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UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE FRANKFURT PARLIAMENT
THE CASE FOR THE GUTTMAN SCALE

Donald J. Mattheisen(+) 

Abstract: Though the unidimensional Guttman scale is a relatively primitive statistical technique compared with multidimensional methods such as factor analysis, it does have its uses. Its simplicity is a virtue, for its meaning can be easily understood. It is merely a way of pointing out who voted which way on a series of questions, given the existence of a scalar voting pattern. My example is roll-call voting in the Frankfurt Parliament, which exhibits a remarkably large left-right ideological scale. Since many of the scalar votes deal clearly with significant constitutional questions I have been able to distinguish 8 fairly distinct ideological positions and to classify each ranked deputy accordingly. Comparing these scale score categories with party membership uncovers the ideological standpoints of the parties as well. There is of course still plenty of room for more sophisticated analysis of the Frankfurt Parliament's roll-call voting, especially since this study uses only part of the data.

One of the projects of the Center for Historical Social Research - the sponsor of this journal - is the collection and analysis of roll-call votes in German parliaments. In a recent article Heinrich Best published some of his observations on that subject, giving special attention to the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848/49, for which the Center has a large set of machine-readable roll-calls. He observed among other things that, as in most legislatures, the voting patterns in the Frankfurt Parliament are multidimensional; and he argued that a satisfactory analysis requires a multidimensional statistical method such as factor analysis rather than the unidimensional Guttman scaling, which "is becoming unfashionable in roll-call analysis" precisely for that reason.(1) Best's observation is perfectly correct, and his argument for a multidimensional method of scaling is unexceptionable. Yet it can happen that a relatively primitive method like Guttman scaling has advantages that justify its application even when a more sophisticated method is available. I certainly do not want to deprecate factor analysis, which Best has already employed to good effect. But I would like to point out here that Guttman scaling has a unique quality that makes it just as useful.

That quality is, in a word, comprehensibility. Guttman scaling is extremely simple in concept, and the meaning of a Guttman scale score is easy even for the statistical illiterate to grasp. The technique merely gives quantitative expression to a particular pattern of consistent voting. The consistent pattern exists when a legislature divides on a given set of votes in such a way that it has only yes voters, no voters, and voters who consistently say yes on some votes and no on the others - but not vice versa.(2)

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The clearest and simplest illustration would involve matters of fact. Imagine a legislature responding to these two questions: Are you over 5 feet tall? Are you over 6 feet tall? The shortest legislators would answer no-no, those of medium height would answer yes-no, and the tallest would respond with yes-yes. But nobody would answer no-yes because one is not, in fact, both short and tall. Thus the consistent voting pattern would reflect the fact that there are short, medium and tall legislators. They would sort themselves into those three categories with their votes. Those categories could be identified by Guttman scale scores given on the basis of the number of the respondents' yes votes: the shortest would get O's, the middle-sized 1's, and the tallest 2's. The significance of each score is obvious. A somewhat more realistic example involving matters of opinion would be the two questions: Shall we raise taxes by at least 10%? Shall we raise taxes at least by 100%? The three likely responses would again be no-no, yes-no, and yes-yes; it is unlikely that any of the respondents would object to a 10% tax increase but not to a 100% increase. Of course in matters of opinion anything is possible, and the apparently inconsistent responses might possibly be forthcoming. In that case the prerequisite pattern of consistent answers would be lacking, and no Guttman scales could be constructed. But the chances are that our legislators would sort themselves into the 3 groups of stand-patters, modest tax-raisers, and big spenders - scale scores of 0, 1 and 2 respectively, based on their yes votes. Here too the meaning of a scale score is plain. To be sure, there are some tricky technical aspects to Guttman scaling when you start working with it in practice. But my point is that it is very simple in principle. You could explain it to any member of your history department.

Not so with factor analysis. Here we enter the sterile world of mathematics, where the subject matter is not yeas and nays but correlation matrices and the several types of variance. With scientific rigor and sophistication the method searches out the sources of statistical variance and reduces them to a limited number of "factors" around which one can group the mathematically related roll-call votes. Legislators can be given "factor scores" to rank them on each factor. The result is analogous to Guttman scaling: a factor takes the place of a scale, and factor scores substitute for Guttman scale scores. And in fact when both methods are employed on the same data the results are usually similar - as they should be, since both methods are supposed to uncover and to measure relationships that are already embedded in the roll-call record. But what a difference when it comes to explaining the nature of these relationships in concrete terms! We have seen how simple and clear is the Guttman scale relationship. But it is virtually impossible to emerge from the austere realm of factor analysis into the everyday world of concrete imagery. What is the meaning of a factor score? To answer that question one plunges backward into the equations, not forward into the arena of legislative activity. And the answer, once obtained, remains abstract and mathematical - useful in some ways, but not in others. Such an answer is particularly hard to communicate to other members of the history department in the ordinary language that we all possess in common.

Since legislative voting behavior is usually multidimensional, as Best pointed out, factor analysis is clearly the appropriate method to use in obtaining a complete description of it. But one is not always looking for a complete description. Let us return to the Frankfurt Parliament. Best ran 52 of its roll-calls through a factor analysis program. He found that over half of them (27 roll-calls) had high loading on a single factor, which upon examination he concluded represented a "right-left dimension". Of the remainder, 10 represent a "particularist versus unitarian" dimension. Some other roll-calls seem to have had high loading on single factors. Best
concluded from this experiment, quite correctly, that the voting here was multidimensional, presumably showing that it was not all determined by party loyalty; thus further study of its determinants could be rewarding, since it might reveal forces hitherto concealed. (3) Interesting as this discovery of multidimensionality is, however, it is not the only striking feature to emerge from his analysis. Consider the unusually high proportion of roll-calls that fit the large right-left dimension: obviously, Frankfurt's deputies handled many of their problems in general ideological terms, especially if they didn't involve the issue of particularism versus unitarianism. Given the fact that the ideological views of these men have long been a matter of interest, this ideological dimension alone deserves some attention. The question is, can it help us to understand better the ideological positions of the various factions? If so, it is useful. To be sure, the answer to this question would leave many others unanswered and multidimensional analysis might address them more successfully. But the first question is fascinating enough to be taken up all by itself.

The large factor tells us that a series of these roll-call votes called forth ideological responses. It might be instructive to spread these votes out along the left-right spectrum to see just where the ideological cleavages lay, and then to sort out the deputies into their ideological categories. Can factor analysis help us here? We have seen that the interpretation of factor scores is not an easy matter. But if we created a giant Guttman scale with these roll-calls so that high scale scores fall on the left and low scores on the right, it would tell us this: That the highest scorers voted left on all those questions, the lowest scorers voted right on them all, and those in between voted left on some and right on the others, their exact scale score showing precisely which is which. In short, it would provide us with something like a huge questionnaire showing exactly where each deputy stood on a big range of issues. If, compared with factor analysis, the method is lacking something in sophistication, it makes up for that deficiency in helping us to address an old and interesting question: what did Frankfurt's parliamentary factions really stand for?

Let me give some answers to that question from my own work. Of the Frankfurt Parliament's 297 roll-call votes I examined the 225 that seemed to have some substantive meaning - votes that were not procedural or too difficult to interpret. The conventional criterion of scalability between any 2 votes is the statistic Yule's Q, an index that reaches a value of 1.0 when they are perfectly scalable - if there are no non-scale responses at all. It is not customary to demand perfection in these matters, but to be satisfied with an approximately scalar pattern yielding a Q of .8 or .9 for each comparison. The search uncovered a scalar pattern similar to what Best found with factor analysis: at the .9 level of Q a large right-left scale of 95 votes, a smaller particularist-unitary scale (mostly of grossdeutsch-kleindeutsch questions) of 32 votes, and a tiny scale of 4 votes having to do with Polish matters. I am concerned here only with the large right-left scale, which I expanded to 128 roll-calls by lowering the minimum value for Q to .8 in order to bring in as many of these ideologically related votes as possible. This is the raw material for the Guttman scale.

But the raw material is almost overwhelming. For one thing, all 128 questions are not of equal importance. Some deal with trivialities, others are crucially significant. In this paper I use only a few roll-calls that seem most enlightening. For another thing, they do not automatically separate the deputies into well-defined blocs. Divisions are sparse at the extremes (indicating few lop-sided votes), but they tend to bunch up toward the middle, with marginals (defined here as "left" votes) occurring at every
point along the scale between .30 and .60. I have chosen only 7 significant roll-calls and constructed the Guttman scale with them, using the other scalable votes mainly to corroborate the importance of those points. That avoids the technical difficulties of actually building a Guttman scale from massive numbers of votes.

Table 1 shows the roll-calls used, which I identify (here and elsewhere) with the letter V (for vote) followed by the page number in the stenographic record — for example, V5192 is the roll-call vote that begins on page 5192 of Wigard's Stenographischer Bericht.(4) They make a scale of 8 positions, ranging from 0 for the most conservative to 7 for the most radical. I have given each scale position a descriptive label, which I will discuss below.

The frequency column shows the proportion of deputies with each score. The scale was created by SPSS, which gave it a coefficient of reproducibility of .943 and a coefficient of scalability of .832.(5)

**TABLE I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Score</th>
<th>Marginal Frequency in %</th>
<th>Roll-Call Vote</th>
<th>&quot;Left&quot; vote</th>
<th>Ideological Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>V5192: State parliaments to be given the right to initiate legislation.</td>
<td>Moderate conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>V5346: The franchise to require a high property qualification.</td>
<td>Moderates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>V4120: Suspensive veto for ordinary legislation</td>
<td>Liberal monarchists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>V3910: The nobility to be abolished &quot;as a class&quot;.</td>
<td>Democratic monarchists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>V6045: The states may change their form of government only through the amendment procedure.</td>
<td>Latent republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>V593: The head of the Provisional Government to have the title of President.</td>
<td>Probable republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>V4800: Any German is eligible to be elected head of state.</td>
<td>Ardent republicans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I will discuss the scale with reference not only to the 7 selected votes but also to the other scalable roll-calls that could have been included and that help to amplify it. The 3 most rightward positions, scale scores 0-2, belong together as varieties of a conservative standpoint. Men with those scores, 40% of the assembly altogether, voted against just about all of the reform proposals considered - scale score 0 literally against all of them, scale score 1 against all but 1, and scale score 2 against most of them. Their common viewpoint seems to have been what in 1848 was usually called konstitutionell: they wanted for Germany a constitutional order that would resemble that of the pre-March constitutional states, where a powerful monarch dominated a largely consultative parliament with few real legal or political controls over his actions. There are some differences among them. The most conservative (scale score 0) rejected a proposal to give to the state parliaments in the new federal German Empire the right to initiate legislation, a measure passed by 87% of the assembly. Even when one considers the hazards of interpreting a negative vote this is not a progressive position; "conservative" is not too strong a label. Those with scale score 1 voted in favor of that measure, but they sided with the conservatives in all other matters, including a high property qualification for the right to vote. They are thus a little more moderate in their conservatism - "Moderate Conservatives". Finally, those with scales score 2 sided with the o's and the r's on all but those two items. That is, they are "Moderates" because they favored giving legislative initiative to the state parliaments and also a lower property qualification for the franchise. But in all other matters in this scale they were at one with their colleagues on the right.

There are several roll-calls around the .60 level that help to define the common position of this conservative bloc more clearly. One is on the question of the veto for the German Emperor, which was a particularly sensitive question. The famous Professor Dahlmann argued passionately for an absolute veto on national security grounds, but it lost by a narrow margin (V4100, with a marginal - proportion of the vote that is "left" - of .56). After much rancorous debate the Parliament then adopted a mild form of suspensive veto, one that gave the Emperor ample opportunity to try to reverse it if he wished (V4100, .60). Even then he would retain an absolute veto over constitutional amendments, a provision confirmed a little later by a significant majority (V4994, .43). But the Konstitutionelle (that is, scale scores 0-2) held out to the end for an absolute veto in all cases.

The constitution granted the federal government special powers for use in emergencies - to suspend constitutional guarantees concerning arrest, search and public assembly under conditions of war or upheaval (see paragraph 197). While the Parliament's majority granted these powers to the federal executive on condition that the suspensions last no more than 14 days before the Reichstag be summoned for its approval, the conservative bloc would have permitted the government to decide when, or even whether, to secure the approval of the Reichstag (V5021, .58); and it sought to add freedom of the press to the list of suspendable rights (V3975, .59). The issue here is whether there ought to be some political control over the Emperor's constitutional emergency powers. To some degree it presents a choice between monarchial and representative government, and the conservatives - here as elsewhere in the voting record - tended strongly to favor the monarch when faced with that choice.

The Parliament passed a surprisingly democratic electoral law for the Volkshaus, the lower chamber of the projected Reichstag. It enfranchised most males 25 years of age and older, and it included direct elections, the secret ballot, and equal electoral districts. As one might expect, the
conservatives voted against it (V5556, .57). In particular, they went on
record as objecting to direct elections (V5535, .57) and favoring a property
qualification (V5349, .55). They also objected to a provision of the law
forbidding the government to refuse civil servants a leave of absence for
the purpose of accepting election to the Volkshaus (V5408, .57). Many German
governments had long tried to protect conservative parliamentary majorities
by such tricks. The Frankfurt conservatives evidently wished them to retain
that option in the future.

Also instructive here is a vote on what became the second sentence of
paragraph 147 of the constitution: "No religious association enjoys special
privileges from the state; no state church exists." The conservative
deputies voted against it (V4129, .56), opposing one of the most distinctive
propositions of 19th-century liberalism. Similarly, they opposed abolishing
capital punishment (V3943, .60).

TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milani</th>
<th>Casino</th>
<th>Landsberg</th>
<th>Augsburger Hof</th>
<th>Württemberger Hof</th>
<th>Westendhal</th>
<th>Deutscher Hof</th>
<th>Donnersberg</th>
<th>Frequency Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Conservatives</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Moderate Conservatives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Moderates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Liberal Monarchists</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Democratic Monarchists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Latent Republicans</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Probable Republicans</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Ardent Republicans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The source for party membership is Eisenmann,
Die Parteien der teutschen Reichsversammlung,
Erlangen 1848.
Table II shows that the party grouping generally followed the ideological scale \((R=0.916)\), even if some parties in the center were unusually tolerant. It also shows that the conservative-Konstitutionelle bloc of scale scores 0-2 is largely identical with the Milani and Casino parties, together with the right wings of the Landsberg and Württemberger Hof and excluding a handful of Casino members on the party's left. That is interesting in view of the fact that the Casino is usually regarded as a centrist party, as distinct from the avowedly conservative Milani. Here the two parties appear to cohabit in the same generally conservative region, at least with respect to these scalable issues. Many of the most prominent Casino members have the most conservative voting records: Bassermann, Beckerath, George Beseler, Dähnemann, Detmold, Droysen and Jürgens all have scores of 0, while Duncker, Haym, Hergenhahn, Langerfeld, Lette, Mathy, Raumer and Waitz have scores of 1. (Unfortunately some top leaders of the party like Gagern and Simson could not be given scale scores because they voted infrequently; they were too busy being ministers or Parlamentspräsidienten).(8) This somewhat unexpected result tends to confirm two recent reinterpretations of the Frankfurt Parliament. Werner Boldt and Wolfram Siemann, from different perspectives and using different sorts of evidence, both conclude that the so-called "moderate liberals" at Frankfurt, principally Casino members, have been misnamed. In fact, says Boldt, they called themselves conservatives rather than liberals. They supported authoritarian political and constitutional measures. If they did temporarily practice parliamentary government at Frankfurt it was only because they had a majority there and that was the best way to shut out the influence of the left. According to Siemann their language was full of notions borrowed from the very conservative historical school of law, which had influenced many of them. He calls their viewpoint "historical-organological constitutional-monarchical conservatism".(9) Thus both authors maintain that the "moderates" were really conservatives. The voting records do indeed make it appear so.

Opposing this conservative bloc, and providing the necessary edge for majorities sufficient to make the Frankfurt constitution a liberal document, were the men of the center - scale scores 3 and 4. I have labelled them "Liberal Monarchists" and "Democratic Monarchists" since unlike the republicans to their left they did not question monarchy as such, but they do represent different degrees of fairly progressive reformism within the nominally monarchical fold. All but a few of them were on the left side of all the divisions we have so far discussed: the suspensive veto, the abolition of capital punishment, the electoral democratic law, the role for parliament in constitutional emergencies, and the abolition of the state church. But the Democratic Monarchists (4's) distinguished themselves from the Liberal Monarchists (3's) in several ways, perhaps most clearly by providing the margin of victory for the sensational vote that abolished the aristocracy "as a class", which ended up as Paragraph 137 of the constitution. (V3910, .52). This was a measure first introduced four months earlier in bolder language, which was twice defeated in that form (V1340, .37 and V3901, .44), but finally secured the necessary majority after the inclusion of the phrase "as a class". Nobody could properly explain what that meant, but it was intended to soften the attack on Germany's most powerful special interest group. It signified that even at the cost of dangerously provoking that interest group the majority was willing to give concrete expression to the ideal of civic equality. The vote was generally interpreted as a bold step in that direction.

In other ways, too, this dividing line was significant. Approximately the same majority voted to antagonize the aristocracy even further by abolishing entail, a practice by which a noble estate owner could settle his property
on its future heirs so that creditors could not secure its partition (V4290, .53; see Paragraph 170 of the constitution). They also adopted the language of Paragraph 144: "No one is obliged to reveal his religious convictions" (V3981, .52), taking a considerable step toward complete religious freedom. And they determined that being convicted of a political crime (such as lese majeste) would not exclude one from eligibility for election to the Volkshaus (V5401, .52), important because many of the pre-March opposition had been imprisoned at one time or another for crimes of that sort. Such people might otherwise have been barred from full participation in the politics of the new German state.

These centrists were evidently not very conscious of their ideological affinity, since they scattered themselves among 5 of the Parliament's 8 parties (see Table 11). They tended either to be "back-benchers" on the left wing of the Casino and Landsberg - Droge, Teichert and Zöllner are the men with scores of 4 in the Casino, while the Landsbergers with that score are Buttel, Dammers, Grüel, Krafft, Lang, Lüntzel and Quintus - or else members of the Augsburger or Württemberger Hof, some of whom were leaders: Biedermann, Fallati, and Riesser of the former and Mittermaier of the latter are good examples. Neither conservatives nor republicans, they were scorned by both extremes. Gustav Rümelin grumped that they were "the German Girondes, only much smaller in numbers, talent, and prospects ...". But Rümelin was wrong to deprecate their significance, since it was they - by definition - who gave to the constitution its moderate liberal character by blocking or modifying the more extreme proposals from either side. The literature on the German revolution tends to concentrate on the ideas and actions of right or left, since that is where the most prominent men took their places. It might be worthwhile to consider whether these relatively obscure centrists, second-rate wafflers though they may be, should not be regarded as authentic fore-runners of the German liberal movement. Their very obscurity is suggestive.

The left side of the chamber was more diverse than the right side, since there are many more roll-calls dividing it up. But in spite of their divergences on concrete issues the deputies with scale scores 5, 6 and 7 shared a fundamental commitment to popular sovereignty, the classic touchstone of the European left for the past 200 years. They manifested this value in several ways, most significantly in the roll-calls touching on the question of the republican form of government. They were not all "Ardent Republicans", to be sure; as the poet-deputy Heinrich Laube observed, "there was a great difference between the republican-minded and the outright republicans, and there was among the republicans themselves again the widest range of ideas about the immediate form of a German republic." But they did all take a positive view of republicanism, and that separates them in an important way from the men of the center and right. In addition, their eager reformism on a number of other points marks them off quite plainly as a left-wing bloc parallel to that on the right.

The roll-call I have chosen to signify the borderline of the left may seem odd: it is a vote on Paragraph 195, which forbids a change in the form of any state government without the consent of the central government, such consent to follow the rule prescribed for amending the German constitution (V6045, .45). But this strange provision started out in the constitutional committee as an adaptation of Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees to the states a "republican form of government": certain committee members wanted to reverse that for Germany and guarantee to her states a monarchial form of government. By the time it came before the assembly the language had been altered, but the intention remained the same: to require any state seeking to change itself
from a monarchy to a republic to secure the approval of the federal government, under a procedure that guarantees the Emperor - a monarch himself - an absolute veto. No better legal guarantee short of an absolute prohibition could be devised. One can reasonably infer that the 45% opposing this measure did not want to erect a perpetual dam against such a change, and thus were not unequivocally committed to defending monarchy. This inference is considerably bolstered when we look at a vote taken a short time earlier on a proposal by the left wing of the constitutional committee that the following statement be adopted as a prologue to the section on "The Central Government": "The German people is sovereign. All central governmental power is derived from the people" (V5966, .42). It was supported by nearly the same group of deputies. While not directly addressing the monarchical form of government this assertion of popular sovereignty has within it the essence of republicanism. Its proponents were, at very least, "Latent Republicans".

As one might expect, the left also came forth with a number of proposals to move the country in a democratic direction. They supported the merely suspensive veto for constitutional amendments, in a form identical to that for ordinary legislation (V4994, .43). They voted for the unqualified abolition of the aristocracy (V3901, .44). In a bid to separate civil society entirely from the church they went beyond guaranteeing religious liberty to establishing the liberty to abstain from joining "any sort of religious organization" (V3983, .47), and to providing that "The public schools may not be confessional" (V4161, .45). They supported local autonomy against the traditionally omnicompetent German state by requiring all communities to create an "organized armed force as part of a general militia (Volkswehr)" (V5618, .44) and by eliminating the usual requirement that elected local officials be confirmed by the state (V5615, .43). There is no doubt that the Frankfurt Constitution would have been a far different document, immeasurably more democratic, if this leftist bloc had had its way. And it came within a few points of success, amounting as it did to about 45% of the chamber.

But it would not have declared the republic. Only a fraction of its membership was overtly republican. Exactly what fraction is not entirely clear. That is because although the Parliament voted on the question, it did so in two different instances with slightly differing results. One instance concerned the Provisional Government installed in June, 1848, which was to "govern" until the Parliament had time to draft a constitution. Some 32% on the left wanted the head of the Provisional Government to have the republican-sounding title of President. That was defeated (V593, .32), and in its place was established a Reichsverweser - "Vicar of the Empire" - who by prearrangement was to be a Habsburg Archduke. To emphasize the monarchical character of this temporary office an amendment added that the Reichsverweser would be "non-responsible", presumably in the same sense as a constitutional monarch. That amendment was opposed by the same 32% on the left (V606, .32). Apparently each side, republican and monarchist, was trying to prejudice the eventual outcome in the constitution by creating a precedent to its own liking. The monarchists won in both instances, but in January, 1849, the die-hard republicans made a last attempt by proposing a popularly elected head of the German state, an office for which "any German is eligible" (V4800, .26). The 26% voting for that proposal are republicans without a doubt.

Then how about the men who were republicans in the first instance but not in the second? Had they changed their minds? Perhaps, but there is also the fact that many deputies treated the Provisional Government as a different kind of institution from the constitutional one. For example, the Parliament voted by a large majority (74%) to require the Reichsverweser to secure its
assent on declaring war, concluding peace, and making treaties with foreign powers (V587, not a scale vote). Yet a substantial majority rejected imposing the same requirement on the German Emperor vis à vis the Reichstag (V4882, .33). They had not changed their minds on the principle; they were merely conscious of dealing with two different types of regime. The Frankfurt Parliament had responsibility for guiding the nation to successful unification, and it could not credibly delegate that responsibility to a Provisional Government. But an established Emperor was a different matter, and the majority, at least, sought to give him most of the powers traditionally held by German monarchs, including sole responsibility for foreign and military affairs, uncomplicated by parliamentary meddling.

This differential treatment of the Provisional and the constitutional government makes it hard to generalize from votes having to do only with the former. It is clear from the record, though, that the left was divided into at least two strata, and that the leftmost of its members were "Ardent Republicans". Though there are few other divisions to give us more insight into their intentions, one roll-call suggests that the 26% on the left had an agenda somewhat different from the others. Though nearly all the measures considered by the Parliament were of a political or constitutional rather than a social nature, some members of the left tried to propose such things as a progressive income tax and state help for the unemployed. The assembly voted by a big majority not to consider those matters, over the objection of the republicans on the left (V5143, .26).

The "Latent" and "Probable Republicans" had an affinity for the Württemberger Hof - for example, von Hermann and von Wydenbrugk - though several other center parties had their share of them: for instance, Wurm of the Augsburger Hof and Moritz Mohl and von Reden of the Westendhall. The Deutscher Hof and Donnersberg were the republican parties par excellence; nearly all of the famous radicals belonged to one of them and earned a scale score of 7: Ludwig Simon, Vogt, and Wesendonk, to name just a few.

One might suppose that the sorting-out of deputies into ideological blocs that I have done in this paper could have been accomplished just as well with other sources. But the scholarly debate involving Boldt and Siemann that I cited early in this paper shows the need for empirically documenting the deputies' positions on the issues. Roll-call votes, though they only deal with some of the issues, are a useful way of doing that. Roll-calls are frequently used uncritically by historians, as when 2 or 3 votes are selected to measure support for rival viewpoints. Every reader of this journal will of course be conscious of the need for a prior statistical examination of the roll-calls to be certain that they are in fact comparable. But it is not always appropriate to use the most powerful statistical tool available for that sort of thing. The choice of method ought to depend on what you are looking for. Factor analysis is a splendid device for an exhaustive study of the patterns of roll-call voting. But if you are trying to determine who voted for or against particular measures, then Guttman scaling seems to me to be the proper tool. I am not sure that factor analysis could do the same job.
FOOTNOTES

1 Heinrich Best, "Recruitment, Careers and Legislative Behavior of German Parliamentarians 1848-1953", in: Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, No. 23 (July 1982), p. 41.

2 Guttman scaling is explained in Lee F. Anderson et al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, Evanston, 1966, pp. 89-121, and Duncan MacRae, Jr., Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting, New York, 1970, pp. 11-38. I have adapted my explanatory examples from the latter. The same two works discuss factor analysis as well.

3 Best, pp. 23-25.


7 See Paragraph 101 of the constitution: A Reichstag measure turned down by the Emperor could not be passed again in the same session; only if it were repeatedly enacted in each of the next three regular Reichstag sessions would it become law over the Emperor's veto. An election would intervene, so the new Reichstag would have to be included in the process. As Gículich pointed out in the discussion in the constitutitonal committee, this came close to an absolute veto de facto: Rudolph Huebner, ed., Aktenstücke und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Nationalversammlung aus dem Nachlaß von Johann Gustav Droysen (Stuttgart 1924), p. 535. The roll-call I used is V4120, the vote on first reading. The majority improved substantially on second reading (V6030). But that second roll-call is not a scale vote. It does not fit the simple right-left division pattern because the enhanced majority came about through the famous Simon-Gagern Pact, by which some conservative champions of the absolute veto switched sides on the issue in order to induce some left-wing opponents of the hereditary Emperor to reciprocate on that question.

8 By inventing an ingenious system for handling missing values Heinrich Best and Reiner Kuznia, "Die Behandlung fehlender Werte bei der seriellen Analyse namentlicher Abstimmungen: Oder: Wege zur Therapie des Horror Vacui", in: Historical Social Research/istorische Sozialforschung, No. 26 (April 1983), pp. 49-82, have been able to assign factor scores to nearly all the Frankfurt deputies on the analogous factor, no matter how few votes they cast. Since their system does not seem to be adaptable to Guttman scaling I must concede that important advantage to factor analysis.


13 It is actually a vote on the second part of Paragraph 195, the part specifying the procedure. V6045 is the vote on second reading; it passed first reading by a similar margin (V4978, 44).

14 See the discussion in Huebner, Aktenstücke, pp. 356-365.

15 See inter alia the statements by Dahlmann and Wurm in Wigard, Stenographischer Bericht, p. 524, pp. 4878-4880. The proposal to give the Frankfurt Parliament a decisive role in these matters originated with the conservatives on the constitutional committee, not with the democrats: ibid., p. 358.