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International Migration and the European Union Relations in the Context of a Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries: Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model

Armando ALIU[†]

Abstract

This study investigates migration flows from Western Balkans and North African countries to the high-income countries of the EU. Migration and asylum issues were analysed with taking into account empirical, analytical and political comparisons of Western Balkans and North African countries from *the triple win solution* point of view. The research attempts to emphasize Western Balkans migration experience in order to respond how to manage and/or control chaotic migration with respect to North African countries. In a sense, the EU enlargement and neighbourhood policies have significant effects on EU migration dynamics of demographic change (i.e. ageing population) and convergence/divergence of EU member states' priorities for migration policies. From this standpoint, the role of the triangle (hybridity) – state, private and civil society in migration research ought to be argued to verify whether a controlling migration by an ideal hybrid structure and indirect centralisation will be more effective and accurate or not. The research presents dialectics of triple win approach and hybrid model (i.e. home country-state, host country-private, and civil society-migrants) with using governance models. The main argument was tested methodologically through using case study research, grounded theory, constructivist and normative approaches.

Keywords: Hybrid Model, Controlling Migration, Social Transformation, Western Balkans, North Africa, Indirect Centralisation

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Introduction

Migration and asylum are very sensitive issues which should be considered with the European values such as; democratisation, fairness, antidiscrimination, protection of human rights, and enhancing liberty in the context of the EU law. With respect to the European norms and values, the EU has created policies and structured the EU supranational law which has legally binding force for all member states. The EU started to shape a common migration policy with Maastricht Treaty which ensured a ground to structure intergovernmental cooperation. Then, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and included migration policies at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement into *acquis communautaire*. In Title V, the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the intergovernmental cooperation to transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, member states and the third countries (Bia 2004; Faist and Ette 2007). Likewise, the TFEU has centralised the power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the centralisation to Brussels has provided convergence and divergence in various migration issues. At national level, the EU respects all member states' own constitutions and regulations because all member states have their sovereignty rights and some member states which suffer from high migration and asylum flows, are referring to their national law and regulations. Accordingly, the EU attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa policy, cooperation with countries on illegal migration flows and back illegal migrant agreements). These relations and agreements are necessary and precondition for regional cooperation and enlargement policy. Thus, the Western Balkans and North Africa appear as two regions which have high priorities for regional cooperation and strategic partnership for the creation of the EU security cycle through becoming more closer to these countries. Recently, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalisations, social and cultural funds, financial aid and so forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia as twenty-eighth EU member state, giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa liberalisation talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve interparty agreement (government-opposition) and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to be perceived as great successes of the EU efforts.

The EU adopted the Immigration and Asylum Pact in 2008 to consolidate its efforts towards a common migration and integration policy and also to deal with North African migration flows. This policy is based on an agreement between member states to apply common principles in the field of migration and asylum. Afterwards, in 2010, the European

Council approved the Stockholm Programme which covers the period 2010-2014. Admittedly, the EU places a high priority on the Lisbon Agenda's aim to create a knowledge-based society. At the core point of this framework, Europeanisation¹ is emphasized on security, the human rights legislation and the development of restrictive migration policies in the EU. From the perspective of free movement of persons and workers as fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the EU law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding migration and asylum issues. The judicial complaints, debates and sceptic attitudes in France, Italy, Germany and Spain against migration policies and Schengen regulations have illustrated this fact perfectly (see Table A1 for Schengen visa statistics). In 2009, only these four countries have received approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 49.02 per cent of total visas) in Schengen zone. With these facts in mind, the harmonisation of EU migration policy and new approaches were examined for finding out whether the EU puts barriers to the free movement of persons and workers of non-EU citizens (i.e. the citizens of Western Balkan and North African countries) or not. For the Western Balkan countries visa liberalisations have provided overstay of migrants and asylum applications. However, what differs Western Balkans from the North African countries is that all Western Balkan countries' (currently except Kosovo) citizens are allowed to enter any EU member state without a visa for maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they move to any member state within this process. Whereas the North African countries' citizens generally have refugee status waiting for enjoying their asylum right because of the repressive political regimes and internal conflicts in their countries. Chronically, some matters of free movement lay on the circulation within the Schengen zone. To give an instance, immigrants who want to establish their lives with their families in France, are not allowed to use Italy as transit country through applying for international protection right. Generally, the Schengen states are sending back immigrants to the previous country from where they have entered (i.e. first asylum principle). Hypothetically, international law and national regulations have many system blanks which are filled in by human smugglers and illegal migrants. Albeit, hard law regulations have illustrated the fact that illegal migrants cannot do anything else until they

¹ Europeanisation can be understood in terms of a limited set of ordinary processes of change (or transformation for engagement). The term Europeanisation involves the changes in external boundaries, developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organisation and a political unification project (Olsen 2002). According to Wallace, Europeanisation is the development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements to manage cross-border connections, such that a European dimension becomes an embedded feature which frames politics and policy within the European states (Wallace 2000: 370).

guarantee better living standards for their families, that absolutely means researchers and policy makers should reconsider alternative ways to tackle with illegal migration issues.

Essentially, the study investigates the fundamental reasons through using empirical data and attempts to propose a *hybrid model* that covers the active participations of state, private, civil society actors in order to embed hybridity in migration and asylum research, and respond to migration issues with a controlling migration approach which is based on theoretical assumptions and practical reasons and consists of migration driving forces; such as legal regulations, capacity building, remittances, hybrid organisations, labour policy of states, economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. As is reflected, there are interrelationships and dialectics among triple win model (home country, host country and migrants) and hybrid model, i.e. state-home country nexus, private-host country nexus and migrants-civil society nexus. Undoubtedly, hybrid model has a *catalyst* role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. With this regard, it is better to perceive the hybrid model a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. In general, the main research question is ‘how hybridity can be embedded in migration and asylum research and what is the role and influence of the indirect centralisation process? Supportive follow up questions are as such: Can hybridity be an effective solution to better control and manage migration and asylum matters? Is a controlling migration approach which consists of alternative and innovative soft law regulations, an accurate model or strategy for embeddedness of general/real or specific/ideal hybridisation in migration and asylum research? How can classical migration theories be reformulated or reconsidered in the context of hybridisation of migration issues in public sphere with governance via governments’ participation? What are the implications of hybridisation for an ideal triple win solution and why states ought to include indirect centralisation process as a hybridisation tool for better managing and controlling migration? What will be the role of migrants who have hybrid identities at the process of EU enlargement, integration, collaboration, and intercultural dialogue among EU, Western Balkans and North Africa?

Methodology and Background

The argument of this study was structured with applications of *the third way approach* (Giddens 2000) and *the theory of structuration, the theory of communicative action (Die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns)* – Labour, Family, Media and Language interactions (Habermas 1990) and theory-practice understanding. Hybrid model can be an effective strategy for social transformation of controlling migration approach, and in order to link the transition to *the praxis* of social transformation, paradigmatic and philosophical critical approaches (Apel 2011) were included to the research. Rather starting with a hypothesis, in this study the main hypothesis will be verified (or falsified) at the end of the research. Eisenhardt's technique which means doing an empirical study with a special focus to data and then generating theory or theoretical model (Eisenhardt 1989: 549) was used in order to conduct research in the context of grounded theory. In other words, this study attempts to create a transition from practice to theory and hence the grounded theory method (GTM) was used to highlight how data and analysis, methodologically, become constructed. The data of two regions were reached up to construct abstractions and then down to tie these abstractions to data. Starting with the EU and Western Balkans relations and in this framework, countries' political relations and empirical migration data include both the specific and the general concepts were investigated in order to explore their links to larger issues or creating larger unrecognised issues in entirety. Thus, GTM in migration research can provide a route to see beyond the obvious and a path to reach imaginative interpretations (Bryant and Charmaz 2007: 13). Meanwhile, GTM is categorised as an inductive method which is a type of reasoning that begins with study of a range of individual cases and extrapolates from them to form a conceptual category. It should be added that, one of the concerns often expressed by researchers is when to stop collecting data and how to balance the comparison analysis among two regions or many countries? A researcher stops when there is no need to continue, i.e. '*achieving the point of theoretical saturation*' (Bryant and Charmaz 2007: 281). The constant comparison of interchangeable indicators in the data yields the properties and dimensions of each category, or concept. This process of constant comparison continues until no new properties or dimensions are emerging. At this point, a concept has been theoretically saturated.

Initially, the research presents a comparison of Western Balkans and North African countries, and then with normative, theoretical and philosophical perspectives, the section

second constructs controlling migration and hybrid model within the framework of two case comparisons and dialectics of triple win and hybrid model.

Why the Western Balkans and North African countries were chosen for a comparison analysis which tests migration flows, indirect centralisation and hybridisation? Geographically, the two regions were examined as a comparative case study because the EU has integration and neighbourhood policies for these two regions. The first region, the Western Balkans, consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain date (i.e. mid-2013) for being the twenty-eighth member state of the EU. All other Western Balkan states have put the full membership objective as ultimate achievement on their national agenda. Thus for the EU the most crucial point is the development process in these states and efforts for achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not possible with merely national capital and state development plans. The European capital flows and direct investments will enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic actions with civil society in Western Balkans. The other region is North Africa. In fact, it is also known as Southern Mediterranean region or the Maghreb. However, the research stresses the recent events in North Africa. Therefore, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia were included to the analyses as North African countries (excluding Sudan, Mauritania and Western Sahara). The EU has neighbourhood policies for North African countries and in this context the partnership relations will accelerate hybridisation and indirect centralisation process in North Africa. From international migration point of view, both cases are *sui generis* and linked to each other. The European Commission has been published many analytical reports and strategy papers for particularly these countries of two regions. Above all, from the European Union perspective, these two regions have a very high priority for pursuing the EU 2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the EU and externally in Western Balkans and North Africa. Agreeably, the distance among the EU and these two regions is a factor that distinguishes these two regions from other regions of the world. The EU considers the relationship with these two regions as both strategy and security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of these two regions and that's why the hybrid model proposed is significant and it is supposed to be an effective strategy for the EU enlargement, integration, stability, and development processes.

To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various conferences in European Parliament and European Commission such as the conference of

Mr. Andrew Rasbash, Head of Unit: Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was entitled 'The EU's Enlargement Policy' and the conference of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the Policy Officer – Visa Policy, which was entitled 'The EU's Asylum Policy'. The author has also participated in a conference which is entitled 'Habermas und der Historische Materialismus.' The conference was organised on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel (Universität Frankfurt am Main), Emeritus Prof. Dr. Jürgen Habermas (Universität Frankfurt am Main) and many other social scientists have participated as speakers and listeners at Bergische Universität Wuppertal in Germany. The author achieved the opportunity and honour to discuss hybridity issue with Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel at the end of the conference. Altogether, the author has improved the hybridity notion and application from two cases i.e. Heidelberg Intercultural Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) and ASAN - Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The author has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners' & Migrants' Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The outcomes of the in-depth interview were very significant in terms of the EU integration and development processes and explain how hybrid structures just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center as a hybrid case are likely to spread and networked in the future.

Eventually, the information was mostly collected from the World Bank databases, the European Commission and the International Organisation for Migration published reports in order to analyse each state and region separately and then compare the illustrations for finding out similarities and differences among each other.

1The Empirical Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries

1.1. General Overview of the EU and Western Balkan Relations

After the collapse of Soviet Union and since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, the emerging countries in the Western Balkans have endured a painful set of multiple transitions. Pathetically, countries in the region shared almost the same fate during this period. For stabilisation of the Balkan peninsula, the European Union created Stabilisation Association Process² (SAP) and during this process signed Stabilisation Association Agreements (SAAs) with each Western Balkan country. Thus, we can put forward that there is a nexus between European Union's political attitude and stabilisation and development of Western Balkan region as a whole. The EU wants to prevent itself from illegal migration flows and hence works in order to ensure stabilisation and development to the Western Balkan countries. It is assumed that the integration of Western Balkan countries within the European Union will effectively stabilise the region. Substantially, the European Commission is giving a crucial priority to Western Balkans integration within the EU because the EU shares common cultural and historical values with these countries. If we focus on the region, we can acknowledge that the Western Balkans had already become a part of Europe in different dimensions. Therefore, initially, the EU is respecting the Western Balkan countries' applications in order to approve them as full member states of the EU in the near future. However, political situations and decisions in various countries in this region make the negotiation process more complicated. Unavoidably, the integration process of Western Balkans is strongly related to governments' foreign policies, implementation of reforms and achieving European standards. In 2003, the EU declared that the future of the Balkans is within the European Union. Yet the results of the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty, the EU shifted to a more restrictive enlargement strategy. With the Thessaloniki Summit the European Council attempted to develop a common policy on illegal immigration, external borders, the return of illegal migrants and cooperation with third countries (Council of the European Union 2003: 3). Since the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the EU and the Western Balkans have become even closer neighbours and the EU's desire for a common migration policy was increased (European Commission 2005: 3). Recently, the EU has been debating about the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Zone. The

² The SAP pursues three aims, namely stabilisation and a swift transition to a market economy, the promotion of regional cooperation and the prospect of EU accession (European Commission 2007a: 14).

border reforms of these countries are going slowly; and for aught as is known, the European Union expects to include these countries to the Schengen Zone until 2015 (European Commission 2007a). However, the Netherlands has opposed the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Zone because of not achieving required EU standards in various areas. Assuredly, it is in the best interest of all of Europe to promote democratic transformation and transition to required EU standards in the Western Balkan countries in order to consolidate stability.

Breadthwise, for the integration of Western Balkans within the EU, meeting the Copenhagen criteria is not the merely set of requirements and conditions for the EU accession. The best example of this is Macedonia which had the best prospects for being accepted by the EU. The problem that slowed the accession process and negotiations down was the issue of the dispute over the name of the country with Greece (Slovak Atlantic Commission 2010). Obviously, that means the EU will not allow a country hindered by serious bilateral political or other problems to join its structures. It is necessary to present and communicate the inevitable political and economic reforms awaited from the Western Balkan countries as to be made foremost in favour of their internal stabilisation, then in favour of the EU accession. Principally, the EU's strategy for the Western Balkans contained a number of key elements³ which flow through and dictate dealings with potential candidate countries. These are as follows (Brown and Attenborough 2007: 10): Tailored Country Strategies, Regional Cooperation and Conditionality. However, some key challenges for EU regarding the Western Balkan countries' integration process are listed as such: a) Increased focus on strengthening the rule of law and public administration reform; b) Ensuring freedom of expression in the media; c) Enhancing regional cooperation and reconciliation in the Western Balkans; d) Achieving sustainable economic recovery and embracing Europe 2020; e) Extending transport and energy networks (European Commission 2011b).

For development of the Western Balkan countries and dealing with issues stated above, the Commission provides financial and technical support to the enlargement countries for their preparation for accession. Assistance is provided essentially under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), under which total allocation over the period 2007-2013 is €11.6 billion.

³ Each country will progress towards the goal of accession based on its own merits, irrespective of how other countries in the region are progressing. Regional cooperation is based on a recognition that the Western Balkans as a whole needs to improve intrapolitical and economic relations, good neighbourliness if each individual country is to move forward (European Commission 2005: 4).

Thoroughly, the integration of the Western Balkan countries and migration issues in these countries are strongly interrelated because the EU has a very high number of migrants whose origin countries are at this region. Generally, the typology of entry of migrants from these countries differ widely between member states. While family reunification is considerable in some countries, like Austria, France or Sweden, other member states, like Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the UK, had a high percentage of work-related immigration (European Commission 2007b: 3). Specifically, the cooperation on migration policy issues between Western Balkan countries and the EU is part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) as the overarching theme of EU relations with the Western Balkans. Relevant to the migration issues, the Western Balkans have seen mass migration flows, including illegal migration and human trafficking (Kathuria 2008).

Juristically, Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) specified common asylum, immigration and border control policy objectives with Article 67, 78, and 79 in Title V (i.e. Area of Freedom, Security and Justice). There are projects which might turn out the realistic view to an ideal type for Western Balkan countries; such as the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). SEECP, a forum for regional cooperation, is involved in the process of creating a new regional framework, which will be the regionally owned successor of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (European Commission 2007c: 5). These projects have not only optimistic means for immigrants but also are desirable for asylum seekers. The Balkans affects directly or indirectly most of the EU reforms in the field of asylum. The efficacy of governments in the region to implement legislative and administrative reforms, absorb projects and financial support, and establish institutions are crucial elements for the success of EU reform (Peshkopia 2005). Practicably, a challenge is that the EU and the UNHCR are not in complete agreement regarding interests, concepts and actions about asylum systems in the Balkans.

Another aspect of integration process is the perception of the EU upon migration and asylum issues. On the one side, legal migration plays an important role in enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic development, and strategically contributing to the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy (Council of the European Union 2004: 19). On the other side, illegal migration is a deliberate act intended to gain entry into, residence or employment in the territory of a state, contrary to the rules and conditions applicable in that state (Europol 2007: 5). The EU encourages legal migration particularly skilled workers of Western Balkan countries, whereas creates policies in order to fight against

illegal migration. Basically for the EU, cooperation in matters of immigration and asylum is one of the most recently addressed aspects of the Western Balkan integration within the EU (Lavenex 2009). Vigourously, the European Council emphasizes the need for intensified cooperation and capacity building to enable the EU member states that are neighbours to Western Balkan countries better to manage migration and to provide adequate protection for asylum seekers⁴. Systematically, the support for capacity building in national asylum systems, border control and wider cooperation on migration issues will be provided to those countries that demonstrate a genuine commitment to fulfil their obligations under the Geneva Convention on Refugees (Council of the European Union 2004: 22). It should be noted that some asylum applicants may remain in a country on a temporary or permanent basis even if they are not deemed to be refugees under the 1951 Convention definition (e.g. asylum applicants may be granted subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection statuses). As a matter of fact, migrant and/or asylum seeker sending countries have been seen as part of the integration problem associated with immigrants, and partnerships with third countries have been largely framed to prevent or control unwanted migration (Kirişçi 2009: 119). In May 2006, the Council of the European Union adopted an Action Oriented Paper (AOP) on improving cooperation on organised crime, corruption, illegal migration and counter-terrorism between the EU, Western Balkans and other ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) countries (Europol 2007: 5). The Council invited Europol and Frontex to determine the high risk routes⁵ in the Western Balkan countries. As a consequence, the Western Balkans is not merely a region of origin for illegal migrants into the European Union, but also a transit region for migrants from other parts of the world.

⁴ In this respect, asylum applications refer to all persons who apply on an individual basis for asylum or similar protection, irrespective of whether they lodge their application on arrival or from inside the country, and irrespective of whether they entered the country legally or illegally (Eurostat 2010: 199).

⁵ With respect to this basic issue, the main high risk routes that have been identified originate in Albania and pass through either Kosovo-Serbia-Croatia or through Montenegro-Serbia-Croatia, towards Slovenia, Hungary or Italy. The exact routes vary depending on changes in policy and countermeasures undertaken by the Western Balkan countries (Europol 2007: 2).

1.2. Country Analyses: Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia

With an approximately *3.1 million*⁶ total population (Republika e Shqipërisë Instituti i Statistikës 2010), Albania represents the most dramatic instance of postcommunist migration (UNDP 2010: 2). The Albanian Department of Emigration within the Albanian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs data related to Albanian emigration figures are specified as; 1 million immigrants from approximately population of 3.1 million inhabitants; 22-25 per cent of the total population; 35 per cent of active population; Albanian migratory flows 5-6 times higher than those in comparable developing countries, concerning the active population (Ministria e Punës, Çështjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve Të Barabarta 2010a). According to World Bank Albania bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 1438451. Throughout the transition period, Albania experienced a steady increase in the number of emigrants living abroad (Castaldo Litchfield and Reilly 2005: 157). Relatively, the scale of internal migration has induced a radical demographic transformation within the country. However, for a sizeable portion of internal migrants, the process represents a prelude to an external move. For instance; In Greece (2003), according to the European Commission's Annual Report on Statistics of Migration, Asylum and Returns, the number of living and working Albanian citizens is 434810. In Italy (2006), ISTAT and the Italian Office of Statistics registered 348813 living and working Albanian citizens. In the U.S. (2005), according to general census of population, the number of living and working Albanian citizens is 113661. In the UK (2005), government report included 50 thousand living and working Albanian citizens. In Canada (2001), according to general census of population, the number of living and working Albanian citizens is 14935. In Germany (2002), Federal Statistical Office confirmed 11630 living and working Albanian citizens (Ministria e Punës, Çështjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve Të Barabarta 2010b). Despite the fact that Greece and Italy remain the main receiving countries, other destinations such as the USA, the UK and Canada have become attractive to an increasing number of Albanian emigrants. Symptomatically, if we highlight the profile of emigrants, we may find out a more tragic truth. According to Barjaba, between 1990 and 2003, approximately 45 per cent of Albanian university professors and researchers emigrated, and more than 65 per cent of scholars who received graduate degrees in the West during 1980-1990 chose to remain there

⁶ However, based on Instat 2011 Census data, the total population of Albania is 2,831,741. The population of Albania has decreased by 7.7% in about ten years (Instat 2011: 14). Large scale emigration and fertility decline are supposed to be the main causes of the observed population decrease.

(Barjarba 2004: 233). After visa liberalisation in 2011, the predictions point out that the brain-drain will have an incline trend in the future. The lack of Albanian legislation in this area causes the emigration of its intellectual future. Many well-educated Albanian migrants prefer to establish their lives in host countries in the EU. This fact significantly explains the decline of the total population and demographic change in Albania. Meanwhile, Albanian migration matures and processes of family reunion and settlement take place in host societies (King and Vullnetari 2003: 51). This leads to a reorientation of migrants' savings and investments towards the host society, and a consequent falling-off of remittances.

On the other hand, von Beyme argued that elite recruitment as effective policy process significantly influenced the regime transition period in Western Balkans (von Beyme 1993). Moreover, modernising economic elites of Western Balkan countries have a driving force at integration to the EU and world market economy. However, there is a matter that generally economic elites in these countries are mafia actors who have very strong relations with state actors.

Many scholars argued the mass Albanian emigration flows period, i.e. the post-1990 era (King and Vullnetari 2003; King 2005; Vullnetari 2007; Aliu 2011a). Historically, the mass Albanian emigration flows begin with Embassy crisis. During the summer of 1990 up to 5 thousand Albanians sought refuge in Western embassies in Tirana. Between the embassy invasion and February 1991, an estimated 20 thousand Albanian migrants had left the state. With the chaos triggered boat exoduses to Italy, during 1991-1992, an estimated 200 thousand Albanians left the country. In 1997, the crisis of the pyramid system which also happened in other Soviet bloc countries, occurred in Albania and the country descended into civil war conflict. Internal rebellion which began first in Albania spread to Kosovo as a domino effect (Aliu 2011a). Pyramid schemes' collapse triggered a period of utter economic and political chaos, and brought down the government. In 1998, the long-awaited regularisation of irregular immigrants in Greece took place; two-third of those regularised were Albanians. In the same year, Albanians were also prominent in the regularisations in Italy. The economic recovery after the pyramid fiasco was remarkably rapid (GDP grew by 12 per cent in 1998), but a still-fragile Albania was destabilised by the Kosovar refugee crisis in 1999; 500 thousand ethnic-Albanian Kosovar refugees entered northern Albania, putting enormous pressure on the country's poorest region. During 2000-2010 according to the World

Bank data, Albanian net migration⁷ (total migration) numbers are as such: -270245 (2000), -72243 (2005) and -47889 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 6802 refugees in 2000 to 14772 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock⁸: 76695 (2000) 2.5 per cent of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 2.8 per cent of population (see Table A2). Sceptically, some scholars implied that future trends may change statistical illustrations. For example, there is high return potential among long-term migrants from Greece and Italy (as a consequence of sovereign debt crisis) which is expected to take place over the coming 5-10 years. Realistically, large-scale family-based return migration seems unlikely. So to speak, Albanian community networks have enhanced and encouraged business opportunities and strengthened Albania's comparative and competitive advantages for inclusion of return migrants (Geniş and Maynard 2009; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010).

Another Western Balkan state is FYR Macedonia. Migration from the Republic of Macedonia to foreign countries is basically determined by the changes in socio-economic development and political stability in the country. Changes regarding the restrictions and selectiveness of migration policies in the receiving countries also have significant effects on the migration process (Nikolovska 2004). Officially, in Macedonia, the total number of migrants is high while the Macedonian Agency for Emigration estimates that there are about 350 thousand Macedonian citizens living abroad, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this number amounts to 800 thousand (Center for Research and Policy Making 2007). According to World Bank Macedonia bilateral estimates of migrant stock data 2010, total number of migrants in host countries is 447 thousand (21.9 per cent of population). In fact, the exact number of emigrants, and immigrants is unknown as there were 5613 claims for asylum by Macedonians in 2001 and 5549 in 2002, with a low 2 per cent recognition rate and a 7 per cent total rate of protection, which likely accounts for a certain number of returning migrants. Even though no information is available about the ethnicity of the asylum-seekers, the circumstantial evidence indicates that many are members of either the Albanian or of the

⁷ The sum of the entries or arrivals of immigrants, and of exits, or departures of emigrants, yields the total volume of migration, and is termed total migration, as distinct from net migration, or the migration balance, resulting from the difference between arrivals and departures. This balance is called net immigration when arrivals exceed departures, and net emigration when departures exceed arrivals (IOM 2004: 65).

⁸ International migration stock is the number of people in country other than that in which they live, i.e. the stock of foreign born residents. The international migrant stock numbers are obtained mainly from population censuses and derived from the data on foreign-born population – people who have residence in one country but were born in another country. That means people who are citizens of a country other than the country in which they reside (The World Bank 2010).

Roma minority (Ibid). During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Macedonian net migration numbers are as such: -9000 (2000), -4000 (2005) and 2000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 9050 refugees in 2000 to 1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of population, and 129701 (2010) 6.3 per cent of population (see Table A2). Commensurably, the 2002 population census indicated 86 thousand immigrants, or 4.3 per cent of the total population, slightly below the 93 thousand (4.8 per cent) of the previous census of 1994. Among the immigrants counted in the 2002 census, 63 per cent were from Serbia and Montenegro and around 10 per cent from Greece. Besides, the majority (i.e. 1900 migrants) who had a residence permit, comes from Serbia and Montenegro (Kupiszewski 2009). According to the updated list of registered voters presented at the beginning of May 2007 by the Ministry of Justice there are 59650 voters staying abroad up to one year out of 1742316 registered voters in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (International Organisation for Migration 2007c: 15). The population census of 2002 identified 22995 people being abroad for a period of up to one year and another 12128 staying longer. Recent research reveals that 56.3 per cent of Macedonian migrants have been staying in their host countries for two to five years. Women are more likely to stay less than 2 years while men are believed to spend longer periods in the destination country. Top five EU states that Macedonian migrants prefer are Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France.

The situation in Kosovo⁹ which is another Western Balkan state, so-called the new born (the 4-year-old) state, is more tragic. Migration has certainly been an outcome of the state's economic backwardness. Resolvedly, Kosovar men migrate as the only hope to provide prosperity for their families and to escape poverty (Vathi and Black 2007). Actually, displacements in and from Kosovo did not begin with the NATO bombing on 24 March 1999. The scale of displacement and exodus became enormous after that date, but the fact that displacements were already taking place, and the genocide of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by Serbian military and police were being reported and observed by international press and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors, was one of

⁹ Surface of Kosovo (SoK) is 10908.1 km². According to the SoK assessment, the number of habitual residents is 2.1 million inhabitants with the ethnic composition: Albanians 92 per cent; Other ethnic groups comprise of 8 per cent of the total number of population (Republika e Kosovës Ministria e Administratës Publike Enti i Statistikës së Kosovës 2011).

the most outspoken reasons given for embarking on the NATO intervention. Rapidly, between 1995 and 1997 at least 114430 asylum applications had been lodged in EU member states by people coming from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Selm 2000: 4). Kosovo's proximity to the EU created strong political support for the military intervention and tremendous humanitarian and development assistance. Undeservedly, the UN Peace Accord (Resolution 1244) did not resolve the more fundamental issue of Kosovo's status and since the creation of the provisional government by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) there has been a confused set of governance arrangements. Kosovo faced the transition of UN administration to EULEX and a national government, supervised by a postindependence International Civilian Representative (Chapman et al. 2008). Professedly, Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of independence recognised by 91 countries* and alas contested by Serbia, China and Russia.

European policy makers willingly expect Kosovo to experience 'zero migration'. Properly speaking, there is a high dependence of Kosovo's economy on remittances. Around 30 per cent of Kosovo's families have one or more family member(s) that lives abroad. Approximately 39 per cent of emigrants live in Germany, 23 per cent in Switzerland, in Italy 6 per cent, in Austria 7 per cent, in Great Britain 4 per cent, in Sweden 5 per cent, in the USA 3.5 per cent and France, Canada and Croatia 2 per cent in each (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2009: 8). According to World Bank migration data total number of bilateral migrant stocks for host country is; 25251, and top destination EU countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. There was also a relatively large inflow of Kosovar return migrants in the late 1990s in response to the political stabilisation following the NATO intervention and the withdrawal of their temporary protection status by Germany¹⁰. Triumphantly, recent events on normalisation of political situation and harmonisation and Europeanisation of Kosovo's institutions have created stable ambience for Kosovar return migrants. As an evidence, Kosovo and Serbia has started a normalisation process¹¹, a process of dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, a dialogue also known as talks on talks in order to strengthen their relationship with each other. Although it's known that there are stark differences on the

* Quoted from; 2 June 2012; <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/>

¹⁰ The European Stability Initiative estimated that 174 thousand Kosovars left Germany at that time, the largest return movement from any EU country.

¹¹ The conditions to explicitly encourage the European integration of one another will be created within this process, although the differences in opinion on the status will remain. This means the creation of a measurable process that would allow all the EU member states to consider Kosovo as a contractual partner, including those that have not recognised Kosovo's independence. Praiseworthy, this measurable progress will qualify Serbia as a state which is creating the basis for resolving its neighborhood problems which is an important objective for the states having recognised Kosovo's independence and that will have to decide on Serbia's accession path.

existence of an independent Kosovo, the political authorities of both countries should define open topics that can be treated between the two countries without taking Kosovo's status into consideration. It is obvious that the success in the Balkans has been achieved only when an intensive true cooperation between the EU and the USA has existed. The diplomatic visits of EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine M. Ashton and US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton to Western Balkan countries brought important contributions for stability of the region (Aliu 2011a). The normalisation of the Kosovo-Serbia relations through the reappearance of this collaboration as part of a transatlantic regional integration policy will cause to an implementation of a transitory process of nonstatutory normalisation between Serbia and Kosovo (Surroi 2009: 20). Recently, Serbia and Kosovo have signed a crucial agreement which Serbia recognises technically Kosovo's sovereignty and gives to Kosovo the representation right as an independent state under the condition that Kosovo must use footnote which indicates the UNSCR 1244 resolution and ICJ advisory decision.

Kosovo continues to benefit from the Instrument for Preaccession Assistance (IPA), macrofinancial assistance, the Instrument for Stability and other sources of funding. Kosovo participates in the IPA multibeneficiary programmes including in an IPA crisis response package developed in 2008. The package is fully operational in 2010. A total of €508 million of EU assistance has been committed to Kosovo for the period 2008–2011. During 2010, a total of €67.3 million granted in the IPA annual programme for 2010 was allocated in close coordination with the Ministry for European Integration and government institutions (European Commission 2010c: 6).

Montenegro, another Western Balkan state with the lowest population¹², has better migration dynamics comparing to its neighbours. Montenegro has been accepted as the EU candidate state recently, and its European perspective was reaffirmed by the Council in June 2006 after the recognition of the country's independence from Serbia and EU member states. Montenegro submitted an application for EU membership on 15 December 2008. In line with Article 49 of the EU Treaty, the member states requested, on 23 April 2009, that the European Commission prepare an opinion upon the merits of the application (Delegation of the European Union 2011b). As of 19 December 2009 EU visa were altered, allowing Montenegro's citizens (along neighbours from Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in 2011 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania) visa-free access to all 25

¹² Estimated population of the Republic of Montenegro (2007) is 625,000 inhabitants; Urban 62 per cent (2003), in 2006 population growth (annual, per cent) was 0.16, life expectancy at birth in 2007 was average 72.7; Male 70.6 and Female 74.8 (UNDP 2009: 7).

Schengen member states within the Union, as well as two states outside the European Union; the UK and Ireland. This was a result of a process that was launched in May 2008. Granting of visa-free travel required the fulfilment of key benchmarks in the areas of rule of law, travel documents and border security.

Immigrants to Montenegro mostly originate from other countries within the Western Balkan region. According to the Employment Agency of Montenegro, the majority of labour migrants originate from Serbia (56 per cent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (27 per cent), Kosovo (11 per cent), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (3 per cent) and another 3 per cent is unknown (International Organisation for Migration 2007a: 14). During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as such: -32450 (2000), -20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 2582 refugees in 2009 to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is a decline at the international migration stock: 54583 (2005) 8.7 per cent of population, and 42509 (2010) 6.7 per cent of population (see Table A2).

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which has the most complicated political and judicial system (i.e. three independent administrative and legislative areas – Federation, Republica Srpska and Brčko according to the Dayton Accords which was signed in 1995) in Western Balkans, shares almost the same situation with Kosovo. Painfully, the population of BiH dwindled from 4.4 million inhabitants in 1989 to 3.8 million in 2004. The loss of more than 650 thousand individuals amounted to a decrease of 14.7 per cent of the population only in 5 years. In 1995, Serbian Army made genocide in Srebrenica in Bosnia and this criminal act caused a loss of tens of thousands of Bosnian people.

Figures released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2007 show that 1343805 citizens of BiH are currently living abroad, whereas the World Bank Remittance Migration and Remittances Factbook for BiH refers to a figure as high as 1471594. It is estimated that more than 800 thousand are living in other parts of Europe (such as, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Austria, Croatia, Serbia, Switzerland) and nearly half a million in the USA and Canada (International Organisation for Migration 2007d: 15). The top destination EU countries are Croatia (EU member in 2013), Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and France. The 2003 European Commission Annual Report on Asylum and Migration highlights 1042 BiH citizens apprehended in Sweden in 2003 and 387 in Slovenia, for the same year.

There were 866 BiH citizens refused entry on the Czech Republic, 254 in Bulgaria, 819 in Hungary, and a 5226 in Slovenia. In terms of removed BiH citizens, 295 from Denmark, 123 from Finland, 1352 from Sweden, 704 from Norway, and 271 from Slovenia. In 2004, 2144 BiH nationals were sent back to their country, primarily from Sweden (28 per cent) and Germany (22 per cent). In 2005, 1533 citizens of BiH were deported on various grounds to BiH from countries in Western Europe and other countries (International Organisation for Migration 2007d: 21). During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and Herzegovina net migration numbers are as such: 281795 (2000), 61825 (2005) and -10000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 refugees in 2000 to 7016 refugees in 2010, and refugee population by country of territory of origin has decreased from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 refugees in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent of population, 35141 (2005) 0.9 per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population (see Table A2). Eventually, the main challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina are divergence of administrative institutions on migration policy and regulations, weakness of migration control and management, lack of coordination and migration databases and an uncertain migration agenda.

Another more complex case is the Republic of Serbia. It must be highlighted that several limitations exist that hinder the conduct of a comprehensive analysis of the current situation concerning migration trends in Serbia. First of all, there are many data sets and sources about Serbia but some of them include both Montenegro and Kosovo, the others include either Montenegro or Kosovo. In this case, the confusion occurs at analysing specifically the Serbian migrants and refugees with the exclusion of Montenegrin and Kosovar migrants and refugees. Based on estimates, between 3.2 and 3.8 million Serbs or persons of Serbian origin live outside Serbia's borders. However, estimates of Serbian emigrants by the Ministry of Diaspora range is from 3.9 million to 4.2 million (Siar 2008: 23). According to Siar (2008), in 2005, the total number of immigrants is 512336 (4.9 per cent of total population), in 2007, total number of refugees is 97417 and in the same year total number of Asylum seekers is 64, and the number of labour migrant is 6324 (excluding Kosovo/UNSC 1244). Besides, in 2005, total number of emigrants is; 2298352. Main EU countries of destination are Germany, Austria, Croatia (EU member in 2013), Sweden and Italy. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are as such: -147889 (2000), -338544 (2005) and 0 (2010). Refugee population by country or

territory of asylum has decreased from 484391 refugees in 2000 to 73608 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 146748 refugees in 2000 to 183289 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 856763 (2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of population, and 525388 (2010) 7 per cent of population (see Table A2).

Axiomatically, migration flows from Western Balkans to the EU have also economic consequences and dimensions. Incrementally, in Albania, there is an increase at both inward remittance flows and outward remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$889 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$1.3 billion. Comparably, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$4 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$10 million. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$1749 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$2.2 billion. Respectively, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$61 million. In Macedonia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$174 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$401 million. Rhythmically, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$26 million. In Serbia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$2.7 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from \$138 million in 2008 to \$91 million in 2009. Another economic consequence of migration flows is workers' remittances: in 2009, Albania received \$1.1 billion worth of remittances per year, Bosnia and Herzegovina \$1.4 billion, FYR Macedonia \$260 million and Serbia \$3.8 billion.

Table A2 illustrates another aspect of immigration from Western Balkans to the EU. Feminisation of immigration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight the fact that a high percentage of immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Albania, 53.1 per cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females. Adhering to the data given above, from gender perspective, at national level states must regulate specific immigration regulations for protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and antidiscriminative solutions. At supranational level, the European Commission should amend immigration regulations with a guarantee of full protection of female migrants' rights. No doubt, feminisation of migration is an important factor for demographic change in the EU and might be a perfect solution for ageing population of the EU. Feminisation of migration has

also another significant effect on family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win and hybrid model which will be argued in section second.

The EU is very optimistic regarding the development and integration of Western Balkans. The European Commission progress reports and published documents of international institutions for these countries are stressing the importance of peace, stability and security in Western Balkans, and the EC welcomes all efforts of the Western Balkan countries to come closer to the EU (European Commission 2006; European Commission 2008; European Commission 2010a; European Commission 2010b; EUobserver 2010; Delegation of the European Union 2011a; Delegation of the European Union 2011b; European Commission 2011i; European Commission 2011j). Broadly, nationalism, transitional justice, returnees, regions of concern, education, civil society and peacebuilders were identified as being the biggest obstacles to lasting peace and stability in the Western Balkan region (Shaw 2009). Periodically, the EU will cooperate and assist the Western Balkan countries to overcome these challenges and adopt Europeanisation systematically. Kukan (2010) argued that the EU ought to; use lessons from the previous enlargements, have a clear vision of enlargement process, attain political and popular consensus in both sides (i.e. the EU and the Western Balkans), achieve conditionality, tailored country strategies, regional cooperation and merit based approach for common European perspective, and consider the Western Balkans as a whole not canalising to the individual countries (Kukan 2010: 36-37). In the framework of Stabilisation Association Process, Kukan's recommendations are very significant for dealing with challenges in the region.

According to the Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework for IPA for the years 2011-2013: Albania will receive an indicative allocation of €228.82 million of preaccession funds including IPA Component II – Cross border cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina will receive an indicative allocation of €328.7 million of preaccession funds. The current Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework 2011-2013 allocates a further €212.4 million to Kosovo. Macedonia will receive an indicative allocation of €320.3 million of preaccession funds. Montenegro will receive an indicative allocation of €104.9 million of preaccession funds. Serbia will receive an indicative allocation of €622.3 million of preaccession funds. (For the planned allocation per sector and per year see Table A3).

To draw a conclusion, the EU is shaping future objectives of the Western Balkan countries. For these countries, the enlargement and integration are processes which will bring European norms and standards, and make these countries reconstruct their European

identities with looking to the future through common perspectives. To link the Western Balkans with North Africa, it can be put forward that the EU is using almost the same strategies and policies for North African countries as well. Within two decades the EU has succeeded to transform the Western Balkans. As has been noted, the EU has achieved the targets for Western Balkans with positive outcomes. To tell the truth, the EU has put the North African countries in the same category as neighbour and economic partner states. Peaceably, with the help of the Western Balkan experience, the EU aims to strengthen the relations with North Africa.

1.3. General Overview of the EU and North African Countries Relations

The EU is a transnational actor and has actively intervened to the transformation process in North African countries in order to stabilise the region, guarantee the protection of human rights, encourage enhanced democracy and pluralism, strengthen the rule of law, social justice, moral values, European norms and standards. The EU supports these countries' transition process from autocratic and repressive political regimes to democracy and welfare state degree. In accord with these objectives, the EU has established a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with North African countries. While the EU respects internal transformation processes, the Union will share technical assistance and financial supports to governments, the European Institutions in these countries, local and regional authorities, political parties, foundations, trade unions and civil society organisations for achieving common interests, high level democracy, stability, peaceful and prosperous North Africa (European Commission 2011h). The EU may ensure to the North African countries the same solutions which the EU dealt with the Western Balkan countries in the past. Affirmingly, it can be put forward that the EU brings the same agenda for the North African countries with some minor transformations and this links the North African countries' future objectives and national strategies with the case of Western Balkans in various dimensions. The Western Balkans ought to be seen as a step forward of the North Africa in the same way and in the same fate.

Tactically, the European Union created the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 for strengthening the prosperity, stability and security both with its neighbours and within the EU. With the ENP, the EU established a partnership for reforms with its neighbours. The partnership had been much more stronger in sectoral reform and economic integration rather than in promoting democratisation and good governance.

Beside various countries, the ENP framework covers all five North African countries – i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Actually, the ENP is a bilateral policy; however, the Arab Spring awakenings have caused the enrichment of the policy focusing on relations at regional and multilateral level. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) or Association Agreements (AAs) were created for implementation of the ENP. Legally, the EU signed Association Agreements with five North African countries and supported each National Indicative Programme (NIP) of these states (European Commission 2007d; European Commission 2007e; European Commission 2007f; European Commission 2007g; European Commission 2007h).

The aim of Association Agreements and NIPs namely are as follows: establishing relations based on reciprocity and partnership, the respect for human rights and democratic principles, political dialogue, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, strengthening the rule of law, control and prevention of illegal immigration, cooperation in the areas of corruption, support social policy, promoting private investments and job creation activities, upgrading economic infrastructure, non-discrimination in respect of conditions of work, pay and dismissal and social security provision and so on. Indubitably, the national indicative programme (NIP) is the Commission's operational response for the period 2007-2010 with an approximately €220 million indicative amount and for the period 2011-2013 €172 million indicative amount. With respect to NIPs, the decentralisation process in these countries has been encouraged via EU financial supports and development assistance. For instance, there is a very high decentralisation trend in various industries in Algeria. The Algerian government intends to continue privatising some of the 1200 public enterprises remaining, particularly in the banking sector. According to Algeria Strategy Paper, the banking sector is still largely in public hands. Public banks hold more than 90 per cent of assets. Although the share of credit allocated to the private sector has recently risen to more than 60 per cent, access to credit is still difficult for businesses.

The Algerian government will reduce state intervention in sectors where the private sector could take over much more effectively (i.e. land and credit markets; investment and the provision of business services; infrastructure; the production of goods and services that are neither strategic nor public goods). Indistinguishably, the EU financial assistance will encourage and speed up the decentralisation process in Algeria. Political situation has stability and is available for welcoming private actors and foreign direct investments. For Egypt, the EU has approved financial allocations for financial cooperation in the years 2011-

2013 in the sixth meeting of the EU and Egypt Association Council. The amount allocated for the period 2011-2013 is €449.29 million (European Commission 2010d). For Libya, the EU supports the National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 and the EU's contribution to the Benghazi Action Plan (BAP) has amounted to €8.5 million, with a further commitment of €2 million to follow in 2010. In 2009, the Commission announced its intention to allocate €20 million for migration. Half of this amount was used as such: €2 million for the prevention of irregular migration at Libya's southern borders; €3.5 million for the management of irregular migration pressures in Libya; €4.5 million for assisting the Libyan border guard and police and develop technical cooperation with the EU agency Frontex. For the period 2011-2013, it is proposed to allocate a total budget of €60 million to the National Indicative Programme for Libya (€30-36 million for improving the quality of human capital and €24-30 million for increasing the sustainability of economic and social development). For Morocco, the EU has approved financial allocations for National Indicative Programme and the amount allocated for the period 2011-2013 is €580.5 million. For Tunisia, the EU has approved financial allocations for National Indicative Programme and the amount allocated for the period 2011-2013 is €240 million. Recently, for the period 2011 to 2013 the EU raised the amount indicatively earmarked for Tunisia from EUR 240 million to EUR 400 million (excluding humanitarian assistance), an increase of EUR 160 million – in excess of 60 per cent. Accordingly, in Article 2 of the Commission Implementation Decision of 26 September 2011 – approving the special measure for Tunisia (2011) for the development support programme for less-developed areas was stated that the financial contribution of the EU is set at €20 million (European Commission 2011f).

Attentively, the European Commission has adopted the Joint Communication of 25 May 2011 'A new response to a changing Neighbourhood which set the following priorities: democratic transformation and institution building, partnership with people with specific emphasis on support to civil society, sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development. In Article 2 of the Commission Implementation Decision of 26 September 2011 was stated that 'the provisional maximum contribution of the EU to the 'Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)' programme is set at €350 million' (European Commission 2011d). Conjointly, in Article 2 of the Commission Implementation Decision of 22 December 2011 on a programme (Strengthening democratic reform in the southern Neighbourhood) was stated that the maximum contribution of the EU to the

programme is set at €4 million (European Commission 2011e) (For the comparison of EU-supported projects see Table 1).

Table 1: The EU-supported Projects

Project Title	Total Cost	Project Approach	Components
Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility CRIS: 2011/023-078	€22 million	Direct Centralised Management	-Strengthening <i>non-state actors</i> ¹³ capacities and increase public accountability, -Strengthening non-state actors through support to regional and country projects, -Increasing involvement of non-state actors in selected EU-partner countries policy dialogues
Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)	€350 million	Direct/Indirect Centralised, Joint Management, Partially Decentralised	- Democratic transformation and institution building, and priority area, - Sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development
Strengthening Democratic Reform in the Southern Neighbourhood	€4 million	Joint management with an international organisation – the Council of Europe	-Enhancing the political and democratic reform processes, independence and efficiency of judiciary, -Promoting good governance and democratic values, -Strengthening and protecting human rights
Source: Authors compilation of European Commission 2011k; European Commission 2011i; European Commission 2011m			

The EU supports decentralisation process in Western Balkans and North African countries, and in fact the EU-supported projects are accelerating this process. As is demonstrated in Table 1, the EU is respecting direct/indirect centralisation and joint management (hybridity) as well. Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2011) compared financial ratings of Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's for developing countries. The ratings of these institutions are crucial in determining the volume and cost of capital flows to developing countries through international bond, loan, and equity markets. According to the research, in Western Balkans; Albania has predicted rating range from BB to BB+ (same with Brazil; Colombia and El Salvador), actual rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina is B2 (May 2006, Moody's) and predicted rating range differs from BB- to BB, actual ratings of Macedonia are BB+ (August 2005, S&P) and BB+ (December 2005, Fitch) and predicted rating range varies from BB to BBB-, actual ratings of Serbia and Montenegro are BB- (July 2005, S&P) and BB- (May 2005, Fitch), predicted rating range varies from B- to BB. The ratings for North

¹³ Non-state actors definition provided in Article 14 of the ENPI Regulation.

Africa are very interestingly more positive than the ratings of Western Balkans. Bizarrely, despite the Arab Spring, it can be put forward that decentralisation process in North Africa has been supported by international financial rating institutions. For instance, for Algeria predicted rating range differs from A to AA (same with Chile; China and Estonia), Libya has the highest credit quality - predicted rating range differs from AA to AAA, for Egypt actual ratings are BB+ (May 2002, S&P), Ba1 (July 2001, Moody's) and BB+ (December 2004, Fitch) and predicted rating range differs from BBB- to BBB, for Morocco actual ratings are BB+ (August 2005, S&P), Ba1 (July 1999, Moody's) and predicted rating range differs from BBB- to BBB. It is assumed that decentralisation and foreign direct investment attraction are more likely in North Africa, whereas the Western Balkans have speculative rates which mean state's authority in these countries exists.

This point is a distinction of comparative states' structure because North African countries' migration history essentially is largely driven by a variety of reasons: notably, slave-trade and colonialism, violent conflicts, poverty, ecological degradation, population pressure and a certain cultural propensity of some ethnic groups for outward orientation (Kohnert 2007: 5). Externally, the dramatic conflicts in North African countries have attracted the attention of all neighbour countries. Unknown future of these countries is concerning particularly the EU because the Arab Spring movements and demonstrations have caused a rapid incline of migrants who are from Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia.

The framework of African migration as a whole has a great complexity. The number of international migrants in Africa in 2010 is estimated to be 19 million. Africa hosted just fewer than 9 per cent of the total global stock of migrants in 2010. Although there were 291 million Africans living in urban areas in 2006, the OECD estimates that 1.2 billion people will be living in cities in Africa by 2050 (International Organisation for Migration 2010). Radically, the Arab Spring has shifted circulation of migrants from North African cities to EU cosmopolitan cities. The results of the Arab Spring are very tragic and put a huge question mark for the future of North African countries (European Commission 2011a: 5). Through its humanitarian financing and the provision of means of transport, the EU has so far contributed to the repatriation of approximately 50 thousand third country nationals.

The total migrant stock in North Africa decreased between 1990 and 2005. During the years 2005–2010, it has reached 1.8 million migrants in 2010. Similarly, the stock of international migrants as a percentage of total population increased from 1.3 per cent in 2005 to 1.4 per cent in 2010. Methodically, the EU needs to strengthen its external migration

policies because there is a great need for partnerships with North African countries for addressing the issues related to migration and mobility in a way that makes cooperation mutually beneficial. In developing such a policy, migration issues should be integrated into the overall EU's external relations to promote EU's interests and needs. In the final conclusions in 2011, EU leaders expressed their solidarity for member states and added that the bloc's border agency (Frontex) should increase its capacity through national governments financial support and extra money from the EU budget (Pop 2011). With centralising power to the EU institutions, setting up a control mechanism is indispensable and very crucial for measurement and effective management. Clearly, many scholars and authors underlined the fact that a common migration and asylum policy can shape a better controlling migration approach (Sørensen 2006; Castillo Curry and Sylvester 2011; Mahony 2011; Pawlak 2011; European Commission 2011a). The European Union has consulted with the countries of the region concerned on financial and technical support to improve the control and management of borders and measures to facilitate the return of migrants to their countries of origin. However, managing and controlling migration have become a problematic in terms of the 1995 Schengen Agreement. The thousands of migrants arriving in Italy and Malta have highlighted the fragile trust-based nature of the Schengen Agreement that allows for passport-free travel in 25 European countries (Mahony 2011; Pop 2011). Threateningly, the announcement of Denmark regarding establishment of customs checks on its borders with Sweden and Germany because of rising crime concerns has put the Schengen Agreement's regulations in the core of the debates. In particular, the Commission wants to ensure all EU governments adhere to the same standards when dealing with refugees from North African countries. However, under current regulation, migrants should seek asylum in the country that was their first port of entry into the EU. On the one hand, some migrants take advantage of borderless travel in the EU to file asylum applications in other countries known for better asylum conditions. On the other hand, some of them are sent back to Italy or Greece for asylum application. Countries such as Greece and Italy argue others should shoulder more of the burden of immigration. Some states also would like to see more joint efforts in securing EU borders (Geddes 2005; European Commission 2011a). Aforementioned, the EU policies on migration and development for North African countries face many challenges that are similar to the case of Western Balkan migration flows. To illustrate; in the EU there are institutional constraints inherent that have to be overcome. The EU can provide financial aid and special assistance in order to prevent occurring possible conflicts in the North African region. Chiefly, there are also national interests of the EU countries which partly reflect

diverging national experiences of migration patterns. Characteristically, EU policies and attitudes often reflect ad hoc solutions that are the result of compromise between the interests of various actors both within and outside the system.

Negatively, these solutions sometimes cause a transformation from legal migration to irregular migration and as a requirement for improving these issues; home countries, host countries and transit countries should amend legal regulations with including more specific statements and articles.

Growing migration pressures in home countries led to massive flows of illegal migrants from many Western Balkan and North African countries. Some of these flows took on the form of movements of mala fide refugees, while some others took on the much more perverse form of human smuggling and trafficking (Bonifazi et al. 2008: 12). According to the Council of Europe anticipations there are over 5.5 million irregular migrants living in the European Union (Kourkoula 2008: 15). It is worth noting that those who enter illegally are few compared to those many more that arrive through regular channels, with a valid visa and then overstay.

Eurostat (2011) stated that the EU countries are currently receiving large-scale migration. In 2005, the EU had a migration flow around 1.8 million people. Effectually, the EU had to implement policies and take measure for these migration inflows from North African countries which reached very high numbers with unending conflicts of Arab Spring. The high migration statistics indicate the fact that capacities of the EU member states are not at adequate level to overcome all migration issues. Explicitly, illegal migration is becoming a threat for the EU in all aspects and dimensions. The North African routes¹⁴ must be observed scientifically in order to control regular migration and prevent irregular migration.

¹⁴ There are three broad routes: the first is from East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea), through Sudan to Libya. Migrants from the Horn of Africa also cross over the Gulf of Aden to Yemen (Kourkoula 2008: 94). It is striking that Yemen in 2006 hosted 88000 refugees from these countries. The second route is the from West and Central Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon) to Mali and Niger. The route then splits to Libya, or to Algeria and Morocco, or to Mauritania and Morocco. The third route links Morocco through Algeria to Libya and Tunisia, a horizontal corridor for migrants already 'in transit' in the region, who move eastwards or westwards according to rumours about where it is currently easier to cross or where jobs are available.

1.4. Country Analyses: Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria

The 1990s Western Balkans conflict era and 2000s postconflict era may highlight many aspects of how to deal with chaotic migration in North African countries. Although the lack of reliable sources makes the research complicated, available sources present some similarities with Western Balkan case and therefore a comparison in this context bridges the practice to theory or model which will be discussed in the second chapter.

A bilateral agreement with Libya in May 2009 substantially reduced illegal migration across the Straits of Sicily. While 37 thousand migrants were intercepted along the Italian coast in 2008, the number fell to 9.6 thousand in 2009 and to less than 3 thousand in 2010. The number of asylum seekers consequently fell from 31 thousand in 2008 to 17.6 thousand in 2009. In the first half of 2010, asylum requests fell a further 35 per cent. Despite refugees in Libya not being officially recognised, according to CARIM, about 18.9 thousand refugees and asylum seekers were in Libya in 2009. Among them, 12322 were registered with UNHCR, 9005 of whom were refugees and 3317 of whom were asylum seekers (CARIM 2010). In June 2010, following a seventh round of negotiations with the EU, Libya expelled the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with whom 9 thousand refugees and 4 thousand asylum-seekers were registered (Bredeloup and Pliez 2011: 13). The number of migrants, landing in Lampedusa Island, decreased by 94 per cent between 2009 and the first six months of 2010. According to an estimate from the Italian government, between 200 thousand and 300 thousand people are expected to land on European coasts in the near future, a figure based on the fact that 2.5 million foreign workers are currently living in Libya. Brussels argues for its part that the number of potential migrants lies somewhere between 500 thousand and 700 thousand people. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Libya are as follows: -20300 (2000), -20300 (2005) and -20300 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 11543 in 2000 to 7923 in 2010, whereas refugee population by country or territory of origin has slightly increased from 619 in 2000 to 2309 in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 558770 (2000) approximately 11 per cent of population, 617536 (2005) approximately 11 per cent of population and 682482 (2010) approximately 11 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank Libya bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 110080 and top destination EU countries are the UK, Germany and Italy.

According to the Minister of Manpower and Migration, the number of Egyptian migrants reached almost 5 million individuals in 2010. The Egyptian government after the 25 January 2011 revolution has encouraged the migration of Egyptians abroad, in order to lower unemployment, and to increase remittances (Sika 2011). During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Egypt are as follows: -945704 (2000), -370780 (2005) and -346922 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has slightly increased from 6840 in 2000 to 95056 in 2010, and refugee population by country or territory of origin has increased from 3953 in 2000 to 6913 in 2010. There is also an incline between 2000-2005 and drop between 2005-2010 at the international migration stock: 169149 (2000) approximately 0.25 per cent of population, 246745 (2005) approximately 0.3 per cent of population and 244714 (2010) approximately 0.3 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank Egypt bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 3741055 and top destination EU country is Italy.

During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Algeria are as follows: -140000 (2000), -140000 (2005) and -140000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 169656 in 2000 to 94144 in 2010, and refugee population by country or territory of origin has decreased from 8034 in 2000 to 6689 in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 250110 (2000) approximately 0.8 per cent of population, 242446 (2005) approximately 0.7 per cent of population and 242324 (2010) approximately 0.7 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank Algeria bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 1211118 and top destination EU countries are France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the UK.

During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Morocco are as follows: -500000 (2000), -614000 (2005) and -675000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 2105 in 2000 to 792 in 2010, whereas refugee population by country or territory of origin has slightly increased from 392 in 2000 to 2284 in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 53124 (2000) approximately 0.2 per cent of population, 51020 (2005) approximately 0.2 per cent of population and 49098 (2010) approximately 0.15 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank Morocco bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 3016631 and top destination EU countries are France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Tunisia are as follows: -55624 (2000), -80599 (2005) and -20000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 436 in 2000 to 89 in 2010, whereas refugee population by country or territory of origin has increased from 1207 in 2000 to 2174 in 2010. There is a decline at the international migration stock: 36221 (2000) approximately 0.4 per cent of population, 34881 (2005) approximately 0.35 per cent of population and 33591 (2010) approximately 0.3 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank Tunisia bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 651737 and top destination EU countries are France, Italy, Germany and Belgium.

Fundamentally, migration flows from North Africa to the EU have also economic consequences and dimensions. In Algeria, there is frequently an increase at inward remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$1.75 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$2.06 billion. In Egypt, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$2.96 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$7.15 billion. Anew, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$79 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$255 million. Incrementally, in Libya, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$8 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$14 million. Whereas, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is \$676 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached \$1 billion. Similarly, working remittances have increased from \$644 million in 2003 to \$964 million in 2008. In Morocco, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$3.6 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$6.27 billion. There is an incline at outward remittance flows from \$44 million in 2003 to \$61 million in 2009. In Tunisia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is \$1.25 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached \$1.96 billion. In contrast with inward remittances, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from \$17 million in 2003 to \$13 million in 2009.

In terms of Feminisation of migration, the empirical results highlight the fact that a high percentage of immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Algeria, 45.2 per cent, in Egypt 46.6 per cent, in Libya 35.5 per cent and in Morocco 49.7 per cent, in Tunisia 49.3 per cent of immigrants are females.

1.5. Data Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries

The outcomes of data comparison of Western Balkans and North African countries are as follows: Libya has the highest international migration stock and thus the highest percentage of population in North Africa. In the same manner, in Western Balkans, Serbia has the highest international migration stock and percentage of population. In North Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia follow Libya with high level of migration stock. However, Tunisia and Algeria have higher percentage of population of international migration stock than Egypt. Juxtaposedly, in Western Balkans, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina follow Serbia with high level of migration stock. Noticeably, percentage of population of international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are relatively high despite the fact that these countries have a low population rate comparing with Serbia (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4).




Figure 1: International Migration Stock Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries

Symptomatically, the results of the comparison of percentage of population of the stock of immigrants, females as percentage of immigrants and percentage of population of the stock of immigrants of Western Balkans and North African countries are as such: In North Africa, Libya has the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants. Morocco has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. Commensurably, in Western Balkans, Montenegro has the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. Exclusively, Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4).




Figure 2: Percentage of Population of the Stock of Immigrants, Emigrants and Females as Percentage of Immigrants

According to the World Bank bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host countries, in North Africa, Libya has the highest number of migrant stock at home country and Egypt has the highest number of migrant stock at host country. In Western Balkans, Albania has the highest number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest number of migrant stock at host country (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4).




Figure 3: Bilateral Estimates of Migration Stock at Home and Host Country

Comparing inward and outward remittance flows of the Western Balkans and North African countries, both two graphs illustrate dynamic trends. For example, in North Africa, Egypt and Morocco have slightly increasing trend at inward remittance flows, and Libya has the lowest level of inward remittance flows and the highest amount of outward remittance flows. Similarly, in Western Balkans, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have high level of inward and outward remittance flows. Albania has the lowest level of outward remittance flows (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4).




Figure 4: Inward and Outward Remittance Flows Comparison of Western Balkan and North African Countries

The World Bank data comparison of *refugee population by country or territory of asylum*¹⁵ of Western Balkans and North African countries indicates interesting results. In North Africa, Egypt and Algeria have the highest refugee population, whereas Tunisia has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of asylum (see Figure 5). In Western Balkans, Montenegro and Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas Albania has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of asylum (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4).

¹⁵ Country of asylum is the country where an asylum claim was filed and granted.

Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum
 Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries




Figure 5: Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum

The World Bank data comparison of *refugee population by country or territory of origin*¹⁶ of Western Balkans and North African countries emphasizes the fact that the Western Balkan region has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of origin. Particularly, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee population level. Whereas Montenegro has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of origin (see Figure 6). In North Africa, Algeria and Egypt have the highest refugee population level, whereas Libya has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of origin (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4).

¹⁶ Country of origin generally refers to the nationality or country of citizenship of a claimant.

Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin

Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries




Figure 6: Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin

With respect to the illustrations above, researchers may acknowledge many similarities among Western Balkans and North African countries when they especially focus on concepts such as inward and outward remittance flows, refugee population by country or territory of asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host countries and so forth. The crucial point for generating a theoretical model in migration research is the generalisation of concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among similarities and differences.

Table 2: The EU Financial Allocations for Western Balkans and North African Countries

North African Countries	National Indicative Programmes for North Africa	Western Balkan Countries	Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework
Algeria* (20011-2013)	€172 million	Albania (2011-2013)	€228.82
Egypt (2011-2013)	€449.29 million	BiH (2011-2013)	€328.7
Libya (2011-2013)	€60 million	Kosovo (2011-2013)	€212.4
Morocco (2011-2013)	€580.5 million	Macedonia (2011-2013)	€320.3
Tunisia (2011-2013)	€400 million	Montenegro (2011-2013)	€104.9
*(2007-2010) €220 million		Serbia (2011-2013)	€622.3
Total Amount	€1.66 billion	Total Amount	€1.81 billion

Comparably, the total amount of the EU financial allocations for Western Balkans is a bit higher than the sum of approved financial allocations for NIPs of North African countries. More importantly, when the allocations are considered at population base (Western Balkans total population: 18.66 million; North African countries total population: 166.7 million), to be sure at which level the EU cogitates Western Balkans can be understood precisely.

1.6. Linking Comparative Analyses with Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model

Grounded theory covers the nexuses among the concepts and/or categories, the data and the theory. The categories ought to be grounded in the data in order to shape theory or model. Systematically, the study has presented the cases of Western Balkans and North African countries data to form conceptual categories. The interrelationship among concepts and categories was illustrated as below.




Figure 7: Interrelationships Among Concepts and Categories of Comparison Analyses
Source: Author’s contribution.

The first step of controlling migration approach is visa applications. Many embassies of EU member states in Western Balkans and North African countries have set up new regulations and procedures so that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot obtain a valid visa because of not meeting the eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of visa applications reflects the attitude of EU member states towards migrants and gives a clue regarding the degree of the usage of rigid and restrictive visa regulations and procedures. If migrants success to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the remittances. Even though the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa application process, many inconvenient matters may occur while they are in host countries or different problems may emerge in home countries. Thus inward and outward remittances are the most dynamic factors which directly influence both migrants at host countries and their families at home countries or vice versa. The transfer of money amounts points out another issue which is obligatory partnership with private banks and institutions. Even public institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at host countries because of several reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are living in between home and host countries. For instance, migrants who face financial problems are problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host country. Therefore, hybridity which will be argued in the second section proposes a solution which links home and host country with public and private actors, and migrants with civil society.

The third step is asylum that covers unqualified and low-skilled migrants. Generally, asylum seekers from Western Balkans and North African countries temporarily find solutions for working and staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home countries, the high level of competitiveness, restrictive migration and asylum policies at host countries are the essential points which force asylum applicants finding alternative solutions. However, these solutions sometimes turn out as illegal forms and damage the image of home country and make the host country change the positive attitude towards asylum seekers. In fact, the main reason of negative behaviours of asylum seekers is the lack of information sources. Altruistically, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base online platforms for asylum seekers so that they will enhance awareness of opportunities and advantages both at home and host countries.

The fourth step is more related to international migration because migration as a category frames the influxes and dynamics from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid model will provide strategies, policies and more effective solutions for measurement of migration

dynamics and creation of collaborations among state, private and civil society in terms of pursuing triple win solutions (home, host countries and migrants) via indirect centralisation within public sphere and state's authority to attain the ultimate goal, i.e. the transition to the controlling migration approach. This will be a reflection of global trends because on the one side, in the EU, there is a demand for legal migration of high skilled workers and well-educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type which is shaped by migrants of Western Balkans and North African countries and symbolizes successes (i.e. achieving unimaginable). Profoundly, this combination will strengthen the partnership level among home and host countries and will provide some definite solutions for issues such as pensions, bargaining, social dialogue, social protection and inclusion, healthcare, job creations, capacity building and so on.

2 Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model

The research paper has initially presented empirical evidences of Western Balkans and North African countries' migration flows to the EU. Basically, giving a general overview of these countries migration data helps us to construct controlling migration and hybrid model on the ground of these data. Of course, data must be clarified with all aspects, dimesions and details. However, the main purpose of this paper is to open a debate regarding the usage of hybrid model in migration research.

If scientists consider research as an archaeological excavation, they might acknowledge the fact that there is a huge difference among the starting point of the research and finalising process of the research because nobody knows what the research outcomes will bring and in which theoretical angle will they fit in and/or which missing knowledge will they fill in. First of all, conceptually, some misusages and misunderstandings concerning with controlling migration and hybrid model need corrections. It is better to distinguish hybrid model as general/real hybrid model and specific/ideal hybrid model. General/real hybrid model covers state and non-state actors (see Figure 8).




Figure 8: General/Real Hybrid Model

Source: Author's contribution.

From general/real hybrid model perspective, arguments of the researches which present a hybrid model without including three parts can be falsified. By the way, researchers are likely to make another mistake, i.e. categorising Figure 8 as a specific/ideal hybrid model. Rightly, to achieve a specific/ideal hybrid model researchers ought to include other non-state actors to this framework (see Figure 9). Probably, a total convergence among all state and non-state actors is an utopia. However, a specific/ideal hybrid model should cover state actors

(e.g. government, municipality and so on) and non-state actors (e.g. civil society, private, cooperatives, trade unions, works councils, NGOs, lobby groups, diasporas, universities, churches and religious associations and communities, epistemic communities, the media and so forth) within the confine of state’s control mechanism.




Figure 9: Specific/Ideal Hybrid Model

Source: Author’s contribution.

Functionally, ‘the Hybrid Model’ means state actors (government, municipality and so on) and non-state actors (private actors, civil society organisations, NGOs, Lobby Groups and so on) equally participating in various industries. The cooperation of public – private – civil society parts has an effective role at creating strategies, determining plans and forecasting models (Aliu 2011b: 1331). With ‘Hybrid Model’, states are embedded with non-state actors in actor constellations in equal order, and at least of the plurality of opinion development processes.

Sociologists argued hybridity as an indispensable collaboration and voluntary or strategic efforts of state, private actors and non-profit organisations. Anheier (1991) examined quasi-nongovernmental hybrid forms and the relation between the public sphere and the voluntary sector in Germany. He found out that the public sphere is institutionally embedded between state and society and located among the decentralised public sector and the centralising tendencies in civic society. He scientifically framed a liberal democratic image of a public sphere and stressed that the emergence of values, conflicts and new subjects of public discourse do not take place in the official public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*) but in the counterpublic spheres or alternative spheres (*Gegenöffentlichkeiten*). In this respect, the third sector which essentially has characteristics of heterogeneity and pluralism rather than homogeneity and isomorphism was argued for engagement in between public and private dichotomy (Anheier and Seibel 1990; Anheier and Toepler 1999). Accordingly, intermediary zone between the state and the market covers an ambivalent political atmosphere, a political economy of interest mediation and organisational sociology. Thus, hybridity as appeared in sociological research area, paradoxically, relied on confrontations with difficulties that occur among Government Organisations (GOs), Private Nonprofit Organisations (NPOs) and Private Market Organisations (PMOs).

Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. *'The Third Way'* was argued by many remarkable scientists, politicians and authors (Lawrence 1988; Giddens 1998; Blair 1998; Giddens 2000; Etzioni 2000; and Jordan 2010). The third way has various meanings such as 'new progressivism' for the American Democrats, 'new labour' for the Labour Party in Britain, a mainstream left or central left, a left-right rationalisation, political environmentalism for Al Gore, the modernising left or modernising social democracy as Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of structuration of Giddens. What differs the hybrid model from the third way idea is that the hybrid model seeks for approaching governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy and civil society from a broader perspective. Whereas, the third way idea looks more into political doctrines to create better political rhetoric for political actors of center left. Thus, the third way approach has a disequilibrium between theory and practice. It explains how the ideal policies ought to be, however, in practice it is vague that to which issues it provides solutions in real terms. Giddens created a triangle which can be accepted in the context of general/real hybrid model, i.e. *finance, manufacture* and *knowledge* (Giddens 2000: 72-3). He emphasized the fact that knowledge has become a driving force of productivity and expanding financial

markets. Thus, he encourages governments to invest on strengthening foundations of knowledge base society. On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through looking to international financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered the third way as failure because of being unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and social relations (Jordan 2010). Jordan included the big ‘*conservative*’ society thesis which is a recent debate in UK to his analyses. As a contestation to the third way approach, big society idea is nothing more than an attempt to strengthen and encourage the position and active participation of churches and religious actors. Big society thesis reflects a decentralisation process from central government to local governments and then enforces religious institutions at local level. The hybrid model that this study argues is something more than this picture. Ideally, hybridity looks into various communities, associations, unions and organisations to form an engaged and networked society. Indeed, it tries to shape a hybrid society, not a big society. Thus, this study frankly opposes big society thesis. Of course, the role and influence of churches at increasing tendencies and voluntary actions of societies are indispensable however not at adequate level for dealing with social issues.

The famous German social scientist Jürgen Habermas involved to hybridity debate however he strongly stressed the partnership with the leadership and central authority of state. Literally, he denoted that *‘the fundamental rights had to become effective for offering as positive guarantees for participation with equal opportunity in the process of the production of social wealth, as well as that of the formation of public opinion. In the interplay of a commercial society the granting of equal opportunity in participating in social rewards (by way of the market) and in participating in the political institutions (as part of the general public) was to be attained only indirectly by means of guaranteeing freedom and security vis-à-vis the power concentrated in the state. A triple function of the fundamental rights is also legitimised by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy can be maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organisation’* (Habermas 1988: 115-7).

Naively, Habermas preferred to construct the relations between state and civil society from Marxist point of view, rather investigating more specifically the ideal hybrid model. Nevertheless, remarkable scientists like Habermas put forward argumentations that take into account the world’s multidimensional transformation process. With respect to this great

transformation¹⁷, multilateralism, regionalisation and multipolarity caused emerging of new regional powers in the world. Monopol powers are by inches oligopolised and this situation has balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both international and transnational level, and therefore the hybrids in various countries are proliferating. Moreover, the economic power shift from the western countries to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries has prepared a base for the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of middle classes and Small-Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective hybridisation via national private actors in modern nation states (Aliu 2012). Hybridity has various dimensions; such as political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance model), economic hybridity (e.g. hybridity in political economy), cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities¹⁸), judicial hybridity (e.g. hybridity in legal systems), environmental and social hybridity (e.g. ISO 14000 and ISO 26000), biological hybridity (Darwin’s hybridism approach¹⁹) and so forth.

According to the mode of institutionalisation, there are three types of governance; ‘governance by governments’, ‘governance with governments’ and ‘governance without governments’.

Table 3: Governance by/with/without Government(s)

Type of Governance	Mode of Institutionalisation	Norm Building	Norm Implementing	
Governance by government(s)	International/governmental cooperation	Without self-organisation	Via nation-states	
Governance with government(s)	Global policy networks	With self-organisation	With nation-states	<u>HYBRID MODEL</u>
Governance without government(s)	Transnational network organisations	Via self-organisation	Without nation-states	

Source: Mückenberger 2008: 27

Table 3 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalisation and how norms are built and implemented. At the level of governance by governments, states

¹⁷ I refer to the terminology of Karl Polanyi. In his book – the Great Transformation – which was a *magnum opus*, he argued how capitalism was disembedded.

¹⁸ Migrants in host communities find themselves challenged because of the continuity and boundaries of the past. The process of belonging involves imagined communities and communities of practice for migrants and host communities. Therefore, this situation shapes migrants with hybrid identities between home and host countries (Babacan and Singh 2010). Papastergiadis entered to the hybrid identity debate with linking identity, culture and community with deterritorialisation, globalisation and hybridity (Blunt and Mary 2001; Hatziprokopiou 2002). From his analyses, it can be put forward that Western Balkans and North African countries’ citizens have hybrid identities.

¹⁹ Charles Darwin added Chapter IX (i.e. ‘Hybridism’ which means the infertility of species and the fertility of varieties when intercrossed) to his well-known book ‘The Origin of Species.’ It is diametrically impressive that Darwin used the terms hybridism and hybrids 171 times in the text.

are presented by their own governments. The governments of states can create international global relations with other sovereign states or international organisations. This type of governance doesn't let non-state actors to build norms and it exists only at nation-state level. Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organisation. Governance with governments means among others also governments take place, however there are also non-state actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors creates hybrid structures in which these actors come together to deal with common issues and gain common objectives. Hybrid model is typically related to governance with governments because public actors, private actors and civil society actors share common interests and these interests are quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors hybrid model means centralised authority of state that has an influence on private sector and civil society. For private actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and capacity building. For civil society hybrid model means having a mainstream role among state and private and transform interests in favour of the goodness of society.

With hybrid model, states are embedded with non-state actors in actor constellations in which they do not act on the basis of sovereignty, but of equal order, and at least of the plurality of opinion development processes. This is the reason why many cases of hybrid development situated among that which is categorised as sovereign within the state and that which is categorised as pertaining to private law (Mückenberger 2008: 28). Scientifically, distinguishing these cases is very complicated because these can become an amalgam which is not only a part of private law but also it is a part of public law. Hence, the question which should be raised is how can be explained voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and legitimacy – effectiveness on the other in the context of hybrid complex structures? This question poses the legitimacy issue among state and non-state actors and the increasing legitimacy power of transnational non-state actors within the nation-state' sovereignty. Objectively, Hudson discussed this challenge that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors influence deeply the inter-state system's monopoly of authority. 'Some commentators assessed a power shift from state to non-state actors, as sovereignty-free actors link up and operate across state borders as part of transnational networks' (Hudson 2001: 334). We can assume that the current transformation of governance for political concepts such as central authority, sovereignty, decentralisation and democratic legitimacy is to balance the tendency towards theoretical complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating the

multidimensional and multicausal nature of current world politics (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 200).

In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration research is a transition for social transformation and indirect centralisation. As an illustration, migration and asylum issues acquire elements of multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away from the nation-state with the assigning policy-making capacity to Brussels (Dijstelbloem and Meijer 2011: 35). On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on the other hand, this shift of power causes decentralisation in nation state structure. Central power of Brussels' governance ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take illegal migrants and asylum seekers under the control of the EU institutions.

The European Commission has created at implementing decision on a special measure which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The Communication proposes the establishment of a 'Civil Society Facility' to provide funding for non-state actors. The objective of the Facility is to strengthen and promote the role of non-state actors in reforms and democratic transformations through increased participation in the fulfilment of Neighbourhood Policy objectives (European Commission 2011c: 1). Naturally, civil society has a crucial role in advancing women's rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities as well as environmental protection and resource efficiency. The EU Delegations aim to bring partner countries' governments and civil society together in a structured dialogue (European Commission 2011g). Latterly, the EU has established a structured dialogue strategic process aimed at defining and agreeing on the roles of civil society and local authorities in development, improving the effectiveness of their involvement in aid activities and exploring ways to adapt EU aid modalities to increase the impact of its development programmes.

Considering clarifications above, supposedly, with creation of hybrid model within state structure at national level or within the EU structure at supranational level controlling migration is possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state and non-state parts with taking into account '*migration driving forces*' (Bauer and Zimmermann 1995) such as remittances, labour policy (wages, employment and so forth), economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks.

Combining migration driving forces with controlling mechanisms supports shaping a controlling migration approach. At this point it is significant to present elements and factors of the controlling migration mechanisms that were included in the UK five year strategy for asylum and immigration report (2005). According to the report, the challenge for the UK government is to maintain public confidence in the system by agreeing immigration where it is in the country's interests and preventing it where it is not. This distinction is really difficult because national policies and strategies should be adjustable and in favour of the supranational and international migration law. The UK government have set up several migration regulations such as: establishing on-the-spot fines for employers who collude with illegal immigration, fingerprinting visitors who need visas, and those planning longer stays before their arrivals, demanding financial bonds from migrants in specific categories where there has been evidence of abuse in order to guarantee their return home, replacing out-dated and confusing rules with a clear and modern points system and so forth.

Controlling migration is not possible with using only hard law of states towards migrants. Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause an incline at illegal migration flows. Fondly, it ought to be noted that preventing illegal migration covers alternative patterns that are in favour of migrants. The attempts to control the migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase in the number of illegal migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks.

While analysing the UK five year strategy for asylum and immigration report, several crucial points have attracted our attention. From a third way approach perspective, soft power of the state with proactive applications was seen as a better option for dealing with migration issues. Additionally, the report was attempted to present concrete solutions that minimise potential problems through using fingerprinting and preboarding electronic checks, requiring from migrants staying in UK for more than three months to have an ID card, screening visa applicants for tuberculosis on high risk routes, expanding the network of Airline Liaison Officers, demanding financial bonds from migrants, detaining more failed asylum seekers, introducing fast track processing of all unfounded asylum seekers, with greater control over applicants throughout the process, preventing applicants concealing their identity to frustrate removal, working with countries which generate the most failed asylum seekers to ensure that they redocument and accept back failed asylum seekers, and expanding voluntary returns schemes, maximising returns to safe countries and finding ways to return unaccompanied asylum seeking children. Gently, in the UK five year strategy for asylum and immigration

report, 'gate-keeping strategy' (Triandafyllidou 2010) was preferred to be followed instead of fencing strategy. Triandafyllidou compared these two strategies as such: gate-keeping strategies (i.e. paper controls) aim at restricting practical legal access to a nation and its institutions, and fencing strategy which measures (i.e. detecting persons) actively target illegal migrants in order to arrest and then expel them. Latterly, as a gate-keeping strategy, most of Western European states adopted tests and language courses as official precondition for immigration. This means mandatory language and country knowledge as precondition for immigration represent effective instrument for immigration control (Goodman 2011: 235).

Controlling migration is an open debate for scholars. Castles argued that a general theory of migration is neither possible nor desirable. Hypothetically, researchers can make significant progress by reembedding migration research in a more general understanding of contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of social scientific disciplines (Castles 2010: 1565). Therefore, I have attempted to illustrate the nexus among controlling migration and hybridity in migration research.

Reasoning hybridity in the context of controlling migration gives some clues to deal with forced migration. Betts (2009) came in the edge of the hybrid model, however he has formulated ideal type relationship as state, citizen and territory. Betts compared forced migration with international theories such as: neorealism, liberal institutionalism, analytical liberalism, the English School, constructivism and critical theory. In this framework, the hybrid model best fits in constructivist approach which explores the role of non-state actors and transnational actors in world politics.

Esping-Andersen argues that the state, the market economy and the family – a community archetype – are the three basic welfare pillars of society (Evers 2005). Inevitably, Esping-Andersen stated that welfare states' labour markets are embedded in the institutional framework of social policy. 'Welfare state and employment regimes not only coincide, but also that welfare states indeed have a direct causal impact on how employment structures and new axes of social conflict evolve' (Esping-Andersen 1990). While investigating state-employment relationship, Esping-Andersen introduced a third way, an alternative strategy. A politics of collectivising families' needs (de-familialisation) frees women from unpaid labour, and thereby nurtures the dual-earner household. A social democratic defamilialisation strategy can reverse fertility decline if it helps employed mothers square the caring work circle and if it is willing to cover a good part of the opportunity costs of having children. A fundamental postindustrial dilemma is that families seem no longer inclined to assume the

costs of bearing children. Humanistically, the double-earner household plays the role of employment multiplier and the employment multiplier of working mothers can be quite substantial (Esping-Andersen 1999). From this standpoint, I should like to remind the impact of migration on female migrants. As it is argued above, in the Western Balkans and North African states, female migrants are increasingly leaving their country of origins because of several reasons. Actually, Esping-Andersen's defamilialisation strategy may help for the feminisation of migration. However, to improve theoretical concepts researching practical reasons is needed. As a consequence, hybrid structures lay behind Esping-Andersen's understanding and arguments which have implications of the impact of what is labeled as state, community and societal or market-principles.

Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a practical intention. He proposed historical materialism which embraces the interrelationships of the theory's own origins and application. He classified three aspects of the relation between theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological, and methodological aspects (Habermas 1988: 1-3). Excellently, Habermas stated that:

The dictum on the ex post facto character of theory determines its relation to praxis. Political theory cannot aim at instructing the state what it should be like, but rather instead how the state – the moral universal – should be known (Habermas, 1988: 178-179). Therefore, a convergence of the two systems (the third way) on the middle ground of a controlled mass democracy within the welfare state is not to be excluded. If indeed the old Utopias of the best possible social order and eternal peace, the highest degree of freedom and perfect happiness, contain the underlying rational themes of a theory, no matter how distorted into a derivative myth, as their implicit basis; and then praxis must legitimate itself in terms of this theory, because it has now been invested with the mantle of a state ideology (Habermas, 1988: 197-198).

In the light of theory and practice understanding, two examples can help us to measure how hybridity may work in EU, Western Balkans and North African countries. The first example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The author of this article carried out an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners' & Migrants' Council in Heidelberg (*Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats*). Heidelberg Intercultural Center (*Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum*) is currently a general/real hybrid project which is a common platform for state, private and civil society. It has been established this month (April, 2012) and the main purpose is to include other non-state actors to this platform in order to deal with migrants' integration problems, society needs and many other issues which are waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly enlightened me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (*Bürgeramt*) and volunteers who participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood has the potential to create a transition from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal hybrid

project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the project's motto that is '*problems are potentials.*' This is a very crucial point because hybridity has state and non-state actors and each actor has its own problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors will be transformed as potentials or opportunities for other actors. This puts indirect centralisation and social transformation in a consensus of hybrid platform together. Togetherness, openness and solidarity are three principles of this harmony. Idiomatically, Mr. Allimadi stated that '*if you open your door to others, then you begin to live in a huge house* (He referred to an African proverb).' The author of this article is currently preparing a similar hybrid project for Western Balkan countries' institutions for benchmarking, embedding and proliferating hybridity.

The other hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The aim of the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration of Albanian young generation who live, study and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a hybrid network of young people at home country and host country. ASAN project participants have created an online database (www.asan.al) and rapidly increased capacity of the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center, ASAN project will deal with internal and external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a general/real hybrid model image, however increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level and incline of participation level will shift this image to specific/ideal hybrid model. Namely, objectives of the project are listed as such: benefit from intellectual property and energy of young ethnic Albanians; take the future of Albania under control; creation and coordination of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of national Albanian identity; establish a national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities for Albanian migrants; increase Albanians' representation in world affairs; unify state and non-state actors in a common platform; balance employment demand-supply of state and private sector; and unify Albanian youth with their diversities.

2.1. Dialectics of Triple Win and Hybrid Model

First of all, many scholars argued triple win solutions in the context of circular migration, i.e. dynamic mobility of migrants among home countries and host countries (Vertovec 2004; Zimmermann 2005; Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani 2006; Vertovec 2007; Erzan 2008; Haas 2010). Haas argued that circular migration brings positive impact for development when home country, host country and migrants are organised through cooperation (Haas 2010). Actually, this cooperation is a combination of triple win and hybridity. Despite the fact that state-private-civil society interactions are part of a long debate, interestingly, many scholars have not recognised this fact yet. Historically, in the past, first Thomas More versus Niccolo Machiavelli had started debating on the role of the state, then this tradition was continued with Karl Marx versus Adam Smith with liberal-communist perspectives, the last scientific duello of this tradition was between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls – arguing whether a social or liberal theory of justice in ideal (Kantian) or real (Hobbesian) terms will be in favour of goodness of society. In fact, all these scientists – including the scientists of Chicago and Frankfurt Schools – were not opposing to the role of all non-state actors.

Mainly, constructing hybridity with taking into consideration these debates will shape hybrid model as a paradigm (in Kuhn's terminology). Apel (2011) argued that researchers should start to their investigations not only with specific paradigms but also with the paradigms of the first philosophy that have ontological, epistemological, hermeneutic and phenomenological perspectives. Apel goes beyond to scientific revolutions and looks to the reasons with very deep research questions. Neutrally, my proposal is to use hybrid model as a paradigm. From triple win point of view, social scientists should strongly criticise and contest the researches which are focusing only on host countries' self-interest maximisation without embedding hybridity. Ethically, a strategic home and host country partnership which does not take into account migrants' interests should be contested as well. This study goes one step further and attempts to enhance the triple win solutions for three sides of hybrid model.

Mentally, there are interrelationships and dialectics among triple win model (home country, host country and migrants) and hybrid model, i.e. state-home country nexus, private-host country nexus and migrants-civil society nexus. If there are interrelationships and dialectics among six sides, then the researchers ought to seek an ideal six-sided win approach. Figure 9 indicates a specific/ideal hybrid model which includes many non-state actors. From this understanding, when a researcher puts home and host country in a zero-sum game approach, of course a special focus would be reciprocal interaction among state actors.

However, many non-state actors exist in both home and host countries. Social scientists may find a solution which balances or maximises national interests of home and host countries, migrants, and more importantly non-state actors in both home and host countries. Probably, a distinction of two things may clarify better migrants integration problems within societies of both home and host countries. First, researchers who examine ideal triple win solutions, mostly analyse state-centric migration issues. A recent debate in some of Western Balkan countries was regarding pensions. The issue has a high level complexity because it has been handled from state-centric, and bilateral dimensions. For example, rather how trade unions are coordinated within home and host countries separately, the crucial point is how the hybridisation of trade unions as non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labour migration-related problems. I would like to call this linkage '*interhybridity*' that may exist in states which reciprocally acts in terms of interhybridity.

Indisputably, hybrid model has a catalyst (katalysator) role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social relations with moral meanings of communication.

Habermas classified social actions as instrumental, symbolic, communicative and strategic actions (Habermas 1979: 40). In the ambiguity of hybrid model, communicative action and strategic action require more attention. Habermas describes communicative action as 'oriented to reaching understanding', whereas strategic action as 'oriented to the actor's success.' He distinguished strategic action from communicative action with taking into account Kohlberg's theory of moral development and discourse ethics in terms of cognitivism, universalism and formalism (Habermas 1990). He defined that 'communicative action is oriented to observing intersubjectively valid norms that link reciprocal expectations (recognition). In communicative action, the validity basis of speech is presupposed. The universal validity claims which participants at least implicitly raise and reciprocally recognise, make possible the consensus that carries action in common. Whereas, in strategic action, according to Habermas this background consensus is lacking. Strategic action remains indifferent with respect to its motivational conditions, whereas the consensual presuppositions of communicative action can secure motivations'. Thus, strategic actions must be institutionalised, that is embed in intersubjectively binding norms that guarantee the fulfilment of the motivational conditions (Habermas 1979: 118).

Giddens supported Habermas' communicative action theory. To achieve a better theory-practice nexus, Giddens created the theory of structuration which is an interaction of objectivism (Marx) and subjectivism (Weber). Giddens argued that from ontological point of view, structuration theory means 'a conceptual investigation of the nature of human action, social institutions and the interrelations between action and institutions' (Giddens 1991: 201). In structuration theory, the core concern of the social sciences is with recurrent social practices and their transformations. Theoretically, structuration theory offers a conceptual action that allows one to understand both how actors are at the same time the creators of social systems yet created by them. Broadwise, structuration theory can be a guide for a specific/ideal hybrid model.

With well-structured specific/ideal hybrid models which will be embedded in migration research, integration and development issues will meet concrete solutions because in a huge platform in a networked hybrid society each state and non-state actors will communicate and debate reciprocally and respectfully.

To attain ideal integration and better results, more efforts are needed both at the EU, the national and local level (European Commission 2011a: 13). Integration requires efforts by the migrant and the receiving society. Migrants must be given the opportunity to participate in their new communities, in particular to learn the language of the receiving country, to have access to employment, education and health systems, as well as to have the socio-economic capacity. Migrants' integration implies a balance between enjoying the rights and respecting the laws and cultures of the host countries. Justly, the human dimension of migration and development policies will also be strengthened through the introduction of a migrant-based approach. Indivisibly, the role of diaspora should get more attention. Initiatives geared to enabling members of the diaspora to contribute to their country of origin should be considered, including the promotion of the temporary return of qualified migrants. Building upon the first positive experiences, the possibilities of circular migration need to be further developed (European Commission 2011a). The European Parliament also underlined in its recent Resolution (i.e. European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2011 on migration flows arising from instability: scope and role of EU foreign policy) the need to have a balanced and comprehensive approach. Certainly, a specific/ideal hybrid model can be an active, comprehensive and rational strategy and/or policy recommendation for stabilisation and development in Western Balkans and North African countries.

Circular migration from Western Balkans and North African countries to the EU member states poses the question that is ‘Does migration encourage development of the countries of origin or hinder such development? Does migration cause brain gain and/or brain drain at home countries?’ (Castles and Miller 2009). What about this question: From postcolonialism point of view, does migration improve relations among postcolonial home country and postcoloniser host country? I raise this question because both Western Balkans and North Africa were colonies of European states in the past under various civilisations’ hegemony and hence postcolonial era brought rapid development to these regions and linked cultural similarities with Europe. In this context, implications of the Mahoney’s investigation are threefold. First, by bringing coloniser institutions back into the picture, it is possible to clarify disagreements about the relationship between precolonial population size and colonial settlement. Second, attention to coloniser differences sheds new light on debates about whether or not colonial settlers preferred to inhabit low-morality environments. Third, a concern with coloniser identity helps make sense of over time differences in the way natural resource endowments historically shaped levels of colonisation (Mahoney 2010: 264-265). The argument of Mahoney’s work highlights how colonial countries were influenced negatively by colonisers during the colonial period and then how this understanding has been changed. Because post-colonial countries are affected positively by their former colonisers during the modern era. Mahoney perfectly explains this shift with Japan case.

In developing countries, effective participation in the world economy has occurred largely only when the state actively stimulates and directs – and perhaps even creates *de novo* – commercial and entrepreneurial classes. This state role bears little resemblance to either the ideal typical mercantilist or liberal capitalist political economies. The new ‘developmental states’ are, instead founded on an active partnership between the state and private capital, one in which state actors enjoy relative autonomy from entrepreneurial classes even as they are deeply tied to those classes through social networks. This kind of state-society model, which perhaps has Japan as its exemplar, has proven most effective at achieving sustained high growth since the late nineteenth century. It was, in fact, Japan that endowed its two most important and heavily settled colonial possessions – Korea and Taiwan – with institutions and actors congruent with a developmental state and a state-led industrial model. Korea and Taiwan are the postcolonial countries that have most impressively risen towards the top of the world economic hierarchy since the mid-twentieth century (Mahoney 2010: 268).

In like a manner, development process in post-colonial India can be perceived in the same way precisely. The UK supported the Indian elite class inside the country and all around the world in order to accelerate the development process during post-colonial era. Fludernik (1998) edited a book which is entitled ‘Hybridity and Postcolonialism’ and her work examines how the UK influenced Indian society with the cultural power and value of English language (Spanish, French, German, Albanian and other languages have influential cultural

power as well)²⁰. She explained evidences through looking to the Indian literature. Thus, if English as an element of the communicative action has the power to shape a hybrid culture in societies, then other elements of communicative action such as media and family may have the power to shape hybridity in terms of cultural aspects as well. Cultural hybridity also have a significant effect on both general/real hybrid model and specific/ideal hybrid model.

As a consequence, it is apparent that Western Balkans has been put to a pro-European position from cultural and economic aspects. The EU has stressed at the progress reports, media channels, and even at academic level that the Western Balkans belongs to European culture, history and tradition. However, the North African countries are somehow still categorised as '*pure orientalist states*' (Said 1978). Nevertheless, it can be claimed that both of these regions share similar characteristics of orientalism as a catastrophic result of the past imperialist experiences. As an instance, in North Africa, French imperial strategies (e.g. mission civilisatrice) shaped a general understanding of orientalism. From classical master-slave dialectic, colonisers actually did not govern colonies in the past, they merely governed the governors of colonies. However, in post-colonial era, hybrid governance will civilise governance approaches and attain ontological stability.

Undoubtedly, culture is a great source for shaping identities and belonging feelings. In postcolonial era, migrants are returning to their own cultures and traditions. Obviously, as Said (1993) pointed out these returns accompany rigorous codes of intellectual and moral behaviour that are opposed to the permissiveness associated with multiculturalism and hybridity. In a world where the number of migrants are reaching a greater amount, it is not possible to consider a culture as single, pure, homogenous, autonomous or monolithic because hybridity is an indispensable and revolutionary transformation process. I have been conscious that Said's arguments are the best responses to the Mahoney's post-colonial 'picture.'

To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in post-soviet bloc Western Balkan countries and post-colonial North African countries. The specific reasons for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the role of states and the existence of centralised power at the institutional structures of these states still exist.

²⁰ Young (1995) investigated hybridity in a comprehensive scope with cultural and racial aspects. The core point is that past colonial experiences shaped differentiated and quasi-assimilated identities. Thus the interaction and confrontation of these identities with present world order might pose a question – i.e. How these mixtures of cultures and identities will communicate with each other within societies? That would exactly mean (quasi) cultural hybrid forms (e.g. amalgamation and miscegenation) are likely to proliferate and this expansion will accumulate various common dimensions in diversified entirety of variations of hybridity.

Second, people living in these two regions have hybrid identities and are more likely to be included in communicative action. Migrants with hybrid identities will protect their culture, national interests and values towards inhumanistic post-modern threats instead of serving as actors with dualistic interests in post-colonial era. Therefore, hybrid model is an effective strategy for social transformation of controlling migration approach.

Conclusion

Dealing with international migration in *the age of migration* (Castles and Miller 2009) requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns. Hegel's dialectic method might be applied to international migration for achieving syntheses and better outcomes. For instance, Hegel concluded that '*all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real* "*Alles was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig, und alles was vernünftig ist, ist wirklich*" (Hegel 1899).' As a rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a proactive vision and transform *mala fide* migration to *bona fide* migration form. Controlling migration by an ideal hybrid structure and indirect centralisation will create more efficient and accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, hybrid structures ought to be created at EU supranational level with vertical relations. With indirect centralisation within the context of state's authority and public sphere, these structures will have same legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus EU may improve its common migration and asylum policies in this way. Furthermore, empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the need of moral consciousness in migration turbulence (particularly for the Arab Spring migration flows) through controlling mechanisms and good migration governance within the framework of hybrid model. The rise of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for researchers to improve migrant-based approach with collection of migrants' narratives. Empirical results are not just simple numbers, thus these should be investigated with migrants' narratives analyses.

Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations for the migrants of North African countries. Openly, hybrid model is a platform in which people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity is likely to increase equal opportunity and active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora events and ethnic enclaves, maximise benefits and minimise negative effects, and enhance the humane of migration from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action among home, transit and host countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to facilitate the exchange of information, create ground for networking and ensure a communication platform. With a specific focus to migrants-civil society dialectic, hybridity will create social and competitive harmony and transform win-lose philosophy to 'To love or to be loved' philosophy and realise the feminisation of migration.

The role of the EU is to help Western Balkans and North African countries to keep up realising reforms in various areas. The Western Balkans and North African countries' migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilisation and integration reforms, enlargement and neighbourhood policy and the Stabilisation Association Process. These reciprocal communication will balance the European Union relations with eastern countries which have multi-dimensional (economic, politic, religious etc.) nexus with Western Balkans and North African countries. Obviously, it can be claimed that partnership and solidarity with Western Balkans and North African countries have significant influences for attainment of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration of Western Balkans within the EU and stabilisation of North African countries will be a driving force for the EU. With respect to EU 2020 targets, high skilled workers of these countries are seen as potentials or opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as threats or potential problems. Therefore, the European Commission is working on how to attract high skilled labour migrants in order to balance the need of 20 million high skilled workers over next years (Weiner and Munz 1997; Martin 2003; Brady 2008; Davoudi, Wishardt and Strange 2010). Both two hybrid case – i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural Center and ASAN – are strategic models for European Commission to support such projects in order to attract high skilled labour migrants and improve employment policies. The convergence of the EU member states' national interests is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of a common EU migration policy. Hopefully, non-state actors are ensuring various scientific routes for solving migration issues in different alternatives. The involvement of non-state actors to hybrid model will support capacity building and active networking. In addition, a more civilised European society can enhance the moral responsibility towards dealing with migration issues. A more civilised European society will have willingness to open its borders to non-EU citizens (i.e. the citizens of Western Balkan and North African countries). Increasing moral values and judgements will make the real beneficiaries of the free movement of persons and workers all Europeans. Only if the migration policies and regulations reformulate with taking into consideration moral values and judgements, they can be more effective and global.

Eventually, moralisation of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and hybrid forms can provide definite solutions in various aspects and controlling migration can transform socially the migration process in favour of migrants and society as well as state and non-state actors.

Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of migration is an utopia (or absolut spirit), however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies with minimum problems is not only rational but also real.

Annex

Table A1: Total Visa statistics 2009

Schengen States	Schengen visas (Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas)		Number of national long-stay visas issued
	Number of visas issued	Non issuance rate	
AT	285.196	5,23%	27.169
BE	165.474	17,38%	24.588
CH	351.578	8,70%	37.975
CZ	440.360	3,74%	17.109
DE	1.491.784	9,06%	139.640
DK	77.142	5,40%	1.037
EE	93.464	2,49%	399
EL	598.883	4,68%	40.686
ES	748.466	9,97%	135.568
FI	783.340	1,58%	-
FR	1.415.886	12,35%	167.108
HU	272.972	4,14%	8.530
IS	779	4,18%	88
IT	1.053.354	5,02%	155.286
LT	236.299	1,77%	2.824
LU	5.364	2,38%	27
LV	118.436	3,48%	1.450
MT	28.915	9,31%	4.168
NL	313.534	7,37%	9.032
NO	105.430	0,75%	16.502
PL	579.424	3,29%	210.292
PT	107.224	6,87%	15.800
SE	172.595	7,62%	527
SI	97.690	4,19%	391
SK	62.287	3,78%	1.982
UE Member States not applying yet fully the Schengen acquis	Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas		Number of national long-stay visas issued
	Number of visas issued	Non issuance rate	
BG	595.914	1,05%	8.575
CY	113.205	2,63%	-
RO	175.956	3,24%	12.831
Totals	Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas		Number of national long-stay visas issued
	Number of visas issued	Non issuance rate	
Sub-total Schengen	9.605.876	7,11%	1.018.178
Sub-total non Schengen	885.075	1,70%	21.406
Total	10.490.951	6,68%	1.039.584

Source: European Commission 2011: 21

Table A2: Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US\$) According to World Bank Data

The Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data (World Bank Database)											
Albania											
Indicator Name	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	17.45868										
Net migration	-270245					-72243					-47889
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	523	292	17	26	51	56	56	77	65	70	76
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	6802	7626	10761	10385	10478	12722	14079	15340	15006	15711	14772
International migrant stock, total	76695					82668					89106
International migrant stock (% of population)	2.496699					2.631231					2.780839651
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 89106 Host Country: 1438451
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France										1438.3 thousands, 45.4% of total population (2.83 million, Instat 2011)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1%										89.1 thousands, 2.8% of total population
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	20.30026										
Net migration	281795					61825					-10000
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	38152	32745	28022	22517	22215	10568	10318	7367	7257	7132	7016
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	474981	447321	406326	300006	228815	109930	199946	78273	74366	70018	63004
International migrant stock, total	96001					35141					27780
International migrant stock (% of population)	2.599048					0.92941					0.73880051
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 27780 Host Country: 1460639
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy										1461.0 thousands, 38.9% of total population (3.8 million, 2011)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3%										27.8 thousands, 0.7% of total population
Kosovo**	**World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral migrant stocks for host country is; 25251 and top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. According to UNDP Kosovo Remittance Study 2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was €442.7 million, 11% of the overall GDP in year 2009.										
Macedonia	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	29.38359										
Net migration	-9000					-4000					2000
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	9050	4363	2816	193	1004	1274	1240	1235	1672	1542	1398
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	2176	12197	8072	5982	5104	8600	7940	8077	7521	7926	7889
International migrant stock, total	125665					120288					129701
International migrant stock (% of population)	6.254819					5.901941					6.294444771
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 129701 Host Country: 447137
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France										447.1 thousand, 21.9% of total population (2 million, 2010)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3%										129.7 thousands, 6.3% of total population

Montenegro	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)											
Net migration	-32450					-20632					-2508
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum							6926	8528	24741	24019	16364
Refugee population by country or territory of origin							135	557	1283	2582	3246
International migrant stock, total						54583					42509
International migrant stock (% of population)						8.709048					6.731539692
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 42509 Host Country: 36
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary										0.0 thousands
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5%										42.5 thousands, 6.8% of total population (0.63 million, 2010)
Serbia	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)											
Net migration	-147889					-338544					0
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	484391	400304	354402	291403	276683	148264	98997	97995	96739	86351	73608
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	146748	144231	323335	296632	237032	189989	174027	16564 3	18593 5	19562 6	183289
International migrant stock, total	856763					674612					525388
International migrant stock (% of population)	11.39866					9.066428					7.204424665
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 525388 Host Country: 130844
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark										196.0 thousands, 2.0% of total population (7.3 million, 2009)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7%										525.4 thousands, 5.3% of total population

Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US\$)

Albania	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	598	699	734	889	1161	1290	1359	1468	1495	1317	1285
Workers' remittances	531	615	643	778	1028	1161	1176	1305	1226	1090	
Compensation of employees	67	84	90	111	132	129	184	163	270	227	
Migrants' transfer											
Outward remittance flows				4	5	7	27	10	16	10	
Workers' remittances				0	0		0				
Compensation of employees				4	5	7	27	10	16	9	
Migrants' transfer											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$0.9 bn, net ODA received US\$0.4 bn, total international reserves US\$2.4 bn, exports of goods and services US\$3.8 bn in 2008.</i>											
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	1595	1521	1526	1749	2072	2043	2157	2700	2735	2167	2228
Workers' remittances	950	919	956	1143	1474	1467	1589	1947	1899	1432	
Compensation of employees	631	581	540	595	579	570	560	739	828	643	
Migrants' transfer	26	25	30	11	19	5	8	13	8	6	
Outward remittance flows	2	11	14	20	62	40	55	65	70	61	
Workers' remittances		5	7	10	49	28	41	50	53	46	
Compensation of employees	2	6	7	11	13	12	14	15	17	15	
Migrants' transfer											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$1.1 bn, net ODA received US\$0.5 bn, total international reserves US\$3.5 bn, exports of goods and services US\$6.8 bn in 2008.</i>											
Kosovo**	Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.										

Macedonia	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	81	73	106	174	213	227	267	345	407	401	414
Workers' remittances	80	68	92	146	161	169	198	239	266	260	
Compensation of employees	0	5	14	28	52	57	69	106	140	121	
Migrants' transfer											
Outward remittance flows	14	21	23	16	16	16	18	25	33	26	
Workers' remittances	14	21	23	15	15	14	16	22	28	22	
Compensation of employees			1	1	1	2	2	3	5	4	
Migrants' transfer											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$0.6 bn, net ODA received US\$0.2 bn, total international reserves US\$2.1 bn, exports of goods and services US\$5.0 bn in 2008.</i>											
Montenegro	<i>Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.</i>										
Serbia	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	1132*	1698*	2089*	2661	4129	4650	4703	5377	5538	5406	558
Workers' remittances								2948	2913	3755	
Compensation of employees								148	191	184	
Migrants' transfer								2	2	3	
Outward remittance flows								114	138	91	
Workers' remittances								95	114	70	
Compensation of employees								17	23	20	
Migrants' transfer								2	1	1	
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$3.0 bn, net ODA received US\$1.0 bn, total international reserves US\$11.5 bn, exports of goods and services US\$14.8 bn in 2008.</i>											
<i>*Serbia and Montenegro</i>											
Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011											

Table A3: Comparison of the EU IPA Assistance for the Western Balkan Countries

Albania			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	56.52	38.66	15%
Public Administration Reform	43.15	38.66	15%
Transport	49.06	51.55	20%
Environment and Climate Change	80.12	51.55	20%
Social Development	13.40	25.77	10%
Rural Development/Agriculture	17.20	51.55	20%
TOTAL	259.45	257.74	100%
IPA Component	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	84.30	85.99	87.45
Cross-border Cooperation	10.13	10.28	10.67
TOTAL	94.43	96.27	98.12
Bosnia and Herzegovina			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	38.64	55.00	17.5 %
Public Administration Reform	51.55	40.00	12.7 %
Private Sector Development	28.10	50.00	15.9 %
Transport	22.30	35.00	11.1 %
Environment and Climate Change	72.70	54.22	17.3 %
Social Development	46.75	40.00	12.7 %
Acquis related and other Actions	52.54	40.00	12.7 %
TOTAL	312.58	314.22	100%
IPA Component	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	102.68	104.67	106.87
Cross-border Cooperation	4.75	4.80	4.94
TOTAL	107.43	109.47	111.81
Kosovo			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	78.50 (18.46%)	61.09	30 %
Private Sector Development	192.93 (45.38 %)	97.75	48 %
Public Administration Reform	106.22 (24.98%)	20.35	10 %
Other	47.55 (11.18%)	24.42	12 %
TOTAL	425.20	203.61	100%
IPA Component	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	65.83	67.07	70.71
Cross-border Cooperation	2.87	2.93	2.99
TOTAL	68.70	70.00	73.70
Macedonia			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Public Administration Reform	28.00	21.33	7 %
Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights	44.00	24.38	8 %
Private Sector Development	45.50	45.71	15%
Agriculture and Rural Development	46.40	67.04	22 %
Transport	52.50	60.95	20%
Environment and Climate Change	28.30	54.85	18%
Social Development	37.30	30.47	10%
TOTAL	282.00	304.76	100%

IPA Component	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	28.80	28.20	27.94
Cross-border Cooperation	5.12	5.18	5.24
Regional Development	39.30	42.30	51.80
Human Resources Development	8.80	10.38	11.20
Rural Development	16.00	19.00	21.03
TOTAL	98.02	105.07	117.21
Montenegro			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	17.85	7.30	8%
Public Administration	21.65	10.04	11%
Environment and Climate Change	14.80	22.82	25%
Transport	16.20	18.26	20%
Social development	8.63	9.13	10%
Agriculture and Rural Development	8.10	14.60	16%
Ad hoc measures	8.11	9.13	10%
TOTAL	106.54	91.28	100%
IPA Component	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	29843599	21585429	49.05%
Cross-border Cooperation	4310344	9257238	12.94%
Regional Development	0	23200000	22.13%
Social Development	0	5757077	5.49%
Agriculture and Rural Development	0	10900000	10.40%
TOTAL	34153943	70699744	100.00%
Serbia			
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)			
2011-2013	Period 2007 - 2010	Period 2011 - 2013	
Justice and Home Affairs	42.00	75.00	12%
Public Administration Reform	89.00	75.00	12%
Social Development	96.00	75.00	12%
Private Sector Development	34.00	75.00	12%
Transport	71.00	75.00	12%
Environment, Climate Change and Energy	93.00	99.00	16%
Agriculture and Rural Development	34.00	75.00	12%
Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities	120.00	75.00	12%
TOTAL	579.00	624.00	100%
IPA Component	2011	2012	2013
Transition Assistance and Institution Building	190.00	194.00	203.00
Cross-border Cooperation	12.00	12.00	12.00
TOTAL	202.00	206.00	215.00

Table A4: Comparison of the North African Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US\$) According to World Bank Data

The North African Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data (World Bank Database)											
Algeria											
Indicator Name	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	9,512722										
Net migration	-140000					-140000					-140000
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	169656	169422	169233	169033	169048	94101	94180	94137	94093	94137	94144
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	8034	8419	12091	11667	10691	12041	8353	10615	9060	8185	6689
International migrant stock, total	250110					242446					242324
International migrant stock (% of population)	0,819124					0,737177					0,683215
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 242324 Host Country: 1211118
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the UK										1,211.1 thousands, 3.4% of total population (34.9 million, 2009)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 45.2%										242.3 thousands, 0.7% of total population
Egypt	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	4,671608957										
Net migration	-945704					-370780					-346922
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	6840	7230	80494	88749	90343	88946	88022	97556	97861	94406	95056
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	3953	4678	6442	5735	5376	6291	7613	6799	6780	6990	6913
International migrant stock, total	169149					246745					244714
International migrant stock (% of population)	0,25004132					0,33252602					0,301665127
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 244714 Host Country: 3741055
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: Italy										3,739.1 thousands, 4.4% of total population (83 million, 2009)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 46.6%										244.7 thousands, 0.3% of total population
Libya	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	4,315018										
Net migration	-20300					-20300					-20300
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	11543	11664	11666	11897	12166	12166	2760	4098	6713	9005	7923
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	619	888	1455	1570	1720	1575	1573	1954	2084	2202	2309
International migrant stock, total	558770					617536					682482
International migrant stock (% of population)	10,68151					10,70307					10,7391
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 682482 Host Country: 110080
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: The UK, Germany and Italy										110.1 thousands, 1.7% of total population (6.4 million, 2009)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 35.5%										682.5 thousands, 10.4% of total population

Morocco	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	18,59199										
Net migration	-500000					-614000					-675000
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	2105	2091	2127	2121	2121	219	503	786	766	773	792
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	392	363	1268	1291	1318	2920	4710	4039	3533	2286	2284
International migrant stock, total	53124					51020					49098
International migrant stock (% of population)	0,184502					0,167871					0,153665
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 49098 Host Country: 3016631
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany										3,016.6 thousands, 9.3% of total population (32 million, 2009)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 49.7%										49.1 thousands, 0.2% of total population
Tunisia	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population)	12,63446										
Net migration	-55624					-80599					-20000
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	436	97	102	99	90	87	93	101	94	92	89
Refugee population by country or territory of origin	1207	1368	2542	2563	2518	3129	2844	2507	2349	2260	2174
International migrant stock, total	36221					34881					33591
International migrant stock (% of population)	0,378742					0,347801					0,318425
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010*	Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN										Home Country: 33591 Host Country: 651737
Stock of emigrants in 2010	Top destination EU countries: France, Italy, Germany and Belgium										651.6 thousands, 6.3% of total population (10.4 million, 2009)
Stock of immigrants in 2010	Females as percentage of immigrants: 49.3%										33.6 thousands, 0.3% of total population
Comparison of the North African Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US\$)											
Algeria	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	790	670	1070	1750	2460	1950	2527 (a)	2906	2202	2059	2031
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
(a): 2.2% of GDP in 2006											
For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$2.6 bn, net ODA received US\$0.3 bn, total international reserves US\$148.1 bn, exports of goods and services US\$79.1 bn in 2008.											
Egypt	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	2852	2911	2893	2961	3341	5017	5330 (a)	7656	8694	7150	7681
Workers' remittances	2852	2911	2893	2961	3341	5017	5330	7656	8694	7150	..
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows	32	35	14	79	13	57	135	180	241	255	..
Workers' remittances	32	35	14	79	13	57	135 (b)	180	241	255	..
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
(a): 5.0% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006											
For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$9.5 bn, net ODA received US\$1.3 bn, total international reserves US\$34.3 bn, exports of goods and services US\$53.8 bn in 2008.											

Libya	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	9	10	7	8	10	15	16 (a)	16	16	14	16
Workers' remittances	6	5	3	3	5	7	6
Compensation of employees	3	5	4	5	5	8	10
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows	463	683	694	676	790	914	945 (b)	762	964	1,000	..
Workers' remittances	454	675	776	644	940	854	880	762	964
Compensation of employees	9	8	10	32	35	60	65
Migrants' transfer
<i>(a): 0.03% of GDP in 2006; (b): 1.9% of GDP in 2006</i>											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$4.1 bn, net ODA received US\$0.1 bn, total international reserves US\$96.3 bn, exports of goods and services US\$62.8 bn in 2008.</i>											
Morocco	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	2161	3261	2877	3614	4221	4590	5451 (a)	6730	6895	6271	6447
Workers' remittances	2161	3261	2877	3614	4221	4589	5451	6730	6894	6271	..
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer	0	0	1
Outward remittance flows	29	36	36	44	42	40	41 (b)	52	58	61	..
Workers' remittances	23	27	30	34	34	35	38	49	54	60	..
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer	6	9	6	10	8	5	3	3	3	1	..
<i>(a): 9.5% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006</i>											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$2.5 bn, net ODA received US\$1.2 bn, total international reserves US\$22.7 bn, exports of goods and services US\$32.6 bn in 2008.</i>											
Tunisia	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (estimate)
Inward remittance flows	796	927	1071	1250	1431	1393	1510	1716	1977	1966	1960
Workers' remittances	796	927	1071	1107	1268	1195	1304	1446	1725	1,727	..
Compensation of employees	143	163	198	206	269	252	238	..
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows	27	24	20	17	13	16	16	15	16	13	..
Workers' remittances	21	21	13	11	7	7	7	7	6
Compensation of employees	7	6	8	10	8	10
Migrants' transfer	6	3	8	7	6
<i>(a): 5.0% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006</i>											
<i>For comparison: net FDI inflows US\$2.6 bn, net ODA received US\$0.5 bn, total international reserves US\$9.0 bn, exports of goods and services US\$24.6 bn in 2008.</i>											
Source: The World Bank 2008 and 2011											

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