U.S. elite and public views an anti-terrorist military action: are women less militaristic?

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U.S. Elite and Public Views on Anti-Terrorist Military Action: Are Women Less Militaristic?

Gwen Moore & Scott Dolan[*]

Abstract: *»Die Bewertung anti-terroristischer Militäraktionen durch Eliten und Bevölkerung in den USA: Sind Frauen weniger militaristisch?«* Increasing numbers of U.S. women in elite positions lead us to ask if women and men share the same anti-terrorist policy attitudes, or whether elite (and non-elite) women are less militaristic. Using data from four surveys of elites and masses from 1986 to 2004, we examine men's and women's attitudes towards the use of three types of force against terrorists and how these have changed over time. Elite and non-elite women are typically less supportive than their men counterparts of military action against terrorists, but after the September 11, 2001 attacks the gender gap decreased and large majorities favoured such action. Among elites, but not the public, gender differences diminish among those with similar demographic and political positions. With negligible gender differences among similarly placed elites, and high levels of militarism among the masses, we conclude that U.S. elites have broad latitude in setting anti-terrorist policies.

Keywords: elites, gender, militarism, terrorism.

Introduction

The world looked on with anticipation while a wave of mass uprisings swept across North Africa and the Middle East in the first few months of 2011. One by one, the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain took to the streets to protest against what they considered to be repressive and tyrannical regimes. This series of events, known as the Arab Spring, was marked by strikes, demonstrations, and civil uprisings throughout the region, though their effects varied. In Libya, a nationwide revolt against the 42-year rule of Muammar Gaddafi emerged in its second-largest city, Benghazi, after peaceful demonstrations against the 1996 massacre of 1,200 prisoners from the Abu Salim prison turned into violent conflicts between the protesters and the Gaddafi-backed police and military. After rebels successfully took control of Benghazi, Gaddafi swore to fight back "to the last drop of blood," and even suggested his willingness to be a martyr for the cause. Over the ensuing weeks, increased

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violent clashes between Gaddafi sympathizers and those seeking to oust Gaddafi prompted the international community to respond as the Gaddafi-led air strikes and artillery fire threatened to crush the heavily outgunned rebel forces.

In the United States, questions about whether to intervene in Libya became a key concern to the Obama administration. It was the first time that President Obama faced a foreign crisis potentially requiring military intervention. In a speech delivered to a national audience on March 28th, President Obama laid out a foreign policy describing his administration's philosophy for dealing with the looming conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East and more specifically in Libya. Responding to critics, the President justified the decision of the United States to intervene militarily as an answer to the calls of the threatened people of Libya, and couched U.S. involvement in air strikes as the need to protect the United States' national security interests. The speech, which some pundits referred to as the 'Obama Doctrine,' clearly demonstrated the willingness of the Obama administration to use military force. But public reactions to the role and involvement U.S. military in the Libyan rebellion were relatively mixed. Some questioned whether it was appropriate to use military resources in Libya while fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Others saw it as a chance for the United States to remove a dictator from the world, and to promote American values of democracy.[1]

Mixed reactions of the public to foreign policy decisions are not uncommon, especially when the use of military force is required. Even the May 2nd assassination of Osama bin Laden following a 'kill-or-capture' raid of bin Laden's compound elicited ambiguous public approval, despite widespread public animosity toward bin Laden. While media coverage shortly after President Obama's announcement of bin Laden's death showed many people taking to the streets in celebration, others questioned whether the killing bin of Laden was the appropriate use of force, or whether it was more important to take bin Laden alive so that he could stand trial. Overall, however, a large majority of the public supported the assassination when asked soon after it occurred.

In fact, some scholars argue the public is often unclear where it stands on foreign policy issues, and relies mostly on elite policymakers for their cues and information regarding the use of military force. So while there are sometimes disagreements between elite policymakers and the public, survey evidence indicates that public opinion tends to follow elite policymaking. For example, public opinion surveys on attitudes toward the Iraq War, found that 61 per cent approved of an Iraq War just before it began, 77 per cent approved soon after the war began, though approval fell as the war continued.[2]

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[1] As of the writing of this paper, the questions about whether the United States should have intervened continue, even as the rebels neared the complete removal of Gaddafi from power, thereby proving the success of the U.S. involvement, by most accounts.

[2] <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq16.htm>; Eichenberg 2005: Table 7.

Despite taking their cues from elite policymakers, threats to national security, the increased fear of terrorist attacks, and U.S. involvement in two long wars in the first decade of the twenty-first century – resulting in thousands of deaths of members of the American military, as well as countless deaths of soldiers and civilians from Iraq and Afghanistan – has made the U.S. public more aware of foreign policy issues and decisions.

The Work of John Higley and Collaborators as a Framework

The framework used in this paper owes tribute to the work of John Higley. Over the past few decades, Higley has worked tirelessly to point out the inevitability of political elites, where political elites are defined as "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Higley and Burton 2006: 7). Because strategic positions within powerful organizations and movements are scarce, elites have the power and authority to make decisions of consequence that the numerical majority of people in society lack. Drawing from this classical elite tradition, Higley has always put emphasis on the kinds of people who can exert influence over the political sphere. Or as Higley and his co-authors often state, elites are people who have the ability to make "real trouble" (e.g., Higley and Moore 2000: 175).

This is no different with regards to foreign policy. From the perspective of elite theorists like Higley, the central focus should be on those people in positions of power who have the organized capacity to make real and continuing trouble. But to say that elites should be the unit of analysis does not mean that non-elites are powerless. Rather it means that elites are more important because they have positions within organizations giving them the capacity to influence foreign policy decisions in ways that the masses cannot. The focus of this article then, drawing from an elite theoretical tradition, becomes how congruent are public opinion to elite opinions and policymaking, especially when it comes to foreign policy. So while elites are the key variable, the elite tradition recognizes that political elites are constrained by non-elites, and at the very least are partially dependent upon non-elite support. Thus, when it comes to foreign policy – and military intervention more specifically – elites must couch their decisions and policies in a way that elicits support from the masses (Higley and Burton 2006). Or at least they must make decisions that do not create too much discontent from the masses. They must "frame their appeals to accord with the interests and political orientations of non-elites" (Higley and Burton 2006: 27). In this way, non-elites set the broad parameters within which elites are able to make decisions.

Little research has compared public opinion to elite opinion (for exceptions see Page and Bouton 2006; Holsti 2004). Thus very little is known about the

degree to which elite attitudes towards the use of the military force operate within the boundaries set by the masses. More is known about public attitudes than about the degree to which elites and non-elites agree on militant foreign policy. At the same time, there is very little research about the extent of agreement within and across elite groups. Questions remain about whether attitudes of elites in government positions are similar to elites in private and voluntary sectors. With increasing numbers of women in elite positions, there are also questions about whether women and men share the same foreign policy attitudes, or whether elite (and non-elite) women are less militaristic than their male counterparts, as some have argued. Such questions can get at issues of value consensus among elites as well as the coincidence of interests between elites and masses with regard to military intervention and the use of force.

Elite and Mass Attitudes Toward Use of Military Force

A set of quadrennial surveys of leaders' and public attitudes conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) from 1975 to 2004 has provided data for most comparisons of elite and mass attitudes toward the use of military force (e.g., Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006) and we use CCFR data here, as described below.

Scholars studying public and/or elite attitudes toward U.S. relations with other countries often distinguish between those holding isolationist views and those favouring a more internationalist foreign policy. Internationalists are typically divided between those favouring cooperative international relations (CI) and those tending toward more militant internationalism (MI) and indicate support for sending U.S. troops abroad under various scenarios, defending allies and supplying military aid to other countries (e.g., Wittkopf 1990; Chanley 1999; Holsti 2004). Elites are more internationalist than the masses (Oldendick and Bardes 1982; Holsti 2004).

Approval of foreign military involvement among the public was at a low point near the end of the Vietnam War (Page and Bouton 2006). But this disapproval was short-lived; approval of deploying troops abroad for various hypothetical events, such as if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, began a gradual increase soon after. As did the U.S.'s military involvement abroad.

A study of elite attitudes toward militancy in foreign policy, based on CCFR studies, found that U.S. elites had not become more militaristic only recently (e.g., as argued by Bob Herbert in a New York Times column on May 30, 2005), but that the trend toward support of the use of military force had been clear at least since the mid-1970s, soon after the end of the Vietnam War (Moore and Mack 2007). Political elites were somewhat more militaristic than those in non-political elite positions (e.g., journalists, business leaders, scholars, union leaders, religious leaders) and Republican politicians were more favourable toward militant action abroad, but the gaps between occupations

and parties were generally small (Moore and Mack 2007). Elite and public support for the 'war on terror' has been strong since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. (Moore and Mack 2007). Indeed, Bacevich (2010, 22-3; also see 14-5) argues that U.S. elites have long held a worldview in which "… U.S. military power, the Pentagon's global footprint, and an American penchant for intervention … are normal, even laudable." At the same time, he contends that the American public takes this for granted, writing "The citizens of the United States have essentially forfeited any capacity to ask first-order questions about the fundamentals of national security policy." (Bacevich, 2010, 27).

In historical perspective, Holsti (2004, 116) states that deploying troops abroad has been contentious ever since the War of 1812. Elites have consistently offered far higher levels of approval than the general public in using U.S. troops abroad under various hypothetical scenarios, such as if Soviet/Russian troops invaded Western Europe or Iraq involved Saudi Arabia (Holsti 2004, Table 4.4; Page and Bouton 2006). Some evidence indicates that public support for deploying troops abroad diminishes if casualties are mentioned in the question (e.g., Holsti 2004, 121-4) and increases for successful wars (Eichenberg 2005). The elite-public gap is not constant in size, shrinking, for example, after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001 (Page and Bouton 2006, 214).

Social Factors in Attitudes Toward Military Force

Page and Bouton (2006) find that public views on the use of military force differ by individuals' personal and social characteristics. With data from the 2002 CCFR, they found that men, whites, the more educated and those with higher incomes more often favour the use of military force than did others (Page and Bouton 2006, 121-22). Most of these relationships, however, lose their impact in multiple regression analyses; i.e., they do not have statistically significant effects when personal and social characteristics are examined jointly. Gender, religion, and to a lesser extent, education, do have independent effects on attitudes toward the use of military force (Page and Bouton 2006, 122). But more important than demographic characteristics are "purposive belief systems," including party identification, ideology and internationalism (Page and Bouton 2006, 122).

Gender and Attitudes Toward Military Force

We focus on women's and men's attitudes toward the use of military force against terrorists and how these have changed over time, especially before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Most research finds that women are less favourable toward military force both in the general public (e.g., Conover and Sapiro 1993; Page and Bouton 2006) and among elites (Holsti and Rosenau 1995).

Based on four surveys between 1976 and 1988, Holsti and Rosenau (1995) conclude that gender has far less power than party or ideology in explaining elites' attitudes toward militancy (MI) or cooperation (CI) in foreign relations. They do report that women but not men moved more toward favouring cooperative relations during that period (Holsti and Rosenau 1995, 122). In addition, they conclude that women are less likely than men to support the use of military power abroad throughout the period studied (Holsti and Rosenau 1995).

Analyzing a large number of public opinion surveys on use of military force by the U.S. in ten episodes between 1990 and 2002, Eichenberg (2003, Table 2) finds that women were less favourable than men for each episode, including the war against terror and the Iraq War. There is a similar gender gap when specific types of military action (e.g., bombing, troops, arms) are mentioned (Eichenberg 2003, Table 3). Nevertheless, the majority of women studied approved of the use of military force in the war against terror, the Iraq War, and in Sudan and Somalia. In a later paper looking at gender differences in support for the use of military force in 37 countries, Eichenberg (2007) found consistent gender gaps, with women less supportive across six historical conflicts (the Gulf War, weapons inspection in Iraq, NATO's intervention in Bosnia, NATO's attack against Serbia to support the Kosovar Albanians, Afghanistan War, Iraq War), with Oman the single exception.

With CCFR data for both elites and masses, we identify any gender gap in elites and/or masses as well as between elite and public women and elite and public men. Over the past several decades women's educational attainment and movement into elite positions in the United States and elsewhere, both in and outside of government, have grown. Uncovering the extent of gender similarities and differences in foreign policy attitudes will yield evidence for the debate over whether women's attitudes are shaped more by their position (elite/non-elite) or their gender. Results will also offer evidence to judge the contention that if more women were in positions of power, states would undertake a more cooperative approach to foreign policy. To address these arguments, we ask whether elite women's views toward the use of military force against terrorists are more similar to those of elite men (the positional argument) or to those of non-elite women (the gender argument).

Multivariate analyses measure the effect of gender on public and elite attitudes toward the use of military force against terrorists, net of other variables that previous research indicates are related to those attitudes, such as demographic characteristics, political party and ideology. Also, identical models for elites and non-elites allow us to compare the net effects of these variables for the two groups.

We seek answers to these research questions: Are elite (and non-elite)[3] men more in favour of military action against terrorists than are similarly situated women? Are gender differences consistent across specific questions and/or across time? Are gender differences larger among the public than among elites? Are elite women's attitudes more similar to those of elite men or to those of non-elite women? Do the same social and political factors affect elites' and non-elites' views on the use of military force against terrorists?

The Data

The longitudinal survey "American Public Opinion and United States Foreign Policy" was conducted approximately every four years from 1975 to 2004 to

> investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public and a select group of opinion leaders (or elites) on matters relating to United States foreign policy. For purposes of this series, opinion leaders are defined as individuals in positions of leadership in government, academia, business and labour, the media, religious institutions, special interest groups, and private foreign policy organizations" (CCFR 2005; ICPSR 2005).[4]

Elite interviews were conducted in person or by telephone, depending on the year. Individual survey years have a total of 330-450 elite interviews in the above groups. The number of persons interviewed varies from one sector to another, with a far larger number of media leaders in most studies. For this reason, we have weighted the data to give equal weight to each of the elite groups.

The CCFR studies also included large, representative sample of members of the general public, with total numbers varying across the years from a low of 1,038 in 2002 to a high of 1,418 in 1986. Interviews were conducted in person and by telephone.

In this paper we use responses to questions on favoured responses to terrorism for 1986, 1998, 2002 and 2004[5] from the following three-part question:

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[3] Previous research has shown that non-elite men are more favourable toward the use of force against terrorism than are their women counterparts (Holsti 2004).

[4] Groups comprising the elite samples vary only slightly across the years. In each leadership group top positions whose incumbents would have knowledge of international affairs were identified. In the Senate and House of Representatives these are members of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. If the Senator or Representative was unavailable, a top foreign policy aide was interviewed. In the Administration they are assistant secretaries in State, Defence, Treasury and other related departments. Also included are: chairmen and vice presidents of large corporations and heads of business associations; heads of major labour unions, editors, broadcasters and publishers of print and broadcast media; presidents and scholars from major universities; leaders from private foreign policy institutes, religious organizations, volunteer organizations and various ethnic organizations (CCFR 2005; Moore and Mack 2007).

[5] In 1986 and earlier studies the small number of elite women in the surveys precludes assessment of elite gender differences.

In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favour or oppose each of the following measures.

- First, How about […] U.S. air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities […]
- Attacks by U.S. ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities […]
- Assassination of individual terrorist leaders.

The questions on military responses to terrorism were not asked before 1998, with the exception of the question on assassination of terrorists that was asked beginning in 1986. Some later studies are omitted because they did not record elites' gender. T-tests compare responses for women and men among elites and in the general public samples to the three questions on favoured responses to terrorism. Percentage differences are also calculated for various subgroups by gender and year.

Finally, multivariate analyses assess the statistical significance of gender, demographic and social factors, net of one another, in the public and elite surveys for each of the three terrorism scenarios. These variables are gender, year of survey, age and age squared, race, education, political party, and political ideology. For elites race and education are omitted because they are not measured in all surveys, and a variable indicating whether respondent is in a political (government) or non-political position is added.

Results

Figure 1 shows public and elite attitudes towards using the U.S. air force to attack terrorist facilities in 1998, 2002 and 2004. It shows a small gap between public and elite attitudes in each year, with a sharp rise in approval between 1998 and 2002, followed by a small decline in 2004, three years after the 9/11 attacks. In all years, a large majority of respondents favoured air attacks on terrorist facilities.

The similarity between elites and the public in Figure 1 declines when the two groups are divided by gender (Figure 2). In 1998 women elites and non-elites favoured air attacks less than comparable men. In 2002, there is considerable agreement among all groups in favour of air attacks on terrorist facilities. But this agreement did not last. By 2004 all groups still overwhelmingly favoured air attacks, but women's approval had declined. This pattern over time is similar for attitudes toward deploying ground troops to attack terrorist facilities, as is shown in Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 1: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward
U.S. Air Force Attack on Terrorist Facilities

Figure 2: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward
U.S. Air Force Attack on Terrorist Facilities by Gender

Figures 3 and 4 again illustrate the importance of introducing gender in our analyses. Members of the public and elites exhibited similar majorities in favour of using ground troops to attack terrorist facilities, except in 2002 when members of the public favoured this action at a higher level than did elites (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward
U.S. Ground Troop Attack on Terrorist Facilities

Figure 4: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward
U.S. Ground Attack on Terrorist Facilities by Gender

A similar sized majority of men and women among elites and non-elites fa-
voured use of ground troops in 1998 (Figure 4). Far larger majorities of all four
groups approved of the use of ground troops in 2002, soon after the September
11th terrorist attacks, with women and men in the public indicating the highest

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rates of approval. But elites' attitudes diverged in 2004: elite men's approval increased while other groups remained roughly stable.

Figure 5: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward Assassination of Terrorists

Figure 6: Public vs. Elite Attitudes Toward
Assassination of Terrorists by Gender

Members of the public expressed far higher levels of approval than did elites for assassinating individual terrorists in all four years shown in Figure 5. Figure 6 shows that both women and men among the public favoured assassination of terrorist leaders far more than did their elite counterparts. Before 2001, a mi-

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nority of elites approved of assassination of individual terrorists, compared to 2002 and 2004 when majorities of all groups except elite women approved of this potential action. Compared to 2002, in 2004 more elite and public men, but fewer comparable women, voiced approval of assassination of individual terrorists.

Results in Figures 1-6 demonstrate that attitudes toward possible military action against terrorists vary by specific hypothetical action (lowest levels of approval are for assassinations), between elites and the public (with the largest gap on attitudes toward assassination), by year (with approval of all three hypothetical actions rising precipitously after September 11th), and by gender (with men generally more favourable toward anti-terrorist military actions than women).

Analyses so far have not included demographic and political factors that some research has found to be important in attitudes toward military action abroad (e. g., Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006). Tables 1 and 2 show three logistic regression models for the public and elites, respectively. The first model shows the impact of gender on approval or disapproval of each of the three hypothetical military actions, the second model adds all variables available in both elite and public samples, but the third model differs, adding a variable indicating political or non-political position for elites, and including race and education for the public. The first two models, thus, are identical for elites and the public, while the third model adds variables that are measured for one group but not the other.

Men in the general public were significantly more likely than public women to approve of the three hypothetical military actions in each model in Table 1. In the second model, years of education is negatively related to approval of military actions, as has been found in related research (e.g., Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006). Republicans were more positive toward military actions, while liberals were more negative. Also consistent with other research, whites were more favourable toward these military actions than were others (Page and Bouton 2006). In sum, gender, race, education, Republican party identification and liberal ideology are statistically significant in the public sample, net of other variables, in these models measuring attitudes toward anti-terrorist military actions.

Turning to elites' opinions shows some differences from the general public (Table 2). Elite men were more favourable toward U.S. air force attacks on terrorist camps in all three models. But gender is not statistically significant for using ground troops against terrorists, nor is it significant in the multivariate models for approval of assassinating individual terrorists. Gender has a more consistent effect among the general public than among elites.

Table 1: Multivariate Logistic Regression for Public Data

	U.S. Air Force			U.S. Ground Troop			Assassination		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	1.529** (0.063)	0.883** (0.345)	1.782*** (0.445)	1.026** (0.055)	0.103 (0.292)	1.035** (0.376)	0.302** (0.042)	-0.348 (0.239)	0.904* (0.294)
Male	0.508** (0.099)	0.533** (0.102)	0.540** (0.102)	0.163* (0.080)	0.169* (0.084)	0.172* (0.085)	0.216** (0.60)	0.235** (0.063)	0.248** (0.063)
1986		--	--		--	--		--	--
1998		--	--		--	--		0.615** (0.081)	0.700** (0.083)
2002		1.004** (0.138)	1.047** (0.140)		1.722** (0.124)	1.782** (0.125)		1.128** (0.093)	1.280** (0.096)
2004		0.445** (0.114)	0.483** (0.117)		0.853** (0.095)	0.863** (0.097)		1.127** (0.088)	1.219** (0.091)
Age		0.012 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)		0.015 (0.012)	0.021 (0.012)		0.333E-3 (0.10)	0.005 (0.010)
Age^2		0.143E-3 (0.140E-3)	-0.205E-3 (0.143E-3)		-0.218E-3 (0.118E-3)	-0.288E-3* (0.120E-3)		0.562E-4 (0.965E-3)	-0.142E-3 (0.984E-3)
White			--			--			--
Black			-0.502** (0.169)			-0.080 (0.155)			-0.304* (0.128)

Table 1 continued…

	U.S. Air Force			U.S. Ground Troop			Assassination		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Other			0.363** (0.147)			-0.030 (0.134)			-0.458** (0.104)
Education			-0.062** (0.023)			-0.706** (0.019)			-0.098** (0.014)
Republican		0.626** (0.146)	0.612** (0.147)		0.284* (0.118)	0.315** (0.119)		0.395** (0.086)	0.408** (0.087)
Democrat		0.232* (0.117)	0.283* (0.120)		0.114 (0.102)	0.113 (0.104)		0.028 (0.076)	0.069 (0.078)
Conservative		-0.120 (0.124)	-0.101 (0.124)		0.150 (0.102)	0.156 (0.102)		0.167* (0.075)	0.186* (0.075)
Liberal		-0.595** (0.127)	-0.556** (0.128)		-0.342** (0.110)	-0.305** (0.111)		-0.296** (0.083)	-0.227** (0.084)
N		3381			3345			4586	

Table 2: Multivariate Logistic Regression for Elite Data

	U.S. Air Force			U.S. Ground Troop			Assassination		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	1.357**	0.280	1.664	0.863**	0.218	-0.138	-0.328*	-0.043	-0.303
	(0.171)	(1.281)	(1.323)	(0.151)	(0.986)	(1.026)	(0.142)	(0.892)	(0.929)
Male	0.609**	0.459*	0.463*	0.280	0.205	0.206	0.324*	0.207	0.210
	(0.198)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.170)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.157)	(0.175)	(0.176)
1998		--	--		--	--		--	--
2002		0.892**	0.896**		1.326**	1.326**		0.728**	0.724**
		(0.230)	(0.230)		(0.187)	(0.187)		(0.165)	(0.166)
2004		0.748**	0.716**		1.163**	1.145**		1.017**	1.004**
		(0.213)	(0.214)		(0.175)	(0.176)		(0.163)	(0.163)
Age		-0.028	-0.011		0.023	0.033		0.003	0.011
		(0.052)	(0.053)		(0.040)	(0.041)		(0.037)	(0.038)
Age^2		0.581E-4	0.612E-3		-0.496E-3	0.572		-0.394E-3	-0.455E-3
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.410E-3)	(0.189)		(0.389E-3)	(0.395E-3)
Gov			0.539*			0.256			0.170
			(0.259)			(0.197)			(0.165)
Republican		0.524	0.471		0.833**	0.804**		0.725**	0.706**
		(0.353)	(0.353)		(0.253)	(0.254)		(0.209)	(0.210)
Democrat		0.541*	0.497*		0.546**	0.521**		0.136	0.114
		(0.221)	(0.222)		(0.186)	(0.187)		(0.168)	(0.169)
Conservative		0.576	0.599		0.088	0.098		0.322	0.328
		(0.358)	(0.359)		(0.246)	(0.246)		(0.204)	(0.204)
Liberal		-1.173**	-1.136**		-0.897**	-0.877**		-0.800**	-0.779**
		(0.234)	(0.236)		(0.190)	(0.191)		(0.166)	(0.167)
N	1130			1119			1115		

More important than gender for elites are political party and political ideology. Liberals were significantly less likely than others to approve of the three hypothetical military actions against terrorists. Political party was also statistically significant, with both Republicans and Democrats more likely than others (the omitted category is independents) to approve of the military actions. In Model 3, a variable indicates whether the person is in a political position or not. Politicians approved of using the air force to strike terrorist training camps more than their non-political counterparts, but the impact of this variable for using ground troops or assassinating individual terrorists is small and not statistically significant.

Among both elites and the general public political party and political ideology are strongly related to attitudes toward militant action against terrorists. Race and education are generally related to those attitudes among the public, but since these variables were not reported for elites, we cannot compare their effect for elites. Age has little effect for elites and the general public, while the year of the study does, even with other variables in the model, as we saw in Figures 1-6.

Discussion

The analyses have shown that elite and non-elite men are generally more favourable toward military action against terrorists than are their women counterparts. Among the public sample, this gender difference is consistent for each of the three anti-terrorism measures in all time periods studied. Women elites are less approving than their men counterparts of the three potential actions in most cases, though gender differences are small or absent in three instances: attitudes toward the use of ground troops in 1998 and 2002 and air attacks in 2002.

The public-elite gap, with the public more favourable toward air force attacks and/or ground troop attacks against terrorist facilities, is small and statistically significant in only one of six comparisons (ground troops in 2002). The pattern over time is consistent: increases in approval in 2002, compared to 1998, and a slight decline in 2004. The one exception is elite men whose approval showed a small increase from 2002 to 2004.

Approval of the assassination of individual terrorists generally reveals the largest gap between the public and elites, with the public approving at a far higher rate. Nearly 60 percent of the public but only 35 percent of elites approved of such action in 1998 before major terrorist attacks by foreigners on the U.S. Both groups increased approval rates in 2002 and again in 2004. Elite women stand out from the other three categories in never rising above half approving of such action.

The gap in attitudes toward assassinating an individual terrorist between men in the public and in elites, as well as women in each group, is large each year. But the percent difference between elite men and women is small.

The trend line of attitudes is consistent with related terrorist and military events. No large terrorist attacks in the U.S. (other than the Oklahoma City bombing in 1993) had recently occurred in 1986 and 1998. The 2002 studies followed soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the beginning of U.S. military action in Afghanistan later that year, while the 2004 data were collected about a year after the Iraq War began. Declines in approval of anti-terrorist activities in 2004 might reflect increasing recognition among the public and elites of the realities of the costs of that War. As noted previously, 77 percent of those polled in the month after the Iraq War began thought the war was worth fighting but that percentage had declined more than twenty points a year later (ABC News/Washington Post Polls as reported in.[6]

Previous research has found that American elites are more internationalist than are non-elites. Yet our examination of attitudes toward the use of military force against terrorists (militant internationalism) indicates that members of the public are at least as or more approving of three possible military actions than are elites (also see Page and Bouton 2006, 214). Overall, though, both groups are increasingly favourable toward these anti-terrorist actions over time, with a slight decline for most in 2004. In general, women in both groups, especially in the general public, are somewhat less favourable toward these militant actions than are like men. When comparing women and men who are similar in social and ideological factors, elite women differ little from their men counterparts on these attitudes. Non-elite women, in contrast, remain less favourable toward the three potential anti-terrorist actions than are like men.

Conclusion

These results offer some support for the view that women differ from men in support for military violence, suggesting that if there were more women in elite positions, militaristic foreign policy in the U.S. would decline. Both elite and public women are less favourable toward the hypothetical antiterrorist actions than are their men counterparts. On the other hand, in the multivariate analyses (controlling for social and ideological variables), elite men and women differ far less. Thus the large gender gap among non-elites is reduced considerably among elites suggesting that women who achieve elite positions are, or become, similar to their men counterparts. While not conclusive, our results offer more support for the positional argument (occupation matters more) than for the gender argument (gender matters more). Indeed, actions of women political

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[6] <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq3.htm> (accessed August 20, 2011).

leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher in the UK, are often as militaristic as those of the men preceding and following them in office. Another example is the 2008 U.S. presidential primaries where Hillary Clinton's election platform supported the continuation of the U.S.'s militaristic foreign policy more strongly than the platforms of her chief (men) opponents. Some argued that Clinton had to show that she was 'up to the job' of war making since women are often seen as 'soft.'

Elite and non-elite women are typically less supportive than their men counterparts of military action against terrorists, but after September 11, 2001 majorities of women in both groups voiced support for the use of air raids and ground troops against terrorist training facilities, and most non-elite women also favoured assassination of individual terrorists. Some authors (e.g., Kanter 1976) have argued that women and other minorities gain more power when they are a large proportion of a group. With the great majority of elite positions in the U.S. occupied by men, we do not know if elite women would offer less support for militant anti-terrorist actions if they held a majority or a large minority of such positions.

Unfortunately CCFR data have not been collected since 2004 to allow study of more recent trends in elite and public attitudes on anti-terrorist actions. Still, polling data on the U.S. public's attitudes toward anti-terrorist actions and the Iraq and Afghan wars are widely available. The public's approval of militant action against terrorists continues; as does the tendency of the public's opinions to follow elite actions. For instance, in 2009 a Pew survey found that sixty percent of those interviewed approved of "the CIA having a program that targets al Qaeda leaders for assassination." A poll just under two years later just after the assassination of Osama bin Laden reported that nearly eighty percent of the public approved.[7] The findings in this paper, however, suggest support for the use of military force against terrorists is partially contingent on the time period, especially the political climate and environment. Public support for military intervention increased as the threat of terrorism became more imminent to the public – following the September 11th attacks. Though as those attacks became more distant, support for the use of military force declined.

The findings also indicate that political party and ideology impact attitudes toward anti-terrorist policy among elites and the general public. The consistent gap between Republicans and Democrats, as well as liberals and conservatives, does not necessarily indicate a fragmented elite or public. Elite theorists assume that consensual elites must agree on broad principles and values, not necessarily specific policies. Such differences, however, could explain the differences among elites and between elites and non-elites towards the use of military force. Particularly, we suggest that future research take into account

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[7] <http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2011/05/11/6626397-ap-gfk-poll-bin-laden-killing-was-justified>.

the political orientation and political party affiliation of elite women in order to assess whether the similarities/differences between elite men and women are due primarily to differences in political ideology.

Ultimately, if it is elite theorists' contention that non-elites set the parameters for elite action, those parameters are very broad in relation to U.S. anti-terrorist policies and actions. As can be seen in this paper, the public in many cases is more supportive than elites of military action against terrorists and approval of such actions rises after military action. This suggests that U.S. elites have little difficulty gaining public support for anti-terrorist actions. Such findings suggest that we can expect elites in the United States to have continued widespread support for military intervention against terrorists. Despite the broad parameters set by the public, it is important to note that elites on the whole are more likely than the public to be moderate in their views towards the use of military force. At the very least, this suggests that elites can be expected to be more discerning when it comes to the use of military force.

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