat for possibly oppressive powers, but also for the people who identified with the reigning power/knowledge configuration. Also popular tropes of loss of self in migration or in excessive intellectual exploration, or social mobility, point at the same fears (Massey, 2005).

For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming means becoming different, not merely – as in psycho-analysis – a cutting loose of neurotic habits, of compulsory repetitions of symptoms tied to old images and experiences. Instead, becoming for Deleuze and Guattari is life, as a force and life is expressive, is joy. Using one’s potential, as individual and community, using it to the fullest, exploring the potential for creative transformation, is ethically commendable. Yet, as said, such self-transformation, with all the unexpected rhizomatic connections, lines of flight, and de-territorializations, can only avoid chaos and reactive power turning back on itself, when it embraces structure as well, as long as its creative potential is there, as long as its virtual field allows for actual changes in various directions. Thinking and acting, for Deleuze, therefore needs rules and roles, but simultaneously needs to harbor spaces of loose connectivity with these rules and roles. Not a continuous meta-reflection, but a cultivation of percepts, affects and concepts that expand the potential for thought and action, the reasons and manners to stick to boundaries and to cross or undermine them by crossing.

**Mobilities and boundaries**

The boundaries that are crossed and sometimes undermined in and by mobilities are threefold: social, physio-spatial and epistemic. Mobilities can also be categorized in this manner. One has to be careful however to note that each of the mobilities can have repercussions for each of the boundaries. Social mobility will affect the crossing and functioning of physio-spatial boundaries, epistemic mobility can entail changes to physio-spatial and social boundaries or changes in their functioning.

Differentiation though can be added by pointing out that social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries affect each other, even without interference of mobilities. Social boundaries delineate identities, yet these identities structure themselves using epistemic and physio-spatial boundaries as well (Eriksen, 2002). Political territories often line up with social identities and the powers that be often use epistemic boundaries to increase the cohesion of the territory and the consistency of the social identities (Paasi, 1991; Massey, 2005). In other cases, epistemic boundaries preexist social identities, contribute to their solidification and this furthers the creation of physio-spatial boundaries (Whatmore, 2002). Changes in the functioning of one boundary can trigger changes in the others; change in physio-spatial boundaries can trigger social and epistemic change processes and vice versa (Cresswell, 1997; Braidotti, 2006). Epistemic boundaries, as boundaries of concepts but also of narratives and discourses, consisting of concepts, can shift for various reasons, not limited to mobilities and these shifts can affect physio-spatial
boundaries (Van Assche, 2004), as in the lines in space that acquire meaning for relevant difference. Political boundaries are physio-spatial, but correlate to a certain extent with epistemic and social boundaries (Buchanan, 1999). The correlation is influenced by respective power/knowledge configurations in place. If the political territory is marked by a strong unified discourse, and if most people believe in this, then the correlation between social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundary is strong at the political boundary. This is not always the case of course and the history of the formation of empires and nation states is the history of attempts to control the formation and evolution of social boundaries, as identities, and to unify and homogenize the territory (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The Romantic idea of the nation state made such correlation a prerequisite, arguing that any political boundary should be an epistemic and social boundary the unity of these last two expressed as culture (Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1981).

Social identities use social boundaries to distinguish themselves, but also physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries. Groups associate with places, areas and with discourses, concepts, histories (as narratives about the past of a group, or from the perspective of the group). Any change can affect the construction of both past and future (Van Assche et al., 2009). And these can also pose challenges to the ruling power/knowledge configuration. If a subgroup becomes a group, if a clan becomes more important than a party, if a profession becomes more important than a family, then the aggregate changes affect the power/knowledge configuration, partly via the changes in physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries. If we add the concept of mobility, as introduced here, then the dynamics of boundary negotiation becomes even more intricate. The crossing of boundaries that might be necessary or desirable in a certain power/knowledge configuration, already starts changing the identities involved by the mere act of moving (Massey, 2005), and by the fact that new relations emerge all the time, with other identities, places and stories (Saldanha & Adams, 2012).

Mobilities, thus, also for Deleuze, are not necessarily positive. Also lines of flight can be destructive. While pure de-territorialization can create chaos that might be just as oppressive and non-creative as any totalitarian regime. Power for Deleuze is also the power of becoming, of creative transformation in mobilities, the forces that make it possible for beings to develop and development is seen as expression of a potential (a virtual field). Power is thus, as for Foucualt, not something negative, and it cannot be solely associated with state power. For Deleuze, state power is often reactive power, as opposed to active power, and ideas of community are often representing it as a pre-existing unit that has to be managed or improved, while for Deleuze, the community can be remade by harnessing new powers. Not individuals, organizations, boundaries, are to be considered, with relations that can be managed, but sets of relations that are a constellation of power. Remaking communities starts with understanding that power needs to be recreated, and then both community and individual (in an assemblage) will be remade. Here, we can intuit that invisibility can be a way to grasp the potential to change, without referring to pre-existing roles and rules; we can also intuit that material want, necessity, brings about mobilities that cross any boundary that needs to be crossed.
**Mobilities and scale**

Scale is a concept that has been under attack from different sides (see the works of Swyngedouw (2004), Thrift (2008), Cresswell (2011, 2010), Whatmore (2006), Massey (2005), as well as (less) Jessop et al. (2008), Leitner et al. (2008) e.g.). Understanding mobilities is also understanding scale, as mobilities can affect and be affected by scales. If one distinguishes several scales, one assumes different layers or levels of boundaries. Multi-scale governance assumes nested territories, where in movement, first boundaries of the same scale are crossed, then boundaries of a higher level, scale etc. The same principle applies to social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries; concepts can be clustered in discourses and those in discursive configurations (Bal, 2002; Paasi, 1991). Social identities can be layered and clustered (Eriksen, 2002). Scale as a concept has been attacked by proponents of globalization, arguing that fewer spatial scales have an impact on communities and individual life; that it is far more important now, after a long era of erasing scales, to look at the impact of the whole, of global society, on what is happening (e.g. Castells, 1996).

Scale was also attacked by various strands of geographers, Deleuzian and neo-marxist, arguing that in the practical unfolding of reality scale is not a necessary concept. Instead mobility is regarded as the essence and micro and macro effects of events are intimately tied, with each series of events, each rhizome, being marked by its own set of dimensions (Massey, 2005; De Landa, 2006), sometimes harboring marked scales, sometimes not. Scaling reality is enforcing morality in and by analysis and reinforcing the oppressive effects of a scalar organization (Buchanan & Lambert, 2005; Scott, 1998). In a different version of critique, scale only emerges from the bottom, in micro-interactions in networks (Fuchs, 2001; Whatmore, 2006), where larger networks might not always be perceived and where a semantics of a layered whole might be useful in navigating the local network environment.

We would argue that, indeed, one cannot assume the continuous relevance of a given set of scales (for reason of the boundary and mobility mechanics just described), that indeed scales are in continuous transformation, that indeed there is usually a difference between the rhetorics of scale (and boundary) and the practices of crossing scales, jumping scales, ignoring scales, and piecing together various scale effects at the local level. We also acknowledge that higher level physio-spatial units (and their global-to local-level discourses) and social unities have become generally more relevant in structuring the life of communities. Yet none of this takes away from the need for boundaries and for scaled boundaries in the functioning of individuals, communities, society at large (Hornidge, 2014; Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014). For every erased boundary, a new one emerges, for every altered scale effect, another one pops up. As van Houtum (2005) and others said, bordering is ordering and society needs order to function. Also Deleuzian nomads create and operate on certain scales (Patton, 2000) and these are – we add – physio-spatial, epistemic and social in nature. Their social boundaries can be the ones of families, clans, tribes, confederations, empires. Their physio-spatial boundaries can be the ones of a temporary village, clan territory, new conquest, homeland. Their epistemic boundaries can be the ones of military organization, nature religion, with sedentary societies as fodder. Their mobilities seem unbounded and free of scale only from the perspective of sedentary societies and of the political entities attacked or crossed and permeated by them.
For Deleuze, some of the plateau’s that produce identities and insights and stabilize them for a while can be associated with a physio-spatial scale. Or, in other words, the assemblages that produce relevant effects in society can create a space that can be grasped as existing only at one level. Rhizomatic connections cross potentially all scale-levels and a given space-time can be produced by a rhizome that makes spaces relevant at a certain scale. It is possible that other scales are not observed from the plateau and it is possible that they are observed, with boundaries then becoming visible.

**Mobilities and (seeming) stability**

The fact that political boundaries do not change every day is misleading in the sense that it veils the constant turmoil that characterizes each society and community, the interplay between boundaries and identities of the different sorts described, the impact of mobilities, visible and hidden (Deleuze 1995; Scott, 1998). Political boundaries stay in place only if power is exerted, from the inside or from the outside (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Mansfeld, 1993). Yet while staying in place, their meaning and functioning can change dramatically; their relations with social and epistemic identities can alter. Their crossing can vary, the mobilities they allow or encourage can change (Patton, 2000). It is not strange therefore that political boundaries can suddenly collapse, that regimes can suddenly collapse, as they are naturally undermined by the way societies work.

Power/knowledge configurations form society, but society also transforms itself continuously under the radar of these configurations and these transformations are bound to produce a situation at a certain point where the stories of the powerful are not persuasive anymore (Luhmann, 1990), where more and more pressure is needed to maintain the boundaries and where the application of power to that purpose becomes less and less efficient (Eriksen, 2002; cf. Anderson, 1991) and were the enforcement and implementation of rules, laws, policies becomes increasingly difficult (Mansfeld, 1993; Hayoz & Giordano, 2013). Political entities can extend their survival and partly deal with this set of mechanisms by allowing for self-transformation, for mobilities, for changes in physio-spatial, epistemic and social boundaries (Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014; Buchanan & Thoburn, 2008). External boundaries might be hard to alter, in an era where conquest is frowned upon, and dissolution of nation states is seen as a threat to international order or an inherent problem. But internal physio-spatial boundaries can be moved, and new relevant scales can be created (Swyngedouw, 2000; 2004). If we see Area Studies in the old paradigm as the study of physio-spatial units, as containers of cultural and epistemic unities, if we see them as assuming stable linkages between physio-spatial, epistemic and social boundaries, and stable articulations of scale internally, then the mobilities and processes of boundary-making and – renegotiating that can be observed physio-spatially, just as much as socially and epistemically, urge us to rethink Area Studies along the lines of the research perspective put forth by Crossroads Asia.

For Deleuze, societal complexity means also that one cannot grasp everything at the same time and from the same perspective, neither the scientist-observer, nor the politician trying to control. Complexity (just as much as differentiation), in a world of becoming, means that things are changing beyond the view of observers. In a society, many things might look the same, and society might reproduce itself on many levels, but meanwhile significant change might gradually build up, either in the
virtual or in actual practices not considered relevant, to suddenly erupt. This is why for Deleuze, societies are defined by their lines of flight. Mobilities and radically transformative mobilities occur all the time, even if not observed. For Deleuze, May 1968 represented such eruption (Deleuze, 1995), a break with the past that created a new world, a creation of new legal, political and cultural futures, a reordering of the virtual; invisible mobilities created a juncture, a break, after which nothing could be the same and could be imagined the same way anymore. This is what Deleuze calls absolute de-territorialization (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

The break-up of the USSR can be considered in this light. Afterwards, old boundaries could not realistically be returned to the old state, old rules, roles and identities had to be reconsidered. Both elements and structures shifted in this event, slowly prepared and one cannot speak of elements which found new relations. Rather, a new force made elements and structures. This does not exclude the possibility of path dependence, of legacies from the past. But lingering concepts, lingering materialities, lingering diagrams of power and identity are now reinterpreted. In a flat ontology one cannot say that the appearances change the essence, but one can say that what is left enters new productive assemblages, creating new effects. Old boundaries can be crossed anew, but old crossings (as well as non-crossings) have different effects. New powers never impose the same boundaries, as no event is ever the same and no becoming ever unfolds in the same manner.

**Mobilities and institutions**

If we pay closer attention to institutions and revisit our concept of formal/informal configurations, we can say now that these self-transforming patterns of coordinative rules cannot be separated from mobilities. If mobilities are hidden, either to escape oppressive powers or to escape the law in less oppressive environments, then their coordination will rely more on informal institutions. If such hidden mobilities are prevalent, they will tend to perpetuate a configuration heavily leaning on informality, and undermine the impact of formal rules (Easterly, 2006). If hidden mobilities are prevalent, in a situation dominated by informality, social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries will change under the radar, and rather than slow and deliberate self-transformation, one can expect shocks, convulsions, collapsing structures and strong coercion to keep them in place (Deleuze, 1995). Hidden mobilities, by virtue of their hiding, are unlikely to be coordinated by means of formal institutions (Mansfield, 1993), the official rules of the game, representing an authority one is likely to avoid.

This does not mean that every rule will be broken in every mobility, that every trajectory through social or epistemic space will have much reverberation in society, and it does not mean that self-transformation of the formal/informal configuration is impossible in every case. It also leaves open the possibility that formally recognized actors, in their official roles, use the same informal rules as others and can accept, sponsor, profit from, or even participate in, some of the hidden mobilities they supposedly don’t observe (Collins, 2006; Solnick, 1998). As said, informality extends to rules to apply the rules, to ignore them, interpret them etc. (cf. Zizek, 2008) and where the law does not apply evenly, this gives more space for people in power to serve themselves by means of informal and/or formal institutions and hybrids of the two (Luhmann, 2004; Gelman, 2004).
What it does mean, and here we refer again to our more expansive Deleuzian view of mobilities expounded earlier, is that the effects of hidden mobilities, tolerated or not by power/knowledge configurations, are less predictable because of the nature of mobilities, the unexpected relations and transformations it caused. What remains under the radar thus has the tendency to expand, to mushroom and the previous set of informal rules becomes less apt themselves to regulate domains of social practice, whether for public or for private gain.

Deleuze (1987) quotes Spinoza, saying ‘nobody knows what a body can do’, and this means that it cannot be predicted how a body will affect and be affected by others (body to be understood in a broad sense, as part of a rhizomatic assemblage). Bodies combine into composite bodies, which increase the capacity to be affected and thus to create new connections. Collective bodies include organizations and communities and these have to be considered as sets of relations, allowing for communal affects and effects. The elements of the community are made anew in the act of composition and the set of relations cannot be considered a blueprint in the sense of an essence. The actual relations between the elements will change and are ontologically primary to the elements; this derives from the emphasis on becoming and on relations (versus on stability and elements). Boundaries in the community, in their physio-spatial and epistemic worlds, follow the same reasoning; they are a derivative of changing forces, and their formal persistence does not mirror their actual function. Their effects, in other words, are less important than what they are affected by and forgetting this is forgetting the power of hidden mobilities.

**Mobilities and the functions of law (as formal institution)**

We can refine these insights by distinguishing three functions of law in development policy and practice: upholding, enabling and delimiting (Beunen et al., 2014). If we see development policy as the collection of policies to improve society, in whatever sense is defined within society as desirable, then this requires coordination of actions and integration of policies (Van Assche & Djanibekov, 2012). It implies a vision of a desirable future and a vision of a good way to work in that direction, as well as a shared idea on the problems in the current situation (Hillier, 2002). Formal institutions, such as laws, plans and policies, can be used to work in that direction, to further development (Easterly, 2006; de Soto, 2000; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Law, as one category of formal institution, can be a tool to further the others, i.e. plans and policies; it can also be a limit, or a break, on the others, on their formation or implementation (Luhmann, 2004; Rosen 2008; Platt, 2003). And they can support the others, or their emergence, by granting legitimate powers to certain actors to produce visions and work in their direction.

Mobilities affect law in these three functions and this can be understood as three possible paths of interference with the effect of development interventions. Each path can further be described in terms of the three types of boundaries mentioned, and respective scale effects.

Mobilities can affect social, epistemic and physio-spatial boundaries and individual identities navigating them; they can engender different forms of organization, different value systems, different impact of official narratives, different understandings of self, place and other. Law as enabling element is touched
by these mechanisms because the implementation of any policy, even if helped by law, hinges crucially on its believability in society (cf. Mansfeld, 1993; Easterly, 2006; Rose, 2008). It also hinges on tools of implementation as tools of de facto coordination of action (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979); if law becomes paper law because of mobilities, because itself or the policy it underpins becomes less believable, or because the tools for implementation have been eroded by mobilities (think local social structures being altered, think money gone), then the policy supported by the law has little effect (Beunen et al., 2014). Hidden mobilities aggravate this tendency.

Something similar applies to the function of law as delimiting policies. The limits can be easily circumvented in and by mobilities and a prevalence of hidden mobilities makes this more likely. As said, such a situation usually means a dominance of informal coordination, and this also means that law in its function of delimiting policy making and implementation, is likely to be eroded and rendered ineffective. This form of erosion can be most interesting for corrupt officials and those in power, with access to policy-makers (Ledeneva, 2013). Implementation of policy can break legal limits more easily when formal rules in general lost vigor (Allina-Pisano, 2008) and this can happen when the situation supposed to be covered by those rules has changed because of mobilities. Policy can lose its breaks when boundaries have changed and law didn’t take this into account. If social identities have changed, identifications with the law can have changed and thus its power (Hardt, 1993; Deleuze, 1995); a similar change with regards to policy and the envisioned common good can occur. If identifications have altered that change both identification with law and policy, then things as policy abuse, for private or group gain, can more easily take place (Mansfeld 1993); then law as delimiting factor in development policy loses its teeth. The same applies to physio-spatial boundaries and epistemic boundaries. The delimiting power of law changes when physio-spatial boundaries acquire a different relevance or disappear altogether (Jacobs, 1991) and when epistemic frames evolve in and through mobilities (Platt, 2003).

Law as upholding policy is similarly affected. Indirectly, by the loss of importance of legitimacy as such (Luhmann, 2004), of the perceived value of the legal system, and more directly, because the connections between a law and the policy it is supposed to support can be broken in many ways by mobilities. Epistemic boundaries might have changed, making the relation between law and policy less visible, less evident, less persuasive (Scott, 1998; Ferguson, 1994). Physio-spatial boundaries might have changed, rendering the law maybe very directly inapplicable. Social boundaries might have changed, influencing the pattern of identification with both law and policy, as said, and reshaping the perceived link between policy and law, thus the potential of law to uphold the policy. Law, policy, and their link can be more easily disputed or ignored.

Mobilities, through their boundary and scaling effects, can thus alter the functions of law, as delimiting, enabling and upholding policy. Mobilities can further redefine the relation between these functions, and disrupt their mutually supportive character – in case a smoothly functioning legal system existed before (cf. Ledeneva, 2005; Ruble, 1995). Indeed, for law to do its work in relation to policy, in a democratic regime, all three functions have to be there and have to support each other (Beunen et al., 2014). This is partly a matter of internal consistency of the legal system, of consistent relations between laws, between law and constitution and between law and policy. But it is also a matter of enforcement of law,
as in forcing compliance and punishing deviance; and a matter of implementation, as requiring a set of tools going beyond law. Resources can be gone, people, expertise, infrastructure, institutional memory, informal coordination mechanisms etc. ad infinitum. ‘Implementation’ is always evolution (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979; Latour, 2004), movement across boundaries and scales, and involvement of a series of tools and resources that can be affected by mobilities (Van Assche et al., 2011) and by the relations between law and policy as described. Policies might not be implemented because the expertise is gone, but also because the experts do not see the relation anymore between law, policy and social need (Gunder & Hillier, 2009).

For Deleuze, these effects of mobilities on the diverse functions of laws, through their boundary and scale effects, would seem obvious. What can be pieced together with insights from different disciplines, looks simple if one starts from the Deleuzian ontology of forces and becomings. If the best description of a society is an assemblage of bodies, of bodies as becomings and shaped by relations, then no identity can be assumed stable and no rule supposed to govern the practices of bodies human and non-human, will be able to hold for long, will be able to fully govern the unfolding multiplicity of new relations formed in society. Simultaneously, the structures temporarily stabilized by law, are just as necessary to maintain the productivity and allow for the reproduction of society. Implementation in a Deleuzian perspective is the path of new encounters, with new concepts and objects and people, and new rhizomatic extensions, and in each case a shift in the virtual field that allows for new actual moves. Each new encounter in the process of implementation changes the idea, changes the bodies encountering the policies and gives some new ideas on how to use and bend the rule for new purposes in ever changing contexts. Implementation itself thus invokes all three functions of law, invokes continuous de- and re-territorializations and represents the practice of remaking society while pretending to maintain it, and thus the practice of creating uncertainty while pretending to contain it.

In the following, we develop the above argument (and thought process) further by means of two cases in post-Soviet space: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Both share a Soviet past, a tumultuous transition, yet in markedly different directions. We briefly sketch the Soviet situation with regards to mobilities, boundaries and institutions, proceed to the cases of the two former republics, paying special attention to networks as infrastructures for mobilities. We conclude with a further developed reflection on the consequences of our analysis for development intervention.

3. Soviet and post-Soviet mobilities

Managing mobilities

Mobilities in a narrow sense, as people moving through physical and/or social space, have something to do with opportunity and need, with escaping from something or wanting something (tourism is a bit more complicated; cf. Urry, 2000). In that sense, the USSR was a breeding ground for mobility, and at the same time a regime that tightly controlled the movement of people, with an extensive system of permits, travel permits and residence permits [propiska’s] (Humphrey, 2002). Many people wanted to escape, move or travel and were hindered in their pursuits, while at the same time many moved around
within the vast USSR, either forced or looking for opportunity in regions with more investment and development (Taubman, 1973). The USSR created its own set of reasons for forms of and obstacles to physio-spatial mobilities. It attempted to create new identities and erase other identities by means of moving people and preventing them from moving around. Tourism was restricted to controlled patterns within the USSR, and tourist trips were rewards for good behavior, for reproducing the norms proposed by the USSR. The imagination of self and other was at the same time altered, with incomplete success.

Presenting the West as imperialist etc. did not always have the desired effects and often it triggered desires for the West, an investment of the West with everything the USSR did not see to offer. Furthermore, the assemblaged USSR itself created desires, including the desire to move, to act differently, see other places, cross boundaries. In Deleuzian terms it was a machine that structured the flows of desire, a structure of interruptions pretending to offer and be a final form of desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). The USSR formed the plane of possible interpretations of the future, including future movements and shaped both virtual and actual mobilities. Moving itself is mechanic in the sense that it potentially restructures everything else, the objects encountered, desired, the places encountered and desired, the individuals and in the end, society as a whole. Travel is thus inherently dangerous for any political regime believing in social engineering and relying on authoritarian mechanisms of control. The rhizomatic linkage of physio-spatial, epistemic and social mobilities makes it all the more dangerous. Control in the USSR thus extended to all three mobilities: reading and traveling and receiving/buying could all alter the circuitry of desire and identification and reshape the frames of self-interpretation that led to social structure. Managing mobilities in consequence was of utmost importance.

Besides attempts to arrest mobilities, the USSR did attempt to attract desire and identification by means of a positive alternative (Westerman, 2010; Weiner, 1999). Social engineering included mass investment in modernization of the country, in the beginning focusing on heavy industries and the military complex, but for most of Soviet history, there was also a keen awareness that results had to be shown quickly to many citizens, that coercion alone would not work without offering some credible vision of the future or – in later periods – at least an acceptable welfare state and a (silently tolerated) degree of freedom to deviate from the professed pattern of rules and roles. Early communism saw a focus on Ukraine, a bit later Central Asia was the target of development policy and afterwards Siberia received most attention (French, 1995). In Ukraine, heavy industries were most important, in Central Asia cotton production, in Siberia oil, gas, mining. For people with a good education, or connections, or an entrepreneurial spirit, and with a capacity to believe the ideology or at least not openly oppose it, there were opportunities within the USSR, ways to travel, to migrate, to find better jobs somewhere else (Iordachi & Van Assche, 2014; Richardson, 2005). Internal private or semi-private trade (initiated by small governmental actors supposedly doing something else) was very active since Chrustjev (Humphrey, 1998; Suny, 1995). One could also climb the ladder in politics and economy, with work, skills, networking. The state apparatus was internally so complex that knowledge of the apparatus was very valuable to make a career (Elster et al., 1998; Kornai, 1979; Hough & Fainsod, 1979) and so complex that many positions were available and many different routes were thinkable in most professions (Hahn, 1988).
So social and physio-spatial mobility were possible. Also epistemic mobilities were tolerated to a certain degree (the cultivation of ‘critical’ intelligentsia) and even indirectly encouraged, in the cult of learning. Free reinvention of social identities in mobilities was deeply suspicious however, as the regime wanted control over the redrawing of social boundaries (Weiner, 1999; Suny, 1995; Ruble et al, 2001). This was seen, especially in the beginning, as a prerequisite for the formation of Soviet society. Social classes were demolished; farmers were driven off the land and ethnic groups moved and dispersed as forced physio-spatial mobility was thought to engender social change (Viola, 1999; Stoner-Weiss, 1997). Ethnic groups and republics were seemingly respected, but in fact redefined and reconstructed, in order to give the appearance of a diverse union, but also to destroy old allegiances and identities, and to open up individuals and groups for new identities, new physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries, to the creation of a new society which required new units and new delineations at all levels and in all domains (Weiner, 1999; Westerman, 2010). The regime was however never fully unified and its complex organization structure, combined with the complex cultural landscape it was supposed to steer and reorganize, made for often inconsistent incentives for group formation and identification; each region and republic had its own set of pressures on existing and new identities, different reasons to stay with, to invest in (Jones-Luong, 2002) certain social affiliations (Ruble et al., 2001) and these identity shifts were entwined with different patterns of mobilities.

For the regime, initiation and management of mobilities was thus crucial in its path of managed self-transformation. Propaganda was important, all forms of reading, films, music, art, moving people around, relearning them the past, present and future (Westerman, 2010). Education was even more important, in order to build the industrialized workers’ paradise dreamt up, in order to blur class lines and ethnic lines, and to instill various aspects of the ideology. Education was a key component to change lives, but again in a managed direction, towards the creation of Soviet man, the building block of communist society (Hahn, 1988; Verdery, 2003). A cult of education and a cult of science ensued, with science supposedly underpinning policy and competitive education supposedly erasing all other, older, forms of unfair competition, based on class, race, gender, networks (North, 2005; Scott, 1998). And indeed, many of these lines were blurred, new identities were created, and many aspects of the political school of thought were persuasive (even now).

One can say that the belief in the power of mobilities was great (in true Hegelian spirit; cf. Zizek, 2008), in their transforming power, their entanglement of physio-spatial, social and epistemic change. One can also say that the Soviet belief in the manageableability of mobilities was too great, an aspect of a social engineering ideology which overestimated systematically the power of central steering (Kornai, 1979), the possibility to oversee every operation from the center, to assess the effects of its operations and to correct itself (the critique made famous by Friedrich August von Hayek). Too much was directly tied to ideology and the direct coupling of many beliefs and actions with an ideology deemed infallible, made self-correction and adaptation difficult (Luhmann, 1990). Moreover, overestimating the power of plans, norms and targets (Taubman, 1973; French, 1995), without detailed knowledge of local conditions, and thus of the possibility to comply and of the appropriateness of them, created large grey zones, hidden scarcities, hidden quality problems, timing problems, and hidden forms of competition of scarce resources (Kornai, 1979; Ruble, 1995; Hough & Fainsod, 1979).
Mending the gaps in mobilities management

The state was not entirely blind of course and responded in a variety of ways, just as local communities and individuals responded to this situation in a variety of ways. The grey zones allowed for informal coordination that could deal with some of the problems of institutional design and steering briefly sketched (Giordano & Hayoz, 2013; Humphrey, 2002). They also invited informal coordination for private and group gain, with group gain inside and outside the state apparatus (Allina-Pisano, 2008). The problems of central steering and oversight created new mobilities, by necessitating them for survival, by creating spaces of alternative opportunity. Necessity and opportunity for mobilities are two sides of the same coin, just as invitation and enabling of alternative coordination. The mere fact that some things did not work, slowly eroded the belief in the ideology, in the formal rules and the stories associated with them (Elster et al., 1998; Kornai & Rose-Ackerman, 2004), and a history of informal coordination created actors, institutions, networks that became entrenched (Friedgut & Hahn, 1994; Ledeneva, 2013; Remnick, 1997). Sometimes these were only feeding off collective resources, sometimes they would contribute to the production of collective goods, but in almost all cases they tended to perpetuate themselves.

Slowly, entirely parallel career paths became thinkable. Whereas the kolkhoz system and to a lesser extent the system of industrial enterprises created micro-environments where informality could be used to correct some problems of central steering and to adapt to local circumstances, for benefit of the state and for local benefit (Humphrey, 1998; Van Assche & Djanibekov, 2011; Shtaltovna et al. 2014, forthcoming), bureaucratic careers could also be structured along lines of clan, family, ethnic networks (Jones-Luong, 2002), could be inspired purely by patronage and networks of reciprocal favors and obligations (Ledeneva, 2005; French, 1995). In other words, it became possible to stay within the state, and largely ignore the official job description, assumed expertise and jump from one profitable job to others, helped by others you were supposed to return the favor, creating the basis for an elaborate system of mutual reciprocity (Hornidge et al. 2013, 2011a). The degree of disconnect between the formally expected career path and actual career tracks differed per region, republic, city, sometimes industry (Ruble et al., 2001; Remnick, 1997; Ioffe et al., 2006). What interestingly enough aggravated this tendency towards disconnect (and thus the further unraveling of the system, its institutions and believability) was the American-like belief in the ‘manager’, as a person who could oversee any kind of operation, regardless of substantive knowledge of the activity, the organization, the context (Berliner, 1957; Hough, 1969; Hahn, 1988). Management skills were supposed to be largely independent of content and could be transferred easily. One can draw a connection with the American managerial revolution of the 1940s and 1950s, but also with the early communist idea of the good Soviet as an organizer of anything (Westerman, 2010).

A second path was that of the ‘businessman’, an entrepreneurial type, again inside and outside government, who was particularly adept at spotting markets, unaddressed demand and unexploited opportunity in the complex Soviet economy (Nove, 1961), and using his insights in that economy to fill the gaps. Part-time farmers in southern Ukraine would sell strawberries in Moscow, car parts in Georgia were sold in Siberia, Armenian cognac was traded directly in Odessa by informal associations of farmers,
etc. (Richardson, 2014). Until today, the statement ‘he is a businessman’ in rural Uzbekistan describes a person able to seize opportunities, well-connected and able to work the system (Oberkircher/Hornidge 2011; Trevisani 2007). During Soviet times, this path of ‘businessmen’ operated sometimes within the law, sometimes outside; in case where it was technically illegal, the response could be accepting as well, since the demand was often also acknowledged by officials in the receiving area (cf. Szelenyi, 1988). A third track, was in crime, with criminal networks offering prestigious career paths, partly inside and partly outside the state (Ledeneva, 2005, 2013). The state, as always, had the resources and the powers to extract more. In some republics [e.g. in the Caucasus and Central Asia] late Soviet youth found criminal careers as desirable and respectable as government careers (Suny, 1995).

All these ways of addressing flaws of the system and exploiting its opportunities, created new mobilities and altered boundaries (Ruble, 1995). It also created a situation where gaps between formal and informal institutions were considered normal; where informality was expected to play a role, both positive and negative. In many cases, the USSR was quite restrained in its reaction to informal institutions, alternative careers and other hidden mobilities, as these were not entirely hidden, and had benefits. Sudden enforcement could lead to disruption of informal coordination and thus disappearance of the communal benefits. Suddenly holding all kolkhozi to all plans and policies, would mean that they could not exploit local and temporal opportunity well, and that the local community and probably the community at large would be less well served (Van Assche & Djanibekov, 2011). The roles, rules and networks created did start to lead their own life, and for the center it became increasingly hard to distinguish beneficial forms of informality from mere criminal activity (Collins, 2006; Ruble et al., 2001).

After independence, these actor/institution configurations held a sway over institutional development and mobility in many of the republics (Jones-Luong, 2002; Slezkine, 1994). Where state authority crumbled most, they became the new regime or formed a coalition with elements of the former state apparatus (Collins, 2006; Schoeberlein, 1994; Suny, 1995; Hornidge et al. 2013). What was hidden became visible in different manners per republic, and sometimes, it became the center of power (Remnick, 1997; Ioffe et al., 2006; Ledeneva, 2013). These evolutions in turn caused new hidden mobilities, as each reconfiguration of power/knowledge sparks off its own resistance, its own mobilities, hidden and visible.

In a Deleuzian perspective, this could be expected, as control is incomplete, as machines only temporarily and incompletely interrupt flows and as these interruptions cause new desires leading to new flows unobserved in and by the machine, to new rhizomatic relations, leading to new objects and subjects (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; 1987). This leads to de-territorializations and re-territorializations which remain unobserved but could become the starting point of a new line of flight and hence a new assemblage, in which everything can be remade. Machines are limited in their effects by the resistance they create and the partial incompatibility with the deeper realities of what they organize; Deleuze speaks of bodies without organs, of a reality ultimately made up of flows. In a more narrow sense, in terms of organization and state, one can say that the state machine never fully coincides with the community it claims to represent and hopes to shape. Its circuitry may emerge out of the community, but leads its own life and the rhizomatic production of new assemblages can never be fully observed or controlled. If observed, the connections made, the interpretations given and actions derived, are a
product of the machine itself, and stay within the world of the machine. Mobilities are bound to remain invisible and the less tuned into the configuration of flows and desire in society, the more resistance mobilities provoked and the less visible they can be.

**Silent acknowledgment of incomplete control**

The silent acknowledgment of the Soviet regime in later years of its inability to fully manage identity construction and all forms of mobility, and its acknowledgment of [semi-]hidden mobilities and coordination to deal with some of its problems, an acknowledgment that came after years of overestimation of control, still proved to be a problematic response in the end. A Deleuzian Soviet leader might have seen that hidden coordination and mobilities, as well as the infrastructures that make them possible and expandable, silently erode all boundaries, creating new rhizomatic connections between unexpected places, objects, ideas and creating new planes to look at reality, new perspectives which render the given reality even less persuasive, and offer possibilities for new mechanic assemblages, new configurations of knowledge, power and materiality which produce new realities, and new lines of flight, breaking open epistemic spaces and inserting new concepts that undermine the old fabric (Pottage, 2004; Massey, 2005, also Alff et al. submitted).

**Central Asia: internal margin and darling of Soviet development**

Central Asia was far and close from the political center and this combination had effects on their post-Soviet trajectories. It was far from the center in a geographical sense and in the sense that the traditional societies there had little affinity with the thoroughly Europeanized Russia that invaded in the second half of the 19th century and its Soviet successor. It was also represented as the internal ‘Other’ in Soviet popular culture. On the other hand, the sparsely populated regions of Central Asia, lacking strong political entities for centuries and loose and shifting ethnic identifications in most areas, were probably the most thoroughly reinvented in the Soviet mold (Amsler 2007). Moscow built an extensive infrastructure of roads, irrigation canals, but also schools, collective farms, villages (in previously semi-nomadic areas) and research institutes and universities. Small scale communities became sedentary, and integrated in larger scale frameworks of scientific and economic production, with science supporting economic decision-making. Local governments in the agricultural areas were de facto the kolkhoz governments, whereas in other areas, the local government and party branches that were nominally central were de facto local government, coordinating the most important collectively binding decisions (Humphrey, 1998; Hough & Fainsod, 1979; Hahn 1988).

Collectivization did certainly trigger resistance (Viola, 1999), but the nature and intensity of that resistance rested on a variety of factors. First of all, what was offered by the new regime in comparison with the old situation. It also depended on the forms of organization and scaling of the previously existing polities, and also on the functioning and layering of social identities. ‘Collectivization’ was not one process with one response and Central Asia was not one place, nor a collection of pre-defined identities and polities. Cities often had longer histories than polities, ethnic identities were sometimes relevant, sometimes not, the new regime related to different places and identities different than to others. Sometimes, tribal coalitions were very loose and feudal structures as well, while in other cases,
villages identities and clan identities were structuring belonging very strongly and with deep histories. Especially in irrigated areas receiving much investment and harboring only small scale social identities, there could be openings for cooperation and cooptation. Clans, extended families, villages, could be easily transformed into collective farms, and leaders of larger social formations could be integrated into bureaucratic structures, could become local or regional party secretary – raicom or obcom (Luong-Jones, 2002; Collins, 2006).

Central Asia was thus also, for a while, a darling of the social engineering-minded elites of the USSR, because it was a region where more space for experiment existed, where the path of development was less determined by older actor/institution and power/knowledge configurations. After a while, they also produced local and regional Soviet elites, with Tashkent as the major political, economic and scientific center for Central Asia, harboring among other things the main cotton, water and irrigation institutes, as well as the largest irrigation projects and agricultural populations. Central Asia provided spaces for heroism, scientific and economic and even now older engineers recount fondly the heroic days of the Hunger Steppes project. Former kolkhoz managers and experts, and people in project organizations remember the possibility of a multiplicity of career paths in the region. Indeed, few made it to Moscow (cf. Jones-Luong, 2002; Hough & Fainsod, 1979), but the mobility in Soviet Central Asia was remarkably higher compared to the previous centuries. Tsarist Central Asia was for most purposes still feudal, and before that, the political entities dominating the area were mostly facades, relying on local lords to maintain a semblance of unity. The Soviet structures allowed for learning, traveling, shifting careers, networking, learning the rules of the new game in different positions (Stoner-Weiss, 1997; Friedgut & Hahn, 1994). Much was new, but old networks, mobilized in early Soviet days, were made important again in the Soviet system and even with all new elements and embedded in a new and larger systems, many local and regional identity structures were maintained (Ruble et al., 2001) The region, as the oblast level, became the scale of careerism and the de facto site of identification for many, if not most, a scale that also still allowed a sense of continuity with older forms of networks.

In the 1970’s and 1980’s, these new elites not only succeeded in navigating the Soviet networks but also using them for private gain, and the accent shifted more and more towards that negative aspect of informal coordination (Collins, 2006; Adams, 1999 ). To the extent that in the mid-1980’s, in the middle of perestroika, an era when central controls in general loosened, Gorbachev initiated a crackdown on cotton producing areas rife with corruption. It was that period, when local autonomy was reduced, that left a mark on the collective memory in Uzbekistan and created for some an association between communism and oppression – rather than the period where the communist system worked more or less the way it was supposed to work. In the center, partly corrupted itself, the region became more and more associated with corruption, systematic abuse and the erosion of the Soviet system of planned rural economy (Critchlow, 1988; Urinboyev & Svenssion, 2013).

For Deleuze, what was made anew was everything in the Soviet Union. Continuity could indeed be observed, but the clans, families, tribes that were reinvigorated by means of kolkhoz and higher administration structures, were also thoroughly transformed in the process. The larger scale social identities involved, associated with titular groups representing a republic, were in most cases solidified
in Soviet days, in some cases largely constructed then. The contact with new places, rules, identities, forms of knowledge, materialities and forms of organization (e.g. the village in country sides that never saw such assemblage) opened new worlds, made a new world, in which each element cannot be traced back simply to one old element, but only through a set of transformations in contact with the other elements of the rhizomatic possibilities of Soviet mobility. While the plan for Soviet society in Central Asia might have been rigidly stratified, the actual movements of bodies, ideas, objects, and their new encounters, guided by the plans but various other informalities and contingencies, opened up different virtualities, actualized in different mobilities.

**Soviet breakup: new boundaries, scales, mobilities**

When the USSR was about to break up, it was Moscow that wanted to get rid of many of the republics, not in the least the Central Asian ones. The hidden Soviet mobilities did surface in the center, when it could not hold anymore, but there was still an option of shedding the costly and corrupt region. Russia and Ukraine could not support Central Asia anymore and Central Asia had contributed to the erosion of the Center itself – this was the common perception. In the other direction, all Central Asian republics overwhelmingly voted to stay within the USSR, even when it was clear for a while in the European USSR that things were falling apart (Collins, 2006). The strident nationalism of the post-Soviet years in virtually all the Central Asian republics was thus a quick manufacture, an ad hoc response to a need for rapid re-consolidation of power at the republican level (Batuman, 2010).

Very quickly, ethnic identities, histories were rewritten or re-codified, from the perspective of now independent nations (Adams, 2010, 1999; Beissinger, 1992; Batuman, 2010; Usta, 2007), expected to be coherent in and by themselves, expected to possess a cultural and ethnic core traceable in the distant past, a history of successes and great men, achievements in all domains and fiercely defended borders, markers of difference in political, legal, economic and cultural sense. The new political borders were often based on Soviet-produced versions (Ruble et al., 2001; Jones-Luong, 2002), but their function shifted and in general they hardened, as the new republics could now be more autonomous, harshly delineated, and more completely controlled from the centers of the former republics (Alff, submitted; Friedgut & Hahn, 1994; Remnick, 1997). This level of control increased even more where the collective farms were dismantled, and the new figure of the individual farmer was confronted with an emboldened regional power center (Allina-Pisano, 2008; Trevisani, 2008).

The mobilities spurred by the construction of the USSR, some officially encouraged, others tolerated, yet others invisible or impossible to stop, transformed with the breakup of the Union (Alff/Benz, 2014). The officially encouraged ones largely disappeared, while the tolerated ones, in many cases linked with beneficial informalities show a more scattered pattern, depending on the pathway of development in different areas. The harmful invisible ones yet continue to proliferate, used to operate in difficult conditions. Often, large enterprises were split in pieces, fell into disarray. When they survived, in Central Asia they usually fell under more direct political control than before, reducing their function as potentially corrective or sheltering micro-environments. Kolkhozi were mostly dismantled, and where they survived, their power as local government was usually reduced (Ioffe et al., 2006). Depending on
the area, local governments could become more powerful (Uzbekistan, Ukraine) and in some of those
cases, they could reinvigorate some old collective farms, sometimes amounting to a form of power
sharing, as in Ukraine (Allina-Pisano, 1998; Verdery, 2003).

In a Deleuzian perspective, the collapse of the USSR does not mean a collapse of the state and a partial
return to reinvented clan and ethnic identities does not amount to a return to nomadic thought or
practice. The nomad was always a metaphorical nomad for Deleuze and the organization of space and
society was a necessity for the reproduction of desirable forms of society, for the production in the
modern world of social identities that can become desiring machines, harboring collective affects and
allowing for individual lines of flight (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Its lack of flexibility made it collapse, the
lack of options for self-transformation, the lack of mythologies that were believable enough to
transform identities, to direct action, to create desire in directions deemed attainable within society. It
relied on an impossible repetition of the same, a negative line of flight. Structures are needed,
sometimes as new starting points for further experiments. Structures are in themselves neither good
nor bad, and no set of boundaries or scales is in itself superior to others. For Deleuze, their productivity
is essential, their life-denying or life-affirming character (Deleuze, 1983; 1993). A plateau is needed, a
new consistency which can produce new lines of flights, new mechanic assemblages, new virtualities.

**New states, new mobilities**

The pathways are manifold, but in general one can say that the former republics, partly by default
(transformation, chaos) and partly by design (creating power bases) tried to consolidate power, increase
control over the smaller scales, harden the new state boundaries, control physio-spatial mobilities, and
bring back the attempts at managing epistemic mobilities from the early Soviet days. The state-sponsored nationalisms of the Central Asian countries has less to do with pre-existing ethnic cores,
histories and aspirations, than with late Soviet elites trying to create autonomous and controllable
domains with early Soviet means (Suny, 1995). These means, as in the old days, have their limitations,
just as social engineering as such has limitations and the forms of mobility described above play a part.

The new stories were in many cases not very persuasive, precisely because the stories and the
institutionalization of the propaganda resembled too much the Soviet approach and people were
familiar with it. Many people had developed an instinct for images of reality conjured by power for the
sake of power (Hornidge et al. 2013). They had developed strategies to believe in alternative realities,
and to navigate political and economic networks in such a way that the most oppressive aspects of new
regimes could be avoided, and new opportunities spotted. The regimes, on the other hand, were just as
familiar with the parallel worlds that existed in the USSR, the hidden mobilities and their corrosive
powers. Thus one gets into a precarious rhetorical and political balance, where nobody believes the
official narratives on anything, nobody assumes that laws and plans are good and will be implemented, yet nobody knows when formal rules will have an impact. Different sections of the elites, and the elites (largely in government) and citizens hold each other hostage. Hidden mobilities are more necessary than ever, because Soviet opportunities are gone, no clear economic alternative is offered, and because the state is often parasitic, yet hiding them is more difficult.

Specialization is generally reduced, functional and organizational differentiation are being undermined by reliance on informal coordination under the radar, in networks that can be clan-based, family-based, ethnic-based or tied to local/regional business interests (Van Assche et al., 2013b). Short term survival and adaptation then decreases the stability of the community and its development potential in the long run (Hornidge et al. 2014, forthcoming). Indeed, the whole economic, bureaucratic and scientific apparatus of the Soviet era could no longer be sustained by the new, much poorer, Central Asian regimes (cf. Wegren, 1989), further hampered by the struggle for control over resources by factions within and behind government, based on factional interest in short-term profits, versus investments and long-term community benefits.

The ensuing mobilities had to be invisible largely, as the state and its allies (including banks) could not be trusted and for the state, the incentive to crack down and profit from them became ever larger because realistic taxation systems supporting collective services had not been developed (Kornai/Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Ruble et al, 2001).

Thus, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, making money is dangerous, showing it or investing it openly even more so. Owning land is very useful (in the form of long-term leases, or technically illegal subleases), but the meaning of ownership can change overnight as rules or their enforcement change (Eichholz et al., 2013). Living somewhere closer to economic opportunity is risky as probably one cannot get a residence permit (Tashkent is an example). Traveling within the country can be difficult because of restrictions; crossing borders for migrant work or trade is problematic, since the relations between countries are shaky and unpredictable and as the trade and taxation per country is unpredictable. All this drives mobilities even more into hiding, and reduces incentives for investment, skill development, and long-term visions (cf. in this working paper series: Steenberg, 2014; Ismailbekova, 2013a; Kuzibaeva, 2014, forthcoming). It also reinforces the reliance on informal networks that have to be monitored constantly.

Migration, internal economic mobility, criminal mobility, is all linked to a situation with limited economic opportunity, state capture, absent rule of law and incomplete control (Acemoglu/Robinson, 2012; Easterly, 2006). Physio-spatial, social and epistemic boundaries and the lines between scales are redrawn in the process of coping with this situation (cf. Ismailbekova, 2013b), in the hidden mobilities sparked off by coping strategies. Thus, one can say that for the USSR time and for the post-Soviet era, it is true that the regimes and their institutional design caused mobilities but also suppressed mobilities, driving mobilities into the invisible, making them less easy to manage, and less productive in the (legitimate) self-transformation of society. A circle of oppressive use of power is initiated in many places, whereas elsewhere, the structures of power collapse and with that, some of their beneficial effects (protection, collective goods, services).
Thus, in Deleuzian perspective, the post-Soviet mobilities are hidden for partly new and partly old reasons. The fact of invisibility per se is not a problem, the reliance on largely informal institutions neither. The changing map of social identities, the loss of an imperial center, is not to be deplored. Old restrictions have been lifted and others have been imposed, on all three mobilities. The new states are smaller assemblages and in some cases the actually productive assemblages, functioning as desiring machines, are only to be found at smaller scales. Life itself is not optimally organized in one configuration, marked by one set of scales and boundaries and mobilities transversing them, but the productivity of the configuration is what counts, for Deleuze a reproduction which brings difference and repetition, difference by means of repetition of interactions between rules and roles, between narrative and material elements. Micro-politics and micro-resistance are not past but future for Deleuze (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) and this can take place in any size of polity. Yet (cf. Hardt, 1993; De Landa, 2002), existence is coexistence of virtual and actual multiplicities and if the virtual becomes largely disconnected from the actual, the unfolding of individual and collective bodies, become thoroughly restricted; one can distinguish between a disconnect between virtual and actual and a reduction of the virtual per se, in the form of cynicism and oppression reducing the variety of imaginable individual and collective futures. Certain patterns of invisible mobilities, associated with specific configurations of formal/informal institutions can therefore be considered harmful for the social body and its future.

In the following sections, we go deeper into the Tajik and Uzbek cases, without attempting to fully map the patterns of mobility. This is beyond our present scope and the aim of this paper. We refer to the literature, including our previous work and rather present the cases as series of illustrations of the previous analysis and the mechanisms mentioned there.

4. Uzbek Mobilities

_Mobilities and the immobility of irrigation systems and production quota_

In Uzbekistan, millions of people live off irrigated agriculture and this agriculture is highly technical, dependent on an elaborate physical, organizational and scientific infrastructure dating mostly from the early Soviet period (for an overview over the water management system, see Hornidge et al. 2011a). After independence, the maintenance of the physical and organisational infrastructure was largely neglected, while scientific content production fared even worse (Wall, 2008; Veldwisch, 2008). Collective farms were dismantled in steps, making the local government, under leadership of the _hokim_, more important, and, as mentioned, a new class of quasi-autonomous farmers, or _fermers_ was created, consisting of former kolkhoz management but also people with various backgrounds and some money or connections (Veldwisch/ Spoor, 2008). The majority of former kolkhoz employees lost their jobs and many former career and learning tracks in the Soviet space (i.e. from the tractor mechanic in rural Uzbekistan to Tashkent, Moscow or a Sovkhoz in Kazakhstan) closed off. Thus, these mobilities disappeared, as the framework of Soviet agriculture disappeared (cf. Friedgut/Hahn, 1994; Ioffe et al., 2006), resulting in substantial (seasonal) labor migration of the (largely male) young to Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, sometimes China, as well as various forms of cross-border trade.
Those who stay in agriculture work under a state plan on cotton and wheat with sale at fixed prices to the state (Veldwisch, 2008; Hornidge et al. 2011; Hornidge et al. 2013). While of strategic importance to the government (cotton as main export product of Uzbekistan) there are little immediate benefits for the individual farmer (i.e. no cash income but merely income on account with access controlled by the government). This nevertheless looks very different in the field of rice production, not regulated by the state plan, but instead a locally marketed and consumed product. Here for the individual farmer interesting margins can be achieved, if he/she can free the land used for rice production from the state plan (i.e. for reasons of high salinization degrees) or keep the rice production out of sight of government actors. Informal coordination of production is thus required and since the rice starts as ‘informal’ product, several other steps in the chain towards consumption are likely to be informally coordinated. Trying to stay under the radar of government is virtually impossible, but one can try to be visible only for a few local government actors and ensure their help to stay out of reach for the rest. If there are other ties, beyond occasional bribes, this can help to stabilize this relationship and so networks grow that can create space for hidden mobilities at the local level. These networks in consequence contribute to a reshuffling of social identities, a redrawing of social boundaries (Oberkircher/Hornidge 2011; Hornidge et al. 2013; Eichholz et al. 2013).

**Building Networks / Redrawing social boundaries**

If we go back to the local level, and to the distinction farmer under stateplan/subsistent farmers and peasants (in Uzbek: *fermer/dekhqan*), one can uncover a few more mechanisms reigning the pattern of hidden mobilities. *Fermers* can lose their land, if they lose favor with political elites and/or clan/elite. *Dekhqans* lose their job on the *fermer’s* land, or their sublease, if they don’t get along with the *fermer*. *Dekhqans* can be involved in small trade at local markets. Sharecropping arrangements can allow to accumulate resources and engage more in trade; or subleases can be obtained of plots with decent fertility and water provision. Relations with the own *fermer*, with other *fermers*, with service providers, or market relations can stabilize the production on those lands, and local political relations can help in accessing useful networks, in some cases in sheltering semi-legal sales (Veldwisch 2008, Trevisani 2010, Shtaltovna 2013).

The need of *fermers* for skilled workers, their dependence on them in many cases and the need of *dekhqans* of services and shelter, encourage the creation of new networks, networks in turn assisting hidden mobilities (Oberkircher/Hornidge 2011). Money coming in from family members, sometimes remittances from the diaspora, can help in the business activities. One can speak here of a wide variety of forms of cooperation and contracts, mostly short-term, of constant experimentation, of old and new networks at the local scale, and of, as yet modest, hidden mobilities. Because there is no open land market, no private property of land, *dekhqans* cannot openly take over whole farms, as in *fermers’* operations, but they can become more important in trade, they can accumulate money, buy houses, become small scale landlords, employ their own people etc.
In some cases, this can mean a reliance on pre-existing but less relevant ties, in other cases new ties, new networks and new group identities are created in the flow of hidden mobilities. In the case of new identities, there can still be a reference to older identities or a pretense of survival of an old identity (Trevisani, 2010). Families can become more extended families and when symbolic kinship starts to play a role one can speak more of clans. Other clans do not refer to family mythologies but to a shared ethnic or regional past, while yet others consciously style themselves as factions sharing business interests (Collins, 2006). Local clans are embedded in or associated with clans at a higher level, at different scales, and the presidency can in fact be described as a mediator’s role, mediating between powerful clans. The mobilities in and between the clans are not entirely visible, also not for other clans, as the relation is usually competitive. The networks shaped by the clans and the ties of reciprocity, obligation and loyalty that are cultivated within them, are an important infrastructure for hidden mobilities (Kuzibaeva, forthcoming; Steenberg, 2014). In some cases, clans hollow out the state, either by capturing it, or by rendering it powerless. They ignore and redraw boundaries of various sorts, and their importance, as new or emboldened social identities is already a strong sign that social boundaries have been redrawn (Alff et al. submitted).

After the Soviet era, the regime in Uzbekistan became more authoritarian and many career paths were closed off for people outside the right families, clans, networks, but at the same time, necessity persists, and the need for food, water, land, and for cotton money, ensures that also outside these clans, other informalities and hidden mobilities mushroom (Van Assche et al. 2013, Hornidge et al. 2013). It also creates access to these networks, when newer small-scale successful families or factions become embedded in pre-existing larger networks, with small and large feeding off each other.

*Risks of visibility and visibility for whom?*

Success is a risk in this situation and this forms another obstacle for long term strategy and investment. Money has to be sheltered. Successful operations become more visible, because more are involved, because more land and water is taken, because more money and products are circulating, and then transaction costs rise. More people have to be bribed, a higher percentage of goods and profits has to be written off, expected to be lost somewhere in the chain. Higher levels, or competing social groups will notice your success, interested in skimming off any profitable business (in taking it over, or crushing it because of competition with the own business ventures). At a certain point, a choice has to be made, or will be forced: stopping, scaling back, working harder on invisibility, buying more official support, or, trying to become part of the establishment and participating in the controlling gaze.

Then, however, the question pops up what the establishment is, and how established it is. It is not very stable. Some regional clans have existed since Soviet times, others emerged right after independence, at smaller scales, the landscape of networks is more varied and changing. Some families have dominated a town for generations, while suddenly a new clan emerges, out of successful business ventures, with a few different political connections. Suddenly, someone can buy the *hokim* position, or be dropped in there from a higher level clan.
Many hokims are fired after a few years, either because they are perceived as a threat by the powers that launched them initially, or because at a higher level the balance of power changed. They can also be fired because their bribery was too rampant, not acceptable anymore for the locals and the higher authorities. This, too, is a self-reinforcing mechanism, a positive feedback loop: if hokims know that they can be fired easily, and pay a lot for their position the tendency to make money quickly is understandable, even if it contributes to their own demise. They cannot calculate the odds anyway (many ancient Roman public offices were sold, and similar mechanisms were prevalent). Downward mobility in an authoritarian regime can be very steep and the landing can be hard; one can end up in prison, lose one’s possessions. Hokims, but also fermers can lose everything, end up destitute. Network protection becomes even more important then, to reduce the chances of this happening.

5. Tajik Mobilities

A history of marginality and recent fragmentation

Tajikistan is a quite different case. The country is more mountainous, more remote, on average less fertile. In some valleys, there is irrigated cotton production, as in Uzbekistan, and in these areas, a system similar to the Uzbek one emerged, with politics and economy dominated by the ‘cotton elites’ (Boboyorov, 2012; Johnson, 2006). Cotton, as in Uzbekistan, is preferred because it brings in hard currency and because its profits are easy to siphon off. In some mountain areas, kolkhozi never took off. In others, they did take root and there usually the local kolkhoz management retained an important role in politics and economy afterwards. The local kolkhoz elites seem more contested (and contestable) than the cotton elites operating elsewhere and at higher levels. In this process of local contestation, various alternative identities and forms of organization are called upon, from family and ethnic loyalties over regional identities to –not in the least– different forms of Muslim identity and associated rules (Jones Luong, 2004; Thibault, 2013). Village councils exist in many places but do not always play an important role in collective decision-making. Sometimes they are powerful but de facto dominated by the kolkhoz elites or by one family. In other cases, they function more or less democratically, in yet other cases they perform a ritual of community, without real decisions ever being taken (Boboyorov, 2013; cf Taubman, 1973; Hahn, 1988). As agriculture here is even more tenuous than in Uzbekistan, access to land and water is even more crucial. Certain versions of Islamic law emerge and are utilized in local competition, that have a bearing on precisely these points; special reference has to be made to a law governing the inheritance of lands from grandparents (Boboyorov, 2012). Agricultural service provision was less developed than in the Uzbek SSR, and after independence, even less was left (Shtaltovna, 2013).

What enables this diversity in local governance, and this reference to competing identities and competing sets of institutions, is the splintering of the state (cf Ioffe, 2006; Ruble et al, 2001; Kavalski, 2013). Tajikistan is less than Uzbekistan a nation state, if we understand this concept to refer to a centralized state, with clear boundaries, a political and economic center, uniform and enforceable laws, an unambiguous governance structure (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In Tajikistan, the civil war that followed independence further undermined the fragile unity of the former SSR, and what is left now can
be described as a weak central government, with incomplete control over the borders and the territory, with strong ties to (and partly overlapping with) the cotton elites, and a government apparatus that is scattered geographically and topically and largely used for extractive and parasitic purposes.

Because western states and organizations are used and obliged often to deal with ‘the government’, they paradoxically keep in place a system that hinders reinvention (cf Ferguson, 1994). Western contacts are valuable, these can be obtained and exploited in the current structure and once a position is taken, this position and the system itself cannot be questioned or transformed easily. At the same time, the increased local autonomy created a lobby-group that cannot easily be ignored anymore, that cannot be easily be forced into a uniform mold (Van Assche et al., 2013b; Elster et al, 1998).

**Drivers of mobilities: positive and negative**

Mobilities then look a little different than in Uzbekistan. Local communities in most parts of the country changed a lot, transformed much, and this implies social, cognitive and physical mobility. Tajikistan is even more depleted of labor and intellect by mass migration to Russia, Kazakhstan and China (Jonson, 2013). Movement within the country is less restricted than in Uzbekistan and residence permits are less meaningful. In USSR times, the career ladders in rural areas were less developed than in Uzbekistan, and what existed, fragmented even more. Expertise is even more rare. Mobility as change of communities, received a stronger negative motivation, as the struggle for survival was harder and a stronger positive impetus, as more change was allowed, more institutional experimentation, more movement of people and ideas, more reference to competing identities and rules.

Other players were allowed onto the scene, and here the NGO sector deserves special mention (Shtaltovna, 2013; Hornidge et al., 2014a, forthcoming). Partly because of the geopolitical importance of Tajikistan, partly because of the institutional vacuum, a rich and diverse NGO sectors settled down in the country, sometimes with clearly political ties, sometimes with clear ties to certain perspectives on economic and political development, sometimes more pragmatic, or focused on smaller issues. The NGO sector was and is not unified and the concomitant focus on projects and their objectives and deliverables makes it hard and undesirable to re-crystallize governance around them.

They do introduce new mobilities, as the capital and infrastructure enable social mobility and their activities introduce new ideas, knowledge mobilities. As in other cases, physical, social and intellectual mobilities are entwined, and working for an NGO requires more travel, learning, and a route for social climbing. People with knowledge of English and of western ways in general gain an advantage, and people with prominent positions in the previous system become suddenly apprentices of new trainers, new NGO’s, with relatively little local knowledge (Hornidge et al., 2014a). This causes friction and de facto a downward social mobility for others.

As said, this does not affect all people with a position of influence in the old system; at local and national level, the major political and economic players still come from the old elites, and the higher level elites also use the NGO sector for their own purposes, either to parasitize directly, or to create opportunities
for themselves and their families, or for business improvement. Thus, the NGO sector at once keeps parts of the old elite in the saddle, and pushes other parts down. Those who lose ground already did so in the Tajik power games. Climbing very high through the NGO career ladder, without other connections, at this point seems very rare. A further step for people climbing the NGO ladder is often migration, to another NGO, a scientific institute, to the headquarter or another office of the same organization.

With the stronger erosion of Soviet infrastructure in Tajikistan, in intellectual and physical sense, and in the sense of offering career tracks (fewer organizations are left and are more in disarray), the effects on social memory are also different than in Uzbekistan. There, more ways are still present to transfer attitudes, knowledge, strategies, concepts pertaining to Soviet society and economy, while in Tajikistan the younger generations are less influenced by that past configuration of mobilities. And, as other side of the coin, by the past set of boundaries and scales. Both opportunity and limitation have been transformed to a higher degree.

**Fragmented structures present new freedoms and new limitations**

The state itself offered opportunities now gone, through its internal structure and flows and its absence offers opportunities, through new flows and vanished barriers. While the old structures also created ladders to climb and roads to travel. Absence in memory makes it harder to reinvent, to go back, absence in organizational structure and resources contribute to this (Weiner, 1999; Van Assche et al., 2009). The disappearing of political, economic structures and infrastructures makes it easier for new social boundaries to appear (Eriksen 2002; Pratt, 1999). In the case of Tajikistan, this often amounts to different versions of reinvention of tradition, usually in manners that are economically and politically advantageous for the inventors. Local political networks can be made more ‘Tajik’, more ‘Muslim’, more circled around the ‘big man’, more identified with a family or clan. In now more localized political games, players realign themselves according to the most stable local elite and their rules of the game.

Mobilities are less hidden than in Uzbekistan, since there is a more open competition between social identities, between associated rule sets and less coordinative (and oppressive) power of the state. This extends to the definition and functioning of criminal networks. Just as other networks, they tend to perpetuate themselves, but in the Tajik case, more than in most post-Soviet places, all players are doing things that can be called criminal. In the senses that law cannot always be enforced, that it does not always exist, that it can be written for private gain, or by criminals, that players combine various activities, some more hidden than others, that different rules can suddenly apply. ‘Law’ and therefore legality and illegality acquire unstable meanings and the state that can stabilize expectations according to a stable rule set does not expect (Luhmann, 2004; Rosen, 2008).

What remains are islands of economic and political competition tied together by a few economic networks, some apparently legal (cotton), some clearly illegal (narcotics, trafficking, weapons smuggle), and by a loosely coupled sector of NGO’s and other organizations supported by foreign money. This is quite far removed from the traditional western idea of a nation state, and the functioning of external
boundaries and internal scales should not be expected to be similar to a western nation state. One of the rare mechanisms keeping communities and the state together are negative notions of conflict and positive notions of harmony which seem to pervade most places and groups, and can effectively be invoked when tensions rise too much, e.g. at village councils (Boboyorov, 2012; Mandler, 2013;).

6. Discussion and conclusions

In this paper, we have explored the potential of the concept set of:

- mobilities (social, spatial, conceptual),
- boundaries (social, spatial, conceptual),
- scales, and
- formal/informal institutions

to compare the post-Soviet transitions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in particular the rural areas, and with special attention to what we called ‘hidden mobilities’, changes that remained under the radar. We articulated these concepts and their relations first in an extensive Deleuzian-inspired theoretical narrative.

In the case analysis, we deemed the importance of hidden mobilities higher in Uzbekistan, and this was tied to the stronger state, its more oppressive effects, its high expectations and limited opportunities. In Tajikistan, only certain networks and mobilities that were strongly frowned upon abroad, by donors and allies, most notably the narcotics trade, were −kind of− hidden. That is, they were a public secret, and the signs are everywhere, but they cannot be publicly acknowledged or supported, and nobody can openly declare gaining from them.

Also in Tajikistan, the more open competition between rule sets makes it harder to speak of formal and informal institutions in a stable configuration. Sometimes, there is open competition, and not one rule set which is expected to govern decision-making, and therefore not a clear formal/informal distinctions. In general, that distinction does exist, but it is a local one and the alternatives are not so much hidden for an all-seeing state, but used less openly in the small shade of local dominance. In other cases, such as in the cotton areas, there is clearly a reigning rule set, and avoidance is linked to informal institutions and hidden mobilities sparked by them.

Hidden mobilities and power/knowledge configurations

Hidden mobilities are thus tied to power, to centralized power, and to stable expectations for decision-making, expectations that are bucked. They are also tied to networks that grow in the shadow, in the shadow of power. Without power, there is no shadow and nothing to hide from. Without power, however, there are also fewer opportunities for open mobilities, physical, social and cognitive (Hillier, 2002; Gledhill, 1994; Foucault, 1975, 2003; Van Assche et al., 2011). The concept of power/knowledge configurations is still useful then (Van Assche et al., 2013c; Beunen et al., 2014). Power/knowledge
configurations guide and create mobilities, in all senses; they pattern the linkages between knowledge and the other mobilities (Thrift, 2006). Splintering of power is also splintering of knowledge; over-concentration of power often brings often overly dominant or hegemonic discourses. Yet absence of power in its organized forms makes it difficult to maintain an open competition between actors and between discourses and for any of them to survive beyond the local level (Patton, 2000; Nakaya, 2009).

Local autarky can bring indeed perfect local democracy, participation, mobilization of local knowledge, but it can also bring highly closed clan rule, internal closure and external hostility, sharp local social and cognitive boundaries, a very suffocating environment (cf Mansfield, 1993; Luhmann, 1990). It can also make it tough to climb the ladder in a structured manner, learning, competing according to accepted rules (cf Seabright, 2010; Seidl, 2005) and often the only routes of social mobility left are crime, submission or simply leaving, which does not contribute much to the further stabilization or development of the community (Shtaltovna et al, 2012; Sanghera & Ilyasov, 2008; Sahadea & Zanca, 2007).

Boundaries are constantly recreated in and by mobilities. Mobilities and hidden mobilities do not only erode boundaries, they create, on purpose and unwittingly new ones, and this also applies to the construction of spatial scales, of boundaries between levels of territory. In Uzbekistan, the reconfiguration of power within a strong hull of Soviet infrastructure made the scales of hokimiat more important, while blurring older lines and scales inherited from Soviet times. In Tajikistan, the scale of the local community, whatever its actual size, became overall more important, while other scales diminished in importance, to the extent that they do not exist anymore in many respects. Again, reconfiguration of power is reconfiguration of networks, of boundaries and scales, with changes in one type of boundary likely to cause changes in the other types (Dagiev, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2000; Shields, 2013). And power playing a role comparable to fire and structure at the same time: it represents a risk but is necessary; it is both constraining and enabling (Foucault, 1975). Power/ knowledge, as coupled entities without meaning by themselves, affect the other couplings, between boundaries, scales and hence social identities.

Power needs knowledge and knowledge needs power; and knowledge is permeated by power in manners that can never be fully elucidated, i.e.clarified without affecting positions of power and knowledge perspectives one is situated in (Foucault, 1968). Power also needs structure to reproduce and expand and it needs more knowledge in the process of expansion (Foucault, 1975; 2003). This process cements social identities and possible mobilities, but it also creates entities that can move, and infrastructures and scales and knowledge that can be reused, reinterpreted, twisted, and made to work in unanticipated ways (Whatmore, 2006; Thrift, 2008; Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). Power creates a world of abuse but also of use, it creates a world one can navigate in and the tools to navigate it. In a Deleuzian perspective, this Foucaultian insight becomes even more radical, when mobilities are seen as intensely entwined and able to create new realities in and by themselves (Deleuze, 1988a; Zizek, 2008).
Hidden mobilities and the post-Soviet condition: elite games and the rest

In the post-Soviet world, the splintering of the USSR, its partial replacement in different ways in each of the republics, and the transformation of actors, institutions and networks in unique manners, offers a unique set of experiments, a unique window into the entangling of mobilities. The scale and the concept of the nation state is not always useful indeed and the scale of ‘Central Asia’, is not always relevant. Similarly, the distinction between formal and informal institutions is not always relevant, and is made differently according to the context, and the pattern of mobilities. It is still useful however, as, just as with boundaries, new formalities and their informalities are constantly created as de-territorialization leads again into phases of re-territorialization. In most post-Soviet states, elites emerged that have something to do with the previous elites but cannot be reduced to them (Schoeberlein, 1994; Suny, 1995; Critchlow, 1988). There is path dependence but not only that. The primal mobility in the emergence of these states was the emergence, rise and consolidation of these elites, using state assets and connections, in combination often with criminal connections and informal networks, in some cases with western aspirations, knowledge and linkages (Ledeneva, 2013; Bissell, 2010; Remnick, 1997; Ruble, 1995). This mobility was primal in the sense that it was foundational; most other things derived and were framed by them. Where no clear outcome emerge, as in Tajikistan, the state fragmented, driving people either to the local scale or into exile.

Where clear winners emerged, where an elite consolidated, maybe as clan alliance as in Uzbekistan (or, in lighter version, Ukraine), mobilities were redefined and restricted. In case the state required much but did not offer much, mobilities were necessary but more hidden and a clear distinction between formal and informal institutions stabilized. In cases where laws and rules could change unexpectedly, and are applied unevenly, this made time horizons with most players shorter, and pushed even more mobilities into hiding, making the infrastructures of hidden mobility, such as networks, even more entrenched.

For Deleuze, beings are not elements then entering into relations of power, and wholes e.g. social wholes, do not pre-exist elements. Neither the element nor the whole is essential in the analysis of communities; beings are forces, forces create relations and sets of relations can create assemblages and machinic assemblages. Power is the power to, and beings are becomings because they are first of all powers in motion, reshaping relations reshaping larger wholes. Power most often associated with the state is reactive power, intending to keep something in place which cannot be kept the same and hampering the unfolding of creative rhizomes. States create subjectivities which are needed to reproduce the rhizome, but keeping those subjectivities in one state of being, hampers its reproduction. Reproduction is necessarily self-transformation and the structure of rules and roles, of boundaries, identities and scales, is a necessity as starting point of its own reproduction.

What is oppressive can therefore not easily be observed from the outside, and from the inside, there is no point from which to observe every place and relation. Each observation already is a contact between various bodies, between actual and virtual, that produces new rhizomatic connections and which establishes a new angle and a new whole. Once again, informality nor invisibility per se pose a problem.
or a negativity in such perspective. In post-Soviet Central Asia, one can say though that the specific differences between visible and invisible forms of coordination, rules and roles, makes self-transformation difficult in patterns which incorporate images of viable futures in a globalized world. One can say that some of the current regimes can survive only because of such globalized capitalism (from which they can derive capital). If what is truly moving people, the affects driving mobilities in the different forms described, cannot become visible, cannot become materialized, then this lack of materialization as becoming-visible and becoming-tangible, makes it harder to restructure the virtual, to keep the desiring machine going, to harness the expressive powers of bodies. What cannot become visible in this sense cannot be folded into social bodies; social affects cannot be expressed and materialized. In this sense, invisibility, and this form of reliance on informality, can make it hard for social identities to survive in meaningful ways beyond survival. ‘Society’ as a whole can easily erode under such conditions, and lower authoritarian pressure could easily lead to mass migration or mass revolt. Yet even such revolt, in Deleuzian view, cannot easily express an alternative vision, not only because of a prior lack of information or education, but also because the identities that are supposed to express alternative futures, are largely paper and reactive (survivalist) and barely capable of collective affects, of passions for a shared future and for a sense of such shared future.

The differences between our two case countries meanwhile attest to the difficulty in assessing risk at this level. Invisibility in the sense analyzed above and fragmentation, as discussed above, acquire different forms and functions, in response to different assemblages, different legacies of rules and roles, of power/knowledge configurations. Where invisibility dominates, the actual state of fragmentation is hard to assess, as is the actual power of a central government. Where fragmentation is a more important obstacle to self-realization, the local differences in visibility might in the end still impact an emerging whole and its trajectory of unfolding. From the scientific side, one can say that new concepts of statehood need to be explored, as it is obvious that new control societies are not the same as in Stalinist days, even when they might appear so to some outsiders, and not as in later Soviet days, even if they appear so (Krasner, 1984; cf Kangas,1994). Even the history of gaps between formal and informal institutions do not mean that current gaps have the same effects. Grasping what has happened and how the assemblages have transformed, means mapping what is under the radar and finding the new reasons and effects of invisibility. This leads to new assessments, which can only become possible if new affects (versus generic outrties of oppression) and new concepts (most of all new concepts of statehood, of scales, of entangled networks) can be explored (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Such new concepts can produce new ones, make new cuts in reality, create new realities, which might, just might, later have effects in the places themselves, allowing for new virtualities locally, and hence new mobilities, lines of flight, a new machine (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

Post-Soviet hidden mobilities: perspectives on ‘development’

The Soviet empire enabled and discouraged mobilities, including its own forms of hidden mobilities, linked to networks and informal institutions that can only be understood by reference to the formal regime. When the center did not hold and the Central Asian republics reluctantly accepted their independence, what was carried over was diverse, including but not limited to a structural difference
between formal and informal institutions, hidden clans and networks, strategies to deal with scarcity and uneven law, as well as links in other republics. The old republics were not designed to function independently and they experienced hardship afterwards. People moved out of necessity, back to the other parts of the old Union and they relied on old strategies to survive. Yet, there was much less to take from, to use, to parasitize, less opportunities for business etc. This applied to the elites and to the rest. Elites created their own domain where they could, destroyed the domain of the state where they did not agree, to the detriment of themselves and all the rest. Others had to accept, to move out, to move in the shadows, or to rely on power games in smaller arenas.

If we consider in this light the opportunities for ‘development’, the diversity of post-Soviet pathways can tell many things. First of all it reinforces the notion that no formula for development can be found in the west and applied everywhere else (cf. Easterly, 2006; North, 2005; Seabright, 2010; Scott, 1998). Whether the formula consists of legal and political reforms, or of knowledge or physical infrastructure, one cannot simply transplant it to any post-Soviet reality. Furthermore, one can observe, especially in Tajikistan, the limits of intervention, in the sense that NGO’s and international organizations are partly blinded by their own ideologies, deliverables, power games, urge to survive and in the sense that the splintered or hidden realities, including mobilities, do not match up with western interventions assuming the infrastructure, the boundaries and scales, the rule of law, of a western nation state.

In terms of the functions of law, as special form of formal institutions, the patterns of mobilities described and analyzed for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, suggest that development efforts should be strongly aware of the limitations of a legal reform approach. The entanglement of mobilities as described (cf Cresswell, 2006, 2010; Jacobs & van Assche, 2014), the pattern of boundary and identity transformation (Paasi, 2002), as well as the need for mutual support of the three functions of law described (enabling, delimiting and upholding), make this a very unlikely route towards development, however understood (Easterly, 2006; Collier, 2007).

Our illustrative cases also show that mythologizing the local scale, the scale of the local community as the best site to do development work, to insert interventions, allowing thus for more diversity, more local knowledge and participation, is not a good strategy (Van Assche et al, 2011; Hahn, 1988; Buchanan, 2006). Localism has its dark sides, just as globalism and lionizing one scale over the other does not make much sense analytically or practically (Swyngedouw, 2000; McCann & Ward, 2013; Marston et al, 2005). Especially in Tajikistan, one can also notice that localism in absence of stable institutions at higher levels severely hinders social justice, in whatever definition taken, social mobility, knowledge mobility and encourages the proliferation of criminal networks, in whatever definition preferred.

**Rethinking development given hidden mobilities = Rethinking the Nation State**

One could draw the conclusion that dropping the whole concept of the nation state and its set of development models should be abandoned, in favor of an approach that only considers networks or configurations. While we agree on the analytic value of an approach giving due space to concepts of network, configuration, mobilities and boundary crossing and transformation, in practical terms this
poses great problems. The world is organized in nation states and both the supra-national and the infra-national scales still assume the presence of nation states. Meanwhile, it is also clear that imposing the structures and necessarily underlying values (and informal institutions) of western nation states in Central Asia is a risky, costly and questionable approach.

We cannot pretend to have simple answers here, but we do dare to say that any intervention aiming at knowledge, social or physical mobilities in order to further development, has to consider their entanglement, has to consider the centrality of power/knowledge configurations and hence of governance, in its current pattern, and has to consider current actor/institution configurations and their evolution. In some cases, this might lead to choices of intervention or support at one scale, or working on one type of boundary, while in other cases the result of analysis might be to leave the place and the community alone. Regarding the model of the western nation state, there we dare to venture that increased awareness in the west, in politics and in the world of development specialists, of the own history, and of the diversity in models of democracies and markets, might help to see more diversity in possible solutions to problems elsewhere and to get a more refined understanding of situations there. Indeed very broadly speaking, one can say that this will not completely resolve the tension between the model of the nation state and actually existing political configurations in Central Asia, that a continuous friction between models has to be accepted as part of development efforts, and that a chain of brokers will be needed for a long time to come, to explore which notions, resources, structures, procedures from the west might be desirable and workable in certain locales.

Again very much in general, one can suggest that awareness of the relative fictitiousness of many Central Asian nation states, and of the gap between formal and formal institutions, of the hidden mobilities and fragmented politics, can help in assessing strategies. Awareness that nation states are partly fictions, can still be coupled to a rhetorical promotion of the nation state, which can have performative effects, create its own realities, including some of the distinct benefits of the nation state. An underlying strategy can then be to accept that other political configurations exist, that their mobilities cannot be simply suppressed or ignored, and that focus of development efforts should rather be on certain agreed-upon values. This can include a reference to human rights, but not necessarily. If a certain regime hinders social mobility, knowledge mobility and physical mobility in a manner that is found unacceptable by the world community, then this might be a starting point for interventions working in the direction of restoring flows, without losing sight of the enabling effects of political-legal structures, of power/ knowledge configurations (cf Baerenholdt, 2013). One can use terminology of justice, of fairness, of representation, without implying the machinery of most western states. Knowledge (cf WB, 1999) in this perspective can only have desirable development effects if it can renew itself, i.e. can create new concepts and build those into new analysis. Knowledge cannot be filling in gaps of ‘information’ in a framework either defined by western governments or local power structures and taking into account hidden mobilities can help in integrating scales and boundaries differently in analysis. Mobilities also have to be analyzed in their material context, since materialities in a Deleuzian flat ontologies co-create anything else and in terms of mobilities, they co-create the landscape of necessity triggering mobilities and the identities evaluating that necessity (Whatmore, 2006; Thrift, 2006). Applicable knowledge, in line with Urry’s ‘sociology without societies’ (2000) and with a
Deleuzian framework, follows then the scales created as relevant in mobilities, the identities, boundaries and concepts relevant in the becoming of communities. The resulting development strategies do however require, we believe, a stable institutional structure at some higher scale, beyond the local community, a scale allowing for mobilities, fairness and allowing for matching with international communities and their understandings of the world.
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The competence network Crossroads Asia derives its name from the geographical area extending from eastern Iran to western China and from the Aral Sea to northern India. The scholars collaborating in the competence network pursue a novel, ‘post-area studies’ approach, making thematic figurations and mobility the overarching perspectives of their research in Crossroads Asia. The concept of figuration implies that changes, minor or major, within one element of a constellation always affect the constellation as a whole; the network will test the value of this concept for understanding the complex structures framed by the cultural, political and socio-economic contexts in Crossroads Asia. Mobility is the other key concept for studying Crossroads Asia, which has always been a space of entangled interaction and communication, with human beings, ideas and commodities on the move across and beyond cultural, social and political borders. Figurations and mobility thus form the analytical frame of all three main thematic foci of our research: conflict, migration, and development.

• Five sub-projects in the working group “Conflict” will focus upon specific localized conflict-figurations and their relation to structural changes, from the interplay of global politics, the erosion of statehood, and globalization effects from above and below, to local struggles for autonomy, urban-rural dynamics and phenomena of diaspora. To gain a deeper understanding of the rationales and dynamics of conflict in Crossroads Asia, the sub-projects aim to analyze the logics of the genesis and transformation of conflictual figurations, and to investigate autochthonous conceptions of, and modes of dealing with conflicts. Particular attention will be given to the interdependence of conflict(s) and mobility.

• Six sub-projects in the working group “Migration” aim to map out trans-local figurations (networks and flows) within Crossroads Asia as well as figurations extending into both neighboring and distant areas (Arabian Peninsula, Russia, Europe, Australia, America). The main research question addresses how basic organizational and functional networks are structured, and how these structures affect what is on the move (people, commodities, ideas etc.). Conceptualizing empirical methods for mapping mobility and complex connectivities in trans-local spaces is a genuine desideratum. The aim of the working group is to refine the method of qualitative network analysis, which includes flows as well as their structures of operation, and to map mobility and explain mobility patterns.

• In the “Development”-working group four sub-projects are focusing on the effects of spatial movements (flows) and interwoven networks at the micro level with regard to processes of long-term social change, and with a special focus on locally perceived livelihood opportunities and their potential for implementation. The four sub-projects focus on two fundamental aspects: first, on structural changes in processes of transformation of patterns of allocation and distribution of resources, which are contested both at the household level and between individual and government agents; secondly, on forms of social mobility, which may create new opportunities, but may also cause the persistence of social inequality.

The competence network understands itself as a mediator between the academic study of Crossroads Asia and efforts to meet the high demand for information on this area in politics and the public. Findings of the project will feed back into academic teaching, research outside the limits of the competence network, and public relations efforts. Further information on Crossroads Asia is available at www.crossroads-asia.de.
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