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REGULATED PROSTITUTION IN BRUSSELS, 1844 - 1877.
A POLICY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

Sophie de Schaepdrijver (+)

Abstract: The 19th century regulation of commercial sex was a nearly all-European municipal initiative. The city of Brussels offers a classic example as well as extensive source material, which has made it possible to trace the history of the closed "system" of prostitution installed by regulation, from its beginnings in 1844 to its de facto downfall in 1877. A comprehensive view is given of its daily reality and of the identity of the people involved (prostitutes and brothel-keepers). The conclusion is that the implementation of this policy has never lived up to its high standards.

Regulation of prostitution in its "orthodox" form first came into existence in Paris and was therefore called the "French system". After a few attempts undertaken during the 1760s and 1770s, it began to take shape during the Convention, and from then on grew piecemeal during the first four decades of the 19th century. With the Napoleonic Wars the idea had been introduced in other European cities; Brussels closely mirrored the Parisian evolution of progressive extension of the police's arbitrary powers in the matter, before arriving at a comprehensive regulatory code in 1844, one year after the French capital.

The Brussels system was regarded by the British regulationist Dr. Acton as "very stringent"(1), very analogous to the one in Paris, and highly representative of continental regulation in general. Other contemporaries praised its degree of detail, and it inspired a large number of municipal regulating efforts in other countries.

The general idea behind regulation, most forcibly put forward by the French social hygienist Dr. Parent Duchâtelet(2) - whom Acton called the "Newton of Harlotry" - is that, prostitution being inevitable and its prohibition impossible if not actually dangerous, it should be dealt with by means of a policy of controlled toleration. Indeed, if kept under continuous control by the police, prostitution would cease to carry both moral and sanitary danger and become instead an organized, clean public utility not unlike a well-kept sewer.(3)

This control was arrived at by confining the "commerce" to a closed circuit: all prostitutes had to register on the list of public women, where a personal file was opened containing name, age, birth certificate, antecedents, social status of parents and sanitary condition together with subsequent observations on their behaviour, changes of address, and health. They had to submit to a medical examination by municipally appointed doctors twice a week; if found non-contaminated by venereal disease, they were given a card which they had to show to any policeman, doctor, or client asking for it. In the opposite case, they were forced to undergo treatment in a special hospital and were only discharged when considered recovered. Any infringement of the host of rules regulating their behaviour, such as "indecent" dress, drunkenness, staying away from sanitary control, and so on, was punished

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with short but exceedingly frequent stays in, again, a specially designed prison.

Ideally the trade itself had only to take place in special brothels, tolerated by the municipal authorities and always within reach of the police. The keepers of these houses had to have a permit or "tolérance"—hence the term "maison de tolérance"—conferred on them by mayor and police. The permit was only given after a scrupulous examination of the location of the premises (they had to be situated at a certain distance from churches or schools, preferentially in quiet, peripheral sidestreets in neighbourhoods which were neither too well-to-do nor too working class), their internal disposition, the morality and judiciary record of the candidate keeper, and so on. It could be revoked at any moment, which resulted in complete obedience from the part of the keeper, whom this measure could ruin. Obedience implied keeping the establishment and its inmates quiet and clean, banning non-registered prostitutes as well as minors of both sexes from the premises, and punctually paying the sanitary tax. The latter was calculated on the number of inmates and the "category" of the business. Indeed, the tolerated brothels were divided in three categories according to clientele, neighbourhood, and type of building; a maximum price was stipulated for each category.

In Brussels as everywhere, the lobby drafting the regulation—composed of doctors from the garrison and the "Conseil de salubrité", and police authorities—recognized that it would be quite impossible to immediately force all prostitutes to live and work in closed brothels. Although keeping the trade out of the public's and in the police's view was the main idea behind regulating it, a too strict and over-hasty repression of street prostitution would have the inverse effect of driving all public women into complete clandestinity; mindful of Parent's maxim "tolerate at first what you cannot repress", the regulationists in Brüssel allowed for a special category of independent registered prostitutes. Hence the lists comprised two kinds of public women: the brothel inmates and the "filles insolées".

The latter did not have an easy life under regulation, as the police by all means tried to diminish their numbers in order to eventually confine all prostitutes to the panoptical brothel world. They were alleged to be more dangerous from both a moral and a sanitary point of view, and served much more frequent and longer prison sentences than did the brothel women. As the police had granted themselves a right to enter their lodgings at any time, they were soon known to be prostitutes and could no longer live where they pleased. They were not allowed to walk or solicit in the wealthier streets and squares; the houses where they usually took their clients to, the so-called "maisons de passe", had to have a "tolérance" as well and their keepers had to pay tax according to the category they had been allocated. Again, there were three categories, each with different maximum prices. Just like the independent prostitutes, these keepers were treated much more severely than their counterparts in the closed circuit; the criteria for location were distinctly more rigid and seizures of permit more frequent. The police never stopped complaining about the "incessant" comings and goings of prostitutes and clients this kind of house occasioned in the neighbourhood.

In short, the regulation left nothing to chance. One immediately senses that this complex system of brothels, "maisons de passe", categories, permits, taxes, brothel women and independent prostitutes, sanitary control and hunt for clandestine prostitution must have necessitated immense administrative
and financial efforts. The question should be not so much why, at a certain point, it has ceased to function, as why it has ever functioned - if at all.

i. EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM, 1844-1877*

In July 1844, an order was given to all brothel- and 'maison de passe' keepers to hand in a request for a 'tolérance'; in spite of all rhetoric, this did not result in any grand rearrangement of the city's houses of ill fame. Most establishments simply received the permit and continued to exist as they had before regulation, albeit now officially placed in some category or other. A few houses were closed because of their location on a too commercial thoroughfare; throughout the period under examination, clandestine brothels disguised as hotels, restaurants, tobacco or liquor shops - continued to pop up on that spot, attesting to the inherent immovability of prostitutional offer and demand.

The underlying desire of the police to limit the number of "maisons de passe" is clear from the way in which requests were handled. Most houses were automatically categorized as closed brothels, even if the candidate had expressly stated otherwise; the latter then had to choose between a brothel 'tolérance' or none at all. Since, as a rule, the brothel manager kept almost all of the money earned by the inmates, huge profits could be made with such houses; but they also necessitated a more considerable starting capital and continuous financial and other efforts, as the women had to be fed, clothed, and lodged, and a large number of clients was not always to be reckoned upon. As a result, many brothel-keepers continuously entreated the municipal authorities to place them in the 'maison de passe' type; only once in all 34 years was a positive reply given to such a request.

A similar phenomenon is to be witnessed within both types of houses: the police often put third-class candidates one category higher(6) - presumably because of the higher taxes to be paid and very reluctantly, if at all, changed their minds.(7)

One of the reasons why life had become harder for the 'maisons de passe' was, that the new regulation forbade them to accommodate "civil" couples, who had constituted the bulk of their clientele before 1844 - an attempt, presumably, to regulate all extramarital sex. In June 1851, after the nth petition from the keepers, who pleaded that this measure was especially ruinous because many prostitutes took their clients home with them, the administration officially interdicted this habit; the number of 'maisons de passe' then increased (graph 1). Most of the new ones, however, did not really serve as "hourly hotels" but rather as lodging-houses for prostitutes; to allow these women to continue to work there, the keepers gave in and requested the official permit, which meant police control, taxes, and a landlord raising the rent - but that could easily be passed on to the sublodgers, the public women.(8)

As Graph 1 shows, both types of tolerated houses tended to be concentrated in the second and third categories, catering, as qualitative sources attest, the former to artisans, shopkeepers, and clerks, and the latter to casual labourers, street peddlars, and soldiers. Labourers, domestic, casual and other, accounted for over half of Brussels' active population in 1846(9); the rural crisis in Flanders drove masses of impoverished migrants to the capital.(10) The housing conditions in Brussels being worse, at the time of the 1846 census, than in other Belgian cities(n), the hard-pressed working population often could not afford to raise or expand a family. As far as the demand is concerned, then, the first decades certainly favoured the growth of lower and lower middle class regulated prostitution. The female labour
market typically offering for the most part low paid and highly insecure jobs such as domestic service and the needle trades.(12) The offer was not lacking either.

The size of the group of independent prostitutes (graph 2) and 'maisons de passe' (supra), coupled with a decline in the numbers of third-class brothels from 1853 onwards, alarmed the police. A royal arrest of January 1854, stating that forced treatment for venereal disease, unlike other medical assistance, had to be paid by the community where the illness had been caught and not by the birth community of the diseased person, carried police hostility towards the independents to extremes.(13) In 1855, they were forbidden to walk the streets after sunset and to live in a 'maison de passe'. Soliciting and taking lodgings in such houses having been the only ways in which prostitutes could make themselves known as such, the trade was now rendered very difficult for them: the same applied to the 'maisons de passe', who had to expel the lodgers who were their only source of income (supra). Some closed down, others became brothels. Hence, the latter's number attains a maximum in 1856, before starting a continuous decline. A short-lived and artificial success as was the one obtained with the prostitutes: the numbers of the independent group did decline, but so did those of the overall population. The 'isolées' had obviously chosen to exercise their trade clandestinely rather than resort to brothels; most of them went to live extra muros, where there was no regulation.(14) This is one of the factors contributing to the system's growing obsolescence: as the actual town, in 1856, did not represent more than 65% of the Brussels conurbation, a strictly intra muros control (the suburbs stubbornly refused to introduce regulation, on financial grounds) could not hope to archived much.

Obviously, other factors were at work which the regulationists had not foreseen: a slight increase in living standards, what with the immigrants gradually integrating into the urban structures, was modifying the nature of demand. The assembly-line sex offered by the too well-known official brothels no longer satisfied the customers who were becoming increasingly attracted by the "illusion of seduction" offered by clandestine prostitutes passing as "honest girls".(15) In the case of Brussels, the decline of the closed brothel starts in 1856.(16)

In 1860, eleven tolerated houses of the second category had their businesses placed in the highest. The reason cited in their requests is that first-class brothels can have their prostitutes inspected at home; the sanitary service having moved to a much further-off location earlier that year, raising the category would spare both keepers and inmates a long and embarrassing bi-weekly walk. Another reason might have been, that more customers were able to afford the prices of first-category houses; anyway, although maximum prices were laid down, there is no record of the police's actually controlling this aspect of brothel life or of keepers being charged with transgression of this rule. All but two of the "upwardly mobile" brothels were situated in the same street, hence probably a "domino-effect". There nevertheless remained a huge distinction between the 'parvenus' and the other first-class businesses, in terms of staff, furnishing, naturally type of neighbourhood, and possibly clientele.

As the uselessness of the brothel system dawned on them, the police's enthusiasm began to wear thin; Parent had noted as early as the 'thirties that the superintendents of the different quarters were likely to abhor a concentration of tolerated brothels in their precinct, as they always deemed the charge unequally divided over the different parts of town.(17) Two specific police sections, the 1st and the 6th, housed 70% of the official brothels
between them.(18) Both contained one notorious street where the bulk of their houses of ill fame had been concentrating "since time immemorial"; all of the buildings in these streets served the purpose of prostitution uninterruptedly, with only the keepers and the public women shifting. Complaints were as frequent as they were unheeded, until 1865 and 1866 when the superintendents of the 1st and the 6th precinct respectively, decided to close down both concentrations of houses, as indeed happened. Surprisingly enough, the brothel-keepers did not react at all. It could be that both red-light areas were already functioning at a loss before that time; maybe this is why one of them had almost completely moved to a higher category (supra), as a keepers' last attempt to make their pile before there would be no customers left at all.

These closures meant the definitive end of second-and third-class brothels. The downward trend of the closed system revealed itself to be irreversible. Demand had shifted in favour of that commercial sex which was moving and on display, as was the entire city(19), and was not confined to official houses in peripheral streets.(20) The offer may have adapted gladly to this less constraining and marginalizing pattern. At the end of the period, the only tolerated houses remaining were the sumptuous high-class brothels on the one extreme, a noisy and all too visible cluster of low 'maisons de passe' (to be closed down in 1886 after repeated complaints from the 'Societé de moralité publique') on the other. As regulated prostitution was initially designed to canalise the demands of the labouring class by way of orderly, controlled establishments, and certainly did not mean to cater to luxury tastes, it is obvious that the system had completely failed in its purpose. Indeed, these upper-class businesses had by now specialized in the high-technology, "perverse" sex which was an abomination to the regulations(21); instead of canalizing needs, they enlarged them. The "maisons de passe", by their open character and lack of discretion(22), also stimulated "vice" rather than merely holding it within bounds.

The size of the group of registered public women had dropped to its lowest in 1866, both absolutely and in relation to the city's population (graph 2); the increase then slowly restarted and gained momentum from 1874 on, which is also the point at which the number of luxury brothels began to expand.(23) However, the proportion of brothel inmates was lower, in 1880, than it had ever been; the reason for the increase in independent registered women has to be found in the regulation of 1877, which was a pure police initiative (as opposed to the medical-military-administrative consensus of 1844), and de facto marked the end of the closed system, as had also happened in Paris three years earlier. The principle of confinement of commercial sex was completely dropped in that nothing was put in the way of the independent prostitutes any more: they could take their clients home, circulate in all parts of town at all times, and so on. We may presume that control considerably slackened, if we take as an indicator that in the police papers, hardly a report or list exists for the period after 1877.

The white slavery scandal of the early 1880s, when a traffic in young English girls to Brussels brothels was discovered by British Contagous Diseases Acts repealers, soon became an antiregulationist 'cause célèbre'(24) and may have contributed to the repeal of the Acts. For Brussels, the affair succeeded in exposing the all too close links between the administration and the brothel-keepers, which resulted in the removal from office of the chief constable and the forced resignation of the mayor - but the keepers themselves were left to run their businesses in peace, and some establishments continued to exist until the interwar period; the regulation, or what was left of it, was not abolished until after the Second
World War. Obviously, the chronology of discourse and that of the actual situation took different paths. The de facto downfall of the control system, meanwhile, continued its way and at the eve of the First World War, Brussels had a total of six brothels with 37 inmates, and 145 independent registered women. (25)

2. WHERE, WHO, AND WHY: LOCATION AND RECRUITMENT PATTERNS OF REGULATED PROSTITUTION

As officialized commercial sex brought with it a considerable administration, quite a few sources have survived, be it in a chaotic state. The registers of public women, alas, have been burned, which can be called a disaster if one knows what they contained (supra). What is left are the ‘tolérance’ papers, by means of which it has proved feasible if time-consuming to build up a file on each of the different permit holders identified in the 1844-1877 period. In all, 254 people received a permit at least once (different lists attested to the exhaustiveness of this number). The archives also contain police records on the way their houses were kept. Research into rate books and "population registers" (updated censuses) made it possible to determine, among other information, the length of time a tolerated house functioned. The latter source also made possible the identification of the brothel inmates. As a result, all data could be assembled on two computer files, one containing individual information on all of the keepers, the other, data on a sample of brothel prostitutes. (26)

We are thus fairly well equipped to answer the question whether the practice of regulated prostitution ever lived up to the ideal of an invisible and orderly closed system, and what it may have meant to the people involved. Throughout the regulationist opinion and especially in the work of Parent, who was more closely connected to and familiar with police practice than any of the other medical writers, we find the firm conviction that the very presence of tolerated houses of prostitution would exert a beneficial influence on their immediate environment. As the police had a right to enter brothels and ‘maisons de passe’ at any time, these could easily serve as an observation-post from which to keep an eye on the whole (as a rule working-class) neighbourhood. (27) The brothel-keeper could even be employed as an agent of police control: "... par la surveillance qu'il exerce sur tous les habitants; (...) il s'empresse d'aller au-devant des désordres, et fait plus à lui seul qu'un grand nombre d'inspecteurs." (28)

If we take the proportion of assisted (i.e. receiving poor relief) families per street as an indicator (29), tolerated houses of the second and third categories, brothels as well as ‘maisons de passe’, were located in streets which were poorer than the surrounding neighbourhood, though not always worse off than the town in general. (30) Many of them had always been known for this trade, some having been subject, during the ‘Ancien Régime’, to enclosure regulations. None of them bore a commercial character, as ‘toléranees’ were never given to houses on busy streets; the administration’s obsession with invisibility was so pronounced that corner houses and dwellings situated on squares were declared unsuited. Much attention was given to the distance between them and historical monuments of other places of touristic interest, churches, and schools; many permits were refused because of this, although from a “trade” point of view some locations must have been very interesting, as the constant flourishing of clandestine prostitution demonstrates. The police too often forgot that prostitution was a commercial activity. Indeed, the inflexibility of the official branch was to lead to its death. As the late ‘sixties saw the ploughing-up of large parts of the urban structure, to make way for bustling boulevards flaunting wealth, regulated prostitution did not follow the demand; none of the new,
opulent buildings ever housed an official brothel.

2.1 THE BROTHEL-KEEPERS

The Brussels reality yields a completely different picture than that usually given in literature: the majority of the "madams" are men - 140 keepers or 55%. Regulationist opinion distinctly preferred according the 'tolérance' to women: in the main French cities, men were forbidden to keep a brothel. (31) This preference can well be explained in terms of the regulation principles: as the main idea was the creation of a closed hierarchical world of women, controlled by men (the medical and police authorities) and meant for men (the clients), having a man at the head of a brothel should cause a blurring of roles. Parent's empirical study led him to conclude that the management and exploitation of houses of prostitution had always been an exclusively female activity anyway, and that men played no more than a secondary role - if any - in the trade. (32) Corbin (33) and Best (34) found only madams; but it should be said that the ones in the former study exercised during a much later period (1908 - 1913), in the city of Marseille where permits were not given to men, and that there were only seventeen of them; in St. Paul (Minnesota), no more than 40 brothel-keepers pried their trade between 1861 and 1883. In towns without a 'tolérance' system, such as the British ones - both those which fell under the Contagious Diseases Acts and those which did not - it is of course very difficult to draw a picture of the brothel-keeper with any certainty. (35) Thus, we cannot conclude that Brussels was necessarily atypical in this respect: the police who, if we may judge from the frequent quotations, all seem to have kept Parent's book on their bedside cabinet, do not appear to have been aware of any discrepancy.

Gender constitutes an important difference with regard to the category of the establishment: one-quarter of the women had a house (brothel or 'maisons de passe') of the first class, as opposed to one-tenth of the men; 46% of the women manage a second- and 29% a third category house; the corresponding proportions in the male subgroup are 32 and 58%. This concentration in the upper stratum does not derive from the female keepers' forming a more "recent" part of the population: in both groups, 70% receive a permit before 1856. (36)

Lower category brothels usually had a beer shop open to the public, so we may assume that a sizeable proportion of the male permit-holders conformed to the image of public-house licensee with waitresses living in and offering special services on the side, rather than to the better-known one of closed-house madam. This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that 'maisons de passe', which were not permitted to have a pub, were more often kept by women (58%). Moreover, second-class brothels sometimes had a pub, sometimes not, depending on the location (all of the houses in one street ultimately tending to resemble one another); within this subdivision, men concentrated in the former kind. Parent noted that 'estaminet' and liquor-shop keepers liked to have prostitutes around, as they attracted customers and incited them to drink (37); he severely disapproved of this sort of establishments, as the women were much more "disorderly" than in any closed brothel. Since rooting out these houses was hardly feasible, however, the administration had to resign itself to granting them an official permit, by means of which control and order could be introduced. Thus created official brothels existed, and had to exist, only in the very shabby neighbourhoods. (38) It is not difficult to see why regularist opinion disapproved of taverns in tolerated houses: they were visible, kept their doors open, and by not serving exclusively the purpose of prostitution, in a sense demarginalized that trade, creating socializing patterns what with people "hanging around"
instead of getting the matter swiftly over and done with.

More generally, Parent did recognize - with regret - that in the case of poor, "immoral" neighbourhoods, the criteria for granting brothel-keepers a permit were to be looser than usual, as these houses had a beneficial influence (supra) and as the administration was obliged to content itself with any request for a 'tolérance' it could get in these quarters. This applied to married brothel-keepers. The principle of a man in the house ran counter to regulation, as noted before, also because the brothel-keeper had to have but one authority above her and no husband in addition to that; moreover, men could exercise authority by sheer force, and Parent loathed the idea of direct physical repression.(39) He found that, in 1830, 22% of the Parisian 'dames de maison' were married; nearly all of those exploited the lowliest and dirtiest houses. The husband usually kept an 'estaminet' at little distance from the brothel, thereby indirectly profiting from it; "most of them", Parent noted with uncharacteristic lack of precision, "are drunkards and thieves".(40) Nine out of the seventeen madams Corbin has identified, had a husband.(41) 19% of St. Paul's brothel-keepers claimed to be married; at least two of these men lived in the brothel.(42) In short, the brothel as a family business seems to be the exception in the upper strata: in the case of Plymouth and Southampton's working-class quarters, this was the prevailing pattern.(43)

In Brussels, the civil status at the moment of receiving the permit(44) is very different for women and men:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>women</th>
<th>men</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>single</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31%)</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>married</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(42%)</td>
<td>(84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>divorced</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>(1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cohabiting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>widow(er)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19%)</td>
<td>(1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, 53% of the women have no partner upon entering the trade, as opposed to a mere 11% of the men. Of the single, divorced, cohabiting and widowed males, 64% get married afterwards; the corresponding figure for the 'tenancièr' is 26% - although the age structure does not differ markedly, the mean being 36 for the men and 36.9 for the women. We may now go on to measure the influence civil status has on class of the housed, the hypothesis being that married couples tended to keep the lower category businesses. Yet, they did not. For the entire population, "civil status at permit" and "category" are distributed in much the same way. 16% of the married people have a first-class house, as compared to 17% of the group(46) in general; 42% exploit a lowest-class business, which is true for 44% of the overall population. The distribution of the other subgroups is more marked: the widow(er)s stay away from the 1st category (only 13%) and concentrate in the second and third; divorced and especially cohabiting people are more
often found keeping the lowest brothels and 'maisons de passe' (60 and 77% respectively). In the male subgroup, differences are more outspoken, but point in a direction opposed to the one expected: 83% of the unmarried men as compared to 56% of all men manage the lower houses.

We more or less assumed that keeping a closed brothel, in the case of men, would be a monopoly of those having a partner, as this probably facilitated the task of running a house with living-in women. 77% of all the males, and 78% of all the married and cohabiting ones have a brothel - not much of an evidence.

This, of course, enhances the value of the gender factor, as it is proven to influence on class of the brothel independently of civil status. Married couples are not concentrated in the lowest strata, as Parent would predict; but women, whom he preferred as brothel-keepers, were more successful - all of them except the widows, whose proportion of lowest-class exploitants is ten percentage-points higher than the general one.

The heavy emphasis on female brothel-keepers has led to the assumption that all of them were upwardly mobile ex-prostitutes. We have been able to distinguish 41% of the women as ex-prostitutes with absolute certainty: 26% yielded enough information to draw the opposite conclusion, and in 33% of the cases we simply did not know. The group of women who had been "in the trade", showed a higher incidence of upper-level tax scales; Parent already noted that ex-prostitutes, having all the required experience and knowledge of the commerce, were the more successful 'maistresses de maison'.(47) As for the men with partners, 17% of the latter had certainly been prostitutes.

The pattern of the occupations exercised immediately before obtaining the permit, can be seen in table 1 at the end of the paper. Clearly, the purely familial background - which could mean anything - dominates in the case of the women; the second largest category is prostitution (both directly(48) and indirectly). The percentage of women in the needle trades is surprisingly low if we consider the importance of this background for the recruitment of actual prostitutes (infra). Inversely, the men overwhelmingly come from a labouring occupation, the majority of those from more or less artisanal jobs threatened with pauperisation: weavers, tanners and, very often, shoemakers (23% of all the occupations classified under number "2" in table 1). Commerce has been added up with other occupations, divided into its low, middle and high component. If we measure it separately, it accounts for 15% of all known occupations; the bulk lies in the middle (food and drink retailers mostly). Commercial activities for women do not constitute more than 4% of all the backgrounds, although we had presumed that many of them, in order to feed their families, shifted from one "supplementary" resource to another (e.g. vegetable-selling to 'maison de passe'-keeping). Many of the women argue that they should receive a permit because of the children "qu'il faut élever honnêtement" (sic), as one demand put it.(49) The men invoke impossibility of "honest" labour due to deficient health, crisis, or, as in the case of the soldiers "not having learnt any skill". Soldiers and prostitutes being the two population groups regulationists devoted most of their attention to, both forming as they did a marginalized or to be marginalized set of social outcasts recruited from the lower labouring classes, it is not surprising that they are present in such relatively high numbers. Unskilled labourer ("1" in table 1), more well-off people ("3"), soldiers ("5") and servants ("9") are fairly equally divided over the civil statuses; skilled workers and the middle commerce ("2") are heavily concentrated in the category "married". 70% of the prostitutes are single. Five of these asked for the 'tolérance' because it would permit them to save enough money to marry. Seventeen out of forty-nine housewives are widows, an additional one has been left by her husband.
Those brothel keepers who were well off from the start, cluster in the first category of houses. Since luxury brothels and 'maisons de passe' necessitated a tremendous starting capital, as the furniture had to be bought from the former owner, this is hardly surprising. Both the unskilled AND the skilled labourers are heavily drawn towards the lowest category, which is more surprising. As hinted at supra, the prostitutes' presence tends to be more outspoken in the second and first categories than their numbers would allow. Ten out of fourteen soldiers have third-class houses; the latter are distinctly underrepresented in the ''housewife'' subdivision (20 percentage-points less than the general population). Finally, the people who had already been making a living out of the prostitution of third parties we admit that it is a heterogeneous set are equally divided over the categories. Four out of eight ex-servants have the less capital-intensive business of "maison de passe", in comparison with only 31% of the overall population.

After this lengthy elaboration, one is justified to ask whether or not the official category of an official house meant something with regard to the subsequent fate of its exploiter. In other words, what were the possibilities for upward social mobility? Parent maintained that, irrespective of category, a well-kept, clean, and obedient business always prospered and allowed its keeper to retire, if not in wealth, at least in comfort. In our case, this is utterly untrue. Once first class, always first class, it seems - 70% of the upper class keepers retire as rentier or proprietor; they constitute 16 out of the 38 permit holders who can do so. Still, this latter figure represents more than one-third of all the cases for which a value to this variable could be found. A closer look into the population registers however soon revealed that the ex-first class rentiers were markedly better off than the others, living as they did in the newly-built boulevard houses, surrounded by servants; rentiers and proprietors could also be found in the more modest neighbourhoods. As expected, a larger percentage of women (39) than of men (29), independently of category, can live off their rents. The destinies of the managers of second-class houses are far less brilliant: 38% have to return to subdivisions "1" and "2" of occupations, 14% are even obliged to take on a totally unskilled job such as daily labourer or street peddler. Still, 36% retire without having to work any more; but the above remark about rentiers holds. As for the third class, 62.5% take up labour again (for nearly one third of these, this means unskilled labour); a mere 6% are listed as proprietor (four out of seven of these was able to buy the hovels they had exercised their trade in, and let them to rag-pickers, independent prostitutes, street musicians, and so on, after the police had closed their brothels). Two of the women actually have to take to the streets again (none of the female permit-holders of the other classes does), and one person ends up on the poor list.

The conclusion must be that exploiting a house of prostitution was only beneficial for those who were already better off, and for those with an experience of the trade (both the prostitutes and the subdivision "8"). The Cramer's V association measure for the crosstabulation "occupation before" and "occupation after keeping a house" yields .35. Nearly one-quarter of the known cases goes back to the former profession. The labourers and servants remain so, or get worse, to an extent of 77%. Six out of seven soldiers take up labour. The prostitutes are more often upwardly mobile: 39% of them finish living off their rents. This is true for 36% of the housewives, for five out of ten of the people who were living off prostitution before holding the permit, and for an equal proportion of the already well-to-do.

Unfortunately, the sources have not permitted us to draw an equally ex-
State in the reproduction of different fractions of classes, and eventually the struggles for alliances amidst the social bloc that has the power. Those conflicts mix with harsh struggles among professional groups of penal practitioners that in consequence become particularly visible in the public debate.

FOOTNOTES

1 On the present relationship of French history and sociology, see for example Michael Pollack (1983), which we cannot discuss here.

2 That is why Bourdieu (1980: 6 especially) can analyse institutions and the habitus as two forms of reification of history.


4 For an overview, see Robert and Levy (1985).

5 This state of thing is worsened by the fact that the sociological investment of the problem has been mostly lethargic from the first World War till the sixties.

6 We could say that it reappears if we have in mind the antiquity of the Roman Empire and the role it had as an ideological reference through successive rebirths (see Anderson 1978).

7 Synthetic representation, but very clear in Genet (1984); see too for instance Bois (1976 f.e.: p. 354), Anderson (1978: 1, 18,36 f.e.) who describes a centralized feudalism; compare in Bruce Mc Farlane (quoted by Genet 1984) the notion of bastardized feudalism. To this major redistribution in favour of the nobility we have to add a minor one but more and more important directed to a State bourgeoisie.

8 about the kind, see for instance Bloch (1978 and 1983), Duby (1973). About the metaphoric role of the royal figure see Kantorowicz (1957) and Shriccoli (1974, 79-82).

9 About the mutation from suzerain-king to a sovereign-king, see for instance Lemarignier (1970, chap. 7).

10 Strayer (1979, 23 f.e. defines the modern State through the apparition of geographical and political units, development of permanent and impersonal instructions and through loyalty to the supreme authority.

11 The classic reference remains Esmein (1969). The apparition of penal is not necessarily accompanied by a passage to the inquisitorial procedure: see England. And Langbein proves (1974) that we should not overestimate the concrete reach of this procedural difference.


16 A good example by Hamscher (1976) about the incorporation into the royal edict of 1670, of the arrêts de règlements rendered during the grands jours d'Auvergne. Another by Soman (1980b), concerning the judicial origin of the mandatory appeal of judgments rendered by inferior courts.


19 Except for galleys (see especially Zysberg, 1975, 1979, 1980a, 1984). Imprisonment does not exist as a penalty, apart from a few exceptions (Deyon 1975); Castan N. (1984a). Yet precedents are to be found in the locking up of roadrunners, of children (Capul, 1983), lunatics (Foucault, 1972) and the “orders of the king” (Funk-Brentano (1903), Quetel (1978), 1981a and b) Farge et Foucault (1982).

20 See for instance, Fijnaut (1980), Lebigre (1979) and Williams (1979) who gives and enlightening view of the different meanings of the word “police” at this time (p. 5-16); see also on that point Boulet-Sautel (1980).


23 Bercé (1974a, 108 s.), It is quite interesting to compare the 20 or 23,000 guards of this national army (Cameron, 1977, 50; Corvisier, 1964, 936) with the 4,000 horse-men from the Maréchaussée.


25 Sturgill (1975), Castan N. (1980a, especially 198).

26 See for instance Castan N. (1980a, 195-211), Williams (1979, 92-94).


30 During the debates of the symposium on international history of prisons (Fontevraud, 24-26/09.1982), Y. Castan underlined that the Ancien Régime king was not the "anima" of the nation but its "protector sword".


32 In practice the voluntary or compulsory removal of the one who escapes the justice or who is banned is satisfying. Usually this temporary or permanent removing puts a stop to the trouble. To get this removal justifies the penal intervention.

33 The "cas prévôtal" draws theoretically a summary rigourous justice without a right of appeal. The monographs show that it is quick and without a possibility of appeal, but not more rigourous than the ordinary
and the 'estaminet' reality, nor to the absurdity of forced inspection of women at a time when venereal disease could not be cured anyway; and no thought was given to the fact that what was being regulated was, after all, a commerce and that it would dwindle when commercially impeded. Lastly, there was no doubt as to the justifiability of marginalizing and controlling a group of people as though they were by nature different, disorderly, and dangerous, when all evidence suggested that they were, most often, merely hard-pressed by circumstances.

In one of his moments of great insight, Parent noted that the prostitutes' love of dress and finery was not to be wondered at, in a society where everything was judged according to apparel.(68) We may distinguish here a situation of anomie in the Mertonian sense(69): certain cultural goals are set for every member of the society, but the emphasis on the institutional, "right" way of attaining those, is less outspoken. In the face of a structural impossibility, for the lower classes, to attain those goals in the standard, accepted way, the pressure towards deviation in attaining the "things worth striving for" will be intense. The goals have to be general, however: if, as was the case in Ancien Régime structures, there is a consensus that certain groups are at any rate excluded from competition, there will be less pressure. But in the plutocrat society of mid-19th-century Brussels, pecuniary success gradually became the universal goal. It was increasingly seen as the only precondition for all other forms of success; and thus we find five ex-brothel-keepers listed as voters for parliament.

This approach seems a more interesting one than an explanation which stresses the inherently larger tolerance of the labouring classes towards prostitution. As Walkowitz argues(70), the poor neighbourhoods tolerated public women because they knew what structural difficulties were; but they would probably not suffer a person's opting for deviant behaviour when other possibilities were open, as in the case of Jean Charlier(71), who was scorned by his neighbours because "... il exerce la profession d'ébéniste et tout ce qui sort de ces mains est parfait."(72)

One final remark: the reason why some members of the disadvantaged classes will and others will not resort to deviant behaviour, is attributed by Merton to differences in socialization and internalization of values.(73) But in many respects, the people resorting to prostitution do not differ very markedly from the labouring classes in general - instance of illegitimacy, divorce, cohabitation, and so on, are not necessarily more frequent, as our data clearly show. Hence, we would rather not resort immediately to pointing to these variables in order to explain why some people did take the deviant option; if more data were at our disposal, we might considerably narrow down the explanatory residuum of internalization by accounting for factors such as the presence or otherwise of family networks, savings, opportunities for renting accommodation, and so on.

FOOTNOTES

* see graph 1 and 2 at the end of this article

1 Acton, W., Prostitution considered in its moral, social, and sanitary aspects in London and other large cities and garrison towns, with proposals for the control and prevention of its attendant evils. London, 2nd. ed. 1870, newly edited 1972, p. 128

2 Parent-Duchâtelet, A.J.B., De la prostitution dans la ville de Paris, considérée sous le rapport de l'hygiène publique, de la morale et de
l'administration. London-Brussels, 1838. For convenience, this will be the only regulationist writing referred to in this paper, as it is the most exhaustive and the only empirically precise one. It established a fixed model of thought which all the others followed even up to the 1880s: there is hardly such a thing as an intra-regulationist “debate”.


4 This distinguishes the French system from the short lived British one installed in several ports and garrison towns by the Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860s: these Acts did not allow for tolerated brothels.


6 They hardly ever “by mistake” put second-class houses in the upper category, the latter being too distinguishably different: neither did they ever put houses in a lower class than was asked for. Even if the conditions stated in the request had been respected, keepers often found themselves afterwards forced to ask for a lower category, as the trade was at an ebb. It clearly emerged from those demands that upper-class brothels presented fewer such risks. None of the keepers of first-class brothels ever required to be put in a lower category, but some of the second class did. The ‘maisons de passe’ were especially hard-pressed: 24% of its second-class keepers requested a lowering.

7 Jean François Charlier, ‘maison de passe’ keeper of the second category since February 1845, asked for the business to be lowered in May, not being able to pay the taxes, as there were too few clients and he had four children; moreover, he claimed to be an invalid. The police refused this request as well as the one which followed, and which was written by his widow, who pleaded that her husband’s illness had completed their ruin; after a few more attempts she and the children left the house, and Brussels. Brussels City Archives, Police Archive, Pol. 265, and manuscript population registers, 1842 and 1846.

8 Parent noted that lodgers by all means tried to bind prostitutes to their houses, as higher rents could be extracted from them. Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 154.


10 As municipal doctor Dugniolle dryly noted on the spectacular increase in registration of prostitutes in 1846 and 1847 (129 and 152% respectively; 100 = 1845): “cela doit être attribué au manque presque complet de pommes de terre”. Brussels City Archives, Police Papers, Pol. 183, report of Jan. 28, 1850.


12 76% of all “active” women in 1842. Quetelet, A., ‘Sur le recensement de la population de Bruxelles en 1842’, in Bulletin de la Commission centrale de statistique, I. 1843, pp. 27 - 146. In 1846 these, most pauperised trades were 65% female. De Belder, op.cit., p. 232.

13 In the case of brothel inmates, hospital costs were paid by the keeper, in addition to the monthly tax. It should be remembered that regulation in
Brussels, as in all other continental cities, was a municipal initiative; at national level it was met with rather cooly.

14 Marinus, Dr. J.R., De la prostitution à Bruxelles. Paris, 1857, p. 25

15 Corbin, op. cit., pp. 278 - 285. In Parent’s days, this consumption pattern was held to be typical only for the very well-off. Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 148

16 The phenomenon is an all-European one: Brussels, in this respect, definitely belongs to the avant-garde, as the chronological evolution is the same in Paris. Corbin, op. cit., pp. 171 - 173

17 Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 93

18 Typically, both precincts were "hybrid" (neither completely poor nor completely well-to-do) and located peripherally with regard to the commercial and entertaining part of the city. See my ‘Filles au fait du langage du monde: gereglementeerde prostitutie in Brussel (1844 - 1877) als indicator voor een sociolinguistische segregatie?’ Taal en sociale integratie 7 (1984), pp. 3 - 51.

19 Corbin points at the analogous evolution of city structure from closed squares and rigid distinctions to broad new boulevards lined with expensive shops: Corbin, op. cit., pp. 300 - 314.

20 Guides of the city’s men-only nightlife mentioned a bevy of ‘restaurants de nuit’, dance houses, taverns with back rooms, etc., but not one official brothel: e.g. Aris, M., Bruxelles, la nuit. Physiologie des établissements nocturnes. Brussels, 1868, updated ed. 1871

21 Dugniolle, in an award-winning defense of regulation edited in 1836, did not stop short of prescribing the manner in which sexual intercourse in official brothels would have to take place, as well as its duration. Dugniolle, Dr. J.F., Exposé des causes le plus fréquentes de la propagation de la maladie vénérienne et des moyens à y opposer. Brussels, 1836, pp. 26 - 27.

22 They were all located in the same street, which in addition housed some six or seven tumultuous ‘estaminets’.

23 First-class closed brothels always had a much larger amount of inmates than second- and especially third-class ones: a minimum of eight, sometimes fifteen at the same time, most often ten to twelve, as opposed to four to eight (second category) and two, sometimes just one, to three (third).


26 A detailed account of the methods used is to be found in my B.A. dissertation De zonde in banen geleid: gereglementeerde prostitutie in Brussel, 1844 - 1877. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1983 (3 vols.) and ‘Filles au fait ...’, op. cit.


28 Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 96

29 As given in the published results of the 1842 census; Quetelet, A., op. cit.

30 The most miserable quarter of all, the 3rd section (35.3% of its inhabitants were on the poor list in 1842), did not contain a single official house during the period, nor before, nor after; neither was there ever talk of clandestine houses.

31 Corbin, op. cit., p. 99

32 Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 128
33 Corbin, op. cit., pp. 99 - 100.
35 See, for instance, Finnegan, F., Poverty and prostitution. A study of Victorian Prostitutes in York. Cambridge, 1979, p. 74: there is not even any certainty about the gender distribution.
36 As this is measured from the first permit a person gets, this excludes the "false" first-class houses (supra), because the upward mobility in that case consists of asking for a new, modified permit for the same house by the same person.
37 Parent Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 160.
38 Id., op. cit., p. 89. The only state intervention in Brussels prostitution had been an attempt to prohibit brothels to have open beer shops; this measure was not enforced and soon repealed, following vehement protest from the police, who claimed that all prostitution would flee into the clandestine circuit, the trades of commercial sex and of liquor being too intimately linked.
40 Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit. loc. cit.
41 Corbin, op. cit., p. 100.
42 Best, op. cit., p. 603
43 Walkowitz, op. cit., p. 198
44 This information is trustworthy enough as it is derived from census rather than police sources.
45 It could be object that taking "class" as an indicator might distort the picture, as this is an official category, imposed by the municipal authorities. A comparison with the rate books, however, has shown that the pattern of the trade tax - which had nothing to do with the sanitary contribution mentioned earlier - entirely mirrors that emerging from the "class" variable. De zonde in banen geleid ... op. cit., p. IV. 38 and vol. 2, p. 4
46 Actually, that part of the group for which civil status is known (97.6%).
47 Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 130
48 The results mentioned in the former paragraph were an answer to the question "... has been a prostitute AT ALL", whereas this variable here refers to the occupation at the moment of requesting the permit.
49 Brussels City Archives, police papers, Pol. 265, request from the 55-year-old widow Jeanne Dognie, August 2, 1844. The women who kept lodging-houses for prostitutes in Plymouth and Southampton frequently came up with the same reason: Walkowitz, op. cit., p. 200. 52% of the men and 29% of the women have legitimate children living in the brothel (which Parent forbade explicitly), at the moment of receiving the permit; 11% of the men and 15% of the women have illegitimate offspring living with them.
50 As stated in the regulation; this was also the rule in Paris.
51 Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 145.
52 Excluding, as always, the missing observations, as well as those who died while keeping the house: one-fifth of the women, 32% of the men.
53 If we take "commerce", divided in its three components, apart for both crosstabulated variables, the picture is in no way altered and the Cramer's V correlation is .34. It will be remembered that we are not dealing with a sample, which means that significance tests are unnecessary.
54 The investigations of Finnegan, op. cit., support this view; but it must be said that the nature of her sources may have introduced a considerable bias, as she used archives of correction-houses and the like; better-off prostitutes hardly ever ended up in these institutions.
55 Acton, op. cit., p. 40.
56 "Comme, dans toutes les carrières, les hommes de génie sont rares, il en est de même dans le métier de prosituée. Pour deux ou trois qui surgissent et arrivent au pinacle, combien ne font que des médiocres affaires, combien croupissent dans les derniers rangs (...)!" Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p. 40.
57 Ibid., pp. 27 - 28.
58 Corbin, op. cit., p. 72.
59 Finnegan, op. cit., p. 28.
60 Walkowitz, op. cit., p. 28.
61 Ibid., p. 209.
62 Naturally, we controlled for the "parvenu" first class already mentioned.
63 Corbin, op. cit., p. 77.
64 This aspect is dealt with extensively in 'Filles au fait', op. cit.
65 Of course, the migration data have been controlled for the length of time during which an individual was "visible".
66 Parent-Duchâtelet, op. cit., p 137
67 Ibid., p. 55.
68 Ibid., p. 29.
70 Walkowitz, op. cit., p. 197
71 A different person from the one cited in note 7.
72 Brussels City Archives, Police papers, Pol. 285, petition of November 2, 1850
73 Merton, op. cit., p. 203.
**TABLE 1: FORMER OCCUPATIONS OF PERMIT-HOLDERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nr.</th>
<th>definition</th>
<th>women</th>
<th>men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>unskilled labourers, low commerce such as street trading, domestic needle trades</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>more or less skilled labourers, middle commerce such as food retailing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>master artisans, rentiers, well-off merchants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>prostitutes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>soldiers</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>housewives, married or widowed</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>unable to work, aged, or otherwise unemployed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>prostitution: governess, male or female servant in a brothel, clandestine brothel-keeper, subletting lodgings to prostitutes as sole source of income, brothel-keeper in another city</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>male and female servants, commisionaires</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| total | 105 | 102 |
|       | 100 % | 100 % |

(missing observations) | 9 | 38 |
GRAPH 2: REGISTERED PROSTITUTES, BRUSSELS, 1844-1877.

The graph shows the numbers of registered prostitutes in Brussels from 1844 to 1878. The bars indicate the proportion of independent prostitutes and the proportion of brothel inmates. The shaded area represents the extent to which the total numbers of registered women (I) exceed those of the brothel inmates (II), hence the size of the independent group.
GRAPH I: BROTHELS AND 'MAISONS DE PASSE', BRUSSELS, 1844-1877.