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The Urbanization of the Periphery: A Spatio-Temporal History of Lyon since the Eighteenth Century

Susanne Rau*

Abstract: »Die Urbanisierung der Peripherie: Eine raumzeitliche Betrachtungsweise der Stadt Lyon seit dem 18. Jahrhundert.« Suburbs have mostly received attention in recent years as social hot spots. An examination of the history of urban planning and expansion reveals a fundamental paradox, for it became apparent very early on that living space does not lend itself so readily to planning. Although the rise of suburbs is usually associated with the nineteenth century, a few "early bloomers" can be identified in urban history. Architects such as Antoine-Michel Perrache and Jean-Antoine Morand, who designed expansion projects in the south and in the east of the city of Lyon, became veritable city planners, if not choreographers, of the suburbs. However, the projects were not realized – at least partially – for nearly another 100 years (when the initiators were long dead). The history of planning and realizing the urban periphery thus resembles a dialectical movement of spatial visions and partial failure, entailing temporal setbacks which lead to a synthesis of the half-planned and half-unforeseen. Yet theories of the production of space offer insufficient explanations of the complex spatio-temporality of urbanization processes. Using the example of the Lyon projects, the essay argues that a description of processes of urban expansion must take into account such temporal phenomena as vision, retrospection, hope, and delay.

Keywords: Urban history, suburbanization, town-planning, center-periphery, Henri Lefebvre.

1. Suburbanization

Urban peripheries have entered the purview of a wider public in the last decades for several reasons. For one, suburbs are primarily associated with North-American cities (Müller and Rohr-Zänker 2001, 28f.). In the USA, which reigns as the utter prototype of suburban society, the development goes back to the late nineteenth century, when the first industrial satellite cities were built. Suburban housing areas quickly followed, which were initially reserved for the more affluent inhabitants. After the middle of the twentieth century, people with less buying power could also afford to reside in the settlements outside of Lyon.
cities. This gave rise to shopping centers and office parks which are no longer solely characteristic of the North-American city but were soon imitated by European cities and even after the “Change” (Wende) of 1989 were copied in a row of east European cities. In a final step, the suburban downtowns which formed in the 1980s (with their concentration of economic areas, capital, and work) introduced the transition into the post-suburban society (with a polycentric structure). Secondly, suburbs are often social hotspots, as displayed by the widely discussed incidents in Paris in 2005 which spread to Toulouse, Lyon, and Strasbourg (Donzelot 2006; Tissot 2007; Lapeyronnie 2008). Thirdly, construction projects have been undertaken in urban peripheries for a while now that introduce a new era of urbanization. One thinks of the futuristic large-scale project of Hamburg’s HafenCity, which began with the transformation of the – now partially musealized – old warehouse district in the 1990s and made headlines in recent years due to the exploding costs of the new concert hall bearing the name “Elbphilharmonie.” A similar project for a “waterside city” can be found in the French city of Lyon: the project “Lyon Confluence,” named after the confluence of the Rhône and Saône rivers. This project consciously attempts not to create a separate new city quarter, but to integrate the new quarter into the traffic and administration of the older city.1

Urban expansion projects are by no means an invention of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Existing scholarship assumes that such projects began in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century, as industrialization and population growth led to an increase in the degree of urbanization (Pinol and Walter 2003, 22f., 27-30, 137-42; Lenger 2012, 157-72). Yet Anthony Sutcliffe (1981) emphasizes as well the historical precursors since the end of the eighteenth century. The expansion plan (ensanche) by Ildefons Cerdà for Barcelona (1859) constitutes for research on city planning an important caesura (Rodríguez-Lores 1980; Santa-Maria Batlló 2009). Commissioned by the central government of Madrid, the engineer developed a theory of city planning in 1859, as well as a general theory of urbanization, that was published in 1867 (Cerdà 1991 [1859], 1867). However, earlier urban expansion projects can be identified: in Ferrara, Palermo, and Antwerp in the sixteenth century, in Marseille and Toulon in the seventeenth century, in Bordeaux, Nantes, Lyon, and Le Havre in the eighteenth century (Lavedan, Hugueney and Henrat 1982, 47f., 62f., 167-72; Kuhn 2006). Not included in this list are the numerous inner-city projects, or the many constructions of new cities (fortress cities, residential cities, exiled Protestant cities). Yet altogether, writes Harouel (1993, 313), most of the larger construction projects in the eighteenth century seem to have affected the urban peripheries. Then, as now, these construction projects are not only combined with the creation of living space and workspace, but also with

the emergence of problems. Expansions do not simply magnify the surface, but also transform the spatial relations within a city and thereby affect the perceptions and ways of life of its inhabitants and visitors.

2. Towards an Analysis of Urban Spaces

The study of the history of planning and implementation of urban expansion reveals a fundamental problem, for it became clear early on that spaces of living do not so readily lend themselves to planning. In order to explicate this problem with reference to an early example, I consider in what follows the Rhône city Lyon, where two competing large-scale projects in the eighteenth century – unlike in Marseille in the seventeenth century – were not initiated by the king but by city-dwellers. These projects evoke a form of collective shaping of urban space *avant la lettre*, such as the one called for by the French sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre in his book *Le droit à la ville* in the face of the process of urbanization (and its negative effects) in the postwar years (Lefebvre 1968; Schmidt 2011). Even if the agents back then were experts rather than a broader urban movement, they were nonetheless concerned with the possibility of shaping urban culture as well as the appropriation of urban or peri-urban spaces. The history of the planning and implementation of the periphery of Lyon offers a suitable object of analysis due to its spatio-temporal complexity. Here, visions, plans, delays, setbacks, partial failures, and realizations of the absolutely unplanned come together in a way that challenges the standard historical narrative oriented toward a linear chronology.

We can make use of the works of Henri Lefebvre once more for the analysis of urban spaces (Lefebvre 1970, 2000 [1974], 48f.; cf. Rau 2013, 47-50). According to him, urban space is “produced” by social practices. Spaces are not simply to be understood abstractly, but as ascertained by the senses and the body. His triad of perceived (*espace perçu*), conceived (*espace conçu*), and experienced (*espace vécu*) space can be fruitfully applied to the history of city planning, for it is through such a process that living spaces are planned which are perceived and used by different agents and which thereby become a symbol or stabilizing element for individuals or groups. However, in order to account for phenomena such as expectations, i.e., projections into the future (the planning of space), probabilities (land speculation) and setbacks (delays due to technical problems, funding shortfalls, institutional resistances) as integral parts of the process of the urbanization of city peripheries, Lefebvre’s tripartite concept of space requires the addition of a temporal perspective.
3. Transformations of Urban Space

Before I attempt to reconstruct the history of an early instance of the planning of an urban periphery – from the first, quickly sunken visions, to the concrete planning, historicizations, hopes and disappointments, competitions, obstacles and delays, to the partial realization – between approximately 1740 and 1860, I will illustrate the condition of “before” and “after” with the aid of two contemporary maps (see figures 1 and 2). Older studies of local history do exist, but they work largely without evidence (Leroudier 1910, 1921), whereas what follows is based primarily on archival research.

3.1 Lyon 1745

In the middle of the eighteenth century, the urban body of Lyon was still relatively compact. The Saône meandered through the middle of town and divided it into two (unequal) halves: on the right lay the old bishop’s town with the quarters of Saint-Paul, Saint-Jean, and Saint-Georges, while to the left lay the former merchant’s town with the quarters of Saint-Vincent, Saint-Nizier, and Ainay. The city was still to a large extent enclosed by walls and bordered to the east by the Rhône. The riverbed featured various islands, in the south the Île Mognat (or Mogniat). In the more southern part of the city, in the vicinity of the Hôtel-Dieu, an old stone bridge led over the Rhône to the village of La Guillotière, which on the map still has the form of a one-street village. The city map, drawn by the royal engineer Nicolas-François Deville between March and May of 1745, is however not a pure reproduction in the sense of a detailed description. The hand-written supplement on the bottom left of the map specifies that in particular the public buildings and churches (in black), the properties of the men’s convent (in blue), and those of the women’s convent (in yellow) are shown (which unfortunately cannot be reproduced here in color). The walls, paths, and bridges are red. In addition, the map contains construction projects, in other words, not yet realized elements (also marked in black).

3.2 Lyon 1861

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the city looked significantly different. Both rivers are unmistakable. The map, which is known for its excellent topographical exactitude, was drawn on behalf of the city by Joseph Benoît Laurent Dignoscyo (1795-1876) and his son Claude Joseph Dignoscyo (1825-1897). Yet this map, too, contains new projects, namely, a few street construction projects, particularly in the eastern part of the city. Compared to 1745, the city had already assumed an entirely new form. A considerable extension is observable in the south of the city. The eastern part of the city (Rive gauche of the
Figure 1: City Map of Lyon and its Surroundings, 1745
Figure 2: Topographical Map of the City of Lyon and its Surroundings, 1861
Rhône) is already larger in terms of surface measure (if not in terms of construction density) than the core of the city. A denser settlement is discernible beyond the northern border as well (Croix-Rousse). Deville had apparently neglected to draw on his map the few houses which already existed in the eighteenth century.

What happened during the time in between? To start with the forms and facts: Lyon experienced two extensive expansions towards the south and the east. The part south of the former abbey Ainay had to be almost completely created by shifting the confluence of the Rhône and Saône. Another new district arose on the other side of the Rhône, yet it could be tied to the already existing La Guillotière. While it is unknown when the suburb was founded, some of the first houses are mentioned already in the late middle ages. As long as the Rhône Bridge remained the only bridge over the Rhône near Lyon, the village served as a type of transit village that one had to pass through in order to reach Savoy and the Dauphiné (Kleinclausz 1925, 333-58). Corresponding houses and activities could be found there: inns, wine taverns, transportation businesses, stables. It was occasionally a site of clandestinity as well: In the time of their exclusion, Protestants would meet there; it was also complained that there was an active black market. Until long into the eighteenth century, the region was rural; a few castles can be found on older maps. In 1705, the city of Lyon assumed jurisdiction over police and law from the archbishop. Yet only in 1852 did La Guillotière become an arrondissement and was thereby fully integrated into the administration of the city of Lyon (Jambon 2010; Zeller 2012). Interestingly, the “Arrondissement de la Guillotière” was already described in a guide book from 1847, which presumably can be attributed to the fact that La Guillotière was already assigned to the Rhône-Département in the years of the Revolution (Combe and Charavay 1847, 269-73).

A completely new city district was created north of La Guillotière, Les Brotteaux, which on the map from 1861 looks like it has already been merged with La Guillotière. The many new houses that can be seen on the map by Dignoscyo had, of course, their inhabitants. A reason for the spatial expansion of Lyon lies in population development. The number of inhabitants had multiplied by two-and-a-half between 1700 and 1860 (Garden 1970, 25-42; Pinol 1996, 316).

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2 Justus Zinzerling wrote at the beginning of the seventeenth century that there were several inns and wine taverns with affiliated gardens. In spring, a large portion of the inhabitants, of both sexes, would go there during festivals for amusement: „Diversoria et tabernae vitnariae cum contiguis hortis et viridariis in hoc suburbio sunt plurima. Diebusque festis magna utrusque sexus incolarum portio animi causa tempore verno expatiatur.“ (Sincerus 1649 [1616], 182).
This development also had implications for the relationship between center and periphery. By the middle of the nineteenth century, contemporary observers already noticed a significant change in spatial relations: “Cette nouvelle ville a un avenir immense, elle menace d’absorber Lyon.” (Combe and Charavay 1847, 271) It seemed that this “new city,” as La Guillotière was called, might one day “absorb” Lyon. Earlier travel guides had, if they even mentioned La Guillotière at all, still referred to it as the “faubourg” (suburb, outskirts) (Chambet 1818, 144). In 1826, Cochard (1826, 46f.) still described it as “faubourg,” but attested to its considerable population of 12,000. The neighboring quarter Les Brotteaux is said to herald a new city. Combe and Charavay confirm in 1847 the continual transformations: the straightening of old streets, the construction of new ones, the creation of splendid public squares, monuments, of a courthouse, a park, even of a naumachia. Yet this part of the city is only really large when connected to the mother city (ville-mère) – which will also soon occur, they conclude (Combe and Charavay 1847, 271f.). The rapid transformations in the city were hence thoroughly noticed by nineteenth-century contemporaries. Yet arriving at this point was all but simple.

The history of the expansion of the city should therefore be told once again from the initial emergence of the idea, to the tough negotiations, to the beginning of the work, and, to be sure, from the perspective of contemporaries, both agents and observers. In this way, space appears, entirely in Lefebvre’s sense, as conceived, perceived, and lived – from completely different persons and watchtowers. Yet negotiations of the projects and constructions of space take time as well, sometimes even an inordinate amount of time, resulting not only in delays but also in unrealized projects.

Theoretically, spreading into the periphery in times of population growth does not have to be the only solution to the problem. Yet on the Presqu’île, the peninsula between the two rivers, nearly all possibilities for concentration were exhausted. The buildable surface was so slight because the churches and convents occupied most of the ground. The integration of the suburbs (Vaise, La Guillotière) would have been another option, but would not have really solved the problem of space. A complicated legal situation, moreover, was affiliated with the eastern suburb La Guillotière.

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3 “Si la plaine de Brotteaux était moins sujette aux inondations du fleuve, une nouvelle ville ne tarderait pas à s’y manifester” (Cochard 1826, 55).
4. Expansion Projects for the Urban Periphery

Alongside the previously mentioned city maps and plans as well as city descriptions (by travellers and inhabitants), this study is based on architecture treatises, council orders, and especially the documents of the family “Morand de Jouffrey” held by the city archive of Lyon. In urban history, the grand expansion projects of Lyon in the eighteenth century are usually connected with the names Morand and Perrache (Lavedan, Hugueney and Henrat 1982, 171f.). However, two advances were already made around thirty years before.

4.1 Early Visions

The first attempt to solve the threatening problem of overpopulation by developing the city’s periphery can be attributed to the architect Guillaume-Marie Delorme (1700-1782), who in 1738 presented to the Academy of Fine Arts in Lyon an expansion project which envisioned connecting the southern tip of the Presqu’île with the island Mogniat (Cottin 1977, 52f.). According to his calculations, 107 houses could be built and at least 10,700 people could live on the newly acquired terrain. So could the 6,600 persons from the Saône Bank be resettled, and in addition there would be sufficient space for others. Delorme was not able, however, to refute the prejudices and objections to his project, so that it failed for the time being.

The second attempt at a solution for the virulent problem of space emanated from a petition to the city council in the beginning of the 1740s, as the city numbered an estimated 110,000 inhabitants. The 76-page Mémoire, whose author is not named, ends with a few – for the first half of the eighteenth century, revolutionary – suggestions for the “internal” enlargement of the city: first, one of the three Jesuit convents should be demolished, and only the large and the small Jesuit colleges should remain standing. For other religious orders with numerous houses in the city, it is recommended that they be moved into a single building. Secondly, streets should be built on the property of some of the convents. Thirdly, the religious communities should be obligated to sell lots to merchants and townspeople, so that they could live near their businesses and workplaces. Finally, also mentioned is the possibility of an expansion of the city on the other side of the Rhône as well as in the south of town – by

4 Archives Municipales de Lyon: Papiers Morand de Jouffrey (cote: 600386), vol. 1: inventory.
5 These early – failed – projects will be discussed later.
6 Bibliothèque de l’Académie de Lyon, Ms. 307, fol. 153v-168v (11 December 1738, 27 April 1739); see as well: Archives municipales de Lyon, DD 275, nr. 1 (plan incl.).
7 Archives municipales de Lyon, DD 274, nr. 4, Mémoire sur la nécessité d’agrandir la ville de Lyon avec les motifs qui y engagent et les moyens de l’agrandir et de l’embellir.
8 Archives municipales de Lyon, DD 274, nr. 4 (pièce 61), Mémoire, unpaginated (48).
annexation of the island of Mogniat.\textsuperscript{9} 194 hectares (1,500 \textit{bicherées}) would thereby be gained. For the time being, however, this project also never left the planning stage. That the population problem in the first half of the eighteenth century was regarded as virulent is to be seen against the backdrop of a tripling of the number of inhabitants over the course of the seventeenth century as well as the exhaustion of possibilities for internally expanding the city (Zeller 1983; Bayard 1997, 109f.).\textsuperscript{10}

4.2 Thirty Years Later – A New Attempt

By no means were the problems of the city solved by the middle of the eighteenth century. Yet Jean-Antoine Morand and Antoine-Michel Perrache, the initiators of both of the new large-scale projects, were apparently able to wield greater powers of persuasion to get their projects underway. The reasons given by both for the necessity of an expansion were the same as thirty years before: a housing deficit and high rents. Economic and traffic aspects also came to bear, for instance, the matter of improved accessibility to the important commercial town by connection to the major streets of the country. In 1769, a merchant complained in an anonymously published pamphlet that the city was very difficult to reach and the roads through the outskirts were nearly impassable. Nor were any alternative ways available to transport goods, the merchant continued, other than along the rivers. Of all the street construction projects, so far only the street to Bresse over Fort Saint-Clair has been completed (Lettre 1769, 3). Morand’s project essentially consisted in expanding the city east of the Rhône and toward the north, but including La Guillotière. Perrache took up here one of Delorme’s ideas. His plan intended to expand the city in the south by filling one of the channels of the Rhône and connecting the island of Mogniat in order to acquire more land. The complaints of the anonymous merchant reveal, however, that the expansion projects of both architects were at least discursively embedded in a larger context. The interest of the merchant aristocracy in Lyon lay in making the city more accessible and in integrating it into the road system of the kingdom.

As a biographical note to both of the “choreographers” of Lyon’s periphery, all that will be said here is that neither one of them was an educated city planner or architect. Jean-Antoine Morand (1727-1794) began as a decorator (of city festivals and interiors such as the comedy house or the concert hall). In the 1750s, he met Jacques-Germain Soufflot, with whom he worked for several

\textsuperscript{9} Archives municipales de Lyon, DD 274, nr. 4 (pièce 61), Mémoire, unpaginated (49f).

\textsuperscript{10} On prior measures, see: Archives départementales du Rhône, 12 G 107, 30 June 1512 (Resolution); Rivet 1951, 5f. See also the plan of the royal architects: Archives municipales de Lyon, 1 S 00113, Projet d’une cité administrative dans un jardin public, 17 September 1677; Kleinclausz 1925, 256f. and 298; Charre 1980; Harouel 1993, 87; Archives Nationales E 2301; Pérouse de Montclos 2004, 49, 116.
years before dedicating himself in 1764 to the conception of a new city district. He was familiar with projects in Parma and in Trévoux (Audin and Vial 1992, 55; Reynard 2009). Antoine-Michel Perrache (1726-1779) began as a sculptor (ibid., 98f.). He too had worked on behalf of the city, which is why, for instance, both statues of the new loggia depicting Europe and Asia at place du Change are by him. In 1766, he started the project of city expansion towards the south for which the confluence of the Rhône and Saône was to be moved about two kilometers to the south. The concrete urban construction projects of both self-made architects, who were occasionally referred to as ‘engineers,’ can be reconstructed relatively well with the help of the plans designed by them.

4.2.1 Eastern Expansion

The plan drawn on Morand’s map was not his very own idea, but stood in the tradition of thoughts about how to enlarge the city described above. After the realization of a few of the smaller construction projects commissioned by the city and the at least financial participation in the construction of the district of Saint-Clair, he began to plan the periphery in 1764. The “plan général” is often referred to as the “plan circulaire,” because Morand was preoccupied with the construction of a city in round form, which is also apparent from the circular form indicated on the map. It is asserted that this is the first zoning map of Lyon (Hours and Nicolas 1985, 10), which is only correct, however, if this is taken to mean a construction project that is, first – and in contrast to the repeatedly undertaken yet selective “décorations” and “embellissements”– large-scale and, second, was at least rudimentarily realized. For Delorme’s proposal did already exist, and his ideas had also been depicted on a map. 11 Morand’s project envisioned both transformations in the older part of the city and the construction of a new district in Les Brotteaux. In addition to a geometric grid, four squares and a park in the south were planned for there; a canal in the form of a semicircle was to surround it all. In the north, a new bridge was to dispatch from one of the squares and its extension was to lead directly to the city hall and place des Terreaux.

11 Bibliothèque de l’Académie de Lyon, Ms. 307, fol. 159, Plan méridional de la ville de Lyon avec les augmentations et les changements proposés, 45 x 57,5 cm.
Morand first presented his eastern expansion project – also referred to as “ville circulaire,” “ville ronde,” or “nouvelle ville” – in 1764 to the Hôtel-Dieu, and then in 1766 to the city council. The round form is clearly recognizable on the map, but as far as I know, Morand did not write a longer treatise justifying this form. The circle was the ideal form of the Renaissance city (Bramante, Filarete,
Leonardo Da Vinci) (Lavedan, Hugueney and Henrat 1981, 6f.). Whether he consciously placed himself in this tradition is a matter of speculation. Briefly mentioned is the urban design of the ancient Greeks and Romans, but no concrete master-builders or cities are named. Only in the round form, a rule prescribed by nature, he argued, could a city of great circumference simultaneously bring inhabitants closer to one another and provide free and comfortable paths of communication. Morand did not design a planned or ideal city, but a new city district for an already existing city. It is thus likely that he imputed an integrative function to the circular form: the new should thus adjoin and conform to the old in a way that results in an ideal, harmonious form. The coordinated paths of communication across town are meant to serve this purpose. For Morand’s grandchildren, the plan had the “authority of a principle.” That means that the eastern expansion of the city should not be regarded as one construction site among others in the city but as part of a new concept of the city itself. Precisely therein lay perhaps the disadvantage of Perrache’s design, which he quipped would have given Lyon the form of a haunch (gigot). On one of the broadsheets of the master plan, which might have circulated or been posted in the city, he summarized the advantages of the project in sixteen points, in order to convince the city council. Many elements of Morand’s master plan were not, if at all, implemented until the first half of the nineteenth century. Decisive vis-à-vis all previous expansion projects was that Morand actually began to implement the construction project after tough struggle and with the support of his proprietors. In 1771, “Morand, Ballet et Cie,” the group of investors founded by him for the sake of the project, received the royal patent letters for the construction of the bridge which established the connection.
between the old and new city and which was his first larger project, after he had demonstratively bought for him and his wife a plot of land in the Brotteaux (1765). From his original plan, the bridge, a square, and a park (Parc de la tête d’or) – however, not in the south but in the north of the city – were realized.

4.2.2 Southern Expansion

Figure 4: Plan by Antoine-Michel Perrache for the Southern Part of the City of Lyon, ca. 1770

![Plan by Antoine-Michel Perrache for the Southern Part of the City of Lyon, ca. 1770](image)

Projet de Mr. Perrache, pour la partie Méridionale de la Ville de Lyon, ca. 1770. Source: Lyon, Musées Gadagne, inv. N 3504.22; scale: 1:10.000.

According to the plan, the Perrache project is in essence distinguished by two elements: for one, by the extension of the Rhône towards the south (on the west-oriented map the river flows towards the left). Leading out from the infirmary (Charité), a wide avenue should run along the river until the confluence of the Rhône and Saône that – as the little points indicate – should be lined with trees. On the other hand, a new city quarter with a radial street network and a square dedicated to the king was planned south of the place Bellecour, as was a boat harbor (gare à bateaux) and a canal with mills powered by the current on its southern end. The winning of new land and the gradual connection of the island Mogniat should occur by means of filling. No major changes were foreseen in the old part of the city. Presumably as a response to the round form of
Morand’s project, Perrache shaped his project in the form of an oval on one of the maps.\(^{18}\)

The first draft of 1766 was rejected by the assembly of city notables due to high construction costs and criticism of technical details. Yet after Perrache was able to found a company of about twenty-five investors, the project was finally accepted by the consulate in January 1770.\(^{19}\) The royal patents and approval of the state council came a year later. In 1777, he received the permit to demolish the rampart of Ainay, which until then had bordered the city in the south. Total costs were estimated at 2 million livres, and the resulting revenues could amount to 3.7 million. Unfortunately, Perrache died in 1779, as the project was barely half-finished: the promenade, which also served as an embankment, was built, but the inner harbor did not function properly, which carried over to the mills. The houses planned for the northern part of the project were not built until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Parallel to this, the investor group encountered financial difficulties, because the city administration did not expedite the sale of parcels. Perrache’s sister temporarily assumed the leadership of the company until a new director was found and borrowed an additionally necessary 1.5 million livres from a Genoese banking house. The collapse of the new bridge near La Mulatière (1783) was the provisional death knell for the project and company which had meanwhile expended over 4 million livres. In 1784, the king, or rather the royal treasury, pitched-in by assuming the company’s debts, approving an additional credit for the continuation of the work – the filling of the closed part of the Rhône had to be quickly completed – and supporting the construction of a new bridge, this time made of stone, in the vicinity of La Mulatière. In return, the company had to transfer the manorial rights over the new quarter to the regime, which the citizens to a certain extent then reclaimed in the Revolution. In any case, the settlement of the expanding southern part of the city could finally begin by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

4.3 Retrospection: Historical Foundation of the Projects

Both expansion projects of the late eighteenth century underwent an historical grounding in a double sense. On the one hand, their ideas for expanding the city towards the south and the east were not fundamentally new but were already seriously discussed around 1740. On the other hand – as can at least be documented for Morand – these visionary projects are inscribed in a longer history of urban change. The story told by Morand resembles a type of histori-

\(^{18}\) Plan géométral de Lyon avec projet d’agrandissement d’Antoine Michel Perrache, gravure d’après un dessin de Perrache (Lyon, Musées Gadagne, inv. N 4240.1).

\(^{19}\) Archives municipales de Lyon, BB 366, fol. 3, 8-17, BB 338, fol. 8-9; see: Audin and Vial 1992, 98; Leroudier 1921, 171f.; Kleinclausz 1925, 255-63; Rivet 1951, 9-12.
cal legitimation of his own project, as if he wanted to refer to the fact that cities constantly undergo structural change (which would represent quite a modern view). Yet he also used this story to call attention to previous mistakes – “architectural blunders” would be today’s expression – and derived from them the necessity and urgency of his own project. Finally, the story carried over to the present and future, in that he explained the “primary advantages of the new plan”: demolition of houses which impede the paths of communication and compensation of the property owners through new land for building in double or triple the size. His genealogy of urban construction begins in Lyon under Roman rulership and runs through the time of rulership by French kings to the changes during the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century, when the protestant Baron of Adret initiated the first “embellishments” in the city. He then thematizes the structural transformations of the city from the epoch of Louis XIV to the present age. The history of urban construction is thus divided by Morand into epochs and subjected to evaluation. The Roman age is not only connected to the foundation of the city but also with beauty and the blossoming of trade. The age of the French kings – the affiliation with Burgundy and the Holy Roman Empire are completely ignored – are associated with ribaldry and ignorance. He notes the following cardinal sins: that the population which descended from the mountain (Fourvière) settled too closely to the water and too few harbors were built; that not enough space was left on each end of the new Saône bridge for public squares; that a proper pier was not immediately built on the Presqu’île; that the most important parish church of the city, Saint-Nizier, was hardly accessible due to the regnant narrowness; and that the Rhône was cut off by a wall. A new age began in the sixteenth century, when the newly revived arts in Italy began to impact the design of some cities. Useful transformations were implemented in Lyon at that time, when a “rebellious” (because protestant) warlord had captured the city, the Baron of Adret (1562/63). Among other things, the construction of the wide New Path to Saint-Just and Saint-Irénée can be attributed to him, as well as the building of squares and connecting streets on the Presqu’île. The next stage, which owing to its diverse and sustained changes is also regarded as a progression, is the age of Louis XIV: city hall squares, piers, avenues and the installation of street lanterns are all mentioned. Morand then transitions to his own general plan by which the useful urban development already begun shall continue.

Morand’s genealogy, which follows a pattern of rise, fall, and rebirth, thus served to historically legitimate his project. The accompanying value judgments of different building measures over the course of history are clearly informed by his current principles and notions of an ideal city, which can be

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20 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 018 Jean-Antoine Morand, Projet d’un plan Général de la ville de Lyon..., 1766, unpaginated (8-10).
21 Ibid., unpaginated (2-7).
said to include openness (instead of narrowness), the establishing of paths of communication (instead of labyrinthine structures), accessibility (instead of obstruction), and the establishment of commercial infrastructures (market places, harbors). Accompanying these notions is the aspect of embellishment (“décoration de la patrie”), which of course does not embody a purely subjective ideal of beauty but is nevertheless historically contingent and variable.

4.4 Rivalries

Both large-scale expansion projects were thus something more than the selective construction projects meant to “embellish” the inner city that had been regularly undertaken since the sixteenth century. They focused – perhaps more so in the case of Morand than in that of Perrache – on the entire city. Aesthetic concerns were taken into account as much as demographic and economic ones. That the highly ambitious projects could not be directly realized as planned was almost to be expected. The (near) simultaneity of the projects should not hide the fact that Morand and Perrache were rivals and did not at all cooperate. Circle and “haunch” as Morand scoffed, competed here on the level of forms. Morand wanted to build on an existing terrain which regularly flooded whenever the water was high, whereas Perrache sought to win new land by embanking and filling one of the arms of the Rhône. Morand’s great grandson still clung to the belief that Morand’s project suffered from the fact that the public authorities favored Perrache’s project. Yet a number of other reasons led to the delays and changes of the construction project. The further history shows that suburbanization as the expansion of cities on their peripheries is a process in which spatial relations constantly change and are re-adjusted in accordance with relations of political and social power, as well as in accordance with the standpoint from which they are observed.

4.5 Hopes and Hopes Dashed

Processes of city planning involve – from an analytic standpoint – two different modes of planning for the future. Along with the construction plans for the spatial unity to be realized on a material level, there is also hope as a subjective time. According to Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1972, 50-72), who refers here to Ernst Bloch, hope is characterized by openness and incompleteness. Hope for the success of the hoped-for is also a sign of trust in the future. Yet in the moment of concrete planning, the human being delimits the open horizon of the possible once again. In the construction projects of Lyon too, the complexity of this form of temporality revealed itself in the fact that planning and implem-

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22 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 Il 001: Famille Morand, fascicule 2, nr. 9, Note sur la vie et les travaux de Morand, unpaginated (6).
station constituted a longer process in which the subjective expectations changed with respect to the state of the projects and their chances of realization. Hopes alternated between dampened hopes, disappointed hopes, and new hopes; added to them are recounted hopes at a later point in time.

Morand, who had found his chosen home in Lyon, and Perrache, the son of the city and member of the academy, undertook their projects with full enthusiasm, battled opponents, ultimately even invested their own money – though not out of charity, but because they of course hoped to profit in the end. Such pecuniary investments would today be termed land speculation. Morand had certainly made considerable profit already with his Saint-Clair project (Rivet 1951, 8, 11). This suggests that he hoped for another coup. The projects were just as much accompanied by skepticism and hope as by setbacks and success.

When in 1789 the Rhône froze and the new Rhône bridge was threatened by ice, Moran personally looked after his bridge in order to protect it from a collapse. After the project had stalled in the course of the Revolution, moments of hope reappeared. When Napoleon I was in Lyon at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he reportedly said while visiting the new quarter, “Lyon sera là un jour.”23 That this scene is reported by Morand’s great grandson about fifty years later, points to an additional form of temporal relations: a past vision is told from a standpoint in the past which refers to a future that more or less coincides with the standpoint of the narrator. No date is given for Napoleon’s visit. However, the certainty with which Napoleon is staged here, could have been formulated in the context of the law passed under his reign – the “Loi du 16 septembre 1807 relative au dessèchement des marais” – which enabled the cities to design construction plans for city quarters that had to be approved by prefects of the Departements and of the central government and subsequently put the city governments in charge of implementing them.24 The descendant further writes that Lyon’s center was shifted eastward under Napoleon III. The remark is interesting not only because a (barely still) contemporary identified the shift of a central spatial relation of the city, but also because Morand had not at all planned to shift the center of the city. In his master plan, the center was the large parish church Saint-Nizier on the Presqu’île.

On the other hand, hopes or visions were also quickly dashed. Thus did the above mentioned anonymous merchant let his feelings run free in his treatise, when he wrote to his likewise anonymous friend about the lack of progress of the Perrache project: “Dispensez-moi de vous dire les raisons qui ont fait évanouir nos espérances sur ces objets intéressants.” (Lettre 1769, 3) Another

23 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 001, fascicule 2, notice biographique de Jean-Antoine Morand II, 8 April 1857, 13.

little memorandum from 1782 turned against Perrache.25 Looking at Perrache’s project, the text argues, it is not clear whether its magnitude or its mistakes are more astonishing. The project had not yet been completed, he continues, and it was already in disrepair: the bridge has already been carried away four times, the harbor gates toppled, the body of the mills had to be replaced, the vaulted Saône quays have collapsed and the bypasses have proved useless. Here as well, the disappointment is clearly discernible, yet the author – presumably an engineer – proposes to take the project in his own hands and lead it to a good end.

In retrospect, Morand’s great grandson comes across more equanimous: When considering today [1857] the plan of the “ville ronde,”26 he contends, we discover with astonishment that a large number of improvements have already been and others were meant to be carried out. In the Second Empire, much had indeed changed since the pre-Revolutionary era, even if the city did not at all correspond to the round city designed by Morand. For the southward expansion had meanwhile been conducted. In order to better understand the reasons for the delays and deviations, the retarding moments will be considered in conclusion. Problems of funding, technology, real estate, as well as natural events and vicissitudes of life and history hindered the planned spatial transformations, resulted, that is, in their temporal delay. These problems were, as will be shown, in part discursively produced.

4.6 Obstacles

Already Delorme had failed to secure adequate funding for his project. To be sure, he had presented the council with a calculation of costs, but the difference between costs (1.2 million livres) and income through sales (891,000 livres) and yearly rents (65,000 livres) was still too great for the council.27 The city preferred to lease the island of Mogniat to a private citizen for another twenty years and surrender the agrarian use of the island to him.28 It was not any different for Perrache and Morand. Both had presented their projects to the city council in 1766, and both were – to be sure, out of technical concerns as well – at first rejected on financial grounds. Morand’s bridge – calculated at 300,000 livres, ultimately costing around 500,000 livres – should have been paid for by bridge tolls, which is why the city council was easily convinced. However, the Hôtel-Dieu opposed it for years, because they would thereby lose income from

25 Mémoire relatif aux travaux Perrache, 1782 [Archives municipales de Lyon, cote: 705.765]. The possible author is one M. Defer, engineer in Bourg-en-Bresse.
26 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 001, fascicule 2, notice biographique de Jean-Antoine Morand II, 8 April 1857, 3.
27 See Archives municipales de Lyon DD 275, nr. 1; Rivet 1951, 7.
28 Archives municipales de Lyon, BB 305, fol. 204r, BB 321, fol. 23r/v; Rivet 1951, 7 (with false dates).
boat traffic. An evaluation made already seven weeks after the presentation of the project criticized the high costs of Perrache’s project to fill the river; it also claimed that the expected revenues were overestimated. Suddenly, the council also argued that there was still enough undeveloped terrain in the parish of Ainay, even though it had confirmed for decades the contrary – namely, the need for new building ground. Both Morand and Perrache founded thereupon their own companies. For Perrache’s second attempt in 1769/1770, the total cost for the southern expansion was calculated at 2 million livres, of which his proprietors and shareholders provided 1.5 million (Rivet 1951, 11f.). With this financial backing, now estimated at 3.785 million livres, the project could finally start.

The project also met with great skepticism regarding the technical details. The first assessment from 21 June 1766 already objected that the project was insufficiently conceived. The different water levels of the two rivers were not precisely calculated, which in times of floods could become a problem. The piers and embankments were not stable enough. Morand’s design appeared more convincing to the city council, but its main adversary was the municipal poorhouse and hospital, which owned a bulk of the land on the other side of the Rhône. In 1772, the custodian of the Hôtel-Dieu commissioned a mathematician and engineer to provide a technical assessment of the bridge design that turned out mostly negative. Morand immediately responded by hiring his own royal engineer and professor of mathematics to conduct a “geometrical investigation” and then composing a counterstatement that addressed every single reproach of the evaluation commissioned by the Hôtel-Dieu. The geographer hired by him repaired with a rope and a graphometer to the quai de Retz and the other side of the Rhône and attempted to use the method of triangulation to determine the width of the Rhône and to thus show that the bridge designed by Morand was adapted to the dimensions of the Rhône and course of the river. The custodians of the hospital were still far from satisfied with the results and drafted a public polemic in which they further maintained that, first, the bridge project was not realizable (it was argued repeatedly that the bridge would not withstand a heavy flood because it runs perpendicular to the course of the river) and, second, that the bridge would rather harm than benefit the city and its commerce; third, they demanded compensation in the event that Morand be allowed to retain the bridge concession (Précis 1772, 5). The concession which

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29 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 021 Jean-Antoine Morand: travaux, pont Morand, construction; Mermet 1994, esp. 96f. and table 4.
30 Archives municipales de Lyon, BB 366, fol. 8-17; Rivet 1951, 9f.
31 On the progress of the project in 1774: Archives municipales de Lyon, DD 275-2, nr. 69; État provisoire et sommaire de la situation des travaux de M. Perrache au 13 mai 1774 (as well as additional yearly reports).
32 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 021 Jean Antoine Morand, fascicule 2.
33 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 021 Jean Antoine Morand, fascicule 3.
Morand had received was one of the reasons for why the custodians so strongly opposed the project. In exchange for the construction of the bridge, Morand had received from the royal councilor on 4 January 1771 permission to collect duties on the bridge for a period of 99 years – between 3 deniers for a goat and similarly small livestock, 1 sous 6 deniers for a person and horse, and 4 sous for a stage coach with two horses and a coachman; for single persons 1 sous.\textsuperscript{34} What particularly bothered the custodians was the fact that their own concession for collecting fees whenever they carried passengers over the Rhône with their own boats (bac) was thereby annulled. This permit had been granted to them in 1743. According to their own assertions, the revenues amounted to 20,000 livres annually, which would no longer be available for the care of the sick and poor (Précis 1772, 2). The misery, they claimed, was increasing already – in 1771, they had to take in over 15,000 sick persons and more than 1,500 orphans – and would only increase more in the absence of these revenues. The custodians reminded the public that royal concessions are in fact granted forever; but that Morand has now come along making demands before even doing something for them in return. Because the project was anyway unrealizable, they continued, it was no less than a case of fraud. The leaflet ends with a diatribe against Morand.\textsuperscript{35} It mentions, in addition, that the Hôtel-Dieu had itself planned to build a promenade in the Brotteaux.

The latter was presumably not a spontaneous idea, for the immense land on the other side of the Rhône (ca. 388 hectares) belonged to the Hôtel-Dieu. Thus, Morand’s entire plan depended upon the Messieurs rectors and custodians. The approval for the bridge construction came from Paris, but so long as access to the bridge was occluded, and no additional paths and houses could be built on the terrain, it did not help the matter any further. They finally arrived at an agreement, because in return the Hôtel-Dieu received a higher payment (22,000 livres) and was exempted from the tax (droit) on the wine it sold on its properties in the Brotteaux. As a matter of fact, the Hôtel-Dieu owned a tavern not far from the new bridge.\textsuperscript{36} In 1774, the bridge was finally completed, but was first opened for transporters as well in 1776. In 1780, a written agreement was also reached: the rectors of the hospital agreed to allow the sale of land in order to facilitate access to the bridge.\textsuperscript{37} The path to and from the bridge was allowed to be extended, the rectors also wanted to plant trees along the bank,

\textsuperscript{34} Extrait des registres du Conseil d’État, 4 janvier 1771.
\textsuperscript{35} “La cruelle avidité d’un étranger, qui fonde ses vains projets d’opulence sur le patrimoine des Pauvres qu’il leur arrache, excite le murmure général. Les Riches indignés détestent la cupidité du sieur Morand.” (Précis 1772, 22).
\textsuperscript{36} Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 018 Jean-Antoine Morand – Travaux: Brotteaux, fascicule 4. It contains a plan drafted by hand on which the new bridge, Morand’s lot, first streets, and the “cabaret” of the Hôtel-Dieu are visible.
\textsuperscript{37} Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 018 Jean-Antoine Morand – Travaux: Brotteaux, fascicule 3.
and finally they consented along with the cathedral chapter to a construction plan in the area behind the bridge: perpendicular streets, a square, a church, a second little square further east, and streets, many of them lined with trees. 38 The sale of lots to individual buyers had already been occurring for several years. The Lyon coffee and lemonade trader Antoine Spréafico, who already owned a coffeehouse on the place des Terreaux, had in this way acquired for the sum of 18,000 livres a lot enclosed by a wall on which to plant a garden. 39

Outright grist for the mill of skepticism were natural causes like flooding that required cleanup efforts and repairs. In 1741, the mills once again had to be carried away and eventually replaced after such a flood. 40 On 13 January 1783 one of the piles of the newly built bridge on the confluence collapsed; two days later, the rest of the bridge was washed away by the floodwaters (Rivet 1951, 17). This meant not only that the bridge had to be replaced, but also that revenues from the bridge tolls were absent for a while, in other words, the already broke company did not have any income and their situation became all the more dire. The bridge was rebuilt between 1790 and 1792. In 1789, a third boat had been approved for ferrying. 41 The Brotteaux were also flooded occasionally (for instance, in the spring of 1783 and in December 1790), which also entailed cleanup efforts and high costs for repairs. 42 Also presenting a danger were the ice-cold winters which caused the rivers to freeze and especially threatened Morand’s wooden bridge (in 1788/1789). 43 Finally, the projects were destabilized by personal and historical vicissitudes. Perrache’s unexpected death in 1779 elicited management problems. Morand was arrested during the siege of 1793 and incarcerated with the recluses and then in the town hall. He was ultimately convicted by the revolutionary government, because during the siege of Lyon he had – under orders of the commander of the defending army, Count de Précy – with the help of a few construction workers removed an arch from his bridge, which he had initially protected from the occupiers, in order to thereby cut off the path over the bridge. The tragedy of the situation is reflected in the protocol of his interrogation by the Revolutionary tribunal in a hall of the town hall that he had himself produced by memory.

He assured that he had only wanted to protect the bridge, his life work, from

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39 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 01B Jean-Antoine Morand – Travaux: Brotteaux, fascicule 5.
40 Archives municipales de Lyon, DD 275-1, nr. 6: Mémoire.
41 Archives municipales de Lyon, DD 275-1, nr. 71: Ordonnance de Monsieur l’Intendant de la ville et généralité de Lyon, 16 April 1789.
42 Archives municipales de Lyon, 14 II 01B Jean-Antoine Morand – Travaux: Brotteaux, fascicule 2.
the enemy and for the Republic to the bitter end (Hours and Nicolas 1985, 50).

At 1:00 pm on 24 January 1794, Morand was guillotined in front of the town hall on the place des Terreaux.44

Despite all obstacles and setbacks, as well as even the execution of one of the architects for defending his own structure and the city, things gradually moved forward. After the Revolution, the projects were conducted by the companies, but they had to adapt to new political, infrastructural, and aesthetic factors and requirements. The place Carnot, which however was originally named place des Victoires and in a guidebook from 1847 place Louis XVIII, was built south of Bellecour in the 1820s (Combe and Charavay 1847, 38f.). Where for a long time the horse market was held, became after 1830 the site of executions. In the northern part of the Brotteaux, the Parc de la Tête d’or, which still stands today, was built in 1856/57; in 1860, on the site of the harbor basin planned by Perrache, a railway station was built – a new junction for the connection of Lyon with the other cities of France. And the built surface was around twice as large as one hundred years before.

5. Spatio-Temporality in Cities

Processes of the constitution of urban space can sometimes take very long periods of time – at any rate, longer than originally planned, because many contingencies can get in the way. During these processes of transformation, the projects themselves change in multiple ways due to necessary adjustments, so that we are not dealing with a linear change from one condition to another; to put it in physical terms, time does not proceed in a uniform manner. The agents of projects of urbanizing the periphery at the end of the early modern period were, as can be seen in the case of Lyon, the inhabitants of the city themselves: They planned this urban space and strove to implement the plans. Yet it was equally the inhabitants of the city – in this case, rather the city council and the administrators of the Hôtel-Dieu – who slowed and in part even blocked developments. Adding to this was the “power” of water, which only the stone bridge could withstand. Here the constitution of space – initially conceived as material – also had to be discursively negotiated. The history of the expansion projects of Lyon, which includes such activities as planning, financing, realizing, living, representing, and describing, shows that urban space was not simply transformed in time, but that this process of transformation also produced temporal modalities which influenced the constitution of space, in which visions, hopes, probabilities (especially with regard to land speculation), temporal retrospec-

44 Archives départementales du Rhône, 42 L 28 Procès-verbaux d’exécution par la fusillade [14 frimaire – 24 pluviôse an II], nr. 38.
tives and delays were not insignificant but rather constitutive for this process. In other words: It is due to the fact that spatialities and temporalities mutually influenced one another that we can properly refer to this as a spatio-temporal process. And today? Urban metamorphosis continues (Bertin 2012, 4; see also Jarrigeon 2012). But the motives, the spaces, and the rhythms have changed.

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