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DECOLONIZATION BY EUROPEANIZATION?
The Early EEC and the Transformation of French-African Relations

Martin Rempe

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Decolonization by Europeanization?

The Early EEC and the Transformation of French-African Relations

Martin Rempe

Abstract

“Françafrique”, “Francophonie”, “l’état franco-africain” and “Mafiafrique” – all these terms are commonly used if one comes to talk about French-African relations after the severing of colonial ties in 1960. Even though they bear slightly different meanings, they share the notion of a very close, stable, and continuous if not to say colonially-styled relationship. According to the relevant literature, the European Economic Community (EEC) acted thereby as a stabilizing instrument. Against this backdrop, the paper tries to present new perspectives on the complex relationship between the EEC, France and its former African colonies associated to the community since 1958. The paper explores to what extent France’s belonging to the EEC triggered Europeanization processes that directly affected French-African relations and eventually acted in favor of decolonization of metropolitan France. I will argue that in the course of the 1960s, emulation of community procedures as well as supranational legal coercion to a certain extent transformed French development co-operation and trade relations with the Francophone African states and in the end fostered France’s regional reconfiguration towards Europe.

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Contents

1. Introduction 5


3. France, the Foundation of the EEC and the African Question 9

4. Decolonization by Europeanization 10
   4.1 Europeanization of Development Co-operation 10
   4.2 Europeanization of Trade Structures 13

5. Europeanization and the Reconfiguration of Regional Spaces 15

Literature 17
1. Introduction

“Françafrique”, “Francophonie”, “l’état franco-africain” and “Mafiafricque” – all these terms are frequently used if one comes to talk about French-African relations after the severing of colonial ties in 1960. Even though they bear slightly different meanings, they share the notion of a very close, stable, and continuous if not to say colonially-styled relationship. A strong French military presence in the African states south of the Sahara, innumerable interventions in their political affairs including organized putsches, scandalous economic undertakings of French companies and an aggressive cultural policy in these countries account for this “neocolonial” narrative (Glaser/Smith 2005; Verschave 2004; Brüne 1995; Geze 2005; Charbonneau 2008; Dozon 2003).

France’s engagement in European integration, if mentioned at all by this kind of literature, is usually seen as an additional instrument of French efforts to strengthen its influence in Africa. Hardly surprising, historians of European integration history as well highlighted the preponderant influence of France on the EEC’s policy vis-à-vis Africa and the beneficial effects for the French state and economy. From their perspective, by providing considerable financial means, the community helped Paris stabilize its special relationship with its former colonies, whereas the EEC’s development policy in Brussels considerably relied on the French model (Vahsen 2010; Turpin 2005; Lister 1988; Cosgrove-Twitchett 1978). Adding these two types of literature together, the picture seems very clear: Backed by the recently established EEC, France continued to pursue a kind of colonial policy in the new Francophone African states, at least throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.

Keeping this backdrop in mind, the following paper tries to present new perspectives on the complex tripartite relationship between the EEC, France and the African associated countries in the above mentioned period. Inspired by recent research in history and political science on Europeanization, I will challenge the narrative of an omnipotent France dominating Europe’s Africa policy as well as preserving its own specific relations to the former colonies. Contrarily, I will explore to what extent France’s belonging to the EEC triggered Europeanization processes that directly affected French-African relations and eventually acted in favor of decolonization of metropolitan France. More precisely, the focus is on the mechanisms driving these processes and how they can be grasped. The aim of this paper is explicitly not to fundamentally question prevailing readings of the relations between the EEC and France as regards Africa. Rather, I will try to add a new aspect so far neglected in order to modify previous interpretations. Two areas are of special interest: French-African trade relations and the field of development aid. Both areas promise significant results since right from the beginning in 1958, the community dealt with trade-related issues as well as with development which coexisted with bilateral aid of the member states. Finally and more generally, I will consider the dynamics of spatial reconfiguration which resulted from these Europeanization processes.

At this point, some definitions and theoretical considerations may be useful. First of all, Europeanization as used in this study is closely bound to the European integration process and therefore relates to the political interactions between the EEC and its member states. Whereas Europeanization generally

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1 I am very grateful to my colleagues of the Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe” for their valuable comments.
includes bottom-up as well as top-down transfers, here it is the latter one which will primarily be looked at. Europeanization then refers to the transfer of rules, procedures and practices which first emerged at the EEC level to national policies, including their repercussions on the society and the economy of the individual member state. In phenomenological respect, Europeanization undoubtedly represents convergent dynamics, but by no means in a teleological sense. Therefore, opposite trends – some name these de-Europeanization – must always be kept in mind, if questions about Europeanization are discussed (Risse et al. 2001; Patel/Hirschhausen 2010; Börzel/Risse 2006; Kaelble 2007).

Secondly, decolonization is understood as an open process which triggered structural transformations in the former colonies as well as in the metropolis itself after the end of formal colonial rule (Frey 2006). The spatial extension of the term to the former colonial powers refers to recent historical literature which is inspired by post-colonial studies. It simply reflects the observation that Empires also struck back home (Ward 2001; Blanchard et al. 2005). Following a spatially extensive and procedural understanding, it is important to keep in mind that institutions, practices and perceptions persisting from the colonial era could influence and hamper this process. Hence, both dynamics – transformative and resistant powers – must be considered in order to measure the extent of decolonization of metropolitan France triggered by the EEC (Kalter/Rempe 2011).

Thirdly, political science literature on diffusion provides us with an appropriate set of different social mechanisms driving such transfer processes. For instance, Börzel and Risse distinguish five mechanisms: coercion, conditionality, socialization, persuasion and emulation (Börzel/Risse 2008). Even though such patterns often seem too inflexible for historical analysis, they undoubtedly possess greater explanatory power than many concepts that circulate within the historical transfer research (Werner/Zimmermann 2002; Paulmann 2004). Consequently, the following paper draws on the mechanisms in a rather pragmatic way, not the least because only two of them are relevant to my research design: coercion and emulation. This is due to the simple fact that the EEC in the early phase of its existence by no means exerted itself to actively promote its ideas, concepts and practices vis-à-vis the member states. Thus, one can only expect legal coercion based on the treaty or “receiver-driven” emulation as mechanisms transforming French-African relations.

Finally, due to the focus of my research question, European agency will clearly be privileged over African perspectives, even if the latter pop up at some points of the paper. This does not mean that the role of African states in the tripartite relationship can be neglected in general. On the contrary, elsewhere I conceptualized this relationship as an entangled history in which the potential and limitations of African influence on development are carefully examined (Rempe 2010). Consequently, the slight disregard of African point of views first and foremost results from my cognitive focus as defined above and should not be misunderstood as a continuation of traditional Eurocentric historiography.

The first part of the paper will give a general survey of French-African relations after the Second World War. Subsequently, the second chapter will discuss the reasons for association of France’s African territories

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2 Both articles are very instructive and recommendable, but they remain relatively silent on the reasons for transfer processes.
to the EEC and the establishment of a European development policy. The third part will then analyze Europeanization processes in the area of development on the one side and of trade structures on the other. Finally, I will shed light on the link between Europeanization, decolonization and the reconfiguration of regional spaces.

2. French-African Relations in the Framework of the French Union

The *Union française* was established in 1946. Its fundamental principles were fixed in part VIII of the constitution of the fourth French republic. The union was supposed to encompass the whole French colonial empire, but very quickly, it became apparent that the union would primarily be relevant to the African territories south of the Sahara. After the Second World War, the hexagon needed its African empire more than ever for several reasons: First of all, in the course of the Second World War, the geostrategic importance of French Africa became most evident, as it served as one base, from which so-called Free France organized its resistance against the Nazi regime. Secondly, the empire was supposed to contribute to the rebirth of a weakened and almost defeated French nation in terms of national prestige and grandeur preserving its self-image as a great power. Thirdly and finally, resources and raw materials from the colonies were needed in order to rebuild the French economy which was strongly damaged by the War (Shipway 2008; Leonhard 2007; Eckert 2006).

For these reasons, France turned away from the principle of colonial self-sufficiency and implemented an investment-driven development policy. Certainly, external factors favored this policy change as well: On the one hand, after the Second World War it became more and more difficult to legitimize colonial empires vis-à-vis a new international arena which at least rhetorically endorsed the principles of self-determination and the right to people's sovereignty. Thus, from the perspective of a colonial power like France, modernization of the colonies was supposed to bridge the gap in this crisis of legitimacy (Mommsen 1990). On the other hand, colonialism not only came under pressure from the international sphere, but was more and more contested by the indigenous population in the colonies themselves. Since the end of the 1930s, their claims for higher wages and equal social allowances resulted in several strikes and tended to destabilize the imperial order on the spot. By promising development, France hoped to appease these anti-colonial tendencies (Cooper 1996).

Along with this developmental colonialism, which in the literature is often labeled as “the second colonial occupation”, French-African relations were considerably intensified: The *Fonds d'investissement de développement économique et social* (FIDES) was established in order to fund local development projects. The colonial administration, hitherto exclusively a business of generalists who were trained at the *École coloniale*, was complemented by highly specialized technical services which were supposed to plan and manage the development projects in the African territories. Innumerable research institutes were created in France as well as in Africa, headed by the *Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre mer*. These institutes were supposed to generate new technical and especially agricultural knowledge for the

3 The associated Asian territories like Indochina refused to join the union (Thobie 1990: 368f.).
modernization of the colonies’ economic production (Dimier 2004; Bonneuil/Petitjean 1997).

However, this “imperialism of knowledge” (Cooper 1997) failed. Although the research institutes were very active right from the beginning of their existence, they remained somewhat aside of the actual development policy. It seems that the lack of co-operation between scientists and bureaucrats hampered the implementation of a knowledge-based development approach. The same holds true with the colonial administration, where the long-established civil servants mistrusted the experts from the technical services. They saw themselves as the real “spécialistes de l’indigène” (Dimier 2004) and judged their human experiences much higher than the technical knowledge of these new services. Consequently, France’s colonial development policy, even if ostensibly articulating a scientific mission, followed older patterns of colonial policy: Personal relationships between patrons and clients played a much greater role than scientific considerations, “palaver” and persuasion ruled over rationality and efficiency. Also in Paris, the civil servants working for the FIDES had a considerable subjective margin of discretion in its funding decisions. All in all, France’s development policy was rather guided by political objectives – among them first of all, the preservation of its colonial empire – than by economic, rational or scientific considerations.

Nevertheless, trade between France and its African territories gained substantial significance after 1945 for both sides: In 1954, 70 percent of France’s food imports came from the Pays d’outre-mer (POM). Almost the same figure accounts for the POM’s imports from France, which was equivalent to 34 percent of French total exports. Concerning some French industrial products like refrigerators, fertilizer or detergents, almost all French exports went to the colonies. Secondary effects notwithstanding, around 500,000 French employees were directly involved in France’s oversea economy at that time accounting for one of 28 French households. As regards the public sector, a little less than a quarter of all applications concerned the colonies. Last not least, the French transport sector was heavily dependent on the oversea trade, because it generated almost half of its business volume. In short, a French-African common market developed after the Second World War, which not only outpaced the European market for French products. Still in 1957, the commercial framework between the metropolis and its African territories, together with the development efforts, caused some French officials like Pierre Moussa to even dream of a bright future for Françafrique (Moussa 1957; Asselain 1984: 123).

Moussa was by no means alone with his dreams. For General de Gaulle, France without its African front yard was for a long time simply inconceivable. The same holds true for François Mitterand, who still in 1957 wrote that “sans l’Afrique, il n’y aura pas d’histoire de France au XXe siècle” (quoted in Dozon 2003: 243). For the political elites in particular, France and its African territories formed a geopolitical unity which had to be maintained even at high costs, as the Algerian war proved. Accordingly, also African leaders pinned their hopes on the French union and its promises for equality. One should not forget that African deputies like Lamine Gueye, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Felix Houphouët-Boigny and others raised their voices in the National Assembly and thereby to a certain extent influenced French politics – temporarily, Houphouët-Boigny even held the position of a state minister (Chafer 2002). The presence of Africans in French politics was at that time perhaps less extraordinary than the appointment of a minister with a so-called migration background today. Admittedly, criticism of France’s developmental engagement in Africa did not stay away:

4 Pierre Moussa was at that time director for economic affairs in the French Ministère d’outre-mer.
The so-called cartierism, a circle around Raymond Cartier, argued that French backward provinces should be modernized first before spending French tax money in the African middle of nowhere (Marseille 1984: 357–365). However, it was just this public debate, popping up in 1956, which demonstrated that France’s relationship to Africa was a central – even though contested – issue within postwar metropolitan French society. Hence, Frederick Cooper has good reasons to characterize the France of this period as an empire-state, which became a “normal” nation-state only in 1960 respectively 1962 (Cooper 2007: 358).

3. France, the Foundation of the EEC and the African Question

There is no place here to discuss why the French Union broke down and, more generally, why the transformation of the French-African colonial relationship into a federation or confederation of equal states did not work out. Suffice it to say that such ideas existed in Paris as well as in Dakar or Abidjan and that the successor of the French Union, the so-called Communauté, did not meet the expectations of many African leaders (Cooper 2007). Instead – and against the intentions of almost all actors involved – the most important and long-lasting international, multilateral framework that emerged on the eve of independence was the association of the African territories to the European Economic Community (EEC).

Why did this framework gain such importance? In the course of the 1950s, France was financially less and less able to pursue a costly investment policy in its African territories. In order to alleviate these financial constraints, the French government embarked on a double strategy: On the one hand, Paris transferred some kind of authority to the territorial level, including developmental and social issues. The so-called Loi Defferre of 1956 led to a certain autonomy of each colony and at the same time deferred the pressure of development demands on the part of the indigenous populations from Paris to their territorial government. On the other hand, France was now – in contrast to the years before, when similar initiatives were made – ready for a European burden sharing (Chafer 2002).

Actually, the French government was not only ready for a European engagement in its African territories, but also made a financial contribution of the prospective partner countries of the EEC a conditio sine qua non for its agreement. The French proposal was to associate the overseas’ countries and territories of every member state to the common market, including the establishment of a European Development Fund (EDF) and preferential market access for the colonies. The motives behind this very firm position were at least twofold: Along with the economic dimension, the French government also intended to maintain its African empire in political terms. In short, the concept of association was an attempt to bring in line two different geographical areas of French influence (Moser 2000; Migani 2008; Girault 1989; Frank 1992).

In the end, France achieved its goal. Actually, the association issue was one that until the very end of the

5 Raymond Cartier then was chief editor of the influential weekly Paris match.

6 Previous initiatives for a common European engagement in Africa were the Strasbourg Plan discussed by the Council of Europe and some (unsuccessful) German-French initiatives (Moser 2000; Wilkens 1999; Levêfre 1999).
negotiations endangered a successful conclusion of the treaty, because the Netherlands and Germany feared involvement in late colonial affairs. It was, however, exactly this threat together with French concessions and some geopolitical considerations relating to the intensifying Cold War which caused the two opponents to give in (Thiemeyer 2005; Harryvan/Van der Haarst 2005). The European development fund was established with a budget amounting to more than 580 billion units of amount (u.a.) for the first five years, and the associated countries received preferential market access. France and Germany took the lion’s share of the fund (400 billion u.a.) in equal parts, the rest came from the other member states (Lister 1988). After independence of the African countries, the association was renewed in 1963 by the Yaoundé convention, now voluntarily negotiated between the African states and the EEC. Consequently, in the course of the 1960s, the community became the most important donor institution for many of the African francophone states right after France (Vahsen 2010; Zartman 1971).

In general, the association of the overseas’ countries and territories opened a policy field for the EEC, which five of the six member states had no intention of dealing with two years before its foundation. Moreover, in contrast to some other EEC policy fields like the transport or competition policy, which were supposed to be built up very quickly, it was the European development policy which right after the common agricultural policy became one of the most active fields of the young community. Last not least, the association established a complex tripartite relationship between the EEC, France and the francophone African states which had not only considerable impact on the latter, but also, as I will show in the following chapters, to a certain extent transformed French-African relations and thereby backed the decolonization of metropolitan France.

4. Decolonization by Europeanization

4.1 Europeanization of Development Co-operation

In April 1962, Jacques Foccart, the secretary general for African affairs in the Elysée palace and President de Gaulle’s most important consultant as regards French-African relations, was made aware by a co-worker of a booklet of the EEC’s public relation office. It was titled “Le fonds européen de développement et les pays d’outre-mer associés 1959-1961.” Inside, there was a map of every single country showing all the development projects funded by the EDF in splendid colors. Short descriptions of the projects, including the amount of expenditures, made the viewer get a bright picture of the EEC’s development activities in each associated country. The collaborator’s comment on the booklet was short and significant: “La Commission de la CEE a le sens des relations publiques. Le Ministère de la Coopération ne pourrait il s’inspirer de cet exemple?”(Centre d’Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales 1962).

This short story is instructive in at least two respects: On the one hand, it indicates that right from the

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7 Translation [by author]: “The commission of the EEC has a sense of public relations. Could not the Ministry for Co-operation be inspired by this example?” (for the general public relation activities of the early EEC see Rye 2009; as regards public relations of the EEC’s development co-operation see Nicaise 2007: 135–139).
beginning, the commission by no means designed its own policy exclusively according to the French model (see however Dimier 2008). Instead, Brussels developed new ideas and activities. The Directorate general VIII (DG VIII), which was in charge of the community’s development aid, followed its own paths and quickly established a distinct “European” development policy. On the other hand, this episode reveals that these dynamics in Brussels caused a competitive situation between the community’s multilateral and France’s bilateral aid. More often than not, the commission became the vanguard of new strategies, development approaches and administrative practices. Confronted with this competitive situation, the French development bureaucracy had the choice between emulation and refusal. In other words, the EEC forced France to reconsider its own development practices crept over by the colonial era. In this sense, the issue of Europeanization by emulation fed at the same time the decolonization of this policy field.

Another example might illustrate this argument and at the same time shed some light on French motives for emulation. It concerns the evaluation practices of the European Development Fund: Very quickly, it became evident that the EEC set very high standards for development project proposals of the associated countries. Between 1958 and 1963, the DG VIII rejected more than 350 proposals. This high refusal rate was by no means due to the lack of technical skills and knowledge on the African side, as was repeatedly claimed (Vahsen 2010; Dimier 2008; Moser 2000; Lister 1988; Cosgrove-Twitchett 1978). Instead, many of these proposals originated from the French colonial administration, which mirrored the gap between French and European evaluation standards in development co-operation (Rempe 2010).

Without a doubt, the DG VIII and its technical services were in favor of sound, scientifically well-reasoned project proposals. To put it bluntly, the more econometrics and calculations a project draft contained, the more probable seemed to be approval in Brussels. As the publication “Les critères d’appréciation des projets soumis au Fonds européen” of 1963 reveals, the DG VIII explicitly distanced itself from France’s evaluation practices, where “grande part [est] laissée à l’évaluation subjective des services dans le cadre de programmes généraux.” (Historical Archives of the European Union [HAEU] 1965: 198). Highlighting their economic, scientific and last not least “objective” approach, the European bureaucrats rather saw themselves in line with the procedures of the World Bank or the United Nations’ evaluation practices (Vahsen 2010: 181).

Unfortunately, the sources do not tell us anything about the process how this document came about. It is therefore difficult to identify the “national” influences bearing on these evaluation criteria. However, there is a great deal of evidence that the publication was the result of a deep conflict within DG VIII between former French colonial administrators on the one hand and rather open-minded development technocrats from other member states on the other. In particular, the director of the EDF, Jacques Ferrandi who had been working in colonial French Africa for decades, made no secret of his disagreement with the content of the document in his preamble. On Ferrandi and the influence of former French colonial administrators within DG VIII see Dimier 2008; however, I do not follow her argument.

8 Translation [by author]:“Great freedom of action remains in the subjective judgment of the administration within the general development programs.”

9 On Ferrandi and the influence of former French colonial administrators within DG VIII see Dimier 2008; however, I do not follow her argument.
development economists and nobel prize winners like the Dutch Jan Tinbergen and the Russian Leonid Kantorowitsch as well as studies of the French pioneer of micro economics, Jaques Lesourne, and of the Canadian Harvard professor Benjamin Higgins. Furthermore, the complete lack of German literature perfectly fits into this picture of an open-minded and at the same time technocratic majority within DG VIII, since German economists had very little to say in this emerging research field (HAEU 1965: 239f.). Thus, international development economics overrode colonial certainties, not the least because its methods and approaches were applied when project evaluation turned into practice (Rempe 2010).

The difference between French and European approaches towards development also made itself felt in the associated countries. For instance, already in 1960, the Senegalese Prime Minister Mamadou Dia moaned about the community’s strict principles and pleaded for the more flexible procedures which the Senegal was used to from the experience with the French development administration (Archives Nationales du Sénégal 1960a). Conversely, exactly this observation that the African governments realized the different hurdles for project proposals between Brussels and Paris made the French administration reconsider its own practices. Of course, it did not acknowledge that, to a certain extent, the problem was home-made. Nevertheless, already in 1962, the French Minister for development Jean Foyer, in a circular to all French co-operation missions in Africa, requested a sounder, more rational and scientifically-guided evaluation of project proposals to be handed in by the African states:

“Il faut reconnaître que les dossiers fournis par les États [africaines] sont […] peu satisfaisants. Sans être aussi exigeants dans les détails que les services du Fonds Européen, nous nous devons d’obtenir à l’appui des demandes d’aides des dossiers justificatif dignes de ce nom et dégageant avec suffisamment de précision, les données économiques, sociales et techniques du projet, la place qu’il tient dans le plan de développement du pays, les produits et les charges récurrentes escomptés et pour ces dernières les dispositions prises pour y faire face...” (Centre des Archives Diplomatiques [CAD] 1962).

Certainly, it was not the competition with the EEC alone which put the French administration under pressure. In general, the independence of francophone Africa opened this region for donor countries like the USA, the USSR and institutions like the World Bank. However, with the interventions of the EDF, the French government for the first time was faced with new rivalry in development co-operation. In gradually emulating the community’s evaluation standards, France explicitly reacted to a danger caused by the misfit between French and European procedures: Ultimately, the French feared that the African states would present the “badly-designed” proposals to Paris, whereas the sound, cost-efficient and spectacular projects would go to the stricter donor institutions and in particular to the EEC (CAD 1960). At the same time, the piecemeal adaption to community practices minimized the possibility of managing development within

10 On the emergence of development economics in general see Speich 2008: 183–192; on the marginal role of German economists in this process see Schlette 1982: 561–568.

11 Translation [by author]: “It needs to be recognized that the application dossiers furnished by the [African] States are […] rather unsatisfactory. Without wanting to be just as exacting in all the details as the administration of the European Development Fund, nonetheless we must for the better support of the requests for aid require and obtain well-justified application dossiers that deserve this name, providing with sufficient precision economic, social and technical data relevant to the project, explaining its role within the development plan of the country, the intended outcome and products and the calculated running costs and for the latter, the dispositions to be taken in order to meet them...”
traditional client patron relationships and therefore triggered the decolonization of French development policy at least as regards the planning and evaluation of development projects.

However – and this addresses the limits of the EEC’s transformative power – the implementation of development projects funded by Brussels more often than not went to French enterprises. The unequal distribution of applications between the six had first of all practical reasons, since quite often French companies due to their long-standing activities in the associated countries enjoyed a competitive advantage (Cosgrove-Twitchett 1978). Secondly, the French EDF director Jacques Ferrandi enjoyed great freedom of action in this sphere of competence. Consequently, he followed his convictions “de rendre à Cesar, ce qui lui appartient”, as he put it in a correspondence with a French development company (Centre des Archives Contemporaines 1964). It is no coincidence that in German business circles Ferrandi was considered one of the most controversial personalities in Brussels. Finally, even when the DG VIII tried to Europeanize the staff of development projects, French companies like the Société d’aide technique et de coopération successfully resisted this action. In short, the EEC had much more impact on the development bureaucracy in Paris and the planning of development there than on the implementation and proceedings in Africa, which still were mainly carried through by French development workers.

4.2 Europeanization of Trade Structures

The transformation of France’s trade structures after the independence of Francophone Africa are much more obvious than the rather subtle changes of its development policy described above. The figures of economic historians indicate that after 1960, trade between the metropolis and its former African colonies steadily declined: Whereas in 1958 more than one third of French total exports went to Francophone Africa and 28 percent of total French imports came from these regions, 15 years later it was respectively only 10 and 8 percent. In contrast, French exports into the EEC member states grew from only 16 percent in 1952 to more than 50 percent after 1970 (Moussa 1957: 32, 59; D’Almeida-Topor/Lakroum 1994: 127; Asselain 1984: 123; Marseille 1984). Thus, as regards trade patterns, French-African relations underwent deep transformations that resulted in a gradual alienation from each other.

However, economic historians generally remain silent on the causality of these dynamics. Hence, the example of the French-Senegalese peanut trade might serve to show the possible mechanisms driving these trade transformations even if it is uncertain to what extent this explanation can be generalized.

The peanut economy has by far been the most important economic sector of Senegal since the middle of the 19th century. Emerging as a typical monocultural economy under French colonial rule, peanut cultivation in Senegal expanded throughout the first half of the 20th century and provided the metropolis first and foremost with cooking oil. In fact, until the middle of the 1960s, peanut oil accounted for more than 80 percent of the total consumption of cooking oil in French kitchens. In order to guarantee a sound and stable peanut production in Senegal, France even established a market organization for vegetable oils in 1954: Basically very similar to its successor in the framework of the EEC’s common agricultural policy, the colonial market organization accorded Senegalese peanut peasants fixed prices – usually above world market
prices – and guaranteed purchase. Under these circumstances, the Senegalese peanut economy flourished and reached a new peak in 1960 with more than 1 billion tons of harvested peanuts (Rempe 2009a).

The association of Senegal to the EEC was accompanied by great expectations on both sides of the partnership: Around 1960, an expansion of the French-Senegalese trade arrangement to the common market was envisaged in Dakar as well as within DG VIII. The Senegalese Ministry of Commerce even hoped for a full participation in the forthcoming common agricultural policy and based its claim on the Treaty of Rome itself (ANS 1960b; Rempe 2009b: 223–225). These expectations were strongly linked to the concept of Eurafrica, that is, the long standing idea of a natural, special and ever closer relationship between the two continents, which at that time gained broad popularity in Europe and Africa (Moser 2000; Mailafia 1997).

However, with the first Yaoundé convention of 1963 these visions turned out to be illusory. Neither the member states nor the commission as a whole wanted to continue subsidizing Senegalese peanuts. Instead, the new agreement accorded so-called production and diversification aid. This development program, designed for a period of five years, was aimed at the abolition of the French subsidies and the integration of the Senegalese peanut economy into the world market. In detail, French subsidies were supposed to end by July 1964. The production aid was supposed to alleviate the transition, but was accorded on a diminishing scale over following five years. An increase of productivity caused by a comprehensive modernization of the peanut economy (e.g. amelioration of agricultural techniques, rationalization of the transport and distribution channels etc.) was supposed to compensate for lower world market prices. Additionally, diversification aid was allocated in order to provide new possibilities of revenue for the peasants. However, this development program turned out to be highly detrimental for Senegal; its calculated losses amounted to 12 billion Francs CFA within the next five years. Similar alarming figures circulated within DG VIII (ANS 1964; HAEU 1963: 193; on further details Rempe 2009a).

Thus, the production and diversification aid failed. At the end of the 1960s, the Senegalese peanut economy underwent its deepest crisis for decades. Why then did Europe force Senegal to embark on such a calamitous development strategy? The reasons can be found in the establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Within the CAP, the principles of a European market organization for vegetable oils and fats were fixed in December 1963. Due to the general principles of market organizations, it was impossible for one country to be a member of two market organizations regulating the same produce. Therefore, the EEC was unwilling to concede the Senegalese peanut economy better conditions, let alone granting it some participation in the European market organization. Peanut oil competed with European produce like sunflower, soja, colza and olive oil. Although the six member states were by far net importers of vegetable oil, they voted for a highly protectionist system which fostered the expansion of European oil seed production (Péhaut 1974: 943–955; Fonsegrive 1970).

Without a doubt, the establishment of the CAP was mainly responsible for the transformation of French-Senegalese trade relations. The story provides us with a typical example of Europeanization by legal coercion for at least two reasons: On the one hand, no options were left open for France to maintain its trade arrangement with Senegal. Whether wanted or not, the French government had to comply with the CAP regulation. On the other hand, the extent of coercion, here meant as transformative power directed against France’s preferences, becomes evident if we look at French attempts to reach better conditions for
the Senegalese peanut economy: As long as no CAP regulation was established – mainly the Empty Chair Crisis was responsible for delay of its final implementation in July 1967 – France continued to subsidize Senegalese peanuts just as before. Moreover, Paris was the main advocate of a prize stabilization scheme for African oil seeds, a measure the EEC had promised the oil producing African states as a compensation for the respective European market organization. In short, the French government was strongly interested in maintaining its peanut commodity chain with Senegal. However, the strict opposition on the part of all other member states within the CAP together with the EEC’s inadequate development policy seriously damaged French-Senegalese trade relations: In the beginning of the 1970s, Senegalese peanut oil had dropped to only 40 percent of the total cooking oil consumption in France (ANS 1972).

Certainly, Senegalese peanuts accounted only for a very small part of France’s overall trade performance with Francophone Africa. Nevertheless, this example demonstrates how Europe exerted a transformative power on French-African relations and thereby triggered alienation between metropolitan France and its former colony (c.f. Nouaille-Degorce 1982: 97f). Hopefully, future research will point to further examples that will serve to evaluate the scope of French economic decolonization by Europeanization more systematically.

5. Europeanization and the Reconfiguration of Regional Spaces

Coming back to the notion of France as an “empire-state”, in the light of previous analysis it might be useful to ask to which polity France actually moved (or returned) to after the end of empire in 1960/1962. This political caesura made France not just a simple nation state. Virtually at the same time, French politics, economy and society became more and more influenced by the European integration process – by the way a perspective which EU historiography has neglected just as much as have students of French history (exceptions are Eck 2007; Frank 2007; also instructive but rather focusing on Americanization Ross 1996). Even if the reconfiguration of regional spaces are not zero sum games, in which stronger ties to one region automatically result in weaker relations to another, there is much evidence that France’s participation in European integration contributed to an alienation in relation to the former African colonies.

Admittedly, at first glance this argument seems hardly extraordinary. However, if one takes into account the French original intentions, the idea of Eurafrica and the complex tripartite relationship between the EEC, France and the associated African countries, the alienation process appears much less self-evident. As I have shown in part II and III, in associating its empire to the community, the French government originally wanted to maintain and stabilize its special relationship to Africa. The concept of Eurafrica then functioned as a compromise in order to bring in line the two most important regional spaces of French influence. However, in the end Europe was far more attractive, which is why France regularly complied in community conflicts on African affairs – normally at the expense of the associated countries. All in all, the reconfiguration of France’s belonging to regional spaces in the course of the 1950s and 1960s can be summed up as

12 On the negotiations concerning the price stabilization scheme in detail Rempe 2009b.
Europeanization “à contre-cœur”: Against its political preferences and often prodded on by the adamant position of the other member states (especially Germany), France adapted to European rules, procedures and practices which had an impact on its relations to the former colonies. Thus, the transformative power of Europe to a certain extent triggered decolonization of metropolitan France in the sense that colonial trade structures as well as colonial development approaches underwent sustainable changes.

However, in the end it is worth remembering that these dynamics were only one side of the coin. The other side reveals innumerable persisting features of French-African relations repeatedly explored in the relevant literature (Glaser/Smith 2005; Dozon 2003; Brüne 1995). Hence, this paper did not aim at replacing existing interpretations but rather tried to deliver a more complex picture of French-African relations and its change over time. It demonstrated that Europeanization has so far been neglected as a striking dynamic factor in the decolonization process of metropolitan France. This should by no means be understood as a normative judgment in the sense that Europe as the good guy taught France as the bad guy a lesson and cured the hexagon of its backward colonial behavior. Rather, the story tells us that colonialism was not the only period where asymmetrical power relations existed and had its impact. To put it bluntly, from an African perspective, the EEC changed a lot over time but not at all for the better at all times.

13 See for this argument in the context of Germany’s role in the CAP Patel 2009.
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