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Gendered Strategies of Social Support and their Inequality Effects in the Context of German-Ukrainian Transnational Space

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Introduction

The strategies of migrants in obtaining social support — e.g., child care, elderly care, medical care, and remittances for relatives in need — are discussed increasingly in migration studies (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1999, Mahler and Pessar 2001, Sassen 2000, Yeates 2004). In this contribution, I distinguished between two research perspectives on social support and migration. On the one hand are various debates concerning a) mutual support practices of migrants and their families in the country of origin and b) mutual support between co-migrants in the country of destination (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997, Salazar Parrenas 2001, Plaza 2000, Toro-Morn 1995). On the other hand, care work, as a form of social support provided by migrants, is increasingly taken under consideration in connection with such topics as migration, care, and welfare (Anderson 2000, Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003, Lutz 2002, Ng 2000). Thus, both perspectives of the debate touch on the issue of inequality formation on the transnational or even global scale. At the same time, they draw attention to different kinds of inequality. First, research on support strategies of migrants usually focuses on issues of remittances or non-financial support sent to recipients in the countries of origin (Gosh 2006, de Haas and Plug 2006, Orozco 2000). This line of research establishes a connection between migrants’ remittances and transformation of social positions of individuals or collectives within the country of departure. It emphasizes ambivalent effects of transnational social support, which sometimes lead to new socioeconomic gaps in the country of origin. The second line of research provides evidence for the formation of a new global underclass consisting of female care workers who move from countries at the global periphery to countries at the global center (Hochschild 2000).

This paper establishes a connection between migration, social support, gender relations, and inequality formation by analyzing support strategies of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants living in Germany. As opposed to the classic perspective on migration and inequality, which assumes that migration either transforms social positions in the country of destination or reshapes socioeconomic gaps in the country of origin, I suggest that we consider the multi-location inequality effects of migration. In this regard, I aim to analyze how support strategies produce

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1 For a critique on this approach, see Kofman (2004).

2 The term ‘Ukrainian’ refers to the citizenship and not to the ethnic belonging of the group of interest.
privileged and underprivileged positions on the transnational scale with respect to gender, ethnicity, and class.

Before presenting the empirical case study, I want to refer to the significance of research on migrants’ support practices to the research on social inequality. There are two reasons to pay special attention to migrants’ support strategies. First, the presented case discloses ways in which not only gender relations but also constructions of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘class’ are effective in creating unequal positions within transnational space between Germany and the Ukraine. Second, it draws attention to the fact that transnational social support is embedded in different institutional dimensions in both sending and receiving countries. On one hand, migrants’ support strategies are deeply interconnected to the fields of social reproduction in both states and, therefore, are determined by different kinds of gender orders. On the other hand, they are strongly influenced by migration and welfare regimes in both countries, which effect ethnicization and complex class positioning of migrants within transnational settings. In this regard, the central objects of my research refer to a) various gendered forms of social support, b) meaning patterns that donors and recipients of social support use with regard to respective practices\(^3\), and c) the relation between social support and migrants’ class mobility. By analyzing these different aspects, I take into consideration that social support is determined by the specific kind of transnational space within which they occur. This is why the empirical study considers d) different institutional regimes in the Ukraine and Germany in which informal migrants’ practices of social support are embedded. All these issues are analyzed on two different levels: first, on the level of everyday practices of migrants and, second, on the level of their institutional conditions.

First of all, the article starts with a description of my empirical study conducted in a ‘German-Ukrainian’ transnational space (II). Second, I present the theoretical framework guiding my empirical research, which is based on concepts of intersectionality and transnational migration (III). The core part of my article refers to the results of my field work. The analysis of migrants’ support strategies is framed by the intersectionality approach on social inequality (IV, V). Additionally, I describe relevant institutional dimensions such as welfare, migration, and gender regimes of both countries, the Ukraine and Germany, which frame transnational social support and provide evidence of their disqualifying practices (VI). The final discussion

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\(^3\) This way of analyses was established by Marcel Mauss (1954) and his theory of gift circulation.
highlights the advantages of a transnational perspective on social support and its complex inequality effects (VII).

The description of the empirical field

The case study presented does not only raise questions about forms and conditions of support strategies of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants, it also touches on issues referring to various inequality effects of support practices. In this regard, I establish a dynamic connection between gendered orders, migrants’ support strategies, and their class mobility.

In general, social support practices within the ‘German-Ukrainian’ transnational space can be divided into three main categories. First, I analyze strategies of social support directed by migrants to their parents or relatives in the Ukraine, such as elderly care, medical care, and remittances for retired parents. Second, I explore various forms of social support flowing from parents or relatives located in the Ukraine to their migrated adult children living in Germany, such as child care (in case migrants have small children), financial support for children’s studies, but also non-financial support in form of advice (IV, V). Third, I consider mutual support of co-migrants living in Germany, which can include child care, elderly care, medical care, teaching of Ukrainian or Russian language, or exchange of relevant information (VI).

The huge socioeconomic gap between the Ukraine and Germany is one of the reasons for focusing on transnational space spanning the two European countries. Besides, Germany is on top of the Ukrainian popularity scale for emigration countries (Poznjak 2007). However, the target regions of labor migration from Ukraine are Russia, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland and Portugal. In sum, about 2 to 2.7 million Ukrainian citizens were involved in labor migration in 2008. That means that migration, and especially labor migration, is perceived as core strategy of social mobility (Poznjak 2009). Migration flow from the Ukraine to Germany has started around 1991, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Economic and political instability caused the emigration of mainly highly skilled people to countries such as Germany, Israel, and USA (Poznjak 2007). In spite of the increasing economic prosperity in the Ukraine in 2003/2004, migration flow did not go down, mainly because of the high level of political instability, which has emerged since the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2003. Today, approximately 128,000 Ukrainian citizens live in Germany. Thus, my study is not necessarily interested in the push-and-pull factors of migration from the Ukraine to Germany, but in social linkages and social practices based on geographic mobility, which span between the two nation-state ‘containers.’
The data for my case study were collected in accordance with the multi-sited research method (Marcus 1995), which implies that localities in both sending and receiving states were selected for the design of a multi-sited research field. First, I chose a locality in the country of destination: Bielefeld, a medium-sized city in western Germany. After conducting 30 semi-structured interviews and 20 participant observations in Bielefeld, I made three additional interviews with migrants’ relatives, who have spent their vacation with their children in Bielefeld. Afterwards I selected four localities in the Ukraine (Ivano-Frankovsk, Rogosin by Lviv, Poltava, and Kyiv), where I conducted five semi-structured interviews with five families of migrants living in Bielefeld. Additionally, I carried out five participant observations by staying for approximately 12 hours with each family (see appendix). The data interpretation was guided by the method of scientific hermeneutics (Amelina 2008, Reichertz 2004), which enables one to shed light on meaning patterns guiding social action.

Access to the respective group of migrants was made possible by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic church based in Bielefeld. The contacts to most of my interview partners were established at church visits. During these visits, I have learned that the church attendees are a very heterogeneous group, which can be characterized by different age levels, marital status, socioeconomic, ethnic, and even religious backgrounds. In short, these church attendees can be divided into three different ‘generations,’ which are equal to the structure of the ‘Ukrainian’ population in Germany. The first group consists of 80–90-year-old migrants who have stayed in Germany since World War II. The second group of attendees is formed by middle-aged male and female migrants who have moved to Germany in the early 1990s. The third and final group of attendees consists of a young generation of (mostly) ‘Ukrainian’ migrants, who have entered Germany at the end of the 1990s or after 2000. Moreover, not only the ethnic but also the religious backgrounds of church attendees are quite heterogeneous. Most visitors are, of course, ethnic Ukrainians with Ukrainian citizenship. But some attendees have introduced themselves as ethnic Russians with Ukrainian citizenship or ethnic Russians with Russian citizenship. Several attendees describe themselves as ‘ethnic Germans’ with German citizenship, who have formerly immigrated to Germany from the Ukraine or from other republics of the former Soviet Union. About 50% of the attendees had not belonged to the Greek-Catholic denomination before moving to Germany. This part of attendees were either Russian-Orthodox, Ukrainian-Orthodox, or Jewish. In general, the ratio of men to women was up to 40–60%.

During participant observations conducted in the Ukrainian church in Bielefeld, I have had sufficient opportunities to have conversations with the different ‘generations’ of migrants, but the focus of my study was on young migrants (between 20 and 40 years) and middle-aged
migrants (between 40 and 60 years), who have immigrated to Germany from the Ukraine at the end of the 1990s and after 2000. All of my interview partners (n=30) are legally living in Germany, but only about 70% of them have acceptable permission to work.

Although immigration from the Ukraine to Germany is strongly restricted, my interview partners described several ways of crossing the state borders. Except for ‘ethnic Germans’ and political refugees, who have received immigrant visas, most of my interview partners obtained temporary non-immigrant visas and some of them have tried to convert them to immigrant visas while they are in Germany. Limited resident authorization of Ukrainian citizens are granted in case they a) study in Germany, b) work at German universities, c) work in Germany as an Au-pair, c) are married to German citizens, or d) are married to ‘ethnic Germans’. All these groups rationalized their decisions to migrate in different ways.

Theoretical framework: intersectionality on transnational scale

The study of migrants’ support strategies is a good example for ambivalent effects of the contradictive class mobility and of the phenomenon of double intersection of gender orders with ethnic and class categorizations within the ‘German-Ukrainian’ transnational space. Before presenting the results of the case study, I make some references to the theoretical framework, which is influenced by the intersectionality approach on inequality and by a transnational way of thinking.

In contrast to class-oriented approaches on social inequality, which are based on the socioeconomic income differences of individuals or households, the intersectionality approach takes a closer look at the relevance of race, ethnicity, gender, and class to the formation of unequal social positions within a nation state frame (Crenshaw 1989, Grusky and Szelényi 2007, Lieberson 1994, Raj 2002, McCall 2005). It highlights the relevance of social attributions and categorizations for unequal access to power, resources, and knowledge. As to intersectionality in terms of the discourse theory (Foucault 1972), one can argue that dimensions of inequality are discursively constructed categorizations (regarding class, ethnicity, race, and gender), which not only affect distribution and allocation of resources but also access to organizations, institutional regimes, and speaker positions in dominant discourses.

With respect to my case study on support practices of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants living in Germany, this would mean that categorizations regarding ethnicity (a specific distinction between ‘majority’ and ‘minority’), class (the supposed low socioeconomic position of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants in the country of origin), and gender categorizations (male migrants regarded as potentially
qualified for professional positions and female migrants as mainly qualified for care and domestic work) produced by dominant societal institutions in Germany intersect and influence downward class mobility of female migrants and upward class mobility of male migrants.

Inequality dimensions such as class, ethnicity, race, and gender tend to produce different types of social categorization. While ‘class’ creates strata, to which different populations can be assigned, ‘ethnicity,’ ‘race,’ and ‘gender’ produce attributions regarding visible traits, which are based on the logic of analogies (Swinn 2007). Thus, the formation of social inequality can only be analyzed appropriately if we emphasize the complex interconnection of different inequality dimensions and their various logics. With regard to my case study, the relevant question refers to conditions that make ethnicization of female migrants and their potential downward class mobility more probable than ethnicization of male migrants.

Thus, there is a challenge to establish a connection between both intersectionality and transnational approaches (Faist 2000, Portes 2001, Pries 2008, Vetrovec 1999). In contrast to most empirical studies on intersectionality, the transnational perspective does not focus on a single nation state frame but on a coherent overlapping of social practices simultaneously referring to different nation state frames. The classic perspective on migration and social inequality analyzes inequality effects caused by migration either in the country of origin or in the country of destination. As opposed to this view, the transnational approach provides evidence for more complex dynamics between migration and inequality. First, the transnational approach points out how migration simultaneously contributes to the transformation of inequality orders in the sending and receiving countries. Second, it draws attention to the phenomenon of “contradictory class mobility,” which arises from the migrants’ simultaneous experience of an increase in financial status due to geographic mobility and the decline in social position due to their employment as low-skilled workers (Goldring 1998, Parrenas 2001: 1150). Third, it highlights the emergence of a new transnational scale of inequality formation, which can be described as a pluri-locally organized societal frame (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003, Pries 2008). Thus, the transnational scale functions as a new frame to which transnational migrants can reorientate their social positions.

The present contribution lays emphasis on the latter mentioned issues. First, it establishes a connection between transnational class mobility and migrants’ social support. Second, it shows how the transnational scale of social inequality emerges.
Engendering of social support and migrants’ social mobility

The case study was guided by the question: How is engendering of transnational social support interconnected with social mobility of migrants in the country of destination? This question implies a description of a complex dynamics of social support, gender narratives, and social mobility. First of all, my empirical research provides evidence that social support rendered by families to their migrated adult children directly influences the children’s class mobility within the country of immigration. At the same time, the amount of help is directly interconnected with gender narratives. Second, social support provided by migrants to their parents or relatives has to be understood as a form of representation of successful social mobility. However, the representation of upward mobility absorbs a huge amount of financial and temporal resources, which, in return, influence the decrease of actual (often downward) class mobility in the country of immigration. However, gender relations influence both representation forms of success and the amount of resources invested in representation strategies.

Although I have interviewed migrant families in the Ukraine (n=5) after conducting the study in Germany, I have used the gained impressions as an initial point for data interpretation. When talking about the reasons for the migration of their adult children, families never highlight economic motivation as a decisive point. Instead, the original reasons given for migrating are regarded as being based on different ambitions, such as “self-realization,” “getting a new professional experience,” “acquiring new social skills,” and “starting a family/ marriage” (Interviews no. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38). At the point of interview, migrants have already spent several years in Germany, and in the course of the interview, their families have had the chance to compare their earlier expectations with the present situation of their children. Independent of initial expectations, the situation of migrated children is primarily interpreted with regard to their class mobility. Financial success connected with social mobility is decisive for the retrospective sense-making of the decision to migrate. The new professional and social experience migrants have gained in Germany is only accepted as valuable or useful if migrants have the possibility to use it to increase their social position either in the country of destination or in the country of origin. Moreover, migration, which is based on the ambition to improve the financial situation, is only accepted if class mobility follows. To sum up, expectation of upward class mobility functions as a central narrative for the evaluation of migrants’ social mobility.

However, expectations regarding successful upward mobility are addressed differently among men and women. While men primarily have to be professionally successful in the country of immigration, women are expected to achieve both professional and private suc-
cess, which is defined as a "prosperous marriage." Analyzing complex interconnections of social support, gender relations, and social mobility I will highlight support strategies of female and male migrants and their parents or relatives. First, I take a look at the circulation of social support of women up to the age of 40 (ad 1a, 1b). Second, I describe practices of social support of women older than 40 (ad 1c). Afterward I analyze the circulation of social support provided by men by distinguishing between men up to 40 (ad 2a) and men older than 40 (ad 2b).

(ad 1a) Altogether, I conducted ten interviews with women up to the age of 40 (see Table 1). Almost all female interview partners (nine) have finished tertiary education in the Ukraine. Six of the ten women got a university degree from a German university or have studied at the time of the interview. They have financed their studies by working under illegal conditions. Non-graduates were also incorporated in the informal labor market in Germany at some stage of their biography.

Table 1: Brief overview of female interviewees up to the age of 40 (Source: own research in Bielefeld 2008/2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Married female migrants till 40</th>
<th>non-married (single-mothers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nr. 1 (1 child)</td>
<td>Nr. 7 (1 child)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. degree in Germany</td>
<td>silling studied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporarily work under illegal conditions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incorporation in the first labour market</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The marital status of female migrants up to 40 conditions the kind and amount of social support distributed by their families. Married women are not financially supported because it is assumed that they are adequately taken care of by their husbands. (Regarding single mothers, the opposite is the case.) However, married women can occasionally expect child care support from their female relatives, which is organized either by sending children to the Ukraine or by inviting female relatives, usually sisters or mothers, to Germany. However, this
kind of support does not occur on a regular basis because of the common narrative that married female migrants are generally supported by their husbands. At the same time, families and female migrants regularly exchange advice by telephone, which generally highlights the women’s duty to “protect domestic peace.” (See interviews no. 1, 2 and 6)

My first conclusion is that the absence of financial and other support during the first years of residence reduces the chances of upward mobility for married women (with and without children) in the country of immigration. On one hand, they are expected to support their husbands by providing acceptable conditions for his success i.e., maintain the household and take care of mutual children (if they have any). On the other hand, it is anticipated that married women have to earn additional income (what they generally do under illegal conditions) to finance the nuclear family during the husband’s quest for professional success. To sum up, family expectations reduce the chances of married women to get a degree at a German university and, consequently, to find jobs that they are qualified to do.

Another point to be stressed here refers to the observation that families of married female migrants are aware of the daughter’s present downward mobility in Germany and her illegal employment. On one hand, it is obvious to them that daughters have to take on unskilled jobs to secure their living conditions. On the other hand, parents who have visited their children in Germany also draw conclusions about their children’s ethnic discrimination. Thus, although parents are aware of the difficulties of upward mobility, surprisingly, they still accept the social support provided by their daughters. Moreover, it is expected that daughters give financial help to retired or ill parents. First, married female migrants regularly or occasionally transfer money to supplement the old-age pension of their relatives in the Ukraine. Second, they occasionally take care of their own parents and relatives in the Ukraine. If they are not able to look after their relatives themselves, they send money intended for this task. But the latter practice is less popular. Third, they send money to buy medical supplies.

This observation raises two questions. First, why do parents accept the social support, though they are aware of their daughters’ situation? And, second, why do women give social support continuously? Both questions can be answered with reference to the idea that class mobility is always embedded in a symbolic dimension: transformation of class mobility is, therefore, strongly interconnected with strategies of symbolic representation of upward or downward mobility. In this case study, however, the representation strategies are directed to the audience in the country of origin and aim at displaying upward mobility by the actual downward mobility of female migrants. The background of these strategies is rooted in the contradictory class mobility of migrants (Goldring 1998, Parrenas 2001). On one hand, from the perspective of the country of origin, the financial situation of female migrants improves.
On the other hand, their social position decreases because of incorporation in the second labor market. Consequently, strategies of representation of success, which address migrants’ families, aim at an up-valuation of social position of migrants in the country of origin. Thus, these strategies are obviously rooted in the success narrative, which seems to be effective for all actors in the transnational field between Germany and the Ukraine.

Consequently, my second conclusion stress that the acceptance of social support by parents is rooted in the symbolic representation. I argue that parents, who are relatively well situated and only exceptionally need support, accept their daughter’s help because they have to legitimize the absence of their children to neighbors and close relatives. They have to show to their social environment a) their daughter’s success and b) the fact that their daughter has not really left them, although she has moved away. This means that their acceptance of support refers not only to the representation of the daughter’s upward mobility but also to the continuing existence of their family.

At the same time, married women also have to represent their imaginary success to their parents. Although most of them have unskilled jobs (also those women who have studied at a university) and have to live off minimum wage, they continuously provide support. Thus, why do married women provide social support though they are in need of it themselves? Just like their parents, they are victims of the narrative of successful upward mobility due to migration. They have to provide evidence that their geographic mobility is accompanied by successful class mobility. This is why they continuously provide social support. At the same time, maintenance of financial and care support for relatives is perceived, from the female and male perspectives, as “something absolutely natural,” a “typical female activity”. Utterances such as “We are raised as caregivers and supporters” and “it is part of female nature to give help and to take care of people close to you” are common statements (excerpts from interview no. 1 and no.7). Apart from financial support and care activities, women also provide new clothing for relatives or take care of parents’ households during their visits home. By providing support, married female migrants take on the position of a donor. (“As long as I can support them, I’m fine. At least, I can still afford that.” [excerpts from interview no. 7]) From this perspective, continuous provision of support increases their social position in comparison with the position of their families at home. Additionally, the pressure to provide support immediately leads to the decision to take on unskilled jobs and to work under illegal conditions. This enables female migrants to provide support earlier. The other side of the coin is that this decision automatically progresses their downward mobility in Germany.
(ad 1b) The circulation of social support between families and their daughters who are single mothers is organized in the opposite way. Most single mothers can count on different kinds of social support flowing from the Ukraine to Germany. There is, first of all, financial support supplied for child care and child equipment (this also includes car ownership). Apart from that, female relatives provide child care on a regular basis: they take care of their grandchildren living in Germany, regularly coming to Germany for several weeks; or, if they are employed, their grandchildren are sent to the Ukraine. In addition, they frequently pay for nursing and education facilities of their grandchildren in Germany. The narrative behind this practice refers to the necessity to provide social support to single mothers because they do not have a husband to provide for them. Consequently, the class mobility of single mothers (in two of three cases) is more successful than that of married female migrants (see Table 1). First of all, single mothers are not obliged to support their husband. Second, they are not expected to provide social support to their parents because of their assumed indigence. Third, due to appropriate support by their family, they are able to study and be incorporated within the first labor market sooner than their married counterparts (two of three single mothers have studied in Germany). Although single mothers are better incorporated and have better chances for upward class mobility, they perceive their situation as not satisfying because they are not successful in “preserving their family.” Besides, they are in the position of a recipient of support services. This is why, from their family’s point of view, their position is interpreted as downward mobility in Germany. At the same time, single mothers aim to be able to return support in the future: if they are able to become German citizens, they would work for the naturalization of their parents (see interviews 8 and 9).

(ad 1c) As opposed to young female migrants, women older than 40 have fewer possibilities to be incorporated in the first labor market in Germany. I have conducted six interviews with women older than 40 (see Table 2).

Table 2: Brief overview of female interviewees above 40 (Source: own research Bielefeld, 2008/2009)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Non-married</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.11 (2 adult children, 1 grandchild living in Germany)</td>
<td>No. 12 (2 adult children and 2 grandchildren living in Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. 13 (1 adult child)</td>
<td>No. 14 (1 adult child)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. degree in Germany</td>
<td>not recognized</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporarily working under</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. 15 (2 adult children living in Ukraine)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


All interview partners have completed tertiary education in the former Soviet Union. Two women have tried to get their Soviet degree recognized, but failed. A few months after moving to Germany, all of them were in the labor market under illegal conditions. They continuously try to improve their social position by attending integration courses or completing advanced training. I assume that circulation of social support between this category of female migrants and their relatives (parents, siblings, and children) in the Ukraine is also guided by a similar narrative of assumed successful mobility. Although they are positioned at the bottom of the German class hierarchy, female migrants have obligations, independent of their marital status, to support their relatives in the Ukraine. This support includes, apart from child care (daughter’s or son’s children), also elderly care. Both married and unmarried women occasionally provide money transfers to finance the old-age pension or medical supplies of their relatives in the Ukraine. They also frequently travel to the Ukraine in order to care for their parents or relatives. Furthermore, they also care for terminally ill relatives and organize their funerals. In sum, they define all of the aforementioned practices as genuine female activities.

Providing social support enables female migrants to be regarded as donors and help providers; consequently, this subjectively increases their social position. (Aside from this, the necessity of support is also discussed with co-migrants.) At the same time, their investments in social support simultaneously decrease their social position in Germany. On one hand, they tend to accept unskilled jobs sooner because these jobs promise immediate income. On the other hand, they do not invest the same money and time to their incorporation within the first labor market in the country of destination.

(ad 2a) Describing the circulation of social support between male migrants and their families, I start with the analysis of practices of men up to age 40 (10 persons, see Table 3). Eight of the 10 interviewees have finished their academic studies in the Ukraine before moving to Germany. More than half of my male interview partners (six) have received a degree from a German university or are studying at the time of the interview. Three interview partners want to study in Germany, but their high school degree is not accepted by German institutions; therefore, instead of studying, they have started to work (under legal conditions). Both cate-
gories of men (with and without a German university degree) are successfully incorporated within the first labor market at the time of the interview.

Table 3: Brief overview of male interviewees up to the age of 40 (Source: own research in Bielefeld 2008/2009)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married male migrants</th>
<th>Non-married male migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.17</td>
<td>No.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. degree in Germany</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporarily working under illegal conditions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation in the first labor market</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just like those of female migrants, male migrants’ migration decisions are also framed by the narrative of upward class mobility due to migration. The parents’ expectations regarding their son’s success refers to their future duty as the family’s “breadwinner.” This narrative is based on the assumption of the ‘Ukrainian’ middle class that only professionally successful men are able to found their own family and to support their parents. This is why a son’s incorporation into Germany’s first labor market is a common ambition of parents and sons.

The family’s expectations regarding upward mobility of male migrants do not differ with respect to their marital status. Sons are generally anticipated to successfully finish their university studies and to find a qualified, well-paid job in Germany or another European country. Male migrants rarely receive financial support from their relatives (only in two cases) because, as male adults, they are expected to make a living on their own. (This expectation is also connected to the notion that self-financing is easier in Germany than in the Ukraine.) Students are expected to finance their studies by themselves, but they are not expected to start with support provision during the studies. Male migrants who intend to study but who cannot get their degrees recognized, start to transfer support to their parents immediately after their move to Germany (three cases). Both categories of male migrants (with and with-
out German university degree) regularly receive advice concerning appropriate ways of professional success in Germany. Students are pushed to continue their studies and find ways to handle difficult situations. My first conclusion in this regard is that parents’ expectations noticeably shape the upward class mobility of male migrants. Additionally, male migrants are supported (mostly non-financially) by their wives. This implies that male migrants are perceived from both groups of actors, parents and wives, as pioneers of successful incorporation within the first labor market, an expectation that positively influences their social rise.

Another point to be mentioned here refers to a significant difference in support provision from male migrants, depending on whether they hold a German university degree. Migrants without a German university degree start to provide social support to their parents immediately after their resettlement to Germany. In contrast, migrants with a German university degree first start to transfer support after they have completed their studies. But the amount of financial help and the frequency of non-financial support are lower compared with those of non-graduates. This observation can also be explained with reference to the idea of status representation, which is connected to the phenomenon of the contradictive social mobility, which is expressed in larger financial income of a migrant from the point of view of the country of origin but low social position in the country of immigration. It implies that migrants who actually reach a higher class position in Germany (manager in big companies, scientists at German universities) are not under pressure to display their success. This is why, they can continue to invest time and finances in the continuous improvement of their social position in the country of immigration. Meanwhile, men without a university degree provide more financial and non-financial support to display the success they claim to have ‘achieved’ in Germany. However, investment of financial and temporal resources in parents’ support does not reduce their chances of being incorporated into the first labor market because they receive additional support from their wives. Nevertheless, it reduces their chances of continuous upward mobility in Germany, which requires additional financial and temporal investments. Therefore, my second conclusion hints at the connection between amounts of social support, contradictive social mobility within a transnational context, and strategies of representation: the higher class position in the immigration country, the lower the amount of support provided to relatives in the country of emigration.

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4 Parents of male migrants who have children do not additionally provide child care because it is anticipated that such duties are fulfilled by the wives of their sons.
Despite the aforementioned difference, almost all male migrants provide different kinds of social support to their relatives. First, they provide regular or occasional money transfers to finance the old-age pension of their relatives. They also take care of the medical and nursing needs of their relatives in the Ukraine. But, in contrast to female co-migrants, they do not provide care themselves. Young men define support of their parents and relatives as an act to compensate for their physical absence: "I need to be sure that the situation at home is good enough and that my parents are adequately supplied." (Interview no. 17) The small amount of money given to parents and relatives raise the possibility realizing some additional wishes they would not be able to fulfill without this help. It can be the possibility to buy some new clothing, to cultivate hobbies, or to improve their living situation. During the home visits, young men do ‘male’ duty such as construction work. But it is not only the physical absence that needs to be compensated for. There is also the absence of a future patriarch, who is responsible for the decision-making process within the family. Thus, the acceptance of social support on the part of the parents fulfills, apart from its practical advantage, the representation of their son’s upward mobility in Germany.

(ad 2b) Independent of their marital status, men above 40 have fewer obligations to support their relatives in the Ukraine than their female counterparts. Men older than 40 have difficulties in getting their Soviet degrees recognized (see Table 4). Consequently, they are only temporarily incorporated into the first labor market. Primarily, they are included in the second labor market.

Their financial transfers to the Ukraine are rather occasional. They also do not engage in elderly care or in the organization of funerals in the country of departure. One of the reasons can be the difficulty to represent a genuine ‘male’ support activity at this age, besides money transfer. It is not expected that men engage in care. Another reason could refer to the assumption that the center of the family is based on the location where the ‘patriarch’ is (in this case, in Germany). While young men at least theoretically imagine the possibility of a permanent return to the Ukraine, co-migrants above 40 are confident of their decision to spend the rest of their lives in Germany. Thus, there is no need to display (an imaginary) success corresponding to the geographic mobility in the social environment in the country of origin.

Although this group provides less support to relatives in the country of origin, the men still cannot use their financial and non-financial resources to improve their social position. Their discontinuous biography connected to devaluation of Ukrainian degrees influences possibilities of advanced professional training and thus contributes to the unavoidable downward mobility of this group. As a result, male migrants tend to transfer their own expectations regarding social mobility to their adult children. A successful incorporation of adult children
within the first labor market is a central narrative of the legitimization of their migration decision.

Table 4: Brief description of male interview partners above 40 (Source: own research in Bielefeld 2008/2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married male migrants</th>
<th>Non-Married male migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.27</td>
<td>(1 adult child, living in Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.28</td>
<td>(2 adult children and 2 grandchildren, living in Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.29</td>
<td>(2 adult children and 2 grandchildren, living in Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr. 30</td>
<td>(1 adult child and 1 grandchild living in the Ukraine)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. degree in Germany</td>
<td>not recognized</td>
<td>not recognized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporarily working under illegal conditions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation in the first labor market</td>
<td>temporarily</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gendered paths of migrants’ reciprocal support

Up to this point I have described the central dynamics of social support between migrants and their relatives in the Ukraine. But I have not provided evidence for the mutual support of co-migrants. In a word, one can distinguish between seven support strategies practiced by co-migrants (see Table 5):

Table 5: Forms of mutual social support provided by ‘Ukrainian’ co-migrants (Source: own research 2008/2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of social support</th>
<th>Gender specificity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provision of employment possibilities in the first and second labor market</td>
<td>Practiced by both genders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money lending to co-migrants</td>
<td>Practiced by both genders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of relevant information concerning visa requirements, welfare regulations, and tax systems</td>
<td>Practiced by both genders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of relevant information about the education system</td>
<td>Practiced by female migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Ukrainian and Russian language</td>
<td>Practiced by female migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this section I point out the significance and conditions of the first (provision of employment possibilities) and the last mentioned (childcare) strategies of mutual support.

The provision of employment possibilities is the most powerful strategy practiced by co-migrants in the country of destination. The first impression I gained during my research led to the conclusion that this strategy is effective independent of gender. Later in the process of data interpretation I realized that women usually provide jobs to other women. However, these jobs, as a rule, are located on the second labor market. Men provide jobs to other men, whereas these jobs are located on the first labor market. The gendered distribution of employment possibilities – this is my conclusion – is one of the conditions which reproduce unequal access to the first labor market. Most men I interviewed are included in the first labor market. In this regard the interesting question refers to the symbolic background which defines boundaries of gender as decisive for an access to different labor markets. Or, to put it in other words: why do men not provide positions on the first labor market to their female co-migrants?

The first reason refers to the ‘Ukrainian’ gender order (see Section VI), which postulates that upward mobility of women is less desirable as of men. Although women are expected to be engaged professionally, their upward mobility is not necessarily expected. The second reason refers to the fact that there are institutional limits, defined by the German nation state, which affect the recognition of Ukrainian university degrees. The difficulty of this procedure conditions the fact that fewer women (but also fewer migrants above 40) have their Ukrainian degrees recognized. This fact decreases the potential possibilities of women to be included in the first labor market. Thus, there are few female candidates which could be recommended for professional jobs on the first labor market by female co-migrants.

I have to stress that male and female migrants apply different meaning patterns to the strategy of job provision. While for males the provision of job possibilities is associated with competition, for females it is a possibility to overcome the outside-categorizations, which define females as passive and discriminated subjects. Two excerpts of interviews with one male (1) and one female (2) interviewee illustrate these differences:

(1) “Yes, mutual help is regularly provided. We also help each other with finding new jobs. When I left a post office, where I worked as a delivery boy, I passed the position on to my
acquaintance (...). Now, while I am applying for jobs, it is not natural that my friend helps me. We all have similar skills [economist with focus on Eastern European countries – A.A.]. It is obvious that we are competitors. But despite of that we are friends and we come to an arrangement.” (Interview no. 17)

(2) “You know, last time I managed to find a legal job for my friend (...) How do I feel when I find a job for her? I feel proud. I am a no-bo-dy in Germany. Despite of that I am able to establish contacts... and to find well paid positions for my friends. That means I am able to overcome difficulties, even living abroad” (Interview no. 7)

To conclude, job provision on the basis of ethnic networks is offered in a very selective way: gender orders and competition for the successful admission to the first labor market define the degree and the willingness of support.

The other strategy, which has to be described in this report, refers to the social conditions and symbolic background of mutual childcare. On the one hand, I have observed that mothers take turns with taking care for children without expecting financial rewards. On the other, Ukrainian women provide childcare in exchange for small financial compensation. This support strategy is embedded in two different frames. On the one hand, the 'Ukrainian' gender order presupposes that women have to combine both, professional work and child upbringing, without necessarily increasing their status. Therefore, my female interviewees with children continued their employment within the second labor market after child birth . This self-expectation of being employed explains why they need continuous childcare. On the other hand, the ‘German' gender order my interviewees have been confronted with postulates that women have to take care of their children at home until they are 3 years old. This order is established in German daycare regulations, which restricts the age of children who can attend kindergarten to three years. To sum up, the expectations of female migrants contradict the institutional requirements concerning daycare facilities. However, female migrants refuse to adopt the new gender order. They rearrange the situation by using the care services of their female co-migrants.

The description of the first strategy provides evidence that migrants’ practices of social support, which are based on focused and generalized reciprocity, are highly selective in regard to gender categories. Consequently, this selectivity promotes declassing of female migrants. At the same time, I neglect to describe female migrants as actors without agency. Currently the female strategy of mutual childcare hints at ways in which women try to reverse situations of underprivileged positioning.
Institutional categorizations as a source of inequality effects: German and Ukrainian institutional frames

The sections IV and V provide evidence for how contradictory social mobility and strategies of symbolic representation of an increased status influence dynamics, amount, and gendered interpretations of social support. They also explore the discursive structure of a narrative which consolidates notions of geographic and social mobility with gender attributions, and point out ways in which this narrative influences the interpretation of upward and downward class mobility of migrants within the ‘German’-‘Ukrainian’ transnational space. However, this section assesses the significance of various institutional dimensions which frame social support in the German-Ukrainian transnational space.

This analysis is based on the intersectionality approach which highlights ways in which social categorizations referring to gender, ethnicity, and class are produced by different institutional regimes. Consequently, it focuses on practices of categorization which influence mobiles’ access to formal and informal institutions. Thus, the transnational turn demands to consider ways in which institutional regimes located in different nation states overlap. The overlapping of ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘German’ institutional dimensions, such as migration regime, welfare regulations, education systems, and gender orders, condition migrants’ biographical life-course and strategies of geographical and social mobility. In this regard, my analysis refers to two central issues. The first issue concerns ways in which categorizations regarding ethnicity, gender, and class are produced by institutional regimes in different nation state frames. The second issue sheds light on situations or frames in which these effects overlap and generate cumulative effects. My analysis focuses, therefore, on institutional dimensions framing migrants’ strategies social support in both countries (see Table 6).
Table 6: Relevant institutional places framing transnational social support in German-Ukrainian transnational space (Source: own research 2008/2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration regime:</td>
<td>Emigration regime:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration regulations:</td>
<td>‘diasporic’ politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration courses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare regime</td>
<td>Welfare regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender order</td>
<td>Gender order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education system: regulations concerning the recognition of foreign degrees</td>
<td>Education system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Referring to the first issue I start with a description of inequality effects produced by institutional regimes in Germany. In this regard I especially take those institutional conditions into consideration which frame migrants’ strategies of social support, such as 1) immigration regime, 2) welfare regulations, 3) regulations concerning the assessment of foreign educational qualifications, 4) integration requirements, and 5) gender order.

(ad 1) The German immigration regime is a central frame for production of various inequality effects, because it decisively determines migrants’ access to the first labor market. Additionally, it is strongly interconnected with welfare and gender orders. As mentioned above, my interview partners fall into four categories: a) migrants married to German citizens, b) students and c) non-graduates who are not married to German citizens, and d) political refugees (the so-called “Kontingentflüchtlinge”) who were moved to Germany because of their Jewish denomination. These groups get different kinds of residence permits, which are linked to different kinds of work permits. The first groups, migrants married to a German citizen, gain temporary residence permits (which can be converted to permanent residence permits after residency of 3 years) and unrestricted work permits. The second group, students, gets temporary residence permits, which are connected to restricted work permits (approx. 18 hours per week). After their studies graduates can stay in Germany under the condition that a) they find employment for which no other German citizen can be found and b) that this job complies with their educational background. The third group, migrants without academic background in Germany, does not receive work permits during the first three years of residency in Germany. This disadvantage especially affects wives of graduated migrants and migrants, who are older than 40. The fourth group, political refugees (“Kontingentflüchtlinge”), automatically receives unrestricted immigration visas and work permits.
To sum up, Ukrainian migrants can receive a permanent immigration visa after 5 years of residency in Germany, whereby one year of studies counts as a half a year of residency. German citizenship can be accessed after 8 years of residency. Both, permanent residence permits and German citizenship are accessible on condition of successful continuous employment in the first labor market. An additional requirement is a minimum of a 60-month payment of pension and unemployment insurance. The plural citizenship is accepted only in exceptional cases.

To conclude, the lack of work permits as well as restricted work permits granted to migrants, who are not married to German citizens, condition illegal employment during first years of their residency. In my case study students and their wives (rarely: husbands) are employed illegally. Migrants older than forty are also incorporated within the second labor market. The main inequality effect of these regulations consists in declassing Ukrainians who are not married to German citizens. Thus, the necessity of incorporation within the informal labor market, caused by migration requirements, influences additional categorizations of migrants: firstly, they have to ethnicize themselves in order to get entry to the unskilled sector:

“When I entered Germany I realized that as a student I cannot earn enough money legally. Then, together with my friend, I walk from door to door to look for a work and very quickly I discovered a job at a farm (...). I didn’t have to explain to the farmer who I am. He was familiar with the system.” (Interview no. 20)

And, secondly, they are pushed to make gendered categorizations in order to access specific positions within the informal labor market. Female migrants, who are engaged in care and domestic work, describe their jobs as genuine female activity:

“My employer knows that Ukrainian women are more willing to help than other. Why? Capitalistic people cannot understand this point. How was it at home? ‘The communist party comes first, than your’. ‘Be willing to give’ – we have learned this statement by heart. It is easy for us to give. We do it, uncomplicated and quickly. Those who grow up under communist conditions have learned to share, to help, and to give.” (Interview no. 7)

(ad 2) The access to the German welfare regime is closely connected to different types of residence permits. Immigration law defines two categories of non-EU citizens with access to welfare benefits. There is, first of all, a certain type of political refugee (“Kontingentflüchtling”), who has unlimited access to social benefits. Secondly, migrants who are married to a German citizen have access to child and social benefits, pension and unemployed benefits, if he or she paid unemployment insurance. Thus, Ukrainians (students, their wives and migrants older than 40), who are not married to German citizens do not have access to the
above mentioned benefits during their first years of residency in Germany. An exception is only the compulsory health insurance. Migrants who are not married to German citizens can receive unemployment and social benefits only after the transformation of a restricted visa to a permanent residence permit (after 5 years of residency). On the one hand, this regulation conditions the necessity of mutual support of co-migrants (see section V). On the other hand, it determines a continuous engagement in illegal care and domestic work which enables migrants to earn additional income for non-budgetary costs. To conclude, restricted access to welfare benefits additionally declasses parts of Ukrainian migrants.

(ad 3) The next and important mechanism of declassing is rooted in the devaluation of Ukrainian university degrees by German authorities. In sum, there are three institutional positions responsible for the assessment of foreign educational qualifications: a) universities, b) The Central Office of Foreign Education which is responsible for the implementation of recognition criteria on the federal level, and c) bureaus for the assessment of foreign qualifications in selected professional fields (for instance in the field of medicine). The inequality effects of recognition procedures vary depending on the groups of migrants (students, their wives, and migrants older than 40). But generally the procedure implicates a) an ethnicization of the corresponding people and, as a consequence, b) their declassing, because it limits migrants’ access to the first labor market. Generally Ukrainian school degrees and university degrees are defined as not equal to German degrees. This is justified as well as by length of schooling or university studies, as well as their content. Thus, Ukrainian school degrees are obtained after 10 (actually 11) years, German degrees - after 13 years (in some federal states 12 years). The former socialist orientation of the Ukrainian education system and high number of private universities in the present Ukraine, whose degrees can be obtained by illegal money transfers, are additional reasons for the unequal classification of Ukrainian education (see interview no. 41).

As mentioned above, apart from few exceptions most people from my case study have received university education in the Ukraine (or other states of the former Soviet Union). But in most cases the procedure of degree recognition tends to devaluate their university and school degrees. Usually Ukrainian university degrees are classified as equal to the German university entrance diploma (“Abitur”). This is why students who study in Germany the same subjects as they had in the Ukraine usually have to repeat the whole course of studies. Migrants, who are the wife or husband of students and other, who are married to German citizens, have fewer possibilities to be incorporated within the first labor market, because of the impossibility to have their university degrees recognized as equal to German university degrees. They either have to repeat their education in Germany or (depending on their work
permit) find employment in the informal labor market. Migrants, who are older than forty, experience similar problems in regard to university degree recognition. After they realize that a degree recognition will fail they start working (depending on their work permit) under illegal or legal conditions. Earning a new degree is one of the last options this group would take into consideration (see interview No.15, 30).

(ad 4) While recognition procedures support ethnicization and, in consequence, the declassing of migrants, integration courses, which the German government defines as new instruments of integration, generate additional ethnicization effects. Since 2005 migrants, who did not finish an academic study at German university, have to participate in integration courses, which have duration of one year and comprise more than 600 hours. University graduates participate on the 45-ours “orientation course”, which explicitly defines expectations on newcomers. First, visiting the course creates the self-perception as a ‘foreigner’ and separates the ‘majority society’ from ‘minorities’:

“To me it was very important to visit this course. Today’s lesson has referred to the German welfare system. We were told that most Eastern-European immigrants become a burden of the German welfare system (...). I see this point, but I was never going to be that. You know me, I can take care of myself (...)” (Interview no. 3)

Additionally integration courses generate engendering of migration by providing pictures of acceptable and not acceptable images of male and female migrants (Interview no. 3).

(ad 5) In recent years the ‘German’ gender regime has been under transformation. Only some years ago the ‘German’ gender order dictated that women, not men or state facilities, are generally responsible for the upbringing of children. One of the expectations assumed that the woman has to take care of her child until it is 3 years old, only then she could return to her professional life. Consequently, only 3-year old children could attend kindergarten. This limitation is one reason for the increase of au pair migration from the Ukraine (but also other Eastern European countries) to Germany. However, after reforms of child-raising benefit and a decrease of the age for entering kindergarten to one year in 2007, the expectations towards female employees have been under transformation. The ‘conservative’ gender regime and its transformation have two consequences in respect to my female interview partners. Firstly, they are confronted with new images of women and new understandings of what it means “to be a good mother”. And secondly, migrant women with children still have few possibilities to find daycare until their children reach the age of three. On the one hand, the difficulty to access child care facilities encourages mutual support of female co-migrants and, additionally, support of female migrants with children by their female relatives living in
the Ukraine. On the other hand, this implies the impossibility of a successful incorporation within the first labor market, which requires reliable engagement. In this regard the incorporation in the “more flexible” informal labor market seems to be a better option to manage family and job (see interviews no.1, 2, 9, 10). Therefore, institutional limitations, which are based on specific gender narratives, have a negative effect on female migrants by additionally limiting the access to the first labor market. These limitations increase a possibility of declassing.

The overview about institutional frames of migrants’ support strategies in Germany shows that different inequality effects are interconnected. Social categorizations regarding ethnicity, gender, and class are not effective on their own, but only in combination with each other. Additionally the overview points out how these different categorizations restrict migrants’ access to institutions and organizations. On the one hand, we can see in which ways ethnicization, engendering, and declassing constrains the access to the German welfare system and to the first labor market. On the other hand, we observe that the self-ethnicization and engendering of Ukrainian migrants enable them to access ‘ethnic’ networks, communities, and (gendered) possibilities of social support (see IV, V). The overview of inequality effects in respect to the Ukrainian population is concisely summarized in the following table 7.

Table 7: Social categorizations produced by German institutions and their inequality effects in respect to the group of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants (Source: own research 2008/2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional frames of Germany</th>
<th>Inequality effects</th>
<th>Effects on migrants’ strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration regime:</td>
<td>Ethnicization, declassing and engendering</td>
<td>Inclusion within the second labor market, marriage as a strategy against declassing (because of a special type of residence permit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration regulations: integ-</td>
<td>Ethnicization and engendering</td>
<td>Positive self-ethnicization (the significance of the role of ethnic church), merging of gender images and ethnic belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ration courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare regime</td>
<td>Declassing</td>
<td>Different forms of social support of co-migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender order</td>
<td>Engendering and declassing</td>
<td>Additional engendering of childcare promotes the inclusion of female migrants within the second labor market; childcare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
My analysis intends to highlight possible overlappings of different institutional frames in Germany and the Ukraine in order to disclose a possible intensification of inequality effects. Before I provide evidence for this topic, I will refer to institutional frames of the Ukrainian state. However, my analysis explores only such dimensions which influence additional inequality effects within the transnational space between Germany and the Ukraine. In this regard I describe 1) the emigration politics of the Ukrainian state. Additionally, I touch issues such as 2) the current revival of ethnicization politics in the new Ukraine and 3) the current status of its welfare regime. Furthermore, 4) I refer to the transformation of gender orders within today’s Ukraine.

(ad 1) The emigration politics of the Ukrainian government can, on the one hand, be divided into strategies supporting a return of labor migration and, on the other, in strategies aiming at the development of an ‘Ukrainian diaspora’ abroad. The first type of policy is only a future option proposed by migration experts (Poznjak 2009). First, the government intends to create return programs which support the establishment of small businesses in which former migrants can be employed. Secondly, returning migrants can benefit from further qualification courses, which can enable them to be competitive at the first labor market. However, diaspora politics are more dominant at present time. These politics include, firstly, efforts concerning the legalization of Ukrainian migrants who live abroad illegally. These politics intend to create consultation possibilities at Ukrainian embassies, which should inform migrants about their rights and responsibilities in the country of destination. Secondly, immigration politics intend to improve social security of Ukrainian immigrants. In this regard several multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements between the Ukraine and the target countries of labor migration have been approved during the last 15 years.

To sum up, Ukrainian immigration politics recognize the fact that labor migrants prefer to continue their employment abroad. Dealing with such migrants in the same way as with members of “diasporas” is a self-evident strategy for the Ukrainian government. The symbo-
lic politics focus at the “improvement of the connection between migrants and Ukrainian governmental institutions” (Poznjak 2009: 16). They establish “cultural centers” in the immigration countries and Ukrainian schools for migrants’ children. In regard to my case study I have to mention the establishment of the so-called “German-Ukrainian Forum”, an umbrella organization which carries a symbolic connection between Ukrainian citizens living in Germany and Ukrainian government authorities. I also stress the role of the Greek-Catholic church, which promotes diasporic connections between the Ukraine and the target regions of migration since 1947. To conclude, ‘diasporic’ emigration politics of the Ukrainian government promote the self-ethnicization of the ‘Ukrainian’ migrant population. Similar effects are also created by domestic ethnicization strategies within the new Ukraine (Mos’ondz 2005, Purigi-na and Sardak 2007).

(ad 2) The ‘diasporic’ nature of immigration politics is to some degree interconnected to new strategies of self-ethnicization, which have arisen within the young Ukrainian state. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union the public discourse on a ‘Ukrainian identity’ has been established, because the new state was in need of a homogenized ‘container’ identity. In this regard the re-invention of the Ukrainian history was initiated by political and public authorities (Davisha and Parot 1997, Gnatyuk 2005, Wilson 2000). Without going into detail, I assume that current debates about the “Ukrainian identity”, but also institutional changes such as the “Ukrainization” of school and secondary education contents, also influence ways in which transnational migrants deal with the ethnicization they experience. “To be proud of who you are”, “to understand what it means to be Ukrainian” (interview no. 18 and 19) are important narratives for self-ethnicization. On the one hand, these narratives condition migrants’ ways of dealing with outside-ethnicization: they enable migrants to overcome discriminatory effects. On the other hand, they influence the resistance of migrants’ self-ethnicization on the long term. To conclude, the deeper understanding of the self- and outside categorizations of migrants is only possible if we recognize the modes of ethnicization in both, the country of origin and the country of destination.

(ad 3) In respect to support strategies, I have to highlight some characteristics of the Ukrainian welfare regime (Gura 2008). Generally one can assume that the ‘Ukrainian’ welfare system declasses parts of the Ukrainian population, because it supports the downward social mobility of the elder population. Formally it provides compulsory health insurance, unemployment benefit, pension, and child benefits. Though health insurance covers for the basic treatments, there are still informal payments required by the physicians. The problematic quality of health care and high costs in case of illness is an additional problem in regard to social security. Other benefits like old aged pension, unemployment or child benefits are,
according to my interviewees, too small for being regarded as benefits. This frame influences the socio-economic situation of migrants’ relatives and strongly conditions support strategies of migrants. The gap between the Ukrainian and German welfare systems is large enough to produce specific expectations concerning migrants’ upward class mobility in Germany. On the one hand, relatives can expect that the children’s entry into Germany enables them, the children, to access the German welfare systems. This is why relatives accept social support from them. On the other hand, migrants do not intend to disclose the actual difficulty to get access to welfare, because it would declass them in the eyes of their relatives. This situation additionally produces consolidated support of co-migrants, who are not forced to explain the mechanisms of declassing to each other (see section V).

(ad 4) How can we characterize the gender regime which dominates the Ukrainian middle class? This regime is strongly influenced by the Soviet ideology of gender equality, which has been widely spread in the Ukraine since this region was a part of the Soviet Union (Dudwick at al. 2002). Its central principle refers to the idea that both genders have to be equally engaged in the productive labor. The structure of the labor market and of childcare facilities as well as the configuration of the welfare system of the Soviet Union was organized in accordance with this principle. State facilities were responsible for the reproductive sector. However, today this order is under transformation and new paths of division between productive and reproductive fields are generated. On the one hand, the contemporary ‘Ukrainian’ gender order still presupposes that both genders are employed in the productive sector, on the other hand, the expectations concerning social mobility vary depending on gender. While middle class men have to be successful within the productive sector, the expectations regarding professional success and social mobility of middle class women, who also have to be employed, are lower. In this regard university studies of women are seen as an investment in their chances on the ‘marriage market’.

Another point that should be mentioned refers to situations in which the takeover of ‘male’ action patterns by women is accepted. In those cases in which “husbands are not able to satisfy family’s needs” (Interview no. 34), women are allowed to adopt the role of “breadwinner” and to focus their professional activities on the achievement of professional success. This takeover is, accordingly to my interview partner (see Interview no. 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39) especially spread within the female population which is moving from the Ukraine to Russia, Italy, and Portugal. On the one hand, fellow women describe these women as “poor women in need who are forced to earn their money abroad because of incapable husbands” (see interview no.34). On the other hand, they are perceived as “autonomous women, who are able to control their own lives and the lives of their families” (Interview Nr. 36). In regard
to my case study the takeover of ‘male’ orientations regarding social success is especially accepted in the case of single mothers, who do not have to follow their husband’s expectations (see Section IV).

To conclude, the roots of social mobility are engendered. Social mobility of men is generally accepted, while social mobility of women is tolerated in specific cases. Consequently, this gender order influences the potential declassing of women. As announced above this gender order influences modes of social mobility of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants in Germany and migrants’ strategies of social support considerable.

(ad 5) Finally, I explore some aspects of the Ukrainian education system in order to shed light on the connection between the educational background of Ukrainian students and their migration decisions. The structure of secondary and tertiary education has been under transformation since 1992. On the one hand, the high number of private universities increased. On the other, the education contents increasingly include professional knowledge required by western companies which have recently located to the Ukraine. Besides of that, a large number of school leavers, who prefer to study International Economy, focuses on professional career in West European companies. The orientation towards competitiveness makes earning international university degrees desirable. Consequently, some qualified young people prefer to study in Western Europe or in the U.S.A. in order to improve their cultural capital for the domestic labor market. To conclude, the earning of ‘western’ education degree is perceived as one possibility to improve the class mobility. But, as mentioned above, the reasons for an earning of a ‘western’ degree differ in respect to gender. This fact potentially facilitates women’s declassing.

Table 8: Social categorizations produced by Ukrainian institutions and their inequality effects in respect to the group of Ukrainian migrants (Source: own research 2008/2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional frames of the Ukraine</th>
<th>Inequality effects</th>
<th>Effects on migrants’ strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emigration regime</td>
<td>Positive ethnicization</td>
<td>Continuous self-ethnicization of both, men and women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnationalization of welfare: different agreements</td>
<td>Government’s intention to avoid downward mobility caused by illegal employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare regime (enables migration of middle-)</td>
<td>Potential declassing of migrants’ relatives</td>
<td>Different forms of social support of relatives by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
aged women)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender order</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engendering of paths of social mobility: potential slowing of upward mobility of women, The takeover of ‘male’ upward mobility patterns is possible under specific circumstances</td>
<td>Expectations regarding social mobility of married women are not very high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education system: orientation on western degrees</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merging of expectations concerning social mobility and geographic mobility</td>
<td>Studying abroad as a strategy to increase social mobility generally reserved for male and rarely for female migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overview about different inequality effects produced by German and Ukrainian institutions highlights complex frames which condition migrants’ strategies of social support. However, my analysis does not only intend to describe different institutional frames in two nation states, but also to point out in which situations and under which circumstances these frames overlap and produce cumulating effects in regard to unequal social positions of Ukrainian migrants living in Germany.

The overview demonstrates general ways in which the overlapping of institutional frames located in both countries, Germany and the Ukraine, intensifies inequality effects. Firstly, German immigration regulations and Ukrainian emigration politics produce double ethnicization effects. Secondly, the Ukrainian welfare system tends to declass migrants’ relatives on the one hand, while the selective provision of access to the German welfare system promotes the downward mobility of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants on the other. Different modes of declassing of both groups determine paths and amounts of transnational social support. And, third, different gender orders in both states simultaneously determine underprivileged social mobility of female migrants.

Table 9: Overlapping of institutional inequality effects in respect to the support strategies of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants (Source: own research 2008/2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inequality effects produced by institutional frames in Germany</th>
<th>Inequality effects produced by institutional frames in the Ukraine</th>
<th>Effects on migrants’ strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicization, declassing, and engendering (immigration regime, integration regulations)</td>
<td>Positive ethnicization (emigration regime)</td>
<td>Continuous self-ethnicization of both men and women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Declassing (welfare regime) | Potential declassing of migrants’ relatives (welfare regime) | Different forms of social support of relatives by migrants
---|---|---
Engendering and declassing (gender order) | Engendering of paths of social mobility (gender order) | Expectations regarding social mobility of married females are not too/very high
Ethnicization and declassing (regulations concerning degree recognition) | Merging of expectations concerning social mobility and geographic mobility | Studying abroad as a strategy to increase social mobility generally reserved for male and exceptionally/rarely for female migrants

Résumé

Migration theories, whose frame of reference is a single nation state (Alba and Nee 2003, Esser 1980, Gordon 1964), presuppose a static view on the interconnection between social inequality and migration. Declassing of migrants is either described as shifted by migrant populations, which are not willing to integrate, or by institutions of the destination state, which tend to exclude minorities. The transformation paths of migrants’ class positions and dynamics of ethnicization and engendering, which are simultaneously produced by collective and institutional practices in both, the country of origin and in the country of destination, are usually disregarded in this regard.

The presented contribution tries to avoid a static perspective on inequality effects of migration. Instead it combines the intersectionality approach with a transnational lens in order to describe complex inequality effects due to migration. What can we learn about inequality reproduction due to migration if we use the transnational perspective?

The central point refers to the significance of the dialectical relationship between two socio-spatial levels on which migration conditions inequality formation: a) the level of nation states and b) the transnational level, which is defined as a pluri-locally organized socio-spatial field consisting of dense social relationships (Faist 2000, Pries 2008, Weiß and Berger 2008). On the first socio-spatial level or scale we can describe transformations of social positions of migrants, their strategies of social mobility, and conditions of access to different institutional spheres, either in the country of origin or in the country of destination. On the transnational level or scale, we can analyze a contradictory social mobility of migrants, who simultaneously...
experience downward mobility in the country of destination and upward mobility in the country of origin. We can also pay attention to overlappings of institutional frames of different nation states, whose categorizations cause cumulative effects in regard to upward or downward positioning of migrants. I argue that a transnational perspective on social inequality in relation to migration gives us the possibility to conduct an analysis on two different socio-spatial scales simultaneously – on the national and on the transnational scale – and to demonstrate, how both scales are interconnected.

The presented case study on the circulation of migrants’ social support within the ‘German’-‘Ukrainian’ transnational space has taken exactly this perspective. It has provided evidence for ways in which inequality effects of migration are mutually constitutive on the national and transnational scale. This is why, I highlight, on the one hand, different nation based narratives and institutional conditions which determine social positions of migrants within the frame of the German and of the Ukrainian nation state. On the other hand, I also demonstrate how these inequality effects of social support are embedded in the transnational frame of reference. Therefore, I describe the constitution of transnational forms of social inequality due to migration, which are expressed in migrants’ experiences of contradictive class mobility and of complex representation strategies of class position. I show that the ‘Ukrainian’ narrative of upward mobility due to migration is differs in regard to gender. While both genders are expected to be successful in the country of destination, women have to provide more financial and other kinds of support for their parents and relatives than men. At the same time the downward mobility of female and male migrants without a German university degree influences the larger amount of social support these groups provide to their families than male migrants with university degrees. In this regard social support can be regarded as a symbolic representation of (an imaginary) upward mobility of migrants. The lower their social position in the country of destination, the more social help they seem to provide. At the same time the financial and time investments in representation strategies influence the degree of migrants’ incorporation in societal institutions in the country of destination. There is a danger that the pressure to provide financial support to the home country results in the continuous employment of women in the informal labor market. In this regard I demonstrate that dealing with the contradictive social status leads, especially on the side of women, to the phenomenon of self-exploitation.

In the last section I also highlight ways in which the institutional frames of two different nation states produce various inequality effects in regard to ethnicity, class, and gender. My analysis points out how complex categorizations of ‘German’ and ‘Ukrainian’ institutional frames overlap and intensify inequality effects on the transnational scale. In this regard I describe
categorization practices of migration regimes and welfare systems of both countries, which tend to ethnicize and declass both, male and female migrants in different ways. In this regard the positive self-ethnicization of migrants is as a form of dealing with the declassing in the country of destination. The positive self-ethnicization signifies a symbolic revaluation of one’s position, but in fact has ambivalent effects.

At the same time, I pay attention to the intersection of two different gender orders, which strongly influence the dynamics of ethnicization and declassing and slow down the upward class mobility of female migrants in the country of destination. These institutional effects are additionally strengthened by selected support strategy of co-migrants, such as provision of job information. While male migrants, who are included within the first labor market, provide information about possible job positions to their male counterparts, female migrants, who are to a higher degree than men included within the informal labor market, provide information about job positions to their female counterparts. The provision of job information follows a specific cultural narrative about women’s places within the productive and reproductive field. Exactly this narrative produces additional engendering and potential exclusion of female migrants from the first labor market.

To conclude, the transnational view on transformation of social inequality due to migration discloses complex revaluation practices of social positions of migrants, which take place on two socio-spatial scales simultaneously. It shows the dynamic and non-homogeneous quality of migrants’ social positions within the ‘German’-‘Ukrainian’ transnational space. It highlights the specific forms and mechanisms of inequality formation, such as contradictive class mobility, complex representation strategies of status transformation, self-exploitation and self-ethnicization.
Appendix: Dates of Interviews

Interviews with ‘Ukrainian’ migrants, which are conducted in Bielefeld:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview No.</th>
<th>Name, Initials</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
<td>O.M.</td>
<td>02.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2</td>
<td>O.K.</td>
<td>20.12.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3</td>
<td>I.M.</td>
<td>05.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4</td>
<td>T.S.</td>
<td>05.12.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5</td>
<td>V.N.</td>
<td>20.11.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6</td>
<td>K.K.</td>
<td>20.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 7</td>
<td>O.K.</td>
<td>03.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 8</td>
<td>E.L.</td>
<td>15.01.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 9</td>
<td>J.N.</td>
<td>02.02.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 10</td>
<td>O.N.</td>
<td>12.02.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 11</td>
<td>V.N</td>
<td>10.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12</td>
<td>T.S.</td>
<td>12.02.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 13</td>
<td>S.N.</td>
<td>12.02.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 14</td>
<td>L.B.</td>
<td>01.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 16</td>
<td>O.K.</td>
<td>13.02.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 18</td>
<td>A.K.</td>
<td>11.11.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 19</td>
<td>M.M.</td>
<td>24.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 20</td>
<td>A.C.</td>
<td>12.12.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 21</td>
<td>I.N.</td>
<td>20.11.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 22</td>
<td>I.S.</td>
<td>10.12.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 23</td>
<td>T.N.</td>
<td>21.04.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 24</td>
<td>S.I.</td>
<td>24.11.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 25</td>
<td>A.H.</td>
<td>12.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 27</td>
<td>V.N.</td>
<td>24.04.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 28</td>
<td>M.V.</td>
<td>01.10.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 29</td>
<td>R.D.</td>
<td>12.02.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 30</td>
<td>I.N.</td>
<td>15.10.2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews with migrants’ relatives (who are living in the Ukraine), which are conducted in Bielefeld:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview No.</th>
<th>Name, Initials</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 31</td>
<td>N.K.</td>
<td>10.01.2009</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 32</td>
<td>N.H.</td>
<td>20.12.2008</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 33</td>
<td>N.L.</td>
<td>13.01.2009</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews with migrants’ relatives, which are conducted in the Ukraine:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview No.</th>
<th>Name, Initials</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 34</td>
<td>O.M.</td>
<td>02.04.2009 - 03.04.2009</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankovsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Location/Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>V.K.</td>
<td>Rogosin by Lviv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td>(9.04.2009) Kyiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Alexandr Poznjak</td>
<td>(10.04.2009) Kyiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The head of department of migration research at the Institute of Demography and Socioeconomic Research at the National Academy of Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Lidija Tkatschenko</td>
<td>(10.04.2009) Kyiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The researcher at the Institute of Demography and Socioeconomic Research at the National Academy of Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Andreas Turow</td>
<td>(07.06.2009) Bielefeld City</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The head of the Foreign Office of Bielefeld City</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources


