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## Intrinsic or Instrumental Support for Democracy in a Post-Communist Society. The Case of Serbia<sup>1</sup>

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### Abstract

According to the cultural model of political culture and political change, citizens accept only those political and economic structures compatible with their relatively stable cultural orientations and political values, which are product of a common early socialization. An important implication of this view is that, after several decades of authoritarian rule and a lack of democratic political culture, the support for democracy in ex-communist societies is rather instrumental than intrinsic, based not on values, but perceived system performances in political and economic terms. The rational choice (or institutional) model, on the other hand, posits that these evaluations of system performances are far more than just lip service to democracy; they shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to democratic institutions and norms. This paper aims at clarifying the importance of certain “institutional” and “cultural” variables for the general support to democracy in Serbia and their dynamic interplay. The data used in the paper were collected in the post-election survey, conducted after the May 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N=1,568). The relative importance of several predictors was analyzed: the socio-demographic variables (respondent’s age, educational level, monthly household income), the personality/dispositional variables (authoritarianism), the institutional variables (satisfaction with Serbian democracy and economy, evaluation of government performance before the election, the perceived level of respect for individual freedom and the quality of voters’ view representation in elections) and the cultural variables (political tolerance, nationalism, liberalism, socialist egalitarianism). The most important predictors of support for democracy were satisfaction with Serbian

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democracy ( $\beta=.21, p<.001$ ) and evaluation of government performance ( $\beta=.21, p<.001$ ); the citizens who were more satisfied with democracy and more inclined to positively evaluate the government performance were more supportive of democracy. The less authoritarian citizens ( $\beta=-.11, p<.01$ ) and those who described their political views as liberal ( $\beta=.11, p<.01$ ) were also more positively oriented towards democracy, proving the relevance of the more general and relatively stable political orientations. The quality of support for democracy in Serbia in intrinsic/instrumental terms was discussed in the concluding part.

**Keywords:** political culture, political values, authoritarianism, democracy, Serbia.

## 1. Introduction

During the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), the majority of former communist countries underwent the process of transition towards the multiparty political system and free market, i.e. democracy. One of the most important tasks of the newly established democratic regimes was to propagate and develop citizens' allegiance to democratic norms and values. However, the possibility of the development of pro-democratic political culture in a previously non-democratic society has been a very important theoretical and empirical question for decades and caused several disagreements between scholars.

According to the proponents of the culturalist model (Almond & Verba, 1989; Eckstein, 1988; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), democratic political structure is rooted in culture and has cultural preconditions. Citizens accept only those political and economic structures which are compatible with their relatively stable cultural orientations and political values. Being a product of the common (early) socialization, they can only be changed during the socialization process, under the influence of more general structural factors such as economic modernization, urbanization etc. (Almond & Verba, 1989; Eckstein, 1988; Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1959; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The prevailing political culture changes only slowly and in the long term, so it takes a long time for a democracy to consolidate in a previously non-democratic country (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Klingemann et al., 2006).

Although the citizens of post-communist countries, compared to those of Western societies, are generally less supportive of democracy (Klingeman et al., 2006; Pavlovic, 2007), the democratization of ex-communist countries, despite prolonged systematic indoctrination, was accompanied by a high level of general support for democracy (Gibson, 1996; Klingemann et al., 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2002; Pavlovic, 2007; Rose & Mishler, 1994).

However, the proponents of the culturalist model argue that this "enthusiasm" for democracy cannot be taken for granted. Citizens of the former communist countries support democracy mainly (or only) because of the goals that developed democracies have achieved and as an instrument for their accomplishment. The standards for such evaluation are external, more prominent and less important manifestations of Western democracies' performances (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). Because of the prolonged authoritarian rule and the lack of democratic (political) tradition, the support for democracy is rather a manifestation of the desirability of its effects (in terms of economic performances) than an expression of the acceptance of democratic norms and procedures, rights and freedoms that define its essence. In other words, it is nothing but an instrumental support, a mere lip service to democracy, a phenomenon similar to which Dalton (1994, p. 479) calls *Fragebogendemokraten*. Consequently, it speaks nothing of pro-democratic features of the prevailing political culture.

The argument that the necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy in a former communist country is the shift in political culture (Klingemann et al., 2006) is strongly supported by some empirical data. Inglehart, for example, has repeatedly argued that self-expression values (Inglehart &

Welzel, 2005) or, more recently, emancipative values (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) are an essence of the democratic political culture. Aggregate (country level) measures of self-expression values are highly correlated with Freedom House scores and with some other composite indexes of democracy's effectiveness (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), implying that the higher the mass acceptance of self-expression values, the more effective the country's democracy, as well as the relevance of mass attitudes for the type and the quality of political system. Inglehart even argues that it is highly probable that democracy will emerge in a society where 45% of population embrace self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). However, the acceptance of self-expression values in post-communist countries is lower not only compared to the Western societies, but even to poorer and less developed African and Asian countries (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

However, if it is true that, due to the lack of democratic tradition, no previously non-democratic country can be democratized, than no country could become a democracy because there are none that did not "start" as an autocracy or became one at some point in history (Fukuyama, 1992). Germany after the World War II is but one example that authoritarian political culture can change rapidly under the changed institutional arrangements (Conradt, 1980; Verba, 1965). In other words, (political) structure can (and, once established, will) influence (political) culture.

These arguments are in line with the rational choice (or institutional/lifelong learning) model. The main focus of this model is not on citizens' normative convergences created by the socialization process but on the current social context, individual aspirations and opportunities, more recent political, economic and social events. The evaluation of system performances, in economic and political terms, and the quality of citizens' experience with the system shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to democratic institutions and norms (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 2002; Muller & Seligson, 1994).

In a newly democratized society, citizens can and must learn to be "democrats" and that is only possible in the context of democratic civic culture and pluralism and through the experience with the democratic political process (Dalton 1994; Fleron, 1996; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). This learning is based on experience; it is the effect of practice and the opportunities for practicing (due to the new institutional arrangements). For example, if human rights and freedoms are guaranteed for a longer time period, the citizens have plenty of opportunities to apply, practice and observe tolerance, pluralistic conflicts and interests and learn to value their worth (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Evaluation of system's performances in terms of the fulfilment of citizens' demands and the accumulation of such experiences contribute to allegiance to democratic institutions and processes (Gibson, 2002; Mishler & Rose, 2002). Thus, it is not that important to create democrats as to create democracy; once established, it is highly probable that democratic institutions will produce democratic values in the end (Fleron, 1996). Some researchers have shown that democratization increases the importance of pro-democratic values (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000) or that some of the most important civic culture attitudes were rather effects than causes of democracy (Muller & Seligson, 1994).

Under this paradigm, quite contrary to the culturalist assumption, instrumental support is far from being just lip service to democracy. It is one of the main mechanisms and a first step towards (re)building democratic political culture. There is empirical evidence that the levels of political tolerance (Duch & Gibson, 1992), trust in social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997) or support for marketization and democracy (Whitefield & Evans, 1999) in the post-communist countries can be explained in rational choice terms, i.e. the effects of economic and political performance evaluations.

This paper focuses on the nature of support for democracy in Serbia where the democratic political system was introduced overnight in 2000, after almost half a century of communist regime, ten years of

Milosevic's authoritarian rule and severe interethnic conflicts, international isolation, NATO bombing and political, social and economic collapse in the last decade of the last century. The support for democracy before, during and shortly after the democratic changes in 2000 was majoritarian in Serbia (Pavlovic, 2008; 2010). At the same time, antidemocratic political attitudes and values were predominant in the Serbian population (Golubovic et al., 1995; Pantic, 2002; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Some of the main features of the non-democratic political culture (e.g., authoritarianism and ethnocentrism) remained intact in spite of democratic changes and are still relatively widespread (Biro et al., 2002; Kuzmanovic, 2010; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009).

The studies linking support for democracy and acceptance of pro-democratic beliefs and values in Serbia are rare, but the available evidence suggests that the acceptance of democracy was quite weakly linked with the acceptance of some more general pro-democratic beliefs and values (social tolerance, autonomy, gender equality, market orientation etc.) (Pavlovic, 2010). Only a minority of Serbian citizens supporting democracy at the same time embrace democratic values, which is in line with the assumptions of the culturalist model.

One possible explanation of these data is that mass protests, which caused the fall of Milosevic in 2000, were rather motivated by a growing dissatisfaction with extremely poor life conditions than by intrinsic mass demands for democracy (Pavlovic, 2010). The other equally plausible explanation (but lacking empirical verification) is that the support for democracy is influenced by some institutional/instrumental variables. The analysis of the sources of support for democracy in Serbia, i.e. the importance of various "cultural" (political values and beliefs) and institutional (satisfaction/evaluation) variables in explaining variations in preference for democracy is the aim of this paper.

## 2. Method

*Sample and procedure.* The data used in the analysis were collected in a post-election survey conducted on the representative national sample of eligible voters in Serbia by the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia. The probability-based sample with multiple stages of selection and face-to-face interviews was used (N=1,568). Data were collected in the period from December 2012 to February 2013.

*Variables and measures.* Several fundamental political beliefs and attitudes, usually regarded as some of the main features of the democratic political outlook, often used in the post-communist political culture studies (e. g. Gibson, 1996; Dekker, 1996; Duch & Gibson, 1992) and very relevant for the Serbian political context, were used. These included authoritarianism, political tolerance, nationalism, socialist egalitarianism and ideological self-identification.

Variables were measured in the following ways:

*Authoritarianism.* Six items of the scale of authoritarianism ( $\alpha=.65$ ) represented the content of the well-known F scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988). A similar scale was used in some previous studies (Todosijevic, 2006; 2013). Each item was followed by a five-point scale. Authoritarianism was operationalized as the first component yielded by the principal component analysis, explaining 31.18% of variance. All items showed positive factor loadings on the first component (see *Appendix, Table 1*).

*Nationalism.* Nationalistic attitudes were measured by a seven item scale ( $\alpha=.72$ ) covering a variety of themes that are most often the content of the nationalistic worldview (Dekker et al., 2003). A similar scale was used in some previous studies (Todosijevic, 2006; 2013). The principal component

analysis yielded one factor, explaining 44.31% of variance. The obtained factor scores were used as a measure of nationalism. All items showed positive factor loadings (see *Appendix, Table 2*).

*Political tolerance.* Political tolerance was measured by the least liked group method (Sullivan et al., 1979), using three items ( $\alpha=.82$ ). Respondents were asked to (dis)agree (on a five-point scale) on whether the members of the most disliked group they had in mind should or should not be banned, allowed to organize public demonstration or nominate themselves for public office. The principal component analysis yielded one component, explaining 73.43% of variance. Factor scores were treated as a measure of political tolerance. All items showed positive factor loadings (see *Appendix, Table 3*).

*Socialist egalitarianism.* The Serbian post-election study included one item related to respondent's general belief regarding the governmental role in economy and economic egalitarianism, which was treated as an indicator of socialist egalitarianism. Respondents were asked how strongly they (dis)agreed (1. strongly disagree/5. strongly agree) with the following statement "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels".

*Liberal self-identification.* Besides the usual left-right self-placement scale, an alternative method of measuring individual ideological positions was used. Respondents were offered several ideological labels (e.g. Conservative, Socialist, Patriot etc.) and asked to estimate on an eleven-point scale (0. Does not describe my view at all /10. Describes my views perfectly) how adequately they described their political views. The variable measuring the applicability of the Liberal label for one's political views was used in the analysis.

Five "satisfaction" variables were used, selected on the ground of some previous research with similar methodology and study aims (for example, Whitefield, 2005; Whitefield & Evans, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 1997) as well as the scope of the available data. These variables cover several economic and political evaluations of the functioning of the Serbian democratic political system.

*Evaluation of democracy.* Measured by one four-point scale item "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Serbia?".

*Evaluation of economy.* Respondents were asked to estimate whether the state of the economy in Serbia had become better, stayed about the same or got worse.

*Government evaluation.* Measured by one four-point scale item "Having in mind the results of the Government, how well do you think the government has done its job, during the last 4 years (before last elections)?".

*Freedom and human rights evaluation.* Respondents were asked to estimate the level of respect for individual freedom and human rights in Serbia on a four-point scale (1. no respect at all/4. a lot of respect).

*Perceived representation.* Respondents' evaluation of how well elections ensured that the views of voters were represented by Members of the Parliament (1. not well at all/4. very well) was treated as a measure of the perceived representation.

*Electoral system evaluation.* Respondents evaluated the method of electing representatives as very good, good, bad or very bad.

Higher values in the afore-mentioned variables implied more positive evaluations.

*Support for democracy.* General approval of the democratic political system was the main dependent variable in the analysis. It was measured by a standard four-point scale (1. disagree strongly/4. agree strongly) item: "democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government".

*Socio-demographic variables.* Respondent's gender, age (measured in years), level of education (primary/secondary/tertiary) and monthly household income (estimated on the 11-point scale, 1. up to 9,999 RSD/11. 100,000 RSD or more) were included in regression models as well.

### 3. Results

The data were analyzed using the hierarchical regression analysis. Support for democracy was first regressed on socio-demographic variables. In the second model authoritarianism was added. Cultural variables were included in the third and institutional variables in the fourth step. The data are shown in **Table 1**.

The first model explains only 3% of variance in support for democracy. Other predictors controlled for, the more affluent ( $\beta=.11$ ,  $p<.001$ ), educated ( $\beta=.10$ ,  $p<.01$ ) as well as female respondents ( $\beta=-.09$ ,  $p<.01$ ) showed higher support for democracy and *vice versa*. These findings can be interpreted as some sort of (educational and/or economic) deprivation based attitude towards democracy. Not having enough means can be a cause for criticism and cynical attitude towards the democratic regime, which is being blamed for the unsatisfactory standard of living. The dynamics of education influence is probably more complex. It is generally linked to a more liberal and pro-democratic political outlook. But this model rather describes than explains the variation in support for democracy. The fact that all of the included predictors lose their significance in the further steps of the analysis implies that the influence of socio-demographic variables is moderated by some dispositional and attitudinal variables.

**Table 1.** Hierarchical regression analysis – four models of support for democracy

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Socio-demographic factors</i>				
Gender (male)	-.09 *	-.09 *	-.08 *	-.07
Age	.04	.06	.06	.06
Education	.10 *	.08	.06	.06
Household income	.11 **	.10 *	.09 *	.08
<i>Dispositional factors</i>				
Authoritarianism		-.13 **	-.12 **	-.11 **
<i>Cultural factors</i>				
Nationalism			.02	.04
Political tolerance			-.02	-.04
Liberal self-identification			.11 **	.11 **
Socialist egalitarianism			-.05	-.05
<i>Institutional factors</i>				
Evaluation of democracy				.21 **
Government evaluation				.21 **
Evaluation of economy				.07 *
Human rights evaluation				.01
Electoral system evaluation				.04
Perceived representation				.02
Adjusted R Square	.03	.04	.05	.15

**Note:** Entries are standardized regression coefficients; \*  $p<.05$ , \*\*  $p<.01$ , \*\*\*  $p<.001$

Authoritarianism is but one example. Authoritarianism has been one of the most important concepts in explaining human political behaviour for decades, related to numerous attitudes and beliefs (see, for example, McFarland, 2010). It also bears special relevance for explaining political behaviour in Serbia (Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009; Todosijevic, 2006; 2013; Kuzmanovic, 2010), being one of the most important aspects of Serbian political culture in the past several decades. Adding authoritarianism in the

model improves its explanatory power significantly (R square change=.015,  $F [1, 719] = 12.44$ ,  $p < .01$ ), but only slightly (4% of variance). Higher authoritarianism was related with the lower support for democracy ( $\beta = -.13$ ,  $p < .001$ ), which is quite in line with the theoretical considerations on authoritarian personality as well as numerous research findings showing relations between authoritarianism and other attitudes and values that are antithetical to a democratic political outlook (Adorno et al., 1950; Meloen, 1993; McFarland, 2010) or the level of state authoritarianism (Meloen, 1996). After authoritarianism is included in the model, the educational level loses its significance, while the influence of the income level remains significant. There is empirical evidence that nationalistic and authoritarian attitudes are related with economic and cultural deprivation in Serbia (Kuzmanovic, 1994; 2010) and the data in this study partly correspond to it. Although treated here as a dispositional variable, there are reasons to view authoritarianism as a form of traditional parochialism in the Serbian context (Biro, 2006; Kuzmanovic, 1994; Rot & Havelka, 1973), the idea not completely discarded by the original view of authoritarianism as a personality or dispositional variable (Sanford, 1973). This points to the relevance and continuity in political tradition.

Adding nationalism, political tolerance, socialist egalitarianism and liberal self-identification in the third step further improves explanatory power (R square change=.015,  $F [1, 719] = 12.44$ ,  $p < .01$ ), but the model still explains only 5% of variance. Nationalism has a special relevance in the Serbian context as well since it has not only been (more or less) the official ideology of the ruling class for decades, but one of the most important dimensions of differentiation between the supporters of the relevant political parties in Serbia (Todosijevic, 2006; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Political tolerance is one of the most important components of the democratic political culture, often used in post-communist studies (Gibson, 1998; Karpov, 1999; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003), while socialist egalitarianism represents the general support for the economic aspect of societies liberalization, i.e. the rejection of some of the most important aspects of the former socialist political system (planned economy and economic egalitarianism). However, only one of the added predictors, liberal self-identification ( $\beta = .11$ ,  $p < .001$ ), is significant. The influence of authoritarianism remains significant, being the most important predictor ( $\beta = .12$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Gender and household income remain significant predictors as well.

Out of all political attitudes and beliefs included in this study, authoritarianism seems to be by far the most important in explaining allegiance to democracy. Adorno et al. (1950) stated that political, economic and social beliefs of an individual were deeply rooted in his/her personality, which may be "regarded as *determinant* of ideological preferences" (p. 5, italics in the original). It seems that, in the case of Serbia, this holds not only for preference for democracy, but perhaps also for nationalism, political tolerance and socialist egalitarianism, which does not gain significance once the level of authoritarianism and demographics are controlled for (see also Todosijevic, 2013).

Finally, adding the satisfaction variables significantly improves the model's explanatory power (R square change=.10,  $F [6, 709] = 15.23$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and triples the percent of the explained variance (15%). The most important predictors of the support for democracy include satisfaction with government performance ( $\beta = .21$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and Serbian democracy ( $\beta = .21$ ,  $p < .001$ ) in general. Satisfaction with Serbian economy also significantly predicts the support for democracy, but it is the weakest predictor in the model ( $\beta = .07$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The respondents who evaluate these more positively are more supportive of democracy, which is what would be expected under the institutional model paradigm. None of the remaining institutional factors significantly influences the support for democracy. The influence of authoritarianism ( $\beta = .11$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and liberal self-identification ( $\beta = .11$ ,  $p < .001$ ) on the support for democracy remained significant, while none of the remaining cultural or socio-demographic variables significantly predicts support for democracy.



The non-significant effects of gender, age, level of education and income, when other predictors are controlled for, are informative as well. The differences in socialization practices and experiences related with gender and especially age are obviously not so important for allegiance to democracy. Age is considered to be one of the most relevant socialization variables, which gains special relevance in the post-communist societies. The culturalist model predicts that younger cohorts, especially those not socialized under the authoritarian regime, should be more supportive of democracy. Some empirical evidence has shown that there were generational differences in that sense (Hahn, 1991; Hageaars et al., 2003; Klingeman et al., 2006; Siemienka, 2006) and great similarity between youth in the post-communist countries and those in the old democracies (Catterberg & Zuasnar, 2010; Moreno et al., 2010; Siemienka, 2003). This finding does not support the assumptions of generational differences in the Serbian society. Similarly, all other predictors controlled for, the level of education, systematically linked with a more liberal political outlook, does not play an important role in explaining individual differences in support for democracy.

#### 4. Conclusions

The presented data are not inconclusive. The most important predictors of support for democracy are satisfaction with the way democracy (in general) and government (in particular) work in practice. The support for democracy in Serbia is predominantly instrumental – the citizens rationally evaluate and prefer those political structures that act in their own or their own group's best interest. Creating and upholding the functional Serbian democracy seems to be one way of causing allegiance to it. Securing benefits for the many would bring the prevailing satisfaction with the system performance and, in the end, a more favourable view on democracy.

On the other hand, if the support for democracy is solely influenced by self-interest and individual or group benefits, one cannot help but wonder whether it is merely a lip service to democracy, as often argued by the proponents of the culturalist model (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) – only instrumental support for democracy (based on its effects) and not intrinsic support (based on democracy as a value in itself).

One additional question occurs. What does the word “democracy” mean for the Serbian citizens, who only had a limited experience with some formal democratic procedures while the truly functioning democracy is yet to come? There is evidence that the democratic political system loses its positive connotation in Serbia (Pavlovic, 2010), which is some sort of a “loving from afar” paradox: citizens fought for it, but got disappointed; not knowing what the true democracy really is, they already reject it under the impression of poor performances of the newly established democratic institutions that suffer from well-known transitional “child diseases”. Furthermore, in some sort of institutional inertia, the new regime continues with the old practices and old rules of political games, which often only resemble democracy and only vaguely. This, above other things, contaminates its meaning (Pavlovic, 2010). At the same time, when “democracy” (wrongly?) equals “state securing jobs” or “free education”, the evaluation of democracy implies the evaluation of something only indirectly related to it.

This raises the question of the stability of this type of support for democracy in a transitional society with its ups and downs in performance. If there is no deeper commitment to democracy, a certain reservoir of support, it is a small step from criticism of poor performance of the democratic regime to the rejection of the democratic political system. When allegiance to democracy is a manifestation of the underlying values that embrace it, the citizens increasingly come to a more liberal understanding of democracy, in terms of civil rights and freedom that empower people (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009).

On the other hand, one can wonder not just what a word "democracy" means but what Serbian citizens have in mind when evaluating "satisfaction" with democracy. Bearing in mind the poor state of Serbian economy, it is most probably the evaluation of democracy/government performance in economic terms. However, the satisfaction could imply the evaluation of the fulfilment of the democratic norms and values in practice, regardless of its economic consequences. In other words, the relevance of satisfaction variables does not (automatically) disqualify the relevance of deeper/value based commitment to democracy: evaluation standards can be individual's values and beliefs, not only self or group interest. It is possible that several types of democracy supporters can be identified. Some limited evidence on Serbian youth political culture points in that direction (Pavlovic, 2012).

Based on the presented data, we can say nothing more than that satisfaction variables are more important, but not sole or the main source of allegiance to democracy. Authoritarianism and ideological self-identification explain some variation in the preference for democracy not accounted for by institutional variables. Lower authoritarianism and/or more prominent liberal self-identification equal the more pro-democratic orientation. Some of the most fundamental and general determinants of political preferences play its part. In understanding and describing the development of support for democracy in a post-communist society, a more integral and coherent approach is needed. It would include the structural, cultural and institutional variables. Some authors argue that „instead of asking whether institutions cause culture or culture causes institutions, we should look for their joint effects“ (Elkins & Simeon, 1979, p. 143) and that political culture evolves in a "reciprocal relationship between institutions ... and values, fundamental political beliefs and implicit understandings" (Brown, 2005, p. 187). The consonance between the two is greater and more easily achieved if democratic institutions develop upward (from within the society) than downward (imposed on the society). The former statement more likely describes the Serbian situation, but nonetheless the data presented here point to the combined effects of the cultural and institutional variables as found elsewhere (Bennich-Bjorkman, 2007).

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## Appendix

**Table 1.** Authoritarianism scale – Factor loadings on the first principal component

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Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values for children	.702
People just reject youthful rebellious thoughts as they age	.576
Forgetting physical punishment leads to immoral conditions	.497
Authorities should censor the media	.689
Solve social problems by eliminating immoral people	.686
People can be divided into strong and weak	.524

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*Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; no rotation; 38.18% of variance.*

**Table 2. Nationalism scale – Factor loadings**

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The Serbs should be proud of their people	.658
Serbia has a more glorious and tragic history than other nations	.798
Serbia contributes more to world culture and science	.789
More important politicians are patriots than experts	.493
Serbia should seek peaceful reunification	.553
Schools should pay more attention to patriotic education	.647

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*Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; 44.31% of variance.*

**Table 3. Political tolerance scale – Factor loadings**

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Disliked group should organize public demonstrations	.884
Disliked group should nominate for public office	.909
Disliked group should not be banned	.773

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*Note: Extraction Method - Principal Component Analysis; 73.53% of variance.*