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Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism
The EU as a Model of Regional Integration

Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) perceives itself as a model for regional integration, which it seeks to diffuse by actively promoting the development of genuine (intra-)regional economic and political cooperation, the building of issue-related regimes, and the creation of joint institutions for consultation and decision-making in its neighbourhood and beyond as well as between the world regions and the EU.

In this paper, we explore the extent to which EU has sought to promote regional integration beyond its borders. More specifically, we analyze what exactly the EU seeks to export and how it has used its external relations and foreign policy to foster the cooperation between regions (inter-regionalism), on the one hand, and regional cooperation among third countries, on the other. We proceed in three steps. The first part of the paper outlines the mechanisms and instruments through which the EU diffuses the idea of regional integration to other regions and fosters regional integration among third countries. In the second part, we take stock of the EU’s attempts to export regional integration focusing on the mechanisms it has drawn upon. We conclude with some considerations to what extent the promotion of regional integration constitutes a genuine EU agenda for global governance.

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1. Introduction

*Our European model of integration is the most developed in the world.*

*Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale.*

*Given the necessary institutional reforms, it should continue to work well after enlargement, and I believe we can make a convincing case that it would also work globally* (Romano Prodi, 31 March 2000)

The European Union (EU) perceives itself as a model for effective and legitimate governance to be emulated by other countries and regions. Moreover, the EU seeks to actively promote the development of genuine (intra-) regional economic and political cooperation, the building of issue-related regimes, and the creation of joint institutions for consultation and decision-making in its neighbourhood and beyond as well as between the world regions and the EU. In its attempt to promote regionalism as a distinct European idea (Bicchi 2006; Grugel 2004), the EU sometimes constructs “new” regions, for example in Sub-Sahara Africa, which share few regional characteristics (e.g. economic interdependence) and have hardly developed a collective identity. Thus, the EU provides a rich laboratory to study external influences on regional strategies of states. The EU and its member states do not merely promote regional integration as normative standards in their external relations with third countries and other regions. Its ideas of regionalism beyond its borders also constitute causal beliefs since they are considered as the best way to ensure (regional) security, stability and prosperity at the EU’s borders and beyond (see Magen 2006).

The export of such ideas, which build upon the very foundations of the European Union, has served to construct a distinct foreign policy identity (Manners 2002; Diez 2005; Manners/Whitman 2003).

In this paper, we explore the extent to which the EU has sought to promote regional integration beyond its borders. More specifically, we analyze what exactly the EU seeks to export and how it has used its external relations and foreign policy to foster the cooperation between regions (inter-regionalism), on the one hand, and regional cooperation among third countries, on the other. We proceed in three steps. The first part of the paper outlines the mechanisms and instruments through which the EU diffuses the idea of regional integration to other regions and fosters regional integration among third countries. In the second part, we take stock of the EU’s attempts to export regional integration focusing on the mechanisms it has drawn upon. We conclude with some considerations to what extent the promotion of regional integration constitutes a genuine EU agenda for global governance.

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1 We are indebted to Vera van Hüllen for her as always meticulous comments and suggestions. Moreover, we thank Esther Ademmer, Carina Breschke, Mathias Großklaus, Eva G. Heidbreder, Pamela Luckau, Yasemin Pamuk, Andreas Stahn, and Lisa Thormählen for their help in compiling the empirical material for this paper.

2 Speech to the 2nd COMECE Congress, Brussels, SPEECH/00/115.

The diffusion of ideas has become a central research theme in political science, sociology, law, history, and economics (for overviews see Simmons/Dobbin/Garrett 2006; Holzinger/Jörgens/Knill 2007; Strang/Soule 1998). It seems to be particularly apt to study how the EU seeks to promote regional integration in its external relations. Diffusion can be conceived as a process through which ideas are spread across time and space (cf. Strang/Meyer 1993). This is exactly what the EU seeks to do – diffuse the idea of regional integration as both a normative and causal idea on how best to achieve peace, wealth and social justice. To have other regions and third countries accept and adopt its ideas, the EU has developed a rather sophisticated tool box that directly relates to the diffusion mechanisms identified in the literature.

The various diffusion mechanisms can be subsumed under three major logics of social action that rest on distinct assumptions about actors and their relations with social structures and institutions (cf. March/Olsen 1998; Habermas 1981; Risse 2000): 1) instrumental rationality or rational choice; 2) normative rationality or logic of appropriateness; 3) communicative rationality or logic of arguing. The three lines of theorizing give rise to different expectations when and how actors seek to promote ideas and decide to adopt them, respectively. Based upon the three logics of social action, we identify five different mechanisms (summarized in figure 1). For the purpose of this paper, we focus on the promoter’s/sender’s side, since we are interested in the ways in which the EU can promote regional integration abroad.

![Figure 1: Mechanisms of Diffusion](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Mechanism and Underlying Theory of Social Action</th>
<th>Promoter of Ideas (Sender)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion [(legal and physical imposition)]</td>
<td>coercive authority ((Herrschaft)), legal or physical force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation of Utility Calculations [(instrumental rationality)]</td>
<td>(positive and negative) incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization [(normative rationality)]</td>
<td>promote ideas through providing an authoritative model (normative pressure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion [(communicative rationality)]</td>
<td>promote ideas as legitimate or true through reason-giving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emulation (indirect influence) [a) lesson-drawing (instrumental rationality)]</td>
<td>(promote comparison and competition – strictly speaking this mechanism does not require the active promotion of ideas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) mimicry (normative rationality)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Note that the following mechanisms represent ideal types. Ideas diffuse in such a complex process that several mechanisms should be assumed at work simultaneously in a given empirical situation.
The first mechanism, which is often overlooked in the literature assuming voluntary diffusion of ideas, concerns *coercion*. Actors may simply have no choice but to accept an idea because they are forced by the threat or the actual use of physical violence (Hurd 1999). Strictly speaking, coercion is only relevant with regard to the internal diffusion of ideas (Europeanization) as part of the member states’ obligation to comply with EU law. Member states of the European Union are subject to ideas diffused by the case law of the European Court of Justice (Shapiro 1992) or European directives harmonizing national legislations (Scharpf 2003; Börzel forthcoming). In its external relations, the EU has not used coercive power. Whether this is due to its identity as a civilian power or because it simply lacks the capacity for military intervention is an interesting question, which lies, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

The second mechanism concerns diffusion of ideas through the *manipulation of utility calculations* by providing negative and positive incentives. Actors seek to promote certain ideas to realize individual gains, such as getting access to new markets, or to avoid costs, for example by stabilizing a political situation in neighbouring countries that creates negative externalities, such as civil wars. In a similar vein, the promoters of ideas can induce other actors into adopting their ideas by manipulating their utility functions. They provide rewards, for example in form of financial and technical assistance, or incur costs through sanctions or empower domestic actors who push for the adoption of the idea (Keohane 1984; Legro 1997; Weitsmann/Schneider 1997). The supply of causal ideas can also result in adaptive or “Baysian” learning (Simmons et al. 2006: 796) if actors receive new information that permits updating their beliefs for instance about how to best reach a certain policy goal (Meseguer 2006).

Concerning the EU efforts to export certain ideas of regional integration to the global level and their projection into third countries, respectively (external diffusion), the EU has used the externalization of European ideas to pursue its own instrumental interests, such as security, stability, prosperity and environmental protection. In its attempt to induce other actors to accept and adopt its ideas, the EU and the member states have heavily relied on external incentives (conditionality), on the one hand, and technical and financial assistance (capacity-building), on the other (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005; Börzel et al. 2008). *Conditionality* tries to manipulate the cost-benefit calculations of target actors through creating positive and negative incentives. *Capacity-building*, by contrast, provides target actors with additional resources enabling to make (strategic) choices to begin with.

The third and the fourth mechanisms draw on logics of social action theorized by social constructivism that resonates with historical work on diffusion. *Socialization* works through normative rationality or the logic of appropriateness (March/Olsen 1989, 1998) which differ from strategic and instrumental behaviour in that actors seek to do “the right thing” rather than maximizing or optimizing their given utilities. Actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of (international) society “in good standing” (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998). Such processes of socialization often result in complex learning by which actors redefine their interests and identities (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2007). They can also work through habitualization. By talking the talk, actors may change their social practices and dispositions, finally ending up walking the walk.
Persuasion is based on communicative rationality or the logic of arguing. It refers to situations in which actors try to persuade each other about the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement. Arguing involves reason-giving and challenging these claims as well as the legitimacy of norms. While some authors emphasize the role of international organizations, which “teach” state actors international ideas (Finnemore 1996; Checkel 2001), others focus on the role of (trans)national non-governmental organizations as promoters of ideas (Keck/Sikkink 1998; Haas 1992).

With regard to the external diffusion of ideas via socialization and persuasion, the EU also provides a rich laboratory. The EU and its member states do not merely promote regional integration as normative standards in their external relations with third countries. These ideas also constitute causal beliefs since they are considered as the best way to ensure (regional) security, stability and prosperity at the EU's borders and beyond (see Magen 2006). The export of ideas which build upon the very foundations of the European Union, has served to construct a distinct foreign policy identity (Manners 2002; Diez 2005; Manners/Whitman 2003). In its external relations, the EU and the member states seek to persuade state actors to adopt this model through processes of arguing and persuasion in institutionalized patterns of political dialogue and cooperation (cf. Youngs 2001).

Emulation, finally, does not require an active promoter of ideas, but relies on indirect influence. It is largely based on the principle of competition (competitive isomorphism, cf. Hannan/Freeman 1977). Actors compete with each other over meeting certain performance criteria, for example on creating employment or fostering economic growth, to which they unilaterally adjust their behaviour accordingly (Elkins/Guzman/Simmons 2006; Vogel 1995; Busch/Jörgens/Tews 2005). Competition does not only entail the diffusion of ideas as normative standards for political or economic behaviour but also seeks to spread causal beliefs, for instance by learning from best practice, on how to best reach these standards (Börzel 2007). Actors, in turn, borrow ideas in order to improve their performance (emulation) in comparison to others. Ideas may become “contagious” (Myers 2000: 175) under conditions of uncertainty, policy failure and dissatisfaction with the status quo, rather than under external pressure. Actors look to others for policies and rules that effectively solved similar problems elsewhere and are transferable into the domestic context (Meyer/Rowan 1977; Dolowitz/Marsh 2000; Goetz 2001). Next to lesson-drawing, which is based on instrumental rationality (cf. Rose 1993), actors may also emulate others for normative reasons, to increase their legitimization (symbolic imitation; cf. Polillo/Guillén 2005) or to simply imitate their behaviour because its appropriateness is taken for granted (mimicry; cf. Meyer/Rowan 1977; Haveman 1993).

Emulation is the least understood with regard to the EU's external diffusion of ideas. The EU has sought to encourage competition among countries seeking closer relations with the EU. While the EU's external relations have been largely structured around regional dimensions (Börzel et al. 2008; Börzel/Risse forthcoming), accession and neighbourhood countries also negotiate bilateral agreements with the EU based on their performance with regard to adopting European ideas (Bauer/Knill/Pitschel 2007). Next to the ‘regatta principle’, the EU has used the Open Method of Coordination developed internally in sensitive areas of EU policy-making (education, employment, health) in its attempt to foster cooperation among countries within one region setting benchmarks and organizing regular peer reviews (Tulmets 2003). At the same time, regional organizations across the globe have increasingly mimicked the EU (see below). The Andean Community, the African Union and recently also the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have modelled parts of their institutions on the EU to increase their international reputation.
While the EU seeks to encourage processes of lesson-drawing and mimicry, diffusion is clearly demand-driven by actors who seek to bolster their effectiveness and legitimacy.

In sum, the EU has developed a tool box for diffusing the idea of regional integration – together with other ideas, such as democracy, human rights and good governance – to third countries and other regions. As we will see in the next section, the EU uses political dialogue, and to a lesser extent conditionality seeking to change the preferences over strategies and outcomes, respectively, of target actors in favour of region-building. Capacity-building through technical and financial assistance, in turn, shall enable them to adopt and implement the necessary policy changes. Conditionality and political dialogue correspond to three of the diffusion mechanisms identified above (manipulation of utility calculations, socialization, persuasion). They can also be used to foster processes of emulation. Theoretically, the EU could employ coercion but is has not made use of it so far. Capacity-building, finally, is an enabling instrument and, hence, can complement all five diffusion mechanisms.

3. Promoting Regional Integration in the Near and Far Abroad

The EU is often considered as the “gold standard” of regional integration. In integration studies, it tends to be treated as the “conceptual universe” (Choi/Caporaso 2002: 481). In practical politics, the EU has served as a major reference point in various attempts of region-building where it is often seen as an alternative to the model of economic regionalism promoted by the US (Grugel 2004; Higgot 2005, 2007).³ The success of European economic integration triggered the creation of free trade areas in Africa, Asia, and the Americas as early as in the 1960s and 1970s.

With the emergence of the ‘new regionalism’ in the 1980s, the EU has kept influencing region-building in other parts of the world. The Andean Community (Saldías 2007), and later the African Union have used

³ Interestingly enough, the EU itself is the result of the US attempt to foster regional cooperation in the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War and forge a Western alliance against the Soviet Union.
the EU as an institutional blue print. The Common Market of the South (Mercosur) (de Camargo 1999; Vasconcelos 2007) has taken on some of its institutions and the general regulatory approach (Duina 2006), while carefully avoiding others, particularly those enshrined in the Community Method (Phillips 2004: 96-99). The most interesting case is ASEAN, which for the longest time sought to avoid the EU model because of its formal, supranational institutions (Acharya 1997; Higgot 2007), but recently committed itself to move down the path of Community-Building (see below).

The EU used to do little to promote the diffusion of its own model. This had changed with the end of the Cold War, when the EU subsequently expanded its foreign policy. Today, it maintains external relations with almost every single country and most regions in the world. The EU has not only written human rights, democracy, and the rule of war into its agreements with external partners (cf. Börzel et al. 2008; Börzel/Risse forthcoming). The promotion of regional integration has become part of the governance package the EU seeks to export, particularly to its immediate neighbourhood. And Inter-regionalism as a way to promote socio-economic development, democracy and good governance through dialogue and mutual cooperation (partnership) has developed into one of the foundations of its foreign policy (cf. Smith 2008: 109; Grugel 2004).

The next section will explore in more detail how the EU has sought to diffuse the idea of regional integration through its external relations. We start with an analysis of the EU’s most important region-to-region initiatives and turn then to its attempts to encourage regional integration among countries.

3.1  Supporting Regional Integration Far Away: The EU’s Interregional Cooperation with South America and Asia

The EU has signed six interregional cooperation agreements and conducts 19 political dialogues with regional groupings (Smith 2008: 101-104). Given the scope of this paper, we will focus on three prominent examples: the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the Andean Community (CAN), and Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN).

The EU maintains the most developed region-to-region relationship with South and Central America. South and Central American countries, most of them former colonies of member states, started to organize themselves early and formed several regional organizations. The EU subsequently established contractual relationships with Mercosur, the Andean Community, the San José Group, and later, the Rio Group. Initially, the agreements focused on economic, technological, and scientific cooperation funded by various programmes, such as AL Invest, Alfa. EU aid has mostly been funded through the ALA programme. In the 1980s, however, issues of democracy and human rights gained momentum starting with the Declaration

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5 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru currently have associate member status. Venezuela signed a membership agreement on 17 June 2006, but before becoming a full member its entry has to be ratified by the Paraguayan and the Brazilian parliaments.

6 Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela.

7 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama.

8 Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
on a political dialogue with the Andean Community in 1983 and the San José Group in 1984, later also involving the Rio Group. Economic and political cooperation has not always explicitly aimed at fostering regional integration. However, assistance and political dialogue have certainly supported endogenous efforts to deepen and widen the various project of region-building. The Cooperation Agreements, which the EU started to sign in the 1990s, provide direct support for regional institution-building.

**El Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur)**

In 1995, the EU and Mercosur signed an Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement to intensify their cooperation. The Agreement foresees EU financial support and technical know-how for the creation of a common legal framework necessary to make regional market integration work.\(^9\) The 2007-2013 Regional Indicative Programme provides € 50 million for projects aimed at the strengthening regional institutions (e.g. the Mercosur Secretariat, Mercosur Parliament), the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU once the Mercosur will have completed its Single Market (e.g. technical standardization, custom harmonization), and the participation of civil society in the Mercosur integration process (e.g. setting up ten EU-Mercosur Studies Centers; support for audiovisual and cinematographic sector).\(^10\)

Political dialogue among ministers (Cooperation Council) and senior officials (Joint Committee) of both regions shall help implement the Agreement by exchanging best practice and fostering mutual learning (Title VIII).\(^11\) Overall, EU assistance and political dialogue shall help Mercosur prepare for the conclusion of an Interregional Association Agreement (Art. 4), which will provide for ample cooperation in virtually all areas of the Single Market. The focus is on the completion of the Mercosur Common Market as a major precondition for the reciprocal liberalization of trade and investment between the two regions. Since the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement had entered into force in 1999, Mercosur has emulated a series of EU institutions, including the Comisión de Representantes Permanentes, the Mercosur Fund of Structural Convergence, and the Mercosur Parliament. Next to institution-building, EU assistance has fostered intra-Mercosur trade by providing new business opportunities, growth and market expansion.

**La Comunidad Andina (Andean Community/CAN)**

The EU has sought similar relations with the Andean Community (CAN), founded as early as 1969 (at the time called Andean Pact).\(^12\) Their relations go back to a framework agreement between the European Economic Community and the Andean Pact on economic cooperation, concluded in 1983. Being mostly about trade and development, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law already formed an essential element of the Treaty. It was replaced ten years later by a Framework Cooperation Agreement, which focused on human rights and democracy, integrated rural development, social development and regional

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\(^12\) Bolivia, Ecuador, Columbia, Peru, and until 2006, Venezuela.
integration. The existing interregional relations will be replaced by the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, which the EU and the CAN signed in 2003.\textsuperscript{13} It focuses solely on political cooperation and does not include trade issues. Rather, the new Agreement shall institutionalize and strengthen the political dialogue based until now on an informal arrangement known as the Rome Declaration (1996) and broadens cooperation to include new areas such as human rights, conflict prevention, migration, as well as the fight against drugs and terrorism. Special emphasis is placed on cooperation in support of the process of regional integration in the Andean Community, particularly with regard to the development and implementation of its Common Market (Art. 6 III; Art. 11). The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement is very similar to the Interregional Framework Agreement between the EU and Mercosur, both with regard to the objectives and the means to achieve them. Likewise, the EU has initiated negotiations on an Association Agreement in 2007, which shall bring the two regions even closer together by intensifying political dialogue and facilitating bi-regional trade and investment through a free trade area. Next to political dialogue, the EU's attempt to foster regional integration relies on technical and financial assistance. Like in case of Mercosur, the Regional Indicative Programme for the CAN earmarks € 50 million in the period 2007-2013 under the financing instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI).\textsuperscript{14} The envisioned projects are also strikingly similar. Interregional cooperation with the EU has not only fostered economic integration in the CAN; it has certainly influenced regional institution-building, too. Reinventing itself in 1997, the Andean Pact renamed itself in Andean Community and essentially emulated major institutions of the EU, including a directly elected Andean Parliament, an Andean Council of Ministers, an Andean Court of Justice, which established the supremacy and direct effect of Andean Law, and an Andean Passport. Finally, the CAN has not only sought to intensify its relations with the EU, it has also entered an interregional agreement with Mercosur to establish a free trade area in 2005.

Overall, the EU appears to have developed once again a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to promoting regional integration on a region-to-region basis in South America. Unlike the US, the EU does not exclusively pursue market goals, although cooperation agreements do aim at an economic association with the EU in form of interregional free trade areas. Not only does the EU seek to export an interventionist regulatory approach that is more legalized than the minimalist model favoured by the US (cf. Duina 2006). Trade relations are flanked by political, cultural and technical cooperation and are based on the EU’s good governance principles, including the respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. While the latter are essential elements of any external agreement the EU concludes with third countries and regions, and hence linked to a general suspension clause, the EU has not invoked either negative or positive conditionality.\textsuperscript{15} Instead, it has relied on political dialogue and assistance to support region-building in South and Central America. Political dialogue also dominates the EU’s relations with other sub-regional groupings, including the San José Process with the Central American countries and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), as well as the Rio Group (since 1990), which brings together all South American, Central American and Caribbean countries but is far less institutionalized than the South American sub-regional organizations.

\textsuperscript{13} http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003PC0695(02):EN:HTML; last access 13 March 2009. Ratification is still pending.

\textsuperscript{14} http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/andean/rsp/07_13_en.pdf; last access 13 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{15} Some may argue that technical and financial assistance for regional institution-building is a form of positive conditionality. However, the EU neither makes its interregional relations conditional upon enhancing intra-regional integration nor does it reward such efforts. Rather, the EU capacity-building encourages and supports endogenous processes.
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

A quick glance at the interregional relations of the EU with Asia appears to confirm the ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ of the EU to exporting regional integration, although the cooperation substantially differs, both in intensity and contents. The most important regional counterpart to the EU in Asia is the Association of South East Asian Nations founded in 1967.16 ASEAN was the first regional cooperation partner of the European Community. The earliest official contacts were made in the 1970s and formalized through the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement in 1980.

Unlike the EU, the wish to constrain national sovereignty has not motivated region-building in South East Asia. Nor did the five founding members primarily strive for market integration. Rather, they sought for a stable external environment, to contain communism, reduce the influence of external powers and satisfy their aspirations for becoming a regional hegemon (Indonesia) and constrain aspirations for regional dominance, respectively (Malaysia and Singapore). Unlike Latin American countries, ASEAN member states have renounced formal, supranational institutions, which would compromise their sovereignty. The ‘ASEAN way’ is based on non-interference, informality, consultation and consensus. It avoids binding agreements and regulatory frameworks (Acharya 2004; Solingen 2005). At the same time and somewhat paradoxically, ASEAN has increasingly mimicked the formal institutions of the EU to increase its international recognition. European integration has provided an important point of reference from the early days of ASEAN on (cf. Jetschke forthcoming). While mimicking used to be selective and limited, the ASEAN Charter adopted in 2007 ‘down-loads’ important parts of the EU’s constitutional structure. It sets the goal of building an ASEAN Community till 2020. 17 After the Charter had entered into force in December 2008, the 14th ASEAN Summit agreed in March 2009 on a Roadmap to put the ASEAN Community (2009-2015), into practice.18 As a first major stepping stone, the ASEAN Economic Community – a Single Market based on the “free flow of goods, services, investment, capital, and skilled labour”19 – shall be completed till 2015. For the realization of ASEAN’s other two ‘pillars’, the ASEAN Political-Security and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, the member states adopted ‘Blue Prints’. ASEAN’s recent efforts to jump start its regional integration has been inspired by the European Union. Indeed, ASEAN has been turned into a “rule-and-rights based Community” with a legal personality (Chapter II). Composition and working of ASEAN Summit and its Chairmanship (Art. 7) as the highest decision-making body strongly resemble the European Council and its Presidency. The three ASEAN Community Councils (Art. 9) have under their purview more than 30 sectoral ministerial bodies. And the Secretary-General of ASEAN as the Chief Administrative Officer, his/her four Deputies and the ASEAN Secretariat (Art. 11) may look like a nascent European Commission. Finally, a Committee of Permanent Representatives shall support the working of the ASEAN Councils (Art. 12). The Charter heavily emulates EU concepts and terminology and presents what could have been a lean version of the Constitutional Treaty (including a flag, an anthem, a motto, and an ASEAN day). However, ASEAN remains an intergovernmental organization lacking any supranational institutions. First, decisions

are still taken by consultation and consensus (Art. 20). Second, ASEAN does not have an independent
dispute settlement body. Diverging interpretations of the Charter and its application shall be settled
by the Secretary-General, who is also in charge of monitoring compliance (Art. 23, 27). Member states
may also refer cases to the ASEAN Summit. Third, while the Charter seeks to put “people at the heart
of cooperation”, ASEAN does not provide for a parliamentary assembly or a representation of societal
interests. It has, however, endorsed “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of
democracy and constitutional government” (Art. 2).

ASEAN has seriously compromised constitutive principles of the ASEAN way, took on the entire governance
package the EU seeks to export, and emulated its (intergovernmental) institutions to bolster its international
reputation, which has severely suffered after the Asian financial crisis (Rüland 2000). Yet, it remains to be
seen to what extent the institutional reforms will affect the relations with the EU. So far, formal institutions
have been largely decoupled from informal practices that keep to be shaped by the ASEAN way (Jetschke
forthcoming). And although the “ASEAN-EU relationship is widely considered the model of interregional
relations” (Hanggi/Ruland 2006; quoted in Camroux 2008: 4), it has been less comprehensive and less
institutionalized than in case of South and Central America.

First, ASEAN is not a community of liberal democracies but includes Communist and (semi-) authoritarian
states, whose respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law has been often more than
questionable. Following the accession of Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia in the second half of
the 1990s, the EU seriously graded down its relations with ASEAN, suspending meetings and avoiding high
level contacts (Camroux 2008: 19-23). While this could be seen as a subtle form of negative conditionality,
the EU has never really pushed its political principles. The cooperation agreement between the EU and
ASEAN, signed in 1980, did not contain any provisions on democracy and human rights. With its new
Asian Strategy adopted in 1994, the EU has sought to intensify the political dialogue with Asian countries
but issues of human rights and democracy have been largely banned from the agenda of the Asia-Europe
Meetings (ASEM) established as an informal region-to-region dialogue in 1996 and the talks within the
regional forum of ASEAN (ARF). In 2001, the Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships with Asia
mentions for the first time political principles. One of the six objectives for the EU-Asia cooperation is
to “contribute to protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance and
the rule of law”. Yet, a political dimension has been largely absent in the regional programmes so far
(see below). Interregional cooperation has focused on fostering economic relations between the EU and
ASEAN.

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21 The ASEAN People’s Assembly is not a parliamentary body but a forum organized by the ASEAN Institutes of
Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS) since 2000 to enable dialogue and confidence building be-
 tween governments, think tanks, and civil society groups in ASEAN.
22 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar.
23 Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
24 The EU cooperation with South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) comprising Bangladesh,
 Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka does not include a political dialogue.
25 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001DC0469:EN:HTML; last access 14 March
  2009.
Second, even the economic cooperation with ASEAN has been much more supply-driven than in case of South and Central America. The EU carries an enormous trade deficit with ASEAN countries. As a result, ASEAN has shown much less enthusiasm for negotiating an interregional Free Trade Agreement than the EU. Moreover, the level of intra-ASEAN trade is still low and there is much to be done before ASEAN will reach its goal to establish an Economic Community till 2015 (Camroux 2008: 25-30).

Given these constraints, the EU has focused on strengthening intra-ASEAN integration. Following the Strategic Framework of 2001, the Strategy Document on Regional Programming for Asia 2007-2013 declares the support for reinforced regional integration in the two sub-regional partners, ASEAN and SAARC (Fn. 24), and the two policy fora, ARF and ASEM, to be the EU’s first priority – next to policy and know-how based cooperation on the environment, higher education and research, and animal and human health, on the one hand, and support for uprooted people in Asia, on the other. The Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2007-2013 earmarks € 775 million (16 per cent) of the EU funds for Asia under the financing Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI) for funding the three priorities, of which 20 per cent shall go into strengthening regional integration. For both ASEAN and SAARC, the EU seeks to support economic region-building by assisting the implementation of SAFTA (the South Asian Free Trade Area) and the completion of the Single Market as envisioned by the Asian Economic Community (AEC), which the EU takes as major stepping stones towards the conclusion of interregional FTAs. Although actions on ASEAN institutional support mention the possibility of region-to-region non-trade related dialogue or dialogue with civil society, the EU has yet to fund a project that is not related to trade and investment, higher education, environment, and research and development. Political cooperation to promote the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is promoted through other institutions supported by the EU, such as the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Next to technical and financial assistance, the region-to-region dialogues shall foster mutual learning through the exchange of relevant experience.

Overall, region-to-region relations between EU and ASEAN have not substantially improved in terms of scope and intensity since the signing of the Cooperation Agreement in 1980. Nevertheless, political dialogue and assistance have fostered interregional exchange and facilitated the diffusion of EU concepts of regional integration, which appear to have shaped recent initiatives of ASEAN to deepen regional integration by broadening its scope and level of institutionalization.

28 ASEF is an international, non-profit organization based in Singapore that was established in 1997 by the countries of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Its mission is to promote mutual understanding and collaboration between the people of Asia and Europe through intellectual, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges. EIDHR is a thematic funding instrument of the EU to support projects that promote democracy and human rights and which exclusively involve non-state actors.
3.2 **Encouraging Regional Integration in its Near Abroad: The EU’s Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy**

Interregional relations require the existence of two independent regional groupings. Consequently, the EU’s region-to-region cooperation has aimed at supporting and strengthening endogenous processes of regional integration. Its attempts to promote regional integration by drawing third countries closer to itself, by contrast, have been largely top-down. Accession and neighbourhood countries have usually lacked some form of at least nascent regional identity. Quite on the contrary, the EU has meant to use regional integration to foster peace and stability among formerly hostile states in the Mediterranean, the Western Balkan, and the Southern Caucasus, fostering the emergence of a common regional identity.

**The African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP)**

The EU’s first experiments with inducing regional integration from outside, however, go back to its development cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP). In line with the overall goal of development cooperation in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, developing countries should first integrate among themselves before they integrate into the world market (cf. Robles 2008: 183f). The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 explicitly states that “Cooperation shall provide effective assistance to achieve the objectives and priorities which the ACP States have set themselves in the context of regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration, including inter-regional and intra-ACP cooperation” (Art. 28). Following this principle of differentiation and regionalization, the EU has encouraged the ACP to enter Economic Partnership Agreements in regional groupings rather than bilaterally.

Where the ACP had already formed regional groupings, the EU’s attempts resulted in interregional dialogues or agreements that aim at establishing interregional FTAs. There is not a single incident in which the EU has been able to initiate genuinely new forms of regional integration. It has tried, though, most prominently with its ‘Southern underbelly’.

**The Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)**

The “Global Mediterranean Policy” of 1972, had already been set up to organize the relations between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean neighbours. It centred on cooperation agreements that were to cover financial, technical and social matters, ultimately aimed at the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MEFTA) that should eventually result into a Euro-Mediterranean FTA (EU-MEFTA). The “Barcelona Process”, established by the Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in 1995, sought to re-launch the EU-Mediterranean cooperation and provided it with a regional, multilateral

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29 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) shall replace the preferential trade agreements the EU had offered the ACP countries and which are incompatible with the rules of reciprocity and non-discrimination of the WTO. The ACP countries have been reluctant to conclude EPA even though the EU has put considerable pressure on them.

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framework.\textsuperscript{31} It identified three baskets\textsuperscript{32} on which the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership\textsuperscript{33} should focus:

a) The political and security partnership establishing a common area of peace, stability and security,

b) the economic and financial partnership providing the framework for economic and financial cooperation and aimed at the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area,\textsuperscript{34} and

c) the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs with the aim of developing human resources and promoting exchange between cultures and civil societies.

The implementation of the corresponding ‘work programme’, as itemized in the Annex of the declaration, shall be monitored during the meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reviewed on the basis of reports prepared by the European Commission on the part of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (Barcelona declaration 1995: 9f). The ‘Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process’ is in charge of the general institutional coordination assisted by ad hoc thematic committees at the level of ministers, senior officials and experts and additionally supplemented by exchanges of experience and information with representatives of the civil society (Barcelona declaration 1995: 7f). For the implementation of partnership objectives, the EU has provided financial and technical assistance through Mediterranean Development Assistance (MEDA), which was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument in 2007, and through loans of the European Investment Bank.

Despite this ambitious agenda for (inter-)regional integration, the EU has not insisted on the establishment of a formal regional organization. The Israeli-Arab conflict has prevented the creation of a ‘Mediterranean Council’. Nor has the EU made regional cooperation among Mediterranean partners a condition for interregional/Euro-Mediterranean relations/cooperation – unlike democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Like in its interregional relations, the EU has mainly relied on political dialogue and assistance. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the dispute between Morocco and Algeria over West-Sahara have been only the most obvious obstacles to a closer cooperation (cf. Adler et al. 2006). Attempts of France and the Southern European EU member states to revive the Barcelona Process, which was integrated into the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 (cf. Börzel et al. 2008), through the creation of a “Union for the Mediterranean” in 2008 are likely to remain futile.\textsuperscript{35} Not only are its financial basis and organizational format still unclear and subject to disputes among the EU member states (no additional funding) and its Mediterranean Partners (an Israeli presidency). There simply is no Mediterranean region the way the EU would like to see it. Next to a lack of common identity, the EU itself has compromised its regional framework by developing differential bilateral relations with each of the countries (Van Hüllen/ Stahn forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{31} For an overview of the history of EU Mediterranean Policy see cf. Gomez 2003: 25-41.

\textsuperscript{32} The similarity with CSCE terminology is no coincidence. It is a reminiscence of the failed attempt to launch a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean in 1990.

\textsuperscript{33} Next to the 27 EU member states, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership comprises Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia). Libya has had observer status since 1999.

\textsuperscript{34} The establishment of a free trade area constitutes an essential element of the EMP!

\textsuperscript{35} http://euobserver.com/9/27045; last access 14 March 2009.
However, it is the absence of ‘regionness’ that renders the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership less of a failure. “[B]ringing all Mediterranean countries around the same table and having them talk business despite unresolved grievances is probably one of the main successes of the EU in its attempts to create a region in the Mediterranean.” (Bicchi 2006: 295) The Euro-Mediterranean Committee, functioning somewhat like the Committee of Permanent Representatives, meets once a month. And the meetings of the General Directors of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, not conceived by the Barcelona Declaration either, look very similar to the Political Committee in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Finally, there are a number of sectoral Euro-Med conferences, which tend to deal with parallel issues to those on the agenda of the EU. Such institutional similarities appear to be the result of gradual emulation rather than the intentional export or projection by the EU fostered through political dialogue and assistance (cf. Bicchi 2006).

Learning from the South: Integrating the Eastern Neighbours

After the end of the Cold War, the EU faced the challenge of supporting the economic and political transition of the former communist countries ensuring the stability of its immediate neighbours. From the very beginning, the EU pursued an approach of regional differentiation according to geographic proximity and transition progress, which ultimately resulted in three regional groupings: the Central and Eastern (CEE) European countries (encompassing the Central European countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Baltic States, as well as Rumania and Bulgaria), the Western Balkans,36 and the post-Soviet Newly Independent States (NIS).

The Central and Eastern European Countries

While the EU ultimately agreed to admit all CEE countries at once in 2004 (with a delay of three years for the two South Eastern laggards, Romania and Bulgaria), the EU had sought to encourage the formation of (sub-)regional groupings. And indeed, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia joined forces in organizing their ‘return to Europe’ forming the Visegrád Group in 1991.37 The three and, since the split up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, four countries have cooperated on all issues relevant to qualifying for EU membership – the development of market economy, the consolidation of democracy, and the integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From the start, they made it very clear that the final goal of their cooperation was their accession to the EU as a result of which they have refrained from any deepening of their regional integration (cf. Anastasakis/Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002: 30-33). They established a Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in 1993, which was subsequently expanded to other (prospective EU member) states. In line with the overall regional approach of the EU, the multilateral trade liberalization among Central European countries should first and foremost facilitate their entry into the EU. Incidentally, countries have to leave CEFTA when joining the EU.

36 The Balkans (sometimes also referred to as South Eastern Europe) are a geographical space that encompasses Albania, ex-Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania. Through the enlargement policy of the EU, the region has been divided with the Western Balkans being those countries which have not been admitted to the EU yet (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo).

The three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) engaged in a similar regional cooperation, which was not least motivated by common security concerns for which integration in the EU and NATO appeared to be the most logical solution. Membership in regional organizations, such as the Baltic Sea States and the Baltic Free Trade Area, established in 1994, did not only satisfy EU conditionality but also brought them in closer cooperation with EU member states. While the integration of the three Baltic States has been more advanced than in case of the Central European countries, they have equally refrained from further institutionalizing their relations. For them, regional integration has always been most of all a pre-accession instrument. Other than that, they have insisted that their progress towards accession is evaluated on a country-by-country basis (Maniokas 2004). The regional approach in the Eastern enlargement process was further compromised by the bilateral Europe Agreements and Accession Partnerships, which provided the main framework for negotiating accession into the EU (cf. Börzel et al. 2008).

The Western Balkans

In light of the success of Eastern enlargement, the EU has heavily drawn on the lessons learned in its attempt to stabilize yet another region that has been vital to its geopolitical interests: the Western Balkans. To address the conflict situation at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU initially had focused on humanitarian and emergency assistance through its Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) on a bilateral basis. Its relations with the Western Balkans lacked any regional policy framework. After the war in Bosnia and the breaking out of the Kosovo conflict in 1998, the EU changed its approach toward the Western Balkans. It had become clear by then that development cooperation would not be sufficient to stabilize the region so close to the EU’s borders. Moreover, it started to develop a regional framework deemed necessary to address the economic, political and security of the region (cf. Börzel et al. 2008).

While ridden by religious divisions and ethnic conflicts, the Balkan countries have been much more receptive of regional integration than the Mediterranean partners of the EU. They have become members of several regional sub-groupings that emerged in the 1990s, including the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) or the Danube Commission (cf. Anastasakis/Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002). Yet, the only initiative generated from within the region is the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). The others have been induced “top-down”, not least by the EU, which made any progress in bilateral relations conditional upon regional cooperation. The first regional approach of the EU aimed at the implementation of the Dayton and the Paris Peace Accords. The development of trade and other relations with the EU as well as the granting of financial and technical assistance, for example under PHARE, was tied to a long list of political and economic conditions, including the Copenhagen criteria and regional cooperation.

Conditionality, however, became only effective when it was linked to a membership perspective. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe of 1999 promised candidate status to Croatia, Macedonia,

38 SEECP is intergovernmental and informal in nature. Its activities have focused on political dialogue on security, economic, humanitarian, social and cultural cooperation as well as justice and home affairs (Anastasakis/Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002: 21).

39 Thus, PHARE funding for multilateral projects has not been applied for.

40 Before the Stability Pact, the EU had initiated the Royamount Process for Stability and Good Neighbourhood in Southeast Europe in 1996. It aimed at a multilateral dialogue between civil society actors. Both EU actions
Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as they would meet the Copenhagen criteria.\textsuperscript{41} Yet, “integration with the EU is only possible if future members can demonstrate that they are willing and able to interact with their neighbours as EU States do” (European Commission 2002; quoted in Anastasakis/Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002: 20). Strict conditionality has been complimented with assistance for regional projects (mostly infrastructure, security and civil society) under CARDS, the financial programme for Assistance, Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization. For the period of 2000-2006, the regional programme of CARDS comprised € 230 million (about 5 per cent of the overall funding).\textsuperscript{42} Finally, a political dialogue was organized in three ‘working tables’ on democratization and human rights, economic reconstruction and development, and security and justice and home affairs (cf. Friis/Murphy 2000; Bechev 2006).

The EU attempts to promote regional integration have helped to intensify the regional dialogue and resulted in several regional agreements, for example on trade liberalization and refugee return.\textsuperscript{43} Yet, the Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP), also initiated in 1999, has somewhat undermined the multilateral logic of the Stability Pact. SAP was to provide a bilateral contractual framework to bring the Western Balkans into the enlargement process. If the candidates had made sufficient progress in terms of political and economic reform and administrative capacity-building,\textsuperscript{44} they could open negotiations with the EU for a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) as the first formal step towards accession and subsequently enter the so-called European Integration Partnerships, which were explicitly modelled on the Accession Partnerships in the Eastern enlargement process setting short and medium-term priorities for approximation. The SAA countries must engage in regional cooperation to advance in the accession process. But the SAP remains a bilateral instrument, which encourages competition rather than cooperation among the Western Balkan countries.

\textit{The Eastern Neighbours}

After the break down of the Soviet Union, the EU launched an ad hoc programme to assist the Newly Independent States (NIS)\textsuperscript{45} in coping with the enormous political, economic and social challenges they faced. The Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) provided bilateral grants for financing technical assistance as well as regional and cross-border measures in the areas of


\textsuperscript{42} http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/western_balkans/r18002_en.htm; last access 15 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{43} For a comprehensive assessment see: Anastasakis/Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002: 25-29.

\textsuperscript{44} The political and economic conditions had been established by the GAERC Conclusions of April 1997. SAA exist with Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. Due to the political situation, negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Serbia currently are suspended.

\textsuperscript{45} These include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Russia. Mongolia joined the TACIS programme from 1993-2003.
environment protection, fight against organized crime and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{46} Between 1994 and 1996, the EU sought to institutionalize its relations with the NIS by signing bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA).

Only with the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, the EU started to develop a more regional approach. In a nutshell, ENP shall provide the EU’s Eastern neighbours with an alternative to membership providing still sufficient incentives for engaging in economic, political and social reforms (cf. Börzel et al. 2008).

In order to turn the ‘near abroad’ into an area of security, stability and prosperity, the EU continues to promote regional integration. “The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation that are preconditions for political stability, economic development, and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment” (Wider Europe Strategy Paper: 3).\textsuperscript{47} But while ENP develops a regional ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, its logic has remained inherently bilateral. Unlike the Mediterranean Policy, it does not provide for any institutionalization of the regional dimension. The integration of the Mediterranean Partnership into the ‘New ENP’ has further undermined the fostering of regional integration since ENP is now located at the interface of several former ‘regional policies’, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) for Northern Africa (Maghreb) and the Near East (Mashreq) and the (old) Neighbourhood Policy for the Newly Independent States in the Western parts of the former Soviet Union (WNIS) and in the Southern Caucasus.

The only EU initiative for new regional cooperation in the area is the creation of the Black Sea Synergy in 2007.\textsuperscript{48} The Black Sea Synergy has been modelled after the Barcelona Process. It shall foster cooperation between EU member states (Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania), future member states (Turkey), Eastern Neighbourhood Countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) and Russia in various areas that cover almost the entire acquis communautaire. The EU will support the new Initiative through co-financing under its European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument.

It remains to be seen whether the EU’s most recent initiative for an “Eastern Partnership” will be more successful in developing a regional dimension of the Eastern ENP.\textsuperscript{49} It shall provide Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine with an institutionalized forum for discussing visa agreements, free trade deals and strategic partnership agreements with the EU, while avoiding the controversial topic of membership. Since the added value to ENP is still unclear, it has mostly been the response of Northern and CEE member states to the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean.

To sum up, the countries, among which the EU has sought to induce regional integration, have responded to the EU’s efforts in a primarily instrumental way as a necessity for developing closer relations with the EU (Anastasakis/Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002). The greater impact on Central and Eastern Europe and the

\textsuperscript{46} Some cross-border projects are partly financed by the INTERREG (Community programmes designed for the promotion of the cooperation of the regions inside the EU) and PHARE programme lines.

\textsuperscript{47} http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf; last access 15 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{48} http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm; last access 15 March 2009.

Western Balkans as compared to the Southern and Eastern European Neighbours is explained by the EU’s strict conditionality on the one hand, and a credible accession perspective, on the other. Both are absent in the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnerships, where the EU has relied on political dialogue and assistance to foster processes of emulation.

4. New Regionalism - The EU’s Agenda for Global Governance?

In the years ahead these inter-regional dialogues will steadily shape the nature of international politics and forge new mechanisms to global interdependence and tackle cross-border problems. (Javier Solana; quoted in Farrell 2007: 249.)

The promotion of regional integration is “clearly an EU foreign policy objective that stems directly from its own internal identity” (Smith 2003: 95) which is meant “to reproduce itself [...] advocating its own form of regional integration” (Bretherton/Vogler 2006: 249). It corresponds to the EU’s construction as a civilian power that seeks to diffuse its own model of democracy, social welfare and regional integration through partnership agreements and political dialogue (Börzel/Risse forthcoming). Regional integration is seen as the best way of managing social and political conflict, fostering the economic wealth of a society and ensuring peace and stability. “The regional cooperation model is essentially an extension of the EU’s own philosophy that deeper cooperation with neighbouring countries is a route to national as well as regional stability and growth” (European Commission 2001; quoted in Anastasakis/Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2002: 16). The EU projects its internal solutions to its external environment (Lavenex 2004, 2008; Bicchi 2006). It does it in the ‘regional way’. Thus, regional integration is not only a means to advance global trade by multilateral trade liberalization under the WTO. It is part of constructing a new global order in which regional entities are the structuring units of international relations (Katzenstein 2005). The EU’s partnership approach to ‘regional governance’ contrasts with the US whose ‘hub-and-spoke’ model is more market-driven focusing on trade and investment rather than political and social reforms and regional institution-building (Grugel 2004; Farrell 2007). To the extent that the US promotes regional cooperation at all, it clearly favours regional free trade areas rather than more comprehensive integration schemes.

Whether the EU is really the “hub of a global pattern of interregional relations” (Hettne 2005: 558) from which it seeks to reconstruct a multilateral world order in a regionalized form (multiregionalism), “meaning a horizontalised, institutionalised structure formed by organised regions, linked to each other through multidimensional partnership agreements” (Hettne 2005: 563) is another question. The juxtaposition of “Pax Europaea” based on a deliberative model of world order and “Pax Americana” as a hegemonic project which merely serves the purpose of maximizing the national interest of the US is certainly wrong. To the extent that scholars accept this juxtaposition, they simply reify the EU’s own identity construction taking it at face value. And they fall back into the false dichotomy of “ideas vs. interests”, suggesting that the US promotes (bad material) interests, while the EU exports (good moral) values. Instead, “Pax Europaea” and “Pax Americana” are both hegemonic projects of two “normative powers.” There are two ‘global scripts’ on regionalism, one based on regional trade cooperation promoted by the US and the other, advocated by the
EU, striving for regional integration, which is broader in scope and infringes stronger on the sovereignty of states. Both scripts also promote material interests of their advocates while, at the same time, proposing visions of good regional orders.

Unlike the US, however, the EU has developed a quite sophisticated tool box that it systematically uses to diffuse its script, mostly relying on political dialogue and assistance. It remains to be seen whether the new Obama Administration will seek to strike more even with the EU – his talk about an “A New Alliance for the Americas” certainly indicates an increased attention at least to its near abroad that might also involve a more substantial policy change by seeking to advance “democracy, security, and opportunity from the bottom-up”.50 (This time it might be Mars approaching Venus).

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The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and Intensive Research

The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a new funding programme launched by the German Research Foundation in 2008. It is a centrepiece of the KFG to provide a scientifically stimulating environment in which innovative research topics can be dealt with by discourse and debate within a small group of senior and junior researchers.

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- Identity and the Public Sphere
- Compliance, Conditionality and Beyond
- Comparative Regionalism and Europe’s External Relations